The Theological Theses of Louis le Blanc

Volume I

Translated by Colloquia Scholastica with AI

Edited by TJ

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On Theology

I. Theology, according to the etymology of the word, signifies discourse about God. And it is taken in general for every doctrine which treats of God and divine things. Therefore, since it is possible to treat of God in two ways, first from principles known by the natural light, then from principles which have been disclosed by God in a supernatural way, hence also a twofold Theology is usually distinguished: One, namely, Natural: The other Supernatural.

II. Natural theology is called that part of Philosophy which especially treats of immaterial being and God. Thus Aristotle himself calls Metaphysics in the first book of the Metaphysics. But supernatural theology is that doctrine about God which has its origin from divine revelation. And this Theology is said absolutely and autonomously. And henceforth we are to deal with this alone.

III. Furthermore, there is a twofold habit which rests on revelation, one by which we simply believe and embrace the things which are contained in the Word of God. And this habit is nothing other than faith itself. The other by which someone is fit to distinctly explain the things which faith believes, and to assert and vindicate them by various reasons, and to deduce legitimate consequences from them. And this habit is properly called Theology.

IV. But Theology thus taken is related to faith as science is to understanding. For faith is the habit of principles: but Theology the habit of conclusions. The primary and principal object of faith are certain truths immediately and expressly revealed by God. But those things are properly set before Theology which are only mediately and virtually revealed, that is, which are gathered by discourse from those first things immediately revealed. Therefore, although Theology is distinguished from faith, it nevertheless presupposes faith and in a certain way includes it. But faith does not necessarily bring Theology with it.

V. But many things are usually disputed about Theology in the Schools. But what we have now proposed to teach about this argument will be referred to these heads. 1. What is the necessity of Theology, and how great. 2. What is its nature, where its genus and difference must be inquired into. 3. Finally, what is the dignity and excellence of Theology above the remaining sciences.

VI. As far as the first is concerned, it is certain that Theology through itself is not necessary for the salvation of individuals, that is, it is not necessary that all who arrive at eternal life be endowed with theological knowledge: for in the Church not all are teachers, as the Apostle teaches in 1 Cor. 12, nor on that account are they deprived of salvation. Since indeed faith suffices for the salvation of individuals, but a fuller and more ample knowledge of the things of faith is not necessarily required.

VII. Nevertheless Theology, that is, such knowledge of divine things which can defend, explain, and persuade faith itself, is necessary in the Church, for this purpose – that the Church may stand and be able to be preserved, and thus that individuals may attain salvation. The Apostle teaches this in Ephesians 4, where besides other things he affirms

that Christ instituted teachers in his Church "for the perfecting of the saints" and edification of the body of Christ, "so that we may no longer be children, tossed to and fro by the waves and carried about by every wind of doctrine." Whence it is evident that there is danger, if there are not teachers in the Church, of its structure being dissolved and edifice collapsing, and of individuals falling away from the faith, carried away by many and various errors. Furthermore, the same Apostle in Titus 1 requires as a necessary condition in a Bishop that he be able to exhort in sound doctrine and refute those who contradict – which he who is not educated in sacred matters beyond the common faithful cannot do.

VIII. And certainly the Church has never been without such men who surpassed the pious and faithful people in knowledge of divine things. For once teachers of this kind were the Patriarchs and Prophets, who had their own schools and disciples – who are called the sons of the Prophets in Scripture. Of this kind the hill of God which is mentioned in 1 Samuel 10 is thought to have been a school. And from there to have taken its name, because divine doctrine was taught on it. Similarly in 2 Chronicles 34 mention is made of "the Mishneh" in which Huldah the prophetess is said to have lived. Which word "Mishneh" is translated by many as school or college, which our French version has followed. Since from the usage of the Chaldaic and Rabbinic language הנש signifies to learn and teach. Whence the Talmudic text is called by the Hebrews הנשמ as if you were to say doctrine or discipline, through a certain antonomasia.

IX. After the times of the Prophets also, the Jewish Church had its own Theologians, who were called מימכח" Wise men", וינבר" Masters", and מירפום" Scribes". By which title Ezra himself is designated in the book which bears his name. And of this kind also were those who are called in the Gospel νομικοί and νομοδιδάσκαλοι, doctors and experts of the law. From whom Christ, taking away the key of knowledge, handed it over to the Apostles, Pastors, and Doctors, who are in their own way their successors.

X. But besides the Bishops and ordinary Pastors, from whom at least some knowledge of Theology is required, the Christian Church from the beginning had its own schools and Doctors professing sacred doctrine in them and expounding the divine writings. The Alexandrian school was especially famous, in which, if Jerome is to be believed in his book on Ecclesiastical Writers, there had been in continuous succession, from the times of Mark the Evangelist to his own times, Ecclesiastical Doctors. Of whom Pantaenus is especially remembered, and Clement of Alexandria who succeeded him.

XI. And certainly from the very necessity of faith the necessity of Theological knowledge is inferred. For faith cannot be propagated and endure unless there are those who teach, persuade and defend the faith. But it is not for every believer to accomplish this – but only for those who are skilled in Scripture and divine matters. Therefore for the preservation of faith and the Church, and consequently for the salvation of men, Theology is necessary – that is, men skilled in divine matters are necessary in the Church to engender, foster and nourish faith in others – although it is not necessary that each individual be so learned and skilled.

XII. Thus it is clear concerning the necessity of Theology. But now in order for us to hold clearly and distinctly what it is, first its genus must be inquired into. It is asked therefore

first whether our Theology is knowledge. On which matter we say that Theology is not knowledge, speaking accurately and according to the definition of knowledge posited by Aristotle. For knowledge according to Aristotle is evident assent: But Theological conclusions are not evident. And this because they are gathered from inevident principles. For faith is the habit of Theological principles. But faith is an inevident habit. For the Apostle opposes faith to sight: 2 Corinthians 5, "For we walk by faith, not by sight." And in Hebrews 11 he teaches that faith is of those things which are not seen, "Now faith is the assurance of things hoped for, the conviction of things not seen."

XIII. But those things are said to be evident which move the intellect through themselves to the cognition of themselves, that is, which persuade and commend themselves to the mind, and so strike and convince the mind by their light that it cannot not assent to them. Which it is plain does not belong to the mysteries of our faith. For they are not things known through themselves, whose truth reveals itself to our mind from itself. But that we assent to them, we do this on account of the authority and testimony of God who has revealed them by his Word and confirmed them.

XIV. But here a distinction must be made between the evidence of the consequent and of the consequence. For indeed Theological conclusions are not evident – but nevertheless the consequence by which they are deduced from their principles is evident. They are indeed gathered from inevident premises – but evidently gathered. For example, that Christ is true God and true man is a principle of faith which is not evident from itself but is believed on account of the testimony of God alone. But nevertheless from this it evidently follows that there are two wills in Christ, one divine and the other human. And therefore in this part nothing is lacking to Theology for the true nature of knowledge.

XV. But although Theology is not knowledge properly and strictly speaking, and according to all the conditions of knowledge posited by Aristotle, nevertheless there is no habit of the mind which it approaches more and to which it should rather be reduced. For it is certain cognition evidently deduced from certain principles which, although they are inevident, are nevertheless no less certain than if they were evident. And therefore it is rightly and fittingly called knowledge, nor can it be designated by any other more apt name.

XVI. Furthermore, Theology is one knowledge in species, not multiple. For although it treats of greatly diverse things, for example, of God, of Angels, of man, of virtues and vices, which seem to pertain to completely diverse sciences, nevertheless all those things agree in one common notion under which they appear to and are set before Theology. Which common notion is divine revelation. For those things which I have mentioned do not fall under the consideration of the Theologian in just any way –but insofar as they can be known through divine revelation. For, for example, the Theologian does not teach whatever can be taught about the nature, powers and duty of man, but only those things which he has learned and gathered from the Word of God.

XVII. But here it must be noted that not whatever things God reveals in any way pertain to the object of Theology. For God can have revealed certain things privately to many, which do not fall under this science. But here by revelation we understand that which is common to the whole Church and has been made for its common usefulness, and which

God has willed to be consigned to writings. Since indeed the Theologian ought to prove his assertions not from private revelations made to this or that person, but from sacred Scripture.

XVIII. Furthermore, Theology does not seem to be a merely speculative science, nor merely practical, but practical and speculative at the same time. And this because Theology treats of many things which pertain to science both practical and speculative. For it contemplates God and the divine mysteries which do not fall under action, and also it gives precepts of life and teaches what are the morals worthy of a Christian man.

XIX. Nevertheless, we judge Theology to be more practical than speculative. Since indeed all of Theology is occupied in the explication and defence of those things which are contained in the Scriptures. But the doctrine contained in the Scriptures, from the purpose of God himself teaching and revealing, is referred to action, namely to the love of God and neighbour. Nor has he attained the purpose of this doctrine who does not refer whatever he has learned from the Word of God to that end. For Christ affirms in Matthew 22 that the law and the Prophets hang on these two commandments, namely, "You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul," and "You shall love your neighbour as yourself." Then Paul says in Romans 15, "For whatever was written in former days was written for our instruction, that through endurance and through the encouragement of the Scriptures we might have hope." But especially the most to be weighed are his words in 2 Timothy 3, "All Scripture is breathed out by God and profitable for teaching, for reproof, for correction, and for training in righteousness, that the man of God may be complete, equipped for every good work."

XX. To this pertains that the Gospel is called by the same Paul "the doctrine that accords with godliness," 1 Timothy 6. For this is from nothing else than that the principal purpose of the Gospel is to form us to piety. Indeed, those articles which seem to pertain most to contemplation, namely about the divinity and incarnation of the Son of God, are called by the Apostle specifically the mystery of godliness in chapter 3 of the same Epistle. Add that the habit of Theological principles is faith. But true faith is a practical habit. But of the same kind is the habit of principles and the habit of conclusions.

XXI. As far as pertains to the object of Theology, it must be noted that sometimes the object of a science is said to be whatever the science in any way considers. Thus the object of Theology is not one. For it considers many and greatly diverse things – God, the Church, Angels, Sacraments. All of which nevertheless agree in one common appellation, insofar as they fall under the consideration of the Theologian. For whatever things the Theologian treats can be called divine things. For they are either God himself or other things which are in some way ordered to God. Nor is anything properly considered by the Theologian except with some respect to God. Therefore, if someone were to ask about the object of Theology, it could be answered not ineptly that that object is divine things.

XXII. But for the most part the object of any science is said to be that whose knowledge the science chiefly intends to give us, and on account of which it considers all other things because, namely, they conduce to its fuller and more perfect notion. God is an object of Theology of this kind, which almost all confess, and the very word Theology teaches,

which as was noted above signifies discourse about God – but it is not agreed whether that object is God simply, as God is, or under a certain respect. The former is defended by the more celebrated Scholastics following Thomas Aquinas, and they establish that the object of Theology is God as God is, and as they say, under the aspect of Deity. But this seems to us too lax and general. Nor is the purpose of Theology to lead us simply into the knowledge of God as God is, but it treats of God with some respect to men.

XXIII. Therefore it can be said more fittingly that the object of Theology is God as God is and the Saviour of men. For indeed all of Scripture proposes God to us under this respect. And it chiefly intends to teach us what are the benefits of God toward men, and what worship and obedience he in turn requires from them. But if it touches on any other things, it does this to declare and confirm those things more. For example, when it teaches that there are three Persons in God – the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit – its purpose is not simply to teach us this truth, but through this it wants to inform us more clearly and fully about the mode of our redemption and salvation which has been obtained for us through Christ and is applied and sealed to us through the Spirit. And similarly the attributes of God, such as justice and mercy, are recounted in the Scriptures in relation to men, namely so that they may know insofar as the justice of God is to be feared by them, and what refuge they ought to seek in his mercy.

XXIV. Furthermore, once the nature of Theology is known, it is readily to be gathered what is its dignity and excellence above the remaining sciences. And indeed first, the things which have now been said about the object of Theology show it sufficiently. For the dignity of the sciences is usually estimated from the dignity of the object. But the object of Theology, as has been said, is God the Best and Greatest who surpasses all other things in dignity to an infinite degree, since he is of infinite essence and perfection.

XXV. First Philosophy indeed treats of God, but about so great an object it hands down few and meagre things in comparison with those which are handed down in this discipline. For Theology narrates the nature and attributes of God far more fully and clearly than Metaphysics. Then it reveals many mysteries about God completely unknown to the Philosophers – such as that there are three persons in God, although there is one essence, and that the Son of God was incarnate and died for us, and many similar things.

XXVI. Then also, although God is the principal object of Theology, because as we just taught it considers nothing except in order and respect to God, nevertheless Theology treats of many things besides God, nor is there any science which extends to more things, whose object lies open so widely. For it elucidates very many excellent things about spiritual creatures, namely Angels, both good and evil, about which human reason can scarcely attain anything. There we have a perfect Ethics and rule of living well far more holy and sublime than any precepts of the wise men of this age. Nor are political and economic precepts lacking to Theology, many of which can be drawn from sacred Scripture.

XXVII. Add that through this discipline man is led into true knowledge of himself, and he learns those things about himself which he cannot be taught from elsewhere. Since indeed this alone reveals the origin of the human race and the various states of man. And since it is easy to notice in human nature great misery and disturbance, Theology alone

teaches the cause and remedy of so great an evil, and reveals the magnitude of it. On which matter Philosophy once laboured and panted in vain.

XXVIII. Indeed sacred doctrine embraces not a few geographical and historical things which shed great light on History and Geography. And without its light shining beforehand, the beginnings of the world and the origins of almost all nations would be unknown, nor would Chronology have any certain beginning, and the first and most venerable antiquity would lie completely hidden. Finally, sacred Scripture, the fount and first rule of our Theology, everywhere sprinkles certain physical things which aid natural science not a little. As for example that saying of Solomon in Ecclesiastes 1 about the origin of springs and rivers from the sea, and their return into the same sea through a perpetual cycle.

XXIX. But as much as this science is commended from its object, so much does its author commend it. For the remaining sciences boast of some illustrious man as their principal author. Aristotle is held to be the prince of Philosophers, and Hippocrates of Physicians. But the Mathematical disciplines acknowledge Euclid as their parent. But Theology claims God as its author, from whom this sacred doctrine emanated. For prophecy was not brought in former times by the will of man, as the Apostle Peter says, but holy men of God spoke as they were carried along by the Holy Spirit, who first consigned it to writings.

XXX. Not without the divine will indeed were the good arts and disciplines invented and the very light of reason descends from the Father of lights, who is the mover and governor of nature. But the principles on which Theology rests are the express sayings and oracles of God, by which are manifested those things which could not become known except through a light higher than reason.

XXXI. Whence it happens that Theology surpasses all the remaining sciences in certainty. Since indeed they rest on human reason, which can be deceived and is liable to error. But Theology reclines on the truth of God, who can neither be deceived nor deceive. Many indeed doubt about Theological truths, and to them the principles and conclusions of Theology seem less certain than those things which are handed down in the human sciences. But that does not stand in the way of their being most certain in themselves – just as the Sun does not cease to be most splendid, although the blind and blear-eyed perceive its light either not at all or only obscurely.

XXXII. But here it must be noted that when we posit that Theology is more certain than other sciences, we do not so understand this as if that certainty were only on the part of the object. For indeed those things which God has revealed are not only most certain in themselves, but can also be known more certainly through the habit of faith and Theology than any truths known through the light of reason alone. So that he who is strengthened in faith and the knowledge of divine things is more certain and more persuaded of divine truths than he is of any other truth. And thus the habit of faith and Theology, in itself and from its own species, surpasses in certainty the habits of merely natural sciences, although all do not equally participate in that habit, and it is firmer in one, but less firm in another.

XXXIII. But in no thing does the dignity and excellence of Theology shine forth more than in the excellence of its end and use. For among the practical disciplines, the further

and more universal the end of any discipline is, the more worthy and excellent is that discipline. Thus Politics surpasses military science, because the end of military science is victory, which is a means to attaining public peace and tranquility, which is the end of political science – and is some greater good. But the highest and ultimate end of all is the end of this science, namely the perfect happiness of man, to which the ends of all the other arts and disciplines are subordinated.

XXXIV. The remaining disciplines and arts take care of some particular good of man. Medicine, for example, the health of the body; Jurisprudence, property; Politics, public peace and tranquility. But none of these suffices to make man happy. But Theology takes care of the complete happiness of man, and supplies whatever things are desired for living well and happily.

XXXV. Philosophy also strives toward this indeed. But it attains its goal less, and whatever goods it endeavours to procure for man are contained within the scope of this life. But Theology offers eternal life and happiness, and furnishes it to those who follow its guidance. And thus it teaches to so arrange the present life that we may be happy not only for the state of this life, but in such a way that it may lead to everlasting happiness.

XXXVI. Therefore by the highest right this sacred discipline ought to be called wisdom. For according to Aristotle himself, Wisdom is the science of the most excellent things. But as is evident from what has been said, Theology treats of the most excellent things – namely of God and his wondrous works, both in our creation and in our redemption. Then also of things of the greatest importance with respect to us, and which it most interests us to know namely of our highest happiness and of rightly ordering life according to God, which is the way to attaining that happiness. Nor does it only treat of the most excellent things, but also in the most excellent way – namely not from the inventions of human reason, but from divine revelation.

XXXVII. Besides, among the marks of wisdom it is usually reckoned that it is occupied with the most difficult things and those remote from sense. Then that it does not depend on another science. And finally that it directs and judges the other sciences, as their arbiter and mistress. All of which fit Theology exceedingly well.

XXXVIII. For first it reveals to us the most difficult mysteries, which are in themselves not only remote from the senses, but far surpass the capacity of the human mind. For they are, as the Apostle says, "things which eye has not seen, nor ear heard, nor have entered into the heart of man – but God has revealed them to us through his Spirit, who searches all things, even the depths of God," 1 Corinthians 2.

XXXIX. Second, Theology does not depend on any other science. For one science is said to depend on another in two ways. 1. When a certain science takes its principles from another, which are the conclusions of that superior science. And thus the Art of fortifying cities depends on Geometry. For the conclusions of Geometry are the principles of that art. Then when the end of one science is referred to the end of another science. And thus military science depends on political science – since the end of military science is referred to the end of political science, and is a means to attaining it. But in both of these ways Theology is plainly independent. For since the end of Theology is the ultimate end of man,

namely his eternal happiness, it can be referred to no end, but all things are necessarily referred to it. Then also there is no human science from which Theology takes its principles – but it has them immediately from the revelation of God, whose they are the pronouncements and declarations.

XL. But you will say, Theologians in their arguments often use propositions which are not revealed but known by the light of reason alone, and very many arguments are found in Theology in which only one of the premises is revealed, but the other is one of the conclusions of a certain natural science. I respond that when Theology takes certain things from other sciences, it does not do this out of necessity, but to illustrate the matter more, and to accommodate itself to weak men. For through itself it suffices for itself alone, and can prove all necessary conclusions from revealed principles. Therefore, when it borrows something from the natural sciences, it does not do this as an inferior which is compelled to have recourse to a superior – but as a mistress who freely makes use of the faculties of handmaids.

XLI. And in reality Theology is the arbiter and mistress of the other sciences, which directs them and judges about them, itself to be judged by no other science. For all the remaining disciplines must be applied to its rule, so that whatever they have that is not consonant with Theology may be rejected, nor may anything be admitted which does not agree with the principles of Theology.

XLII. And thus various errors have been detected in Philosophy, as for example about the origin of the world, which some of the Philosophers thought was eternal, others made from matter – but none created from nothing, as is really the case, except with Theology showing and leading by the hand. And in many other matters where the Philosophers were stuck and did not have the matter sufficiently investigated, Theology has placed it in the open and removed all doubt. As is evident in the matter of divine providence and the immortality of the Soul.

XLIII. Therefore by the highest right sacred doctrine is to be adorned with the title of Wisdom, which is also often attributed to it in Scripture – as when the Apostle calls the Gospel "the wisdom which is in a mystery," and says that it is "foolishness to the Gentiles and a stumbling block to the Jews, but to those who believe, the power and wisdom of God," 1 Corinthians 1 and 2.

On the Authority of Scripture

Part I

I. The authority of Scripture is hotly disputed between the Orthodox and the Papists. The question is, Whence does sacred Scripture have its authority? But by the authority of Scripture both understand the dignity according to which it deserves faith in all things which it says in any way, and the highest obedience in faith in those things which it commands and prohibits.

II. But here the Papists distinguish, and indeed confess that Scripture in itself has its authority from nowhere else than from God: But they contend that that authority, as far as we are concerned, depends on the testimony of the Church. This is certainly their opinion. That Scripture is worthy of all faith and reverence is because it has emanated from God, the fountain of all truth and the supreme Lord of all: But that it cannot be known certainly and indubitably from anywhere else that Scripture has proceeded from God than because the Church testifies to that. So that, that Scripture is of irrefragable truth and has the highest authority over consciences is because it has God as its author: but that it is now certainly acknowledged to have God as its author depends on the testimony of the Church.

III. But our people suspend the authority of sacred Scripture neither in itself nor as far as we are concerned on the testimony and authority of the Church. Since indeed they assert that it can be recognized from elsewhere that the sacred books have proceeded from God than from the voice of the Church testifying; nor do the faithful receive these books as divine on account of the authority of the Church but Scripture itself suffices to furnish knowledge of Itself.

IV. Therefore the parties agree whence its authority belongs to Scripture: but they do not agree whence it is known that such authority belongs to it. And thus the state of the controversy seems easy and unimpeded: But truly when it has come to the disputation, and each party explains its opinion more clearly and in particular, then great obscurity and confusion arises in this question; and it is hardly permitted to assign in what thing the parties properly disagree.

V. Therefore, in order to bring some light, as much as is in us, to this most celebrated question, we will attempt to treat the whole matter more accurately. And indeed first we will investigate and expound the mode by which Scripture becomes known to us as divine. Then we will inquire into the opinion of the Papists, which to acknowledge and perceive is not so unimpeded and ready as it might seem. And finally, the state of the controversy having been drawn out from there, we will explain what is the error of the Papists in this part, and we will refute it.

VI. Furthermore, about the mode by which we come into knowledge of sacred Scripture, four things especially will have to be discussed. 1. Whether sacred Scripture has some light by which it offers itself to be recognized, and what and of what sort that light is. 2. What are the roles of the Holy Spirit in this business, and how far his work is necessary in order

for someone to acknowledge the Word of God and Scripture. 3. What should be attributed to the Church in this matter, and how much its testimony is worth. 4. Finally, on what foundation especially rests that faith which we apply to Scripture as true and divine.

VII. As far as the first is concerned, in this question our people lay down as a foundation that sacred Scripture has a certain light in itself by which, all authority of the Church being set aside, it can become known through itself. And certainly Scripture compares itself to light in many places. But this having been noted thus only in general brings little light to this controversy. Therefore it is necessary to treat more distinctly what is that light and evidence of Scripture. Indeed by that light we understand nothing except a certain evidence of truth which the faithful perceive in Scripture and by which Scripture proves and persuades its divinity to their minds.

VIII. Furthermore, a twofold evidence can be distinguished: one which it is permitted to call Mathematical or Metaphysical; but the other which can be called moral. I call metaphysical evidence that which belongs to first principles known through themselves, and to conclusions demonstrated through principles of this kind. But moral evidence is that which is discerned in things which indeed cannot be demonstrated, but nevertheless are persuaded by such indications and arguments that a prudent and skilled man cannot doubt them and obtain dissent from himself. Thus that the Aeneid was written by Virgil, and that the orations against Verres, Catiline and Antony were once published by Cicero is indeed not a thing known through itself or which can be demonstrated: But nevertheless that has been attested by such constant and solemn report and confirmed by such great indications that no one who is of sound mind and who has some knowledge and experience of things and letters can doubt it.

IX. The evidence which belongs to Scripture is not of the former kind. For that Scripture is divinely inspired is not a thing known through itself, like these principles: The whole is greater than its part; The same thing cannot be and not be at the same time. Nor also can that be demonstrated logically or mathematically, as is clear by experience. For no one has ever been able to bring any demonstration of this truth. Add that, if the matter were so, the assent which we would apply to sacred Scripture would be knowledge, not faith, since the very definition of knowledge is that it is a demonstrative habit.

X. Therefore sacred Scripture does not have any other light or evidence besides that which we have called moral. For although it is not known through itself, nor also can it be properly demonstrated that sacred Scripture has proceeded from God: nevertheless this is persuaded by so many and so probable arguments. And Scripture has in itself so many and so remarkable marks and indications of its divinity that from there a pious and prudent man is efficaciously induced to believe that it is true and divine.

XI. And to bring forward here some specimens of those arguments, that that Scripture which we hold as sacred is truly such and divinely inspired is proved from the condition of those who first handed it down and commended it as divine. For if sacred Scripture is not true and divine, it is necessary that the sacred writers, who profess that they have written by the inspiration of God and testify that those things which they write either have been seen by them or revealed to them by God, were impostors whose purpose was to deceive

men and impose on the world. But this suspicion cannot fall on the Prophets and Apostles by whose work Scripture has been consigned to us. For those who have the intention to deceive strive for that either by desire of gain, or for the sake of some pleasure, or by hope of attaining some glory and pleasure. Thus those who have been the authors of some superstition have certainly procured for themselves riches and dignities by their fictions: as for example, Muhammad who by deceiving the world with his fables arrogated the highest authority to himself and his own. But such a thing cannot be imputed to the Prophets and Apostles except very impudently and against all appearance of truth. For if the matter is estimated from the sense of men, almost all of them were most miserable and of an abject and despised condition; nor by their preaching did they obtain for themselves any riches in the world, or any authority and glory among men. But on the contrary, that doctrine which they asserted by word and writings stirred up against them the hatred of their fellow citizens and of foreign men, and rendered them liable to infinite reproaches and insults; indeed it cast them into certain danger of life, so that most of them sealed their writings with their own blood.

XII. Nor can it be said that they fell into such miseries through thoughtlessness. For they, undertaking their office, were foreknowing of these calamities and willingly gave themselves to be harassed and tormented by so many evils. Moses indeed was the leader and priest of the Israelite people: but nevertheless how little he strove for himself and his own is manifest from this – that he did not transmit the principate and priesthood to his posterity, but designated his servant Joshua as leader of the people after him, and inaugurated his brother Aaron as priest by the command of God. But how alien the sacred writers were from vainglory is evident from this – that if anything great or remarkable was done or said by them, they attribute it all to God; indeed in those very writings which they commend as divinely inspired, they candidly note their own blemishes and defects. And if there was anything lowly and inglorious in them, they do not dissemble that. Thus Moses noted his own diffidence and the punishment of diffidence which God imposed on him, and likewise the idolatry of his brother Aaron and the murmurings of his sister Miriam.

XIII. Then, that the doctrine and Scripture which we hold as divine is truly divine is rendered very credible by the faith which has been had for it in the world. For in a few years the Gospel of Christ pervaded almost the whole world; and as soon as it began to be preached to the Gentiles, it found innumerable followers everywhere of every age, sex and condition, so that one Paul, from Jerusalem even to Illyricum, in a very brief space of time, filled all things with the Gospel of Christ, as he himself writes to the Romans, chapter 15. But that could not have proceeded except from a certain divine power which accompanied that sacred doctrine, and as the same Paul notes in the cited place, from the power of the divine Spirit, inscribing it on the hearts of men and confirming it by various prodigies and signs.

XIV. For if the matter is considered in itself, all things seem to have had to stand in the way of men receiving that doctrine and Scripture which is its foundation. First, the character of the doctrine itself. For it proposes for belief very many mysteries which human sense judges to be foolishness; and it orders and requires those things which are most repugnant to human affections, namely that we should bear the cross of Christ, deny ourselves, and

for the sake of the crucified Christ be prepared to relinquish riches and pleasures and pour out our life. Then, those who announced that doctrine to men did not use art and eloquence by which the minds of men are usually bent. Nor did they prevail among men by authority or by the fame of wisdom and doctrine. Nor were they powerful men who could terrify by threats and arms and compel to the acceptance of their doctrine –but they were for the most part unskilled men and unlearned, making a living by mechanical arts, from the nation of the Jews despised and hated by all others, held as barbarians and ignorant by those who were then esteemed wise and learned. Add that they preached to men nurtured in another religion and who were occupied by many and great prejudices. For the superstition from which they were turned away they had received from their ancestors, and they saw it confirmed by the consent of the peoples, the judgment of the wise, and the authority of the great. Finally, it can hardly be said how many and how fierce and powerful enemies the doctrine contained in our Scriptures had. For the teachers of the Jews and the Philosophers of the Gentiles opposed it with great effort. And indeed the former set against it their authority; but the latter exercised on it all the sharpness of their talent and unfolded their eloquence. And besides, the magistrates and princes of the world most atrociously persecuted those who had embraced it and raged against them with every kind of punishment. Since therefore nothing humanly assisted it, but on the contrary it had all things adverse, it is necessary that its increase and propagation be ascribed to the power of God alone. Whereas if any other sect and religion has crept widely and found many followers, that has been done by human means. For Islam was propagated from Greece in a short time through many provinces – but that was done by arms and open force. Then because that doctrine in many things flatters the flesh.

XV. Furthermore, something divine in Scripture is argued by the constancy, number and condition of the martyrs who sealed it with their blood. For since by nature nothing is dearer to man than life, whence did it happen that so many men gladly suffered death for the defence of Scripture and the doctrine it teaches, if not from a certain divine power which had wholly settled in their minds? Sometimes indeed certain heretics and superstitious people have been raged against, and perhaps a few examples can be found of those who out of a certain fierceness and obstinacy of mind chose to die rather than allow themselves to be moved from an error once adopted. But there is no error, no superstition and human doctrine which has had many followers so obstinate that, when they could escape safe and unharmed by denying their impiety, they nevertheless did not refuse to bear punishments and torments. But when the Apostolic and prophetic doctrine and Scripture first began to be propagated through the world, and could not yet be considered confirmed by the tradition of ancestors and custom – by which roots human institutions usually adhere most to the minds of men – not a few were found, but infinite myriads of men of every age, every sex, every condition, men, women, boys, old men, the literate, the unlearned, who suffered the direst kinds of death rather than deny the doctrine of Scripture – although by the mere denial of it they could not only redeem their life but also enjoy their goods and honours with their fellow citizens by equal right. Nor can they be judged to have rushed into certain death out of ferocity or stupidity or some disease of mind – since they often extorted from the enemies themselves the testimony of a rightly composed mind and a blameless life, and in death itself they testified the greatest modesty, the greatest

humanity and presence of mind. In which certainly, unless someone willingly shuts his eyes, the finger of God can easily be noted.

XVI. Furthermore, that the doctrine handed down in the Scriptures, and thus Scripture which is the foundation of it, is divine and has flowed from God is proved from the miracles which have been done for the confirmation of that doctrine. For since there are two principal parts of the Scriptures and heavenly doctrine, the Law and the Gospel – indeed the Law was confirmed by those wonders which happened in the desert, such as that the living voice of God speaking from the midst of fire was heard, that for forty years manna rained in the desert, that water was often brought forth from the rock, and that the garments of the Israelites were not worn out in all that time, and more of the same kind. But the Gospel received testimony from the almost infinite miracles of Christ, then from those visible and plainly stupendous gifts of the Holy Spirit which were poured out on the first believers, so that they suddenly spoke in various and foreign languages, healed any diseases, cast out demons, and did very many other wonders. For since such things are above the powers of nature, it is necessary that God exercised his power in them. But it is wrong to think that God wanted to use his omnipotence to make faith in Scripture and doctrine which was falsely and injuriously ascribed to him, as if he wanted to lie by agreement with men.

XVII. But you will say, those miracles are indeed said to have been done, but how can we know that they were really done? For it does not seem less uncertain whether those miracles are true than this – whether that Scripture is divine in confirmation of which they are said to have been done. I respond. That those things really happened can be efficaciously proved from our Scriptures themselves. For our writers wrote those things in such a way that it cannot happen that they lied in this matter. For I will ask him who denies or doubts that the things which our writers Moses and Paul, for example, narrate about those miracles are true, whether he wants to call into doubt that there was a certain Moses who gave laws to the Israelite people and wrote certain volumes, and similarly that there was a certain Paul who preached the Christian doctrine and wrote certain epistles which are ascribed to him. About this matter certainly no one has doubted up to now, nor indeed have the Atheists themselves wanted or dared to deny this. And in reality this is attested by a report so constant, so perennial, so received by the consent of all, even of adversaries, that to doubt this would be plainly to be delirious. For frequent mention of Moses and his writings is made among the pagans. Nor do the Jews and Muslims, the most hostile enemies of the Christian religion, deny or doubt that our Apostles existed and wrote. But if anyone wanted to call that pertinaciously into doubt, he would have to be driven to this – to bring the cause of his doubt and some reason why he does not have faith in the agreeing testimony of the whole world. And why he believes rather that Pliny and Livy existed and wrote than that Moses and Paul did. And certainly we labour in vain in proving this, since the matter is in agreement. For those who reject the Word of God do not deny that those authors whom we hold as sacred existed or wrote, but they blaspheme that they did not write true things.

XVIII. Come then, let us see whether it can happen that those things which are narrated by Moses and Paul about those miracles are not true. Certainly, if they are not true, either

they were deceived in writing, thinking that those things had happened which had not really happened – or they wrote with the intention of deceiving and endeavoured to thrust false things for true. The former cannot be said. For they do not report those things as accepted from elsewhere, but testify that they were done or seen by themselves. It is necessary therefore that Moses wanted to deceive the Israelites, and Paul the Corinthians, Galatians and others. And profane men who accuse Moses and Paul of imposture think this. It must be seen therefore whether they were impostors who endeavoured to persuade those to whom they wrote and into whose hands they delivered their writings that these and those prodigies and miracles had been done, when nevertheless none of those things had been done.

XIX. Certainly impostors and those who have the intention to deceive are accustomed so to produce their lies that they cannot easily be convicted of lying by those whom they want to be deceived. Thus Numa, who instituted most of the rites of Roman superstition, pretended that he had nightly conversations with the Nymph Egeria – but alone with her alone, and of which no one could be a witness. Also in the Quran of Muhammad certain portentous things are narrated, but not as done before the eyes of men, but whose credibility was up to him. But if someone were to narrate portents and dreams and yet appeal to the senses of those whom he was addressing concerning their truth, as if he were now commemorating that the waters had flowed backwards for Moses and that it had rained grain while we were watching, and wanted to persuade us of that very thing, this now would not be imposture but a certain kind of madness plainly unusual and incredible. Nor can this befall one who is not completely raging and agitated by black bile. But now those wonders which are contained in Moses, such as that the sea was parted, that the voice of God speaking was heard from Mount Sinai, that it rained manna and quails in the desert, that torrents of water burst forth from the rock, and more of the same kind – those wonders, I say, Moses does not commemorate as having happened at other times or in distant places, but he narrates that they happened at that very time and in that very place in which he was writing, indeed with those watching and attending for whom he was writing and into whose hands he was delivering his writings. And concerning the truth of those miracles he appeals to the eyes and ears of the Israelites. "You have seen," he often says, "and you have heard," and on that account he seriously and often rebukes their ungrateful mind toward God.

XX. Similarly, when the Apostle Paul had certain rivals and envious persons among the Corinthians who were trying to call his Apostleship into doubt and render it suspect, he appeals concerning the truth of his Apostleship to the miracles and signs which had been done in their midst. "The signs of an apostle," he says, "were performed among you with utmost patience, with signs and wonders and mighty works." 2 Corinthians 12:12. And in chapters 12-14 of the first Epistle he discusses the miraculous gifts of the Holy Spirit, the gift of healing, the working of miracles, the gift of prophecy, and the gift of speaking and interpreting foreign languages by the sudden inspiration of the Spirit, as matters known and customary in their midst; he exhorts them to peace and warns them not to envy one another on account of such gifts; and he even rebukes them because they sometimes used such gifts ambitiously. And he orders that henceforth they do it for edification, and he prescribes the legitimate use of those gifts.

XXI. If therefore all these things are lies and fictions, certainly Moses and Paul were not, as the profane accuse, crafty men and men skilled in deceiving, whose purpose was to deceive men and impose on the world. For no one can be deceived in those matters concerning which appeal is made to his ears, eyes and experience. But it is necessary that they were, far be it from blasphemy to say, men plainly raging and insane. But their writings, even the Atheists being judges, argue enough that they were of sound mind. For they speak things consistent with themselves, and in which much prudence and wisdom is discerned.

XXII. Then, let us suppose that they were insane men who with the greatest madness or imprudence wrote and thrust forth as true those lies about which they could be openly convicted by all; whence then did it happen that the Israelites looked up to Moses, the Corinthians, Romans, Galatians and others to Paul as divine and holy men, and accepted their discipline with such great reverence –although in many things it is unpleasant to the flesh and burdensome and repugnant to human affections; nor did any advantage redound to those who so wanted to be deceived, if the matter is estimated from the sense of men? Certainly no miracle, nor any portent is more incredible than this – that the doctrine of insane men, and their crass and foul lies, without any help either divine or human, obtained so great faith among those very persons by whom it was impossible for their insanity and lies not to be recognized and noticed.

XXIII. And here that ancient dilemma has a place – the miracles which are narrated in the Scriptures are true, or not true; if true, the doctrine and Scripture for whose confirmation they were used are also true. But if they are not true, it is more than a miracle that a doctrine so abhorrent to the sense of men, and full of so many lies which it was easy for anyone to convict, was nevertheless embraced with such ardour without any divine or human aid, and retained with such constancy through exiles, through crosses, through torments, with those who were eminent in the world for power and prudence raging and indignant.

XXIV. Since therefore the things which Moses and Paul relate about the miracles done for the confirmation of the Law and the Gospel are written in such a way that those to whom they wrote could immediately recognize whether they were saying truth or falsehood – since they are matters concerning which appeal is made to their experience and senses – and nevertheless such great faith was had in those writings by those who first accepted them, and thereafter up to the present day, it is plainly necessary that they wrote true things, and the miracles which they narrate are true, and consequently the Scripture and doctrine are true for whose confirmation God wanted those things to be done.

XXV. But furthermore, that the miracles which are reported to have been done by Moses are true, and similarly those which are attributed to Christ and his Apostles, is evident from the very confession of the adversaries. For as far as Christ is concerned, the Jews who are the most hostile enemies of the Christian name neither dared in the past nor dare even now to deny that Christ performed miracles – but they have invented I know not what to elude the force of the argument which we deduce from there; namely, that Christ did those things either by magic art which he had learned in Egypt, or by the power of that tetragrammaton name, the correct pronunciation and exposition of which he knew. For they fable that whoever knows how to pronounce that name correctly can by the power of that name do any wondrous works. The vanity of which fiction is evident through itself,

nor is there need to refute it. We only note here that the truth of the miracles of Christ is not a little confirmed by this – since the Jews who most envy his glory do not dare, nor can they openly deny that they were done. And similarly very many of the pagans bore witness to Moses and acknowledged the truth of the Mosaic history, as can be seen in the books of Josephus against Apion, and of Eusebius on Gospel Preparation.

XXVI. But especially the truth of the Christian doctrine, and the divine origin of Scripture, are proved by the predictions of the Prophets. For it belongs to God alone to foreknow certainly and distinctly contingent futures, and finally things to come to pass after many centuries. And consequently no one can predict such things except by the inspiration of the divine Spirit. But the Prophets predicted many things of which no causes appeared in the nature of things, and which were fulfilled long after their death. Thus Isaiah named Cyrus, and predicted his empire and wondrous felicity, one hundred and fifty years before Cyrus was born. Thus Jeremiah the Prophet precisely numbered the seventy years of the Babylonian captivity, before the Jews were led to Babylon. Thus finally Daniel clearly prophesied about the Persian and Greek Monarchy, about the successors of Alexander the Great, and especially about Antiochus Epiphanes who profaned the temple of God.

XXVII. But what is principal, the things which the Gospel teaches us about the nativity, life, passion, death, burial of Jesus Christ, about his resurrection and ascension into heaven, likewise about the fruit of his death and passion, about the calling of the Gentiles, the desolation of the Jewish Nation, and the abrogation of the ceremonial worship with almost all the circumstances of these things, are found clearly and openly predicted in the Prophets. Among others, Isaiah chapter 53 is remarkable, where he speaks so expressly and clearly about the death and passion of Christ our redeemer, and his offering for the sins of the world, that he seems to narrate a thing done, not to predict a future thing: And Daniel chapter 9, where he expressly designates the time in which Christ was to come and soon be cut off and put an end to sacrifices, namely after seventy weeks of years, which a horrible destruction of the whole Jewish nation was to follow: so that to one comparing the oracles of Moses and the Prophets about the Messiah with the Evangelical history about Christ, a wondrous and plainly stupendous agreement immediately appears. Whence it is manifestly proved both that the books of the Prophets are divine, since they contain predictions of things which happened so long after: And also that the Evangelical history is true and divine, since God bore witness to it through the Prophets so many centuries before.

XXVIII. Furthermore, that these prophecies were not fabricated by the Christians is attested by the Jews, the enemies of the Christians, and yet the most fierce assertors and defenders of the prophetic books. And besides, that the greatest hatred of the Christian religion could not compel them to erase from their books those prophecies so greatly adverse to them this very thing, I say, frees them from the charge with which some pagans wanted to render them suspect, as if they had inserted those prophecies about Cyrus and Alexander the Great into their books in order to court the favour of those kings. For if they thought so much was permitted to them, those prophecies by which they are so greatly pressed by the Christians would not have been left intact, especially that of Daniel about the time of the advent of Christ and his destruction. Nor will anyone ever suspect such a

thing of the Jews, who has found with how great religion, not to say superstition, they conduct themselves toward the sacred books, even to the point that they have the syllables and points of each book numbered; and they proclaim a public fast if by chance a copy of Scripture has fallen to the ground through carelessness. Add that whoever will attentively read and consider the books of the Prophets Daniel and Isaiah will easily recognize that in them all things cohere, and are woven together by the same thread and genius, nor is anything found which anyone can justly suspect to have been added and inserted there contrary to the mind and sense of the author, and which can be torn away from there without the ruin and gap of the whole work.

XXIX. Besides these, many arguments can be taken from the antiquity of Scripture, from the care of God in preserving it, and from the world's hatred for it, and from the just judgment of God against its haters and despisers, to gain authority and veneration for Scripture. For the books of Moses, which are as it were the basis and foundation of all Scripture, are by far the most ancient of all that exist. Indeed there are no writings which equal the antiquity of Solomon and David. And yet almost the whole world long waged war against Scripture, and tried to abolish it, as in Jewish times that Antiochus Epiphanes, but in Christian memory the Roman Emperors, whose power was so great and whose empire lay so wide. But as much as the world strove to abolish it, so much did the providence of God watch that it might remain safe and whole up to this point.

XXX. Nor is the consensus of the nations, indeed of the various sects, in this matter of little importance. Although today there flourish three principal sects, afterwards subdivided into many others – namely the Jewish, the Christian, and the Muslim which occupy the greatest part of the world – the Jews, Christians, and Muslims all acknowledge the authority of the Old Testament. Indeed the Jews reject the New Testament, but the Muslims hold it in esteem with us, and venerate Christ at least as the greatest Prophet of God. But what could compel so many peoples discrepant among themselves in morals and sects, and pursuing each other with the fiercest hatred, to approve these books as sacred and divine, if not the very force of truth and a certain divine efficacy?

XXXI. Although all these arguments perhaps are not equally valid if each is taken by itself, nevertheless taken together they have the greatest force to prove the excellence of Scripture and to gain authority for it. Indeed we judge the former arguments which we have explained more widely to be such that by them the authority of Scripture can be strongly asserted and proved even against Atheists and the profane, who can object and oppose nothing which has any force, whose vanity it is not easy to show.

XXXII. But besides those arguments by which the divinity of Scripture can be asserted against one denying it, Scripture in itself has very illustrious marks and indications of truth and divinity by which it proves and commends itself to a well-disposed mind whose eyes have not been blinded by prejudices and perverse affections – although from there suitable means for disputing cannot be taken, or certainly not so strong and efficacious. For just as in an extraordinary work of some art, as for example in a Virgilian poem or a painting of Apelles, there are certain things by which it betrays its author and vindicates itself to him and these are certainly and clearly recognized by the skilled, although the unskilled do not attend to them, nor can arguments easily be drawn from there against one denying it – so

the vestiges of the divine Spirit and the marks of heavenly origin are deeply impressed on sacred Scripture, which those discern whose mind is not darkened, and who are skilled in divine things, and from there they become certain of its divinity, even if ignorant and profane men make light of those things or do not notice them at all. And certainly, if there are any learned in human letters, when they peruse any human book, they easily note in it a certain genius and character by which they are led to the knowledge of its author. By which reason critics assert genuine writings to their authors, to Aristotle for example or Cicero, but expunge spurious and supposititious writings, although often what the sagacious critics note and recognize can scarcely be explained and demonstrated to another who is not versed in these things. Will we doubt that the Prophetic and Apostolic writings savour of the divine Spirit, and that there is in them something that the pious and learned man may perceive, and by which he may distinguish them from human and Apocryphal writings, although that could not be demonstrated against one disputing and resisting?

XXXIII. Furthermore, such marks of divinity which we say to be in Scripture can be observed both in the things and in the words. And indeed first in the words, or manner of speaking, a certain divine character shines forth through all of Scripture. For when it narrates things done, it does it ingenuously, simply and nakedly, without any artifice, without any trappings. Human writers, when they recount great things, are accustomed to give signs of an anxious mind fearing that it will not be believed. For they try secretly to remove what could offend more, and to render the matter, as much as is in them, credible. But when something must be said by them about themselves, they either boast and show their own deeds, or are timid and fearful, and use certain excuses and prefaces –which certainly arises from a certain weakness, and betrays a mind distrustful of itself and not secure enough. But as far as pertains to the sacred writers, although they treat of the greatest and plainly stupendous things, and often done by their ministry, nevertheless in their narrations all things are direct and simple, nor is there anything which savours of an anxious and solicitous mind, lest faith be denied to it. But everywhere they speak as if secure about the judgments of men, relying on the dignity and truth of the matter –which argues a certain magnanimity and majesty worthy of God.

XXXIV. Also in the precepts, reproofs and exhortations of Scripture, it is easy to observe a certain divine majesty. For it addresses kings and commoners, the highest and lowest, magistrates and private persons with equal authority. It flatters no one, connives at no one, and its author plainly shows himself to be impartial, devoid of favour and hatred, hope and fear, and who is the same toward all of whatever state and condition they may be. Nor nevertheless is the speech fierce, swollen and proud. But in it indeed a certain wondrous gravity appears, but one which is tempered with the highest gentleness and pious affection toward men.

XXXV. But when it teaches, it uses a certain condescension by which it accommodates itself to the capacity of the unskilled. Nor does it seek ornaments for the things it teaches from art and eloquence, but commends them by their own weight and usefulness. The masters of human arts and sciences are accustomed to coin peculiar terms for each art, and to cover the things they hand down with the wrappings of grand words –so that they may thus procure dignity for their art, and affix something of a mystery which the common

people may regard with awe and admiration. But Scripture explains divine things by human words and phrases sought from the common people. When it wants to illustrate something, it does not seek its similes and examples from afar, but uses examples ready to hand and as it were from the crossroads. Nor are its arguments such as can be perceived only by the learned, but for the most part of such a kind that any rustic and unlearned person may recognize their force.

XXXVI. Often indeed there is in the words and phrases of Scripture something foreign and at variance with common usage. But that is to be attributed to the genius of the Hebrew language, to which our ears are not accustomed. For the sacred writers either wrote in the Hebrew language, as Moses and the Prophets, or used the phrases and idioms of the Hebrew language, even if they wrote in Greek, as the writers of the New Testament.

XXXVII. Finally, Scripture everywhere acts candidly and ingenuously. And although men are accustomed, in blaming or praising, in threatening or promising, to inflate and exalt small and lowly things with magnificent words and sublime metaphors, Scripture on the contrary expresses the greatest things for the most part in a style thin and common, and in words which fall below the magnitude of the matter. And when it threatens and promises, its promises are indeed magnificent and its threats terrifying – but nevertheless in such a way that the moment and gravity of the thing itself far surpasses the sound and emphasis of the words. And yet the highest simplicity of Scripture is never devoid of gravity and decorum. Indeed, often joined to it is a wondrous sublimity of speech – so that Longinus himself, a pagan rhetorician and most hostile enemy of the Christians, discussing περὶ ὕψους, that is, the sublime kind of speaking, cites an example of it from Moses: "As," he says, "the Lawgiver of the Hebrews said, 'And it was done.'"

XXXVIII. But now, if we attend to the things themselves of Scripture, in them the marks of divinity will appear still more illustrious and clear. But whatever things are contained in Scripture are either histories and narrations of past things, or prophecies and predictions of future things, or dogmas and precepts which denote no difference of time. Furthermore, history is especially commended by two things – the truth of the things, and then also their weight and importance – which two things sacred History claims for itself in an eminent way. And indeed first, sacred history has many and great indications of truth. For either reason and the very nature of things support it, as the history of the creation of the world, which is proved by the strongest arguments to have been made from nothing and in time. As the monuments of ancient and external historians bear witness to the truth of it, as for example in the history of the universal flood, of the building of the tower of Babylon, of the conflagration of Sodom and Gomorrah, of the exodus of the Israelites from Egypt – of which mention is made in approved and ancient historians whose fragments remain in Eusebius, Josephus and others, and some of whom are even in the hands of men.

XXXIX. Add that sacred History in many things proves itself by its ingenuousness and verisimilitude, and has those marks of truth which any honest historians have, as can be seen in the books of Samuel and Kings. Also the names of nations, cities and regions which were formerly, and remain today, create faith for those things which Scripture narrates about the posterity of Noah, from whom after the flood the world began to be inhabited anew and to be filled with inhabitants, as is plain to one comparing those names which

Moses recites with the names of peoples and nations. But the things which seem to surpass faith, and are wondrous and plainly stupendous, are written in such a way that it is impossible for him who wrote to have lied – since he appeals to innumerable witnesses by whom he could be convicted, who nevertheless received his writings as divine and commended them to posterity as such, as was shown above concerning the miracles which are narrated by Moses, and of which there is mention in the Apostle Paul.

XL. Furthermore, the sincerity and candour of the sacred Historians, which is so great that they do not conceal their own vices, and often brand themselves and their own with many marks of ignominy, renders credible the history of Scripture. Indeed, the fables of the poets themselves render the history of Scripture credible. For if anyone diligently inspects the ancient fables of the poets and compares them with sacred history, he will find that those fables are certain shadows of things of which Scripture has the body, and to have taken their origin from the true histories which were disseminated through the whole world by the tradition of the sons of Noah, and at length corrupted and interpolated by the lapse of time as could be made manifest by many examples, and learned men who have laboured in this matter have rendered the thing easy.

XLI. But now if anyone wants to weigh the weight and importance of sacred history, what things of greater weight and importance can be either in reality or imagined than those which pertain not only to some nation and republic, but to the whole Church which God has selected for himself from the world, indeed to the whole world, to the angels the inhabitants of the Heavens, and to God himself who is the first cause of all things? But these are the things with which the history of sacred Scripture is occupied. For Scripture recites to us what were the beginnings and cradle of this universe, and how God once founded all things and ordered them to exist; whence the human race was born and propagated, how it diffused itself through the whole globe of the earth, and what were the divisions of the nations and languages in the beginning. It narrates the appearances of angelic spirits and their frequent conversations with men, and the wondrous deeds of God himself in ruling and protecting the Church and procuring the salvation of the human race. With which if anyone compares the histories of the Greeks or Romans, he will find nothing whose importance and gravity can be compared with these in any part.

XLII. Especially in the prophecies and oracles of the Prophets the greatest light of divinity shines forth, about which we have already spoken before, since it not only suffices to persuade the pious and faithful mind, but also has the greatest force to refute the enemies of the Word of God, and to prove its divinity even against the profane. For if you consider the matter of the sacred prophecies, they are not about things of no or little importance, but which pertain to the glory of God and the salvation of the whole human race. Nor are the predictions of the prophets perplexed and ambiguous, as once the oracles of the pagans, but so clear and perspicuous that in them the persons and place are often designated by their proper names, and the time of fulfillment is precisely defined. Nor also are they fallacious and uncertain, but such that most of them have already been proved by the very event.

XLIII. The precepts and dogmas of sacred Scripture also do not lack their own light, indeed they have the greatest light. Which, so that it may appear more clearly, it must be

noted that they are of two kinds. For Scripture teaches and orders many things of which men by nature have some notion, but very confused and vacillating. But Scripture has made those things more clearly known, and taught them fully and accurately. Of this kind are the things which Scripture hands down about the nature and attributes of God, namely about the eternal, immense and immutable essence of God, and about his infinite power, wisdom, goodness, and also justice; about the creation of the world and all things which are in it; about the providence of God by which he conserves, rules and administers all things. Likewise about the duty of man both toward God and toward his neighbour, such as that God is to be loved above all things, all things are to be referred to his glory, he is to be diligently worshipped and invoked, he is to be trusted, and we must rest in his care. The neighbour also is to be loved, good is to be done to all, injuries are to be borne, one must think humbly of oneself, intimate thoughts and affections are to be kept pure, and in a word, all and each of the precepts of the Christian life, which ought to be pure in every part, and from which all filth and luxury ought to be absent. These certainly and similar things the sense of conscience approves, reason confirms, and certain rudiments of them are discerned in the books of the pagans. For they hand down some not contemptible things about God, about piety and the duty of man. But nevertheless obscurely, sparingly, coldly, doubtingly, and with the admixture of very many errors. But Scripture puts those things in a clear light, and teaches them fully and openly – so that after its light has shone on us, we wonder that things so certain and indubitable were perceived and handed down only thinly, doubtingly and obscurely by the most excellent talents. But when those most excellent talents handed down those things, whose truth we now discern by the benefit of Scripture, so jejunely and obscurely, but Scripture so fully and perspicuously – and nevertheless the sacred Writers did not excel above other men in erudition or gifts of nature, indeed on the contrary most of them were unskilled in human sciences and unlearned – it is necessary that they were led by another light than that of nature, and taught and inspired by God.

XLIV. But besides those things, of which men by nature have a certain thin and fleeting knowledge, sacred Scripture teaches many things which surpass reason, nor can the human mind grasp them, nor does it have certain arguments for them – but nevertheless they cohere so well with those things which the sense of conscience approves, and of which right reason is convinced, and are so agreeable and fittingly built upon those former things, that it appears enough that they are not human fictions, but mysteries of divine wisdom. Such is, for example, the doctrine about the expiation of our sins through the death and offering of Christ, God and man, made on the cross – which is seen to agree most with the justice and mercy of God. For in this way the justice of God is satisfied, while our sins are punished in Christ, and mercy, while they are forgiven to us. And with this doctrine coheres that dogma so sublime and lofty about the three divine persons in one essence. For unless the Son of God were God, and equal to the Father, his sacrifice would not have been of infinite value, such as was required, that by it our sins might be expiated, since they had merited an infinite punishment. And such also is the doctrine about the resurrection of the dead. For it seems to be agreeable to reason that man, who acts well or badly in the body, should also receive in the body the punishment or reward of things justly or unjustly done – which since it does not happen in this life, it is congruous to the justice of God that our bodies,

which death has reduced to dust, be again joined to their souls, so that it may be well or ill with the whole man, according as he has acted well or badly.

XLV. But besides, the greatest indication of divinity in sacred Scripture is its efficacy, by which it acts inwardly in man, partly indeed by terrifying consciences and affecting them with a sense of sin, partly by lifting up the contrite mind and consoling afflicted consciences – but especially by so changing man that he hates sin and pursues piety and true virtue from the heart – by which efficacy indeed nothing is more powerful in confirming the faithful; although it cannot compel the assent of those who have not yet felt that efficacy, and have hardened themselves against the Word of God. And nevertheless, a most profane man, even if he has not felt the efficacy of the Word of God, if nevertheless he considers it attentively, can easily recognize that this word is such that it generates the highest tranquility and joy in those who firmly believe it, and compels them to every good work and every virtue.

XLVI. And let it suffice to have touched upon these few things about this argument which can never be exhausted, and which is treated more fully and copiously by learned men, whose footsteps we follow, and who have carried the torch before us. But this seems necessary to be added, namely that these characters of divinity which we have said shine forth in Scripture are not to be sought in the individual parts of Scripture separated from the whole, but in the divine writings as they are considered conjointly and according to their whole selves. For it is not to be thought that any pericope of the Canonical books has a certain mark by which it can be discerned and distinguished from the Apocryphal.

XLVII. And besides it must be confessed that the marks and indications of divinity which we have said to be in Scripture are not equally conspicuous with the same brightness in the individual books of Scripture. For just as star differs from star in light, so certain books of Scripture emit richer and more splendid rays of the divine Spirit, but others far more meagre and obscure ones. Thus for example, in the Old Testament the brightness of divinity is far unequal in the book of Esther or the book of Ruth than it is in the Pentateuch of Moses and the Prophecy of Isaiah. Nor are the vestiges of the Spirit of Christ so open in the epistle of James or Jude as in most of the epistles of Paul and the four Gospels.

Part II

In which it is taught what the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit is by which the faithful are certain of the divinity of Scripture, then what and how much is to be attributed to the Church in this matter, and also what is that in which our faith is ultimately resolved.

I. In the preceding disputation we expounded what light, that is, what arguments and indications of truth and divine origin sacred Scripture has; it follows that we inquire how that light is perceived. And Whether and How far the work of the Holy Spirit is necessary in order for us to acknowledge Scripture as true and divine.

II. But here a distinction must be made between a certain fleeting and evanescent opinion, and true and salutary faith which is pleasing and acceptable to God. For someone can conceive a certain opinion about the divinity of Scripture, having been led to that by certain human incitements, without any internal operation of the Spirit – and this is what the Schools call human and acquired faith. Thus many most wicked and perverse heretics do not deny the authority of Scripture, and acknowledge it to be divinely inspired. Indeed, even the unbelieving Jews fiercely defend at least the authority of the Old Testament. But the Muslims are said to hold and revere the books of both Testaments as divine. Nor nevertheless is it necessary that we think the Holy Spirit to act in all those heretics and unbelievers, and to illuminate their minds inwardly.

III. But in order for us to conceive a certain and legitimate faith about Scripture, and one which is of some moment for salvation, it is altogether necessary that the Holy Spirit insinuate himself into our minds and work in them in a secret way. Whence it is that the Schools call such faith divine and infused. But Scripture itself teaches this in many places. For in John, Christ our Lord affirms that no one can come to him, that is, believe in him and embrace his doctrine, unless the Father draw him and he hear the Father teaching inwardly: "No one," he says, "can come to me unless the Father who sent me draws him. It is written in the Prophets, 'And they will all be taught by God.' Everyone who has heard and learned from the Father comes to me." John chapter 6. Furthermore, Paul, in 1 Corinthians 12, expressly asserts that no one can say that Jesus is Lord except by the Holy Spirit. And in chapter 2 of the same Epistle, speaking about the mysteries of the Gospel, "God," he says, "has revealed them to us through his Spirit, for the Spirit searches all things, even the depths of God. Now we have received not the spirit of the world, but the Spirit who is from God, that we might know the things freely given us by God." And a little later, "The natural man does not accept the things of the Spirit of God, for they are folly to him, and he is not able to understand them because they are spiritually discerned." And hence it is that faith is called the gift of God, Ephesians 2: "By grace you have been saved through faith; and this is not your own doing, it is the gift of God."

IV. Furthermore, the depravity of human nature and the darkness which sin has brought upon it renders that operation of the Spirit of God in our minds necessary. For sacred Scripture contains many things which are repugnant to our depraved and distorted affections. Whence it happens that the carnal man abhors it and turns away from it, which impedes him from acknowledging its truth and forming a right judgment about it –since as each one is affected, so he judges. Then the mind of man is so obscured by sin in general

that even in natural things it cannot but hallucinate and be very often deceived. And consequently it can much less certainly recognize and perceive the things which are above nature. For this, therefore, it is necessary that the Holy Spirit dispel the native darkness of the mind and those fumes by which depraved affections obscure the intellect and impede it from being able to discern the truth.

V. Indeed, not only the depravity of our nature and the darkness arisen from sin, but the very genius of the doctrine handed down in Scripture necessarily requires this operation of the Spirit for engendering faith in our minds. Since indeed it contains many mysteries which not only surpass corrupt nature, but human nature in itself, even considered apart from sin – so that by it they can not only not be found out and devised, but not even understood and perceived. And therefore it is necessary that the Holy Spirit not only heal our minds blind by sin, but also raise our intellect not a little above the natural state, so that it may be able to rise to such great things.

VI. But what may be the mode of that operation is a very obscure matter and difficult to explain – which perhaps could seem strange to someone. For since that operation of the Holy Spirit happens in our minds, we seem to have to know it by sense itself and experience. But nevertheless there is nothing in this which we ought to marvel at. For we experience many things in ourselves, indeed we ourselves work many things, of which nevertheless we do not grasp the reason and mode, nor are we able to understand. Thus we experience daily that we see and understand, and nevertheless when it must be explained in what manner vision and understanding happen, even the most acute and most learned men are stuck, nor can they sufficiently extricate themselves. And there is still a dispute between Physicists and Mathematicians, Whether vision happens through the emission of rays, or through the reception of visible species. Therefore, although any faithful person experiences that he embraces the Word of God by a certain faith, and attributes a full and firm assent to sacred Scripture, it ought not to move wonder if Theologians are stuck in expounding how that faith is engendered in us, and in what manner the Spirit begets that assent in us. About which matter we will briefly set forth our opinion.

VII. First, therefore, it is certain and undoubted to us that the Holy Spirit so disposes and affects the mind of the man whom he leads to faith, which otherwise is dim-sighted and blind in these things, that it perceives and recognizes the light of the Word of God and Scripture that is, seriously attends to those arguments, marks, and criteria by which the Word of God is proved to be true and divine, and judges rightly about them, and thence, as is fitting, is persuaded of its divine truth. Which while the Spirit inwardly does, he is said to give us new eyes. Of which Moses, Deuteronomy 29: "You have seen," he says, "all that the Lord did before your eyes in the land of Egypt, to Pharaoh and to all his servants and to all his land, the great trials that your eyes saw, the signs and those great wonders. But to this day the Lord has not given you a heart to understand or eyes to see or ears to hear." And David implored this help of God, Psalm 119, section Gimel: "Open," he says, "my eyes, that I may behold wondrous things out of your law." For by the wondrous things of the law, he understands the teachings of divine wisdom which are scattered through the law of God about which our carnal mind cannot judge rightly, our native dullness,

depravity and ignorance standing in the way, which are like a certain veil spread before the eyes of our mind, which the Holy Spirit removes in the faithful.

VIII. But whether that operation of the Holy Spirit, by which he so affects our mind that it attends to the light shining in Scripture and perceives it, precisely and alone considered by itself, suffices to engender in us a full and certain enough faith about sacred Scripture can rightly be doubted. For that light of Scripture about which the question now is, is only a certain moral evidence, which does not so convince the mind as principles known through themselves, or logical or mathematical demonstrations, and consequently does not beget an equal certainty, but one of a certain inferior kind – as we taught in the preceding disputation. And therefore, either it must be said that the faith which we apply to sacred Scripture does not of itself and from its own kind admit so great a certainty as is found in the human sciences – which is contrary to the common opinion of Theologians – or the Spirit, in order to impress that faith on us, does something else than simply open the eyes to see and perceive the light of sacred Scripture. Especially if we consider the individual books of sacred Scripture, many will be found which, if we want to confess what the thing is, do not have so much light in themselves that it is rendered altogether certain and manifest from there, not only that they contain true doctrine, but also that they were written and inspired by God. As for example, in the Old Testament the book of Esther, the book of Ruth, and the Song of Songs; and in the New certain epistles, such as those of Jude and James. Wherefore, in order for someone to acknowledge and receive those books as divine by a certain and firm faith, it is not enough to discern that light which is in them – since that light is not so great that it can extort that assent which faith requires, to whose object they pertain, since they are a part of the rule of faith, and are numbered among the principles of faith.

IX. Therefore, in order for us to believe the whole of Scripture as divine, as it deserves, firmly and certainly, besides that action of the Holy Spirit opening the eyes of our mind to the light shining in sacred Scripture, there seems necessary a certain internal impulse and instinct, as I may say, by which he may move us to believe, by a certain force which is greater than every argument and reason. And that instinct is what we think ought to be properly understood by the intrinsic persuasion of the Spirit, and the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit. For it is not to be thought that when the Holy Spirit is said to testify in the hearts of the faithful about the divine truth of Scripture, the faithful inwardly hear a certain voice which says expressly and explicitly, "This is true and the Word of God." But that is to be taken of a certain virtual testimony, as I may say – nor is anything else given to be understood by this than that the Holy Spirit in a secret way instigates us to believe, and imprints a certain persuasion of the divinity of Scripture on our minds. In which way that celebrated passage of Augustine is to be understood, which is usually cited from his Confessions. "Let me hear," he says, "and understand how in the beginning you made heaven and earth. Moses wrote this, he wrote and departed, he passed hence from you to you, nor indeed is he now before me. For if he were, I would hold him, and ask him, and through you I would beseech him to open these things to me, and I would lend the ears of my body to the sounds issuing from his mouth. And if he spoke in the Hebrew language, in vain would he strike my sense, nor would he touch my mind at all. But if in Latin, I would know what he was saying. But whence would I know whether he was speaking the

truth? And if I knew this too, would I know it from him? Inwardly indeed within me, in the dwelling place of thought, Truth, neither Hebrew nor Greek nor Latin nor barbarian, without the organs of mouth and tongue, without the sound of syllables, would say, 'He speaks the truth,' and I, immediately certain, would say confidently to that man of yours, 'You speak the truth.'"

X. But it is not to be feared lest, if that impulse and instinct of the Holy Spirit in the faithful is admitted, a place be given to enthusiasms. For such a force and action of the Spirit in us differs much from enthusiasm. For, to omit other things which could be brought forward here, in enthusiasm God so insinuates himself into the minds of men that he reveals to them those things which they have learned or heard from no man. But the Spirit does not instigate the faithful to believe, except those things which are outwardly proposed to be believed, in the Word of God handed down by the Apostles and Prophets. Nor also can the persuasion which that impulse of the Spirit generates be called blind, and ignorant of itself. For the Spirit of God does not impel to believe, except those things whose light he first made them so discern that the intellect judged them to be credible, and that they could rightly and with reason be believed, although the arguments of truth which it notes in them do not equal the certainty which the Holy Spirit imprints, nor are they its rule and measure.

XI. Furthermore, that Spirit of wisdom and revelation, by whose power and efficacy men are led into the knowledge of the Word of God and conceive a certain faith about it, is common to all and each one in the Church, nor is there any faithful person and member of the Church who is altogether devoid of it. For as many as are led by the Spirit of God, these are sons of God. But if anyone does not have the Spirit of Christ, he is not his, as the Apostle testifies in Romans 8. And also, since it was proved before that no one can believe the Word of God and receive it as divine who has not been illuminated by the Holy Spirit, from there it is manifest that any faithful person who believes the Word of God has been illuminated by the Holy Spirit.

XII. But that Spirit is given unequally, and not to all by the same measure. Whence it is that, although all and each of the faithful have the Spirit of God, in some degree at least, yet certain of them are called spiritual, in opposition to others who are called carnal, as can be seen in 1 Corinthians 3. "And I, brethren," says Paul, "could not speak to you as to spiritual people but as to carnal, as to babes in Christ." For Paul does not call any his brethren unless they are faithful. And nevertheless those whom he there addresses he says are carnal, that is, still rude and of weak mind, and who have not yet received that measure of the Spirit of Christ that they can bear and grasp the more abstruse and difficult mysteries of the Christian religion; and therefore, as he himself says, infants in Christ as it were. But by the spiritual he understands those whom the Holy Spirit has raised to a more perfect state.

XIII. Therefore not all who are in the Church receive the Spirit of God in that measure that any of them can recognize and discern whatever pertains to the Word of God and sacred Scripture. For among the faithful and those having the Spirit of God, there can be doubt about some book of Scripture, and about some dogma of the Christian religion. Thus formerly in the ancient Church, not all good and holy teachers felt the same about

the Canonical books, but some rejected those which others admitted. For, for example, the Epistle to the Hebrews was long rejected by the Latin Church, whose sacred and divine authority the Greek Church meanwhile acknowledged. Nor is he who errs in some point of Religion immediately to be expunged from the number of the faithful. For Paul, in Philippians 3, wants that those who are perfect bear with those who think otherwise, and cultivate communion with them as with brothers, in the meantime until God reveals to them that to which they have not yet attained.

XIV. But however unequally that Spirit of Wisdom and revelation may be distributed, it is certain that each and every one who has the Spirit of God can recognize the word of God presented to them, and discern true doctrine from false, as much as is necessary for each person's own salvation. For it should be noted that it is not necessary for the salvation of each individual to know every single book of sacred Scripture, and everything that God has revealed in his word. Since some of these things are necessary for the salvation of individuals, while others only pertain to the common good of the Church. Then, if a comparison is made between individual members of the Church, one is required to know more, another less in the word of God. Nor should it be thought that what suffices for the salvation of a private individual is sufficient for those who are called to teach in the Church. And for that reason, God, to whom it seemed good to variously dispense his gifts in the Church, does not bestow his Spirit on all in such abundance that they can attain to all things which are contained in the scope of his word. But at least he bestows on each believer that measure of the Spirit which is necessary for them to be able to recognize and perceive what is fitting for their calling, and what they need to know, according to their state and condition. And according to this limitation and suitable distribution, those passages of Scripture are to be understood which attribute to the faithful the ability to discern and judge the word of God. As is that saying of Christ in John 10, "My sheep hear my voice." And in John 7, "If anyone wants to do the will of the Father, he will know whether the teaching is from God, or if I speak on myown." Likewise, what Paul says in 1 Corinthians 2, "The spiritual person judges all things." And in 1 John 2, "You have an anointing from the Holy One, and you know all things." Again, "The anointing teaches you about all things." For in these and similar passages, Scripture does not mean to teach that each and every believer can immediately, by the help of the Spirit, recognize whatever pertains to God's word in any way. But only this: that the faithful, and those who are piously disposed towards God, can discern sacred doctrine from contrary error by the instigation and suggestion of the Spirit, as much as is expedient for the salvation of each individual.

XV. And so it is clear how necessarily, and in what way, and to what extent, the Holy Spirit works in us so that we may recognize God's word and sacred Scripture. It follows that we should briefly see what is to be attributed to the Church in this matter as well. Which was the third point of those things which, at the beginning of this disputation, we undertook to examine.

XVI. The question is asked, therefore, whether the voice and testimony of the Church is needed to attain this knowledge. We answer briefly that, speaking absolutely, no man's work is necessary for this. Since God can immediately, and without any external ministry, give someone knowledge of Scripture and his word, and impress a certain faith concerning

it. Thus Paul had not received the Gospel from man, nor had he been taught it, but by the revelation of Jesus Christ, as he himself testifies in Galatians 1. So the rest of the Apostles were led into all truth by the Spirit, the Paraclete, with no man going before them. So finally the Prophets of old learned what they spoke from the Holy Spirit alone, who inspired them.

XVII. But that was extraordinary. Nor did it seem good to God to use this way commonly in bringing men to faith and instructing them in heavenly doctrine. But he wanted men to be taught by men, and to receive faith, yet with the Spirit himself teaching and cooperating within. And so he instituted the sacred ministry in the Church, and commanded pastors and teachers to publicly proclaim, explain, and commend his word, and to testify concerning its truth. And what the Pastors do publicly and with authority, individual believers are also bound to do privately, according to their capacity, with those entrusted to their care, by divine ordinance.

XVIII. Therefore, according to the ordinary law, this ministry is necessary for someone to have knowledge of divine doctrine and Scripture, and to conceive faith. For the Holy Spirit does not lead us immediately into the knowledge of God's word. Nor do we embrace heavenly doctrine and revere the Scriptures by any immediate inspiration of the Spirit. But it is necessary that in this we have as guides the ministers of the Church, and those to whom our instruction is entrusted, who may set forth and expound that doctrine to us, and point out, explain and commend Scripture. And we are first moved by this testimony of the Church to think well of heavenly doctrine and sacred Scripture, and to have faith in it, otherwise we would remain in perpetual ignorance of it. According to that saying of the Apostle in Romans 10, "How will they believe in him of whom they have not heard? How will they hear without someone preaching?" Likewise, "Faith comes from hearing, and hearing through the word of God," that is, by God's command. To which pertains that oft-repeated saying of Augustine, "I would not believe the Gospel, unless the authority of the Catholic Church moved me." For he speaks in the person of one who is being introduced to the faith, and begins to have some persuasion of the divine truth of the Gospel. For the common consent and testimony of the Church is ordinarily the first incentive by which we are induced to give some credence to Scripture. And even among the faithful themselves, when doubt arises about some book or divine dogma, we confess that the constant and uniform testimony of the Church is an argument of the greatest weight and importance, which it would be insolent and rash for a man to oppose with his own judgment. Especially when it is a matter of the rejection or admission of some sacred book, we recognize that the perpetual consent of the Jewish and Christian Church is an incontrovertible argument, to which everyone ought to yield.

XIX. Yet the consent and testimony of the Church is not the proper and principal basis of our faith, to which its certainty is to be reduced. For the Church indeed, as we have just taught, is the one that proposes and explains to us what is to be believed through its ministers, and even private believers, according to God's ordinance, and by its testimony and authority we are first induced to give them some credence, but our faith does not rest in that, but relies on a far more solid foundation. But if it does not proceed further, it is not true and legitimate faith, but only a certain human persuasion. Namely, the Church

performs the same service for us as the Samaritan woman once did for her fellow citizens. For the Church gives us access to knowing Christ and his doctrine. And we are first admonished by the testimony of the Church to believe in Christ. But after we have heard Christ himself speaking, both outwardly in the word and inwardly in our hearts, our faith no longer rests on the testimony of the Church, and we can say to it what the Samaritans said to the woman, "We no longer believe because of what you said, for we have heard for ourselves, and we know that this is truly the Saviour of the world."

XX. But that the matter is so, and that the testimony and authority of the Church is not the proper reason for our faith, and the principal thing on which our certainty about the word of God rests, is proven by many arguments. For first, if our faith had such a foundation, it would be human, not divine: because, of course, it would rely not on divine truth and authority, but on the testimony of men. Then it would follow that the faithful believe God not for his own sake, but for the sake of men, and that with respect to the faithful themselves, the authority of men is greater than that of God, which is very absurd. The definition of faith would also have to be changed. For, by the consent of all Doctors, faith is that assent which we give to God speaking. But thus, by faith, we would believe not so much God speaking, as men. Nor would faith be an assent altogether firm and infallible. For no human veracity is so great that it can remove all fear of falsehood.

XXI. Moreover, there never was, or will be, any greater authority in the Church than that with which the Apostles were endowed. And yet the faith of those who believed the preaching of the Apostles did not rely on the authority of any Apostle. This is clear from Paul's words in Galatians 1: "Even if we, or an angel from heaven, should preach to you a gospel contrary to what we preached to you, let him be accursed." For if the authority of the Apostles had been the only or principal foundation on which the faithful relied, certainly with that foundation removed, it would also have been necessary for their faith to be taken away or waver. And yet if the Apostles, indeed, the Angels themselves, had taught contrary to what had first been preached, Paul wants the faith of the Gospel to stand firm and unshaken nonetheless.

XXII. Then the Prophets and Apostles, who first handed down sacred doctrine and Scripture, could not resolve the faith which they had in the word of God into the authority of the Church, since they were handing down that doctrine to the Church, not accepting it as commended by the Church. And it is possible, at least out of the ordinary way, for someone to believe the Gospel without being taught by any man, but perhaps coming upon some codex of the Gospel. In which case the faith of that man could not have the authority of the Church as its foundation, whose testimony he had never heard. And yet the faith of all is one. Nor does our faith differ in kind from the faith of the Prophets and Apostles, and of those who would be taught immediately by God. But our faith would not be the same as their faith, if it had another foundation, and another formal reason for believing. For there is one proper and principal foundation of one faith in kind: nor are there, as the Scholastics say, diverse formal reasons for believing it.

XXIII. Add that, if some imagine our faith rests on the authority of the Church, by the Church they mean the universal Church. But individual believers do not hear that Church, but most are instructed by particular Churches, and their ministers, who can be

deceived and err. And therefore their faith cannot rest on the testimony of the universal Church, which has never been heard by them.

XXIV. But with that view exploded, which reduces faith given to the word of God and sacred Scripture to the authority of the Church, it must be seen what then is that in which our faith finally rests, and what is its proper and principal foundation. In order to make this clear, it seems a distinction must be made between the Word of God itself, or divine revelation: And those things which are handed down and contained in the word of God, are made known through divine revelation. For our faith receives the mysteries which are handed down in the word of God in one way, and the voice of God itself, or divine revelation, in another way.

XXV. For as far as the things themselves which are handed down in the word of God are concerned, such as what are called the dogmas of faith, and other things which are contained in the Scriptures, we assent to them and receive them as true, because God, who is supremely truthful, and who can neither be deceived nor deceive, has revealed them to us through the Apostles and Prophets, and taught them in his word. The dogmas of faith do indeed have, besides divine revelation, many arguments by which they are proven and persuaded. Nor is God accustomed to lead us to faith in them, except by means of certain arguments, indications, and reasons, by which their truth is rendered credible to our mind, and is gently insinuated into our souls. Hence it is that Peter in 1 Peter chapter 3 wants the faithful to be able to make a defence and give an answer to anyone who asks for a reason for the hope that is in them. But one who would believe without any reason, and would have or could give no reason for his faith, that would not be true faith, but a slight and rash persuasion of some kind. And so it is not enough for those who proclaim the word of God simply to set forth the doctrine of faith, but there is need besides to apply certain persuasions, and to elicit arguments either from the things themselves, or from certain adjuncts, by which they may render the mysteries of the Christian religion credible and even powerfully prove them. Yet the principal foundation of our faith, and the proper reason, are not those reasons and arguments of whatever kind, but divine revelation, on which our faith especially rests.

XXVI. It has seemed to certain learned men, if we rightly perceive their mind, that the certainty of faith by which we embrace the dogmas of religion and believe the things revealed by God is founded on the light of the things revealed, and a certain inherent splendour of truth, by which our mind is convinced and as it were compelled to assent. Namely, when someone believes the Gospel, and persuades himself that the Son of God was made man and came into the world, suffered and died for us, rose again, ascended into heaven, and the rest which pertain to our redemption, they are of the opinion that the proper and principal reason for that assent is the very majesty, holiness, sublimity, truth, and congruence with right reason of the doctrine, which seizes the mind into assent to itself, and makes it manifest that that doctrine is not only true, but proceeded immediately from God; since such great and wondrous things could neither be invented nor fabricated by human wit. From which it follows that the truth of heavenly doctrine is recognized by us by nature prior to our being certain that it has God as its author; and thus the ultimate and chief reason for believing it is not the veracity and authority of God speaking, and

because God has so said and revealed; but, as we said, the very truth and evidence of the thing. But although we acknowledge that the dogmas of religion have their own light and arguments of truth, and even of divine origin: Yet it seems more in agreement with truth and Theological doctrine, if we say that the proper and principal reason for faith, by which we receive those dogmas, is the authority of God speaking and revealing, rather than the truth and light of the thing itself: which is proven by many arguments.

XXVII. For first, it has hitherto been accepted in the Schools that faith, although it does not exclude reasoning, nevertheless relies more on the authority of the one speaking. But faith does not rely especially on divine authority, if the principal reason why we believe the things of faith is a certain evidence of truth which is in them, not divine revelation. The definition of faith would also be absurd, namely, that it is the assent which we give to God speaking. For then through faith we would not believe God speaking, except materially, as they say in the Schools, that is, we would indeed believe those things which God would speak, but not because God had spoken them. But it is absurd for some habit of the mind to be defined only by its material object. For if someone, for example, skilled in Peripatetic doctrine comes upon some book of Aristotle, and carefully considering his doctrine, recognizes it to be true, and also from the sharpness of style and manner of disputing judges the book to be by Aristotle, the assent given to that doctrine could only absurdly be called faith held in Aristotle speaking. But certainly Theologians up to now by common consent have not only defined faith as the assent shown to God speaking, and have determined its object to be the word of God and the things revealed by God; but also teach that the formal reason of that object, under which faith apprehends it, and on account of which it receives and acknowledges it, is divine authority and revelation.

XXVIII. Then, if the proper and chief reason for faith were the very light of truth which is discerned in the things to be believed, and which necessarily determines the mind to assent, faith would be evident assent, and the dogmas of faith would be evident. Since that is evident which by its light convinces the mind, and compels assent. But it is like a certain axiom of the schools, founded in the Scriptures, that faith is an inevident habit of the mind; since Scripture opposes faith to sight: and teaches that faith is of things not seen.

XXIX. Moreover, although some things which the word of God teaches are demonstrable, and can be deduced from self-evident principles: yet many things are proposed for belief by faith, which, unless one wishes to be contentious, must be admitted to be neither self-evident, nor able to be proven by any necessary and convincing arguments. Let us take, for example, that principal article of faith, by which we are taught that in the one most simple essence of God there are three distinct persons. Who will dare to promise a demonstration of so great a mystery, and seriously affirm that in it there is a certain evidence of truth? when on the contrary our mind sees nothing there but mere darkness, being blinded by that inaccessible light, as the eyes of owls by the sun; and scarcely can even the most acute and subtle vindicate that article from apparent contradiction, much less demonstrate it. And the same can be said about the satisfaction rendered by the death of Christ, about the future conflagration of the whole world, and the resurrection of all the dead, of whose truth, if anyone seeks proofs besides the authority of sacred Scripture, he will find nothing very certain and firm, and which suffices to support our faith. We do not indeed disapprove

of the pious attempt of those who labour to prove these and similar mysteries by reasons sought from every quarter, and to persuade. But if we wish to act candidly, it must be acknowledged that those arguments, whatever they may be, are only, as the schools say, certain congruities, which render the matter at most probable and likely, but do not necessarily conclude that it is so.

XXX. But when the Israelites in Egypt were taught that every male was to be circumcised on the eighth day, that they were to abstain from blood, that they were allowed to eat certain animals, not others, and many things of this kind, no one can deny that these things had to be embraced by them in faith, as things pleasing and acceptable to God. And yet who can sincerely and from the heart affirm that these things had in themselves a light by which they sufficiently produced faith in themselves, and from which the mind of the faithful was efficaciously compelled to believe that these things had been commanded and handed down by God. And the same can be said today with respect to us about that washing of water which is used in Baptism, and about the taking of bread and wine at the Lord's table. Since, therefore, many dogmas and precepts are to be received by faith, which do not have that light and evidence in themselves by which they sufficiently prove themselves to be certainly true and handed down by God, it is manifest that the reason and principal basis of faith, by which we receive the things handed down in the word of God and the dogmas of religion, is not the truth and evidence of the thing itself, but rather the truth and authority of God teaching and revealing.

XXXI. But, you will say, how do we perceive divine revelation: And on what does the certainty of faith depend by which we embrace the word of God itself? Certainly God is not accustomed to speak without his voice and word having certain marks and indications by which it can be distinguished and recognized from human or diabolical imposture and fraud. But especially that revelation on which our faith rests today, and which we have recorded in the sacred Scriptures, has very illustrious arguments by which it claims God for itself, as was abundantly shown in the preceding theses. Nor is the faith by which we receive it a blind persuasion, and one which has no reason for itself. But one who believes the word of God as is fitting is induced to give assent to it by certain reasons and motives, which can persuade a prudent man that it is truly God who speaks, and that a fictitious and false revelation is not being passed off for a true one. And so, besides the arguments which can be sought from the thing itself, God often, in order to produce faith in his word, and to compel men to believe, employed many signs and miracles, to which the faith of those who believed is not infrequently ascribed. Thus Sergius Paulus, a prudent man, when he saw the blindness with which the Apostle Paul had struck Elymas the sorcerer, believed, being astonished at the teaching of the Lord, Acts 13. And the Centurion who stood by the dying Christ, seeing the wonders which happened at the death of Christ, glorified God, saying, "Truly this man was righteous," Luke 23. Similarly in John 4, when a certain Father recognized that his dying son had been healed and recovered by the word of Christ, at that very hour at which Jesus had said to him, "Your son lives," he himself believed, and his whole household. Hence the conversion to faith of those who, when asked for a reason for their conversion, have nothing to say, or bring forward frivolous things, is rightly suspect.

XXXII. Yet we do not think that those arguments and motives for believing, by which the word of God is persuaded, and by which the minds of men are gently bent to obedience to it, are that on which the certainty of faith chiefly depends, and its principal foundation. God does indeed use these arguments in generating faith, and faith already generated is also nourished and cherished by them; yet they do not seem to be the chief basis of faith and the measure of its certainty. And this because, as was already said in thesis 8, the Christian schools agree that the certainty of faith is supreme, and such that it either equals or even surpasses all certainty which is found in the human sciences, namely, if faith is estimated from its principles, and considered as it can and ought to be: but not as it actually is in many. But the faith by which we receive the word of God, which today is contained in Scripture, cannot have that certainty, if it relies only on the marks and arguments by which Scripture is proven divine. For they are not demonstrations which generate absolute certainty, but only moral arguments, which although they suffice for someone to be induced to believe prudently, nevertheless cannot by themselves, and from their nature, produce a certainty equal to that which, for example, the Mathematical disciplines have: such as or even greater than we suppose faith to acquire.

XXXIII. Especially if we consider the individual books of sacred Scripture, it must be confessed that there are many which do not have in themselves those marks of divinity by which their divine authority can necessarily and evidently be proven, and on which so great a certainty as faith requires can be founded. Such are, for example, the book of Judges, the book of Ruth, the book of Esther, the Song of Songs, which can scarcely be proven to be divinely inspired by any other arguments than those general ones which are sought from the testimony and consent of the Jewish and Christian Church. And yet those books are part of the divine word, and of that most certain rule of faith, to which all things pertaining to religion are to be applied and examined; and thus pertain to the object of faith taken in its full extent: and the assent which we give to them, as is fitting, is referred to no other virtue than faith. And therefore, since certain parts of the word of God to be received by faith do not have those arguments of divinity which can of themselves found an assent as certain as faith demands, without doubt the arguments by which the word of God proves itself divine and to have flowed from God, are not the principal foundation of faith, and that ultimate thing to which the certainty of our faith must be resolved. Nor is it relevant that faith in such books is not necessary for the salvation of individuals. For here the question is not what is necessary for the salvation of individuals, or not. But we are considering in general the nature and foundation of faith to whose object pertain many things which are not necessary for individuals to know for salvation.

XXXIV. Therefore we establish that the ultimate thing to which our faith is finally resolved, and its principal support, is that impulse and instinct of the Holy Spirit which was described by us in thesis 9. By which name we designate the action and efficiency of the Holy Spirit by which he immediately moves us to accept divine revelation, and impresses a certain persuasion of it on our minds. For the illustration of which thing, a comparison can contribute something if a comparison is made between the assent of faith and the assent of the sciences. For what demonstrated conclusions are in the sciences, here are the dogmas of faith and other things which the word of God teaches and hands down. What is the means of demonstration with respect to the conclusion, that is the authority

of God speaking and revealing with respect to those things which are proposed to be believed. But as we immediately perceive the means itself and the force of demonstration by the natural and innate light of reason: so we immediately believe and perceive divine revelation made to the Prophets and Apostles through the internal instinct and testimony of the Spirit of God, which the Scholastics call the light of faith. And as the light of reason is not that which we perceive and know by reasoning, but that by which we know and reason: So that testimony of the Holy Spirit is not something further which is believed, nor an argument which moves to belief, but only that by which it is believed, and the action by which faith is impressed on our mind: which it is not necessary for every believer who elicits the act of faith to know and understand by a reflexive cognition: No more than it is necessary for some peasant to think about intelligence and the power of reasoning when he understands and reasons.

XXXV. But what the testimony of the Holy Spirit contributes, and what weight the arguments have by which the divine authority of Scripture is persuaded, so that we may give it the faith which is fitting, we cannot better explain than in the words of that most celebrated man [John Calvin] who speaks thus on the matter: "Let this therefore remain fixed, that those whom the Spirit teaches within solidly acquiesce in Scripture, and that this is indeed ἀυτόπιστον, nor should it be subjected to demonstration and reasons: which certainty, however, it obtains among us by the testimony of the Spirit. For although it gains reverence for itself by its own majesty, yet it seriously affects us only when it has been sealed upon our hearts through the Spirit. Illumined, therefore, by his power, we now believe, neither by our own nor by anyone else's judgment, that Scripture is from God; but above human judgment, we affirm with utter certainty that it has flowed to us from the very mouth of God by the ministry of men. We seek no arguments, no verisimilitudes on which to lean our judgment; but we subject our judgment and wit to it as to a thing placed beyond any guesswork. Not as some miserable men are wont to tether their minds captive to superstitions; but because we feel that the undoubted power of his divine majesty lives and breathes there, by which we are drawn and inflamed, knowingly and willingly, to obey, yet also more vitally and more effectively than by mere human willing or knowing. Such, then, is a persuasion that requires no reasons; such, a knowledge with which the best reason agrees – in which the mind truly reposes more securely and constantly than in any reasons; such, finally, a feeling as can be born only of heavenly revelation." Institutes, Book 1, Chapter 7, Section 5.

Part III

In which the opinion of the Papists is set forth, and the state of the controversy indicated, and the true opinion confirmed by arguments.

I. Thus far we have expounded, as distinctly and clearly as we could, our opinion on the authority of Scripture. And to draw the whole matter into a small compass, we have taught 1. That Scripture shines with its own peculiar splendour, and emits various rays of divinity by which it can strike and affect a mind rightly disposed: and thus prove itself. Yet that light is not evidence properly so called, such as is found in things which are self-evident or fall under demonstration, as is seen in things Mathematical and Metaphysical: but only a certain moral evidence, which consists entirely in this, that Scripture is persuaded by so many and so probable arguments, and has in itself so many and such remarkable marks of divinity, that from this a pious and prudent man is efficaciously induced to believe that it is true and divine: although its divine authority is not a thing self-evident, or even one which can be demonstrated.

II. We have proven that for someone to believe sacred Scripture, and to acknowledge it as divinely inspired, with a true and legitimate faith which is of some moment for salvation, there is need of the Holy Spirit warning and illuminating within. But that operation of the Holy Spirit is necessary for us, not only on account of the darkness brought in by sin, which is like a certain veil spread over the eyes of our mind, which hides from us the light of sacred Scripture, and hinders us from being able to behold it; but also on account of the genius and nature of the doctrine itself contained in Scripture: which, since it altogether surpasses our mind, even considered in itself apart from sin, it is necessary that our intellect be raised above itself, so that it can rise to it. And thus, so that we may acknowledge and receive Scripture and its individual books as true and divine, firmly and indubitably, and with a certainty as great as faith requires, to whose object they pertain, there is need not only for the Holy Spirit to heal the native blindness of our mind and dispel the darkness brought on by sin, which hinder us from being able to perceive the light of Scripture: but also for him to compel us to believe by a certain secret instinct and impulse, or by a certain internal efficacy, which is greater than any argument and reason.

III. And this has been shown by us, that although, speaking absolutely, there is no need for the voice and testimony of the Church for us to have knowledge and faith in Scripture, yet according to the ordinary law, God uses the ministry of the Church in generating faith in Scripture in us; and the first incentive by which we are ordinarily moved to accept it as true and divine, is the common consent and testimony of the Church. Yet neither the voice nor authority of the Church is the principal foundation of our faith, and that to which the certainty of faith by which we embrace sacred Scripture is ultimately to be reduced.

IV. We have taught that although the dogmas of religion and other things which are handed down in the word of God may have many arguments for their truth, yet those arguments are not the proper and principal reason on which rests the faith by which we receive the things handed down in the word of God, but rather the authority and veracity of God teaching and revealing. But the word of God itself, or divine revelation, does indeed have marks and indications by which it can be recognized and distinguished from diabolical and

human frauds, nevertheless our faith does not rely chiefly on marks and indications of this kind: but the certainty of it is resolved into the secret testimony of the Holy Spirit, and that internal efficiency by which he immediately renders believers certain that it is God who speaks, and impresses a firm persuasion of this matter on our minds.

V. It follows now that we should see what the Papists think about all these things, so that it may clearly appear in what the state of the question on the authority of Scripture, which is debated with such contention between us and them today, is situated. But here, before all things, it should be noted that among the Papists there are two kinds of men. For among them there are many shameless men, of no candour, scarcely any learning, who have proposed nothing else to themselves than to harass our people with importunate disputations. These often fight in the manner of the Andabatae [gladiators who fought blindfolded], not seeing what they strike, and where they direct their blows. And so, in the course of disputing, they not only attack our doctrine, but also overthrow their own positions, and contradict themselves. For it is enough for them, provided that with certain stinging sophisms and a certain captious subtlety they create trouble for us; not caring in the meantime whether the things which they bring forward against us can be retorted against themselves. When the question is about the authority of Scripture, they hiss at the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit, and babble many things against our people which take away all authority from sacred Scripture, and suspend our faith solely from the testimony of men. And thus they expose the Christian religion to reproach and render it ridiculous, as if it rested on no other foundation than the authority of those who profess it.

VI. But besides these babblers and sophists of no authority even among their own, it must be confessed that in the Papal school there are many learned men who speak more considerately and exactly, and have a greater selection of arguments. These certainly hold the opinion of the Roman Church more accurately, and explain it better, and defend it more cautiously. And so those former wranglers should indeed be restrained and repressed, and their foolishness and impiety is rightly reproved by our people and publicly whipped. Yet when the state of some controversy with the Roman Church is to be sought and determined, we do not think that the trifles of those men should be dwelt upon: but it should be inquired what the latter think and teach, who are strong in learning and authority among their own.

VII. Yet again those leaders and chief centurions of the Papal school are to be distinguished from themselves. For they do not always seem to be consistent with themselves. Indeed, they speak one way when they deal with their own people, and teach among their own with a calm and composed mind, but another way when they fight with us, and the ardour of disputing and contradicting has grown hot. Since in their contests with us, carried away by hatred of us and the heat of disputation, even those standard-bearers of the Roman school rashly blurt out many things, not only adverse to us, but to themselves, of which they themselves are ashamed. And so those very things are found elsewhere in their writings set forth far more mildly and more agreeably to the truth.

VIII. Moreover, although such things rashly blurted out, and brought forth more from hatred and blind passion than from a certain judgment of mind, are most justly noted and

harped upon by our people: yet in determining the state of some controversy, we think that regard should rather be had to those places where they speak with a calm mind, and treat the matter in question expressly, and clearly and distinctly explicate the mind of their Church. For it happens not infrequently, not only to such men who plead a bad cause, but also to good men whose purpose is to defend the truth, that in the course of disputing they recede too much from the opposite opinion and are carried to contrary shores; and inadvertently bring forward against their adversary things which are harmful to themselves also, and do not altogether agree with the truth and their own positions. Which both our people and the Papists often note in the ancient Fathers of the Church, while they refute schismatics and heretics and inveigh against heresies. But fairness and candour require that things thus spoken harshly and unsuitably should be explained from other places where those authors speak more suitably and more agreeably to the truth. Nor do we deny that our Doctors also sometimes need this pardon and indulgence. And so, that we may deal kindly and candidly with our adversaries, we think that this also should be granted to them, that if they have anywhere spoken some things badly and falsely, but elsewhere well and congruently with the truth, those former things should be softened and understood from the latter.

IX. But to apply these things to the present matter, it is certain that not only those vain men, and of no value even among their own, but even those very ones who lead the family among the Papist Doctors, bring forward many things in the course of disputing, which seem plainly contrary to these things which we have hitherto taught, about the marks of the word of God and the arguments by which sacred Scripture is proven, and about that internal testimony of the Spirit, to which our certainty about the word of God is to be referred. For they often speak as if sacred Scripture would merit no faith, nor have authority, except what it borrows from the Roman Church, and as if the whole certainty of our faith would rest on the Doctors of the Church today: so that, with that testimony set aside, Scripture would be of no more value among us than any profane book. Sayings and blasphemous statements of this kind our Doctors note and collect in their disputations on this argument. Yet when those Papist doctors bring forward such things injurious to Scripture, they seem to be forgetful of themselves, and in that to unseal their own positions. For almost the same things which we taught before, about the light of sacred Scripture and the word of God, about the secret testimony of the Holy Spirit, about the proper reason of faith and its principal foundation, and about that ultimate thing to which the certainty of faith is resolved, are handed down and taught by Papist Theologians in the schools. Which, so that we may show more clearly, those points about which we have previously dealt must be briefly run through by us, and what the Papists teach about each one must be indicated in a few words.

X. First, therefore, although the Papists do not want those things which pertain to faith per se and properly to be things self-evident, or which can be demonstrated, which we also confessed above, yet they do not deny that a certain external and moral evidence belongs to the things of faith: and besides the authority of their Church, they acknowledge that there are very many arguments by which Christian doctrine and sacred Scripture is proven, and, as they say, is rendered evidently credible. This is commonly taught by the commentators of Thomas Aquinas on the second part of the second part, question 1,

article 4. Where Thomas discusses this, Whether the object of faith can be something seen. For in that article Thomas, who determines that the object of faith is not something seen or evident, objects to himself the passage of the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 13, "We see in a mirror dimly" [1 Cor. 13:12]. Where the Apostle speaks about the knowledge of faith: And yet he says that through it, we see as in a mirror. From which it follows that the object of faith is seen by the believer, and thus faith is of things which are seen. To which that Doctor responds, that the things which are of faith can be considered in one way in particular, and thus they cannot be at the same time seen and believed: in another way in general, namely, in the common notion of credibility, and thus they are seen by him who believes. For, he says, he would not believe, unless he saw that they were to be believed, either on account of the evidence of signs, or on account of something of this kind. From which words of Thomas the Scholastics gather this maxim, that the things which fall under faith are not evidently true: yet evidently credible and persuaded by many very weighty arguments and very strong reasons. Which arguments they then enumerate, each one, of course, those which seem to him most valid. As can be seen in Dominic Bañez, John Puteanus, Pesa, and others on the passage of Thomas mentioned above.

XI. But especially Gregory of Valentia, a learned and acute Jesuit, in that volume which he titled On the Analysis of Faith, spends the first book pursuing the arguments by which Christian doctrine and Scripture, which is its book, can be proven and persuaded: and he enumerates arguments of this kind up to nineteen. In which he touches upon almost all those which our people call the marks of the word of God, that is, arguments by which sacred Scripture can be recognized and discerned from human writings. And even Bellarmine himself, in Book 1 On the Word of God, Chapter 1, omitting the testimony of his Church, which those with whom he deals reject, proves the divine authority of Scripture by many arguments and reasons. As, for example, from the miracles done in confirmation of Scripture, from the admirable agreement and harmony of the sacred Writers, and from the predictions of future things and the prophecies of the Prophets contained in Scripture, and proven by the event. Which and certain other things he brings forward and vindicates against the Libertines who despise Scripture. And so those of our Theologians who labouriously prove against them that sacred Scripture has certain marks and certain arguments by which it is proven divine do not seem to grasp the mind of the Papists well enough; as if the heat of the controversy about the authority of Scripture were placed in that, and the Papists simply denied that Scripture has any marks and notes of divinity, but could only be recognized by the testimony of the Church alone.

XII. Moreover, the Doctors of the Roman Church agree with us that there is need of a certain internal operation of the Holy Spirit for this, that we may acknowledge the word of God and sacred Scripture, and receive it with the faith which is fitting. Which operation of the Spirit of God in us they call, as we also do, the internal illumination of the Spirit, revelation and persuasion, and the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit. And they speak about that testimony of the Spirit so clearly, so constantly and frequently, that it might seem superfluous to bring forward their testimonies on this matter. Yet lest any place be left for doubt, we will cite a few out of many. Thus, therefore, Melchior Cano in Theological Places, Book 2, Chapter 8, Response to Argument 4: "This must be determined," he says, "that human authority and all those incentives mentioned before, or

any others whatsoever applied by him who proposes the faith, are not sufficient causes for believing as we are bound to believe, but besides there is need of an interior efficient cause, that is, of the special help of God moving to belief." And with a few things inserted, "All external, therefore, and human persuasions are not enough for believing, however competently those things which are of faith may be proposed by men. But there is need besides of an interior cause, that is, of a certain divine light inciting to belief, and certain internal eyes given by the benefit of God for seeing." Which in the same place he proves by the authority of Thomas Aquinas and Augustine, and by many passages of Scripture, which he cites and urges for this matter. The same is taught by Thomas Stapleton in his Relectio on the Principle of Controversies about the Power of the Church in Itself, Question 1, Article 2, Conclusion 4. And more fully On the Principles of Faith, Controversy 4, Book 8, Chapter 1, whose heading is, That it is impossible without special grace and the gift of faith divinely infused to produce an act of true faith, or to believe by faith truly so called. And in his disputations against Whitaker he perpetually complains that it is objected by calumny to the doctors of the Roman Church that they deny that the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit is necessary for generating faith. He especially makes this reply against Whitaker in defence of the authority of the Church, Chapter 3: "This secret testimony of the divine Spirit," he says, "is absolutely necessary for someone to believe the testimony and judgment of the Church about the approbation of the Scriptures." With which Gregory of Valentia agrees in his Analysis of Faith, Book 1, Chapter 1: "God," he says, "is the one who in the first place, by the voice of his revelation and by a certain internal instinct and impulse, bears witness to human minds of, and persuades them of, the truth of Christian doctrine and thus of sacred Scripture, as is expressed in many places in Scripture itself." Finally, Bellarmine pursues this doctrine in an entire lecture, to which he has given the title On the Light of Faith.

XIII. But from these things it is manifest that those of our Theologians have not reached the scope of this controversy who so explicate the state of the question: Whether, namely, we believe Scripture on account of the testimony of the Church alone or rather principally on account of the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit: as if the Roman Church utterly rejected and hissed at that internal testimony of the Holy Spirit. And conversely those Papists wrong us who harp upon our people as if they were boasting of a private Spirit and panting after certain enthusiasms. For we do not teach anything else about the secret testimony of the Spirit than what they themselves confess and teach. Nor by that testimony do we exclude, as they calumniously object to us, the necessity of the Ecclesiastical ministry in setting forth and expounding those things which pertain to faith, as we taught abundantly in the preceding disputation.

XIV. Nor do the Papists any less expressly teach that the authority of the Church is not the formal reason of our faith, that is, the principal foundation on which our faith rests. This is especially taught by Melchior Cano in Theological Places, Book 2, Chapter 8, Response to Argument 4: "This third thing," he says, "must be put down, that the formal reason of our faith is not the authority of the Church, that is, the ultimate resolution of faith is not made to the testimony of the Church." And below, "The authority of the Church is not the reason moving per se to believing." Again, "If it is asked generally whence it is certain to the believer that those things which he holds by faith have been revealed by God, he will

not be able to adduce the authority of the Church." Some indeed there were among the old Scholastics, namely, Durandus and Gabriel Biel, who ultimately resolved Christian faith into the authority of the Church, as if the ultimate reason for believing for the faithful was the testimony of the Church. But this opinion was long ago exploded, and is rejected by common consent by the Scholastics today; it is expressly rejected by Melchior Cano in the place which we have now indicated. "Their error," he says, "I cannot dissemble, who assert that our faith is to be reduced to this as if to the ultimate cause of believing, that we believe the Church to be truthful." Later he adjoins many arguments by which he refutes that error: such as, that it would follow from it that the first formal reason of faith would not be uncreated but created truth: And thus our faith would not rest as on its foundation on divine truth, but on human truth. Moreover, since the assent of the conclusion is not more certain than the assent of the principles, he shows that it would follow from it that it would not be more certain or firm for us that God is triune than that the Church is truthful, which we would believe through the incentives of human causes. Then he urges the passage of Paul, "But even if we or an angel from heaven should preach to you a gospel contrary to the one we preached to you, let him be accursed" [Gal. 1:8]. From which he gathers that assent of faith does not rest on human causes and incentives. "Wherefore," he says, "lest our mind waver, the authority of divine Scripture must be sought from a higher source than from either the reason or the authority of man." To which he adds that the Apostles and Prophets ultimately resolved their faith to divine authority and veracity: But now our faith is the same as the faith of the Prophets and Apostles, and thus is not resolved into the human authority of the Church, and many similar things.

XV. Thomas Stapleton teaches things agreeing with these in Controversy 4 on the Power of the Church in Itself, Question 3, Article 3, where this is his second conclusion, The voice of the Church is not the formal object of faith. Which he proves, First, because faith can exist without it. And second, because the voice and authority of the Church alone cannot induce faith truly so called. Later he objects to himself the arguments of certain old Scholastics, and among others that celebrated passage of Augustine, "I would not believe the Gospel unless the authority of the Catholic Church moved me." To which he briefly responds in these words, "The Gospel is not believed except by the authority of the Church moving one to do so, namely, ordinarily, because it is the ordinary way by which the First Truth reveals all things." And in the same place he confesses that our faith does not depend on the testimony of the Church alone, nor principally on it. But on that saying of Augustine, Melchior Cano says these things in the place cited above, "It is not the case that if the Church provides us access to the knowledge of the sacred books, one must immediately acquiesce in that, but it behooves us to proceed further and to rely on the solid truth of God." Dominic Bañez, celebrated among his own, agrees in treating the second part of the second part, question 1, article 1, doubt 4, where this is his second conclusion, "The assent of our faith cannot be reduced to acquired faith, by which we believe the Church to be truthful, as if to the rule or formal reason for believing." And afterwards he adjoins, "This conclusion is so certain that its opposite seems to us to be not only rash, but even erroneous in faith." From which it is evident that neither is this the state of the question between us and the Papists: Whether, namely, the proper reason and principal foundation of the faith which we give to Scripture is the authority of the Church.

XVI. But what the proper reason of our faith is, the same Cano thus explains in the oft-cited place, "But to these three certain and stable opinions this is also conjoined, that the ultimate resolution of our faith is made to the interior efficient cause, that is, to God moving to belief, for instance, to this article, 'God is triune,' and to this, 'The Church cannot err,' and to all the other principles of Christian doctrine, I assent through infused faith, not because John said it, or anyone else, but because God revealed it: but to this, 'God revealed it,' I believe immediately, moved by God through a special instinct." And so, on the part of the object, the formal reason moving is divine truth revealed: but that, nevertheless, does not suffice to move, unless the interior cause, that is, God also moving by a gratuitous and special concurrence, is present. The same is taught by Thomas Stapleton in that first question, article 2, where this is his third conclusion, "God revealing is properly and absolutely the formal object of faith." And he proves it by the example of the faith of the Prophets and Apostles, who had no other formal object of their faith: from which he concludes that the faith of all has the same object; since the faith of all is one. But in the same place, in response to the third argument, these are his words, "Absolutely and per se, the ultimate resolution of things to be believed is to God who is truthful, or to God revealing inwardly in the heart, according to that saying of John the Baptist, 'He whom God has sent utters the words of God,' and 'Whoever receives his testimony sets his seal to this, that God is truthful,' John 3[:33-34]." Finally, this is the common opinion of the Scholastics, that the assent of our faith is ultimately resolved into the interior motion of the Holy Spirit, as can be seen in the commentators on Thomas in the second part of the second part, question 1.

XVII. And so those Doctors want the voice and testimony of the Church to be a cause without which we would not believe, and, as they say, a certain condition of the object of our faith because the Church is the means through which God reveals and proposes things to be believed. Yet they do not want our faith to be reduced to the testimony of the Church as if to the supreme and ultimate reason for believing, but to God revealing and the Holy Spirit illuminating, as Bañez accurately teaches in the place which we have now cited. And similarly Stapleton, whose these words are in the article indicated by us more than once, "Faith which begins from the testimony of the Church, insofar as it proposes and induces to faith, ends in God revealing within, and teaching within what the Church preached without. For the preaching of the Church teaches outwardly, proposes, induces, assists: but he who teaches within has his chair in heaven, as Augustine teaches." By which internal teacher once approaching, the saying of the Samaritan woman has a place, "It is no longer because of what you said that we believe, for we have heard for ourselves, and we know that this is indeed the Saviour of the world" [John 4:42].

XVIII. Nor do the Scholastic Doctors deny that the faith which we give to divine revelation is a prudent assent, that is, that he who believes the word of God is moved to it by certain arguments, which can persuade a prudent man that the word of God is truly what is proposed to him as such. Although the certainty of faith does not depend on those arguments, or properly rest on them: as can especially be seen in Gregory of Valentia, Analysis of Faith, Book 1, Chapter 1, where these are his words, "But because divine revelation is not evidently apparent to human reason, certain other arguments besides divine revelation are needed, by which men, having also been induced, may prudently

persuade themselves that Christian doctrine is true. But such arguments are not required for that matter, so that on account of them men may properly, certainly and firmly believe (for the certainty and firmness of faith, and thus its assent, per se rests on divine revelation alone, as on a foundation). But that they may have certain clearer motives by which they may prudently induce their mind to will to believe certainly and firmly, with the help of God, on account of divine revelation. For two motions of the mind should be accurately distinguished in those who embrace the faith. For they also, with prudence dictating, judge that the doctrine of Christ is worthy to be certainly and firmly believed, and finally they believe by the assent of faith, assisted by God, that it is true. As for what they believe by the certain and firm assent of faith, assisted by God, that the doctrine of Christ is true, that indeed ought to be referred to the divine testimony alone, which is contained in divine revelation, as if indeed to the cause and reason for believing. And likewise, to the proposition of the Church, as if to a certain condition, without which it would certainly not be believed by Christian faith. But as for what they in the first place prudently deliberate upon, and determine that that doctrine can be believed by them as divine and true with certainty and firmness, that is indeed a certain judgment of prudence, which properly rests on arguments other than divine revelation." To which Melchior Cano hands down things agreeing in Book 2, Chapter 8, Response to Argument 4: "It is necessary," he says, "not only that those things which are of faith should be simply proposed to him who is about to believe by a man, as if first principles to a disciple, but there is also need to apply a certain external persuasion, and human incentive." And he proves it by the examples of those who were moved to believe by miracles and other reasons. And afterwards he also adds, "With which things set forth, it can easily be understood, as I think, that those things are true which were said a little before, that is, that it behooves certain human and external aids to intervene for believing: yet that they are not suitable per se, nor is the resolution of our faith made to them, but to the interior divine cause, which excites and moves so that we may believe." And this is also the common opinion of the Roman school, with no one, as far as I know, dissenting: so that it is superfluous to accumulate more testimonies.

XIX. But, you will say, what then is finally the state of the controversy about the authority of Scripture? For in the points reviewed up to now there seems to be agreement between the Orthodox and the Papists. Or perhaps is there only here a dispute about a name? Certainly not. Here there is a great and very important disagreement between both sides. For the understanding of which it should be noted, 1. that there are certain revelations which are not made known to us except through another revelation, from which they borrow their authority with respect to us. Thus, for example, the revelation once made to Balaam became known to us through the revelation made to Moses. And I say the same about that fragment of the prophecy of Enoch, to which the Epistle of Jude grants authority. But since there cannot be an infinite regress in this matter, nor should a circle be admitted, by which one revelation would be proven through another, and this in turn through that other one: it is necessary that there be given a certain revelation which is first with respect to us, which obtains faith among us per se and on account of itself, but not by the benefit of a certain better known revelation.

XX. Moreover, it should be known that, speaking accurately, a distinction can be applied between the proper and, as the Schools say, formal reason of faith, if it is considered simply

and absolutely; and between a certain external principle of faith, or external rule of things to be believed. The proper and formal reason of faith was, is, and will always be the same among all the faithful, namely, the revelation of God, in whatever way that revelation may be made, whether by the immediate inspiration of God, or through men, or through Angels, or through Scripture, or apart from Scripture. For to all the faithful this is the perpetual formal reason for believing the things of faith and religion, namely, because God has revealed such things. But it did not seem good to God to reveal privately to individual believers what would be necessary for the salvation of each one, but for preserving unity and communion in the Church, and so that the wiles of Satan might be met, God always wanted there to be extant in the Church a certain common, external and public revelation, which would be the rule of faith, to which all dogmas of faith were to be applied, and from which every contention about matters of faith was to be decided and ended. Such a rule of faith before the Law was given were the voices of the Patriarchs, and the living oracles of God. But after the Law had been given through Moses and committed to writing, the rule of faith in the Church was the written Law of Moses itself, and the revelations made afterwards to the Prophets and also consigned to writing. But after the advent of Christ, this rule has been made larger and ampler by the addition of the New Testament. And so now the rule of our faith in the Christian Church is the Scripture of the Old and New Testament.

XXI. Thirdly, it should be noted that the resolution of our faith can be made in two ways, with respect to the object and with respect to the subject, or with respect to us and with respect to others. With respect to us, and with respect to the subject, faith is resolved when it is asked what is the internal principle of faith, and that in which the conscience of each one rests, and it is not permitted to proceed further. But with respect to the object, and with respect to others, our faith is resolved when it is asked what is the ultimate foundation of our faith, which we can put forward and indicate to another. But that ultimate foundation of our faith which we can indicate to another must necessarily be some external principle of faith, and a certain external rule of faith, in which one must stop, and than which no other further one is given.

XXII. Now to apply these things to the present matter, it is agreed between us and the Papists, as is clear from what has been said before, that the proper reason for our faith, simply and per se, is divine revelation, in whatever way that revelation may be made, nor is there any controversy between us on this matter. It is also agreed that that ultimate thing in which the conscience of each believer rests is the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit. But it is not agreed what is that revelation today which is first and best known with respect to us, which must be received by us per se and on account of itself, but not on account of any other revelation which is better known to us and of greater authority; and thus what is the first and most common external principle of faith, through which all things must be proven, but which itself is proven by none prior. We assert that this revelation is contained in sacred Scripture: For the word of God, comprehended in the books of the Old and New Testament, is such that it ought to obtain faith among us per se; but not through some other word of God, and a certain divine revelation, which bears public and external testimony to it, which is better known and more certain to the faithful than Scripture itself. Nor is there any rule of faith, or any external principle of faith, which is prior to sacred

Scripture, and by which Scripture can be proven as if from something prior. But it is the first and most common rule of all things which pertain to faith, itself to be examined by no other rule. And so if someone asks why you believe this or that dogma, for example, that God is triune and one, and that the faithful are to be baptized in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, we respond: because this is contained in Scripture divinely inspired, and we indicate the place. But if we are further asked why we believe that Scripture to be divine, we no longer put forward another principle of faith by which Scripture is proven: but we advise that one must stop at that principle. We do indeed adduce arguments by which we try to prove that Scripture is divine, and that it is rightly believed as divine. Yet those arguments are not the principles of our faith properly so called, and that foundation on which our faith chiefly rests: But we believe Scripture, that is, God speaking in the Scriptures, immediately, moved to that by the internal impulse of the Holy Spirit.

XXIII. But the Papists do not want sacred Scripture to immediately and per se merit and obtain faith among us; but they teach that there is another divine revelation through which Scripture must necessarily be proven, so that it may be publicly established concerning it in the Church. And this revelation for them is the voice and testimony of the Church, that is, the teaching of the leaders of the Church. For they want God himself to speak today through the pastors of the Church, as through infallible organs, as far as the doctrine of faith is concerned, just as he once spoke through the Prophets and Apostles. And so they admit indeed that Scripture is the rule of faith, but a subordinate and partial one, which needs to be proven by a superior and broader rule. Therefore, to prove the dogmas of faith, they do indeed bring forward the authority of sacred Scripture. But if they are asked why they give credence to sacred Scripture, they say they do it on account of the testimony of their Church, and in this testimony, as the supreme one among the external principles of faith, they must necessarily rest, if indeed they want to stand by their positions. We indeed also bring forward the constant testimony of the Church to prove the authority of some sacred book: but not like them, as if it were some principle of faith to which our faith must be subjected: but only as a certain argument from posteriority, valid indeed and good, but not entirely divine and infallible.

XXIV. And from that arises that celebrated question about the authority of Scripture. With us asserting that the authority of Scripture among us is supreme, and not borrowed from elsewhere: because Scripture has no revelation above itself, as some other principle of faith by which it can be proven. But the Papists contending that the authority of Scripture depends on the authority of the Church: because they think that the testimony of the Church is a certain principle of faith superior to Scripture, and by which Scripture needs to be proven so that it may be publicly established concerning it among the faithful.

XXV. But so that the difference between the Papist opinion and ours may appear more distinctly, and in what the hinge of the controversy is placed, it should be known that the Papists so compare sacred Scripture with the teaching of the Church, as we compare some particular dogma of faith with sacred Scripture. For just as some article of faith, as for example, that the dead will one day rise again, has its truth and authority in itself from God alone, but not from the testimony of the Prophets and Apostles, who wrote the books of

Scripture: so the Papists admit that sacred Scripture has its authority in itself from God alone, not from the testimony of the Church. Then, just as the principal reason for faith, by which we embrace that dogma, is not properly the authority of Peter, Paul, Isaiah, etc., but divine revelation transmitted to us by their pen, since before Scripture that dogma was believed, and can still be believed apart from Scripture. So the Papists confess that the testimony of the Church is not the proper and principal reason for our faith about Scripture, but simply and absolutely divine revelation. Yet again, as that dogma, and any other similar one, ought not to be publicly received in the Church, and proposed to be believed, except insofar as it is proven by the testimonies of Scripture from which alone it can be publicly established to the faithful that something pertains to faith, and thus the authority of any dogma with respect to us, and public and external certainty depends on the testimony of sacred Scripture: So the Papists want the authority of Scripture with respect to us to depend on the testimony of the Church, and for it not to be publicly established to the faithful concerning the divinity of any book, except from the approbation and testification of the Church. Finally, just as, notwithstanding that dependence of dogmas on Scripture, the dogmas of the Christian religion can be proven and persuaded by many arguments besides the testimonies of Scripture, which arguments nevertheless are not the reason and foundation of our faith, but only certain motives inducing to faith: So the Papists also do not deny that sacred Scripture, besides the testimony of the Church, has many arguments and marks of divinity, by which it can be proven and persuaded, but which nevertheless cannot found public faith in the Church concerning the divinity of Scripture.

XXVI. From which things we think it is sufficiently clear what controversy we have here with the Doctors of the Roman Church. Namely this, whether Scripture is the first rule of faith and the first external principle of faith which therefore cannot be proven by any other principle, nor borrows its authority from elsewhere. Or whether the teaching and testimony of the Church is the principle and rule of faith, better known and more evident to us than Scripture itself, and by which Scripture must necessarily be proven, so that it may be publicly established concerning it among the faithful: We assert the former: The Papists the latter, who by the Church, as was just said, understand the Pastors of the present Church, and especially the Roman Pontiff.

XXVII. But from that their error is refuted because Scripture is something better known among the faithful than the Church itself is. And this because it is agreed among all Christians what the true Scriptures are, at least as to the principal parts, as is clear by induction. For the Greeks, Armenians, Ethiopians, Papists, Protestants, and if there are still any sects of Christians today, by common consent acknowledge that the books, which our Churches hold as Canonical, are truly Canonical. The Papists indeed add certain other books to the Canon of the Old Testament: but concerning those which we deem Canonical they agree with us. But if any have denied or despised the Scriptures altogether, which in the memory of our fathers the Libertines are thought to have done, they were very few, and of no name, and quickly passed away. But it is not agreed what is the true Church: but each sect claims to be the true Church. Nor do the Greek, Armenian and Ethiopian Churches hold the Roman Church to be the true Church of God, or think themselves bound by its authority in any way.

XXVIII. Add that no Pope, no Council, no Assembly of Pastors has so many and such illustrious marks and arguments of its authority as sacred Scripture has of its divinity. For sacred Scripture is commended by very many things enumerated by us in the preceding Theses; The predictions of future things which are contained in it, the holiness, sublimity and efficacy of the doctrine which it hands down, the majesty and simplicity of its style, the agreement of the Old and New Testament, the miracles done in confirmation of it, the kind of life of those who first handed it down, the perpetual care of God in preserving it, the constancy of the martyrs in defending its truth, the consent of the peoples, and the testimony of the enemies themselves. But what Council or what multitude of Pastors impresses its authority with so many and such remarkable arguments? And here the conscience of our adversaries must be appealed to, whether it is not, namely, better known that the writings of Moses and Paul are divine and authentic than that the Council of Florence, Trent, or the Lateran are legitimate Councils, and which had the infallible guidance of the Holy Spirit.

XXIX. Moreover, Scripture is more certain to the faithful than the testimony of those who are in charge of the Church, and therefore does not borrow its authority from them. For the authority of the Pastors of the Church is not more certain today to the faithful than the authority of the Apostles was to the first Christians. But when the Apostles were formerly living and preaching, their testimony was less certain to the faithful than the testimony of Scripture, as is clear from the words of Peter, 2 Peter, chapter 1, where, speaking to those who had already received the faith, after he testified that he had heard the voice from heaven saying to Christ, "This is my beloved Son, with whom I am well pleased," he adds that the faithful have another testimony about Christ that is firmer, namely, that of the Prophets in the holy Scriptures, "For," he says, "we did not follow cleverly devised myths when we made known to you the power and coming of our Lord Jesus Christ, but we were eyewitnesses of his majesty. For when he received honour and glory from God the Father, and the voice was borne to him by the Majestic Glory, 'This is my beloved Son, with whom I am well pleased,' we ourselves heard this very voice borne from heaven, for we were with him on the holy mountain. And we have the prophetic word more fully confirmed, to which you will do well to pay attention as to a lamp shining in a dark place" [2 Peter 1:16-19].

XXX. Add that sacred Scripture has greater authority in every respect among the faithful than the testimony of the Pastors of the Church. For the testimony of the Pastors of the Church is not greater today than the testimony of John the Baptist was formerly. But the testimony of Scripture was greater than the testimony of John the Baptist: as our Lord Christ manifestly teaches in John, chapter 5, where he places that testimony which the sacred Scriptures bore to him before the testimony of John the Baptist. "You sent to John," he says, "and he has borne witness to the truth. Not that the testimony that I receive is from man, but I say these things so that you may be saved. He was a burning and shining lamp, and you were willing to rejoice for a while in his light. But the testimony that I have is greater than that of John" [John 5:33-36]. And afterwards he brings forward a threefold testimony greater than the testimony of John: and indeed first, the miraculous works which he was doing. "For the works," he says, "that the Father has given me to accomplish, the very works that I am doing, bear witness about me that the Father has sent me" [John

5:36]. Then the voice of the Father from heaven bearing witness, "And the Father who sent me has himself borne witness about me" [John 5:37]. And finally the testimony of sacred Scripture. For he adjoins, "You search the Scriptures because you think that in them you have eternal life; and it is they that bear witness about me" [John 5:39].

XXXI. Moreover, according to the adversaries, there is no testimony of the Church more illustrious and solemn than that which is given in the Councils and Decrees of the Popes. But the common sense of the faithful dictates that no Councils have so great authority as sacred Scripture has: For no one would dare to equate any Council, whether Nicene, Chalcedonian, Tridentine, or any other, in authority with the writings of Moses and the books of the Prophets. Nor have even those who are most devoted to the Popes yet so hardened their forehead as to dare to equate the Papal Epistles with the Epistles of Paul and the four Gospels. Which the practice of the Romanist doctors teaches. For when they arrange the places from which Theological arguments are drawn, they always assign the first place to Scripture, but the later place to the Councils and the Decrees of the Fathers. And indeed they so venerate Scripture, as is fitting, that they acknowledge that no error, even the smallest, can be found in it. But, although they want the Councils to be infallible as far as the dogmas of faith are concerned, yet they acknowledge that in many other things they are liable to error, and that their conclusions are indeed de fide, but that the Councils can use arguments that are not good: And although they do not err in the question of law, yet they often are deceived in the question of fact. Add that the Pastors and Doctors of the Church use the testimonies of sacred Scripture to gain authority for their teaching: and their teaching can and ought to be brought back to the examination of sacred Scripture. Hence it is that the faithful Bereans are praised who, having heard Paul's preaching, consulted the Scriptures to see if these things were so. Acts 17. Since, therefore, sacred Scripture has greater authority among the faithful than the Pastors of the Church, without doubt it does not receive its authority from their testimony, since what has greater authority cannot receive authority from what has less. For nothing can confer authority greater than that which it has itself.

XXXII. But how could the authority of Scripture with respect to us depend on the authority of the Church, when on the contrary the authority of the Church with respect to us depends on the authority of Scripture. For from Scripture we learn what is the true Church, and what and how great is its authority. Nor can that authority be certainly proven from elsewhere. And so the fathers of old referred the heretics who did not acknowledge the true Church of Christ to the Scriptures, and thought that the true Church should be demonstrated from them. For thus Augustine deals with the Donatists: "Whether they hold the Church," he says, "let them show only from the Canonical books of the divine Scriptures." And the Papists themselves today try to prove their Church, and its infallible authority, against us from sacred Scripture, and think that they fulfill that duty excellently while they bring forward to us those passages of Scripture. "I am with you always, to the end of the age" [Matt. 28:20], "I have prayed for you, Peter, that your faith may not fail" [Luke 22:32], "The Spirit will guide you into all the truth" [John 16:13], "Tell it to the church" [Matt. 18:17], and certain similar ones which they bring forward as the foundations of that authority which they attribute to the Church. Since, therefore, by their own admission, the authority of the Church becomes known to us from Scripture, and no

more certain proof of it can be brought forward, it is plain that conversely the certainty of our faith about Scripture does not rest on the testimony of the Church, as its principal foundation. Otherwise a circle will be admitted here. For the authority of Scripture will be proven through the Church, and in turn the authority of the Church through Scripture; And again there will be a return from Scripture to the Church, and so on to infinity.

XXXIII. To this it is added that the Papists teach that Scripture in the hands of the Church is like letters which they call credentials, that is, by which credence is given to someone who is sent by a superior, and by which we are referred to him, so that we may be more fully informed about the mind and will of the sender: For so they want the Church to exhibit Scripture to us, as a diploma by which its divine calling and authority is confirmed, and sealed to us. And by which we are referred to it, so that we may be more fully taught about the will of God. But the authority of those letters, which they call credentials, does not depend on him who exhibits them: but on the contrary his authority becomes known to us and is confirmed through those letters. And he who brings the letters is not the reason why we believe the letters: but we believe him on account of those letters by which credence is given to him.

XXXIV. It is amazing how the Papists respond to this Argument. For Stapleton, who seems to have treated this controversy most accurately of all, concedes that the authority of the Church with respect to us depends on the authority of Scripture. But he denies that it follows from this that the authority of Scripture does not in turn depend on the authority of the Church. And he tries to prove it by certain instances adduced as the reason for his denial. For, he says, the authority of Christ with respect to us depended on the authority of John the Baptist. For John was sent to bear witness to Christ, and that all might believe in Christ through him. And yet in turn the authority of the Baptist with respect to us depended on the testimony of Christ. For Christ bore testimony to the Baptist, and confirmed his calling. But this Instance, and similar ones which he brings forward, do nothing for the matter. For by this it is only shown that two certain things can bear witness to each other mutually, and prove each other. But not that two things are so related that the authority of the first depends on the authority of the second, and in turn the authority of the second on the authority of the first, at least with respect to the same people. For it is indeed true that the Baptist bore witness to Christ, and pointed him out, and led men to Christ. But yet the authority of Christ did not depend on the authority of the Baptist, nor did those who had been led to Christ and had acknowledged Christ by the Baptist's indication believe in Christ on account of the testimony of the Baptist, as the principal foundation of their faith. Nor was the authority of John the Baptist greater and more certain with respect to them than the authority of Christ. And so we grant indeed that the authority of John the Baptist depended on the authority of Christ, but we utterly deny that the authority of Christ in turn depended on the authority of John the Baptist. And certainly it is impossible for two things to be so related that the authority of one depends on the authority of the other, and vice versa, at least with respect to the same people, and at the same time. For that whose authority depends on another is less certain and known with respect to us than that on which it depends. Thus, if the authority of the Church with respect to us depends on the authority of Scripture, then the authority of Scripture is more certain and better known with respect to us. But if in turn the authority of Scripture

depends on the authority of the Church, then Scripture will be less certain and known with respect to us. And thus the authority of Scripture will at the same time be more certain and less certain, better known and less known with respect to us than the authority of the Church, which implies a contradiction. But here the question is not simply whether Scripture can be proven through the Church, and the Church in turn through Scripture. But whether the authority of Scripture, properly speaking, depends on the authority of the Church, as on some principle of faith which is more certain and better known with respect to us.

XXXV. Secondly, Stapleton responds that the authority of the Church indeed depends on the authority of Scripture with respect to us, yet not in such a way that the Church cannot become known from elsewhere than through sacred Scripture. For, he says, apart from Scripture the faithful learn from the Creed that the Church exists and that it must be believed. But certainly the Creed does not have authority per se, but takes its authority from sacred Scripture, from which it is entirely derived. Nor is the Creed anything other than a declaration of those things which the faithful, according to sacred Scripture, profess to believe. Moreover, it follows from this that the authority of the Creed with respect to us is better known than the authority of the Church itself, which greatly goes against the adversaries, who contend that the authority of the Creed, as of all other things to be believed, depends on the authority of the Church, as on a certain principle of faith better known and a more evident argument. For the Church, according to the adversaries, is itself that which composes the Creeds, and grants them that authority. Add that in the Creed we profess to believe in one holy Catholic Church. But the Creed does not teach what is that holy and Catholic Church, whether, namely, the Roman, rather than the Greek or Ethiopian. Nor can that be elicited from the Creed by any proofs. But so that the authority of Scripture may be confirmed for us through the authority of the Church, in the way the Papists want, it is not enough for us to know in general that there is a Church on earth, but it is necessary for us to know determinately what is the true Church, namely, endowed with divine and infallible authority.

XXXVI. Moreover, that the certainty of faith, by which the faithful embrace sacred Scripture as the rule of faith, does not depend on some public and solemn judgment of the Church, by which the divine authority of Scripture is confirmed as if by a divine oracle, is evident from the fact that, apart from any such judgment, Scripture was publicly known and received as the Canon of faith for many centuries. For through some centuries from the time of the Apostles, no Council, nor any Pope, fixed a certain Canon of Scripture, and drew up a catalogue of the sacred books. For the first Council in which the number of the Canonical books was reviewed was that of Laodicea, which was not held before the three hundredth year after the birth of Christ, and was still particular, not general. But before that Council the Canon of Scripture was certain, and the authority of Scripture certain to the faithful. Nor was the scope of the Synod of Laodicea, as of the subsequent Councils which reviewed the number of the sacred books, to acquire some new authority for those books, but only to indicate and declare which ones were already Canonical.

XXXVII. Nor can recourse be had here to some tradition of the Church, as if before the Councils which defined the number of the sacred books, the tradition of the Church was

the foundation of faith about Scripture. For the Papists want tradition to be indeed the means which the Church uses in judging those things which are of faith, yet they want tradition to be doubtful, no less than the books of Scripture, and not to be a certain foundation of faith, before it has been approved by the public judgment of the Church.

XXXVIII. Nor is the fiction of Stapleton any more to the point, who distinguishes a twofold testimony of the Church. One solemn and express; which, namely, the Church gives in universal Councils and the Decrees of the Fathers. The other tacit and interpretive, by which the Church is thought to approve those things which it allows to be taught by its ministers, and to be held by the faithful people: as if the Church before the determination of the Councils had already pronounced judgment concerning the Canonical books, and had borne witness, not indeed that solemn and express one; but that other tacit and interpretive one: insofar, namely, as it allowed the Pastors to hand down the books of Scripture to the faithful as Canonical, and did not disapprove of the faith of the faithful accepting them. For that judgment, or testimony, which he calls interpretive, could not found the faith of the faithful, nor did the faith of Christians depend on it, since that judgment follows the faith of the faithful, it does not precede it. For what the Church allows to be done is understood to be and to be done, before the Church allows and suffers it to be done. And so I ask the Papists what foundation that faith of the ancient Christians had, which the Church tolerated, and which it is thought to have approved by its tolerance. For certainly that faith which is conceived as something prior to that tolerance could not rest on the tolerance of the Church, and tacit consent.

XXXIX. Then, whatever may be the case concerning that tacit testimony of the Church, at least as far as certain Canonical books are concerned, the Papists teach that for some time the Church did not pronounce its opinion on them; for they say that some of the books of the New Testament were formerly doubted, because the Church had not sufficiently testified its mind about them. But although some doubted about them, yet among most Churches those books were publicly received even then, and held as divine and authentic. From which it is clear that the public testimony of the Church is not necessary so that the divinity of any book can be publicly established, and the faithful may be certain about it. Since before the determination of the Church about those books, about which some doubted, the authority of them was certain and publicly acknowledged in the greatest part of the Christian world. For although the Epistles of Jude and James seemed to some to be spurious, as Eusebius says: yet, by the testimony of the same, among others they were genuine, and publicly received. And similarly, although some rejected the Apocalypse of John, yet the Churches founded by John, as Tertullian says, defended its authority. And the matter stands the same way concerning the Epistle to the Hebrews. For although it was doubted about for some time in the Latin Church, yet Jerome teaches in his Epistle to Dardanus that the Churches of the East venerated it as divine and Apostolic.

XL. But if it pleases to go back to the times of the Old Testament, when the Prophets were publishing their books, those books had authority both de jure and de facto among the faithful of the Israelite people, before the priests placed over the Church at that time had approved those books, and declared them to be divine. Indeed, since most of them had been sent by God for that purpose especially, to reprove the vices and sloth of the Priests,

they had them for the most part as adversaries; and yet notwithstanding that repugnance of the Priests, the books of the Prophets were held and acknowledged as divine and authentic. Which is especially clear from the example of Jeremiah. For in chapter 8 of his book he thus rebukes those who were then in charge of the Jewish people. "How can you say, 'We are wise, and the law of the Lord is with us'? But behold, the lying pen of the scribes has made it into a lie. The wise men shall be put to shame; they shall be dismayed and taken; behold, they have rejected the word of the Lord, so what wisdom is in them? From prophet to priest, everyone deals falsely" [Jer. 8:8-10]. And so in chapter 18 we see that those leaders of the Church rose up against Jeremiah, saying, "Come, let us make plots against Jeremiah, for the law shall not perish from the priest, nor counsel from the wise, nor the word from the prophet. Come, let us strike him with the tongue, and let us not pay attention to any of his words" [Jer. 18:18]. And yet although the leaders of the Jewish Church thus opposed Jeremiah, far from approving his prophecies, yet, I say, Jehoiakim is most severely rebuked, because he had rejected the authority of his prophecies copied by Baruch, and had cut them with a scribe's knife and burned them, as is contained in Jeremiah chapter 36. But according to the positions of the Papists, what great crime was that king committing, in not holding as divine a writing which had not yet been approved by the judgment of the Church, indeed was then being opposed by the leaders of the Church?

XLI. Finally, since by the Church on whose authority the authority of Scripture with respect to us depends, the Papists understand the Pastors and Bishops who govern the Church, we ask them on what the authority of Scripture depends with respect to the Pastors themselves, and whence it is established for them that these books are divine, and inspired by God. Certainly here they cannot have recourse to the judgment of the Church, by which the faith of the Pastors about Scripture may be founded. For the Pastors and Bishops are the very Church whose testimony and judgment is in question: and thus those Pastors would learn from themselves what are the true Scriptures, and their faith would be founded on its own testimony: for lest there be any place for exception, we will take as an example those who first pronounced some such judgment, and could not rest on the judgment of other pastors. And yet the adversaries do not want the Pastors of the Church to be driven by enthusiasms, and to have knowledge of Scripture from the immediate revelation of God. Since enthusiasms and immediate revelations no longer have a place in the Church of God. But they determine that the Bishops and Doctors of the Church come to that knowledge, indeed by the Holy Spirit teaching and leading, but yet also by means of their own study and diligence, and accurate consideration of the books themselves, and diligent examination of the many arguments which the Holy Spirit uses to generate faith about Scripture in them. But what is absurd, if we say that the faithful are led by the Holy Spirit into the knowledge of sacred Scripture in that way? At least it manifestly follows from this that it can be established for us concerning sacred Scripture apart from enthusiasm, and immediate revelation, and yet also apart from some authentic and infallible judgment of the Church.

Part IV

In which the objections of Adversaries are solved.

I. In the immediately preceding disputation we explained the state of this question, and confirmed the true opinion with those arguments which seemed to us most suitable. It remains for us to examine the arguments of the adversaries, and to show their vanity, as briefly and clearly as can be done by us.

II. First, therefore, they try to prove that the authority of Scripture depends on the authority of the Church in this way. Scripture, they say, cannot be proven by Scripture. Therefore, so that Scripture may be established among the faithful, it is necessary that there be some divine and infallible testimony by which Scripture is proven. But this testimony can be no other than the testimony of the Church, than which there is none more certain and august on earth. But if you say that Scripture in many places asserts itself to be divine, they retort that for us to believe Scripture asserting itself to be divine, it is necessary that we are already persuaded of its divinity from elsewhere. For it is not enough for a writing to be held as divine that it asserts itself to be divine: which most of the Apocryphal books did, which were nevertheless rightly rejected. And certainly it seems manifest that Scripture cannot be proven by Scripture itself from the fact that every proof is from things better known. But the same thing is not better and less well known than itself. Nor is anything proven from Scripture to one ignorant of the authority of Scripture, or doubting about Scripture.

III. I respond that this argument is a mere fallacy by which the Papists can be urged just as much as we can. For thus it can be retorted against them. The voice and testimony of the Church is not the supreme rule of faith, but its authority depends on some other principle of faith better known and more certain to us. For it is necessary that there be another divine testimony, better known and more certain than the testimony of the Church, through which the testimony of the Church may be established. And this because the authority and testimony of the Church cannot be proven through the testimony of the Church itself. Since the same thing is not better and less well known than itself, nor can anything be proven from the testimony of the Church to one ignorant of the authority of the Church, or doubting about the authority of the Church. And so, if this argument is worth anything, it overthrows all faith whatsoever: since no rule of faith can be brought forward, as first and supreme, against which it is not permitted to use a similar argument.

IV. But so that the fraud and vice of this argument may be detected, it must be reduced to form. Therefore, they must argue in this way: What is not evident of itself, nor can prove itself, that is not the first principle of faith, and the supreme rule of faith, whose authority does not depend on something else, but it is necessary that it be proven through something else. But Scripture is not something evident, nor can it prove itself. Therefore, etc. But now the major of this argument is manifestly false. For it is plainly necessary, on the contrary, that what is the first principle of faith neither prove itself, nor be proven by something else; and yet not be something evident. For just as in the human disciplines there are certain first principles, on which the rest depend, and through which the rest are proven, yet they themselves depend neither on themselves, nor on others in this genus, otherwise they

would not be first, but obtain credence and assent per se: so also the matter stands in the doctrine of faith. For either a circle must be admitted here, or an infinite regress be granted, both of which are absurd: so that it is necessary to stop at some principle, on which the rest which pertain to faith may depend, and through which they may be proven, yet it itself is proven by no prior thing, of course, nor even by itself, since the same thing cannot be proven by itself: but obtains faith and assent per se, and to which we believe and assent immediately.

V. In this indeed the principles of faith differ from the principles of the sciences, that the principles of the sciences are known per se and are evident, and compel the intellect to assent by their own light: but the principles of faith, although they have some moral evidence, yet, speaking logically and properly, are inevident, nor do they obtain assent, such as faith requires, by their own light. Yet in this they agree that just as we assent to natural principles immediately, through the natural light of the intellect: So also we believe the principles of faith immediately, through the illumination and impulse of the Holy Spirit. But as nothing hinders natural principles from sometimes being proven a posteriori: so also the principles of faith can indeed be proven; but a posteriori, and only to the man.

VI. From that, therefore, it is plain that in the business of faith we must come to some principle, which is neither evident of itself, nor can be proven by itself, and yet does not depend on any prior principle, but merits authority and faith per se. Although, therefore, Scripture is neither evident of itself, nor can prove itself, yet it cannot be concluded from that that it is not that first principle of faith which does not borrow its authority from elsewhere.

VII. And certainly, wherever the Papists may turn, they will be altogether compelled to confess that the testimony of the Church, which they put forward as the first and supreme principle of faith, is not a thing evident per se, nor can it be suitably proven through the voice and testimony of the Church itself. When, therefore, they nevertheless want the testimony of the Church to depend on no other prior authority; but to obtain its authority among the faithful per se, they openly fight against themselves, when from the fact that Scripture cannot be proven by Scripture, they conclude that its authority does not depend on something else, and ought to be proven to us by the authority of the Church, as by a certain principle of faith prior and superior to Scripture itself: since Scripture, as the first principle of faith, obtains faith and assent among the faithful, not by the intervention of such proof, but immediately through the internal efficacy of the Spirit impressing a certain persuasion of it on our minds.

VIII. These things, however, must be rightly accepted. For first, when we concede that sacred Scripture cannot be proven by Scripture itself, we only mean this: that those testimonies by which Scripture preaches that it is divinely inspired are not suitable arguments by which he who denies the authority of sacred Scripture may be convinced and persuaded. But this does not hinder Scripture from being able to be said to prove itself in another sense, insofar as, as was shown in the preceding theses, there are many signs and arguments of divinity in sacred Scripture, by which it asserts itself to be true and divine. Just as heaven and earth preach and show their author to be God, not by some simple voice and testimony, but from the very excellence of their nature, and the vestiges of divine power

and wisdom, which can be noted in them. Or, as some book claims Aristotle and Euclid for itself, not from the title alone, but from the very genius of the doctrine, sharpness of style, and manner of disputing, which is such that it cannot be attributed except to those outstanding minds.

IX. Then, when we say that we believe Scripture immediately, through the internal efficacy of the Holy Spirit, but not by the intervention of some proof, our opinion is not that our faith about sacred Scripture is a blind persuasion, and one which has no reason for itself. Nor by that do we deny that he who believes Scripture, as is fitting, is led to it by certain arguments, which can persuade a prudent man that Scripture is true, and has proceeded from God. For by that word immediately we do not exclude proofs of whatever kind, but only proofs which the schools call de fide, that is, which are sought from some principle of faith, and make the thing to be de fide, and can found an article of faith per se. But of this kind are not the proofs by which the divinity of sacred Scripture is persuaded. For they are not sought from any principle of faith, and from some rule of faith; but only from various marks and signs: and they consist entirely of certain moral arguments, which cannot per se beget that certainty which is required in faith: since the certainty which is owed to faith, of itself and from its genus, equals, if it does not surpass, all certainty which can be born from demonstration. And therefore, although those proofs are aids of faith and motives for believing, yet the full certainty of faith, by which we ought to embrace the sacred books, is not to be referred to them, as to its proper and principal foundation, but rather to the internal persuasion of the Holy Spirit.

X. But when we say that the certainty of our faith about the divinity of Scripture is to be referred immediately to the internal persuasion of the Holy Spirit, the adversaries urge that those things which are of faith, such as that this and that book was written by divine inspiration, are no longer had through immediate revelations, but according to God's ordinance ought to be learned and received from the teaching Church: otherwise a window would be opened to fanatics and Enthusiasts. Resp. When it is said that something is believed immediately, through the illumination and impulse of the Holy Spirit, that can be understood in two ways. First indeed so that the work and ministry of men explaining and commending those things which are to be believed may be excluded; in which way the Apostle Paul had not received the Gospel from man, nor through man, but had been taught it immediately by the Holy Spirit. A revelation of the Spirit of this kind no longer has a place in the Church of God. Nor does the Holy Spirit, commonly and according to the ordinary way, thus reveal to the faithful that these and those books were written by divine inspiration. But faith about Scripture is generated in us through the work and ministry of the Church handing down and commending the sacred books. But in another sense it can be said that Scripture is believed immediately through the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit; namely, so that any extraneous authority may be excluded, whether of some word not written, or of the teaching Church, which is properly called the argument of our faith, by which the Spirit is understood to found our faith. And thus we believe Scripture immediately, since that faith which we give to Scripture, and which the Spirit of God impresses on us, does not properly rest on any external argument and means, nor is founded on some word which is in the mouth of the Church. Just as, from the mind of the Doctors of the Roman Church, that faith which is given to the teaching Church, and

proposing the word of God, which they believe to be in its mouth, does not rest on some other authority, which is diverse from the authority of that word: nor does it have for its argument the testimony and voice of the Church, since the same thing would be the argument of itself, but is immediately from the illumination and instinct of the Holy Spirit. Who nevertheless also, from their mind, uses certain motives by which he may dispose men to give faith to the Church: such as are what they themselves call the marks of the Church. And so by that word immediately we exclude the authority of the Church as the foundation of our faith, but not simply the work and ministry of the teaching Church.

XI. But the adversaries continue to urge us. For, they say, if the faithful immediately received Scripture through the internal illumination and persuasion of the Spirit, but not on account of the teaching and testimony of the Church, as the rule of their faith, it would happen that the faithful, who have the Spirit of God, could infallibly and certainly distinguish the divine books proposed to them from those which are not divine, without the authority and testimony of the Church. But experience is to the contrary. Since, before the judgment and determination of the Church, it was doubted about many books which are truly divine: as for example, about the Epistle to the Hebrews and the Apocalypse of John, and about many other books of the New Testament. But others which were not Canonical and divine were ignorantly held to be such even by pious men. And so that they may urge us more, they say, You Protestants, who boast that you have that Spirit of God by which the sacred and divine books are distinguished from the apocryphal, are not in agreement among yourselves about these books, since the Lutherans doubt about the Epistle of James, and certain others, which the Calvinists admit. And so that they may bring the matter as it were before our eyes, and refute our opinion among our people by experience itself, they read to someone from among our common people a chapter of an Apocryphal book, and likewise a chapter of a Canonical book, with the name of the author and book concealed. Then they ask whether he can discern by the help of the Spirit which is divine, which is not.

XII. Resp. It is indeed true that God bestows his Spirit on all the faithful who leads them into the knowledge of his word: and that they, as John says, have an anointing from the Holy One which teaches them about all things. But not all equally partake of that spirit of faith and wisdom: Nor does God dispense it to all and each in an equal measure: but imparts a greater supply of that spirit to some, but a lesser to others. Nor does that unction teach all the faithful about all things simply, but at least about all things which are congruent to the calling of each one, and which are necessary for the salvation and knowledge of each one, according to his state and condition, and the place which he holds in the Church of God. From which it happens that he who is endowed with faith, and with the knowledge of divine things, as much as suffices for salvation, can nevertheless err in some chapter of faith, and not acknowledge some part of the word of God. And so Paul in Philippians chapter 3, wants those who are perfect to bear with those who think otherwise, and to maintain communion with them as with brothers, meanwhile until God reveals to them that to which they have not yet attained. "Let those of us who are mature think this way, and if in anything you think otherwise, God will reveal that also to you. Only let us hold true to what we have attained."

XIII. But now for the salvation of each individual it is not necessary that he receive and acknowledge each individual book of Scripture, and each individual part of them. And so it is no wonder if all who have received the spirit of faith and revelation, at least in some degree, nevertheless are ignorant of certain parts of Scripture, and are deceived in this, that they think that some book, which is truly divine, is human: And conversely they consider some book, which is only the offspring of human wit, to have been written by divine inspiration. Indeed it is plainly unjust, and against reason to require from any simple believer that he be able to distinguish by himself immediately any particle of a Canonical book from a small portion of an Apocryphal book. For this is not required for his salvation. Yet it does not follow from that that those who embrace those books rejected or unknown by certain ones, and receive them by faith, I say that they do not do this immediately through the testimony and internal illumination of the Holy Spirit, by which they have been endowed in greater abundance in this part, but by means of the testimony and authority of the Church, as the foundation of their faith.

XIV. And certainly many, whom the Roman Church holds to be truly faithful, can no more distinguish by themselves the genuine testimony of their Church from a supposititious one, and a true and legitimate Council from an illegitimate one, and true Canons from adulterated ones, than believers from among our common people can distinguish a particle of a Canonical book from a particle of an Apocryphal one. And even learned men in that Church dispute about the authority of certain of their Councils, and do not sufficiently agree among themselves whether they are legitimate or otherwise. And yet they maintain that the teaching and testimony of their Church is the supreme rule of faith, whose authority does not depend on any superior authority, and to which the faithful ought to subject themselves immediately, moved and impelled by the Holy Spirit.

XV. Moreover, the Papists strive to prove that the authority of Scripture with respect to us depends on the authority of the Church in this way. Without the authority and testimony of the Church, Scripture is doubtful and uncertain to us. Therefore it is necessary that it be confirmed by some superior authority. But they prove that Scripture is doubtful and uncertain of itself, unless the authority and testimony of the Church is added, from the fact that without that authority it cannot be known with certainty which are the sacred and divine books, which are not. And this because very many writings, fabricated by heretics and vain men, have been attributed and foisted upon the Prophets and Apostles. Nor have whatever things the Prophets and Apostles wrote merited divine authority. For many things are read to have been written by Solomon, and other Prophets, which are not held in the number of the sacred writings. Then also there is scarcely any book of sacred Scripture whose authority has not been called into doubt, or entirely denied, by those who professed to be Christians. For example, the Manicheans denied the authority of the Old Testament, the Ptolemaites of the books of Moses, the Marcionites of the Gospels, except the Gospel of Luke alone, and so on concerning the rest. And even today there is a dispute between us and the Papists about the divine authority of certain books. Since they want many books which we deem Apocryphal to pertain to the Canon of the Old Testament. And also about many books of the New Testament it was formerly doubted among the orthodox themselves, and even today it is doubted among those who seceded from the Roman Church in these last centuries. As for example, about the Epistle of Jude and James,

and certain Epistles of John and Peter. Add that the sacred books have been corrupted, depraved and interpolated by heretics, and many things have been added to or detracted from them. And to certain ones the first part of the eighth chapter of the Gospel according to John is still suspect, where the story about the adulterous woman is had. In such a variety and confusion of opinions, therefore, they say, about the sacred books and their parts, by what certain reason will the truth be able to be found without the authority and judgment of the Church? From where do you know that the books which are attributed to the Prophets and Apostles are truly theirs: And supposing that those books truly have certain ones of the Prophets and Apostles as authors, from where will you know with certainty that they were not written by human diligence, but by divine inspiration, and have come down to us intact, but were not corrupted in various ways by heretics. And from that they conclude that, so that our faith about Scripture may have a firm foundation, it is necessary to have recourse to the authority of the Church, which, namely, by its certain and infallible judgment discerns the divine books from the Apocryphal and supposititious ones, and on which judgment it is permitted for the faithful to securely rely.

XVI. Moreover, they indeed urge and exaggerate these things speciously, but nevertheless, if someone examines that argument, and accurately weighs it, he will easily recognize that it is a mere sophism, which rests on a false presupposition. And so that we may make this clear to the adversaries themselves, we can argue against them plainly in a similar way, and overturn the foundation which they lay under their faith. The authority of the Church is doubtful and uncertain. Therefore the teaching of the Church is not the supreme rule of faith nor does the Church have the first authority with respect to us. But that the authority of the Church is doubtful and uncertain is clear because it is doubted what authority should be attributed to the Church. Whether, namely, an infallible and certain divine authority, as the Papists want: Or, as we think, a great one indeed, but nevertheless human, and liable to error. Then also it is not certain among Christians what is the true Church; but since Christianity is divided into many parts and sects, each one claims to be the true Church. Here therefore we can also ask them: In such a diversity of sects among Christians, by what argument can you demonstrate that the true Church is among you, and that its authority is infallible? For now they cannot have recourse to sacred Scripture whose authority is also called into doubt, and which they want to depend on the authority of the Church as better known and superior. Much less can they put forward the testimony of their own Church itself, about whose authority the question is here asked and disputed. Either, therefore, they will be compelled to be silent here, or they will necessarily have recourse to those indications and marks which they call of the true Church, that is, certain arguments by which they think it can be rendered probable that the Roman Church is the true Church. But here arguments are not sought which only render the matter probable and credible, but by which our faith may rest as on its legitimate foundation, and which certainly prove the matter to be de fide. Then Scripture has far clearer and more illustrious marks of its divinity than the Church, nor are arguments lacking by which it can be strongly persuaded, even if not demonstrated: of which kind many arguments were brought forward and indicated in the first part of these Theses.

XVII. But since the Doctors of the Roman Church want that Ecclesiastical authority to reside especially in the Councils and Pontiffs, their argument can also be strongly retorted

in this part. For I will also prove from this that the authority of the Pontiffs and Councils is not first and supreme, because their authority is doubtful and uncertain. For certain Pontiffs were intruded and created by vice. And there were often many Antipopes who mutually excommunicated each other and declared each other Antichrists. Many Councils also which said they were Ecumenical, and gathered in the name of Christ, favoured heretics, and were not legitimate, such as the Council of Ariminum which favoured the Arians, and the second of Ephesus in which the Eutychians were superior. But the second of Nicaea, and that of Frankfurt under Charlemagne cannot both be legitimate at the same time, but it is necessary that one or the other erred. Since one forbade and prohibited the adoration and worship of images, but the other commanded it under penalty of Anathema. Indeed in the recent Roman Church, such as it is for some centuries now, there were many Councils which each call themselves Ecumenical, of which nevertheless certain ones were reprobated, but others approved, others approved in part and rejected in part. And there is bitter dispute about the authority of certain ones among the Pontifical Doctors. Thus Bellarmine subscribes to the Lateran Council under Leo X, but the Gallican Church does not admit the decisions of that Council. Since it defined that the Roman Pontiff is above the whole Church, and the universal Council. And conversely, the Council of Constance, which many in France receive in its entirety, is rejected by Bellarmine and others as to its first Canons: since it defined that the Council is above the Pontiff. Thus also some among the Papists have venerated the Council of Basel, but others defame it as a Conciliabulum.

XVIII. We therefore can also justly ask the Papists, From where do you know that this or that Council is legitimate, and that Pontiff is not intruded, and created by vice, just as many others, whose successors rescinded their acts, and defamed their memory? By what certain argument can you prove that the Council of Trent was truly gathered in the name of Christ? Is it because it itself says this? But it cannot make credence for itself, and prove itself: and there are many other impious Councils which likewise boast that they are led by the Holy Spirit. Is it because the Roman Pope approved that Council? But he also approved the Lateran one, by whose authority nevertheless not all Papists want to be bound. Then by what certain argument of faith can it be proven that those Pontiffs who approved the Councils were legitimate, and did not occupy their see by force and simoniacally? At least no greater certainty can be had about this matter than historical and moral certainty which does not suffice for faith. Moreover, how will credence be given to anyone that the copies of the Councils and Pontifical Decrees have not been corrupted, and nothing has been added to or detracted from them; when it is certain that many decrees were attributed to the Pontiffs, and the acts of very many Councils were corrupted and depraved? Nor will a new declaration of the Pontiff or of some Council remove this doubt. For the same difficulties will be moved against this last Council as against the former, and so on to infinity. And so, if the reasoning of the Papists against the certainty and authority of sacred Scripture has a place, the authority of the Church and of the Councils and Pontiffs will also be overturned: nor will any foundation of faith remain.

XIX. Indeed I dare to say that no foundation of faith can even be imagined in the mind against which it is not permitted to use similar cavils. For whatever will be brought forward as the first rule of faith, it is necessary that it be something logically inevident, and which

cannot be properly demonstrated. For the principles of faith, from the common consent of Theologians and Scholastics, are inevident and indemonstrable. And besides it is necessary that it cannot be proven from other principles of faith as prior and better known, otherwise it would not be the first rule, but some prior one would be granted. From which it necessarily follows that the first rule of faith, whose authority is supreme with respect to us, is something which cannot be proven by arguments de fide a priori, and about which also the questions of profane men cannot be satisfied through demonstrations, and utterly necessary and evident reasons.

XX. But so that the vanity of that sophism may appear more clearly, it should be noted that many things are presupposed in it which are altogether false. And indeed first it supposes that everything is doubtful and uncertain to us which is denied by many, and about which there are many who doubt. But if this is admitted, nothing at all certain will remain. For there is scarcely anything so certain and evident about which it has not been doubted by many; indeed which has not been denied by many. Thus it will not be certain to us from the aspect of heaven and earth that God exists, since the Epicureans and Atheists deny this. Nor will the first principles of the sciences be certain and indubitable to us, since the Pyrrhonists, who took away all assent, doubted about those also. Nor will the authority of their Church be certain to the Papists, as we have said, since it is denied by the rest of Christians. And so it must be said that that about which it is undeservedly doubted, and which is denied without reason, does not cease to be certain to those who think rightly. For the error and doubt of badly disposed, perverse and foolish men about things certain in themselves does not at all detract from the certainty of men of sound judgment, and whose mind is rightly disposed.

XXI. Then it is supposed in that argument, what cannot be demonstrated, and proven by necessary and evident arguments, cannot be certain and ascertained to faith, and a certain rule and foundation of faith among the faithful. But this is most false. For the first rule of faith, whatever it may finally be determined to be, must necessarily be something which cannot be proven by evident, and, if we speak logically, utterly necessary arguments. Since those arguments would either be sought from its own testimony, or from other principles of faith, or from human reason. But now they cannot be sought from its own testimony; because in this way nothing proves itself; nor from other principles of faith; because what is posited to be the first rule of faith is by this very fact supposed to be the best known principle of faith, to the proof of which, therefore, other less well known things would be employed in vain; unless perhaps to the man; finally not from human reason; because, since the rule of faith is something inevident, properly speaking, it cannot be demonstrated by necessary reasons, but only persuaded by moral arguments.

XXII. Thirdly, that argument supposes that those doubts which human reason can move against Scripture are removed by the authority of the Church. But this also is false. For to one asking from where we know that the books which are circulated are of the Apostles and Prophets, or that there were any Apostles and Prophets at all, it is not sufficient to say that the Church says and teaches this. Since by equal right he will ask from where we know that the Church speaks the truth and is led by the Holy Spirit. But since there are so many sects among Christians, from where do we know that this one rather than that one is the

true Church, or that there is any Church of God at all on earth. Certainly then nothing will remain for them by which they may defend themselves against a questioner of this kind, except those marks and prejudices by which the authority of the Roman Church is rendered credible in their judgment. But here arguments of this kind are not sought, but those which certainly prove the matter to be de fide, and on which faith can rest as on its foundation. And besides, if it should come to that, it is ready for us to show that the authority of Scripture is commended by far more and more certain arguments and marks than the authority of any Church among Christians.

XXIII. But, so that we may now deal more closely, these things are to be applied to the argument proposed. The argument was of this kind. What is doubtful and uncertain to us of itself cannot be apprehended by us with firm faith, unless it is confirmed by some superior authority. But Scripture is doubtful and uncertain to us of itself. Therefore it is necessary that it be confirmed by some superior authority. Which can be no other than the authority of the Church. I respond that something can be said to be doubtful and uncertain to us in a twofold respect. Namely with respect to faith: then with respect to human reason. With respect to faith, that is uncertain which is not revealed and inspired by God. But with respect to human reason, that is uncertain which cannot be demonstrated by necessary and evident arguments. And so the minor must be distinguished, Scripture is doubtful and uncertain to us of itself. For if that is said to us with respect to human reason, it can be conceded, but if with respect to faith, it must be denied. For although Scripture can be persuaded and commended to human reason also by many good and valid arguments: Yet because those arguments are not logically and mathematically demonstrative, to that extent we allow Scripture to be called uncertain to human reason. But it is false that what is uncertain to reason, and cannot be demonstrated, cannot be certain to faith, and be a certain rule of faith.

XXIV. But to the major, What is doubtful and uncertain to us of itself cannot be apprehended by firm faith, and be a certain rule of faith, unless it is confirmed by a superior authority. Resp. it is most false, if by that which is uncertain to us is understood that which cannot be demonstrated, and confirmed by utterly necessary and evident arguments. For what cannot be proven by arguments, philosophically and properly speaking, necessary and evident, can nevertheless be apprehended by firm faith, and be a certain rule of faith, although it is not confirmed by a superior authority prior and superior to us. Indeed, as we have just now proven, it is altogether necessary that the first rule of faith be something inevident, which cannot be demonstrated, and yet also cannot or ought not to be confirmed by a superior authority. Since in this way it would not be, as is supposed, the first and supreme rule of faith, but only a subalternate and inferior one.

XXV. But to the confirmation of the minor, by which it was proven that the books of sacred Scripture are doubtful apart from the authority of the Church, because many books were foisted upon the Apostles, and it was doubted about their true writings. Resp. that what is doubtful to ignorant, perverse or insufficiently instructed men can nevertheless be certain to the faithful and pious, who are abundantly instructed, and illuminated by the Holy Spirit. For the rash and unjust doubt of certain ones does not at all detract from the certainty of men of sound judgment.

XXVI. But as far as those importunate interrogations are concerned, From where do you prove that the Apostles existed and wrote books by divine instinct, and that those which are circulated are truly theirs. Resp. that something unjust is required of us, namely that we demonstrate what is indemonstrable. And so we freely confess that those things cannot be demonstrated by us, and proven mathematically or logically. But from that we deny that it follows that those books cannot be a certain and first rule of faith; since this is proper to the principles of faith that they are inevident, and cannot be proven by arguments philosophically necessary and evident. Which nevertheless are not to be so accepted, as has already been often observed, as if we have nothing which we can throw back at profane men, and oppose to their impious questions. For we do not lack arguments which can be enough for a prudent man, and persuade him that the Apostles and Prophets wrote by divine instinct, and that we have their genuine books in our hands; of which kind of arguments we proposed and explicated many in the first part of these theses, nor is there need to repeat them here. This alone we confess, that those arguments do not have logical, or mathematical evidence, and to that extent leave the matter uncertain, if it pleases to call uncertain what is inevident, and ἀναπόδεικτον. But this also we add, that if those arguments leave any uncertainty, it can by no means be removed by a certain judgment and determination of the Church, as has just now been proven.

XXVII. And these things are now enough about that argument. We must proceed to another. Therefore, the Papists also strive to prove that the authority of Scripture with respect to us depends on the authority of the Church from the usage and practice of the Church. For they say that the Apocryphal books, which various impostors published under the name of the Prophets and Apostles, and tried to foist off as sacred and divine, were rejected and exploded by the faithful, was done by the authority and judgment of the Church, which by its wisdom discerned those supposititious books from the divine ones, and expunged them from the Canon: or at least never judged that they were to be received. And for this matter they bring forward many testimonies from the Fathers. As what the author of the synopsis which is attributed to Athanasius, bringing a reason why those Gospels of Thomas, Peter, according to the Hebrews, etc. are not approved, says, "The sacred Canons of the holy Catholic Church have sanctioned for us four books of the Gospels, besides these there is not another one." And similarly Augustine rejects a certain Gospel of Thomas, which the Manicheans brought forward, with these words, "It is permitted for us not to believe this Scripture, because it is not in the Catholic Canon:" And again, "The Ecclesiastical Canon rejects these Scriptures." To which they add Eusebius, who in his Ecclesiastical History often pronounces writings of this kind to be Apocryphal, because there is no mention of them among the ancients. And because no Ecclesiastical Writer has used testimonies drawn from those books: or has anywhere deigned to bring them to remembrance in his writings.

XXVIII. But since it was sometimes doubted even among the orthodox themselves about certain truly divine and Apostolic books, as for example, about the Epistle to the Hebrews, about the Epistle of James, about the Epistle of Jude, and the second Epistle of Peter, and about the second and third of John and his Apocalypse, they assert and contend that this happened because the Church had not yet pronounced its judgment and opinion on these books: But that doubt was at last removed through the determination and judgment of the

Church. Namely in the Synod of Laodicea, and the third of Carthage, and the decrees of Popes Innocent and Gelasius, by which not only the aforementioned books of the New Testament, but also those about which there is still today a dispute between us and the Papists, Whether they pertain to the Canon of the Old Testament, were received into the Canon of Scripture, as indeed they want. And in confirmation of this matter they also bring forward what Jerome writes about the Epistle of James, "Although it was asserted to have been written by someone else under his name, yet gradually with the progress of time it obtained authority." And what he similarly says about the Epistle of Jude, "Although it was rejected by most, yet it merited authority by antiquity and usage." With which are agreeable the things which Jerome also writes about the Epistle to the Hebrews, and the Apocalypse of John in his epistle to Dardanus, "We," he says, "receive both, following by no means the custom of this time, but the authority of ancient writers, who for the most part use the testimonies of both, not as they are sometimes accustomed to do from the Apocrypha, but as if from the Canonical and Ecclesiastical."

XXIX. Finally, since many books whose authority was always certain among the Orthodox were rejected or called into doubt by heretics, the Papists are busy in this, to show that the Fathers refuted those heretics from the authority, consent, and testimony of the Church, by which they vindicated and asserted the divinity and authority of those books. For thus, for example, Augustine speaks about the Acts of the Apostles, whose authority the Manicheans denied, "It is necessary for me to believe this book, if I believe the Gospel: since the Catholic authority similarly commends both Scriptures to me." And against the same Manicheans he says, "The authority of our books, strengthened by the consent of so many nations, through the successions of Apostles, Bishops, and Councils, is adverse to you: But there is none of yours, which is brought forward by so few," etc. From which and similar things the Papists conclude that our faith about sacred Scripture depends on the judgment of the Church: and that its authority, testimony and consent is the rule and standard, to which all Scripture must be proven and examined, so that it can be certainly established for us: according to that celebrated saying of Augustine, "But I would not believe the Gospel unless the authority of the Catholic Church moved me." And what the same holy man says elsewhere. "A faithful soul will hold this manner in the Canonical Scriptures, that it may prefer those which are accepted by all Catholic Churches to those which certain ones do not accept. But in those which are not accepted by all, it may prefer those which more and weightier Churches accept, to those which fewer Churches of less authority hold."

XXX. So that all these things may be satisfied, here first of all it must be called to mind what the adversaries understand by the name of the Church. For that is especially necessary for rightly understanding the state of the question, and for removing here all homonymy. Therefore, it should be known that the Church is not taken here collectively for the whole multitude of the faithful, who are and hitherto have been. For the question is not properly about the authority of the Church taken in this way. And although the authority of sacred Scripture does not depend even on the authority of the Church so taken, it is nevertheless certain that an argument for the authority of Scripture can be drawn from its testimony and consent, divine and infallible, and which obliges our faith: since in that Church is comprehended the Apostolic and primitive Church, to which it belonged to confirm the

Canon of Scripture in a certain and divine way, and to hand it down to the faithful, as what was henceforth to be the unique rule of faith.

XXXI. But the Papists understand by the Church the present Church of each age. Nor yet by that present Church do they understand the community of the faithful living in one and the same age: but they restrict the name of Church to the leaders and Pastors of the Church. And so, when they contend that the authority of Scripture depends on the authority of the Church, their mind is that the faith by which the faithful people embrace the books of Scripture as true and divine, rests on the testimony of the Pastors who are then in charge of the Church; and acquiesces in that testimony. And this because in the Pastors and prelates of the Church there perpetually resides an infallible and certain divine authority, from which they can pronounce concerning the truth and divinity of any book: so that their opinion and judgment obliges our faith. Indeed they are endowed with that power, that a book, which hitherto was of doubtful authority, and about which it was permitted to opine on either side, through their determination becomes authentic, and afterwards ought to be held in the same number as the other sacred and canonical books.

XXXII. There were indeed some among the old Scholastics who restricted that authority of infallibly and certainly determining about Scripture to the Apostolic Church, and taught that it was not to be attributed to the present Church in any other sense than because it is considered one body with the Apostolic Church. And the old man indeed did what he did when he was a boy, although now as an old man he can no longer do those things. Which was the opinion of Durandus, and Thomas Waldensis, and even in the previous century of Driedo. But this opinion is commonly deemed erroneous today. And the Doctors of the Pontifical School today concede to the former opinion. And so it must be seen, whether from the usage and practice of the Church, and those argumentations of the ancient Fathers, which were adduced above, it can be concluded that the authority of the Pastors who govern the Church in each age is so great, that it is the rule of our faith about Scripture, more certain and better known to us than Scripture itself, and on which our faith about sacred Scripture rests, as on its principal foundation. That is what we deny: nor do those proofs which were brought forward above do anything for this.

XXXIII. We indeed freely concede that the Doctors of the ancient Church rejected the Apocryphal books, which the heretics had fabricated, and were foisting off as divine, on the grounds that those books had never been in the Canon of the Church, nor acknowledged by the Doctors of the Church, and held and cited as divine. And we approve their argumentation as legitimate, and in a plainly similar way we impugn the authority of those books which the Roman Church adds to the Old Testament above the Canon of the Jewish Church: namely, because these books were never acknowledged by the Jewish Church, even then when it was the true and only Church of God. Indeed not even by the primitive Christian Church, whose Doctors by common consent, with perhaps a very few exceptions, expunge those books from the Canon, although they admit their reading in the Churches, as useful for the edification of the people. And although most of the Apocryphal books have certain marks of vanity in themselves, and vestiges of human infirmity, by which it can be detected that they were not inspired by God: yet speaking absolutely and in general we do not think that there is any more suitable argument, by

which the authority of the Apocryphal books can be impugned, than that the true Church of God never held them as divine.

XXXIV. But so that that argument may stand, and have its force, it is not necessary that the Pastors of the present Church have a divine and infallible authority, more known and superior to Scripture itself with respect to us. Nor does that argument simply rest on their authority: but the force of the argument consists in this, that if those Apocryphal books were truly divine, and written by the Prophets and Apostles for that purpose, so that they might be a perpetual rule of faith in the Church, without doubt they would have been handed down and commended to the faithful by the Prophets and Apostles themselves as such, as the other Canonical books were, and consigned with the rest of the Canon of Scripture. But if this had been done, the Apostolic men and the Church immediately succeeding the Apostles, which received their other books with such great reverence, would without any doubt also have received these, and, if not by all, at least by the greatest, or a notable part of the faithful they would have been admitted. And so the fact that the ancient Doctors of the Church do not even mention them, is a manifest sign that the Apostles, when they fixed the Canon of Scripture, did not admit such books but rejected and repudiated them. Nor is it in any way likely that God by his singular providence inspired a Prophet or Apostle to write, for the purpose that his book might be a rule of faith in the Church of God and serve for the instruction and consolation of the faithful, and yet would have allowed that book to be neither received nor acknowledged by his Church.

XXXV. But to that second proof taken from the books about which it was formerly doubted, as if the authority of certain divine books was formerly doubtful, because the Church had not yet pronounced its opinion on them: but afterwards all doubt was removed through the judgment and definition of the Church: I say first that the authority of the books which are truly divine and Canonical was never so doubtful, that it was once permitted to doubt about them, but now it is no longer permitted, as the Papists want. For those who doubted about the Epistle to the Hebrews, and the Apocalypse of John, and other books of the New Testament, did so rashly, and without just reason. And just as today he would not lack blame who would deny or call into doubt the authority of those books, so also those who formerly took away authority from those books, or wanted to render them doubtful, were worthy of reprehension. But as far as those other books are concerned, which the Papists want to pertain to the Canon of the Old Testament, and about which nevertheless they acknowledge that it was formerly permitted to doubt, just as it was rightly doubted about them, so also we contend that it can be doubted about them today by right.

XXXVI. But secondly I say that the authority of no books which are truly divine was ever so doubtful that all and everywhere doubted about them. But that doubt was only of certain ones: but among the rest their authority was certain. Thus it is indeed true that the Epistle to the Hebrews, the Epistle of James, and the Apocalypse of John, were suspect to some, and held by some to be supposititious: yet among most Churches they always obtained their authority. Nor can any time be assigned when they were not received, and held as divine and authentic, in a great part of the Christian world. Which is indicated by the very places which the adversaries refer to as favouring their cause. Thus Theodoret

responds to the Arians denying the authority of the Epistle to the Hebrews, "It was necessary for them, if nothing else, certainly to revere the long duration of time, in which the alumni of the truth had perpetually read this Epistle in the Churches." And thus Tertullian defends the Apocalypse against Marcion, "We also have the Churches founded by John, for although Marcion rejects his Apocalypse, yet the order of Bishops traced back to its origin will stand on John as the author." But as far as the Epistle of James is concerned, the same Eusebius who says that it seemed to some to be spurious, testifies that it was publicly received in very many Churches.

XXXVII. I say thirdly that those who doubted about those books did not have as the cause of their doubt that they did not see them received by the Churches, and commended by the tradition of the ancient Fathers referring them to the Apostles as authors: but because, the matter not being sufficiently weighed, they thought that in these books there were certain things which did not savour of the divine Spirit; nor sufficiently cohered with the doctrine of faith contained in the other books. Thus it was doubted in the Latin Church about the Epistle to the Hebrews, because in chapters six and ten it seemed to favour the Novatians, who took away all hope of pardon from the lapsed after baptism. The Apocalypse also was suspect on account of the Millenarians, who abused certain places in it, which in appearance favour them. But the Epistle of Jude was rejected by some, because it seems to cite a certain Apocryphal book, which was formerly circulated under the name of Enoch the Patriarch.

XXXVIII. Finally, as for the fact that those books were afterwards received by common consent, the cause was not some new decree of the Church by which their authority was sanctioned; but those things which moved scruple in certain ones about those books gradually receiving light, and being rightly understood, at last there ceased to be those who doubted, and all conceded to the opinion of the ancient Fathers, who being next to the Apostles, commended these books to posterity as accepted by them: and approved them by frequent usage and reading. And certainly that this is not to be attributed to the Synod of Laodicea, or the third of Carthage, is clear, because those Synods were provincial, nor could they, from the very opinion of the adversaries, properly oblige faith. And in truth it was still doubted about those books after the Synod of Laodicea. For in the time of Jerome, who was more recent than it, there were still those who doubted. But it is especially manifest that neither the Synod of Carthage, nor the Decrees of Popes Gelasius and Innocent, removed the doubt about the books of the Old Testament, which they think Canonical, we Apocryphal: since up to the times of the Council of Trent, there were very many, in the Roman Church itself, who rejected the authority of those books.

XXXIX. But to that confirmation of the argument, which is taken from the fact that the Doctors of the Church, to refute various heretics, who repudiated certain books of Scripture, perpetually used the testimony and consent of the Church, by which they proved the authority of those books: I respond that from that it can by no means be concluded what the Papists want and what is in question, namely that the authority of the Pastors, who govern the Church in each age, is greater with respect to us and better known than the authority of Scripture, and that our faith about Scripture rests on the testimony and judgment of the Pastors who are now in charge of the Church as divine and infallible,

and as its principal and proper foundation. Nor do those Doctors simply argue from the authority of the Bishops of their time, as if it were the rule of faith, and the faith of each individual member of the Church was bound by it, but, when those heretics, whom they were impugning, rejected the authority of certain sacred books, as if they were falsely attributed to the Apostles or Apostolic men, and had been fabricated by the Catholic Doctors, the Fathers opposed to them the perpetual consent of the Bishops and faithful, who ever since the times of the Apostles had venerated those books as handed down and commended by the Apostles as true and divine: to which consent faith cannot be derogated, except by a wanton and obstinate man. For if he who today would deny that the books of Aristotle, Demosthenes and Cicero are by those to whom they are attributed could be convicted from the consent of the Doctors, who in all ages attributed those books to those great and excellent men, and would be held insane who would deny credence to a report so constant and celebrated: Would not he by equal, indeed by far greater right be held insane, who dares to oppose himself to the tradition, and the report more constant and celebrated, and still more continuous, which refers those books, which we hold as sacred, to the Apostles as authors and approvers?

XL. And certainly that the ancient Doctors of the Church chiefly put force in this, when from the authority of the Church they defended the authority of the Canonical books, is clear from Augustine, who in Book 32 and 33 against Faustus the Manichean, to Faustus asking whence he knew that those were the letters of the Apostles, responds that he knew it from the same place whence Faustus knew that those other letters were by Manichaeus, and whence all knew that certain books were by Varro, Plato and Aristotle, and whence posterity would know that the books which Augustine was then writing, were by Augustine. And after he had explained and accumulated more examples of this kind, he at last concludes in these words, "Since these things are so, who finally is so blinded by madness, unless he is subverted by consenting to the malice and fallacy of lying demons, who would say that this could not have merited the Church of the Apostles, so faithful, so numerous a concord of brothers, that they transmitted their writings faithfully to posterity, when they preserved their chairs by a most certain succession up to the present Bishops, when this happens so felicitously to the writings of any men whatsoever, whether outside the Church, or in the Church itself."

XLI. And so when some book of Scripture is called into controversy, and it is doubted whether it is truly Prophetic and Apostolic, and consigned with the rest of the Canon by the Apostles or Apostolic men, we acknowledge that the best argument of this matter can be drawn from the perpetual and constant consent and testimony of the Church, by which that book was always referred to the Apostles as authors or approvers, to which testimony faith cannot be derogated, without great impudence and obstinacy. Nor do we think that there is any argument more suitable by which a sectarian man, or a heretic, can be refuted. Yet nevertheless that argument is not divine, but human, nor does its force consist in this, that in the leaders of the Church there resides an infallible and certain divine authority. For that is not necessary for the argument to stand, and have its force. For in those who treat of literary matters no such infallible authority of judging can be imagined. And yet the perpetual consent of the learned who ascribe certain books to Aristotle, Plato, and Galen, suffices to make full credence; and if anyone would want to strive against it, he would by

right be held wanton and insane. How much more therefore will the consent of the Church, which it is not doubtful is ruled by the peculiar providence of God, and the assistance of the Holy Spirit, make credence that this or that book was written by an Apostle or Prophet, and commended as divine.

XLII. But however good and valid an argument can be taken from the consent and testimony of the Church for proving the divinity of some sacred book, we deny that it follows from that that the authority of Scripture depends on the authority of the Church as better known and superior. Which we can extort from the adversaries themselves even most unwillingly. For just as the Fathers refuted the heretics who denied Scripture from the authority and testimony of the Church; so also they referred the Schismatics not acknowledging the true Church of Christ to the Scriptures, and contended that the true Church was to be demonstrated from them. For thus Augustine deals with the Donatists, "Whether they hold the Church let them show only from the Canonical books of the divine Scriptures." And today the Papists try to prove their Church, and its authority from the Scriptures: And they think that they excellently fulfill that duty. And yet they by no means want the authority of the Church to be less known and certain to us than the authority of Scripture: which is the very thing about which the question is here, and which we affirm, but they deny. Therefore, from the fact that some book of Scripture called into doubt cannot be defended by a more apt and certain argument against heretics, than from the consent and testimony of the Church, the Papists cannot conclude that the authority of the Church is more certain to us and better known than the authority of Scripture: since they are compelled to confess that a heretic, who does not acknowledge the true Church, cannot be refuted by a more certain and firm argument than by the authority of Scripture. And yet they utterly abhor saying that the authority of sacred Scripture is prior and better known to us than the authority of the Church.

XLIII. And so it must be said that not all proofs are taken from what is simply better known and more certain. For in the course of disputing we are compelled to accommodate ourselves to those with whom we have to do: And against those who deny the principles, and those things which are most certain in themselves, to use less certain proofs, and arguments which are called a posteriori, that is, by which what is prior in knowledge simply speaking, is proven through that which is posterior in knowledge. Thus against the Pagans who deny the Christian religion, we often argue from the opinions of wise men, philosophical axioms, and the consent of nations. And yet all those things do not have certainty with respect to us, more than the Christian religion. And the very first principles, than which absolutely nothing is better known and more certain, we prove by examples and inductions, on which nevertheless the certainty and authority of those principles does not depend.

XLIV. In sum, therefore, we confess that the authority of the sacred books is rightly and validly proven through the consent and testimony of the Church. But we nevertheless deny that it follows from that what the adversaries want, namely that the testimony of the Church is a rule of faith better known to us than Scripture itself. For not every good proof is taken from some rule and principle of faith, nor even from what is simply better known and more certain: but often we are compelled to prove things to the man, and a posteriori.

On the Plenitude and Sufficiency of Scripture

Part I

In which the opinion of the orthodox is set forward.

I. It is the constant opinion of the Churches, which made secession from the Roman Church in the previous century, that sacred Scripture sufficiently contains all things which pertain to faith and salvation: so that there is no need of another word of God, from which those things which are lacking to Scripture may be supplied. But the Doctors and defenders of the Roman Church most bitterly oppose that opinion, and there is a serious controversy about that matter, which we undertake to treat in these and the following theses. But so that it may be done more distinctly and clearly, we will set forth the opinion of our Churches as clearly and distinctly as can be done by us. Then we will inquire into the opinion of the adversaries, and comparing it with ours, we will make manifest what properly is that which is in question. And finally we will confirm the truth in a few words, and undermine the foundations of the opposite opinion.

II. As far as the first is concerned, before all things our Theologians distinguish between those things which are necessary for salvation, and those which are not necessary for salvation. And indeed they assert that those things which are necessary for salvation are contained in sacred Scripture. But those things which are not necessary for salvation, from their mind it is not at all necessary that Scripture contain.

III. But here it should be observed that something can be said to be necessary for salvation in two ways. And indeed first because it is such that no one can be ignorant of it without the loss of salvation, nor can anyone be saved without express knowledge of it. Then also because no one can reject it, and the Church teach the contrary of it, without sinning against his own salvation.

IV. And similarly something is said to be necessary for faith, either because it is necessary for the faith of each individual, nor ought anyone to be deemed faithful without explicit faith in it: or it pertains in general to the object of faith, and obliges the public faith of the Church.

V. But when our Churches determine that those things which are necessary for faith and salvation are all contained in the Scriptures, they understand necessary not only in the first way, but also in the second way. For we do not only want that nothing is without the explicit faith and knowledge of which no one can come to salvation: but also this that no one ought to be deemed to sin against the Christian faith, and his own salvation, by rejecting and impugning something which sacred Scripture does not teach. From which it follows that our opinion is not sufficiently proven, by making an induction of those things the explicit faith and knowledge of which can suffice for someone for salvation. For faith in general comprehends more in its scope than those things the knowledge of which is

necessary for salvation. But we deem that nothing pertains to faith which is not found in Scripture.

VI. And so that all ambiguity may be avoided, some of our Theologians use here a distinction clearer and more suitable. For they observe that a distinction must be made between those things in which is the substance, and as it were the body of the Christian religion, and which from the force of divine institution are necessary not only for faith, but also for forming morals, and containing the polity of the Church: and other things which are only as it were appendices of this substance, and ornaments of this body, and which neither from their nature, nor from divine institution, are necessary, but indifferent, and received into usage only for the sake of order and decorum: such as are many parts of discipline sanctioned by various Canons, also rites and ceremonies various, both universal and particular, observations indeed free, but so far that no one by his private authority can or ought to despise or reject them.

VII. We assert that things of the former kind are contained in sacred Scripture, but not in like manner those other things, which are as it were accidental to the faith, morals and discipline of the Church. For we confess that many things which pertain to the various circumstances of divine worship and Ecclesiastical polity are not delivered one by one in Scripture; but left to the prudence of the leaders of the Church, under this general precept, that all things be done in order and decently in the Church of God. From which it is evident that in this controversy various instances are brought forward in vain against us by the Doctors of the Roman Church from the rites, statutes and certain ceremonies, which were formerly observed in the ancient Church, whether Jewish or Christian, and are even now preserved among us both in divine worship and in Ecclesiastical polity, even if nothing has been determined about them in Scripture.

VIII. Therefore, what are those things, which we say are contained in sacred Scripture, is manifest from what has been said. Next it must be seen, in what way and manner they are contained in Scripture from our opinion. Moreover, certain dogmas and precepts can be contained in some book in two ways. Indeed first word for word and in the same words. Secondly in substance, and in equivalent words. But our opinion is not that all the dogmas of faith, and precepts of life which are handed down by the orthodox, are found in sacred Scripture in so many words and syllables. Indeed certain wranglers of today impute that to us, who from the fact that we profess to accept nothing outside of Scripture in the matter of religion, require that whatever we write and teach, we show in sacred Scripture in so many words and syllables. But it suffices for us to believe some dogma, that sacred Scripture contain it in substance. Thus sacred Scripture nowhere has these words. God is one and triune. And yet we believe that by certain faith, indeed because Scripture says the equivalent that there are three in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Spirit, and these three are one. And in many places it testifies that God is one, and yet the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God.

IX. But to that former distinction is related another. For it is one thing to contain expressly and immediately, another mediately and by consequence. And indeed Scripture, from the mind of our people, does not contain all the dogmas of faith immediately and expressly. But there is nothing necessarily pertaining to faith and religion, which cannot be deduced

from Scripture through a good and clear consequence. Thus Scripture does not say expressly that Christ has two natures, and that in him there are two wills. Yet both pertain to the truth of faith because it clearly follows from what Scripture teaches in many places, namely, that Christ is true God, and true man.

X. From which it is again evident that today's Sophists unjustly vex us, when we draw out some dogma of ours by a good consequence from Scripture. As if in that we were unsealing the law posited by us, by which we determine that Scripture is the unique rule of faith and religion, to which nothing is to be added, nothing detracted. For to deduce something from Scripture is not to add something to it, or to substitute another rule of faith: but to unfold the very things which it contains, and to explicate its hidden treasures. Thus in the Acts the Prophets are said to testify to Christ, that it will be that whoever believes in him will receive remission of sins through his name. Yet that is found posited expressly nowhere among the Prophets; But the Prophets are said to testify what is deduced from their testimonies.

XI. Moreover, certain dogmas can be deduced from some principle in two ways. First individually, distinctly and per se. Then generally confusedly, and through another. Thus all the dogmas and institutions of the Christian religion cannot be proven from the Scripture of the Old Testament per se and one by one. As, for example, that the faithful are to be baptized in the Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit could not be sufficiently proven from the Old Testament, if no other principle of faith was available besides that old Scripture. And yet all things which pertain to Evangelical doctrine can be proven from the Old Testament in general, insofar as it can be efficaciously demonstrated from there that Jesus of Nazareth is the Messiah, and the Son of God promised by the Prophets, and thus his doctrine is true and divine, and his institutions are to be embraced by us as divine. Those things which can only be gathered and deduced from some principle generally and confusedly, are contained in it virtually and in seed. But those which are proven from it distinctly and one by one can be said in some way to be contained in it expressly: although in a stricter sense expressly signifies the same as explicitly and immediately.

XII. But in this disputation our opinion is not that all the institutions of the Christian religion, and dogmas of faith can be proven from Scripture only confusedly and generally, but distinctly and one by one, and thus indeed in this sense, they can be said to be contained in Scripture expressly not only virtually, and in seed.

XIII. But since all things which pertain to faith are contained in sacred Scripture, in the way now explained, it is gathered from that that Scripture is the perfect and sufficient rule of faith. Which sufficiency nevertheless does not exclude the necessity of the Ecclesiastical ministry, by which, according to the order constituted by God, heavenly doctrine is drawn from Scripture, and handed down to the faithful people by their pastors and doctors: then also of the internal teaching of the Spirit, by which the faithful are led into the knowledge of the doctrine drawn from Scripture and proposed, and without which they will not discern it, and salutarily embrace it. But that perfection and sufficiency of sacred Scripture only excludes the necessity of another rule, which must necessarily be joined to sacred Scripture, so that we may have the whole doctrine of faith. From which it is evident that

the Doctors of the Roman Church do nothing, who try to prove to us that Scripture does not suffice for salvation from the fact that otherwise the Ecclesiastical ministry would be in vain, the necessity of which is nevertheless commended in sacred Scripture itself.

XIV. But for a fuller understanding of this question, here also it must be noted that those things which are usually treated in our schools, and set forth and expounded in the public confessions of our people, either consist in the admission of true principles of faith and religion, and the rejection of those which are undeservedly and falsely obtruded as such principles: or are the doctrine itself drawn and deduced from true principles. And indeed we say that the principles of faith are contained in sacred Scripture, since they are sacred Scripture itself. For our Churches do not admit any principles of faith, besides the books divinely inspired of which the body of Scripture consists.

XV. But the plenitude and sufficiency which we attribute to sacred Scripture, in no way requires that the principles of faith can be proven and demonstrated from it, for example, that this or that book is divine and Canonical. For the perfection of any rule consists in this, that it is the measure of all the rest which are of the same genus, but by no means that it is the rule of itself. Nor in any discipline is it required in the principles, that they prove and demonstrate themselves, which is absurd and impossible; but in their genus they are held sufficiently perfect, if from them all things which pertain to such a science and discipline can be proven and demonstrated.

XVI. Therefore, just as in all human disciplines there are certain principles, proper to each art and science, from which are deduced and proven all the conclusions and propositions, which pertain to the art and science of which they are the principles, but they themselves in that genus are certain per se nor can they be demonstrated and thus they can be said to be as it were the rule on which depend, and through which are proven all things, which pertain to such an art or science, although they themselves can neither prove themselves, nor ought they: so also the matter stands in divine and heavenly doctrine. For when its Theorems and propositions are called to examination, and it is asked what is their foundation, it is necessarily to be arrived at certain principles, beyond which in that genus at least, it cannot be proceeded: And consequently, which cannot be proven through other principles of faith, as prior and better known: and from which also it ought not to be required, that they prove themselves, since nothing can prove itself: And which nevertheless ought to be held for a sufficient and perfect rule of faith, since all other things, which pertain to faith, are proven and demonstrated through them.

XVII. From the common sense of Theologians indeed, in this there is a difference between the principles of faith, and the principles of the sciences, that the principles of the sciences are known per se, and are evident, and extort assent from the natural light of reason by their own light: but the principles of faith do not have equal evidence; and so, as is fitting, they cannot be believed and accepted, except through the internal illumination of the Holy Spirit. Yet in this they would agree, that just as we assent to natural principles immediately through the natural light of the intellect, but not through certain other better known principles, through which they may have been demonstrated: so also we believe the principles of faith immediately, through the illumination of the Holy Spirit, but not by the

intervention of some proof, which is drawn from other better known principles in this genus.

XVIII. Indeed the first principles of faith ought to have marks and characters of their divinity and truth, and arguments by which they are proven and persuaded: but they cannot properly and directly prove themselves: nor do they depend on other principles of faith, from which they borrow authority and credence. But now those first principles of religion, and of the Christian faith for us are the divine Scriptures consisting of a certain number of divinely inspired books. And therefore the authority of sacred Scripture, according to our opinion, ought not to be proven from Scripture itself, but to be accepted immediately and for its own sake by all Christians.

XIX. But just as, if the first principles of some science are denied by a contentious man, they are not proven from themselves, but it is necessary to leap over the boundaries of that science, and seek their proofs from elsewhere: or even to have recourse to certain less known things by which they are proven a posteriori, and to that man; nor does this at all detract from the perfection and sufficiency of those principles: So if the divinity of the sacred Scriptures is called into doubt, as it is by Pagans and profane men, it will indeed have to be proven, yet not from their own testimony, or from some other principle of faith, nor are there any more proofs available which they call de fide, that is, which are sought from the principles of faith properly so called, but other proofs will have to be applied, which are sought from various marks, both intrinsic and extrinsic, by which the divinity of sacred Scripture can become known, and be confirmed. Nor does this hinder Scripture from being a most full and most perfect rule of religion and faith, with respect to the faithful.

XX. And hence it is clear how the argument, by which the Papists greatly vaunt themselves, is to be met, while, namely, they think they demonstrate that Scripture is not a full and sufficient rule of faith, because Scripture itself cannot be proven by Scripture. For it is not necessary for the perfection and sufficiency of a rule, as is clear from what has been said, that it be able to prove itself. But it is enough that through it all things besides itself which are of the same genus can be examined and proven. And besides in the analysis of faith, unless one wants to admit a circle, or an infinite regress, both of which are absurd, it is necessary to come to some principle in which one must stop, and which cannot be proven through another better known in that genus, nor prove itself, since, as has been said, nothing proves itself.

XXI. But just as it is not required for the perfection, which we attribute to sacred Scripture, that it prove itself, so also there is no need at all, that what are falsely put forward as principles of faith can be directly and expressly rejected by Scripture, and that the testimonies of Scripture be required for this. But just as we immediately believe the true principles of faith, through the illumination and internal persuasion of the Holy Spirit, who gently leads men to this, not through some other principle of faith, but only by certain motives and marks by which their divinity becomes known: so to reject and not admit what are falsely thought to be principles of faith it suffices that they are destitute of the true marks of true principles, and that in them can be noted vestiges of ignorance and human weakness.

XXII. And therefore it is no objection to the perfection of Scripture, if it cannot be demonstrated through it that this or that book, which is falsely presumed to be Canonical, is in fact Apocryphal. And, even if it were altogether silent about unwritten traditions, it ought to suffice to reject them, that their authority cannot be persuaded and proven by suitable arguments just as divine Scripture can. Nor is it for us to prove that they are not divine, but it is incumbent on those who urge and defend them to prove that they are divine.

XXIII. But as far as the doctrine which is drawn from Scripture, and is usually set forth in the schools, either it consists in those things which are found set forth explicitly and expressly in sacred Scripture, or at least in those which are deduced from them by proximate and evident consequences: of which kind ought to be those things, which are proposed to the Christian people to be believed as articles, and heads of faith, with the mark of heresy on those who teach the contrary. Or in those things which are indeed rightly and well deduced from Scripture, but yet not so clearly, and evidently, and by more subtle and remote consequences: which kind are not properly articles of faith, but only Theological truths, or opinions, the contrary of which ought not to be called more gravely than an error; but not marked with the name of heresy. Just as the Doctors of the Roman Church determine that only those things are de fide, which are perspicuously and expressly defined by their Councils, but not whatever they think they can rightly gather from them by stringing consequences from consequences. And so they distinguish between the dogmas of faith, and the opinions and views of their Theologians, opposing heresy to the former, error to the latter.

XXIV. But from this it can be gathered what is to be responded to the adversaries, while impugning the sufficiency, which we attribute to sacred Scripture, they object that certain things are held, and taught in our Churches, which however are not deduced from Scripture by such open and necessary consequences, that they can oblige the faith of the Christian people, unless they are supported from elsewhere by some divine authority; for example, that those who once received baptism among heretics are not to be baptized anew. For that dogma, and some others are indeed held, and taught in our Churches, as agreeable to Scripture, and besides proven by long usage and the common suffrage of the faithful, which it is therefore rash to condemn and reject: yet we do not attribute to them such necessity, that they necessarily oblige the faith of Christians: so that he who thinks otherwise is to be expunged from the number of the faithful, and reckoned among the heretics, to whom we would by no means want numbered Cyprian a holy man and martyr of Christ, who did not think the same about the baptism of heretics as our Churches.

XXV. Moreover, from those things which have now been set forth, it is sufficiently manifest, in what sense we commend the plenitude, and sufficiency of Scripture, and inculcate that it contains all things which are necessary for faith and salvation. But we attribute that perfection not only to the Scripture of the Old and New Testament, as it was consigned to us by the Apostles, and Apostolic men, but, from the time it seemed good to God to hand down his word in writing, we deem that Scripture always contained all things which were necessary for the people of God and the Church to rightly worship God, and

obtain salvation, nor was there need to have recourse elsewhere to draw the doctrine of faith and salvation.

XXVI. Nor does it make against this that Scripture, as it now is, contains not a few things necessary for salvation, which are wanting in the five books of Moses, of which alone the body of sacred Scripture once consisted for some time. For it should be known that not the same things were necessary for salvation in all ages. For very many things now under the New Testament necessarily pertain to faith and religion, which did not always have the same necessity. Since God did not reveal all the mysteries of heavenly wisdom at once and once for all: but as the Apostle says in Hebrews 4, "in many parts and in many ways." And, from the time heavenly doctrine first began to be consigned to writing, the light of divine revelation gradually grew, until in the last times Christ brought the fullness of heavenly doctrine, and announced to us the whole counsel about our salvation.

XXVII. But with the clarity, and amplitude of heavenly doctrine growing, the body of the Scriptures also grew. For as God, according to the various courses of his Church, revealed something anew to the Prophets and Apostles, they handed that down summarily in writing. From which with the progress of time the Canon of Scripture was increased.

XXVIII. But the more things God revealed, and the more distinctly, the fuller and more distinct faith he also required from men. But when revelation was more sparing and obscure, faith also extended to fewer things. For the measure of faith is divine revelation, nor is it necessary for salvation to know and believe more things, than are those which God has Revealed.

XXIX. And so although Scripture, when it was first given through Moses, did not contain all things which are now necessary for us, yet it sufficiently contained those things which were then necessary for the Israelite people. And divine Scripture always had that perfection, that it embraced all things, which it was necessary for the Church to do and know.

XXX. Yet that seems to be understood with this caution, namely with the divinely inspired men being taken away through whom the light of divine revelation grew, and their writings being published. So that the time may be excepted when their living voice resounded in the Church, and they had not yet consigned to writing what it pleased God to reveal anew to them. For, for example, when the Apostles began to preach, and had not yet written anything, the Scripture of the Old Testament did not contain all things necessary for salvation, except confusedly and implicitly, insofar as it sent us to the true Messiah, by whom we would be more fully taught about the will of God.

XXXI. But after those were taken from the earth, and translated into heaven, whose mouth and pen it seemed good to God to use to hand down his mysteries to the Church, nothing is to be deemed to pertain to faith and salvation, which is not found in the writings which they left, and commended to the faithful, that they might be the norm and rule of faith in the Church. Nor can their doctrine be safely and certainly sought and found elsewhere than in their writings.

XXXII. We indeed freely confess that the Prophets and Apostles and other men inspired by God, said and taught very many things by the living voice, which are not found

expressed word for word in the sacred writings. Nor do we even deny that it could have happened that the Apostles and divinely inspired men once ordained many things in the Church, about the form of divine worship, and the various circumstances of Ecclesiastical polity, which are not written down in the sacred writings. And also that some historical things received from them could have been preserved among the faithful and transmitted to posterity.

XXXIII. But we strictly hold this, that the sum of those things, which holy men, driven by the divine Spirit, taught and spoke, as much as suffices for salvation and faith, is contained in sacred Scripture, nor did they teach anything, which is of any moment for religion, which is not abundantly handed down in the sacred writings.

XXXIV. Moreover we also assert, that those things, which were instituted by the Apostles about the rites of divine worship, and the circumstances of Ecclesiastical government, and about which nevertheless the sacred Scriptures are silent, are left to the power of the Church, that it might variously change them, according to the nature of times and places; under only this general rule and caution, that all things be done in order and decently in the Church of God.

XXXV. Finally, what is chief, and from which the rest follow, we constantly affirm that of those things which the Apostles taught, or instituted, we hold nothing as altogether certain and ascertained, except those things which are handed down and consigned in the sacred writings. And this because after the Apostles, and Apostolic men, there were no longer any men in the Church divinely inspired placed beyond all danger of error. And so whatever has come down to us about the sayings and deeds of the Apostles, besides the Canonical writings, we do not have except from the faith of infirm men, who could both be deceived and deceive.

XXXVI. From which it is evident that there is no unwritten tradition, which ought to be compared in authority with the divine and Apostolic writings: and thus that Scripture is the unique rule of faith, to which another cannot be joined which has the same force of obliging the conscience, and binding faith. And therefore, if it were not sufficient, and did not contain all things, which pertain to faith, it would follow that the church would lack such a sufficient rule, nor would its salvation have been sufficiently provided for.

XXXVII. And hence it is that we argue negatively from the authority of sacred Scripture. For since of those things which God revealed through the Prophets and Apostles, nothing at all certain has come down to us, besides those things which they themselves divinely committed to writing, so that we may reject something as not pertaining to faith, it is enough that it does not have a foundation in Scripture, nor can be proven and deduced from it.

XXXVIII. And so we do not altogether condemn, and reject unwritten traditions about historical matters, and the rites, order, and polity of the Churches: but nevertheless we admit none about the dogmas of faith, and those things which pertain to morals. Nor do we think that those things which the Spirit did not judge necessary to be committed to writing by his amanuenses the Apostles and Evangelists, can be known by us with such

certainty, or have the same authority in the Church, as those which he willed to be consigned to writings, that they might have the force of an eternal law in the Church.

Part II

In which the opinion of the Pontificians is expounded, and the state of the controversy is indicated, and the true opinion is confirmed by arguments.

I. In the preceding theses the opinion of our Churches concerning the plenitude and sufficiency of Scripture was expounded as distinctly and clearly as could be by us. But that we may contract the whole matter into a few things, it seems to come to this, namely, that from the time God wanted his word to be consigned to writings, the Church had in the sacred books all things which for the individual ages, and the varied dispensation of God were so necessary to salvation, that no one could teach, defend and hold the contrary without the loss of salvation: or what comes to the same thing, that sacred Scripture always contained all things, which pertained to the body and substance of religion, and from the institution of God were necessary, although the determination of many circumstances which pertain to the exercise of divine worship, and Ecclesiastical discipline, was permitted to the power of the Church, but was not prescribed one by one in Scripture.

II. However, we do not affirm that all those things which we say are necessary are found in Scripture word for word, but, either in equivalent words, or at least so that the individual things can be deduced from Scripture by a necessary and evident consequence, without the help of another principle of faith, to which Scripture remits us, that from it we may draw a fuller knowledge.

III. And moreover that the principles of faith are indeed contained in Scripture, since they are Scripture itself, not something outside of Scripture; not that sacred Scripture ought to or can be proved. But all other things which pertain to religion and sacred doctrine, are either proved by express texts, or deduced from the Scriptures by open and proximate consequences, such are those things which properly ought to be called dogmas of faith: or are only as it were drawn out by more remote and less evident consequences from the more recondite store of Scripture, of which kind are many Theological truths wont to be proposed and taught in the Orthodox Schools.

IV. To which it must be added that our Churches strictly hold this, that the things which are necessary to salvation, cannot be sought certainly and infallibly from elsewhere, than from Scripture, nor is there any word of God besides Scripture, by which those things which are of faith can be confirmed, and therefore that sacred Scripture is the only rule of faith, to which another which is of equal authority cannot be adjoined.

V. It now follows that we should inquire what is the opinion of the Doctors of the Roman Church about this question, Therefore first they teach, that Scripture was not given to the Church to this end, that it should be the only rule of faith, and that from it alone the institutions of religion and dogmas of faith ought to be sought and drawn out. Therefore that it is not necessary, that all things which pertain to faith and morals, should be proved from sacred Scripture. However they do not deny that those things, which are simply necessary to all for salvation, are found in sacred Scripture, as can be seen in Bellarmine, De verbo Dei book 4, ch. 11, par. ultimò proferunt. Where responding to that of Augustine which is wont to be brought forth by our side for their opinion, "In those things which are

openly put in Scripture are found all those things which contain faith and the manners of living." "He speaks," he says, "of those dogmas which are necessary to all simply, such as are contained in the Apostolic Creed and in the Decalogue." And in the following he proves that of the same Augustine, "I believe that even hence would be the most clear authority of the divine eloquences, if a man could not be ignorant of it without the loss of promised salvation."

VI. Indeed also the Doctors of the Roman Church do not deny that the whole doctrine, whether of faith, or of morals, necessary, not indeed simply to individuals, but to the whole Church in some way is contained in Scripture: but they only assert that it is not expressly contained, as can be seen in Bellarmine book 4, de verbo Dei ch. 3, par. 2. And similarly Stapleton treating of the doctrinal principles of faith, Controv. 5. quæst . 5. art. 1. while he explains this question; He proposes various ways in which the whole doctrine of salvation is contained in the Scriptures. And first indeed this that sacred Scripture indicating the true Church, and sending us to it, through it teaches us all necessary things. Then also this, that from those many dogmas which are openly put in the Scriptures: the rest can be firmly deduced, as the dogma of the two natures in Jesus Christ from the incarnation of the Son of God. "For," he says, "it is also true in this sense that all things necessary to faith are comprehended in the Scriptures and the Fathers teach."

VII. And although in this question all the Doctors of the Roman Church do not speak in the same way, but some seem to attribute more, and some less to Scripture in this matter; yet in this they all agree, that all things which are the necessary requisites to eternal salvation, are contained in sacred Scripture explicitly, or implicitly, expressly or virtually, and as it were in seed, if the Scriptures are understood to that sense which the Holy Spirit intends.

VIII. But they all deny that those things which are necessary to the doctrine of faith and morals in the Church are so contained all in the Scriptures, that they can be sufficiently sought and drawn from there, without the help of tradition, and of some unwritten word, which is deposited in the heart of the Church.

IX. For the Doctors of the Roman Church by common consent teach, that Christ our Lord, and his Apostles, taught and instituted many things pertaining to faith and divine worship, which are not found expressed in the sacred letters, nor can be sufficiently drawn out from them and therefore that Christian and Apostolic doctrine is contained partly in Scripture, and partly in some unwritten word, and handed down orally.

X. But they want that unwritten word commended to the rectors and rulers of the Churches, and committed to their faith, to have been afterwards handed down from hand to hand, and to have come down to us sincere and uncorrupted by the perpetual succession of Bishops and Pastors.

XI. And these are what they call unwritten traditions, by which name they understand dogmas and institutions pertaining to faith and religion, which were not consigned to the canonical Scriptures. About which, that, what is their opinion, may be more distinctly understood, it must be known, the Pontificians themselves confessing, that the name of tradition is of itself general, and signifies all doctrine which is handed down and

communicated by one to another, whether through writing, or outside of Scripture. And so to hand down is the same as to teach, and tradition the same as a document. But yet the use of Ecclesiastical Writers for the most part restricts the word tradition to doctrine not written, but handed down by voice: and so the Pontifician Schools take this word. Nor yet by doctrine not written, do they understand that which is written nowhere, but, which is not written by the first author, or rather, as some of them more accurately say, which is not found written in the Canonical books of the Prophets and Apostles.

XII. Moreover they variously divide traditions. But the partition which is here most to be considered, is that which is taken from the authors to whom they are to be referred. For they say that traditions, "are some Divine, others Apostolic, and others Ecclesiastical." They call Divine traditions those things, which, as they think, Christ himself immediately taught and instituted: and yet are not found anywhere in the sacred letters. Of this kind of tradition to them is that anointing from oil and balm which is done in confirmation, which they number among the Sacraments of the new law. For they acknowledge that all the Sacraments of the new law had to be immediately instituted by Christ.

XIII. But those things are properly called Apostolic traditions by them, which they think were commanded and instituted by the Apostles, although no mention is made of them in the Apostolic writings. To which traditions they refer the fast which they call of Lent, which they reckon to have been instituted by the Apostles. And yet they often confound these words, calling those things Divine traditions, which not Christ himself, but only the Apostles are thought to have instituted: since what things were instituted by them they did not institute without the afflatus of the divine Spirit. And again what things they refer to Christ, they also call Apostolic traditions, since nothing of those things which Christ taught has come down to us, except through the writings and preaching of the Apostles. But those things are called by them Ecclesiastical traditions which are certain ancient customs, either begun by the Prelates, or by the peoples, which gradually by the tacit consent of the peoples obtained the force of law.

XIV. But they do not attribute altogether the same authority to all those traditions. And indeed they want those traditions which they call divine, to have the same force, as the divine precepts and dogmas which are written in the Gospels. And similarly they decide that the same authority is to be attributed to the traditions, which they call Apostolic, as to the Apostolic writings. But to the Ecclesiastical traditions they defer a somewhat lesser authority, namely that, which the written Canons and Laws of the Church have.

XV. Therefore they restrict to only the first two kinds of traditions the Decree of the Council of Trent, which is contained in Session four: where it is commanded that the unwritten traditions should be received with equal piety of affection as the books themselves of Canonical Scripture. The words of the Council are, "The Synod perceiving the truth of the Gospel and discipline to be contained in the written books, and the unwritten traditions, which having been received by the Apostles from the mouth of Christ himself, or from the Apostles themselves the Holy Spirit dictating, have come down even to us, as it were handed down by hands, following the examples of the Orthodox Fathers, receives and venerates with equal piety of affection and reverence all the books both of the Old and of the New Testament, since one God is the author of both, and also

the traditions themselves pertaining both to faith and to morals, as having been dictated either orally by Christ, or by the Holy Spirit, and preserved in the Catholic Church by continuous succession."

XVI. Moreover the Doctors of the Roman Church hand down many rules, by which the traditions truly divine and Apostolic can be discerned from others, which could be falsely obtruded for such. Which however can all be reduced to three. The first is that whatever the Roman Church believes as of faith, and yet is not found clearly handed down in Scripture, by this very thing is to be considered to be a divine, or Apostolic tradition. And that rests on two foundations which they suppose. One is that the Roman Church cannot err: The other that yet that Church today is not ruled by new revelations: but whatever it knows in matters of faith it learned the whole of that from the Apostles and Prophets.

XVII. The second rule resting on the same foundations is this, That those things which the Roman Church observes which are of such a kind, that no one except God could legitimately institute them, and yet are not found instituted by God in the Scriptures, must have been handed down by the Apostles.

XVIII. Finally the third rule of them is, That that, which the Doctors of the Roman Church teach by common consent, truly ought to be held for an Apostolic tradition to descend from Apostolic tradition although it be such that it could have been instituted by the Church. Of which kind they want that fast to be which they call Quadragesimal.

XIX. But again these three rules can be contracted into one, this namely, That whatever the Roman Church proposes as a divine or Apostolic tradition; is undoubtedly to be held for such a tradition. For as the Doctors of the Roman Church suspend the authority of books long known as to us from the testimony of the present Church, so also they want the true traditions to be certainly and infallibly discerned and distinguished from the false by none except its judgment.

XX. Moreover from those things which have been said, it can easily be collected how far our Churches agree with the Roman Church in this question, and how far they dissent from it: and therefore what is the state of this controversy. And first indeed we concede to the Roman Church that the individual things which pertain to the polity of the Church, and the ceremonies of public and external worship, cannot be sought from Scripture; but are permitted to the power of the Church, and left to the prudence of the rulers of the Church.

XXI. We also freely confess that those very things which pertain to the substance and body of faith and religion are not contained verbatim and expressly in Scripture, or immediately, but many dogmas of faith are only deduced from Scripture by a good and legitimate consequence.

XXII. But the Doctors of the Roman Church in turn concede to us, that all things which are simply necessary to all for salvation; and the explicit faith of which is required from the individual faithful, are clearly and openly contained in Scripture. And moreover they grant us that all things which are necessary to the doctrine of faith and morals are contained at least virtually and implicitly in Scripture, and can be deduced from it by a good consequence.

XXIII. But the difference is in this, that we contend that all things which are necessary to faith and religion, can be so sought and proved from Scripture, that there is no need of another principle of faith, to which Scripture remits us to be more fully instructed. Nor also do we acknowledge any principle and rule of faith outside of Scripture. But the Doctors of the Roman Church contend that all the dogmas of faith, and institutions of religion cannot be sufficiently proved from Scripture, unless by the intervention of the doctrine and tradition of

the Church, which they teach is to be received as another part of the divine word of equal authority with sacred Scripture.

XXIV. And therefore this whole question turns on two things. One is, whether the Apostles taught or instituted certain necessary things, which are not sufficiently contained in the sacred letters. The other, whether the documents and institutions of the Apostles can be certainly and infallibly sought and had from elsewhere, than from sacred Scripture, namely from the tradition of the Doctors of the Church who followed the Apostles, to which an equal obedience of faith ought to be given as to sacred Scripture itself. The Doctors of the Roman Church affirm both; but all Orthodox Theologians deny both.

XXV. Therefore we affirm two things. And first indeed that all things which pertain to the substance of faith and religion are fully and sufficiently contained in sacred Scripture. Then that besides Scripture there does not exist any word of God which is the principle and rule of our faith, and therefore that no unwritten traditions are of equal authority with sacred Scripture. But that honour is to be attributed least of all to those traditions which the Roman Church commends as Apostolic and divine. But the former of these follows from the latter. For if there is no word of God besides Scripture, it is necessary that it contain all things necessary to faith and salvation, or that we now lack some necessary things. And what follows from that, that no certain way to salvation remains to us. Therefore omitting those testimonies by which Scripture commends its own plenitude and perfection, we will chiefly contend to prove this that there is no word of God handed down only by living voice which with sacred Scripture is a certain rule of faith.

XXVI. Therefore first we argue thus. In the Jewish Church, when sacred Scripture consisted of the books of the Old Testament alone, the whole doctrine of salvation was contained in Scripture, nor were there any unwritten traditions of equal authority with sacred Scripture. Therefore much more is it to be believed that the whole doctrine of salvation is contained today in sacred Scripture, when Scripture has now been increased by the books of the New Testament, in which is expounded the doctrine of Christ and the Apostles. But that in the Jewish Church there did not exist any unwritten traditions, of the same authority with sacred Scripture, is collected from this, that, if any such were to be held, they would doubtless be those which the masters of the Jews commended and the observance of which they urged upon the people. But that those were vain and the fictions of men Christ teaches in Matthew 15 and in Mark 7. For when the Scribes and Pharisees, who then were the Doctors of the Jewish Church, accused the disciples of Christ, saying, "Why do thy disciples transgress the tradition of the elders? For they wash not their hands when they eat bread." Christ in turn rebukes them, saying, "Why do ye also transgress the commandment of God by your tradition?" Also "Ye have made the commandment of God

of none effect by your tradition." Nor does he only argue their hypocrisy, that they urged the observance of human commands, while they themselves neglected the commands of God, and corrupted them by depraved dogmas: but in general he declares that their traditions as vain are to be rejected, nor does he distinguish any traditions as true and legitimate from the false and spurious. "Well," he says, "did Isaiah prophesy of you, as it is written, This people honoureth me with their lips, but their heart is far from me. Howbeit in vain do they worship me, teaching for doctrines the commandments of men. For laying aside the commandment of God, ye hold the tradition of men, as the washing of pots and cups: and many other such like things ye do." And therefore Paul in Col. 2 admonishes the faithful that they should beware of the traditions of men. "Beware," he says, "lest any man spoil you through philosophy and vain deceit, after the tradition of men." And in Gal. 4 he imputes it to himself as a fault that before his conversion to Christ, "he was beyond measure zealous of the traditions of his fathers." When therefore Christ and the Apostles condemn, and hold for doctrines of men the traditions of the Jews outside of sacred Scripture, by equal reason it follows that the traditions of the Pontificians are to be rejected and condemned, since those are not commended to us with greater authority than of old the traditions of the Jews.

XXVII. The adversaries respond, that Christ and the Apostles do not reprehend the traditions, which the Jews had received from Moses and the Prophets, but traditions received from some more recent ones, which traditions indeed were partly vain, partly repugnant with the Scriptures: But that the reason of the traditions of the Roman Church is other, which they namely received from Christ and the Apostles. But on the contrary it must be known, that those traditions, which Christ exagitates as doctrines of men, were sold as traditions of Moses and the Prophets. For the Rabbis of the Jews, following in this the footsteps of their elders, call their traditions "therahfcebbahal peh," as if you should say, the oral law, namely because they want those to have been received orally by Moses, who had them on mount Sinai from God himself, no less than the written law, to which therefore they want those to be equal in authority. But now in the time of Christ the Doctors of the Jews were the Doctors and Masters of the Church; since then there was no true Church of God except among the Jews. When therefore nevertheless Christ openly rejects, and holds for doctrines of men the traditions which they brought forth outside of Scripture; although they had received them from the ancients, and therefore boasted that they were handed down by Moses himself, what faith will the Doctors of the Pontificians of today make that those traditions, which they boast to have received from Christ himself and his Apostles through the hands of their fathers, are truly the institutions of Christ and the Apostles, but not human inventions? And certainly when thence it is apparent that the masters of the Church can be deceived in that, and obtrude for divine dogmas and precepts which are merely human, Thence also it follows that no certain word of God is found outside of sacred Scripture. For, if any such word of God existed, it would have to be received from the rulers of the Church; nor would it be commended to us with greater authority.

XXVIII. Finally what the Doctors of the Church hand down and teach cannot be rejected as human tradition, except because it is outside of Scripture. For, if the word of God were not determined by sacred Scripture, but besides there existed an unwritten word of God,

the Doctors of the Church could justly contend that their documents are that very word of God. And really, if recourse had to be had by us to some unwritten word of God, whence should it rather be received than from them themselves? When therefore nevertheless it happens, Christ being witness, that the Doctors of the Church propose for the word of God what is nothing other than a human fiction; thence it is manifest that whatever can be proposed outside of the substance of Scripture is to be held for the doctrine of men, and that Scripture is the rule to which all things are to be examined: otherwise, as we have said, the precepts and documents of the Masters of the Church, could not be rejected as human traditions.

XXIX. Moreover it is very much to be noted what the adversaries concede in their response, namely that Christ there reprehends certain traditions accepted by some more recent than Moses and the Prophets. For thence it follows that by at least equal right are to be condemned, and rejected those traditions which the Pontificians call Ecclesiastical, that is, many things by which God is thought to be worshipped, and which yet neither Christ, nor his Apostles instituted, but the Pastors and Doctors of later ages: which traditions certainly constitute a great part of the institutions of the Roman Church. For those traditions are no less the commands and precepts of men than what were formerly instituted by the elders of the Jews. And therefore no less do the words of Isaiah brought forth by Christ, and confirmed, agree with them, "In vain they do worship me, teaching for doctrines the commandments of men."

XXX. But to that which the adversaries say that the traditions of the Jews were contrary to sacred Scripture, but theirs not so: it is to be observed that many traditions of the Jews were not directly, and by their nature contrary to the divine law, but only insofar as they were additions to the law, since the divine law prohibits anything to be added to it. Thus that custom of washing hands with a certain religion before taking food seems of itself to have nothing evil, and which is directly contrary to Scripture. And yet this is that very tradition which Christ carps at specially. But if the Pontificians say at least that it is vain, they will indeed say truly. But it squares no less with their traditions, For they are no less vain and empty. But if the thing is estimated from the judgment of human reason, that custom of the Jews will be found to have no less an appearance of wisdom, than most of the institutions of the Pontificians. But Christ does not simply condemn the traditions of the Jews, either because they were vain, or because they were contrary to Scripture: but moreover in general, since they were the commands and doctrines of men. Which is no less true of the traditions of the Pontificians.

XXXI. Add that of most of the traditions of the Pontificians it is easy to prove that they are not only besides Scripture, and added to Scripture, which itself is in some way contrary to Scripture, but also directly fight with Scripture. For, for example, according to the tradition of the Roman Church, it is both lawful, and expedient to administer the sacrament of the Eucharist to the faithful under the sole species of bread. And yet Christ in the Gospel instituting this sacrament expressly said of the chalice, "Drink ye all of it." Similarly God in the second precept of the Decalogue forbids any image to be religiously worshipped. And in many places he specially prohibits lest anyone presume to fashion any likeness of God. But the tradition of the Roman Church teaches that it is lawful and useful

to place images of God and of Angels, and of men deceased in temples, and to fall down before them, and to venerate them and worship them with religious rites. Finally the same tradition alleges that Christ in the Mass is daily offered in a true and properly so called sacrifice, although in it he suffers nothing. But the Epistle of Paul to the Hebrews preaches that there is only one oblation of Christ, and that Christ does not offer himself more often, because he cannot suffer more often. Whence it is rendered manifest that the traditions which the Roman Church commends as Apostolic and divine are not the word of God and a certain rule of faith. For the word of God cannot be contrary to itself. And therefore what is contrary to Scripture, which is received without controversy by all Christians as the word of God, ought not to be held for the word of God.

XXXII. Moreover that Scripture alone is the certain rule of faith, but traditions which are proposed outside of it are doubtful and uncertain, is evident from this that if any part of Christian doctrine had been handed down by the Apostles only by living voice, and committed to the memory of men, but not also consigned to writings, certainly either it would not have come down to us, or at least not without many corruptions and depravations: so that the pure could scarcely be discerned and separated from the impure, and genuine and sincere truth from human fictions and additional comments. For so great is the perversity, ignorance and negligence of men, that those things which are simply committed to their care and memory, are easily consigned to oblivion, and completely obliterated, or at least corrupted and adulterated in various ways. And therefore the use of Scripture is plainly necessary for preserving a certain and accurate memory of things. But those things which are not consigned to writings, in a short time are erased from the memory of men, or are so entangled with fables that the true cannot be distinguished from the false. Which could be rendered manifest by many experiences. For the decisions of Philosophers, and the institutes of Republics which are not handed down in letters, but only committed to the memory of men have utterly perished, nor is anything further known about them, except perhaps something incidentally committed to letters by someone. Finally about all those things which in past times have been either done, or said, we have nothing certain except those things which are given to books as to faithful custodians to be preserved. But if the use of Scripture is anywhere necessary, certainly it is especially in those things which pertain to religion and divine worship, about which men are by nature most forgetful, and prone to lie and to feign. And in faith of this thing we can ask the Pontificians, where now are those traditions of the Jews which they want them to have received from Moses and the Prophets. Certainly not even the Pontificians themselves dare or can explain what was contained in those traditions. Nor do we have anything certain today about the religion and worship of the Jews from elsewhere than from the writings of Moses and the Prophets.

XXXIII. But, say, the adversaries, from the creation of the world to Moses the heavenly doctrine was conserved by tradition alone without writing. Why therefore could Apostolic traditions not similarly be preserved from the times of the Apostles to our own times for a thousand and six hundred years? But to that I say that indeed before Moses sacred doctrine was preserved without writing for some time. But within very few indeed. For among very many it was immediately corrupted, and involved in most absurd fables: so that the covenant of God, and the doctrine of salvation, remained in almost one family of Abraham

alone, but all the remaining human race turned aside to idolatry and feigned worships. Add that then of times the defect of Scripture was supplied by frequent appearances of God, and familiar colloquies with the Patriarchs, by which he often restored and renewed the doctrine handed down by living voice among them, and recalled it, not so incorruptly preserved even by the pious, to its purity and integrity. But those divine appearances, and extraordinary colloquies of God with men have long not had place in the Church.

XXXIV. And, that we may more constrain the adversaries here, we ask them why God at last wanted his law to be committed to writing, and the remaining body of sacred Scripture to be made. Certainly they cannot deny, but that God wanted this to be done, both that it might succour human infirmity, and that it might meet the frauds of the impious: and but that it was the counsel of God, to vindicate the sacred doctrine contained in those books, from the oblivion and corruptions of men, and to render it safe against the negligence indeed of some, but the frauds and impostures of others. But since the thing so has itself, let the adversaries say why God did not so consult for the whole sacred doctrine; But indeed wanted one part to be written, but the other to remain not written. For, whether is that part not written less opportune for diabolical frauds, and less obnoxious to oblivion, than that part which is committed to writing? And does not experience testify in the whole world, where Scripture has been wanting, that indeed some vestiges have remained of the divine doctrine handed down by the Fathers, but that they have been contaminated in a miserable manner with fables, and that foreign rites of sacrifices have been introduced, and distorted into horrible, as we have said, idolatry? Add that the adversaries among the causes, by which they want divine providence to be used in conserving traditions, number the writings of the Doctors of men, in which they are consigned. If therefore there was need for traditions to be written that they might be able to be more easily conserved, why would God have wanted this to be done rather by common men and obnoxious to error, than by the Prophets and Apostles, to whom he commanded the other heads of the doctrine of salvation to be written? And why, if those things which they want to be sought from tradition are of the same moment with those which are contained in sacred Scripture, did he want these to be consigned to authentic tables, but those to be required in the writings of common men.

XXXV. The Pontificians add that their traditions have been conserved, and have come down whole to our times by the continual use in which they have been among the Christian people; just as, they say, vulgar languages are conserved, although sometimes no grammars exist on account of their continual use in some nation. But experience is against this. For as men are by nature inconstant and very changeable, so whatever things are in their use, unless something else hinders, by this very thing are continually changed and altered; although for the most part sensibly and without sense. Which is manifest by the very example which they bring. For vulgar languages perpetually receive some change, which after some ages is so notable that they seem to have passed into another dialect. And so also in any people the ancient customs, and customs differ very much from those of today, the lapse of ages always bringing some change to human things. And the same can easily be observed in the Christian Church itself. For if anyone skilled in Ecclesiastical history, should put before his eyes the face of the Church, as it was in the second and third century after Christ, as it is allowed to collect it from the writers of that age, he will

immediately acknowledge that the Roman Church today differs much from it in rites and discipline: nor is there anyone who can deny but that a great change has been made in those things. Whence more appears the necessity of some firm and stable rule, and not simply hanging from the memory and good faith of men, to which the abuses and errors gradually growing up in the Church can be corrected: which rule is sacred Scripture alone, but by no means unwritten tradition.

XXXVI. And certainly how undeservedly unwritten traditions are equalled in authority with Scripture, is manifest from this, that in the sacred Scriptures that Christ the Lord taught this and that, and instituted, Writers divinely inspired, and put outside of all danger of error testify to us. But about the sayings and deeds of Christ and the Apostles outside of sacred Scripture nothing could come down to us, except from the testimony of those men, who flourished in the Church in the first ages after Christ, and succeeded the Apostles and Apostolic men: such are those whom today we name the ancient Fathers, and whose monuments remain among Christians. But all those were obnoxious to error, and such they confess themselves, and desire that their writings should be examined to the norm of Scripture, but not received ἀβασανίστως and without examination. Indeed the Doctors of the Roman Church themselves have noted not a few errors and blemishes in them: and that not only when some one of them speaks solitary, so to speak, with others, being silent, or speaking against: But also when more of them consent in the same thing, which can be made manifest by many examples. Thus e.g. most of the Fathers taught that the souls of the saints before the resurrection cannot enjoy the glory of the divine vision, as Sixtus of Siena notes, Bibliotheca sancta lib. 6. annotation 365. where he prolixly cites for this thing the testimonies of Justin, Tertullian, Clement, Origen, Lactantius, Victorinus, Ambrose, Prudentius, Augustine, Theodoret, and many more recent ones. Of the same book also annot. 35. he observes that the Ancients thought that no creature was incorporeal, and that this dogma so pleased them, that it was received among the Catholic rules and synodical sanctions. But in annotation 26, he adduces many places of Chrysostom, Origen, Athanasius, Hilary, Ambrose, Jerome, Chromatius Bishop of Aquileia, Oecumenius, Euthymius, whence he proves that they believed that all swearing was simply unlawful, and interdicted to Christians. Moreover the error was very solemn among the most ancient Fathers, that Christ was sometime to reign for a while on earth with the saints in the flesh: which Papias Bishop of Hierapolis, Irenaeus, Apollinaris, Tertullian, Lactantius, Severus and Victorinus are witness to have once thought, Hieronym. lib de viris illustribus in Papias, and book Eleventh on the Prophet Ezekiel. Nor do Hieron. himself and Augustine dare to openly condemn that opinion, as the same Sixtus acknowledges lib. 5. annot. 233. Finally in the same lib. annot. 171. he refers the testimonies of Origen, Ambrose, Hilary, Basil, Lactantius, Jerome, whence it is clear that they thought that all men who are who were and who will be, with Christ alone excepted, are to be examined, proved, and in some way burned by the fire of the conflagration of the world on the day of judgment. When therefore those ancient Doctors of the Church were so obnoxious to error, that they could embrace a false and erroneous dogma as divine truth, how can the Churches of later ages be so certain of those traditions which it learned from no other than their faith and testimony, and learned from elsewhere that they had origin from the Apostles, as of that which it sees consigned in the divine books themselves of the

Prophets and Apostles? And is it not altogether abhorrent from right reason that that, which men testify who could deceive and be deceived, ought to obtain equal authority with the Church with that which God himself testifies through the Apostles and Prophets?

XXXVII. But that it may appear more clearly, how fallacious are the traditions, which are brought forth outside of Scripture as Apostolic, here it is very much to be considered, that, if ever those traditions had any certainty, that especially ought to have place in the first times of the Christian Church, when the memory of the Apostles was still recent. But now in the first ages after Christ unwritten traditions were so uncertain and various, that the Doctors of the Church contended among themselves about them, and many men otherwise good were deceived by the name of traditions, and embraced many vain and false things as Apostolic traditions. Thus Eusebius testifies Ecclesiastical History lib. 3. cap. ult. that Papias that Bishop of Hierapolis, who lived next after the Apostles, attributed much to traditions, and among other things wrote five books about the sermons of the Lord from unwritten tradition, but that they were filled with fables. So also when some time after there was contention with great contention between the Churches of the East and West about the celebration of Easter, Whether namely it was to be celebrated precisely on the fourteenth of the moon, or on the Lord's day after the fourteenth; Polycrates, and other Bishops of Asia, who defended the former, proposed the tradition of John and Philip: but Victor the Roman, and other Westerners asserted that they followed Peter and Paul, as can be seen in Eusebius hist. Ecclesiast. lib. 5. cap. 23. and following and in Socrates lib. 5. cap. 22. Thus not a few of the ancients thought that the Apostles instituted certain stated and certain fasts, these indeed in one, but those in another way. But Augustine epist. 86. to Casulanus, and Socrates lib. 5. cap. 22. deny that the Apostles determined anything about fasts; but left it free to the Churches when and how it was to be fasted. And when Augustine in that epistle treats that question, Whether it is to be fasted on the Sabbath, which the Romans did, and a few Westerners, proposing the tradition of the Apostle Peter, but all the rest of the Churches either neglected, or even thought unlawful, relying on the tradition of the other Apostles, from whom they had received the doctrine of the Gospel, he judges that this contention is interminable generating contentions, not finishing questions, and therefore that nothing certain can be had from unwritten tradition about the reason and mode of fasts. So also Tertullian in his book on the soldier's crown, and Basil in his book on the Holy Spirit, recount various traditions which they want to be Apostolic, as ex. gr. that it is wrong to fast on the Lord's days, and that on the same Days it is necessary to pray standing, as also on all the days from Easter to Pentecost, which the Nicene Synod also sanctioned. And yet those things were not observed in later ages, and held for Apostolic traditions.

XXXVIII. Indeed once among Christians, especially in the Roman and African Church, and indeed for many ages, the custom obtained of offering the sacred Eucharist to infants as soon as they were baptized: and that was thought necessary to their salvation, as is evident from Cyprian in his book on the lapsed num. 20 from Innocent the first Bishop of Rome in his epistle to the Council of Milevis. Also from Gelasius also a Bishop of Rome, in his epistle to all the Bishops through Picenum, and from Augustine in many places. Who do not simply approve that opinion about the necessity of the sacred Eucharist in respect

of infants, but bring it forth as common to the whole Church of their time, and therefore, descending from Apostolic tradition, and thence as from a known and conceded thing they draw arguments against the Pelagians, as can be seen especially in Augustine book 1. on the merit and remission of sin ch. 24. and lib. 1. against Julian ch. 2. Nor is there any writer of that age who reclaims. And the Pontifician Doctors themselves acknowledge that, as Vasquez tom. 3. in. 3. Thom. disp. 212. ch. 2. and Maldonat. in John 6. num. 116. where he says that that opinion of Augustine and Innocent flourished in the Church for about six hundred years. And yet this custom has long been abrogated in the Roman Church, and condemned by the Council of Trent. If therefore now of old in the first times after Christ unwritten traditions were so uncertain and various among the faithful themselves and the Doctors of the Church, who often were deceived by the pretext of traditions, what now after sixteen ages will we think can be had more certain from traditions? And how unsafe and dangerous will it be to assume them for the rule of faith, and to equal them in authority to the sacred Scriptures themselves.

XXXIX. But, say, the adversaries, many things also of old were falsely supposed to the Apostles in writing, and about certain true writings of the Apostles it was doubted among the faithful themselves. Therefore, if this argument takes away the authority of unwritten tradition, its own authority will not stand to Scripture itself. But this instance neither overturns the authority of Scripture with us, nor can it diminish the force of our argument against Pontifician traditions. For we do not want the authority of sacred Scripture as to us to hang from the testimony of the doctors of the Church, but we state that Scripture is to be received by the faithful immediately and for its own sake, as which has in itself the arguments and notes of its divinity implanted: and therefore the doubt of some once about certain books of Scripture can prejudicate nothing to its authority with us. Nor also do we simply reject traditions, because some once doubted about them, but because they are adverse to Scripture, nor have anything in themselves by which divine authority can be conciliated to them. But the Pontificians state that the authority of the word of God as much written, as not written as to us hangs from the testimony of the doctors of the Church. And therefore, if the ancient Doctors of the Church, from whose relation and testimony the Church of later ages received its traditions, and learned from nowhere else that they had origin from the Apostles, if, I say, those ancient Doctors of the Church were so uncertain and various about those traditions, and most of them were deceived and deceived in discerning them, according to the decisions of the Pontificians no certain authority can stand to them.

XL. But the adversaries retort, if we hesitate, whether something is an Apostolic tradition, and the thing seems uncertain on account of the dissenting opinions of the ancients, in the Church there is a certain authority which can take away the doubt, and by whose judgment the true traditions will be discerned from the false, and will be certainly and infallibly known to the faithful. But if we ask who is endowed with so great authority, when there are no longer in the Church men inspired by God, as the Prophets and Apostles, not all the Adversaries respond in the same way. For most of them say that that authority resides in the Roman Pontiff, whom, namely, they want to be an infallible judge constituted by Christ in matters of faith. But this authority is not certain in the Roman Church itself. For not even those who flatter the Roman Pontiff most, dare to assert that this is a dogma

ascertained and manifest of faith. Since there are not a few whom the Roman Church holds for Catholics, and who remain in its communion, who do not acknowledge such an authority in the Pope. But others contend that that prerogative of infallibility in judging about matters of faith is found in a Council, that is, in a general assembly of the rulers of the Church. But again this is even less certain with the Roman Church. For very many Pontificians reclaim, and especially the Roman Pontiffs themselves. Nor is he who denies this held by anyone in the Roman Church as a heretic. But, you will say, at least all the Pontificians consent that general Councils which the Pope has approved and confirmed cannot err in faith, and can be safely believed. But, if Councils however general are not outside of all danger of error before the confirmation of the Pope, and the Pope himself is not infallible, how will he infallibly judge whether the proposed Council has erred, or not?

XLI. And certainly neither the Pope, nor a Council, can bring forth any legitimate document of so great an authority, which they arrogate to themselves. Nor can they with any appearance propose anything else, than certain places of Scripture plainly distorted into an alien sense. Thus for example, the Pontiff tries to prove his infallibility by that saying of Christ to Peter, "I have prayed for thee, Peter, that thy faith fail not," where Christ promises to Peter about to be subjected immediately to the greatest temptation, and about to deny Christ himself with his mouth, that faith would not be utterly extinguished in his heart, but that he would rise from that fall, and persevere in faith, which pertain nothing at all to the Bishop of Rome, and that infallibility which he attributes to himself. But Roman Councils to claim for themselves a similar authority, especially abuse that promise of Christ, "where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them." But Christ there promises nothing absolutely to a general Council of Pastors, but to all councils whether general, or particular, he promises the assistance of his Spirit, provided they use the means instituted by him, and propose to themselves solely the glory of God and Christ, and the edification of the Church, nor allow themselves to be carried away by their own affections. But there is no assembly of Pastors of which we can be infallibly certain, whether it has fulfilled that condition.

XLII. Add that, if we are rendered certain about the true Scriptures, and traditions by a certain infallible authority which is in the present Church, without which they cannot be certainly and infallibly discerned from the false and apocryphal, it is necessary that we are first clear about that infallible authority, than about Scripture itself and tradition, and with the authority and testimony of Scripture and tradition set aside it can be known to us. And therefore we can justly ask the Pontificians, that they prove to us that authority, which they attribute to the Pontiff or Council, from elsewhere, than from Scripture itself and tradition, since they profess that they are moved by the authority of the Pontiff or Council, to defer so much to traditions and Scripture, and to embrace as much the Scriptures as traditions as divine. What therefore at last will be that on account of which they believe their Church to be infallible while it judges about traditions and the Scriptures?

XLIII. But however great authority is attributed either to a Council, or to the Pope, the most learned and most approved of the Pontificians acknowledge, that the Church today is not ruled by new revelations, nor the Pope, nor a Council immediately from God learn what the Apostles handed down. Whence therefore can they certainly learn that? Certainly

nothing here remains to be said by them, except, what they also really say, namely, that the Pope, or Council has this from the voice and testimony of the Doctors of the Church, who from hand to hand received this or that from those ancient Doctors who were the hearers of the Apostles. But now by many instances, and from the confession itself of the adversaries we have made manifest that the most ancient Doctors of the Church were often deceived, and hallucinated in receiving and commending traditions, and that more of them by common consent admitted as a dogma and Apostolic institution, what the Roman Church today rejects and condemns. How therefore could their testimonies make a certain faith to the Councils and Pontiffs of later ages? And how can traditions received from the Fathers in respect of the Pontiffs and Councils themselves be held for a certain rule from which they judge the proposed controversies, no less than from Scripture itself: And now this very thing is asked, by what reason that uncertainty can be taken away which is born from the various testimonies and opinions of the Fathers and those ancient Doctors of the Church fighting among themselves, when it is a question of those things which the Apostles handed down. Wherefore Augustine rightly says in the place cited, th. 37. That when recourse is had to the tradition of the Apostles and it is fought about it, "This contention is interminable, generating contentions, not finishing questions."

XLIV. Finally, if any tradition is to be held for true, it is that which the perpetual and constant consent of Christians commends. But this least of all agrees with the traditions of the Roman Church, because they are not only outside of Scripture, and in most things are adverse to Scripture, but also most of them are unheard of in the ancient Church and contrary to its faith and practice. Of which kind are indulgences, such as are conceded by the Pope, the canonization of saints, the celebration of public worship in a language not commonly understood by the people, the prohibition lest sacred Scripture be translated into vulgar languages, and be read by the common people without special permission: but especially the custom of administering the sacred Eucharist under only one symbol, also of fashioning and pursuing with religious worship the images of God himself and of the saints, and more of this kind which it is easy to show did not have place in the primitive Church, and that the contrary was plainly observed. Whence it is manifestly apparent that those are the fictions of men, nor can they without impiety be compared in authority with the writings of the Apostles and Prophets.

Part III

In which the arguments are solved by which the Doctors of the Roman Church try to impugn the sufficiency of Scripture.

I. This whole controversy can be referred to two things, which, although they are very connected, yet ought to be distinguished. One is whether all things which are necessary to faith and religion are fully and sufficiently contained in Scripture. The other is whether besides Scripture there is in the Church some other word of God of equal authority with sacred Scripture, which has been derived to us by unwritten tradition. The Doctors of the Roman Church deny the former, affirm the latter, and try to confirm their opinion, about both, by many arguments.

II. Therefore first that they may prove that the Scriptures do not contain all things which are necessary to faith and salvation, they argue in this way. If the Scriptures sufficiently contained all things necessary to faith and salvation, that would have to be understood, either of the whole Canon of Scripture, which taken together would be sufficient; or of the individual parts of Scripture, which would each suffice by themselves. But neither can be said. And indeed of the individual books it is manifest that they taken separately, and without the remaining body of Scripture do not contain all things necessary to salvation. For no prophecy of the Old Testament, or any Epistle of the New Testament embraces all the dogmas of faith. It remains therefore, that that perfection and sufficiency is to be attributed to the whole sacred Scripture, Canon. Therefore that the whole doctrine of salvation may be had, it is necessary that the whole Canon of Scripture be had. But if something is lacking in the Canon of Scripture, in doctrine also something must necessarily be lacking. But now the whole Canon of Scripture is not had. Therefore from Scripture, as we have it today, the doctrine of salvation cannot be sufficiently drawn. But that now the whole Canon of Scripture is not had they prove from this that many sacred books have perished, as much from the Old, as from the New Testament. And indeed from the Old Testament the books of Nathan and Gad the Seer, of which mention is made in the last ch. of 1 Chronicles. And also the books of Ahijah the Shilonite and Iddo the Seer, of which mention is made in 2 Chron. 9. today no longer exist. As neither do the five thousand Songs of Solomon, and three thousand parables which he is said to have spoken (1 Kings 4). But from the New Testament they say that the Epistle to the Laodiceans has perished, of which mention is made, as they think, in Colossians 4. And perhaps some other Epistle to the Corinthians, of which mention seems to be made in 1 Cor. 5.

III. I respond, when we say that Scripture sufficiently contains all things necessary, we do not understand this of the individual books of Scripture, as if there were no little book of Scripture in which all the dogmas of faith were not handed down. But that this is true of the body of Scripture taken indefinitely, and according to the principal parts at least. But I say notably of the body of Scripture taken indefinitely, and according to the principal parts, because it is not our mind, that the necessary doctrine is so contained in the whole body of Scripture, that if thence some part, and some book be taken away, immediately something is lacking to the integrity of doctrine, which the adversaries suppose in the argument. For in the body of Scripture, as we have it today, the doctrine of salvation is contained not only

sufficiently, but also abundantly. And there are more books of Scripture in which new dogmas are not handed down, and diverse from those which are taught elsewhere, but only certain more lucid explications and applications of the same dogmas, either to refute contrary errors, or to form and institute the morals of men. Therefore without the loss of the doctrine of salvation we could lack certain books of sacred Scripture, and which were given to the Church not precisely to necessity, but to abundance and greater utility. Although therefore we should grant that certain divine and authentic writings have perished, yet it would not follow from that that the whole doctrine of salvation can no longer be found in Scripture. For it could happen that certain other divine writings existed and yet in them there was no dogma, or precept, which does not exist today in the parts of Scripture which remain.

IV. However it is not probable to us that any writing properly divine and authentic has perished. For that does not seem to be able to be stated without great injury to divine providence. For to what end would God have taken care that some divine and authentic book be written, that yet it would be of no use to the Church, but God would immediately allow it to perish? And since among those books of sacred Scripture, which divine providence has hitherto miraculously conserved, certain very small ones are found, and of which a great necessity cannot seem to be, who will be able to induce in his mind that God would have been about to allow, that so many books of no less authority should perish; and which are feigned to be such that they surpassed those in magnitude, moment, number and use? Add that the Pontificians who attribute infallibility to the Church, and extol its authority beyond measure, yet make no slight reproach to it in this matter, and brand it with ignominy. For who could excuse so great a fault and negligence in the Church, that it allowed divine books written, and given to it, that through them it might be instructed in the doctrine of salvation, and use them as the norm and rule of faith and truth, that such, I say, books, and those many, should perish, nor guarded them, with that care, which was fitting.

V. But now as for those books, by the example of which, the adversaries contend to prove, that certain divine and authentic books have perished, I Say, that either it is false that they have perished, or that they were never Canonical, and immediately inspired by God. And indeed we think that the books of Gad the Seer, and Nathan the Prophet, which in the last ch. of 1 Chronicles are joined to the books of Samuel, and in which are said to have been written the acts of King David, as much the first as the last, were prophetic, and pertained to the Canon: but we deny that they have perished, and contend that they still exist. For they are the very books which today are called the books of Samuel, or, as the vulgate version has it, the first and second of Kings. For that Samuel alone is not the author of them, is manifest from this, that in the middle of the first book the death of Samuel is described. Samuel therefore could not have written beyond about sixteen chapters of this book. But the rest of the book, and also the other book, which from the use of the Jews is also called of Samuel, who could have written rather, than Gad and Nathan the Prophets, who lived in that time, and were themselves no small part of that history? Certainly that place itself which the adversaries cite openly enough indicates this: For there Gad and Nathan are joined to Samuel, as writers and continuators of the same history of David.

VI. The same also we say of the books of Iddo the Seer, and Ahijah the Shilonite, which are mentioned 2 Chron. 9. where the acts of Solomon are said to have been written in the books of Nathan the Prophet, and in the Prophecy of Ahijah the Shilonite, and in the visions of Iddo the Seer. For they seem to have written the first book of Kings, which is called the third of Kings in the vulgate version. For it indeed bears the name of no writer, but cannot be more commodiously attributed to others, than to the Prophets of those times.

VII. But as for the books of Solomon, of which it is clear that very many have perished, it must be known that not all things, which the Prophets and other men inspired by God wrote, had divine authority: For, as Augustine rightly admonishes de Civit. Dei lib. 18. the Prophets could write some things as men, with historical diligence, and other things as Prophets, with divine inspiration. Which were so distinguished, that the former indeed were to be attributed to them, the latter to God speaking through them. Thus therefore Solomon indeed wrote some things inspired by God, in which kind are those books of Solomon which make part of Scripture, and are related in the Canon, as Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and the Song of Songs. But the same wrote very many things by his own industry, and not as a Prophet, but as the most learned man of his time in all things. In which kind were many physiological things, as what he wrote about plants from the cedar to the hyssop. Also many ethical things, to which pertain those parables which are not contained in the book of proverbs. Finally many poetical things, as those five thousand songs, of which mention is made in the place cited.

VIII. Similarly our Apostles, besides those Epistles, which merited to have Canonical authority in the Church, could have written many others, pious indeed and holy, yet not of the same authority with the former ones, as which were not inspired by God, as those, immediately, and extraordinarily. Of this kind could have been that Epistle of Paul of which mention seems to be made 1 Corinth. 5. where thus says the Apostle, "I wrote unto you in an epistle not to keep company with fornicators." For these things seem not to be able to be commodiously referred except to some other epistle to the Corinthians, which preceded that former one. Although there are many learned men, as much from ours, as from the Pontificians, who do not want there Paul to designate some epistle which was diverse from that very one which he then wrote. But they so interpret his words, "I wrote unto you in this epistle:" That Paul does not look to some other epistle, but to those very things which he had written above, about purging out the old leaven, and taking away from the midst of them that fornicator, who had his father's wife.

IX. But what some of the Pontificians contend that a certain epistle of Paul to the Laodiceans has perished, has no foundation: but was born from the ambiguity, which is found in the words of the old interpreter in the last ch. of the Ep. to the Colossians. For thus it is read there in the old interpreter, "When this epistle is read among you, cause that it be read also in the church of the Laodiceans; and that ye likewise read the epistle from Laodicea." But by that epistle, which there is called of the Laodiceans, they understand an epistle written to the Laodiceans, when in reality there it is a question of an epistle written from the Laodiceans, as is manifest from the Greek context, which thus has, "καὶ τὴν ἐκ Λαοδικείας ἵνα καὶ ὑμεῖς ἀναγνῶτε," "and the epistle from Laodicea that ye also read."

For certainly there is no one so little understanding Greek who can be ignorant that "τὴν ἐκ Λαοδικείας," signifies an epistle written from Laodicea, but not to the Laodiceans.

X. Moreover the Doctors of the Roman Church, that they may prove that the word of God necessary to the Church extends more widely than sacred Scripture, thus reason. If it had been the purpose of Christ and the Apostles to confine and restrict the word of God to sacred Scripture, Christ would have openly commanded a thing of so great moment. And the Apostles would testify that they wrote from the command of the Lord, just as from the command of the Lord they taught in the whole world: But this we nowhere read.

XI. I respond, it is true that the Apostles, would not have attempted to embrace the sum of Evangelical doctrine in writing, and to deliver their writings to the Church, as the norm and rule of faith, except from divine command; But that they had no such command is false. The adversaries could have learned this from Augustine. For the words of Augustine are book 1. on the consent of the Evangelists ch. ult. "Whatever Christ wanted us to read about his sayings and deeds, he commanded the Apostles as if with his own hands to write this." It could indeed happen, that Christ did not command this by living voice and express words: But it cannot be doubted nor do the Pontificians themselves dare to deny, but that to this they were inspired by God, and moved by the Holy Spirit extraordinarily. For what Peter says about the prophetic writings, that prophecy did not come in old time by the will of man, but holy men of God spoke as they were moved by the Holy Spirit, is no less true of the writings of the New Testament. And, as the Apostle teaches in 1 Tim. 3. "All Scripture," whether of the Old, or New Testament, "is given by inspiration of God." Therefore the Apostles perhaps did not have an external and vocal command of writing: But certainly they had an internal command, and by it were led by an extraordinary impulse of the divine Spirit, which is stronger than any command. Nor do I see, where it is clear about divine inspiration, why moreover an external command should be required.

XII. Nor yet was an external command lacking at least to John; for he himself in the Apocalypse testifies in many places that it was enjoined to him from heaven that he should write those things which the Lord had revealed to him, and especially those Epistles which, in the name of Christ, he inscribes to the seven Churches of Asia. But Bellarmine does not rightly oppose the command of teaching, which the Apostles had from Christ, to the command of writing: For he teaches not only who institutes by living voice, but also who delivers doctrine in writing: And therefore what Christ enjoins to his disciples Matt. ch. ult. "Teach all nations," ought not to be restricted to preaching alone made by living voice, but can be extended to writing itself, which is one of the modes of teaching. For there Christ orders that they should imbue the nations with the knowledge of the Gospel by the best modes whatsoever, whether by speech and tongue, or also by pen.

XIII. Bellarmine also notes in vain the various occasions by which the Apostles and Evangelists were invited to write. Matthew, for example, wrote the Gospel that he might leave to the Hebrews, whom he was leaving to go to the Gentiles, some memorial of his doctrine and preaching. But John published his Gospel at the asking of the Bishops of Asia, on account of the heresy of the Ebionites then arising. But Luke undertook to write the Evangelical history, that he might draw us away from the uncertain narrations of others. Whence Bellarmine collects that the Apostles and Evangelists wrote only incidentally, and

by occasion, but not as if from their proper office and divine command. But although various occasions of writing were offered to the sacred writers, yet they did not for that reason write without divine command. For they were inspired by God, which is the strongest kind of command, that they should seize those occasions of consigning sacred doctrine to writing for the perpetual use of the Church, but not simply that they might remedy some singular inconvenience.

XIV. But, says Bellarmine, if they had wanted to consign sacred doctrine to letters on purpose, certainly they would have made a catechism or similar book. But they themselves, either wrote history, as the Evangelists: or epistles, as Paul and others, in which they treat of dogmas only incidentally. I respond that the sacred writers wrote not so much, as God through their hands: But God in writing is not bound to human and scholastic method; Indeed those laws of the school do not sufficiently become the majesty and simplicity of divine writing. But in whatever way the sacred books were written, whence the doctrine of faith, and the precepts of life can be collected easily and clearly enough by attentive and pious readers. Certainly it cannot be denied that Moses at least from the open and express command of God committed to letters the law received from God. Nor yet did he write books more methodical, than the Apostles and Evangelists. But in the Mosaic books the precepts of God are scattered without any certain order, and inserted in various histories.

XV. Finally what Bellarmine urges is not of greater weight and moment, namely, if it had been God's purpose to consign the doctrine of the Gospel to letters through the Apostles, it would have been that, either the individual Apostles would have written the body of Evangelical doctrine for the use of those provinces to which they preached, or certainly all having been gathered together before they departed into their provinces, they would have published some common book: For that this purpose of God might be ratified, and committed to execution, it sufficed that some of the Apostles and Evangelists undertook the care of writing with God inspiring. For the writings published by a few could have been for the use of the whole Church, and serve the faithful of all provinces. Nor was there need for the Apostles to consult in common about this matter, since God no less inspired the individuals separately, than all gathered together. Add that the divine writings had to be made not from the counsel of men, but from the immediate and extraordinary inspiration of God.

XVI. The Pontificians take a third argument against the sufficiency of Scripture from many things, which, as they say, ought not to be unknown, and yet are not contained in sacred Scripture. And first, they say, in the time of the Old Testament without doubt the women no less than the men had some remedy by which they were purged from original sin. And yet indeed for the males circumcision was instituted, but what was for the females Scripture nowhere has. Then in the same time it is in no way credible that there was no remedy for the males dying before the eighth day, on which alone they could be circumcised, and yet nothing stands out about this matter in Scripture.

XVII. I respond by that argument, if it has any force, it can be proved not only that Scripture does not contain all things necessary to be known, but that the whole doctrine of faith cannot be sufficiently drawn from sacred Scripture and unwritten tradition taken together. For here tradition and the unwritten word are no less silent than sacred Scripture.

Otherwise let the Pontificians draw out for us from their tradition what was that remedy of original sin under the Old Testament in women and males dying before the eighth day. But if they say that that tradition has perished, this argument will be retorted against them by which they try to prove that sacred Scripture is not a sufficient rule of faith, since, as they think, certain books of Scripture have perished. And with equal facility it could be said that this was contained in some one of those prophetic books which they contend have perished.

XVIII. As for the thing itself I say, the whole force of that argument rests on a certain false hypothesis of the adversaries, namely, that the grace of God necessarily depends on certain external signs, and that the external act of the Sacraments has the force of producing grace in us. For this having been put, it seems wonderful to them how the women could be saved under the Old Testament without circumcision, or some similar external sacrament: And yet in this very thing they forget themselves. For when they treat of the Sacraments, they attribute that efficacy and necessity to the Sacraments of the New Testament alone, but not to the Sacraments which were under the old law, which according to their mind were only shadows and figures of ours, nor had in themselves any force of working grace. And therefore if they want to stand by their own laws, neither circumcision, nor any other rite under the Old Testament could be a remedy of original sin.

XIX. But whatever the adversaries may say, or think about this matter, we with the Apostle say that circumcision was, not some remedy by the external application of which original sin was immediately taken away and abolished, but, as the Apostle speaks, "a seal of the righteousness of faith," Rom. 4. Therefore the true means of righteousness, and the remedy of original sin in all adults, as much men as women, was faith applied to the divine promises. But that promise which faith received, and on which grace and salvation depended, was this made to Abraham, "I will be a God unto thee, and to thy seed after thee," under which seed not only males, but also females were comprehended. By the virtue of this promise, not however of some external sign, God forgave original sin to all infants who died in the covenant before the use of reason, whether they had received circumcision, or on account of the female sex, or immature age, had not received it. But that the sign of circumcision was impressed on the males of each family, this sealed the promise to the whole family, and in the males the women were consecrated to God. And certainly that without an external sacrament received in their own body the women could be saved of old under the Old Testament, and also the males before the eighth day, Bellarmine could have learned from Lombard. For he in book 4. dist. 1 letter, G. teaches that women of old obtained salvation and righteousness through faith and good works, either their own, if they were adults, or of their parents, if they were little ones. And similarly that little ones before circumcision were saved in the faith of their parents, and confirms that by the testimony of Pope Gregory.

XX. And Bellarmine indeed, whose footsteps we especially follow, brings forth that, as an example of a thing necessary under the Old Testament, about which yet nothing is found in sacred Scripture. But that today under the New Testament many things pertain to faith about which we cannot be taught through Scripture, he tries to prove by many instances. And first indeed, he says, it must be believed that the Blessed Mary was always a virgin

against the error of Helvidius, as the whole Church always believed. And yet there is no testimony about this matter in Scripture.

XXI. I respond that faith indeed requires that we believe that Mary was a virgin, when she bore Christ our Saviour. "τὸ καὶ ἐξῆς," as Basil says, "ἀπολυπραγμόνητον τῷ λόγῳ τοῦ μυστηρίου" that is, what follows does not pertain to the reason of the mystery, and to inquire about it is curious. We indeed piously believe that Mary remained perpetually a Virgin, and think that Helvidius who dared to assert the contrary, was deservedly condemned as a rash man: Yet we do not think that that is to be numbered among the articles of faith, and to be urged as a thing necessary to salvation.

XXII. Nor does the other instance, which Bellarmine brings about Easter, have greater force, which, he says, must be believed to be celebrated in the New Testament on the Lord's day not the fourteenth of the Moon, on whatever day it may fall, although about that nothing stands out in sacred Scripture. For we indeed confess that in Scripture nothing is had about that matter, but we also say that the thing is of itself indifferent, which only pertains to the external rites of the Church, but not to those things on which salvation depends. Indeed once about this matter in the other century after Christ, a great controversy was excited between the Roman Church and the Asiatic Churches, so that for that reason they excommunicated each other. But although the custom of the Roman Church, which at last obtained everywhere, seems more agreeable to reason, yet in this matter there was sin on both sides. And therefore Irenaeus Bishop of Lyons about those times gravely reprehended Victor Bishop of Rome, because he contended with so great ardour about a matter of no great moment, and too much broke the bond of charity with the Oriental Churches for a slight cause. Indeed in the catalogues of heretics, which the fathers wove, the Quartodecimans are reckoned. But whoever will diligently inspect those catalogues, will see that those fathers number among heresies any opinions disapproved by them, although about slight matters and least necessary.

XXIII. They object moreover, Bellarmine and others, infant baptism as a necessary thing, and yet not handed down in sacred Scripture: or at least which is not sufficiently proved from sacred Scripture. But we deny that the legitimacy of infant baptism cannot be proved from sacred Scripture. Certainly our Theologians confirm this by many and valid arguments deduced from sacred Scripture against the Anabaptists. To relate and vindicate which arguments would not be of this place, and requires a more prolix work. But, what is very strange, the Pontificians themselves excellently confute the Anabaptists from the Scriptures. But among others Bellarmine so disputes about this controversy from the Scriptures, that he glories and trusts that his arguments can be solved by no reason, eluded by no art, book 1. on the sacram. of Bapt. ch. 9. And yet the same forgetting himself, while he tries to impugn the sufficiency of Scripture, asserts that paedobaptism cannot be sufficiently proved from Scripture. But here we appeal from Bellarmine carried away by zeal for the cause, to Bellarmine elsewhere convicted by the evidence of the truth.

XXIV. But the adversaries especially make force in the dogma about not iterating baptism in those who have been baptized by heretics as if we cannot deny that that dogma necessarily pertains to faith, and that those who deny it are heretics, and yet also cannot prove it from sacred Scripture. But certainly whether that is necessary to salvation, if there

were nothing else, could be made ambiguous by Cyprian the Martyr of Christ, who after death merited the name of saint in the Church. For it is not doubtful that he departed from the living retaining that opinion which the Church afterwards commonly repudiated. And yet who would dare to pronounce that a man most excellent in doctrine, piety, and constant faith in Christ had fallen from salvation? Nor does the difficulty expedite what the adversaries are wont to except that about that matter in the time of Cyprian nothing had yet been defined by the Church: For if, what the Pontificians want, the Church received that dogma from Apostolic tradition, what could be added to the authority of the Apostolic sanction from the decree of the Church? Surely if it was not necessary from the authority of the Apostles, it could not be necessary from the authority of Councils. Add that Cyprian himself living the opinion of him was publicly condemned and reprobated by Stephen Bishop of Rome, by whose mouth they want the Church to speak, and his rescripts to be so many oracles obliging the faith of Christians. And yet Cyprian did not acquiesce in his judgment, but thought it free for himself to remain in his own opinion, and to refute the writings of Stephen. Therefore, although we may go into that opinion, which was sanctioned by the common judgment of the Church, namely that baptism received among heretics is not to be iterated, yet we would not want to urge it, as what is simply necessary to salvation. But that we follow and defend it, we do not do this because we think it to be supported by the authority of some unwritten word, but because, if it cannot be demonstrated from Scripture, yet it can be most probably collected from it, as the arguments make manifest which Augustine has sedulously collected from sacred Scripture for this thing. And moreover it would be petulant and shameless to reject an opinion now received by the universal Church, and contrary to it in no thing to Scripture to follow by a certain wantonness of mind a diverse practice from that which has been approved by the long use of the faithful, Scripture in no way repugnant.

XXV. Some of the Pontificians also urge the dogma about the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son, about which there is contention between the Greek and Roman Church: As if also that dogma could not be shown, and proved from the Scriptures. But first it seems to us very hard to number that dogma among those which cannot be denied without the loss of salvation. And although in this question we follow the opinion of the Roman Church as more true, if however the Churches of Greece had no other error, we would not for that reason think their salvation to be done, nor would we refuse communion with them. Then, although that procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and Son is a thing plainly arduous, and far above our capacity, yet we deny that it cannot be proved from the scriptures. Indeed we persuade ourselves of it by no other arguments, than which can be drawn from sacred Scripture, as that the Holy Spirit is said to be no less the Spirit of the Son, than of the Father, that he is sent from the Son as from the Father, and other things of this kind, which our Theologians deduce and explain from various places of Scripture. Indeed the Pontificians themselves, while they try to refute the dissenting Greeks, use almost no other arguments than those drawn from Scripture, which they collect very many, as can be seen, not only in Peter Lombard, but in Bessarion and Bellarmine Cardinals. Thus that the adversaries here are compelled to confess, either that the procession of the Spirit from the Son can be proved through Scripture, or that they argue perversely and sophistically against the Greeks.

XXVI. But the adversaries think that they can prove something more grave by which Scripture, as long at least as it consisted of the Mosaic books alone, did not contain all things necessary to salvation. For nothing can be feigned more necessary to faith and salvation, than the dogma about the immortality of souls and the resurrection of bodies. But, they say, about those dogmas of so great moment nothing is found in Moses. As for the first, namely the immortality of souls, I say it is a thing which all religion presupposes. For if we differ from the brutes to that extent, and our souls no otherwise than of cattle, perish with our bodies, and nothing of man remains after death, piety is in vain, and religion in vain: nor does anything else remain, than that we say with the profane, Let us eat, drink, for tomorrow we die. Therefore, since the books of Moses are wholly occupied in handing down religion and prescribing the worship of God, the immortality of the soul is presupposed by Moses, and is something which is undoubtedly and openly deduced from the general scope of his books and the doctrine contained in them. But moreover there are many singular places in Moses whence not only the immortality of the soul, but the resurrection of bodies can be proved and collected. For Christ confirms both against the Sadducees from those words of God, "I am the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob," since, as he says, "God is not the God of the dead, but the God of the living." And thus Christ arguing the error of the Sadducees in this part recalls them to Scripture, and reproaches them with ignorance of the Scriptures. "Ye do err," he says, "not knowing the Scriptures." Whence it is manifest, that that doctrine ought to have been known to them from Scripture. Add that, if we suppose that the doctrine of the resurrection was only obscurely insinuated in the Mosaic books, it will not be able to be proved that a clear and distinct faith of it was even then necessary to salvation.

XXVII. Moreover they contend, that under the whole course of the Old Testament it was necessary to be known in the Church, that the legal sacrifices foreshadowed the future sacrifice of Christ. But that could not have been known from the Mosaic writings, indeed not even from the prophetic. I respond that the real sacrifice of Christ, that is, his death and the relation which the typical sacrifices had to it, is a mystery which the Gospel alone revealed, and which was silent in the preceding ages, as the Apostle speaks in many places. Those things indeed our Apostles, after the light of the Gospel had acceded, and the event of things itself, the best interpreter of prophecies, deduced from sacred Scripture. But truly before they lay hidden in the shadows of the law and the obscurity of the prophecies: nor could they be perceived at least by the common people of the faithful. And certainly that now after the advent of Christ himself on earth, nothing had yet become known among the Jews about his oblation and death, so far is it that they knew anything about it from the beginning, is manifest from this, that nothing so alienated their minds from Christ, as that bloody oblation which was accomplished on the cross. Nor is that true only of the unbelieving Jews, but also of the pious and faithful: For the Apostles themselves a little before the passion of Christ did not yet understand that he was to die for us. Whence it is that, when he first began to speak openly to them about his death, this was rejected by Peter with great aversion: Wherefore also Christ rebuked him saying, "Get thee behind me, Satan," as can be seen in Matt. 16. Nor yet did anything necessary to salvation fail the ancient faithful: For divine revelation is the measure of our faith, nor does God require from us a fuller faith, than can be had from the revelation hitherto made. As long therefore

as the mystery of the oblation to be accomplished by Christ was only confusedly obscurely and indistinctly revealed, it sufficed that the faithful had only an obscure and confused faith of it. But a clear and distinct faith of that mystery was necessary only after the promulgation of the Gospel.

XXVIII. There follows an instance which has more of difficulty, and through which the Pontificians think that they demonstrate that Scripture cannot be a sufficient rule of faith. For, they say, it is necessary to know that there is some Scripture divinely inspired, and that it consists in those books which we have today before our hands, which bear, the name of the Prophets and Apostles, and are held for divine by Christians. But this dogma so necessary cannot be sufficiently had from Scripture, For, even if Scripture says that the books of the Prophets and Apostles are divine, no one will certainly believe it, unless he first believes that the Scripture which says this, is divine: therefore it is necessary that besides Scripture there be some word of God by which we may be taught that Scripture itself is the word of God; otherwise we would have no faith about it, since faith rests on the word of God.

XXIX. I respond that that argument however specious it may be, is a mere sophism, which can easily be shown. For although the Pontificians deny that the whole word of God is contained in sacred Scripture, yet they cannot deny but that God at least could have delivered his whole word in writing, and commanded the Apostles that they should commit to writings all things which had been revealed to them, and which it was necessary for the Church to know: And but that, this case having been put, our thesis would be true, namely, that sacred Scripture is a sufficient and perfect rule of faith, and that nothing can be urged as necessary to faith and salvation, which it does not contain. And yet, this hypothesis having been made, it would be allowed to argue in the same way, and to prove that all things pertaining to faith cannot be sufficiently had from sacred Scripture, because this very thing, that such Scripture was divinely inspired, and consisted of these and those books, would be a thing most pertaining to faith: And yet that could not be proved from Scripture: since, namely, nothing proves itself, nor can anyone believe the testimony of some Scripture asserting itself divine, but that he is first persuaded that it is divine Whence it would be concluded that an unwritten word is necessary besides that Scripture, which would bear testimony to it and by which our faith about such Scripture would rest. Which conclusion however, from the hypothesis made, would be manifestly false, and therefore it is necessary that the argument brought is false and sophistical since from it the false can be concluded.

XXX. But that it may be more evident, we ask the Pontificians, if Scripture is not the whole and sufficient rule of faith, let them tell us what at last that is. They will respond that that rule consists as much of the written word, as of the unwritten, which is in the mouth of the Roman Church: And that that word as much written, as unwritten is the sufficient and total rule of faith, outside of which there is no other word of God, and from which alone those things which are necessary to faith and salvation can be sought. But now I retort their own argument against them. That word partly consisting of sacred Scripture, partly without writing of traditions to which the Roman Church bears testimony, is not a sufficient rule of faith. For not all things which are necessary to faith can be proved from

it. For of all things most necessary it is that we believe that there is some word truly divine, and that that word consists partly of certain Scriptures, partly of unwritten traditions, and that those divine Scriptures and traditions are the very ones to which the Roman Church bears testimony; and that we can and ought to believe its testimony in this part, as altogether certain and infallible. But that dogma so necessary, and which is brought forth as the foundation of the whole religion, cannot be sufficiently had from the word, either written, or unwritten, which is in the mouth of the Roman Church. For although Scripture affirms itself to be divinely inspired, and the Roman Church glories that its traditions are divine, and that the word of God is to be sought from it as from an infallible witness. Yet I will not certainly believe the Scriptures, nor the traditions, nor the Roman Church, but that I first believe that God speaks through the Roman Church, and that as much Scripture as traditions draw their origin from God. Therefore it is necessary, besides Scripture and traditions, and the very testimony of the Roman Church, that there be some word of God whence I may learn that all those things are divine, and oblige my faith: otherwise my faith about the authority of the word as much written, as unwritten which the Roman Church has in its mouth, will rest on no word of God, and so will not be faith. Finally no rule of faith can be feigned against which someone cannot use a similar argument.

XXXI. But that the fallacy of that sophistical argument may be detected, it is to be noted that it supposes as a manifest thing that which is most false, namely, that that is not a sufficient rule of faith by whose testimony all things which pertain to faith cannot be proved, not even excepting that very rule itself. For, whatever at last the rule of faith may be stated, it cannot be proved by its own testimony. For nothing can prove itself in this way, since all proof is from things more known, but the same is not more known and more unknown than itself. And yet it is a thing most pertaining to faith, and necessary, that we embrace the very rule of faith itself, and give certain assent to it. Therefore that is a perfect and sufficient rule of faith, not which proves itself, but from which having been supposed all things can be proved, besides itself, which pertain to faith. And therefore although Scripture cannot be sufficiently proved by its own testimony, yet this does not argue that it is not a perfect and sufficient rule of faith. And to say that Scripture does not suffice to prove all things which are of faith, because it cannot make faith for itself by its own testimony, is to sophisticate in plainly the same way as if someone should prove that the sky does not cover all things because the sky does not cover the sky itself: or that the principles of some science are not as it were the norm and rule, through which all things are proved which look to that science: because the principles themselves are not proved through the principles; And yet it pertains to some science to know its principles.

XXXII. Moreover that argument supposes that we embrace nothing by faith, except what can be proved by some divine word and testimony: which, although at first sight it seems to be most true and undoubted, yet is not true on all sides. For our faith receives the things revealed in the word of God otherwise, and the word of God itself, or divine revelation otherwise. Since indeed we believe and receive the things themselves revealed by God on account of the divine revelation, and because God bears testimony to them in his word. But about the word of God itself, or divine revelation there is another reason. For one part of the divine word can indeed bear testimony to another, and one revelation be received on

account of another revelation by which it is confirmed to us; But here a progress cannot be given into infinity. But at last it must be stood in some word of God, which our faith receives on account of itself, and which does not borrow its authority from some other word of God outside of itself, by whose testimony we are rendered certain about it. Therefore it is necessary that there be some word of God which is known to us through itself, that is, from implanted signs and notes, and other arguments and incitements, by which our mind illuminated by the Holy Spirit is moved that it may believe that such a word is really divine, and refers its origin to God. Although therefore there is not another word of God, which bears testimony to the divinity of Scripture, nevertheless Scripture will be the legitimate object of our faith, if indeed faith is the assent by which we embrace the word of God, and on account of it whatever things are confirmed by its testimony. Nor can the adversaries escape but that their faith is at last resolved into some word of God to which they adhibit faith induced only by certain arguments and motives, but not on account of another word of God, by whose testimony its authority is sanctioned.

XXXIII. Moreover here it is to be observed, that the testimonies, by which sacred Scripture asserts itself divine, are not indeed suitable and efficacious arguments to convince those who call into doubt the authority of Scripture; And to that extent it is true that Scripture cannot be proved through Scripture. But yet in another sense Scripture can be proved through Scripture itself, insofar as there are in Scripture many arguments and notes of divinity by which, it indicates and asserts itself true and divine. Not otherwise than the sky and earth prove and show their author to be God, not by some simple voice and testimony, but from the very excellence of their nature, and the vestiges of divine power and wisdom which can be noted in them: or as some book vindicates itself to Aristotle and Cicero, not from the title alone, but from the very genius of the doctrine, the acumen of style and manner of arguing, which is such that it cannot, be attributed except to those most excellent wits. For so the books of Scripture, whether you regard the style, or the things themselves, have the vestiges of divine wisdom so deeply impressed, that it appears enough that they were divinely inspired, and have God for their author.

XXXIV. Therefore the sum of our response comes to this, that in the analysis of faith neither a circle can be given, nor a progress into infinity, but our mind is necessarily fixed in some word of God which is not confirmed by another word of God, but which our faith receives immediately and on account of itself, and into the knowledge and faith of which we are led by implanted arguments and signs, and other things, as the schools say, motives of believing, not taken from the testimony of some other divine word. But that that word of God, in which our faith is fixed, is sacred Scripture, consisting of a certain number of books, and therefore that it is not received by us on account of some other word of God, which bears testimony to it, nor also that it proves itself to us by its simple and bare testimony, but is known to us from implanted signs and notes, and other arguments and incitements. But from that it does not at all follow that it is not a perfect and sufficient rule of faith: because in such a rule it is not required, that it prove itself otherwise, but it is enough that, that excepted, all things which pertain to faith can be confirmed by its testimony. Indeed it is impossible to give such a rule of faith, which can prove itself, as the rest, by its simple testimony: but it is altogether necessary that the first rule of faith among

Christians be supposed as a principle, nor be proved by other principles of faith except perhaps to man, and a posteriori, as they say in the schools.

XXXV. The adversaries add, It is necessary that we know not only that the books of Scripture are of themselves divine, dictated by the Holy Spirit, but also that they are found sincere and uncorrupted today, and have come to our hands such. But that we cannot learn from Scripture itself: and on that account there is need of another word of God, through which we may be rendered certain of the sincerity and integrity of Scripture itself. Therefore Scripture alone is not a sufficient rule of faith.

XXXVI. But they can be urged by a similar difficulty. For I will say in the same way, It is not only necessary, that we know that the Apostles handed down the doctrine received from Christ to the Pastors and Rectors of the Church without writing for the most part, and simply committed it to their faith, but also that we be certain that those Apostolic traditions have come down to us through so many ages whole and uncorrupted. But that we cannot learn from Apostolic tradition itself. Therefore it is necessary that besides that word which the Apostles partly in writing, partly by living voice handed down, there stand out in the Church another word of God, through which the Church of today may be rendered certain that as much the Scriptures as the traditions have come down to it whole and uncorrupted. And therefore what Bellarmine asserts with the most learned and approved of the Pontificians is false, that the Church now is not ruled by new revelations, but remains in those things which were handed down by those who were ministers of the word: And that all those things which the Church holds by faith, were handed down by the Apostles, or Prophets, either in writing, or in word. Of the unwritten word of God book 4. ch. 9. But if anyone should say that the faithful are rendered certain of the sincerity and integrity as much of Scripture, as of traditions through the testimony of the Church which cannot err, he will not at all take away this difficulty. For it is asked whence the Church itself says this, and on what foundation the faith of the Church itself rests in this part.

XXXVII. Then I will thus urge, that my faith may have a certain foundation, it is not only necessary that I know that the Church bears infallible testimony, either through a Council, or through the supreme Pontiff: but moreover that I be certain that that Pontiff is legitimate whose testimony I hear, and also that that Council is legitimate whose decrees are objected to me. But about this I cannot be rendered certain through the testimony either of the Pontiff, or of the Council itself. For nothing can be sufficiently proved by its own testimony. And moreover it having been put that such a Pontiff was legitimate, and legitimate such a Council, it is necessary that I be certain that the decree of the Pontiff has come to my hands sincere and uncorrupted, and similarly sincere and uncorrupted the Canons of the Council. Therefore it is necessary that not only besides Scripture and traditions, but also besides the very decrees of the Pontiffs, and the statutes of the Councils of the Canons, there be in the Church some word of God, by which it may render certain that that Pontiff is legitimate, and that Council, and that the decrees of the Pontiffs and Councils, which are handed to me, are sincere and uncorrupted, otherwise my faith does not rest on a certain foundation, nor ought it to be called faith, since faith rests on the word of God.

XXXVIII. Here certainly the Pontificians are constrained by their own snares, nor can they expedite themselves but that they furnish a response to their own objection. But I respond that just as there is no need of another word of God, by whose testimony it may be proved that sacred Scripture is divine, because sacred Scripture is the first rule of faith, in which our faith is fixed: But it can be known through itself from implanted signs and notes, and other arguments and motives of believing, by which the faithful can be sufficiently moved that they embrace it as true and divine so also there is no need of another word of God whence we may learn that Scripture is uncorrupted and whole. For whence we learn that it is divine, thence we learn that it is whole and sincere, in things at least momentous and essential.

XXXIX. For that I may inculcate this which cannot be noted enough, in the proofs of faith, neither a circle can be given, nor a progress into infinity, both of which are vehemently absurd: and therefore our faith is necessarily reduced to some authority, whose testimony as divine, and therefore as sincere and uncorrupted we receive, on account of itself and immediately, through the internal illumination of the Spirit, who leads us to it, no longer by some external, testimony of another divine word, but by motives and incitements of another kind.

XL. Again the adversaries urge, it is not enough to have Scripture in our hands, but it is necessary that we hold its true sense. For the words of Scripture are not properly the rule of faith, but rather the sense of Scripture intended by the Holy Spirit. But the true sense of Scripture cannot be had from Scripture alone, For Scripture is very often ambiguous and perplexed, so that, unless it be explained by someone who cannot err, it cannot be understood nor can we be certain of the true sense of Scripture, unless tradition accedes. Therefore Scripture alone does not suffice.

XLI. I respond that in the Scriptures there are indeed certain places very difficult, and upon the understanding of which the mind hesitates: Nor can even the most learned perspicuously enough discern, what may be their true sense. But from that it does not follow that some tradition is necessary whence the understanding of those places may be sought. For it is not necessary to faith and salvation to penetrate into the true sense of such places. But if it were necessary, the Church would lack certain necessary things. For, from the confession of the adversaries themselves, in those most obscure and perplexed places of Scripture tradition does not teach, and put out of doubt what is their genuine sense: and the Pontifician Doctors are no less uncertain about it than ours.

XLII. Of whatever kind therefore the obscurity of Scripture may be, we deny that it is so obscure, but that the whole doctrine necessary to faith and morals can be undoubtedly and certainly collected from it by an attentive and skilful reader. For we do not assert that Scripture is so clear in all things which are of any moment to faith and salvation, that to attain its scope, and to dig out sacred doctrine from it, there is no need of labour, study and diligence: but that any faithful person by himself immediately and without any help can sufficiently understand it. For although the sense of Scripture is often so ready at hand, that it does not need proof, and forces itself even upon the unwilling, yet sometimes, that the sense of Scripture may be dug out, and shine forth, the words must be diligently weighed, the things preceding and following must be accurately considered, and parallel

places must be compared, prejudices having been set aside, and the affections of the mind having been composed. In which thing there is need that Pastors go before the people committed to their care, as much by private discourses, as by public sermons, and also, when the thing requires, by published writings of diverse kind, in which they may explain Scripture and apply it to the various uses of the Christian people. For to this among other things God gave Pastors and Doctors to the Church, that they might expound the word of God contained in Scripture, open the sense of Scripture, and as it were lead the faithful people by the hand into the understanding of it.

XLIII. Nevertheless the faithful people do not embrace the sense of Scripture shown by their Pastors by a certain blind obedience, and on account of their authority alone, but are led to it by the light of truth itself, when it has once been indicated and shown to them. For it is more difficult to find and detect the sense of some place, than to acknowledge and discern by the evidence of truth alone what has been detected by another and demonstrated. Just as there are many who cannot by themselves read some epistle Written in letters growing obsolete or not aptly enough formed. And yet after it has been read to them, they begin to acknowledge, and distinguish the strokes of the letters, and see with their own eyes what is contained in it.

XLIV. Therefore that the faithful may attain the true sense of Scripture in many things, and take abundant fruit from it, they have need indeed of an interpreter but not of an interpreter who cannot err, as the Pontificians say, but of an interpreter sagacious and skilful. But, after such an interpreter has gone before them, they hold the sense of Scripture, and are certain of it, not on account of the authority, either of the interpreter, or of the tradition, which they have learned from their interpreter: but on account of the force and light of truth, which they now acknowledge and observe in the things themselves, if indeed they have a mind, as is fitting, purged by the virtue of the Holy Spirit, and illuminated. Just as those who study Philosophy and the more human letters immediately by themselves cannot understand the text of Aristotle, and the Satires of Horace or Juvenal, but for this need the work of a preceptor and master. And yet after the true sense, either of the Poet, or of the Philosopher has been indicated and expounded to them; they now discern it by their own judgment and see it in the author himself: Nor are they persuaded of it on account of the authority of their master alone. For as the sense of the Poems of Horace and of the Aristotelian text is not of itself uncertain and doubtful, until some external authority accedes, which may pronounce upon it; but can be certainly detected from the very words of the authors and the context of the works, provided they be duly considered: so also the true sense of sacred Scripture has in the text itself its own light, and arguments and proofs of itself by which it can be known, nor is it of itself vague and undetermined until the authority of unwritten tradition accedes, or of Ecclesiastical judgment, which may limit and coarct it in a certain way.

XLV. Therefore although Scripture is in some way obscure, and among the faithful needs explication, in which way it has now been expounded, nothing can be concluded from that against the sufficiency which we attribute to sacred Scripture. For, when we say that Scripture alone suffices to faith and salvation, we do not understand that it needs no interpretation, that from it the individual faithful may draw the whole doctrine of faith,

but only that for this there is by no means need of another word of God besides Scripture, and another rule of faith, or of some infallible interpreter, who may determine the sense of Scripture otherwise doubtful and uncertain, and render us certain of it.

XLVI. But against that the adversaries urge, that there are not a few things which are of great moment to faith, which are indeed in some way deduced from Scripture But not so certainly and evidently, that the mind can firmly acquiesce in it, and all doubt be taken away, until the authority of tradition is adhibited, which may confirm the true sense of sacred Scripture, and put it out of doubt. And for example they bring the doctrine of the equality of persons in divinity, of the procession of the Spirit from the Son, of original sin, and of the necessity of some internal grace, that someone may be able to work well, and usefully to salvation. For that those things cannot be deduced clearly enough from the Scriptures, that without the authority of tradition they can be had for dogmas of faith, they prove from this that heretics, as today the Greeks, and of old the Arians and Pelagians, disputably dispute against those things from the Scriptures, and not only respond to the arguments, by which those articles are confirmed from sacred Scripture, but in turn object not a few places from the Scriptures for their opinion with appearance. Therefore controversies can never be finished with froward men, unless there be besides Scripture another word of God which may more clearly confirm those dogmas, and whence the true sense of sacred Scripture about controverted places may be sought certainly and infallibly.

XLVII. I respond that the sophistry and perversity of men who deny the truth, and clamour against it, and give some paint to lies and errors which can deceive light and incautious men, does not hinder but that the truth may be clear and certain in respect of those who duly consider the thing, and with a purged eye, without prejudices and perverse affections. Otherwise nothing at all clear, and certain will remain. And it will have to be said that it cannot be proved from the natural light of right reason that God is, and that he is one, because many Atheists and sophists have denied those things, and abused reason that they might assert the contrary: nor will its own certitude and evidence stand to the Mathematical disciplines themselves, because the Sceptics have tried to overturn their certitude: and by many sophisms and fallacious arguments to render their principles and axioms doubtful. And what can more urge the Pontificians, I will similarly prove that from tradition and the unwritten word, those very dogmas, which were brought for an example, are not clearly and certainly enough deduced, and therefore that besides the word handed down partly in writing partly by living voice by the Apostles, another word of God is necessary in the Church, whence they can be had more clearly and more certainly. For the Arians and Pelagians did not only dispute from the Scriptures against the Orthodox, but also claimed the tradition of the Church for themselves, and gloried that their opinion was confirmed by the testimonies of the ancient Doctors of the Church: as is manifest from the disputations of the ancients against those heretics. Indeed not even, will the thing be able to be defined by the authority of their Councils themselves. For the Arians opposed their own Councils also to the Councils of the Orthodox, as the Ariminian to the Nicene. But especially the Greeks contending with the Roman Church about the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father alone, about the Monarchy of the Pope, and other articles, fight not only from the Scriptures, but also from the ancient tradition of the Church, from

the testimonies of the Fathers, and the decrees of Councils, and oppose their own Church to the Roman Church, their tradition to its tradition, and their Councils to its Councils.

XLVIII. Therefore if some truth is rendered doubtful, and some proof is weakened, because there are many who do not see and acknowledge the light of that truth, and the force of the proof but dispute against from the same principles, and in whatever way solve the arguments brought from them for the truth, no word of God at all will remain, whence heretics can be solidly enough confuted, and the dogmas of faith be proved certainly and evidently enough. But truly although men led and blinded by prejudices and perverse affections do not see the salutary doctrine contained in sacred Scripture, and try to cast darkness upon it by cavils and vain sophisms, that does not hinder, but that they evidently collect it from the Scriptures, and are certain that they have firm and undoubted arguments of it in them who with a sincere mind, and a mind free from prejudices and perverse affections, and with the Holy Spirit as leader, and holding forth a torch, weigh, and compare the testimonies of Scripture that they may find the truth in them.

XLIX. It remains that we may solve one Argument yet. For we profess to believe, and studiously assert that sacred Scripture contains all things which are necessary to faith and salvation, and that there is no unwritten word of God, But, they say, this very thing cannot be proved from Scripture. For those places of Scripture which are brought forth for this thing do not convince that, and the arguments deduced from them can easily be solved. I respond that the truth which we here defend can be solidly proved from Scripture itself, and in the preceding theses arguments have been dug out and vindicated from the Scriptures by which the authority of unwritten tradition is weakened, and the perfection and sufficiency of Scripture is asserted, and many other things are brought forth by our Theologians, and vindicated from the exceptions of the adversaries.

L. But although sacred Scripture made no mention of traditions, nor anywhere commended its own perfection and sufficiency, nevertheless we would truly and not without reason affirm, that there is no unwritten word of God: because no such appears, and the tradition which is proposed as divine has in itself notes by which it is acknowledged to be human, and arguments which convince that it is not a safe enough foundation of faith, as has been shown by us in the former disputation. For just as the true word of God, and the legitimate principles of faith do not need to be proved by another word of God, and deduced from other principles of faith, but are known to the faithful from implanted signs and notes, and other arguments and motives of believing, so also, that we may justly reject that, which is falsely proposed as the word of God, and a legitimate principle of faith, there is no need of some express testimony, which is taken from the true word of God, but it is enough that it has in itself indications and notes of human weakness, and motives and arguments are wanting by which the faithful can be sufficiently moved and persuaded, that they receive it as divine. But from that that besides Scripture no other word of God stands out and appears, it is evidently deduced that it contains all necessary things. For it is known through itself, that men are not bound to know and believe more things about divine and supernatural things, than it pleased God to reveal and manifest to them.

Part IV

In which the arguments are resolved by which the Papists endeavour to reconcile unwritten traditions with equal authority to sacred Scripture.

I. In the newest theses we have resolved the arguments by which the Papists think they show that Scripture is not a full and sufficient rule of faith. It follows that we should resolve those by which they attempt to prove that unwritten traditions have equal authority with sacred Scripture, and should be embraced with equal piety and affection.

II. Therefore, first, in order to prove that there are many dogmas and institutions of Christ and the Apostles which are not contained in the sacred writings, and yet should obtain the same authority among the faithful as those which are written, they bring forward the words of Christ in John 16, where addressing his disciples, he says, "I still have many things to say to you, but you cannot bear them now." To which passage they join those which are read in the last chapter of that Gospel, "And there are also many other things which Jesus did, the which, if they should be written every one, I suppose that even the world itself could not contain the books that should be written." Therefore it is certain, they say, that the Lord did and said many things which are not written. For one hand can hold those books which are extant, but John says that the whole world could not contain the books which should be written. And besides, those things which the Lord promised he would say in the cited passage, he undoubtedly said after his resurrection, as can be gathered from the first chapter of Acts, where Luke testifies that after his resurrection the Lord appeared to his disciples for forty days and spoke to them of the things pertaining to the kingdom of God. But the Evangelists wrote very few of the deeds and words of the Lord after the resurrection. Moreover, it is not at all credible that the Apostles, who had seen or heard those things, did not pass them on to the churches. For they were neither envious nor forgetful, so that they would not or could not say those things.

III. I respond that by those many things which Christ testifies he had to say to his disciples, and which the disciples could not yet bear before Christ's death, is understood the accurate and distinct explanation of the mysteries of the Gospel, such as concerning the efficacy and fruit of Christ's death, his resurrection, ascension into heaven, and sitting at the right hand of the Father, the calling of the Gentiles and the abrogation of legal worship, the state of the Church under the New Testament, and other such things, about which Christ spoke to his disciples briefly and generally even before his death, but which they could not then understand, nor bear their accurate explanation, on account of the various prejudices with which their mind was occupied, and the greatest sorrow by which their spirit was cast down, and because they had not yet received that Spirit of truth who was to enlighten the eyes of their mind, so that they could bear and behold the light of the Gospel.

IV. And certainly it is manifest that the disciples did not then understand those things from the fact that even after they saw Christ raised from the dead, they still did not know what the nature of his kingdom would be; which ignorance of theirs they reveal by that question to Christ which is related by Luke in the first chapter of Acts, "Lord, will you at this time restore the kingdom to Israel?" Indeed, even after Christ's ascension, the calling of the Gentiles and their gathering together with the people of God into one body was not

sufficiently understood by Peter, until he was more fully instructed concerning that mystery by a special vision, as can be seen in the 10th chapter of Acts. But Christ undoubtedly taught the Apostles those many things, both by word of mouth after the resurrection, and through the Holy Spirit abundantly poured out upon them after sitting at the right hand of the Father. But from where do the Papists prove or conjecture that those things were not written, when those mysteries which we have briefly recounted, and far more, are found written in the writings of the Evangelists, which they undoubtedly drew from their Master? Therefore, it is true indeed that before his death Christ had many things to say to his disciples which they could not bear, and it is also true that Christ said and revealed those things to his disciples after the resurrection. But it is false that those things were not written by the Apostles and Evangelists, at least as to the sum and substance, and as much as is sufficient for our salvation. For they are the very mysteries which are scattered throughout the whole New Testament. Nor can the adversaries prove the contrary by any argument.

V. But they can much less make us believe that those many things which Christ had to say to his disciples are those traditions which they today thrust upon us, concerning the sacrifice of the Mass, the invocation of Saints, the worship of images, and other such things. Certainly they do not affirm this with greater reason about their traditions than the ancient heretics did about their own fictions and dreams, which with similar audacity they endeavoured to reconcile with authority and faith. For Augustine testifies in Tractate 97 on John that the ancient heretics abused these words of Christ in order to commend their fictions to the people, as if they were the very things which Christ had to say to his disciples. "All the most foolish heretics," he says, "who want to be called Christians, attempt to colour the audacity of their fictions by this occasion of the Gospel sentence, where the Lord says, 'I still have many things to say to you.'" From which it is clear that the Papists openly imitate the ancient heretics, while from the same words of Christ they argue for their unwritten traditions.

VI. As for the other passage, where John affirms that not all things were written which Christ did, and that the world could not contain the books which could be written about them, I respond that neither do we say that all the deeds of Christ were written, but only his entire doctrine, as much as suffices for salvation. But of the deeds of Christ so much has been written as is enough that we may know Christ, and through the knowledge of him come to eternal life, as the same John teaches in Chapter 20: "Many other signs," he says, "Jesus also performed in the presence of his disciples, which are not written in this book. But these have been written so that you may believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God; and that believing, you may have life in his name."

VII. Moreover, what kind of consequence is this? Christ did many signs which were not written, therefore there are many dogmas necessary for salvation which are not contained in sacred Scripture? Should we not rather conclude from this that, just as Christ indeed did many signs which are not recorded in sacred Scripture, yet nothing certain about his signs and miracles can be had from tradition, but only from sacred Scripture? So also we have nothing certain and ascertained about the words and doctrine of Christ, except from the same Scripture. And besides, just as Christ wanted only so much to be written about

his deeds as is enough for a saving knowledge of him, so also he took care that only so much should be committed to writing about his words and doctrine as seemed to him to suffice for our faith and salvation.

VIII. A third place of Scripture from which the Papists argue for unwritten traditions is found in 1 Corinthians 11, where Paul addresses the Corinthians as follows: "Now I praise you, brethren, that you remember me in all things and keep the traditions just as I delivered them to you." For they say that by "traditions" are meant certain precepts about the manner of praying in the church, which are nowhere found written. But this needed not only to be said, but also proven. But we say that by "traditions" in that place is meant the whole doctrine of the Gospel, and all the precepts which they had received from Paul. For the word "tradition," as was observed before, is general, and signifies any teachings delivered in any way, whether by word of mouth or also in writing. Moreover, of those documents and institutions which were first delivered to the Corinthians by Paul, most had already been written down then, while others had not yet been written, but were afterwards written in Paul's very Epistles, and other books of the New Testament which were composed later. Some perhaps were never written, in which category there may be certain rites and ceremonies which were accommodated to those times, and other things which pertained to the polity and order of the Church of that time. For we do not contend that all such things were committed to writing. But from this it cannot be proven that all things which are necessary for faith and the worship of God either were not written then, or were not afterwards committed to writing. For what kind of consequence is this? Paul praises the Corinthians because they held to all the documents and precepts which they had received from him. Therefore Paul handed down certain necessary dogmas and institutions which were neither written then, nor afterwards.

IX. Nor does the other testimony, which the adversaries take from the same chapter, have greater force. For the Apostle, about to set forth the manner of celebrating the Lord's Supper, begins his discourse as follows: "For I received from the Lord that which I also delivered to you." And finally he concludes with these words: "And the rest I will set in order when I come." Where first Bellarmine presses the word "delivered," as if it made something for unwritten traditions. Then he adds that nowhere is it found written what Paul set in order. But rightly do Catholics think that he not only set in order the things that pertained to rites and ceremonies, but also handed down other weightier matters, such as about the ordination of ministers, the sacrifice of the altar, the matter and form of the other sacraments – nor can heretics show the contrary.

X. But as for the first point, it is a wonder that Bellarmine insists on the word "delivered," when he himself acknowledges that the word "deliver" is general, and does not pertain only to unwritten doctrine, but also to doctrine delivered in writing. And certainly the things which Paul there delivers about the institution of the Lord's Supper are not only written by him in that place, but are also found written by three Evangelists – namely, by Matthew, Mark, and Luke. But the rest which Paul promises he will set in order when he comes, our side rightly refers (whatever the Doctors of the Roman Church may think to the contrary) to rites and ceremonies, and other things which look to decorum and order, and which are therefore matters indifferent in themselves, and do not bind the Church everywhere and

always, nor are observed in the same way among all. And for that reason it was not necessary that those arrangements of Paul should be written down one by one, since in this matter the general rule of Scripture suffices – namely, that in the Church all things should be done decently and in order. But the particular disposition of order, and of that which looks to decorum, is left to the judgment and decision of the Pastors and the Churches themselves.

XI. But it is unjust, and against the rules of disputation, for Bellarmine to demand of us – namely, to show that those other things which Paul promises he will set in order are not certain weightier matters concerning the sacrifice of the altar and the matter and form of the sacraments of the Roman Church. For since Bellarmine here argues, but we respond, it is for Bellarmine to prove what he says, but for us it suffices to deny his propositions and to assert our own. Therefore he ought not simply to have said, but to have demonstrated that Paul ordained something about the sacrifice of the Mass, and those sacraments of the Roman Church which we judge to be adulterated and spurious.

XII. Therefore we do not at all heed Bellarmine's conjectures and suspicions. And yet we can easily show (which Bellarmine affirms we cannot show) – namely, that Paul there intimates nothing about the sacrifice of the Mass, and the matter and form of the sacraments, and other weightier matters. For the very manner of speaking which the Apostle uses sufficiently indicates that he is dealing with things which are not of such great moment. For after he briefly set forth the institution of the Lord's Supper, and rebuked certain graver abuses which obtained among the Corinthians in the celebration of it, he subjoins those words about which the question is: "And the rest I will set in order when I come." Where anyone who carefully considers the text will easily acknowledge that by that "rest" Paul intimates certain things of less moment than those which preceded, and which there was no need to write, and the ordering of which could be remitted to another time without danger, and seemed to require the presence of the Apostle, who being present should consider the state of the Corinthian Church, and all circumstances having been weighed, should determine what needed to be done, and what discipline and order should be followed in that Church.

XIII. But what has greater force, and can stop the mouth of the adversary – whether by those "other things" the ordering of which Paul defers to another time, are understood those things which the Doctors of the Roman Church make so much of (namely, the sacrifice of the altar, the ordination of ministers, and the rest about the matter and form of the sacraments) – then certain necessary things had not yet been delivered to the Corinthians when the Apostle wrote this epistle. For the Papists say these things of theirs are necessary above all. But all necessary things had been abundantly delivered to the Corinthians by the Apostle before he sent this epistle to them, as is clear from the first chapter of this epistle, where Paul says that the Corinthians had been enriched in everything in Christ – in all utterance and all knowledge. And in the fifteenth chapter he affirms that the Gospel which he had preached to the Corinthians, which they had received, and in which they stood, was of such a kind that through it they were saved, if indeed they held it fast in the way he had preached it to them. From which it is manifest that the Apostle had previously delivered to them the whole and perfect doctrine, and had

not concealed from them anything which he judged necessary for salvation and faith. Therefore the Papists must either concede that those traditions of theirs about the sacrifice of the altar and the matter and form of their sacraments are not necessary, or acknowledge that they do not pertain to those things which Paul, when he wrote to the Corinthians, had not yet delivered, but promised he would set in order among them afterwards.

XIV. But even if Paul did not expressly signify that he had already delivered all necessary things to the Corinthians, who could induce in his mind that Paul, when he preached the

Gospel to the Corinthians and established a Church among them, delivered nothing to them about that sacrifice in which the sum of the Christian religion is to be constituted, and by far its most important part? And how preposterous would be that diligence, to write to the Corinthians about the attire in which men and women ought to be present in the public assemblies, but to defer to another time instruction about the Sacraments, and that which is thought the chief part in divine worship?

XV. The Papists take a third argument for traditions from those words of Paul which are found in 2 Thessalonians 2: "Therefore, brethren, stand fast and hold the traditions which you were taught, whether by word or our epistle." For, they say, Paul there opposes certain traditions to written doctrine, and sets forth two kinds of documents which the Thessalonians had received from him: some, namely, which he had committed to writing and inserted in his epistles; but others which he had commended to them only by word of mouth. And yet he wants both to be held equally.

XVI. I respond, it is indeed true that the Apostle, when he wrote these things, had not delivered in writing to the Thessalonians all things that pertain to the doctrine of the Gospel, but some things only by word of mouth, and some also in writing; and both ought to have been received by the Thessalonians with equal reverence –seeing that no less faith was to be given to the Apostle preaching than writing. We also freely confess that it could happen that then the whole doctrine of the Gospel had been committed to writing neither by the Apostle, nor by others, since the Canon of the New Testament was not yet constituted and completed. But it does not follow from this that afterwards the whole substance of the Apostolic preaching was not committed to writing, both by Paul himself and by the rest of the Evangelists and Apostles; or that now anything certain about the Apostolic preaching can be had otherwise than from sacred Scripture. The Thessalonians indeed, who had seen and heard the Apostle in person, could be certain of the true doctrine of the Gospel not only from the books of Scripture which then existed, but from the living voice of the Apostle which they themselves had perceived. But from the time the Apostles departed this life, we cannot be certain of their doctrine otherwise than from their writings, by which the Holy Spirit willed to be sealed whatever is necessary for the perpetual use of the Church. The things, therefore, which the Apostle had delivered to the Thessalonians, partly by speech, partly by epistle, were afterwards included in the Apostles' epistles and Gospels, so that, the Apostles no longer teaching by the living voice, the doctrine of salvation should be drawn from there. Therefore it in no way follows from these words of the Apostle that even now there exist certain traditions, from which must be sought certain precepts of the Apostle which are not contained in the sacred Scriptures.

XVII. But Bellarmine insists that not all things which the Apostle taught were afterwards included in the writings. "For," he says, "the Apostle in this very chapter indicates that he taught the Thessalonians when Antichrist would come, and what was delaying his coming. 'And now,' he says, 'you know what is restraining.' And, 'for you know what I told you when I was still with you.' But this is nowhere written –namely, when Antichrist is to come. Wherefore the blessed Augustine, in Book 20 of The City of God, says that they knew what the Apostle taught by the living voice, but we cannot know it who have not heard the Apostle. Therefore not all things are written which the Apostle said."

XVIII. I respond first, we do not say that all and each of the things which the Apostle said have been committed to writing, but only all things which are necessary for faith and salvation. Of this kind, nothing was delivered and preached by the Apostle by the living voice which is not found written in the sacred writings. But we are unwilling to say that the Apostle did not communicate to certain ones particular revelations which do not pertain to the common salvation of the whole Church – which revelations were not afterwards written. But if Paul had from a special revelation when Antichrist was to come, and taught this to the Thessalonians, certainly this belongs not to the former category, but to the latter. For I do not think the Papists themselves will say it is a thing necessary for salvation to know the time and hour of the coming of Antichrist.

XIX. But what is especially to be noted, I ask the Papists whether the whole doctrine of the Apostle cannot be had from Scripture and tradition together. Undoubtedly they will not deny this. Let them therefore teach us from tradition when the Apostle told the Thessalonians that Antichrist was to come. Certainly here tradition is no less silent than sacred Scripture. Therefore, if there is any defect in this matter, tradition can be blamed for it no less than sacred Scripture. But if this does not prevent the whole doctrine of the Apostle from being able to be had from tradition, neither will it prevent it from being able to be had from Scripture.

XX. But as to the matter itself, the Apostle does not intimate that he taught the Thessalonians when Antichrist would come, but simply that he would come before the second advent of the Lord; and besides, what was delaying the coming of Antichrist. For he does not say, "You know at what time the man of sin is to come," but simply, "And now you know what is restraining." But what that was, the Apostle had not only taught before by word of mouth, but afterwards repeats and confirms in this very epistle. "For the mystery of lawlessness," he says, "is already at work; only he who now restrains will do so until he is taken out of the way. And then the lawless one will be revealed." Those things indeed which perhaps the Apostle had explained more clearly and fully by word of mouth; but whatever the tradition may be, it adds nothing here to Scripture, nor do we have anything more from it about those things which the Apostle intimates by these words.

XXI. But the passage of Augustine which Bellarmine brings forward for himself works marvellously for us. For there Augustine says that when this was not written, we cannot know it, since we have not heard the Apostle himself teaching. From which it is manifest that Augustine did not think anything certain could be had about the preaching of the Apostles from tradition alone, but only from sacred Scripture, which certainly is what we maintain.

XXII. But besides the testimonies of sacred Scripture, by which the Doctors of the Roman Church strive to prop up the authority of unwritten tradition, they bring forward for the same purpose certain arguments drawn from reason. And indeed they say the first argument is from the consent of heretics in despising traditions. For, they say, the heretics of all ages have rejected traditions. And therefore the contempt and rejection of traditions is, as it were, a mark and indication of heresy. But that heretics have always rejected traditions, they prove by induction and the example of the Valentinians, Marcionites, Donatists, Arians, Eunomians, Nestorians, Eutychians, Aerians, and certain others.

XXIII. I respond, whatever heretics think, yet what they think is not forthwith heretical. For heretics can embrace many true things along with false dogmas. Therefore, although those heretics whom the adversaries enumerate rejected traditions by common consent, yet it would not follow from this that it is heresy to reject traditions. For they were indeed heretics, but not in that they did not attribute enough to traditions, but in that they defended perverse and impious dogmas against the authority of Scripture. Otherwise, if whatever they thought must be condemned, it must not be believed that Jesus is the Christ, and that we must suffer for Christ, which they also admitted.

XXIV. Moreover, it is false what Bellarmine assumes – namely, that all heretics have rejected traditions. For there were indeed some heretics who despised unwritten traditions and professed to adhere only to Scripture, although they corrupted it in various ways; but there were also many heretics who peddled certain unwritten traditions, and used that pretence and colouring in order to commend their fictions and dreams to the people. This is taught by Irenaeus, book 3, chapter 2: "The heretics," he says, "resist and fight against their own salvation. For when they are refuted from the Scriptures, they turn to accusing the Scriptures themselves, as if they were not correct, nor of authority, and because they are variously expressed, and because the truth cannot be discovered from them by those who are ignorant of tradition. For that tradition was not delivered through writings, but through the living voice." Indeed, those very heretics whom Irenaeus censures in this place are the Marcionites themselves, and the Valentinians, and others like them, whom Bellarmine brings forward as enemies of traditions. Consonant with this, Jerome teaches in his commentary on Haggai, speaking of heretics: "The things," he says, "which, without the authority and testimonies of the Scriptures, they discover and devise of their own accord, as if by apostolic tradition, the sword of God strikes down." And above we referred to the words of Augustine, by which he testifies that the ancient heretics abused, in order to confirm their traditions, those very words of Christ which the Doctors of the Roman Church similarly abuse today – namely, "I still have many things to say to you, but you cannot bear them now."

XXV. But Epiphanius, in Heresy 33, specifically teaches the same thing about a certain heretic Ptolemy, where he reports his words from an epistle to Flora, in which he promises that she would learn the truth of the things he taught, after she was deemed worthy of the apostolic tradition, "which," he says, "we also have received through succession." But in Heresy 73, he reports an epistle of the Semi-Arians, in which they boast that they embrace the faith handed down by the fathers, and that they preserve that faith as a kind of inheritance, which they had received from apostolic times, through the fathers who were

in between up to them. The Papists, therefore, have no reason to reproach us with our agreement with the heretics in rejecting traditions, since even the worst heretics have boasted of certain unwritten traditions, and wanted to cover their pernicious fictions with that pretence, as the Papists do today.

XXVI. Besides, the Papists prove that unwritten traditions are necessary from the custom of all nations. For first, they say, the Jews had, and still have, some traditions apart from Scripture. Then all profane Commonwealths are ruled in great part by unwritten laws, as formerly the Athenians and Lacedaemonians, and also the ancient Gauls, as Caesar, Thucydides, and Plutarch testify. And besides, the most noble and celebrated philosophers, Pythagoras and Socrates, although they taught very much, nevertheless wrote nothing. From which Bellarmine concludes that nature itself in a certain way proclaims that unwritten traditions are necessary, or at least most useful.

XXVII. I respond, as far as the Jews are concerned, they indeed long ago had unwritten traditions. But what kind they were and how much they should be valued, Christ teaches, when he reproaches the Jews that by their traditions they abrogated and rejected the law of God and his commandments, and when he applies to them the words of God in Isaiah, "In vain do they worship me, teaching as doctrines the commandments of men." Therefore they indeed had their traditions, but with God disapproving, and Christ rebuking, so far is it from being the case that their example should be imitated by us and held as a rule. But how great the force of unwritten tradition is, and how apt a means it is for propagating and preserving the truth, the Jews' traditions of today can make manifest, which they boast of having from the mouth of Moses, although they are nothing but mere trifles, and impious, most foul-smelling, and often blasphemous dreams.

XXVIII. Moreover, we do not heed at all the examples of profane Commonwealths. They indeed can best use unwritten laws in those things which pertain to civil government, and which therefore depend on the judgment of human reason. But it does not follow from this that the same reasoning holds for those things which pertain to faith and divine worship. For since those things are had from divine revelation, nor does reason perceive anything in them, they could not be entrusted safely enough to the care and memory of men; and therefore it seemed good to divine wisdom that they should be committed to writing by men divinely inspired, by which they could more easily be preserved uncorrupted in the Church.

XXIX. The Papists take a third argument from the dignity of the Church. For, they say, as formerly the Jews excelled all nations, because the oracles of God were entrusted to them, as Paul says in Romans 3, so now the Church of Christ surpasses all sects, because it alone knows all the mysteries of true religion, and is privy to the secrets of the bridegroom. But if all things were written, the Church would have no privilege. For the heretics, Jews, and Pagans would know no less about the mysteries of our faith than we ourselves and our prelates.

XXX. I respond, as formerly it was the privilege of the Jews that the oracles of God were entrusted to them, so also it is the privilege of the Christian Church that the same oracles have been committed to it. But as the Jews had those oracles consigned to writing, so also

they have been delivered in writing to the Christian Church. The Church, therefore, is the guardian and depositary of sacred Scripture and the heavenly doctrine contained in it. But if unbelievers have any knowledge of it, they borrow it from the Church. Moreover, a twofold knowledge of the divine mysteries must be distinguished. For it is one thing to know what Scripture teaches, and what are the mysteries of the Christian religion; and another to believe those mysteries, and embrace them with sure faith. For someone can be most practiced and most learned in Christian doctrine, who nevertheless does not believe Christian doctrine, but conceals an occult infidelity in his heart. But the privilege of the Christian Church does not properly consist in the former knowledge, which is nothing other than a simple apprehension of what is said, but in that knowledge which also includes faith and sure persuasion of what is apprehended by our mind. For as they can read and learn the Koran, and yet not believe Muhammad and his Koran, so also a Muslim, and anyone else who is an unbeliever, can read Scripture, and learn the whole body of the Christian Religion, and yet he will not on that account give credence to the Christian religion, and enjoy the privilege of the faithful, who truly know and embrace Christ and his Gospel.

XXXI. But if account is taken of the former knowledge, which is wholly situated in a certain simple apprehension, certainly in order for that also to remain proper to the Church, and for no unbelievers to be partakers of it, Christian doctrine ought never to have been committed to writing by anyone, and entrusted to paper, but only always handed down in the Church by the living voice. But although the Papists contend that not all the mysteries of the faith were written by the Apostles and the divinely inspired men, they nevertheless confess that those mysteries are found written in very many books of their Doctors, and that specifically, clearly, and plainly, so that they can be perceived by any reader. And consequently, although unbelievers could not draw the whole Christian doctrine from the writings of the Prophets and Apostles, they can nevertheless easily learn it from the books of Christian Theologians. And thus that imaginary privilege of the Church falls to pieces no less than if all things were written in the books of the Prophets and Apostles, as we contend.

XXXII. Finally, the Doctors of the Roman Church take an argument for unwritten tradition from the dignity of the mysteries of the Christian religion. For, they say, there are many mysteries which require silence, nor is it fitting that they should be explained in the Scriptures, which are read by the whole world. For if it is not permitted to admit any unbaptized persons to see the tremendous mysteries of the Mass, how will it be permitted to deliver the same to them in writing?

XXXIII. I respond that it is characteristic of superstition to hide its mysteries, and to keep the common people away from them, as the Pagans did of old. But the Christian religion is not ashamed of itself; and, as Tertullian says, the truth of Christ blushes at nothing except being hidden. Therefore the Christian religion begrudges the knowledge of itself to no one, but invites even unbelievers to it. I confess indeed that some prudence is needed in this matter. For Christ warns that what is holy is not to be given to dogs, nor pearls to be thrown before swine. One must also deal differently with little ones in Christ than with the perfect. And to the former, indeed, milk is to be offered; to the latter, solid food is to

be reserved. It is therefore the part of Pastors and Doctors to have regard for their hearers in this matter, and to set forth the doctrine of the Gospel, which they draw from the Scriptures, skilfully and in a way suited to the understanding of those who hear, and not rashly to expose the mysteries of the Christian religion to be laughed at by the profane and impious. But our Evangelists and Apostles did not sin against that prudence, prescribed by Christ himself, when they consigned the whole Gospel, briefly and summarily, to their writings. For those very writings can be set forth and expounded to some in the manner of milk, but to others in the manner of more solid food. Nor should whatever is written be forthwith deemed to have been thrown to the swine, and exposed to the hisses and guffaws of the profane. Otherwise the Doctors of the Roman Church themselves would daily give what is holy to dogs, and throw pearls before swine, seeing that they daily publish Theological Summae and Catechisms, and teach and explain in writing any mysteries whatsoever of the Christian religion, as clearly and openly as they can. Which certainly if it is permitted to them, with the dignity of the mysteries of the Gospel remaining inviolate, why was the same not permitted to the Apostles and Evangelists? But if it was not permitted, and was not fitting for the Apostles to explain all the mysteries of the faith in writing, why today is the same thing more permitted to the Scholastics and Pontifical Theologians, who teach in writing all the dogmas of Pontifical Theology, and those very things which Bellarmine calls the tremendous mysteries of the Mass, of which there is absolutely none which is not found written in the books of the Papists?

XXXIV. Moreover, let the Papists tell us what are those mysteries, whose dignity and majesty is so great that they ought not to have been explained in the sacred Scriptures. For certainly the mystery of the creation of the world, and its destruction, of the resurrection of the bodies, of the incarnation of the Son of God, of the two natures in Christ, of the three persons in one divine essence, and many others of this kind, are set forth in the Scriptures. But can the Papists bring forward mysteries more august and sublime than these? And are the dogmas of the worship of images, of the invocation of the Saints, and of the succession of the Pope in the place of the Apostle Peter, something loftier and more worthy of veneration than the trinity of persons in God, the redemption of the human race through the death of God incarnate for us – so that these indeed could be written, but those ought not to have been written? Finally, what is that madness, to think that it was not in keeping with the dignity of the traditions for them to be written by the Apostles, but that their dignity is not violated when they are committed to writing a hundred times by common Doctors, and inculcated to all?

On the Perspicuity of Scripture

I. Most doctors of the Roman Church so dispute with the Theologians of the Protestants, as if they simply said that in the scriptures all things are so plain and perspicuous, that they can be understood by anyone without labour, nor does anything obscure occur in them which needs explication and the help of an interpreter. But this is not their opinion. For they freely admit, that what Peter says of the Epistles of Paul, is true of the rest of the parts of scripture, namely that in them are some things hard to be understood; nor do they so assert that scripture is clear and perspicuous, that it lacks all difficulty and obscurity whatsoever.

II. But that it may be understood what and what kind of perspicuity is attributed to scripture by the Protestants, it is to be noted first that they distinguish between those things which are necessary to salvation and those which are not necessary to salvation. And indeed they contend that those things which are necessary to salvation are clearly contained in the scriptures. But as for those things which are not necessary to salvation, they confess that scripture is often obscure in them and very difficult, as can be seen in many prophecies, and certain hidden mysteries.

III. Again, to remove all ambiguity here, it must be known that by those things which are necessary to salvation can be understood, either those without whose knowledge and explicit faith no one can attain to salvation. Such are the precepts of life, and the articles of faith contained in the creed. Or those which no one can reject, and teach the contrary in the Church without the loss of salvation. Which latter things are far more extensive than the former. For many things one can be ignorant of, or only know generally and confusedly, without the loss of salvation, which nevertheless no one can reject and impugn, but that he incurs the mark of heresy, and deserves to be expelled from the communion of the Church, and thus but that he sins against his own salvation. Moreover, when the Protestants assert that scripture is clear in those things which are necessary to salvation, they understand necessary not only in the first way, but also in the second way. For they do not think that heresy can otherwise be incurred, than by pertinaciously asserting and defending that, the opposite of which sacred scripture perspicuously teaches.

IV. Moreover it must be known, that when the Protestants say that all things which are necessary to salvation are clearly contained in the scriptures, they understand this of the whole body of scripture taken indefinitely and generally, but not of the individual places, where something necessary to salvation is proposed. For it can happen that a thing necessary to salvation is obscurely proposed in some place, when yet it is clearly contained in others. Thus, for example, the incarnation of the Son of God, and his death for us is obscurely hinted at in many prophecies of the Prophets, but in the Gospel it is so clearly expounded, that the infidels themselves, namely the Mohammedeans and Jews acknowledge this, although they do not give faith to the Gospel.

V. Then those things which are necessary to salvation are indeed so clearly and perspicuously proposed in the scriptures, that the conscience may be satisfied, and in that a pious mind can acquiesce. But this does not hinder but that curious and itching wits

perhaps may not think themselves satisfied, and may be able to raise some dust, by which they hide the truth from themselves: just as in natural and human things, many things are proved by evident reason, and so that a man of sound judgment is sufficiently convinced by it, and fully persuaded, which nevertheless some from petulance deny, and about which by stubbornness, and zeal of contending their mind is so clouded, that they do not discern nor perceive a thing however clear in itself.

VI. And that the opinion of the Protestants about this matter may be made plainer, it is to be noted that they acknowledge three degrees of things in scripture, as far as it looks to its perspicuity, or obscurity. For first in the scriptures some things are so openly and evidently put, that they are obtruded even upon the unwilling, nor is there any endued with common sense, who cannot acknowledge them. As for example, that the world was created by God, and is ruled and administered by his providence, that Jesus is the Christ and the Son of God, and other things of this kind, which are absolutely necessary to anyone for salvation.

VII. The second degree is of those things to understand which there is need of labour and exercise, frequent reading, meditation and sedulous collation of the scriptures. By which things is comprehended a more distinct and accurate knowledge of the mysteries of faith, and of those things which fight with them, or are agreeable to them. In which knowledge the faithful more or less profit, as they apply greater or less study to that thing, or are endowed with a greater, or lesser grace of God.

VIII. Finally the third degree is of those things which in scripture are so sublime or recondite, that they surpass the capacity of man, as long as he lives here on earth, at least if we regard the ordinary measure of grace: nor are they to be manifested fully unless when we shall enjoy the presence of God in heaven. For now, as the Apostle says, we see in a riddle, and as through a glass: but then we shall see face to face, 1 Cor. 13.

IX. Moreover, that God has so tempered the scriptures, that some things in them are obscurely, some things clearly put, and those very things which are clearly explained somewhere, are obscurely hinted at in other places, he has done this by his supreme wisdom. And first indeed that he might repress human pride, and that even the most Learned might be compelled to acknowledge their infancy, and ignorance in divine things, and presume nothing of themselves; but cast away all swelling of mind.

X. Then by this God wanted to excite in the faithful a desire of that happy and perfect state, which we expect in the world to come: where we shall no longer, as was said, see obscurely and in a riddle, but we shall see face to face. For just as the faithful under the law, by the great obscurity of the divine mysteries; and the veil of shadows and figures, were compelled to pant after the coming of the Messiah, who was to teach them all things, and bring much light to the divine mysteries: so also now under the New Testament, while we live on earth, what we acknowledge to be hidden from us in the mysteries of scripture, forces us to long for the second coming of Christ, and that perfect state of the Church, where we shall know all things clearly and perfectly, seeing God as he is.

XI. Moreover also God wanted to excite us to labour by those difficult places and mysteries with which he sprinkled the scriptures, and to the study of searching the scriptures, which

would languish by too much facility. For plain and easy things we immediately neglect and disdain. Therefore God took care lest perpetual facility in reading the scriptures should beget disgust, and lest continual and too much difficulty should deter from the reading of them. Which wisdom of God Augustine notes and excellently describes, "Magnificently," he says, "and wholesomely the Holy Spirit has so modified the holy scriptures, that in the more open places he might meet with hunger, but in the more obscure he might wipe away disgusts. For scarcely anything is dug out of those obscurities, which is not found said most plainly elsewhere." Book 2, de Doctr. Christ. ch. 6.

XII. It is also to be carefully observed that the Protestants do not teach that scripture is so clear and perspicuous in all things which are of any moment to faith and salvation, that to attain its scope, and dig out sacred doctrine from it, there is no need of labour, study and diligence, but that any faithful person, immediately and without any help, can sufficiently understand it. For the sense of those places of scripture which can be called perspicuous is indeed sometimes so ready at hand, that it does not need proof, and forces itself even upon the unwilling, which can be seen in those things which are simply and absolutely necessary for anyone to know for salvation. Yet sometimes also, that the sense of scripture may be dug out, and shine forth, the words must be diligently weighed, the things preceding and following must be accurately considered, parallel places must be compared, and the sentence must be not drowsily examined to the analogy of faith, prejudices being set aside, and the affections of the mind being calmed.

XIII. In which thing there is need, that Pastors go before the people committed to their care, as much by private discourses, as by public sermons, and also, when the thing requires, by commentaries published on sacred scripture. For to this, among other things, God gave Pastors and Doctors to the Church, that they might expound the word of God contained in scripture, open the sense of scripture, and as it were lead the faithful people by the hand into the understanding of it.

XIV. Which sense of scripture however shown by their Pastors the faithful people do not embrace by a certain blind obedience, and on account of their authority alone; but it is led to it by the light of truth itself, when it has once been indicated and shown to them. Just as novices who give their work to the more humane letters, cannot by themselves understand the classic authors, as Tacitus, Suetonius, Persius, Horace, and in many things penetrate their sense, unless a skilled Master indicates and expounds it. But led by the hand and taught by such a Master, they see by themselves that this is the true sense of the author, and remain persuaded by the evidence of the thing itself, not simply on account of the authority of their Master.

XV. For it is more difficult to find and detect the sense of some place, than to acknowledge and discern by the evidence of truth alone what has been detected by another and demonstrated. To the former, when it is a question of the scriptures, that the faithful might be invited, Christ gave Pastors and Doctors to the Church. To the latter, in necessary and momentous things, besides the internal illumination of the Holy Spirit, without which no one can be faithful, nothing further seems to be required.

XVI. For it is still to be observed that the Protestants do not teach, that the true sense of scripture once proposed to anyone, so proves itself by its own light and evidence, that it can be perceived, understood and discerned by anyone, without the help of the divine spirit. For the mind of men, whom the Spirit of God has not yet breathed upon, is from birth so blinded by prejudices, and depraved affections by which they are variously carried away cast such great darkness upon it, that there is plainly need of divine grace, and the internal operation of the Holy Spirit, to this, that we may be able to acknowledge scripture itself for divine, as it is in reality, and perceive and discern the true and salutary sense of it in many things.

XVII. In the scriptures indeed many things are so clearly put, that a man endued with common sense, without any supernatural light, can perceive how and acknowledge that scripture teaches this and that, although he does not adhibit to it the faith which is fitting. But no one can understand scripture to salvation, and in all things which look to salvation, discern its true sense from the false, without the light of the Holy Spirit, and the special help of God.

XVIII. Nor also do the Protestants attribute that perspicuity to scripture, that any faithful person, who is imbued with some light of the Holy Spirit, understands plainly all things in it, nor finds anything difficult in it, even about those things which look to the precepts of life, and the articles of faith, in respect of which there are given many and various degrees of knowledge. And the very mysteries of our Redemption, the knowledge and faith of which is required from all, have certain sublimities and profundities, which surpass the capacity even of those who are most illuminated, and most versed in sacred doctrine. Therefore there is always given place here for progress, and fuller knowledge, even in those who are most perfect among the faithful. Whence it is that the Prophets themselves, and holy men through whom scripture was delivered, frequently implore divine grace, and the illumination of the Holy Spirit, that they may be able to rightly perceive and understand the law of God, and penetrate its wonders and profundities. As especially can be seen in Psalm 119, as when David says, "Give me understanding, and I shall keep thy law." Also, "Open thou mine eyes, that I may behold wondrous things out of thy law."

XIX. In sum therefore the Protestants do not teach that scripture is everywhere and always clear and perspicuous, but they confess that in it many difficult and obscure places are found, and also some mysteries and prophecies into which we scarcely penetrate, or are able to attain anything. They only want this that those things which are necessary to faith and salvation, in the way which was explained above, are clearly contained in scripture, or can be evidently drawn out from it.

XX. And yet not in respect of all things which pertain to faith and religion do they attribute that evidence to scripture, which excludes either the work of Pastors teaching, and explaining the scriptures, either by living voice, or by writings and published commentaries: or the care and attention of the faithful learning and reading the scriptures, as the adversaries commonly impute to them. As if, namely, they simply wanted the scriptures to be so open and obvious to each one, that even the common people and most unlearned anyone should not have need of one teaching and going before in understanding

the sacred letters, but by themselves and without labour they could follow and perceive the sense of them everywhere.

XXI. For on the contrary they teach and inculcate that to perceive the true sense of scripture, and to attain the understanding of it, there is altogether required the sedulous study of those reading, and serious attention, and the imploration of divine help, without which we can profit not even a little in the true and salutary understanding of scripture: and moreover the hearing of the living voice of Pastors, which is never to be neglected by the faithful, as which is a means instituted by God, by which he ordinarily calls us to faith, and once called confirms us in the faith, and daily more and more instructs and teaches us about those things which pertain to faith and salvation.

XXII. As for the Doctors of the Roman Church, they do not deny, nor can they deny, that many things in scripture are perspicuous. Nor also do they much labour, whether those things which are necessary to be known for salvation to all and each one, and which no one can be ignorant of without the danger of salvation, are openly put in scripture: and many of them not unwillingly concede that. Bellarmine especially who responding to that of Augustine, which is often wont to be cited by the Protestants, "In those things which are openly put in scripture are found all those things which contain faith and the manners of living:" says that Augustine speaks of those dogmas which are necessary to all simply, such as are contained in the Apostolic creed and in the Decalogue. And afterwards he proves that of the same Augustine, "I believe that even hence would be the most clear authority of the divine eloquences, if a man could not be ignorant of it without the loss of promised salvation." Of the word of God, book 4, ch. 11, paragr. "Lastly they bring forth." Nor is the mind of Coster the Jesuit other. "We do not deny," he says, "that those principal heads of faith, which are necessary to be known by all Christians for salvation, are perspicuously enough comprehended in the Apostolic writings." In Enchiridio, ch. 1.

XXIII. Therefore the whole dispute which intervenes between the Roman School and the Protestants about the perspicuity of scripture, can be reduced to this, whether all controversies of faith and Religion, which are of any moment to salvation, and about which it is not lawful to opine thus or otherwise, without heresy, can be clearly and openly decided from scripture? which the Protestants affirm, but the Doctors of the Roman Church deny.

XXIV. But that it may more clearly appear how far and to what extent the Theologians of the Roman School want sacred scripture to be obscure, attention must be paid to the occasion of this controversy. For from that it was born, that when the Protestants brought forth various testimonies of scripture, by which they argued many things in the worship and Doctrine of the Roman Church; and very many of the Christian people moved by them seceded from the Roman Church, and adjoined themselves to the communion of the Protestants; the Doctors of the Roman Church proposed that scripture was ambiguous, perplexed, and obscure, and could be drawn into various senses, and admit diverse and opposite interpretations: and therefore they compared it to a two-edged sword, a waxen nose, and a leaden rule, which can be variously twisted and bent to the will of anyone. Whence they concluded that the disputes which arise in the Church about matters of faith, cannot be safely and certainly

decided from it. Indeed such great darknesses are cast upon scripture, that what is its opinion about the controverted heads of the Christian Religion, cannot be clear to the faithful without the authority of unwritten tradition. Therefore the Christian common people should not be struck by the places of scripture by which the Protestants impugned the doctrine and practice of the Roman Church: Nor should the faithful stand by their own judgment in this matter, but by the interpretation of the Church, that is, of the prelates of today, they should acquiesce with the greatest lowliness of mind. For nothing is more prone, than that those who want to use their own light and judgment in choosing and discerning the true sense of scripture, should fall into heresies, on account of the obscurity and ambiguity of Sacred Scripture, which ought to be taken away and removed by the determination and authority of the Church, that we may establish something certain about the sense of Scripture.

XXV. Wherefore between the Protestants and the Doctors of the Roman Church it is not asked, Whether Sacred Scripture is in some way perspicuous or obscure. For the Protestants freely confess that in the sacred letters there are certain obscure places: nor do the Doctors of the Roman School deny that there are some perspicuous ones, as was shown before. But the whole contention is about the degree or magnitude of the obscurity and perspicuity. Whether, namely, sacred scripture is to that degree obscure, that what is its opinion about the controversies of faith and Religion, which are of any moment to salvation, cannot ordinarily be certainly clear to the faithful, except from unwritten tradition, and the judgment and testimony of the Church of the present age; however much sedulous and diligence they apply, as much in imploring divine help, as in weighing and comparing among themselves the places of scripture, as in hearing and consulting the expositions of pious doctors? The Protestants deny that there is so great obscurity in scripture, that to perceive and discern its true sense it is necessary to flee to unwritten tradition, and the judgment of the present Church as of a certain infallible interpreter, without whose authority and determination, the true interpretation of scripture, and the true opinion about matters of faith, cannot prove and persuade itself to the faithful by its own light, and to those to whom the Holy Spirit has been granted according to the ordinary measure of grace, and has opened the eyes of the mind. But the Theologians of the Roman School affirm that: who not only require the skill of the Doctors and Pastors of the Church, to open and show the true sense of scripture, about controverted dogmas, but moreover their authority to determine it, without which it would remain ambiguous and uncertain.

XXVI. And that I may more briefly conceive the state of this question, here it is chiefly and properly asked, Whether the style and manner of treating of scripture is to that degree perplexed and obscure, that in things which look to faith, the salutary sense cannot ordinarily be discerned from the pernicious, without the authority of unwritten tradition, and the judgment of the present Church, as of a certain infallible interpreter. Which the Protestants deny, but the School of the Roman Church affirms.

XXVII. But it can easily be shown that that obscurity which the Doctors of the Roman School attribute to Sacred Scripture, openly fights with the counsel of God in procuring scripture. For first it cannot be denied but that it was the counsel of God, when he wanted

sacred doctrine to be consigned to writing, that by that reason it might be able to be more easily conserved and propagated, and vindicated from the corruptions and oblivion of men. For such is the perversity, carelessness, and negligence of men, that those things which are simply committed to their care and memory are easily given over to oblivion, or at least are corrupted and adulterated in various ways, and are obnoxious to many and great changes. And therefore God that he might take care for the heavenly Doctrine once delivered to men, and perpetually conserve it among men, judged it to be of the thing to consign it to authentic tables, and to deliver it to sacred books as to faithful custodians to be preserved, that from it it might always be able to be drawn pure. But in vain did God intend that end and enter upon this reason of conserving the heavenly Doctrine, if Sacred Scripture is so obscure, that without the help of unwritten tradition the faithful cannot be clear about its sense. For if the thing so has itself, since sacred Doctrine is not so much to be sought in the letter of scripture, as in the sense, certainly it ought not to be thought committed so much to scripture, as left to the care and memory of men; nor will it be less obnoxious to the frauds and oblivion of men, than if it were not written. Indeed men will be able to pervert the doctrine of faith at will, and change the sense of scripture, nor yet will they be able to be argued from scripture, if scripture is to that degree perplexed and ambiguous, that in those things which pertain to faith and the manners of living, it admits opposite and contrary senses.

XXVIII. Then to this end God delivered scripture to men, that from the reading of it all might be able to learn the will of God, and be instructed in heavenly doctrine. For, as Paul says, "Whatsoever things were written aforetime were written for our learning, that we through patience and comfort of the scriptures might have hope," Rom. 15. And Deuteronomy chapter 31 God orders that the book of the law should be read before the whole people, the women also, little ones, and strangers standing by; and that to this end, that all may hear and learn to fear the Lord their God. And of the same book chapter seventeen it is separately commanded to the King, that he should have the volume of the law with him, and read it all the days of his life, that he may learn to fear the Lord his God, and to keep the words and ceremonies of it which are commanded in the law. Similarly the Apostle commands his epistles to be read with adjuration to all the faithful, 1 Thess. 5 as also he professes to write not only to the rulers and Pastors of the Church, but to all the faithful: as can be seen in the beginnings of most of his epistles. But now if God wanted his word to be committed to writings to this end, that from the reading of it all the faithful promiscuously might be able to be instructed in the doctrine of salvation, without doubt he took care that it should be so perspicuously written, that all also by reading it, or hearing, might be able to learn and draw from it those things which pertain to salvation and faith. But they would not be able if scripture were so obscure and ambiguous, that those who read and hear it were unable to discern the salutary sense from the pernicious, but as a waxen nose it could be turned, bent, and twisted to whatever part. For what else can such a writing do, than leave its reader, or hearer perplexed and uncertain about what is to be believed and done by him? Nor is it of a wise man to propose for reading what cannot be understood, and from which no, or little fruit can redound to the reader.

XXIX. Moreover the Doctors of the Roman Church do not deny, nor can they deny, that scripture is the rule of faith, at least, as they want, partial, and to this end was given by God.

To which makes the very title of Canonical, which Christians by common consent attribute to scripture. But if the sense of scripture is of itself obscure, vague, and uncertain, and there is need of the determination and authority of the Church, that anyone can be certain of it, certainly scripture in no way deserves the name of rule, since a rule ought to be something certain and determinate, and per se known in its kind. Indeed the living voice of Pastors will be the rule of scripture, if the words of scripture do not determine it, but it is to be defined and determined from the voice and testimony of Pastors; since scripture is not to be esteemed from the letter, but from the sense. But the words of scripture, and their coherence, do not determine its sense, if they leave the reader ambiguous and suspended, until the authority of the Pastors of the Church accedes. And yet the Doctrine of the Pastors of the Church, ought to be proved from scripture, and so to speak, measured: as can be taught by the example of the Bereans, who having heard the preaching of Paul, consulted the scriptures whether the thing was so, as Paul had said, Acts 17.

XXX. And certainly the Theologians of the Roman School openly contradict themselves, while on one hand they admit that scripture is the rule of faith, or makes part of that rule; and on the other however, when it is a question of the perspicuity or obscurity of Sacred Scripture, in those things which pertain to faith, they cry out that it is like a waxen nose, and they call it a Lesbian, or leaden rule. For a leaden rule, which is bent to the will of the user, is in no way a rule, nor worthy of that name. And whoever calls something a leaden rule, denies that about which it is a question to be a rule.

XXXI. Moreover it is the perpetual use of the Church, and was from the beginning, to argue and convict heretics and heterodox openly despising the authority of the Orthodox Church, from Sacred Scripture itself, by bringing forth testimonies, by which their errors are damned and rejected, or the contrary truth is asserted, either expressly, or by a good and valid consequence. Thus in the beginning of the nascent Christian Church, Apollos mightily convinced the Jews publicly, showing by the scriptures that Jesus was Christ, Acts 18. And Paul similarly by the scriptures convinces in his Epistles to the Romans and Galatians the errors of the Jews or Judaizers, about the justification of man, and the use and necessity of the Legal Ceremonies. And the ancient Doctors of the Church also, as Augustine, and Athanasius, thought that the errors of the Arians and Pelagians, even putting aside the authority of the Catholic Church and its Councils, could be strongly and evidently impugned and overturned by very many testimonies of Sacred Scripture. Indeed the Doctors of the Roman Church themselves, when they dispute against those who have seceded from the Roman Church, urge various places of scripture against them, and glory that they can be evidently convinced from them. But if scripture is so perplexed and ambiguous, about the dogmas of faith, that it admits opposite senses, and for that reason deserves to be compared to a two-edged sword, and a waxen nose, the errors of the heterodox cannot be convicted from it, and putting aside the authority of the Church, to dispute from it against heretics, is to mock, and lose work. For how can you ever convince an adversary from places which can admit as much his, as your sense?

XXXII. But Sacred Scripture itself openly enough removes from itself such obscurity and ambiguity. For thus Moses speaks of the law which he delivered in writing to the Israelitish people, "This commandment which I command thee, it is not hidden from thee, neither

is it far off. It is not in heaven, that thou shouldest say, Who shall go up for us to heaven, and bring it unto us, that we may hear it, and do it? Neither is it beyond the sea, that thou shouldest say, Who shall go over the sea for us, and bring it unto us, that we may hear it, and do it? But the word is very nigh unto thee, in thy mouth, and in thy heart, that thou mayest do it," Deut. 30. For who does not acknowledge that by so many accumulated words it is signified, that Moses had clearly proposed to the Israelites what was the will of God, and what God ordered to be done and believed by them, that they might avoid death, and obtain life? That henceforth they could pretend no ignorance, if they did not perform their duty towards God. For to what else do those things look which Moses exaggerates that that word is not above them nor far put, but is very near in their mouth, and in their heart, nor is there need of one who should bring it to them that they may hear it? And how could he truly and with reason thus speak of Doctrine proposed in words so ambiguous and obscure, that its sense should remain ambiguous and uncertain, until an interpreter should accede who by his authority should determine it, and not only by some skill of his own should perish it?

XXXIII. To this with other Doctors of the Roman School Bellarmine responds two things. One is that the place is to be understood of the facility of fulfilling the law, but not of the facility of knowing the law. But elsewhere Bellarmine himself says, that the exposition is most literal and proper, if the place is so accepted, not of the facility of the law to be fulfilled, but to be known. "For since," he says, "before the giving of the law the Jews could have pretended ignorance, if they had not done, what God wanted to be done by them: therefore Moses, after he expounded the whole law to them, admonishes them to fulfill the law, and in no way to profess ignorance: therefore he says, This commandment is not above thee, nor far put, that is, not in a high place, or distant, that thou canst not know it." Book 5, de grat. & lib. Arbitr. ch. 6. Then those words, "that we may hear it," make manifest that there it is a question of knowledge. To omit that the law cannot be fulfilled unless it is understood, and it is much easier to understand the law, than to fulfill it.

XXXIV. The other which the Theologians of the Roman School respond, is that there it is not a question of the whole scripture, but of the precepts of the decalogue, which they concede to be easy to know. But first the series of the place openly makes, that Moses by the Word and Commandment of God designates all the precepts and documents, which God had delivered to the Israelitish people, and commanded to be written by Moses. For in the verse next preceding he exhorted the Israelites to the keeping of the precepts of God and ceremonies, as the vulgar interpreter has it, which, he says, "are written in this law." And afterwards he subjoins the words above alleged, as the reason of his saying, "The commandment which I command thee," &c. Then we take, what the Doctors of the Roman Church here freely concede, that the Decalogue at least is clear and perspicuous, and can be easily understood. Although its precepts are wont to be expounded in so many sermons, and have been illustrated by so many and so great commentaries; indeed so grave controversies exist among Christians, now for many ages about the sense of those Words, by which in the Decalogue the worship of images is prohibited. Whence it is apparent that from the controversies which are among men of the Christian name about the sense of scripture, and the commentaries and sermons by which it is the custom to expound it, it

cannot be collected that it is in itself obscure and ambiguous, nor to a sound mind, and rightly disposed, clear and perspicuous in those things which pertain to faith.

XXXV. Finally, if there is any difficulty and obscurity in sacred scripture, it especially occurs in the prophetic books. And yet Peter does not fear to compare the prophecy of scripture to a lamp shining in a dark place: and that in respect of those among whom the authority of the Apostles was not yet firm and ascertained, but who had a more firm prophetic word, and to whom the day of the Gospel illustrating the prophecies of the prophets had not yet shone. For after he brought forth his own testimony concerning Christ, he adds, "We have also a more sure word of prophecy; whereunto ye do well that ye take heed, as unto a light that shineth in a dark place, until the day dawn, and the day star arise in your hearts," 2 Pet. 1. But how can a writing be compared to a lamp so obscure and doubtful, that its sense about matters of faith, remains ambiguous and suspended, until it is determined by another's authority. For such a writing has no light in itself, or can of itself bring it to the mind, but what it has of light it borrows from elsewhere. Therefore that prophetic scripture can with reason be called light, and compared with a lamp shining in a dark place; it is necessary that it should pour forth some light from itself, and its true sense should prove itself to the mind rightly affected by certain proper rays, and convince it. But if prophetic scripture affects the mind in that way, and illuminates it in the knowledge of heavenly and salutary truth, how much more does this belong to the scripture of the New Testament? which shines round about with far greater light, and by the judgment of the Apostle Peter, so much surpasses the prophetic word in this part, as the morning star surpasses a lamp in splendour, or even the day itself.

On the Necessity of Scripture

I. On the necessity of Scripture, many of our theologians debate with the Romanists as if we were affirming its necessity while they were simply denying it. Indeed, both sides do not speak in the same way about this matter. Our theologians greatly emphasize the necessity of Scripture, while the Romanists minimize it as much as possible. Moreover, some of their arguments on this subject are utterly unacceptable and can rightly be considered blasphemous against Scripture. For instance, it is reported that a certain cardinal once said and wrote that it would have been better for the Church if Scripture had never existed at all.

II. However, if we consider calmly and objectively what both the Romanists and our theologians teach, it will easily become apparent that there is little to no substantial difference in their opinions on the necessity of Scripture. We do not claim that Sacred Scripture is simply and absolutely necessary, as if without it the Church could in no case exist, nor that Divine Wisdom has no other means by which true faith could be preserved in the world. Rather, we assert that it is necessary based on the divine ordination and the current state of the Church, which requires this means ordained by God to preserve the pure and uncorrupted word of God within it.

III. On the other hand, the Romanists only seek to prove that Sacred Scripture is not simply necessary. As can be seen in Bellarmine's writings, where he briefly addresses this issue at the beginning of chapter 4, book 4 of "De Verbo Dei," he distinguishes between simple necessity and necessity for a good existence. He concedes that Sacred Scripture is necessary in the latter sense, especially since the advent of Christ.

IV. Indeed, although according to our theologians, who argue that after the apostles and their immediate successors passed away, there was no absolutely infallible person or assembly left on earth, it might seem to follow that Scripture as a kind of infallible rule of faith is more necessary in the Church. This would be more so than if we admitted, as the Romanists do, that the Church in judging matters of faith is not subject to error. Nevertheless, according to their own opinion, if properly considered, it also follows that Scripture is necessary. They believe that the Church (by which they mean the Roman Pontiff and bishops assembled under his authority) is led by the Spirit of God into all truth that is significant for faith and salvation. However, they do not believe the Church is guided by new revelations but rather led into the knowledge of the truth through the use of means established by God for this purpose, among which they include not only the Church's tradition but also Sacred Scripture. They profess to venerate both with equal piety.

V. Therefore, since we do not assert that Scripture is simply necessary and they do not deny that it is necessary in a qualified sense, any remaining controversy here is very slight and of little significance.

On the Canonical and Apocryphal Books

I. Here, by Canonical Books, we understand the books written under divine inspiration and thus their authority is supreme and their truth infallible. Furthermore, they are called Canonical from the Greek word "kanon," which signifies a rule and sometimes an index or catalogue. These books are designated by this name either because they serve in the Church as the rule of faith and morals, to which all other writings or doctrines must be examined and rigorously measured, or because they are placed in the Canon of Scripture, that is, in the index or catalogue of sacred books, which the Church Doctors privately, and the Councils publicly, have maintained and promulgated to assist the less learned and simpler ones in recognizing the Sacred Books and to counteract the fraud and deceit of those who attempted to introduce spurious books falsely attributed to Prophets and Apostles as divine into the Church.

II. By the name Apocrypha, however, in this controversy, certain books are designated that are falsely and without certain reason attributed to men inspired by God and imposed as divine, and are considered by some as such. They are called apocryphal, from the Greek word meaning "hidden," either because their authority was hidden and uncertain, not open and manifest, and not established before the common consent of the Church, as is the authority of the Canonical books, or because the use of these books was not supposed to be so public as to derive and confirm the articles of our faith from them, but only private and particular, that is, as it was lawful for individuals to use them for edification, and derive lessons from them useful for life and manners.

III. Since all Canonical books pertain either to the New or the Old Testament, there is no controversy between us and the Roman Church regarding the books of the New Testament; it does not add any books to the Canon of the New Testament, nor is there any book of that Canon which it does not acknowledge and receive as divine, as is evident in the index of Canonical books found in Session 4 of the Council of Trent.

IV. But as for those who are called Lutherans, they seem to differ somewhat from our Churches and from the Roman Church, for there are many books of the New Testament which they do not consider properly Canonical, and such as constitute part of the rule of faith. They do indeed count them among Ecclesiastical writings and useful ones, but do not attribute to them certain authority and call them apocryphal. These are the Apocalypse of John, and the seven Epistles, namely, the Epistle to the Hebrews, the Epistle of James, the Second Epistle of Peter, the Second and Third Epistles of John, and the Epistle of Jude; they do not consider these books suitable to confirm the authority of dogmas and to prove matters of faith and church controversies, nor do they attribute greater authority to them than to the apocryphal books of the Old Testament, like the books of Tobit and the Maccabees. This opinion is transmitted by Chemnitz in his examination of the Council of Trent, in Session 4, title on Canonical Scripture, and Brentius in the Wittenberg Confession, and I believe other Lutherans adhere to this view.

V. Concerning the Old Testament, the Roman Church indeed holds as divine all those books which we believe belong to its canon, but it adds many more as truly Canonical and constituting part of the Old Testament, which our Churches by no means count as divine but number among the Apocrypha. For the Reformed Churches follow the Hebrew canon, and contend that nothing belongs to the Old Testament Scripture that was not formerly received by the Jewish Church and is not found in Hebrew codices. But besides the books received by the Jews, which some reduce to 22, others to 24, the Roman Church adds to the Old Testament seven others that are read only in Greek, namely, Tobit, Judith, Baruch, Wisdom, Ecclesiasticus, and the two books of Maccabees, namely the first and second; and furthermore, it adds certain chapters to some truly Canonical books, which are not found in the Hebrew text, namely, three chapters to the book of Daniel, one containing the story of Susanna, another the story of Bel and the Dragon, and the third the Song of the Three Children. It also adds seven chapters to the book of Esther, which in the Vulgate version are appended to the ten chapters translated from Hebrew. The Council of Trent, under the penalty of anathema, commands that all these books and parts of books be received as sacred and canonical, as is seen in Session 4.

VI. But up to the Council of Trent, the authority of these books remained so doubtful and uncertain in the Roman Church itself, that they could be rejected among the apocrypha without prejudice to the Roman faith and without the danger of heresy. Indeed, many and most celebrated Doctors of the Roman communion rejected them, as demonstrated by the testimonies collected by the most learned Moses Blondel in his published treatise on this matter titled "Rome Called to Aid Geneva," where he cites among others in this opinion Nicholas of Lyra, Thomas Walden, Thomas Aquinas, Alphonsus Tostatus, Cardinal Antonius, Cardinal Ximenes, and Cardinal Cajetan, who explicitly assert and argue that these books, which are outside the Hebrew canon, are not canonical nor have the same authority as the others.

VII. What is more astonishing is that even after the Tridentine anathema, some Doctors of the Roman Church dared to reject as apocryphal certain books included in the Tridentine canon: thus, John Driedo, as reported by Bellarmine, denies the divine authority of the book of Baruch, although Baruch is explicitly named in the index of Sacred Books sanctioned by the Tridentine anathema. And Melchior Cano, although he himself believes this book to be divine, acknowledges that its authority is not entirely certain.

VIII. Our Churches, though they consider these books added by the Roman Church to the Old Testament canon to be apocryphal and do not attribute to them divine authority, do not despise or reject them as harmful or useless. Just as the ancient Christian Church, although not equating these books with the divine, held them in high honour and deemed them worthy of being publicly read for moral edification, so too we today do not deny them an honourable place in the Church of God and a certain privilege above all ecclesiastical writers. An argument for this is that we customarily bind them in the same volume with the truly sacred and canonical books and do not disdain to often cite them in homilies. Furthermore, in Great Britain, something from these books is customarily read in public and ordinary worship, as evident in the celebrated Anglican Liturgy used in that kingdom. Our theologians do note certain errors and blemishes in these books, to show

that they are not, like canonical books, written by the Spirit of God, who is free from all error, dictating and inspiring, yet this does not prevent them from being filled with the most salutary precepts and lessons of piety and containing histories most worthy of being known and very useful for the edification of morals, especially evident in the Book of Wisdom, Ecclesiasticus, and the two books of Maccabees, particularly the first.

IX. Thus, the question here is whether the aforementioned books are truly divine and prophetic and should have equal authority with the other unquestionably canonical books, or whether, although useful for moral instruction and filled with divine and salutary precepts, they are nonetheless composed by human art and thus not of such authority that articles of faith can be drawn and confirmed from them. The former was defined by the Council of Trent and is commonly taught today by the Doctors of the Roman Church; the latter is affirmed by the common consensus of the Churches not only of those called Reformed but also of those commonly called Protestant.

X. But besides those books whose authority is disputed between us and the Roman Church, certain writings are customarily added at the end of the Bible, which, although sometimes honourably cited by the ancients and parts of which are also publicly read in the Roman Church, as was once customary among us in England, yet are placed and held as apocryphal outside the divine canon of Scripture. Among these are the books of Esdras, called the third and fourth, because they are found added to the two books of Esdras, which are truly canonical in the Latin Vulgate edition, the first being the one that retains the name of Esdras among us, and the second being the one we call Nehemiah. But in ancient editions of Greek Bibles, what is the third Esdras to the Latins is regarded as the first Esdras by the Greeks; the second Esdras according to the Greeks includes the two books that are the first and second to the Latins; which both the Hebrews also count as one book. The fourth Esdras, however, is not found in the Greek Bible edition and is only found in Latin today; thus the Greeks have only two books of Esdras, the first being apocryphal, and the second canonical.

XI. The Roman Church, together with us, also holds the Prayer of King Manasseh as apocryphal, which is appended to the end of the second book of Chronicles in the Latin Vulgate. Finally, the third book of Maccabees is also apocryphal to the Doctors of the Roman Church, though it is not found in the Latin edition, but is customarily added to the second book of Maccabees in the Greek Bibles and contains an admirable deliverance of the Jews that occurred under Philopator in Egypt.

XII. But here it should be noted that, although the Council of Trent did not place these books in the index of divine books, and thus they are commonly held as apocryphal in the Roman Church, there are some theologians among the Romans who attribute canonical authority to certain of these books. For instance, John Benedict, a Parisian theologian, in the preface to the Bible in which he compiled certain scholia from the Fathers, includes the third and fourth books of Esdras in the number of those books which, although not in the Canon, are nonetheless received by the Christian Church. Similarly, Renatus Benedict, following the former Benedict, in his Stromata Biblica, book 1, chapter 9, also counts the third and fourth books of Esdras among the canonical books. But particularly notable is Gilbert Genebrard, also a Parisian theologian and Archbishop of Aix, who, writing in the

previous century in his Chronology at the Year of the World 3749, not only calls both these books canonical but also laboriously attempts to prove his paradox, for which he is noted and rebuked by Bellarmine in "De Verbo Dei" book 1, chapter 2.

On the Integrity and Authority of the Original Manuscripts

I. No Christian doubts that the Old Testament, at least as regards those books which by common consent are held as canonical by both our churches and the Roman Church, was written in Hebrew by Moses and the Prophets, indeed under the dictation and inspiration of the Spirit of God. Moreover, the reason why God chose this language in which to first deliver His oracles seems not to be due to the dignity and antiquity of the Hebrew language, but rather because the descendants of Abraham, for whose particular benefit the Law and the entire Old Testament were written, spoke the Hebrew language. For God had chosen the descendants of Abraham to be a peculiar people unto Himself, with whom He made a covenant and to whom He revealed Himself in a special way, while He permitted other nations to walk in their own ways until the coming of Christ and the calling of the Gentiles.

II. However, there are certain portions of the Old Testament written in Chaldee, specifically the eleventh verse of the tenth chapter of the prophet Jeremiah, six chapters in Daniel, namely from verse 4 of chapter 2 to the end of chapter 7, and approximately three chapters of the book of Ezra, from verse 6 of chapter 4 to verse 19 of chapter 6. This was not done arbitrarily but for specific reasons. The Chaldee verse in Jeremiah contains the words with which Jeremiah exhorts the Jews to rebuke the idolatry of the Chaldeans, among whom they would be captives. "Thus shall you say to them," he says, "The gods that have not made the heavens and the earth shall perish from the earth and from under these heavens," which he writes in Chaldee because it was to be said to the Chaldeans.

III. The chapters in Daniel and Ezra written in Chaldee contain the letters and decrees of the Persian and Babylonian kings and other matters that seem to have been transcribed verbatim from the records and archives of the Persians and Babylonians for greater historical accuracy.

IV. Therefore, it is certain and acknowledged by all that the Hebrew text of the Old Testament is the original text, and that all other editions of the Old Testament Scripture are derived from the Hebrew as from a source.

V. As for the New Testament, it is universally acknowledged that it was written in Greek by the Apostles and Evangelists, except perhaps for one or two of its books. The reason why God willed the New Testament to be written in Greek rather than Hebrew, as was the Old Testament, is because the Old Testament was written, as has just been said, primarily for the benefit of the Hebrew people, with whom God had made a covenant, rejecting other nations. But the New Testament was written when the calling of the Gentiles had arrived, and thus was written not particularly for one people, but for all peoples indiscriminately and universally. Therefore, it was fitting for it to be written in a language as widely known as possible and understood by many nations. There was no language more widely known and commonly used at that time than Greek. Cicero attests to this when he

says, "The Latin language is indeed confined to its own narrow limits, but Greek is read throughout the world." Therefore, by divine providence, it was written in Greek rather than in any other language.

VI. Many of the ancients, such as Irenaeus, Eusebius, Jerome, and the author of the Synopsis attributed to Athanasius, indeed assert that Matthew first wrote his Gospel in Hebrew, and this tradition is commonly followed by the doctors of the Roman Church. Consequently, some of them, especially Baronius, seek to undermine the authority of the Greek text of Matthew, saying, "We cannot affirm the credibility of the Greek text unless it is compared with the original Hebrew." However, if we are to believe the ancients who handed down this tradition, the Greek text of Matthew is not to be doubted as Apostolic, because if it is not the original text of Matthew, it is at least a version published or approved by the Apostles themselves. This is what the Fathers who said Matthew first wrote his Gospel in Hebrew taught: that the Hebrew Gospel of Matthew was translated into Greek by James, or by John, or by Matthew himself. Bellarmine, acknowledging this, teaches that the Greek text of Matthew, though it may be a translation, was received by the Church as if it had been written first in that language. Though some of our theologians leave this tradition as uncertain, most of them find it improbable and do not believe Matthew wrote in any language other than that of the other Apostles.

VII. As for the Epistle to the Hebrews, most Papist theologians believe it was written by Paul in Hebrew. Certain ancient sources, such as Clement of Alexandria cited by Eusebius (Book 4, Chapter 14) and Eusebius himself (Book 3, Chapter 37), indeed maintain this. But our doctors refute this tradition with many indications and arguments derived from the text of the Epistle itself. Yet, even if this were conceded, it would not diminish the authority of the Greek text; for those ancients who said this Epistle was first written in Hebrew also asserted it was translated into Greek by an apostolic man, whether that was Luke, as Clement of Alexandria thinks, or Clement of Rome, as Eusebius suspects.

VIII. It is entirely unfounded and has no basis in the ancients that Bellarmine, following some of his own, suspects the Gospel of Mark was first written in Latin by Mark when he was in Rome and later translated into Greek by him at Aquileia in Italy. The Pontifical of Damasus, from which this story is taken, is a modern work falsely attributed to Damasus, as acknowledged by the most learned among the Romanists.

IX. From all the above it clearly appears, by the consent of all Christians, that the Greek text of the New Testament, except for these three books, is the original text written by the authors themselves. As for these three books, though the doctors of the Roman Church believe they were written in another language than Greek, most of them acknowledge that they were at least translated into Greek by the Apostles or Evangelists, and thus even in these books, the Greek text is divinely inspired and of no less authority than if they had been originally written in Greek by their authors.

X. Further, it should be noted that the Hebrew text can be considered in two ways: either as it consists of the bare Hebrew letters, as in those Bibles printed without points, or as it has the vowel points and various accents added. There is no controversy, either among Jews or Christians, that at least in the former way it was handed down and written by Moses

and the Prophets. Among scholars, however, there is a debate about whether the points were added by the early doctors or are a more recent invention of the Rabbis. The latter is the opinion held by Papist doctors, as I have seen. Among our doctors, there is a sharp dispute on this matter, and in France, Louis Cappel, a professor at Saumur, teaches and tries to prove the novelty of the Hebrew points in published writings and has many eminent supporters today. In Germany, however, Johannes Buxtorf the Younger follows his father Johannes Buxtorf, Antonio Caravario, and Junius, defending the opposite view and refuting Cappel in writings, asserting that the vocalic notes were added to the Hebrew text by the Prophets themselves. But the former opinion seems more probable to us, according to which, even though the unpointed codices generally do not differ in reading from those with points, wherever a more convenient reading occurs, it should not be rejected merely because it does not agree with the received points, since the pointed codices, as such, do not have divine authority but human authority, which we do not deny is great and should not be opposed without substantial reason.

XI. Similarly, concerning the Greek text of the New Testament, it can also be considered in two ways: either as it consists of the bare elements of the Greek letters, or as it has the notes, accents, and distinguishing points added. In the former way, it is unquestionably divine and Apostolic. As for the latter, Sixtus of Siena in "Bibliotheca Sancta" book 3 and Francisco Ximénez, Archbishop of Toledo, in the edition of the New Testament, deny that the accents and points were added by the sacred authors themselves. Epiphanius, at the beginning of his book on weights and measures, quite clearly teaches that not the sacred authors, but certain others after them, added the points and accents to the Greek text of Scripture. Indeed, Greek grammarians with many arguments show that the accents were not an invention of the earliest grammarians and that it is not probable that accents were customarily added to Greek books in the time of the Apostles, except perhaps by certain curious individuals learning the Greek letters. Therefore, it follows that no certain and firm argument can be derived from the accents and distinguishing notes against any interpretation of the Greek text that is otherwise apt and suitable, since they were added not by the original authors themselves, but by learned and skilled men with only human authority. Even less ancient and of lesser authority is the division into verses and chapters. The Greeks and Orientals do not divide the books of the New Testament into chapters as the Latins do but into much shorter sections, as can be seen in the edition of the New Testament printed in smaller form in Paris by Robert Estienne. The division of Scripture into verses as we see today is no older than Robert Estienne, who somewhere claims to be the author of it.

XII. Moreover, from what has been said, it appears that the Roman doctors agree with the Reformers that the Hebrew text of the Old Testament is prophetic and original, at least if considered not as determined by specific points, but as consisting of the bare Hebrew letters according to the ancient and still common manner of writing. Similarly, both recognize that the Greek text of the New Testament is the original and the source of other editions, or at least an apostolic translation in the case of some books, which is as good as a source, except for one or two Roman doctors who either deny this or do not dare to affirm it.

XIII. However, there is greater contention and greater divergence of opinion about the integrity and authority of the Greek and Hebrew texts, both among us and the Romanists, and among the doctors of the Roman Church themselves. Some Romanists indeed admit that the Hebrew edition was once written by Moses and the prophets, but they claim it is no longer intact but has been much corrupted and altered, partly due to the ravages of time, partly due to the fraud and malice of the Jews, who, out of hatred for the Christian religion, have maliciously corrupted many places in the Old Testament. From this, they conclude that the Hebrew text, as it simply exists today in Bibles, has no certainty, and in disputes of faith and morals, we should not refer to the Hebrew but to the Greek exemplars, and that no certain faith in controversies can be established from it. Therefore, although the Greek and Latin editions were once derived from the Hebrew source, they claim that the greater purity is found in them, especially in the Latin Vulgate edition, and they do not wish those editions to be corrected and examined by the Hebrew text. Melchior Cano elaborately discusses this in his second book on theological places, chapter 13. Stapleton affirms the same in his treatise on the principles of doctrinal faith, controversy 5, question 3, article 1.

XIV. But many men of great name and authority within the Roman Church dissent from this view, asserting and proving with many reasons that the Hebrew text has not been maliciously corrupted by the Jews, and while they do not deny that some errors may have crept in, they argue that they are minor and of no great significance, and do not impair the integrity and purity of the Hebrew text concerning matters of faith and morals. Therefore, they condemn as rash and inconsiderate the opinion of those who think the Latin Vulgate edition is to be trusted more than the Hebrew volumes. Such are the opinions of John Driedo in his first volume, book 2, chapter 5, and Andradius in his defence of the Council of Trent, book 4, to whom Bellarmine himself joins in his second book on the Word of God, chapter 2.

XV. The same diversity of opinion is found among the Romanists regarding the New Testament edition. The former maintain that it is so corrupted, whether by the negligence of scribes and copyists or by the craftiness and evil arts of heretics, that it can no longer be relied upon for certainty in controversies, and the Latin exemplars should not be compared to it, as they now have greater and more certain authority among us. The latter, however, while not denying that Greek codices may contain some errors, deny that they are so corrupted that their integrity and purity in matters of faith and morals are lacking, and thus their authority is less and more uncertain.

XVI. As for our theologians, Bellarmine speaks of them as if they attribute such integrity and purity to the Hebrew text that they deny any error, however slight, can be found in it. And indeed, our theologians do not propose their opinion so rigidly, nor do I know of any of them who simply and absolutely denies any error, however slight, can be indicated in the Hebrew text. Rather, they all willingly concede that some minor errors could have crept into the Hebrew codices through the fault of scribes and even seem to have done so, as scholars infer from many indications, especially from the various readings noted long ago by Jewish critics called Masoretes in the Hebrew text, to which pertains the "Keri and Ketiv," frequently mentioned among Hebrew grammarians and critics. With these

Chaldaic words meaning "read" and "written," they indicate certain places in Scripture noted by the ancient rabbis of the Jews, which are written one way and read another. Besides these errors noted by the Jewish doctors, there may be some that escaped their notice, and it is not impossible that in numbers and proper names some things were written incorrectly through the fault of the scribes, giving rise to apparent contradictions in Scripture.

XVII. But what our theologians commonly teach is first that the Hebrew codices were not corrupted and depraved by the malice and fraud of the Jews, but were rather religiously kept and preserved by them as much as humanly possible. Secondly, they teach that the errors which for any reason have crept into the Hebrew text are minor and of no great significance, and do not in any way impair the integrity of Scripture concerning faith and morals. Thirdly, they teach that whatever the errors are, they can be corrected and detected from the context and by comparing other passages of Scripture. Finally, they teach that the number of errors is small relative to the number of volumes that make up the Sacred Scripture, so that there is no edition of Scripture purer and more accurate than the Hebrew text, and where fewer errors and mistakes can be found.

XVIII. Therefore, they conclude that in controversies of faith and religion, it is safest to refer to the Hebrew codices, and from them, the mind and meaning of the Holy Spirit can be more certainly sought than from any other version or edition; thus, the Hebrew text is not only the source from which other editions of Sacred Scripture have been derived but also the norm and rule by which all those editions should be corrected and examined.

XIX. This is, as I said, the common opinion of our theologians, from which, however, Louis Cappel, a professor at Saumur, has departed. He acknowledges the integrity of the Hebrew text concerning matters of faith and morals, but nonetheless contends that many errors have crept into it for various reasons, and believes that it can be corrected and amended in many places by the Greek version of the Septuagint, which often reads differently and better than what is read today in the Hebrew codices. He has published a large volume on this subject, which he is said to have titled "Critica Sacra."

XX. Furthermore, what our theologians think about the Hebrew text of the Old Testament, they also think about the Greek text of the New Testament. They do not deny that some errors may be found in it, as the diversity of codices and various readings noted by scholars sufficiently argue and show. However, they maintain that it has not been so corrupted and depraved by the fraud of heretics, the ravages of time, or the negligence of scribes, that any dangerous change has occurred in it. Even if some errors are noted by scholars, they have not invaded all codices, nor are they of great significance and do not introduce any notable change in meaning. Nor are there many, so that the Greek edition does not cease to be the purest and most complete of all; nor is there any version in which fewer errors are found. Therefore, in matters of religion, it is safest to seek the meaning of the Holy Spirit from the Greek text rather than from any other edition. And all other versions and editions of the New Testament should be referred to and examined by the Greek text as the source.

On the Vulgate

Part I

In which is set forth who is its author, and also its authority according to the Doctors of the Roman Church.

I. By the Vulgate Version is understood that which the Roman Church commonly uses. About which version two things are called into question. Who is its author, and what is its authority. As far as the former is concerned, the Doctors of the Roman Church do not agree on who is the author of the vulgate version, but their opinions vary on this matter. For the understanding of which, it should be known that formerly, before the times of Jerome and Augustine, there existed very many Latin translations, which were all expressed not from the Hebrew text, but from the interpretation of the Seventy Elders. But among all those Latin editions one certain one was eminent, and was most in use, and it was called the old and vulgate edition. And this is what Augustine calls the Itala, and prefers to all the other Latin versions. Book 2 on Christian Doctrine, Chapter 15.

II. Moreover since Jerome in his time saw so many discordant interpretations of scripture, in each of which were found not a few errors of the interpreters, and faults of the scribes, he himself also undertook to translate scripture into Latin. And indeed he translated the Old Testament twice. First from the Greek text of the Seventy interpreters. Then from the Hebrew text, on which version he laboured with the greatest care, so that the doubts, which arose from the discrepancy and contrariety of the various versions, might be removed by comparing them to that one, which was conformed to the Hebrew truth. But the New Testament he did not so much translate anew, as purge and emend the old version, conforming it to the Greek context, where it seemed to have wandered from it.

III. But the version of Jerome from the Hebrew, although by its novelty it offended some, and among others Augustine himself, was nevertheless received with great applause by many, and soon began to be received and publicly read in certain Churches. And the offense, which the novelty brought in the beginning, being gradually removed, it was at last commonly received in the Latin Church; although the former one was not despised, nor did its use altogether cease.

IV. Which obtained in the time of Gregory the Great Bishop of Rome, about the six hundredth year after the birth of Christ. For then, as he himself testifies in his Epistle to Leander, the Roman Church used a double translation, namely, the New and the Old. Where by the new version he understands the Hieronymian, but by the old that which was in public use before Jerome, and which Augustine calls the Itala.

V. But after Gregory all the other versions gradually vanished, and only one remained, which is in use today, and which is called the vulgate and old edition, about which we must now treat, and about whose origin and author we have said that the Doctors of the Roman Church do not agree.

VI. Some from whose number is Thomas Stapleton, think that the Latin vulgate edition is that most ancient one, which the Roman Church first used, and which is celebrated by Augustine under the name of the Itala version. But there is no doubt but that they are deceived in that. For that ancient version, by the testimony of Augustine, was expressed from the text of the Seventy elders. But today's vulgate, in most books at least, recedes very far from the Greek version of the Seventy interpreters, and approaches more closely to the Hebrew text. Add that Jerome in the ancient version notes and reproves many errors in many places, which no longer appear in that version, which the Roman Church now uses, a manifest indication that it is different from that former one.

VII. And so others from the Doctors of the Roman School determine that the Latin vulgate, which is in use today, is the interpretation of Jerome. But neither is this approved by their most learned men. And this because Jerome in his version accurately followed the Hebrew text, as he himself professes, and the ancient Doctors of the Church, who saw his pure version, acknowledge. But today's vulgate, although it approaches more closely to the Hebrew text than to the translation of the Seventy interpreters, yet often recedes much from the Hebrew text, and has not a few things which do not appear in the Hebrew, especially in the books of Kings. Besides that Jerome in his commentaries teaches that many things should be translated and expounded otherwise than they are found translated and expounded today in the Latin version whether of the Old or New Testament. From which it can be certainly gathered that that version is not altogether the same, with that which Jerome made, or at least emended, whom it is not credible to have translated or emended scripture against his own opinion.

VIII. And therefore a third opinion obtains in the Roman School, which determines that the vulgate which is in use today, is neither simply the version of Jerome, nor even that old one, which the Latin Church used before Jerome, but is mixed and composed from both. So think John Driedo, Sixtus Senensis, Baronius, and Bellarmine himself, and very many other men eminent in learning and authority in the Roman Church; And this is also the commonly received opinion among Protestants, which seems to us also agreeable to the truth. Book 2, Chapter 1. Sacred Library Book 8. To the year 251, number 41. Book 2 on the Word of God. Chapter 9.

IX. Therefore we think that today's vulgate is not of one author; but is mixed and interpolated, both from the ancient version, which obtained before Jerome, and from the Hieronymian version itself. And indeed first, as Bellarmine rightly warns and proves, the whole Psalter of the Latin Vulgate edition is not that which Jerome translated from the Hebrew, but the ancient translation of the Psalms itself, which was used in public worship in the first times, and was accustomed to be sung. For it was never possible to substitute any new version for the old edition in this part. And this on account of the too great offense of the people, who from all time were accustomed to this version, and therefore tenaciously retained it. For no part of scripture is more known and familiar to the people, and of which there is more frequent and constant use in sacred worship. But that the matter stands thus is clear from this, that what Jerome, and others cite, as from the ancient edition of the Psalms, are found in entirely the same way in today's Psalter. And besides it is certain, Bellarmine himself confessing, that the Books of Maccabees, Wisdom, and Ecclesiasticus

are in no way from the version of Jerome, who never translated these books, but from that ancient translation, whose author is unknown.

X. But as far as the New Testament, and the remaining books of the Old Testament are concerned, they seem for the most part to be from Jerome's version, or emendation, to which nevertheless very many things are admixed from that older edition. And this perhaps by a certain design, lest when the Hieronymian version was substituted in place of that older one, it should offend the people by too much novelty.

XI. Nor is it altogether improbable what Baronius thinks, that both versions, as well the old, as that of Jerome remained unmixed up to Gregory the Great, but afterwards one was conflated from the two, which alone the Latin Church would henceforth use: lest the use of two versions should beget some division and contention. Yet it is more likely that that admixture was not made at once and once for all, but gradually and slowly by scribes adding and changing certain things at will.

XII. And let these things be said briefly about the origin and author of the vulgate edition. There now follows a more serious question to be explicated about the authority of this edition. The Council of Trent attributes the highest authority to it, whose these words are in the fourth Session. "The sacred Synod considering that no small utility can accrue to the Church of God, if from all the Latin editions of the sacred books which are circulated, it becomes known which is to be held as authentic, determines and declares that this same old and vulgate edition, which has been approved in the Church itself by the long usage of so many centuries, is to be held as authentic in public lectures, disputations, preachings, and expositions, so that no one may dare or presume to reject it under any pretext."

XIII. By which words the highest and absolute authority seems openly to be attributed to the vulgate edition, and without any ambiguities. But nevertheless the Doctors of the Roman Church do not agree on how much is to be attributed to the vulgate edition. And there is much doubt and disputation on both sides about the sense of the Tridentine Decree.

XIV. But before all things it should be noted that the Tridentine Fathers themselves did not dare to sanction this definition with an anathema, and to reckon among the heretics those, by whom the vulgate edition was not approved in every part. And therefore they did not place this definition among the Canons of the Council, to each of which an anathema is subjoined, but they included it in the decree of Reformation, by which they do not think the faithful to be obliged with such rigor, as the history of the Council of Trent warns in the second book. Wherefore it is less a wonder, if the highest authority of this version is not everywhere agreed upon among the Doctors of the Roman School themselves.

XV. But so that it may be clearer what they think about the authority of this edition, and how far they consent, or dissent among themselves on this article, it should be known that there are none in the Roman Church who do not acknowledge that many errors have crept into this edition by the fault of Scribes, and that it has happened by their carelessness and negligence, that it has been corrupted and vitiated in many places; especially when the Council of Trent declared it authentic.

XVI. And therefore that same Council, in which it was determined that it was to be rejected under no pretext, that same Council, I say, sanctioned that it should be printed as emendatedly as possible, and mandated that work to learned men, that they diligently apply themselves to its emendation and correction. And Salmero and Andradius, each of whom was present at the Council of Trent, warn that the Synod willed to constrain all to embrace the Latin edition, not simply, but provided that it was expurgated from the vices which had crept into it, and cleansed from all blemishes; and to so commend that old edition, that it very much wants the errors which have been brought into it either by the carelessness of Scribes, or perhaps by the audacity of others, to be purged. Volume 1, Prologue 3.

XVII. Therefore before and after the Council of Trent many learned men of the Roman communion undertook to correct and emend this edition. And indeed before the Council Isidore Clarius Abbot, who afterwards was part of that Council, noted and emended up to eight thousand errors in the Vulgate version, in the edition which he had printed at Venice in the year 1542, as he himself testifies in the preface which is prefixed to that edition. Indeed Santes Pagninus Lucensis Dominican Monk acknowledged such a great depravation in the Vulgate version, that he thought it would be a matter to undertake a new version of the whole scripture: which he himself undertook, Pope Leo the Tenth exhorting, and providing the expenses necessary for the work, as Sixtus Senensis writes in Sacred Library Book 4. And the same Pope Leo approved the Lucubrations of Erasmus on the New Testament, in which he notes and reproves the errors of the Vulgate version with the greatest liberty.

XVIII. But after the Council of Trent the Theologians of Louvain, so that they might satisfy the desire of that Council, attempted to emend the vulgate version, and published a certain edition of it, emended as it seemed good to them. And at last the Roman Pontiffs themselves laboured on that emendation, and selected a peculiar assembly of Cardinals, and other men, who should continually apply themselves to that work. And indeed Pius IV and Pius V, who immediately succeeded him, first undertook this care, but each died with the matter unfinished.

XIX. But a few years later Sixtus V keenly pursued the work undertaken by his predecessors, but not completed. And so he summoned learned men and those skilled in languages from all quarters, and with their help recognized and emended the Latin edition in very many places: and thus emended he had it printed in the Vatican Library constructed by himself. And so that the matter might be accomplished more solemnly and incorruptly, he corrected with his own hand, if any errors had crept in by the fault of the press. Not only that, but he prefixed to this his edition a solemn Bull, in which, after he set forth with how great care and diligence he had it emended, he determines and decrees that the old edition, which was received as authentic by the Tridentine Synod, is to be deemed the very same, which he then published emended as best could be done, and printed in the Vatican Typography. And he wants it to be held as true, legitimate, authentic, and indubitable in all public and private disputations, preachings, explanations.

XX. Yet nevertheless the Roman School did not rest in this edition of Sixtus as expurgated from all blemishes. For with however great authority Sixtus fortified it, and however much

he exaggerates its purity, immediately after the death of Sixtus, Gregory XIV undertook to emend this edition again. But Clement VIII perfected the emendation. Which contradiction of the Popes Thomas James an Englishman criticizes in a little book to which he gave the title Bellum Papale, or the discordant Concord of Sixtus V and Clement VIII, where comparing these editions, he shows that the former differs from the latter so much, that you would not know it to be the same: for Sixtus followed Hentenius and the Louvain doctors for the most part, but Clement adhered more to the Hebrew, Chaldaic, and Greek truth. From which it follows that that edition, whose purity and integrity Sixtus had so greatly commended, was nevertheless in the judgment of Clement defiled with many errors, since he judged that it needed a new emendation.

XXI. But however much labour either Sixtus or Clement applied to correcting the errors of the old edition, the Doctors of the Roman Church do not therefore think that they have an edition purged from absolutely all blemishes and errors. Indeed not even Clement VIII himself presumed so much about his edition, as the preface prefixed to the Clementine Bibles testifies. "Receive," it says, "the Old and Vulgate Edition of Sacred Scripture corrected with as much diligence as could be done, which just as it is difficult to affirm to be absolute in all respects, on account of human weakness, so it should be doubted not in the least that it is more emended and purer than all others, which have been published up to this day." Indeed, as the same preface subjoins, in that edition certain things were left deliberately unchanged, to avoid the offense of the peoples.

XXII. Which Bellarmine also confesses in a certain Epistle to Luke of Bruges. "I want you to know," he says, "that the Vulgate Bibles have not been most accurately corrected by us: for we deliberately passed over many things, for just causes, which seemed to need correction." And so this Luke of Bruges not only compiled a correctorium index, in which he diligently notes those things which have been emended in the Pontifical Bibles, lest henceforth there should be a relapse into the removed vices: but he also included in another little book other varieties of readings, by which, as he says, the begun correction of the Latin Bibles can be rendered more perfect.

XXIII. And so it is certain that all the Theologians of the Roman Church, however great authority they attribute to the Latin Vulgate, nevertheless acknowledge that it was depraved by the fault and carelessness of scribes and typographers, and that from that many blemishes remain in it up to this day, however much zeal many learned men, indeed even the Pontiffs themselves, have applied in correcting it. Nor by those errors which they attribute to the scribes and copyists do they understand only those by which certain particular codices have been corrupted, and which can be easily detected by anyone from the collation of other copies, but certain solemn, so to speak, and inveterate errors, which have pervaded either all the codices, or the greatest part of them, and which have been as it were confirmed by usage.

XXIV. But besides those errors which the fault and negligence of the scribes brought into the Vulgate, and also often the audacity and ignorance of the emendators themselves, there are scarcely any in the Roman School who do not acknowledge other defects in this Version, which are refunded to the interpreter himself. And certainly he must purposely blind his eyes, indeed be more than blind, who does not acknowledge in it frequent

solecisms and barbarisms, and very many things translated ambiguously, obscurely, unsuitably, and improperly. And therefore even those who attribute the most to this version in the Roman Church, yield on this part, and confess that this interpreter speaks less suitably, and uses words scarcely congruous and accommodated. And thus far the Theologians of the Roman School seem to agree among themselves.

XXV. But henceforth they begin to disagree from one another. For those among them who have some candour acknowledge that the Vulgate interpreter, not only failed in the choice of words and forms of speaking, but now and then lapsed in the things themselves, and neither attained nor expressed the sense of the text in his version: And therefore, setting aside even the errors of the copyists, they do not want it to be authentic and immune from error simply and in all things, but only in those things which pertain to faith and morals.

XXVI. Bañez reports and explains this opinion of his own at length in the first part of Thomas Aquinas, question 1, article 8. "This opinion asserts," he says, "that the interpreter of the Vulgate Latin edition, in certain things which pertained neither to faith, nor to morals, was mistaken." And so they understand the Decree of the sacred Synod about the Vulgate edition, which namely is to be held as authentic in things pertaining to faith and morals.

XXVII. But he attributes that opinion to many Theologians whom he calls pious and Catholic, such as Lindanus, Sixtus Senensis, Melchior Cano, Bartolomeo Medina, Andradius and Vega, who assert that the old interpreter did not attain perfect knowledge of all things which he undertook to interpret, and that in his lucubrations there remain vestiges of human weakness, and that he was not immune from all error. And therefore they think that the old edition is to be deemed authentic only, because it exists defaced by no error from which some pernicious dogma in faith and morals can be gathered.

XXVIII. And certainly Sixtus Senensis especially openly accedes to this opinion, and prolixly and ingenuously sets forth his mind about that matter. "We ingenuously confess," he says, "that in this our edition some blemishes are found, Solecisms and Barbarisms, hyperbata, and many things unsuitably translated, and less Latinly expressed, obscurely and ambiguously interpreted, also some things superadded, some omitted, some transposed, changed, and depraved by the fault of scribes, which Sanctes Pagninus, Thomas Cajetan, Francis Forerius, and Jerome Oleaster, most erudite men from the Dominican order indicated in their interpretations and explanations. Yet it does not follow from these that the Church up to this day has not had a true, sincere, integral and faithful edition of the New Testament, because, although such errors are found in it, it is nevertheless certain that neither in the Old, nor in the New edition has anything ever been found which was either deviant from the truth of the Christian faith, false or mendacious, or contrary to orthodox dogmas and rules, or added beyond the truth, or changed against the truth, or omitted to the prejudice of the truth, or so depraved, that it brought occasion of perniciously erring, or furnished matter and fuel for heresies and depraved dogmas, or so obscurely and ambiguously translated, that it concealed the mysteries of our faith, or did not explain them sufficiently, and as much as is enough for salvation. Which errors, blemishes, and depravations nevertheless Saint Jerome testified that he deliberately left in the Old edition of the New Testament, and the Church similarly left in the new edition on

purpose: not because so many most erudite and holy Fathers of the Church either did not recognize those errors, or approved them: but because they saw themselves impelled to dissemble them for just causes. First because they noticed that no danger in faith and morals threatened from these so slight errors. Then lest the faithful should be offended importunely, and by too exacting a novelty of correction, etc. Finally that they might venerate that ancient edition, which had educated the faith of the nascent Church, and strengthened it as it grew, and had gotten the upper hand." Sacred Library Book 8.

XXIX. Moreover those who are of this opinion, or at least most of them, do not admit that the Council of Trent prefers this edition to the Greek or Hebrew text, but only that out of the many Latin versions which exist it puts this one before the others, so that it may be authentic only in the genus of a Version, not in opposition to the original text, to which it must be subjected, at least not preferred. Bellarmine interprets the words of the Council of Trent clearly enough in this opinion. "The Fathers," he says, "made no mention of the sources; but only out of so many Latin versions which are circulated they chose one which they might put before the others." Book 2 On the Word of God, Chapter 10.

XXX. And thus also Alphonsus Salmeron, who was present at the Council, softens the Tridentine Canon, Volume 1, Prolegomenon 3, where he teaches that the old edition was not so approved, that on that account the Greek or Hebrew Volumes were rejected. "For nothing there," he says, "was done concerning the Greek or Hebrew copies. Only among so many Latin editions, it pronounced this one vulgate to be truer, purer, more lucid, and more agreeing with its sources whence it arose, than the rest." And he adds that it is permitted, with the authority of the Council of Trent safe, to produce the various reading of the Greek or Hebrew copy, and to weigh it as the text of the Bibles, and not only to edify good morals through it, but also to prove the dogmas of faith; and thus to take from it an efficacious argument, as from the mind of the Holy Spirit.

XXXI. Moreover the Theologians of the Roman School who are of that opinion, and who diminish and restrict the authority of the vulgate edition in the way now declared, or at least most of them, do not think it necessary that its author had the Prophetic Spirit, or some other peculiar and extraordinary guidance of the Holy Spirit, for without this it could happen that he faithfully translated, and at least in those things which pertain to faith did not err. Bellarmine manifestly concedes to this opinion in Book 2 On the Word of God, Chapter 11. "We admit," he says, "that the interpreter is not a Prophet, and could have erred. We only say that he did not err in that version which the Church approved."

XXXII. And similarly Andradius in the fourth book of his Defence of the Tridentine Faith, teaches that the power of the Holy Spirit did not so pour itself out on the old interpreter, that he can be compared with the most holy heroes, who committed the sacred mysteries to writing, or attained perfect knowledge of all things which he undertook to interpret. Indeed he notes that by a certain wondrous providence the Holy Spirit willed that some vestiges of human weakness remain in the lucubrations of the old interpreter, which sufficiently betrayed that not all things were instilled into his mind, as into the Prophets and Apostles. And therefore he denies that he was immune from error. Indeed after many things of this kind, he breaks out into these words, "It would be infinite to enumerate each error by numbering them."

XXXIII. But there are others among the Doctors of the Roman School who extol the authority of the Vulgate version much more. For first they do not admit that the Vulgate interpreter erred in any thing, and deviated from the sense and scope of the Holy Spirit. And so they want him not only in those things which pertain to faith, but also in all other things of whatever kind everywhere to have attained the sense of the sacred text, so that whatever is found in him it is impious to call into doubt.

XXXIV. Then so that they may defend that infallibility of the old interpreter, they imagine that he had the Prophetic Spirit, or at least some Spirit similar to the Prophetic, which perpetually assisted him in interpreting, and rendered his version immune from error. Which among others Gretser, Titelmans, and Gregory of Valence boldly affirm.

XXXV. Finally they so extol the authority of the Latin edition, that they put it before the Greek and Hebrew text, as of more certain and ascertained authority, indeed as alone properly authentic. For these are the words of Stapleton, "To have recourse to the Greek and Hebrew is both permitted, and often expedient, but to elucidate that which is obscure, not to condemn the vulgar text of any falsity. And in this sense the Council of Trent determined that the old Latin edition alone is to be held as authentic." In the Relectio of the Principles of Faith, Controversy 5, Question 3, Article 3.

XXXVI. And so wherever it dissents from the Hebrew text they do not want it to be corrected from it; but rather they think that the Hebrew text itself is to be corrected from the Latin version. This can be seen in Gregory of Valentia's Analysis of Faith, Book 8, Chapter 5, where he contends that those are not to be heard, who even after the Council of Trent, want to emend the old edition in some places, as far as the sense is concerned: when rather the Greek and Hebrew codices, if they differ from the Old version anywhere, are to be emended by it: since the Church approved this edition by a special definition, but not those codices: which it does not indeed reject, unless perhaps where they would contradict the old version, yet it has not so precisely declared them authentic.

XXXVII. But Huntley proceeds so far, that he says that those who, rejecting the Old edition, take refuge in the Hebrew text, elicit nothing certain from there, but rather render faith doubtful, infirm, and uncertain. And similarly he who rejecting the ancient Latin version, takes refuge in the Greek text which exists today, without doubt recurs from things certain to things uncertain, doubtful, and depraved. Controversy 1 on the Word of God, Chapters 10 and 14.

XXXVIII. But the latter opinion, seems more conformable to the words of the Tridentine Synod. For that Synod determines that the Vulgate Version is to be rejected under no pretext in public lectures, disputations, and preachings. But if some errors are admitted in it, at least in lighter matters, now it is permitted to reject it under some pretext; especially in public disputations, in which often the matter is not about graver things, and which pertain to faith and morals. And in the same way, if it is permitted to correct it in certain places from the Hebrew or Greek text, it is also lawful to reject it under that pretext, that it dissents from the Hebrew or Greek: and thus it is false that it is to be rejected under no pretext. From which it is that this opinion, although more abhorrent from the common sense, and from the truth, is nevertheless more common in the Roman Church, and is

proposed more boldly by its defenders, while others set forth the feelings of their mind only timidly.

XXXIX. Yet for the former opinion it makes that those who were present at the Council of Trent, such as Salmeron, Vega, and Andradius, seem to favour it more. Indeed after Andradius taught and affirmed that the old edition is to be deemed authentic only, because it exists defaced by no error from which some pernicious dogma in faith and morals can be gathered, lest anyone doubt that this was the mind of the Council, he cites as a witness about that matter Cardinal Sancta Cruce who then, as the Pope's Legate presided over the Council, from whom Vega had heard it, the day before this decree was asked, and whom he heard confirming and protesting the same thing more than once. Which the History of the Council of Trent also testifies.

Part II

In which the opinion of the Protestants on the matter is set forth and confirmed.

I. The Protestants by common consent determine this first, that no Version of scripture is properly speaking authentic. But they say that authentic which has plainly divine and irrefragable authority, and which it is impious to contradict. And of their assertion this is the foundation, that so that a writing may be so authentic, it is necessary that it was made by divine inspiration; but all versions have been made by human industry and study, but not by divine afflatus. For as Jerome warns in his preface to the Pentateuch, "It is one thing to be a Prophet, another to be an interpreter. There the spirit predicted future things, here erudition and copiousness of words translates those things which it understands."

II. But especially that the Latin Vulgate was made by human study, not divine inspiration, is not difficult to prove. For, according to the principal Theologians of the Roman School, for the most part, it is either of Jerome, or corrected and revised by Jerome, or at least mixed from the version of Jerome and another older one. But Jerome was not a Prophet: nor in translating or correcting the Bibles did he have a peculiar and extraordinary guidance of the Holy Spirit. For Jerome never attributes so much to himself, but everywhere professes that he laboured on his version with human study, and in that he acknowledges that he was liable to error, indeed and sometimes erred. He also often freely leaves it to the readers to interpret many things in this or that way, because he doubted whether they had been rightly understood and translated by him. But Augustine in his epistle to Jerome 11, takes it for granted that Jerome could err, indeed and modestly complains that he actually erred somewhere. Indeed Jerome altogether freely leaves his version either to be admitted or repudiated. "Let those who want," he says, "read: let those who do not want reject." And he orders him who with venomous tongue carped at his work, either to accept it, if it pleased, or to despise it, if it displeased. Preface to Joshua. But would he speak so submissively and contemptuously about his work, if indeed he had published it with the divine Spirit inspiring, and would he not, if it had been so, have ordered his version to be admitted, all others being repudiated?

III. It is especially worthy to hear in what way Jerome translated the book of Tobit, which is held Canonical in the Roman Church, and which the Doctors of it think they have translated by Jerome. Jerome relates it in his preface to Tobit. "Because," he says, "the Chaldean language is near to the Hebrew speech, finding a loquacious Jew most skilled in both languages, I took up the labour of one day, and whatever he expressed to me in Hebrew words, this I, with a notary summoned, set forth in Latin speech." From which it is evident that Jerome, since he did not know Chaldean, used the work of a certain Jew, who by a certain extemporaneous paraphrase expounded the Chaldean text of Tobit to him; but Jerome, also extemporaneously, dictated the sense of it, as much as he grasped, in Latin speech. But is there anything there which savors of divine inspiration? And who will be able to believe that text to be authentic which is expressed from a paraphrase of I know not what loquacious Jew, and that by one who ignorant of the language, dictated in Latin speech whatever that loquacious Jew had expounded in Hebrew.

IV. It is therefore clear enough that the vulgate version, at least as far as those things which it has from Jerome, does not have divine authority, since Jerome was not a divinely inspired man, nor did he write anything with God peculiarly inspiring, but laboured on his version with human study only. But so that such authority might be established for it, it would be necessary not only that Jerome was divinely inspired, but also the author of that older version, from which also, as we taught before, it is mixed. Which came into the mind of no one before the Council of Trent, not even in a dream.

V. Indeed since the vulgate version, Jerome teaching in his preface to Daniel, and Bellarmine acknowledging in the second book On the Word of God, chapter eleven, has certain things translated from the version of Theodotion, such as those chapters about Bel and Susanna added to Daniel, who would believe either that the version of Theodotion the heretic and Apostate was made by Divine inspiration, or that a version expressed from a non-authentic edition is authentic?

VI. But if anyone should say that there is no need at all, that the individual writers, from whose patchworks the vulgate is made, had divine authority, provided it is established that nothing was taken from them which was not rightly and according to the mind of the Holy Spirit translated; for thus the authority of the Vulgate is sufficiently established: this being posited; I say that at least it will be necessary, that that selection was made with God inspiring, and that the interpolator of this version was a Prophet and a divinely inspired man. Otherwise it cannot have divine and irrefragable authority. But there is not one author of this commingling, nor was it made at once and once for all, and by a certain design; but gradually and little by little, and rather randomly, than from a certain deliberation. For neither the author nor the time of this correction or interpolation can be indicated. Which without doubt could be done, if the matter had been done solemnly, and for a certain end.

VII. From all which it becomes clear and evident, that neither the Latin vulgate version, nor any other is such, that its authority must necessarily be acquiesced in, nor is it permitted to recede from the sense which it indicates, and to introduce a better sense, if the matter bears it. But from that it follows, which also the Protestants determine by common consent, that no version is to be equated in authority, much less preferred, to the original text of scripture, whether Greek or Hebrew. And therefore every version, and thus the Latin Vulgate, is to be examined and corrected from the Greek and Hebrew text, if anywhere it differs from it.

VIII. But that is manifestly proven from this, that the Hebrew and Greek codices were immediately written by the Prophets and Apostles, with the Holy Spirit dictating, and therefore have not only as to the things, but also as to the individual words, plainly divine authority and immune from all error: since all versions, as has now been said, have been elaborated only by human work and industry, by those who could be deceived, both in grasping the sense of the sacred text, and in rightly and with suitable words expounding it.

IX. There are indeed some in the Roman School, who want the author also of the Vulgate version to have written with the Holy Spirit assisting, lest he err from the true sense. But this is not certain among the doctors of that School. For some affirm, but others deny. And

those very ones who affirm timidly affirm that, but not as a certain and ascertained matter; nor do they want the individual words of the Vulgate version to be from the Holy Spirit, since they admit that it sometimes uses words less proper, congruous, and accommodated, which is alien to the Holy Spirit. But now who does not see that the authority of that edition is greater, of which it is indubitable that the individual words are from the Holy Spirit, than of that about which at least it is permitted to doubt whether it is so, nor is it so ascertained and explored?

X. Then the Hebrew and Greek text holds itself in the manner of a fountain, but all versions hold themselves in the manner of streams, which have been drawn from it. But the wave of the fountain must be believed to flow purer and more sincerely than that of the stream. Then that text is as it were the exemplar, from which all versions have been expressed as images. But certainly the exemplar is always the rule and norm of those images, which have been expressed from it; and if any are less congruent with it, without doubt they are to be corrected and reformed from it.

XI. Which the ancient Doctors of the Church acknowledged. For they were accustomed to referring all translations to the original text of scripture, and to estimate them from it: so that those which approached it more closely, and expressed it more happily, were to be held in greater esteem, and made more of. This is especially openly the opinion of Jerome, whose authority here ought to be great among others, on account of his erudition, and skill in languages. For thus he says against Helvidius, "The wave of the fountain must be believed to flow much purer than that of the stream." And in his epistle to Sunia and Fretella, "Just as in the New Testament, if ever a question arises among the Latins, and there is a variety among the copies, we have recourse to the fountain of the Greek speech, in which the New Testament is written; so in the Old Testament, if ever there is a diversity between the Greeks and Latins, we have recourse to the Hebrew truth, so that whatever proceeds from the fountain, this we may seek in the streams." And in his epistle to Marcella speaking about the New Testament, "I wanted," he says, "to recall the faultiness of the Latin codices, which is proven from the diversity of all the books, to the Greek origin, from which they do not deny that they themselves have been translated, to whom if the wave of the most pure fountain displeases, let them drink the muddy streams." But in his Commentaries on Zechariah speaking about the Old Testament he says thus, "We are compelled to have recourse to the Hebrews, and to seek the truth of knowledge from the fountain rather than from the streams."

XII. Augustine teaches similar things in Book 15 of the City of God, Chapter 13. "I would in no way doubt that it is rightly done, that when something diverse is found in both codices, credence should rather be given to that language, from which the translation was made into another by interpreters." But in Book 2 of Christian Doctrine, Chapter 11, he says, "Men of the Latin language have need of two others for the knowledge of the divine scriptures, namely, Hebrew and Greek, so that recourse may be had to the preceding exemplars, if the infinite variety of the Latin interpreters has brought any doubt."

XIII. With which Ambrose hands down agreeable things in On the Holy Spirit, Book 2, Chapter 6. "If anyone," he says, "contends from the variety of the Latin codices, some of which the perfidious have falsified, let him inspect the Greek codices." And in the Book on

the Sacrament of the Lord's Incarnation, Chapter 8, "Thus," he says, "we find in the Greek codices, namely, of the New Testament, whose authority is greater." But the Doctors of the Roman School in this matter ought to be especially urged by the authority of the Canon Law itself, and its testimony. For thus it is had in the Decree of Gratian, Distinction 9, Canon Ut Veterum. "As the reliability of the Old Books is to be examined from the Hebrew volumes, so the truth of the new ones requires the norm of the Greek speech." Which words are taken from Jerome's epistle to Lucinius.

XIV. To this the Doctors of the Roman Church who are of the contrary opinion Respond, that by these arguments it is indeed evinced that the Greek and Hebrew text would be to be put before any versions whatsoever, if it were established that it is whole and uncorrupted: but since that text has been corrupted and vitiated, it no longer obtains that pristine dignity, nor is it safe to correct the Vulgate version from it. For to this amounts the response of Bellarmine in Book 2 On the Word of God, Chapter 11. "I respond," he says, "that it cannot be denied, that the fountains of the scriptures are to be put before the streams of the versions, when it is established that the fountains are not disturbed: but now we have already shown that the fountains flow muddied in many places."

XV. But how Bellarmine has shown that it is worth the trouble to hear. The place to which he refers is the second chapter of the second book On the Word of God. But there he brings forward five places in all from the Old Testament, which he contends have been corrupted: but with how unhappy an attempt, is evident from the mere inspection of the places. The first place is Isaiah 9, where he contends that Tikkare "he shall be called" is to be read, "his name shall be called Wonderful;" although nevertheless in the Hebrew codices it is constantly read Likra "one shall call." But besides that Bellarmine conjectures, but does not prove by any solid reason that the Hebrew text here has been vitiated, what does it matter for the sense whether you read, Tikkare, "he shall be called," or likra "one shall call" impersonally, as is the custom of the Hebrew language? The second place is Jeremiah 23, where the Hebrew text has, "this is the name by which likreo 'one shall call' him, The Lord our righteousness." But Bellarmine wants it to be read likreubu "they shall call him." But it is the same whether you read likreo, or read likreubu. For the verb is always to be taken impersonally, as the usage of the Hebrew language bears, which on a similar occasion uses the verb indiscriminately now in the plural now in the singular.

XVI. The third place is Psalm 22, where the Hebrew text has Caari, that is, "like a Lion my hands and my feet," which have no sense: but it is to be read Caaru "they pierced." But although in the Hebrew text it is Caari, the Masoretic notes themselves which are placed in the margin warn that Caaru is to be read. And that word is from the number of those which the Masters of the Jews note are to be written one way, and read another. The fourth place is had in Psalm 19, where the Hebrew Codices have "into all the earth exivit Kavam 'their delineation' has gone out," although nevertheless it is to be read Kolam "their voice," as it is in the version of the Seventy interpreters, which Paul uses in Romans 10. But neither from that is any error convinced in the Hebrew text. For the Seventy who translated φθόγγος αὐτν, refer the sense not the words. Since that delineation of the heavens about which the Psalmist speaks, that is, their elegant and as it were to the line polished structure, is a certain voice everywhere preaching the infinite power and wisdom of the artificer. The

fifth and final place is Exodus chapter 2, where these things are read about Moses in the Vulgate version, "He begot another also, and called his name Eliezer, saying, The God of my Father has helped me, and delivered me from the hand of Pharaoh." Which words are lacking in the Hebrew text, and Bellarmine wants them to have been erased from it, but gratuitously and without reason. Nor is there reason why we should give credence to him more in this matter than to Cardinal Cajetan, who rather acknowledges that these words are redundant in the Vulgate edition, in his commentaries on this place.

XVII. Nor does Bellarmine attempt to shake the integrity of the Greek text in the New Testament with stronger indications. For he brings forward, for example, that in 1 Corinthians 15, where the Greek text has: δεύτερος ἄνθρωπος Κύριος ἐξ οὐρανοῦ. "The second man the Lord from heaven." But in the Vulgate Edition it is "the second man from heaven, heavenly." But of how great moment is it, and what does it do for the sense, whether we read "the second man the Lord from heaven," or "the second man from heaven, heavenly"? Moreover he notes that in Romans 12, in the Greek text it is καιρῷ δουλεύοντες "serving the time:" when it is to be read Κυρίῳ δουλεύοντες "serving the Lord." But most Greek Codices have Κυρίῳ not καιρῷ, which is found only in a certain few: and therefore corruption is here brought forward in vain. Which also on that account is not to be attributed to the Greek codices in general, because certain codices, and those few, are truncated in part, and mutilated by some chapters, or verses perhaps: just as Bellarmine there contends in vain.

XVIII. We report these things individually, so that it may be apparent with how much faith and reason Bellarmine dares to say that the fountains of the scriptures flow muddily, and therefore are not to be preferred to the streams of the versions. For although we would grant that in those places noted by Bellarmine there was some error by the fault of the Librarians, which however, as we have shown, it is not necessary to concede, how small are those things and of how little importance, that from them their authority should be detracted from the Greek and Hebrew codices? Here we appeal to Bellarmine himself, who after he had laboured much in vain, to show that certain things in the Hebrew text were corrupted, concludes in these words, "However, errors of this kind are not of such great importance, that in those things which pertain to faith and good morals, the integrity of sacred scripture should be desired." For the whole discrepancy of the various Readings is usually placed in certain words, which change the sense either little or not at all. Will the authority and excellence of the original text immediately dictated by God therefore perish on account of some slight and unimportant errors of this kind? And should it not for that reason be preferred to the Latin version, which was not prepared by men inspired by God, and which, by the admission of the Roman School itself, has its own faults, and has been greatly corrupted by the lapse of time and the fault of the scribes?

XIX. And certainly here it is fitting to wonder at the thoughtlessness and stupor of those with whom we have to do. They acknowledge that the Greek and Hebrew text of scripture was immediately written by the Apostles and Prophets, with the Holy Spirit dictating; and yet they dare to detract from its authority, and to assert that it is uncertain. Why? Because, they say, that text has lost its purity, and has been corrupted and depraved. We ask where, and how far? They bring forth certain places, and those very few, in which they contend

there was error by the fault of the Librarians, but in such a way, however, that those errors make little or nothing for the sense. While they use this argument, it is necessary that they presuppose that that text cannot be certain and authentic, into which even the slightest blemishes have crept, by the fault and negligence of men.

XX. Now let us apply these things to the Vulgate edition. Certainly they are not so iron-hearted, but that even the most obstinate of them freely grant that many errors have crept into this edition by the lapse of time, some things added, others removed, and others indeed changed, and that its codices vary greatly among themselves, so that it is difficult to judge which reading is true, and according to the mind of the interpreter. So that Lucas Brugensis noted more than six hundred errors in it to be corrected, and Isidore Clarius observed up to eight thousand errors in it. And yet, notwithstanding so many blemishes and errors, they want this Latin edition to be certain and authentic, indeed the only certain and authentic one; and that rightly and justly defined by the Council of Trent, even before that edition had been emended: although it was not ignorant that it was in the greatest need of emendation.

XXI. Recognize therefore the Spirit of vertigo. Perhaps some errors, and those not of great importance, which have slipped into the original text of scripture, will render it uncertain, and will abrogate its authority; but far more and graver errors by which the Vulgate edition is corrupted, will not prevent it from being certain and authentic. But let us grant that the corruption is equal in both, and that no less of errors has been introduced by the lapse of

time into the Greek or Hebrew text itself, than into the Vulgate edition, should not the original text always be preferred, other things being equal, for the reasons which we have just now brought forward? Certainly if they wanted to cast down the original text below their Latin edition with any colour, on this pretext that that text is corrupted and vitiated, they ought to have rendered their Vulgate edition immune from all errors and faults, with which however, even in their own judgment, it is no less filled than the Hebrew text.

XXII. But that the truth and force of that argument, by which we assert the first and chief authority to the Greek and Hebrew edition, above all other editions whatsoever, may be more clear, it must be known that the Theologians of the Roman School do not think the same thing about its integrity or corruption. For there are some among them, like Lindanus and Melchior Canus, who, in contempt of it, in which they hold the Original text of Scripture, allege its corruption, and assert that the Hebrew text was greatly depraved and corrupted by the malice of the Jews, in hatred of the Christian religion; and that the Greek text of the New Testament suffered similar things by the craft and frauds of heretics. But this opinion is not of so many whom zeal for the cause has altogether blinded. But others more learned and in great number oppose it, like Bellarmine, Sixtus of Siena, Dominicus Bannes, who excellently refute that opinion.

XXIII. But that we also may stop up that evasion, if the Latin version is to be preferred to the Hebrew text, because that text has been depraved by the Jews, we ask when that depravation took place, Whether before that version was made, or indeed after it was made. If they say that the Hebrew codices were already depraved, when the Latin version was made, certainly they cut their own throats. For how could a pure and authentic version be

expressed from an impure and non-authentic text? And how will that stream be pure, if it is drawn from a fountain already muddy? It is necessary therefore that the Hebrew codices remained whole up to Jerome, who is considered the author of the greatest part at least, of the Vulgate edition. And indeed, Jerome and Augustine absolve the Jews from that crime, which had begun to be levelled against them by some, and they call them faithful librarians of the Christians. They not only praise their faith in this regard but also confirm it with many arguments.

XXIV. Now, moreover, that the Jews have not violated the Sacred text from the time of Jerome out of hatred for the Christian religion, is manifest from this, that if there are any places that favour the Christian religion, they are no less whole in the Hebrew text than in the Latin edition. Indeed, the testimonies concerning Christ are often more illustrious in the Hebrew text than in the Vulgate version. An example may be that of the second Psalm, "Nashchku Bar," "Kiss the Son," where Kings are ordered to adore the Son of God. But in the Vulgate it is held corruptly and dilutedly, "apprehendite disciplinam" [embrace discipline].

XXV. Add that the Jews after Jerome had less cause for corrupting the sacred text than before Jerome. For the more remote the times were from Christ, the rarer were the colloquies and disputations of the Jews with the Christians about religion. Nor was the hatred of the Jews against the Christian religion greater after Jerome than before him. And also they could more easily be accused and convicted of that depravation after Jerome, by the translation recently made by him from the Hebrew, with one and another Jew striving and lending their work to him, who taught Jerome the Hebrew letters. Then also no one will hold the Jews suspected of so great a crime, who knows with how great religion, not to say superstition, they deal with the letter of scripture: so that they have all its letters and points in number, and if any few and slight blemishes have long been recognized in the sacred text, yet they have not dared to correct them for many centuries back, but have only noted in the margin how it should be read.

XXVI. But what is especially to be noted, since those with whom we have to do, on that account contend that the Hebrew text has been corrupted, that they may defend the authority of the Vulgate edition, which differs not a little from it, it is necessary that they say that the books are more corrupt in which the Vulgate version departs further from the Hebrew text. And so no book will be more depraved than the Hebrew Psalter, from which the Latin differs very much. And yet that nothing was changed in the Hebrew Psalter from the time of Jerome, Jerome's version expressed from the Hebrew text of the Psalter makes manifest. For this version, which has remained whole up to this point, is altogether conformable to the Hebrew text, which exists even today: nor does it depart less than it does from the Vulgate version.

XXVII. But especially the vanity of that calumny, by which the Original text of Scripture is assailed in the person of the Jews, is openly convicted from this, that those who cry out that the Hebrew text has been so corrupted, when it comes to the thing itself, and they are ordered to bring forth those places which the Jews have corrupted with evil intent, can scarcely indicate one or another place, in which even a slight suspicion of that corruption occurs. For besides those things which we have reported above from Bellarmine, they

contend, for example, that in the Hebrew Psalter eight verses are missing, which are cited by the Apostle in chapter 3 of the epistle to the Romans, and are inserted in the Vulgate version in Psalm 13. Namely, "Their throat is an open sepulchre, with their tongues they have used deceit," and what follows in the Apostle: But these verses are not missing in the Hebrew text, but have been rashly inserted into the Vulgate version, as the most Learned Theologians of the Roman School acknowledge, and among others Bellarmine himself. For these verses are not cited by our Apostle, as if they existed in some place of Scripture in a continuous series, but are taken from various places of scripture, as Jerome testifies in the preface to book 16 on Isaiah.

XXVIII. They object moreover that in Genesis chapter eight in the Hebrew text it is "The raven went out, and returned"; when yet it should be read, "and did not return"; as the Vulgate version has it. But what did it concern the Jews to remove the negative particle in this place? And what does it make for their case, if the raven returned into the ark, or not? And how will they prove that in this place we must not stand by the faith of the Hebrew codex, but rather follow the Latin codices, which here also vary among themselves, and do not all read in the same way? From which it is clear how futile are the things which are wont to be objected against the Hebrew text, and with what slight arguments its authority is impugned.

XXIX. Nor are the things which are brought against the Greek text of the New Testament more valid. For although it is true that the heretics often tried to corrupt the Greek codices, yet it is also true that the Orthodox always resisted such an impious attempt, and did not suffer their codices to be depraved, whatever the heretics dared in theirs. Of which thing it makes faith, that those places of the New Testament which are apt to confute the various heretics, who have vexed the Christian Church, are no less whole in the Greek text than in the Latin codices. Nor can, or dare, those with whom we deal individually designate what places of the New Testament remain corrupted by heretics in the Greek Codices, which the Christian Church uses today.

XXX. But experience confutes what Bellarmine imputes to the Greeks: namely that they were not as faithful and careful in preserving their codices, as the Latin Church was. For, omitting the faults of the interpreter himself, more depraved and various readings can be shown in the Latin codices themselves than in the Greek. If, therefore, any errors have crept into the Hebrew and Greek codex by the fault and negligence of men, they are few and very slight, and of no importance, as to the sense, as we have heard Bellarmine himself confessing, with the sounder Doctors of the Roman Church. And therefore nothing is taken away from the authority of the Original text, which does not for that reason cease to be certain and authentic, and to be preferred to any versions whatsoever: and even to the Latin edition itself, into which, by the acknowledgment of the Roman School itself, many errors have slipped, by the fault and unskilfulness of the scribes; and which nevertheless they do not want for that reason to have lost that authority; which they wrongly attribute to it.

XXXI. But that it may more clearly appear how without reason that sacrilege, by which its authority above all other editions is detracted from the Greek and Hebrew text of scripture, is covered by the corruption of that text, will those, whose opinion we impugn, say that

from the time when the Canon Law was collected by Gratian, and confirmed and sanctioned by the Roman Pontiffs, such corruption invaded that text, as took away from it the authority which it had hitherto had? Certainly they will be compelled to say that? if they want to stand by their right. For whatever the Greek and Hebrew codices were, when the Canon Law was composed, in that law there stands a Canon, by which it is sanctioned that the faith of the old books is to be examined from the Hebrew volumes, but the truth of the new ones to desire the norm of the Greek speech, as was observed above. And therefore it is necessary, that that corruption happened only a very few centuries ago. For it is not many centuries since Gratian lived. But what need is there to recur all the way to Gratian, since in the century immediately preceding, the Decree of Gratian was recognized, and newly sanctioned by the Roman Pontiffs, who by no means abrogated that Canon, on the pretext of any corruption, which had happened after that Canon was first composed.

XXXII. But Bellarmine and other Doctors of the Roman School try to elude this Canon and similar opinions of the Fathers in another way. For they concede that it is often useful to recur to the Greek and Hebrew fountain, and that for various reasons. And first indeed, when there seems to be an error of the Librarians in the Latin codices. Secondly, when the Latin codices vary, so that it cannot be certainly established what is the true reading of the Vulgate. Thirdly, when the words or sentence in Latin is ambiguous. Fourthly, to understand the energy and propriety of the words. And in this sense they draw what is contained in the Canon Law, and in Jerome, Augustine, and other Fathers, about all versions being emended and examined from the Hebrew and Greek text. But they do not want it to be lawful to correct the Vulgate edition from the Original text, as if something in it was erred by the interpreter, and alien to the mind of the Holy Spirit. But surely the aforealleged Canon sanctions that very thing. For when it says that the truth of the books of the New Testament desires the norm of the Greek speech, does it not manifestly declare that whatever in those books does not agree with that norm should not be held for the true word of God? And similarly when it says that the faith of the old Books is to be examined from the Hebrew volumes, does it not openly sanction that faith is not to be had in those books, except insofar as they are found to agree with the Hebrew text; and therefore that faith is to be abrogated from the Vulgate edition, where it dissents from the Hebrew text?

XXXIII. Let this therefore be concluded, that the Latin version is neither properly authentic, nor in any way to be equated in authority to the Greek and Hebrew text, much less to be preferred to it. For the rest, if anyone asks how much it is to be esteemed, and what place it ought to hold among the versions, this is the opinion of the Protestants about it, That there are many Latin versions better than it and more accurate; indeed, that there is scarcely any extant today which is more imperfect, and which has more defects.

XXXIV. For first it bristles with wondrous barbarity and is full of dissonant and absurd words. Of this kind are Psalm 76, "Scopebam spiritum meum," for that which is in Hebrew "Vajechappe's Kouchi," "my spirit searched." Psalm 67, "Benedictus Dominus die Quotidie." Psalm 125, "In convertendo Dominus captivitatem Sion facti sumus sicut Consolati." Also in Joel chapter 2, it is said of God that he is "praestabilis super malitia." Which is explained by Bellarmine with a wondrous enough gloss, "excellent in pitying." When in Hebrew it is "Nicham hal haraha," "Whom it repents of the evil," namely, which

he was otherwise about to send upon the obstinate. And of the same vein are those in the New Testament, "Nonne vos magis pluris estis illis." Matt. 6. "Omnis populus manicabat ad eum," for "mane veniebat" [came in the morning]. Luk. 21. Also, "Deus intentator est malorum." Jam. 1. for that which is in Greek "ἀπείραστος κακῶν," that is, "who cannot be tempted by evils." Which things we bring forth only in appearance. For Myriads of such barbarous Locutions could be noted.

XXXV. Then not only do many barbarous words occur in that version, but also many places which have no sense, especially in the Psalms, whose version is most depraved. It would be infinite to pursue each one. But we will give only a certain specimen of this thing in two Psalms. And first indeed in Psalm 67, according to the Vulgate version. Which is almost entirely so depraved, that the reader can scarcely sculpt any sense from it; or certainly if the words bear any sense, it departs very far from the Hebrew truth. But especially who could divine the sentence of these words, "The Lord will give the word to them that preach good tidings with great power. The king of hosts, of the beloved, and to the beauty of the house to divide the spoils. If ye sleep among the midst of the lots, ye shall be as the wings of a dove covered with silver, and the hinder parts of her back with the paleness of gold." Also of those which follow, "When he that is in heaven appointeth kings over her, they shall be white as snow in Salmon. The mountain of God is a rich mountain, a mountain curdled as cheese, a rich mountain, why suspect ye curdled mountains?"

XXXVI. Nor did the Vulgate interpreter less infelicitously translate Psalm 89, which in Hebrew is 90. Which that it may be more clearly apparent we will compare some of its verses with the Hebrew text. For what do those things mean in the third verse, "Lest thou turn man to destruction; and thou hast said, Return, ye children of men." When according to the Hebrew codex the sentence is plain, this namely, "Thou turnest man to dust, and sayest, Return, ye children of men:" Namely, into the dust whence ye were taken. In the fifth verse the Vulgate has, "Their years shall be. They are accounted as nothing." But the Hebrew words in Latin sound, "With a flood thou carriest them away, and they are a sleep." But especially how absurd is the version of the tenth verse and those following, where it is read in the Vulgate, "As a spider our years shall be spent in thought. The days of our years in them are 70 years. But if in strength, 80 years: and what is more of them is labour and sorrow, for mildness comes upon us, and we shall be chastised." But in the Hebrew text it is, "We spend our years like a tale [or meditation]. The days of our years are 70 years: and if any be strong, 80 years. But their strength is labour and sorrow: for it is soon cut off, and we fly away." Which words have a sense not so difficult, and which one may easily understand: But who would understand that, "our years like a spider shall be spent in thought"? and what do those words void of good sense have in common with the Hebrew text? To which many similar things could easily be observed in almost every Psalm.

XXXVII. Moreover it is manifest that the Vulgate interpreter, whether deluded by the ambiguity of the Greek or Hebrew word, or by a depraved reading, has translated many things absurdly, and in a sense most alien to the mind of the sacred author. Thus Exodus 34, it is said of Moses by the Vulgate interpreter, "He knew not that his face was horned." Whence was born the common error of painters and sculptors, who represent Moses as some other Bacchus with a horned forehead. But the interpreter was deceived by the

ambiguity of the word "Keren," which properly indeed signifies a horn, but metaphorically is said of rays, which are as it were certain horns of light. Whence comes the verb "Karan" to shine. Which the Hebrew text uses in this place. For there it is said of Moses that "Karan," the skin of his face shone. The interpreter made a similar error in the third chapter of the Prophet Habakkuk, where the Majesty of God is thus described, according to the Hebrew truth, "his brightness was as the light, he had rays from his hands." But in the Vulgate it reads "He had horns in his hands." Here pertains what is in the first Book of Chronicles, chapter 4, where the same interpreter turns many proper names into appellatives: Whence arises a fabulous and absurd sense. For among the posterity of Selah the son of Judah these are reckoned in the Hebrew text, "Jokim, and the men of Chozeba, and Joash, and Saraph, who had the dominion in Moab, and Jashubi-lehem." But the Vulgate version has, "And he that made the sun to stand, and the men of Lying, and Secure, and Burning, who were princes in Moab, and who returned into Lehem." Where it is absurdly feigned that another besides Joshua made the sun stand still.

XXXVIII. Similarly in Psalm 34 among the Hebrews, the Hebrew text has, "Choneh," that is, "The angel of the Lord encampeth round about them that fear him." Which the LXX not badly turned "παρεμβαλεῖ." For "παρεμβολὴ" signifies a camp. But the Latin interpreter who turned the Psalms from the Greek not reaching the force of the Greek word turned it, "The angel of the Lord shall send in the circuit of them that fear him." In no sense, or little congruous. In Psalm 131 in the Vulgate version, the Hebrew text has "Tjedah barek abarek," that is, "her victuals [or provision] I will bless with blessing." Which the LXX turned "τὴν θήραν αὐτῆς εὐλογῶν εὐλογήσω," "Blessing I will bless her venison." And indeed "tsaid" properly signifies venison. But by the fault of the copyists "θήραν" was changed into "χήραν," that is, "Widow." Which error the Vulgate version followed, for it has "Blessing I will bless her widow."

XXXIX. Finally, in the ninth chapter of Proverbs, Solomon speaking of him whom the immodest woman allures and seduces with her blandishments, thus says, "And he knoweth not that the dead are there, and that her guests are in the depths of hell." But the Vulgate version has "He was ignorant that giants are there." Namely, the interpreter was deceived by the Homonymy of the word "Rephaim," which is found in the Hebrew text. For this word sometimes indeed signifies Giants, but as for the most part it signifies the dead. Which ambiguity also deceived him in Job chapter 26, where the Hebrew text has, "Harephaim," that is, "The dead things are formed under the waters, and the inhabitants thereof." Where by dead things are understood bodies void of soul, like metals and gems, which are formed under the very waters, in the lowest bowels of the earth. But in the Vulgate it Reads, "Behold the giants groan under the waters, and they that dwell with them."

XL. It would be allowed to collect more of this kind, but let these things said for an example suffice. More serious is that the vulgar interpreter often not only departs from the Hebrew text, but induces a plainly contrary sense; thus in Genesis chapter eight, in the place already noted above, according to the Hebrew truth it is said of the Raven, that it went out of the ark and returned. But the Vulgate has "and did not return." Which error, as Augustine Bishop of Chisamo observes in Sixtus of Siena, made it so that the expositors invented most

fabulous questions, inquiring in what place the raven was absent. Thus 1 Cor. 15, according to the Greek text is, "We shall not all indeed sleep, but we shall all be changed." But in a contrary sense the Vulgate interpreter has, "We shall all indeed rise again, but we shall not all be changed." So also in the second chapter of the first Epistle of Peter, it is said of Christ in the Vulgate version, "When he suffered, he threatened not, but delivered himself to him that judged him unjustly." But in the Greek it is, "To him that judged righteously."

XLI. Moreover, although we do not think that the Vulgate interpreter acted in bad faith, and purposely corrupted the text of scripture to foster some errors, which some of the Protestants less prudently attribute to him, yet it is certain that many from his faulty version took occasion of erring, or at least of confirming themselves in their errors. Thus Bellarmine to prove the religious cult of relics brings forth that of Isaiah 11, "His sepulchre shall be glorious." But in Hebrew it is simply, "His rest or dwelling shall be glorious." Similarly in the eleventh chapter of the Epistle to the Hebrews it is said of Jacob, according to the Vulgate version, "He adored the top of his staff." Which some bring forth to prove the religious adoration of images. As if, forsooth, by these words it were signified, that Jacob adored some image carved on the top of the staff of Joseph. But in the Greek it is "he adored upon the top of his staff," or "his own," that is, leaning on his staff because of infirmity. So also to prove the invocation of saints those words of Peter are wont to be adduced, ch. 1 of the second Epistle, where in the Vulgate it is read, "I will endeavour that you may be able after my decease to have these things always in remembrance," as if Peter were promising to the faithful his endeavour and care after his decease. But the Greek truth has, "I will endeavour that ἑκάστοτε ἔχειν ὑμᾶς," "that ye may be able to have these things always in remembrance after my decease." For ἔχειν there signifies to be able, from the frequent use of the Greek tongue. And in that place the Apostle renders a reason why he wrote to them, namely, that after his death, they might be able continually to call to remembrance what he being present had taught them.

XLII. But those who attribute more than is fitting to the free will of man in those things which pertain to piety and eternal salvation, abuse the words of the Apostle 1 Cor. 15 in the Vulgate interpreter, "I laboured more abundantly than they all, yet not I, but the grace of God with me." When in the Greek text it is "yet not I, but the grace of God which is with me." Where the Apostle attributes the fruit of his labour in solidum to the grace of God, but not, as they want, divides it between himself and the grace of God. And the same also think that they have found something which favours their opinion in Luke 2, where the Vulgate edition has "on earth peace to men of good will," as if some good will of men preceded the grace of God. But in the Greek it is far otherwise, Namely "among men," or "towards men, good pleasure" or "good will." Where the good will of men is not celebrated, but the good will of God towards men. Finally, to prove the perpetual splendour of the Christian Church very many twist that of the Vulgate version, Psalm 18 in it, "He hath set his tabernacle in the sun." When the Hebrew truth has "He hath set a tabernacle for the sun in them." That is, in the heavens of which the Psalmist treats.

XLIII. Moreover, although many and various defects can be noted in the Latin Vulgate edition, yet it should not for that reason be despised, but its antiquity merits some

veneration, and its use celebrated through so many ages in the Church. Nor is it so corrupted and depraved, that those things which pertain to faith and good morals cannot be sufficiently sought and drawn from it. But if either by the fault of the interpreter, or of the Librarians, it has been gravely erred somewhere in it, that can easily be corrected and supplied from other places. And certainly we are of the opinion that it should have departed from it as little as could be done, saving the truth, and that it should rather have been emended, than that new and entirely other versions should have been freshly coined for the common use of the Church. Although versions expressed verbatim and more closely from the Greek and Hebrew text have their use also among the learned, and conduce not a little to elucidating the text of scripture.

XLIV. But that we may so think, we are moved by the example of the Apostles and Evangelists, who did not despise the Greek edition of the Old Testament, Vulgate in their time, although labouring also itself with many defects: but they used it for the most part in citing the testimonies of the Old scripture; although also in those things it did not exactly agree with the Hebrew text. Nor did they rarely change anything in it, and cite it otherwise than it is read in it, Having regard to those to whom they wrote, and for whose sake they wrote; because, namely, they were accustomed to that edition; and taking care lest they should trouble them with unnecessary novelty, and cast unnecessary scruples upon them.

XLV. Although also we would not want any version to be properly authentic, yet we do not deny that it would be advisable, if all the Orthodox would agree on some version, which once diligently castigated and corrected they might all commonly use, and adhere to it as much as could be done. In which sense the Protestant Theologians in Germany are said to have once declared Luther's version authentic.

On the Septuagint

I. There is some question regarding this version among the doctors of the Roman Church and our theologians, but it does not seem to be of great importance. Both sides understand by the Septuagint the Greek version of the Scriptures that was in use among Hellenistic Jews at the time of Christ and the Apostles, from whom the early Christians and the Apostles themselves adopted it. This version is frequently cited in the New Testament when referring to the Old Testament, and therefore, it has been widely used both privately and publicly in the Christian Church since that time.

II. However, whether the entire version truly comes from the seventy-two interpreters who were sent by the high priest of the Jews to Ptolemy Philadelphus, King of Egypt, to translate the Scriptures, as narrated by Josephus, or whether those interpreters only translated the Pentateuch while other later interpreters translated the rest of the Scripture, is a matter of debate among scholars on both sides, and some leave the matter undecided. Nevertheless, it seems more probable to most that all the books of the Old Testament were translated into Greek by those seventy-two interpreters. But whatever the case, both sides recognize that the Greek version which was in use at the time of Christ and the Apostles is no longer intact and uncorrupted. Over the centuries, it has been so altered and interpolated by various errors and corrections that it may now seem different and does not have the same authority it had before it was corrupted and depraved.

III. Thus, the only question is what authority the Greek version originally had in the Church. The Romanists argue that it had supreme and divine authority because the notable seventy-two interpreters did not produce it solely by human art and intellect but had the special guidance and assistance of the Holy Spirit to prevent them from deviating from the true meaning. Therefore, they are seen more as prophets than mere translators. Our doctors, however, admit that the Greek version deserved great authority due to the expertise and number of interpreters and also because the Apostles, by their usage, somewhat endorsed and consecrated it. Nevertheless, they do not concede that these interpreters were prophets or possessed a similar prophetic spirit; thus, they do not believe its authority should ever be equated with that of the Hebrew text, but rather that it could and should always be corrected and examined by the Hebrew text as the source and rule.

On Vernacular Versions of Scripture

I. The Doctors of the Roman Church do not think the same thing about the use and necessity of translating Scripture into Vulgar and Vernacular languages. For first there are among them some rigid and harsh ones, who absolutely condemn the translation of scripture into vernacular languages, and want the use and reading of them to be altogether forbidden to the laity, as too dangerous, and from which little fruit can redound to them. Which is the opinion of many in Spain and in Italy. But by others they are accused as rude Masters, and who so think more out of zeal than out of knowledge. With which censure Thomas Stapleton the Englishman notes them, in Relectione principiorum fidei Contr. 5. quæst. 3. art. 4.

II. On the other hand there are some more lenient ones who judge, at least per se and commonly, that it is expedient, as simply more agreeable to the divine honour, and the salvation of the faithful, that the scriptures should be delivered to the faithful in the vulgar tongue, although secundum quid, and in case, their reading can be noxious. For on account of either many, or few, either unlearned, or unstable, who deprave the scriptures to their own and others' destruction, not a few good and pious faithful, who would receive the greatest edification and consolation from it, are to be defrauded of that most wholesome Reading. So in France and England not a few Theologians of the Roman School think everywhere, who have some commerce with the Protestants in those kingdoms.

III. Especially that Veron formerly a Jesuit, and afterwards famous for his little books and disputations against the Reformed of France, in the third prologue, which he prefixed to the French version of the New Testament, which he himself prepared, professedly affirms and proves by many arguments that the reading of the Bibles turned into the French language is prohibited to none. Nor do artisans, idiots, women, and any others of the simple Christian people, need for such reading any permission and permission of their Bishop, Parish priest, or confessor. Indeed, that individual faithful are to be exhorted and invited to such reading, by the example of Timothy. Which opinion of Veron those Learned men from the Disciples of Jansenius approve, commend and adopt, who wrote against the Mandate of the Archbishop of Paris, by which the reading of the French version of the New Testament was prohibited, printed at Mons in Hainault, some years ago.

IV. But this opinion also is disapproved by the greatest part of the Theologians of the Roman Church. The more common doctrine of them therefore is, that vernacular translations are neither to be simply approved, nor simply prohibited. And indeed that it is not expedient, that their reading should be permitted everywhere and to anyone, but yet that it can be usefully conceded to some.

V. But Stapleton thus explains the whole matter in that Controversy 5, question 3, article 3. Namely that in the peace of the Church the reading of the whole Sacred Scripture in the

vulgar tongue is not to be permitted, but only of certain parts, namely, of those which are Moral and historical. But when heresies are raging, the reading of the whole scripture can indeed be conceded, in vernacular languages; and that on account of the corrupt translations of the heretics. But yet that reading is not to be conceded promiscuously to all, but to some only, namely to those to whom the ordinary Pastors will judge it expedient.

VI. And this is the opinion of the Council of Trent, in the index of prohibited books, rule four. When, it says, it is manifest by experience, that if the sacred Bibles are permitted everywhere without discrimination in the Vulgar language, more detriment than utility arises from it on account of the temerity of men, let it stand in this part by the judgment of the Bishop, or Inquisitor, that with the Counsel of the Parish Priest, or Confessor, they may concede the reading of the Bibles turned by Catholic authors in the Vulgar language to those, whom they will have understood to be able to take from such reading, not harm, but an increase of faith and piety. Which faculty let them have in writing. But whoever will have presumed to have them, or read them without such a faculty, unless the Bibles have first been returned to the ordinary, he may not receive absolution of sins. Indeed afterwards the Regulars themselves are forbidden to read or buy Vulgar Bibles, unless a faculty has first been had from the prelates.

VII. But what the Council indefinitely decides, namely that vernacular Bibles can be conceded to those to whom the Ordinaries will have judged that to be expedient, this, I say, the same Stapleton acknowledging, in the place just now cited, the practice of the Roman Church restricts to places where, as they say, the battle line of the Church is disturbed, that is, where those who adhere to the Roman Church are mixed with those whom they consider heretics, and can have Vernacular Bibles from them. For then lest their own use corrupt editions, as they contend, they sometimes concede to them the use of Bibles turned by Doctors of the Roman School. But where, in their judgment, the battle line of the Church is ordered, that is, where the Pope reigns absolutely, and without contradiction, then they think it safer to prohibit Vulgar editions altogether, as is done in Spain and in Italy. For there the use of any vulgar translation is conceded to no one. And long ago by an edict of Kings Ferdinand and Isabella in Spain it was forbidden under the greatest penalties, lest anyone translate the Bible into the Spanish language, or import, buy, or retain those translated elsewhere.

VIII. But the Protestants by common consent teach that the scriptures ought to be common to the whole people of the faithful, and the use of them to be permitted indiscriminately to all: and therefore that it is plainly expedient, and agreeable to the divine will, that the sacred scripture should be translated into the languages vernacular to Christian peoples, that so all may be able to use it, and from it perceive instruction and consolation. And therefore that those are injurious to the Christian people, who prohibit, as much as is in them, lest versions of the scriptures should be published in vulgar languages, or at least lest it should be allowed to all to use them: nor should the Christian people obey such superiors in this matter: but rather, according to the exhortations of the scripture itself, and the liberty granted by God, they should handle the sacred books with nocturnal and daily hand, and not suffer them to be snatched from them by the Prelates.

IX. But that they may so think they are induced by many arguments. And first indeed by the example of the sacred writers themselves, or rather of God himself who wrote and spoke through them. For when God first delivered his Word in writing, he did it in a language known and vulgar to the Israelitish people, of which the Church then consisted. For Moses and the Prophets wrote in the Hebrew language, which was vernacular and familiar to that people. A manifest indication that they wanted their writings to be read and understood by the people.

X. Similarly our Apostles and Evangelists, who having rejected the Jews, wrote chiefly for the sake of the Gentiles, published their writings in the Greek language, which then was vernacular to many Gentiles, but to very many, if not vernacular, yet commonly understood, and not unknown to the common people. Thus the Corinthians, Philippians, Thessalonians, Ephesians, to whom the Apostle wrote in Greek, also spoke Greek in common. But the Galatians, and other peoples of Asia Minor, although each had their own language, yet they commonly understood the Greek language: so that if any public speech had to be made, whether before they became Christians, or after they had embraced the Christian Doctrine, it would be made in Greek: as is evident from the homilies of the Fathers, which were made in Greek among those peoples. Indeed, the Romans themselves, to whom the Apostle wrote in Greek, knew the Greek language for the most part: so that even the women spoke and understood Greek: as may be seen in Juvenal, who therefore Satirically calls Rome a Greek city. "I cannot bear the Greeks, O Quirites, a Greek city." Since therefore God wanted his oracles first to be written in a language known not only to the rulers of the Church, but also to the common people themselves, to whom it was delivered, is it not agreeable, that they should also be proposed to each faithful people, in a language likewise vulgar and known? At least it is manifest from this that those who blame editions of scripture in the vulgar tongue, as dangerous to the faithful common people, accuse the divine wisdom, as if too improvident, as which delivered the sacred scripture in a language known and familiar to the people of God, as we have said.

XI. Then the example of the Prophets and Apostles was followed by the practice of the Church of the Old and New Testament. For under the Old Testament, after the Hebrew language began to become obsolete, but the empire of the Greeks rendered the Greek language common through a great part of the East, and understood by the common people, the Old Testament was converted into the Greek language by those seventy-two interpreters, sent for by Ptolemy, and sent from Jerusalem by the high Priest. But the scripture once so translated, the Jews dispersed through the various Provinces of the Greek empire, who having forgotten the language of their country, commonly used the Greek language, and for that reason were called Hellenists, the Jews, I say, those, having omitted henceforth the Hebrew text, began to read the scripture in Greek, not only at home but also publicly in the Synagogues on each Sabbath, in which not the Hebrew text, but the version of the Seventy elders was read. But our Apostles approved this custom, and gave that honour to the Greek version of the Seventy interpreters, that they commonly use it in their writings, while they cite the Sacred Scripture.

XII. But as for the Jews of the other dispersion, who to the distinction of the Hellenist Jews are called Hebrews, they certainly used the Hebrew text in the Synagogues, which

they understood in some way. But yet because the Hebrew language had already greatly degenerated, and about the time of Christ pure Hebraism had begun to be less understood by the common people, therefore the Old Testament was expounded by the Chaldaic Paraphrase of Onkelos and Jonathan, that the Jews then living in Babylon, and Jerusalem, and all Judea, who commonly used the Chaldaic, or Syriac idiom, might be able to use it more familiarly and easily.

XIII. But after the New Testament was written, and very many nations were converted to Christ, the whole scripture of the Old and New Testament was immediately turned from Greek into Latin, and that not by one, but by many interpreters, for the use of the Latin Church, namely, of Italy, and the adjacent Provinces, in which the Romans with their empire had propagated their language, and rendered it commonly known.

XIV. And yet, which is especially to be noted; in those Provinces the Greek language was known to the learned and many others, and the learned wrote in it, and the Disciplines were delivered; according to that of Cicero for Archias the Poet, "Greek is read through the whole world." So that even in the other century after Christ, the Bishops of Gaul published their books in Greek; as is evident by the example of Irenæus Bishop of Lyons, who wrote in Greek against the heresies of his time. But this did not seem enough to those first Christians, if scripture was had in a language known to the learned, and therefore they turned it into Latin, that it might also be able to be read and understood by the common people. But if in those first times of the faith, the Greek Church thought it equitable to have scripture in Greek, but the Latin in Latin, is it not also equitable and agreeable, that the Churches of other Languages, to which either the Greek and Latin language was never, or is no longer known, should also have the sacred scripture in a language known to them, and understood by the common people, and procure versions of it into their own languages?

XV. And certainly Ecclesiastical history teaches that other Churches used the same right, and followed the example of the Greek and Latin Church, and translated the sacred scripture into their own idioms. For Socrates testifies in book 4, ch. 27 of Ecclesiastical history, that a certain Ulphilas Bishop of the Goths, who flourished in the time of Emperor Valentinian, about the year of Christ 370, translated the sacred scripture into the Gothic language. For thus he has it in the place already cited, "Having interpreted the divine scriptures in the language of the Goths, he prepared the barbarians to learn the divine oracles."

XVI. But Jerome openly enough teaches that he translated the scripture into Dalmatian. For when he was a Dalmatian born in Stridon, thus he writes of himself to Sophronius, "I do not say this that I may bite my predecessors, or that I may think anything should be detracted from them, whose translation most diligently emended I once gave to the men of my language." Where he speaks of the Version of the LXX interpreters, from which he prepared a version for the men of his language, that is, the Dalmatians, as it seems. Bellarmine indeed doubts about this matter, but Marianus Victorinus denies it in his Scholia on this place, where he contends that Jerome understands the Latins by the men of his language. But other Doctors of the Roman School agree with us about that Version of Sacred Scripture into the Dalmatian language made by Jerome. For thus has Cardinal

Hosius the Pole, in his book on the vernacular reading of the sacred, "It is clear that Jerome translated the sacred books into the Dalmatian language." And similarly Alphonsus de Castro lib. 1, de haeresibus ch. 13, "We confess," he says, "that once the sacred books were translated into the vulgar tongue." And for an example of this thing he cites Erasmus who writes that Jerome translated the scripture into the Dalmatian language.

XVII. Similarly Chrysostom, when he was an exile in Armenia, is said to have translated the Psalms and other books of Sacred Scripture into the Armenian language, George the Patriarch relating in his life, as Sixtus of Siena acknowledges, Bibliotheca lib. 6. But Chrysostom himself Homily one on John testifies that his Gospel, and therefore the rest of scripture was translated into the various languages of even barbarous peoples. "But," he says, "the doctrine did not vanish away to unlearned and illiterate men. But the Syrians, Egyptians, Indians, Persians, Ethiopians, and innumerable other nations having transferred the dogmas introduced by this one into their own language, barbarian men learned to Philosophize."

XVIII. Agreeing is Theodoret in his book on curing the affections of the Greeks. "The Hebrew books," he says, "have been converted not only into the Greek speech, but also into the Roman language, Egyptian, Persian, Indian, and Armenian, and Scythian, and even Sarmatian: once, so to speak, into all the languages which nations use to this day." To which similar things Augustine teaches, lib. 2, de Doctrina Christiana ch. 5. "From which," he says, "it is made, that the divine scripture proceeding from one language, which could opportunely be disseminated through the world, being diffused far and wide through the various languages of interpreters, became known to the nations for salvation."

XIX. But the Ethiopian Churches have always used, and even now use, the Ethiopian version, but the Syriac the Syriac version, which is doubtless very ancient, as to the New Testament at least: which the Syrians think they have turned into the Syriac language by the Evangelist Mark. And similarly the Egyptian Churches, from the time the Saracens abolished the Greek language in Egypt, and introduced the Arabic, use the Arabic version of scripture.

XX. Moreover, that it is not only lawful and expedient to translate scripture into vulgar languages, but also that this is necessary by divine ordination, is proved by scripture itself.

XXI. From this it is possible to argue thus. If as long as the Jewish Church stood the divine law had to be solemnly read to the people of God in perpetual courses of ages, and for that end that all, men and women, little ones and strangers might learn that law from that reading, and observe it, certainly that reading had to be done in a language vulgar and known to the women and little ones themselves: otherwise they could not have learned the law from that reading, which yet was the end of this precept. Then if all were bound, from the divine precept, to hear the public reading of the law that from it they might learn the law, it follows that they also could and should read the law privately. For of that of which it is necessary to hear the reading, it is also good to read it, and the reason and end of the precept looks not only to the public reading, but also to the private. For from both can men learn the law of the Lord, and be formed to his fear.

XXII. Finally it is to be noted, that although in this precept there are certain circumstances of place and time peculiar to the ancient people, yet the end of the precept and its substance, no less today looks to Christians, than of old to the Jews. For today we are no less bound to hear and learn the law of Christ written by the Evangelists and Apostles, than they the ancient law consigned in writing by Moses. For if God of old wanted his law to be read to his people, that from that reading it might be rendered familiar to that people, and from it the women and little ones themselves might learn the will of God, who would doubt that the Christian common people ought to be instructed by a similar reading, that it also might learn the will of God, and in the knowledge and fear of him more and more profit?

XXIII. Moreover the Lord in the law not only commends the public reading, but also the private, and that not only to the Persons whom they call Ecclesiastical, as the Levites and Priests, but also to the Laity themselves. For Deuteronomy ch. 17 it is nominally commanded to the king, that he should take care to have transcribed for himself a copy of the divine law, and preserve and read it all the days of his life, that he might learn to fear the Lord his God. But when the reason of this precept is not peculiar to the king, but pertains to any faithful one from the people of God, it is plain that the precept itself pertains to any other from the King. But it is separately commanded to the King, lest anyone think himself excused from the study of the divine law by the magnitude and multitude of the business by which he is detained. For if anyone could with colour pretend such an excuse, certainly the King would be most able, as to whom pertains the care of the whole Republic, and to whom all business is referred.

XXIV. Add that in the sixth chapter of Deuteronomy, this command is proposed to the whole of Israel, and also vehemently urged, that namely, the words of the divine law may be engraved on their hearts, that they may tell them to their sons, that they may speak of them sitting in their house, and walking by the way, lying down and rising up, that they may have them bound as signs to their hands, that they may be always before their eyes, finally that they may inscribe them on the posts of their houses, and on their gates. But how could they have rendered the words of the divine law so familiar to themselves, unless it had been allowed to them to have the law of God with themselves, and to read in it daily? Or who will be able to dream that it ought not to have been read everywhere and by anyone, which individuals are ordered to inscribe on their gates, and on the posts of their houses, and to have bound to their hands and forehead? And that they could have had so great a knowledge of the law, and daily meditated on it with themselves, and discoursed of it among their domestics, unless the law had been handled in their hands in a known and vulgar language? But now who would believe that a lesser knowledge of the Evangelical law is required from Christians, than of old of the Mosaic law from the Jews? Especially when the Apostle writing to the Colossians wants the Word of Christ to dwell in the faithful πλουσίως copiously, with all wisdom, and wishes for them all the riches of the fullness of understanding in the knowledge of the mystery of God the Father and of Christ? (Ch. 2 and 3.)

XXV. Moreover the example is praised and proposed for imitation in the New Testament; of Lois the grandmother of Timothy, and Eunice his mother, who had instructed him

from infancy in the scriptures. For the Apostle testifies in 2 Tim. 3 that he had known the sacred letters from childhood in which he had not been instructed by his father, since he was a Gentile, as we learn from the sixteenth chapter of Acts, but by his mother and grandmother, whose unfeigned faith the Apostle commends in the first chapter of the same epistle. But how will faithful matrons be able, to the example of those pious women, to instruct their children in the sacred letters, if it is not allowed to them to have and read the sacred letters in a language which they understand? Or who ought to be barred from the reading of sacred scripture if it is commended in children themselves?

XXVI. Similarly the Jewish Bereans are praised in Acts 17, who having heard the preaching of Paul, indeed received the Word with all readiness, but yet daily searching the scriptures ἀνακρίνοντες whether these things were so. But how could they so ἀνακρίνειν the scriptures to compare and confer among themselves, if the reading of scripture was not familiar to them, and indeed in a language which they well understood? And will the rest of the faithful people be able to imitate so laudable an example, if the reading of Sacred Scripture is not conceded to them in a known and vulgar language?

XXVII. Nor ought that to be omitted which Peter in 2 Peter 1, addressing the faithful from the circumcision, says that they do well that they take heed to the Prophetic Word, as to a lamp shining in a dark place. For how could they take heed to the writings of the Prophets, unless they read them, and so that they understood them? Stapleton responds that it is taken heed to Sacred Scripture when it is read, but much more and safely, when it is expounded by the voice of the preaching Church. But certainly it is new and unusual to call the preaching of the Ministers of the Gospel the Prophetic Word. Nor is one ever said from the Style of scripture, or of anyone else, sanely and agreeably to the Word of God speaking, to take heed to the Prophetic Word who listens to those things which preachers say, while they expound some text of Scripture. Add that Peter in that place expressly opposes the Prophetic Word to the testimony of the Apostles, and to the living voice of those who preached the Gospel. For before he said, "For we have not followed cunningly devised fables, when we made known to you the power and coming of our Lord Jesus Christ, but were eyewitnesses of his majesty." But afterward he subjoins, "We have also a more sure prophetic word, to which ye do well that ye take heed, as to a lamp shining in a dark place."

XXVIII. It is also worthy of great consideration that in Revelation 1 John thus speaks of it, "Blessed is he who reads, and Blessed are those who hear the words of this Prophecy, and keep those things which are written in it." For if John could declare him Blessed who reads that book, which is doubtless the most obscure of the books of the New Testament, how much more is it allowed to declare them blessed who read the other writings of the Prophets and Apostles? But will this blessedness pertain to the learned only and the rulers of the Church, but will the Christian people be barred from it as unworthy of it? And is it not rather the duty of Pastors to call the people committed to them to the participation of that blessedness with themselves? For who does not see that John, while he declares him blessed who reads the words of that Prophecy, invites any faithful to the reading of it with the hope of enjoying that blessedness.

XXIX. Finally what Christ says in John chapter five, addressing the crowd of the Jews, "Search the scriptures, for in them ye think ye have eternal life, and they are they which testify of me." Stapleton responds that those words are not said to the crowds and people, but to the Pharisees and princes of the people. But in the whole chapter there is no special mention of the Pharisees, but John relates these things as simply said to the Jews, as can be seen by reading. Moreover he Responds that these words do not constitute a general and perpetual precept, but this is said to them by way of permission and indulgence, that namely, because they did not want to believe the Words of Christ, at least they should inspect the old scriptures. Therefore those words do not contain a precept, but partly a permissive indulgence, partly a tacit reprehension, that they believed the Mosaic letters more than the Words of Christ. But these Words of Christ are too clear, that they can be eluded by such Quibbles. For what need was there for Christ to grant the Jews permission to search the Scripture, when they neither sought nor expected that permission from Christ? But since Stapleton wants Christ there to address not the people, but the princes of the people, Do the rulers of the Church also need some permission and indulgence, that they may search the scriptures? And is this not rather their duty prescribed to them by God, to diligently unfold and search the scriptures?

XXX. But how can Stapleton feign that by those Words Christ tacitly reprehends the Jews, that they believed the Mosaic writings more than Christ, when in this chapter he reprehends them on this account, that they did not sufficiently believe Moses? "For if," he says, "ye believed Moses, ye would believe me also: for he wrote of me. But if ye believe not his writings, how shall ye believe my words?" By which words Christ acknowledges that it was just that they should believe the Mosaic letters more than then his simple testimony. And therefore he perpetually sends the Jews back to Moses and the Prophets, "They have," he says, "Moses and the Prophets, let them hear them." And he often proves and confirms his vocation by the testimony of Moses and the Prophets. Not that in reality the authority of Moses and the Prophets was greater than the authority of Christ, but because it was more known and confirmed to the Jews, at least before the Gospel was solemnly preached and confirmed. Whence it is that Peter, in the place just now cited, opposing the Prophetic Word to the preaching of the Apostles, dares to call it more sure, "We have," he says, "a more sure prophetic word."

XXXI. Therefore, the hiding places into which Stapleton tries to induce himself being omitted, it is plain that Christ both addresses the Jews, and simply exhorts them to search the scriptures. But to search the scriptures is not simply to read the scriptures, and much less to mutter in an unknown tongue, but to investigate their mysteries and hidden senses, as Chrysostom notes in his homily on this place. But how will the faithful be able to obey this command of Christ, unless they read the scripture assiduously, and have it in a language known to them?

On the Existence of God

I. As God gave his name to Theology, so he is its principal object. Therefore, one who is undertaking to treat of Theological matters must take his beginning from God himself.

II. But the things which are handed down about God can be reduced to two heads. For they either regard the existence of God, and the question AN SIT (WHETHER HE IS); or the nature and essence of God, and the question QUID SIT (WHAT HE IS). Reason demands that we begin from the former.

III. Therefore, the first theorem of all Theology, on which all religion is built, is this: "That there is a God," that is, an eternal Mind, best, most powerful, and most wise, who is the cause of all things, and on whom all things depend and are governed. According to which the Apostle says, Hebrews 11:6, "He who comes to God must believe that he is."

IV. Moreover, this principle is not of the kind which are had from revelation alone, and the word of God; but it is a matter which all nature inculcates, and almost forces upon our senses. For as the Apostle says, Romans 1:20, "For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead." To which pertains also Job 12:7-9, "But ask the beasts, and they will teach you; the birds of the heavens, and they will tell you; or the bushes of the earth, and they will teach you; and the fish of the sea will declare to you. Who among all these does not know that the hand of the Lord has done this?"

V. From which it has come about that even apart from revelation, by which God made himself known in his word, some knowledge of God has emanated to almost all men. Since indeed there is no nation, or hardly any, which does not have some form of religion, and some worship of divinity. Nor do the terrors and stings of conscience, which draw out even the most wicked and abandoned, who endeavour to shake off all fear of God, unwillingly to his tribunal, and strike them with the horror of divine vengeance, arise from any other source.

VI. It is indeed not to be denied that true and saving knowledge of God is found among very few men; and that the true God was, and still is, unknown to most nations, on which account they are said by the Apostle to be "without God in the world," Ephesians 2:12. But this does not prevent some sense of deity from remaining even among those very nations whom Paul in a certain way charges with Atheism, although involved in many foul errors. An argument of this matter is that very idolatry by which the profane nations polluted themselves, and forsaking the creator, worshipped various creatures, and the very fictions of their own mind. For that sense of divinity must be deeply impressed on men, since man, too prone to pride and puffed up with arrogance, preferred to abase himself below the beasts, and to worship stones and wood, than to acknowledge no God at all.

VII. It is therefore altogether certain that from the contemplation of the world, and of the things which are seen in it, men can come to the knowledge of God; nor did the darkness poured over the human mind by sin prevent the greatest part of men from attaining, by this way, and with nature as guide, some knowledge of deity. But it is asked, of what kind

are those reasons by which, from the consideration of the works of nature, it is shown that there is a God? Whether, namely, they are necessary, or only probable? And whether the existence of God is demonstrable to human reason, or whether it can attain to it only by certain conjectures and probable arguments? But we are of this opinion, with almost all Theologians, both ours and the Papists, that the existence of God is a matter which can be demonstrated, and established by necessary arguments.

VIII. But since there is a twofold demonstration among Logicians, one which shows the effect from the causes, but the other which, on the contrary, shows the cause from the effects, it is manifest that in the former mode of demonstration it cannot be taught that there is a God, since neither for God, nor for his existence, can a cause be adduced in any genus; but it can be demonstrated in the latter mode, namely from effects. For it must not be thought that the arguments by which it is proved that there is a God in some degree leave the matter doubtful, and only persuade, but do not convince.

IX. But this cannot be better shown than by bringing forward examples of arguments of this kind, which of themselves reveal their own evidence and necessity. Therefore, in the way by which we think this can more suitably be done, we will endeavour to deduce from those things which in this visible world are presented to our eyes, by a necessary and evident consequence, that there is a God who produced those things. And we will be content with that as if it were a single demonstration. For to pursue the individual arguments by which it is proved that there is some supreme deity would be a work of infinite labour, and beyond the scope of our undertaking.

X. But that we may gradually make a level road for ourselves to our purpose, and leave nothing to the highest evidence, such indeed as can be demanded in Physical and Metaphysical matters, certain principles must be established, on which the rest may be built as on foundations, and which must often be used in the whole course of our discourse.

XI. First, therefore, it is certain that nothing is made by itself, and that nothing is the cause of itself. For if something made itself, it would plainly be necessary for it to have been before it was, which involves a contradiction. For what is made does not yet exist; for what is made passes from non-being to being. But what makes something already exists, since acting presupposes being.

XII. It is also beyond doubt that nothing depends on itself, but whatever depends, depends on something else. The reason is manifest: for if something depended on itself, it would be both prior and posterior to itself. For what depends is posterior to that on which it depends.

XIII. A third principle no less manifest than the previous ones is that in the order of efficient causes, of which one depends on another, there cannot be an infinite progression; but at last we must come to some first and highest cause. For if an infinite progression were granted in causes, and there were no first cause, all and each of the intermediate causes would be such, and thus would have some cause before them; indeed, there would be no cause which did not have infinite causes superior to itself. But this is impossible: for if before all and each of the causes there were infinite causes, before the whole multitude and

collection of causes there would be infinite causes. For what is before all and each is before the whole multitude of individuals. But it involves a manifest contradiction for there to be infinite causes superior to the whole multitude of causes. For certainly outside the whole multitude of causes, no cause can be found. Otherwise, that multitude would not be whole. Moreover, if by ascending from effects to causes, the first cause could not be reached, by equal reason, by descending from causes to effects, the last effect could never be reached. For the distance is as great from the highest to the lowest as it is from the lowest to the highest. And what is infinite can no more be passed through by ascending than by descending.

XIV. To these principles we add a fourth, which will be of great use to us: namely, that whatever exists either exists of itself and by its own essence, or exists by participation in, and dependence on, something else. The former manner of existing belongs to God alone; the latter, to all creatures. This distinction seems to have been not unknown to the ancient philosophers. For Plato, or whoever was the author of the dialogue entitled Parmenides, brings in Parmenides philosophizing about the One (by which he certainly understands the supreme deity) in this manner: "It seems to me that the One has a most honourable condition. For thus it is: if the One is not, nothing is. This is apparent on many accounts. But this is the principal one. For, whenever anything else exists, it exists as participating in the One and on account of the One." Similar things are found in other places in Plato, and in other philosophers, by which they plainly recognize some supreme nature, which exists of itself, and is the cause of existence to all other things.

XV. These things having been established, let us suppose, if you please, that this whole visible world, and all things which it contains, exist. I ask whether they exist of themselves and by their own essence, or depend on some superior cause as the origin of their being? If you say the former, you say what is manifestly absurd and impossible. For besides the fact that it has already been shown that nothing is or can be the efficient cause of itself, who can persuade himself that this whole machine of the world, and all things which are seen in it, in which so much order, beauty, power, and wisdom shine forth, arose from itself, and depends on no external principle? And if, of the things which are seen in this universe, some are living, others lifeless, and some are endowed with sense, intellect, and reason, but others lack sense and reason, who would be so insane as to affirm that the former, which are more perfect, depend on no external cause, when he dare not affirm it of the latter, which are more imperfect? Certainly if dull and lifeless matter has not the power of existing from itself, much less will life, sense and reason be able to exist, without being produced by some external cause.

XVI. It remains therefore that we affirm the latter – namely, that this whole visible world, and all the things which exist in it, exist not of themselves, but by participation, and depend on some superior cause, which we call God. For either we must admit some eternal and immutable being on which all other things depend, or we will be forced to say that all things which we see have arisen out of nothing without any cause, which is not only absurd, but clearly impossible.

XVII. Thus far we have proceeded by arguments abstract and metaphysical, which greatly exercise the intellect. Let us now, if you please, use arguments more concrete and physical,

drawn from this visible fabric of the world. I ask therefore, whence such beauty and splendour in the heavenly bodies, such constancy and regularity in their motions, such variety and glory in the things of the earth, unless we confess that the most beautiful and perfect mind was the creator and architect of these things? The heavens surely declare the glory of God, and the firmament proclaims the work of his hands. Nor can the wonderful order of the seasons of the year – the unfailing changes of days and nights, the continual and uninterrupted succession of generations, and innumerable other things, be attributed to any other cause than to some most wise and powerful governor of all things.

XVIII. For in contemplating this whole visible world, one cannot but easily observe innumerable marks of the highest wisdom, not only in the structure of the entire universe, but also of every animal, which are so wondrous and stupendous, and in which all proportions are so accurately and exactly observed, and so diligently provided for in all things, that the human mind cannot sufficiently grasp and marvel at such great wisdom. Who therefore, unless entirely stupid and foolish, could ascribe works made with such art and industry, and arranged with such order and harmony, to a cause which is altogether brute and devoid of all wisdom and knowledge?

XIX. Thirdly, that the bodies of which this world consists are not self-existent and unproduced, is manifest from the fact that each has a certain end, and is not for its own sake, but for the sake of something else. For certainly that which is from itself is also for itself, not for the sake of something else; nor can it be referred to an end. For whatever is referred to an end is referred to it by something else on which it depends. But that which is from itself does not depend on anything else, by which it could be referred to an end. Add that every end is prior in intention to the thing of which it is the end, but that which is from itself, as was already said, has nothing prior to it, by which that end could have been intended. But that the individual bodies of the world are not for their own sake, but are referred to an end, is clear even from the fact that they are parts of a certain whole, harmoniously and orderly arranged, namely of the world itself, to whose common good they are referred. For the good of the whole is the end of the individual parts. Nor can anyone deny that this or that body, for example, the earth, the sun, or some planet, is of this or that magnitude, in this or that state, endowed with this or that quality, figure and motion – that, I say, all these things have a certain end, and are thus or not, because the adornment, beauty and advantage of the universe requires it. And therefore it is necessary that the whole harmony and idea of the universe was conceived and intended by someone, by whom all things were constituted and ordered according to it.

XX. Fourthly, that those bodies which constitute this whole universe are not self-existent, but have arisen and been produced by another, is proven by the fact that each has a certain and determinate perfection, and a nature diverse from one another. For that distinction of theirs, and that determination, must by all means be referred to an efficient cause, which bestowed such a nature on each, and that perfection and not another. For if all were from themselves, they would be one and the same. For whence would it be that they have a diverse nature, and moreover lack every bound and limit of perfection? For what has a determinate and limited essence must necessarily have been thus limited by some cause; but what is from itself has no cause which could have set limits and bounds to it, but drew

its being at the very fountain, or rather is the very fountain of being – it must necessarily contain in itself all entity and perfection.

XXI. But now if the bodies of which this universe consists are produced beings, and have a cause and origin of themselves, the universe itself also must necessarily be produced. For what consists of produced parts cannot be unproduced.

XXII. And certainly if this world, and the parts of which it consists, were something from itself, and which did not have a cause of itself, it would also be eternal, and lack a beginning of duration. For what is, and yet was never produced, must necessarily have always been. For what is, and at some time was not, must necessarily have been produced. For what passes from non-being to being is certainly said to be produced; but it cannot happen that this corporeal and visible world was from eternity. For this world is in perpetual motion, and its duration is measured by time. But motion and time, which follows motion, cannot be from eternity, which can be demonstrated in many ways.

XXIII. For first, if the motion which appears, for example, in the sun, is said to be from eternity, it will be necessary for the sun to have been from eternity, either in some sign of the Zodiac, or in all the signs of the Zodiac. But neither can be said without manifest contradiction. For if the sun was from eternity in some sign of the Zodiac, say in Aries, but not likewise in the others, it follows from this that the sun only arrived at Taurus and Gemini in time. And thus, when motion is supposed to have been from eternity, through all eternity it will have traversed only one or another sign, that is, a finite space in infinite time. For a motion which is from eternity precedes by an infinite time whatever is done in time. And accordingly, the sun, by that same motion by which it traverses one sign within a month, could not in infinite time traverse more than one or another sign. But if it is said that the sun was from eternity in all the signs of the Zodiac, it will be necessary for the sun to have been simultaneously in all the signs of the Zodiac. For if it was from eternity both in Aries and in Cancer, and in Libra and in Capricorn, it was not in Aries before Cancer, and in Libra before Capricorn. For what is from eternity has nothing before it. And accordingly, since it was not in one before another, it must necessarily have been in all simultaneously. But it involves a contradiction for the sun to move through the Zodiac, and yet to be simultaneously in all the signs of the Zodiac. For for the sun to move through the Zodiac is to leave one sign and proceed to another; besides the fact that thus the sun would have been opposite to and distant from itself.

XXIV. Moreover, if the motions which are observed in the world were from eternity, and have no beginning of themselves, it is necessary that hitherto there have been infinite generations of men and other animals, and that in those generations there be given a progression to infinity. But this is impossible. For if in the generations of men a progression to infinity were granted, there would be no first man from whom the rest were begotten, but absolutely all men, none excepted, would be begotten by man. But it cannot happen that absolutely all men, none excepted, are begotten by man. For thus the whole and complete multitude of men would have been begotten by man, which cannot be said without contradiction. For if the whole multitude of men was begotten by man, it is necessary that he by whom it is said to have been begotten is either outside the multitude, or contained in that multitude. The former cannot be said. For it cannot happen that the

entire multitude of men, not even one excepted, was begotten by some man who is not included in it, since outside the whole multitude of men, no man is found. Nor can it be said either that the whole multitude of men was begotten by someone who is part of that multitude. For if it were so, that man who would be said to have begotten the rest would also have begotten himself. For he who begot the whole multitude of men begot each individual contained in it, of whom he is one. But nothing begets itself, nor is the cause of itself.

XXV. Moreover, there is no man begotten by man before whom another man did not exist. Therefore, if absolutely all men were begotten by men, before all men whatsoever certain men existed, and thus before there was any man, there was a man, which is manifestly contradictory. Indeed, if all men are begotten by men to infinity, there was never any man who was not posterior to infinite other preexisting men, and thus there were infinite men before there were any men. Add that if before us there had been infinite generations, the order of generation could not have come down to us; for the infinite cannot be passed through.

XXVI. But just as those motions which are observed in the world cannot be from eternity, so neither can time be eternal. For if time is eternal, from eternity there is an alternation of day and night. But it is impossible for the alternation of day and night to have been from eternity. For if the alternation of day and night was from eternity, both night and day were from eternity. For if either night or day was not from eternity, that alternation only began in time. But it is repugnant for both, namely day and night, to have been from eternity. For of those things which are from eternity, one is not before another. For what has something before it is not from eternity. And accordingly, things which are from eternity are simultaneous. But it is clearly necessary that either night preceded day, or day preceded night, nor is it possible for day and night to be simultaneous, since night is the privation of day. But for a disposition and privation to be in the same subject simultaneously involves a contradiction. In a word, if day and night are supposed to have been from eternity, it is necessary that either day and night existed simultaneously, that is, simultaneously and in the same respect it was day and not-day, or that in those things which are said to be eternal, one precedes the other – both of which involve an open contradiction.

XXVII. Moreover, if time is eternal, there was no first day. For if there is some first day, time has a beginning, and thus is not eternal. But it is necessary that there be some first day. For if there was no first day, every day was preceded by a day, and before all and each day, some day existed; and thus there was a day before there was a day. Moreover, if time is from eternity, it is necessary that hitherto there have been infinite hours, infinite days, infinite centuries, indeed also infinite myriads of centuries. I ask therefore, is the number of days hitherto elapsed equal to the number of hours, or less than it? If it is said to be equal, it will follow from this that the part is equal to the whole, and the whole is not greater than its part. For since in each day there are twenty-four hours, the number of days is only a twenty-fourth part of the number of hours, and necessarily twenty-four times more hours than days have elapsed. But if it is said that the number of days is less than the number of hours, first this absurdity will follow, that there is given an infinite number which yet is only a twenty-fourth part of a greater number, and which is contained in another number

twenty-four times, indeed more than a hundred thousand times, and a thousand times, and yet more times, if one wishes to compare not the number of days with the number of hours, but the number of centuries with the number of minutes, and myriads of centuries with tenths of minutes. Certainly it cannot be conceived how that number is infinite, which is contained so many times in a greater number, and which is such a small part of it. For a number which is contained in another is bounded and limited by that greater containing number, and thus is not infinite, since it does not lack every bound and limit.

XXVIII. Moreover, since the number of days is twenty-four times less than the number of hours, I ask again, does the number of hours equalling and not exceeding the number of days constitute a finite or an infinite time? It cannot be said to constitute a finite time; for since the number of days is supposed to be infinite, the number of hours equal to it is also infinite. But infinite hours cannot constitute a finite time. Nor can it be said either that that number of hours, which equals and does not exceed the number of days, makes an infinite and eternal time. For it is bounded on both sides, namely by today, and on the other side, by a time twenty-three times longer, which preceded. And certainly since that time, which the number of hours equal to the number of days constitutes, is only a twenty-fourth part of the whole time past, it cannot be called infinite and eternal without manifest contradiction. For beginning from today, no part of past time is infinite, since any such part of past time is terminated by the preceding and subsequent time. But the infinite is what lacks limits; but what has limits cannot be infinite. Nor is the notion of eternity less incompatible with what is only a certain part of past time. For the eternal is not what has another time before it; but a part of past time of this kind has another time before it, namely all that which is outside that part. Since therefore any assigned part of time, such as a twentieth, hundredth or thousandth, cannot be eternal and infinite, the whole time cannot be eternal and infinite. For what consists of finite and determinate parts cannot be infinite.

XXIX. To these add that all past time was once future, and was as much future as it is past. Therefore, if now past time is infinite, once there was an infinite future. But the end of an infinite future time can never be reached. Therefore the end of past time could never have been reached. And if hereafter so much time will never pass away, that it can be said that an infinite time has already passed, certainly neither could so much have passed before, that there is an infinite past, infinity being equally opposed in both cases. But if up to today an infinite time has passed, today was once infinitely distant. How then could it be reached? Nor does this argument of a most learned man carry little weight – namely, either no day is from eternity, or every day is from eternity, or some day is from eternity and some is not from eternity. For a fourth cannot be imagined. But if the first is true, time is not from eternity; for that is not from eternity of which no part existed from eternity. The second cannot be true, experience being opposed to it. Nor also the third. For if some day was from eternity, its duration was infinite, nor does it have a beginning; but the duration of any day whatsoever is limited to twenty-four hours. From which it is clear that time could not flow from eternity, but as Scripture says, it is God "who made the ages," Hebrews 1.

XXX. Since therefore neither motion nor time could be from eternity, but necessarily have some beginning of themselves, it is manifest that the world also, which as we have said is in

perpetual motion, and whose duration is measured by time, could not be from eternity either, but has some beginning of itself; and accordingly it was made and produced by another. But who can be thought the author of so great a work, except a cause which is not only most powerful, but also best and most wise, and thus except some supreme and eternal mind, which is signified by all with the name of God?

XXXI. But that the matter may be made still more manifest, and all occasion for doubting may be removed, since we have shown that the world was made, and has a cause of its existence, we ask, what is that cause to which the world owes its origin? Certainly, as far as we can conceive, three causes of it can be imagined and assigned in all. For either it must be said that it arose by chance, and from some fortuitous concourse of the particles of matter; or that it indeed has a necessary cause, but one which is brute and ignorant of itself, which is called by the name of nature; or finally, as we have said, that the world is the work of some intelligent cause, at once best and most powerful.

XXXII. The first is attributed to Democritus and the Epicureans, who are said to have thought that the world arose from some fortuitous and rash concourse of atoms. But this opinion approaches madness. For constancy, order, and harmony cannot be from chance; but things which happen and arise by chance are uncertain and disordered, and have nothing constant and always like themselves. But nothing can be imagined more ordered and composed than this frame of the universe. And in the individual works of nature also the highest order and constancy can easily be observed.

XXXIII. And certainly who is there who, while contemplating some palace splendidly and artfully constructed, or some clock skilfully made, which by various wheels and motions composed among themselves marks and measures the hours, days, and phases of the moon, would induce himself to think that those things were made by chance, and arose from pieces of wood and stone and particles of brass and steel rashly heaped together? But what palace can be devised constructed with greater art and symmetry, and where all proportions are better observed, than this very universe which is presented to our eyes? Or what machine is there in which more motions, and more wonderful ones, and more constant ones in the highest variety, can be observed?

XXXIV. Nor can so great a work be ascribed to a brute cause, and one which acts from necessity, without reason and intelligence. For first, among the things which are seen in the world, there are many which are not only endowed with sense and knowledge, such as the beasts, but also with reason and intellect, such as men; but that which knows and understands necessarily has some knowing and understanding cause. For an effect cannot be more perfect than its first and principal cause; nor can there be anything of perfection in the effect which is not in the cause, if not formally, at least in some more eminent way, as was demonstrated before. But now to know is simply and absolutely more perfect than not to know, to understand than not to understand. Therefore it is necessary that what is the first and principal cause of an intelligent thing should not be devoid of intelligence; otherwise the cause would be less perfect than the effect. And this is the demonstration which the Psalmist uses in Psalm 94, when he refutes atheistic and profane men: "Understand, you stupid among the people! Fools, when will you be wise? Does he who

fashioned the ear not hear? Does he who formed the eye not see? Does he who disciplines nations not punish? Does he who teaches mankind lack knowledge?"

XXXV. Moreover, we see that nothing in the world was made rashly, and that nature in all things acts for a certain end, and in the way that is fitting to attain that which is best. Thus there is none of those who investigate the works of nature who does not easily acknowledge that the daily and annual motion of the sun is so moderated as it is, so that by means of the alternation of days and nights, and of the various seasons of the year, the different species of things in nature can be generated and preserved. But on earth all things are arranged for the use and advantage of animals, and especially in animals those so many and so various organs are made for certain uses, and each has its own end, one to serve for nutrition, another for generation, another for the functions of the senses – and so on for the rest, which are almost innumerable. But now it is necessary that what acts for an end, and tends to some end, either knows that end, or, if it does not know the end, is directed by another to whom that end was proposed, as an arrow is directed to the target by the archer. Therefore that nature which is supposed to be the cause of things necessarily either is something intelligent, and thus God himself, or is directed by some supreme intelligence, which will certainly be God.

XXXVI. Moreover, if anyone considers both the whole system of this world and the arrangement of those bodies of which it consists, and their various motions and flexures, and the individual things which are observed in it – the plants, I say, and animals and other things which we can see and handle – he will not be able to deny that in all these things shine forth infinite marks of the highest wisdom, and that not only the structure of the whole universe, but of any animal is so wondrous and stupendous, and in it all proportions are so accurately and exactly observed, and all things are so diligently provided for, that the human mind cannot sufficiently grasp and marvel at such great wisdom. Who therefore, unless entirely stupid and foolish, could refer works made with such art and industry, and arranged with such order and harmony, to a cause which is altogether brute and devoid of all wisdom and knowledge?

XXXVII. But to press still more those impious ones who are unwilling to acknowledge any other cause of things than some brute nature, we ask them what they understand by the name of nature. For commonly by nature, which is opposed to chance and to those things which act from counsel and deliberation, is understood the order and series of causes of which this universe consists, according to which order we see various generations taking place on earth, and other changes in the elementary region. For thus, when a plant generates another plant, and an animal another similar animal, we say it is the work of nature; and similarly, when the snows cover the earth in winter, but in summer the earth gapes with heat, we refer those things to nature. But here recourse is had in vain to that nature. For that nature, as is clear from what has been said, is nothing other than the order of agents and patients of which this universe consists. But here the author of this order is sought, and what is it that produced the heaven, the sun and the earth, and disposed them in the order we see. What therefore is the nature which is the cause of this nature which now operates?

XXXVIII. Some impious men think that this nature, which is nothing other than the system of the world, arose from the various situation, figure and arrangement of the parts of matter, which being agitated by a certain measure of motion, spontaneously disposed themselves into this order which is now observed in the world, and that no other cause of things or other principle beyond this is to be sought. But by the same arguments by which we proved that the principal parts of the world, namely the earth, sun and planets, do not exist of themselves, but have some cause and origin of themselves, we can also prove that those particles of matter do not exist of themselves either, but have their being from another. For that which is from itself cannot have any limits of perfection, as was shown before; but matter and its particles are most imperfect beings. Moreover, what is from itself is also for itself; but the parts of matter are not for themselves, but for something else, namely for the bodies which they compose and of which they are parts.

XXXIX. Moreover, whence is that division of matter, and the various magnitudes and figures in its parts? It is altogether necessary that there be some agent which so divided matter, and impressed various figures on its parts. For if all had their quantity and figure from themselves, there would be no reason for diversity among them. Nor could their figure be varied and changed. And accordingly matter would not be, as nevertheless it is, divisible to infinity.

XL. But especially, since we have demonstrated that motion and time cannot be from eternity, whatever may be the case concerning matter itself, it is necessary that that motion of the parts of matter, from which the whole disposition of things is supposed to have arisen, has some beginning of itself; and accordingly matter cannot have that motion from itself, but that motion necessarily is from an extrinsic principle. For not granting that, matter would be eternal and exist from itself, the contrary of which was proved before; nevertheless after eternal rest it could not be moved, unless some external mover impressed that motion on it. But who is that mover who first began to move and agitate sluggish matter, and so aptly measured its motion that from it would arise the system of the world? Here certainly it will be necessary to have recourse to some supreme mind, that is, to God.

XLI. To these add that it cannot fall into the mind of a sane man that certain corpuscles variously tossed about, without any proposed end, and without any directing mover, could have composed so admirable a structure of the universe, where such great order, such great wisdom, such great agreement and harmony of all the parts, which remains constant and invariable through so many ages, can be perceived by anyone not entirely blind. Indeed, if we consider the human body alone, I do not think there is anyone so stupid or mad who could persuade himself that so wondrous a fabric, in which so many organs can be counted, so artfully and elegantly made, so aptly disposed, serving for such various and multiple uses – a fabric, I say, of this kind has no other cause than the blind tossing of the particles of matter.

XLII. Therefore we conclude that this whole universe, and the individual things which are observed in it, do not exist of themselves but have some cause of themselves; but that cause cannot be chance and fortune, nor even some blind and self-ignorant nature, but necessarily is an eternal mind, best, most powerful, and most wise, which we call God. And

thus we think that we have evidently demonstrated what we proposed – namely, that God exists.

On the Simplicity of God

I. We have already shown that God exists beyond any doubt. Next, we must consider the other question, namely, what God is, and with what modesty and sobriety we should inquire into the nature of God itself.

II. Here, above all, we must confess our weakness and ignorance. For it should not be thought that the human mind, as long as it dwells in this mortal body, can comprehend what God is in Himself. The Apostle teaches this in 1 Corinthians 13 when he says, "Now we see through a glass, darkly." And in 1 John 3, presenting as a privilege of future life that we shall then see God as He is. It is clear evidence that God, as He truly is, is no longer known to us. And certainly, if even the essences of flies and ants cannot be perceived by us, as the more modest philosophers acknowledge, how much less can we estimate by our knowledge what the nature and essence of God are.

III. Nevertheless, it should not be denied that we can form certain concepts that represent the divine nature to some extent, according to the measure of our understanding: and many things are attributed to God by us, and many things are enunciated concerning God which truly apply to Him, although they do not at all reach His immense perfection. And these are what are called divine attributes, by which the essence of God is somewhat shadowed, although very imperfectly and obscurely.

IV. Furthermore, these attributes are of two kinds. For something is either affirmed of God through them, or something is denied of God. Indeed, we can strive for knowledge of the divine nature in two ways. First, by attributing to Him all the perfections that are seen in created things. For since He is the first being and the first cause of all, it is necessary that whatever perfection is found in creatures should be found in Him in a more eminent manner. Secondly, by denying of God whatever is imperfect or entails any imperfection in creatures. For whatever is imperfect in created things must be removed from God.

V. It is easier, therefore, to say what God is not than to explain and grasp what He is. Therefore, as we investigate the divine nature, we must briefly run through and consider such divine attributes—not all and each, but certain principal ones that are more difficult or have greater use in theology.

VI. The first attribute by which the divine nature is in some way declared is God's Simplicity. By simplicity here, we do not mean a moral sense, but a physical and metaphysical one, as opposed to what is mixed and composite. For when simplicity is attributed to God, all composition is thereby removed from Him.

VII. Moreover, various kinds of composition are observed in created things. The first and most perceptible of these is that which is seen in every body, consisting of extended parts, one of which is outside the other, and therefore can be divided and separated from each other. The second kind of composition to be considered here is that of subject and accident; just as whiteness consists in a body that sustains whiteness. And as in man, besides human nature, there are various accidents, such as virtue and vice, knowledge and

ignorance, from which man is variously designated as learned or ignorant, vicious or virtuous.

VIII. Furthermore, there are certain more abstract and metaphysical kinds of composition that should be considered here. For in all created things, essence can be distinguished from existence—there is one thing that is essence and another that is existence. For by essence we mean that without which a thing cannot be conceived, and by which each thing is defined. Thus, the rational animal is the essence of man, because you cannot conceive of a man without conceiving of a rational animal; and this is the definition of man. By existence, however, we mean that by which a thing actually exists in nature. Now these two are entirely distinct in created things. For existence is not of their essence. For they can exist and not exist. And you can conceive of their essence even if you do not think of their existence; indeed, even if you think and make them not exist. For example, in winter, when there is no rose, the nature of the rose is contemplated. And so all created things can be said to be composed of essence and existence.

IX. There is also another kind of composition common to all created things. For in their essence there are certain gradations. For there are some things that agree with each other, and some that differ from each other. That by which they agree is called genus, and that by which they differ is called difference. Therefore, all created and finite things can be said to be composed of genus and difference.

X. Having explained these things, the question arises whether such simplicity as excludes all such compositions belongs to God. And on this point there is common agreement among Christian scholars. But each of these must be distinctly shown. First, it is asked whether that composition mentioned in the first place applies to God—whether God is extended in the manner of bodies and has parts outside parts, which is the same as asking whether God is corporeal or not. Many ancient philosophers, such as Anaximenes, Diogenes Apollinaris, who thought God to be airy, and Xenocrates, who imagined God with a celestial body, and Epicurus, who attributed to God a body similar to human, considered God to be corporeal.

XI. However, among the Jews, the Sadducees, believing there is no spirit, yet not denying God, seem altogether to have thought that God is not a spirit but a body. Nor have heretics been lacking among Christians who thought God to be corporeal. Such were the Anthropomorphites, who attributed human-like members to God, and once greatly troubled the Church. Indeed, Tertullian himself expressly affirms in his work Against Praxeas that God is corporeal, so it is not surprising that he also considered the soul to be a body. Nevertheless, Augustine, in his work against heresies (Book 86), excuses Tertullian somewhat in this regard, as if he intended to affirm simply that God is something real and subsisting.

XII. But whatever he and others may have thought, it is certain both from Scripture and from right reason that God is entirely incorporeal. First, for Scripture distinctly calls God a spirit (John 4). For Christ says, "God is spirit." Now, spirit and body are opposed to each other. Secondly, Scripture teaches that God is everywhere and fills all things (Psalm 139). "Where shall I go from your Spirit? Or where shall I flee from your presence?" (Jeremiah

23). But if God were a body and extended, He could not be everywhere and fill all things without there being two bodies together, and there would be penetration of dimensions, which is absurd and impossible. And finally, Scripture clearly indicates that God is not a body, by denying that any likeness of a body can be made that is similar to God (Isaiah 40). "To whom then will you liken God, or what likeness compare with him?" (Acts 17). "We ought not to think that the divine being is like gold or silver or stone, an image formed by the art and imagination of man."

XIII. The Anthropomorphites indeed based their error on the authority of Scripture, which says that man was made in the image and likeness of God, from which they inferred that God has members similar to humans. However, the image of God in man does not consist in the arrangement and conformation of limbs, but rather in the spiritual faculties of the soul—namely, intellect and will—and furthermore in the various gifts with which the soul is adorned by the grace of God. The fact that Scripture attributes human members to God in various places, such as ears, eyes, hands, and feet, is to be understood metaphorically. Ears and eyes, for example, are attributed to God to signify that nothing is hidden from Him, and all our words and deeds are thoroughly known and seen by Him. For ears and eyes are instruments of sight and hearing, by which we perceive what is done and said. Similarly, because hands are instruments of our actions, the hand of God signifies His power and that strength by which He accomplishes things. And so it is with the rest.

XIV. Besides the testimonies of Sacred Scripture, there are also arguments from philosophers to prove that God is incorporeal. First, as Aristotle demonstrates, God is the prime mover who moves all things while Himself remaining immovable. But no body moves unless it is moved by something else, as is clear by induction. Therefore, God cannot be a body. Furthermore, among things produced by God are immaterial substances, such as angels and the human soul, which are far superior to bodies. But God is something far more excellent and noble than any things produced by Him. Therefore, He must be incorporeal and immaterial to a much greater extent. Lastly, what is corporeal contains within itself something that is not completely perfect—namely, its individual parts from which it is composed, each of which is something less and less perfect than the whole itself. But since God is everywhere the first being and from Himself, nothing can be in Him that is not entirely perfect. For no reason can be given why something perfect would be lacking in that which exists from itself. Therefore, God cannot be a body.

XV. The second composition we mentioned is that of subject and accident, concerning which the question is whether there are certain accidents in God distinct from His essence. This, theologians unanimously deny, and not without the highest reason. For since God is the first being and the first cause, it is necessary that He is entirely independent. Therefore, in Him there is nothing that depends on another. But every accident depends on another, namely, on its subject. Therefore, there is no accident in God. Moreover, whatever has an accident besides its essence thereby shows that its essence is not completely perfect. For if the perfection of the essence of something were complete, it could receive no additional perfection outside of its essence. If indeed it has from itself all perfection, no perfection can be added to it. But God has His essence completely perfect. Therefore, He is incapable of any accident. And, to put it briefly, every composition of subject and accident indicates

imperfection, both of the subject, which borrows additional perfection from the accident, and of the accident itself, which is always shown to be imperfect because its existence always depends on the subject. But in God there is nothing imperfect, and therefore He is free from such composition.

XVI. But you may ask, are not many accidents attributed to God, such as wisdom, justice, goodness, mercy, and similar attributes, from which He is called wise, just, merciful, and good? I respond that all these are not said of God in the same way as they are of us. For those names signify certain accidents in created things, but in God they denote His very essence, which due to its all-encompassing perfection and various operations, assumes various names. Because such perfection cannot be signified by a single name, nor grasped by a single concept.

XVII. The third composition that we noted is that of essence and existence. For these two, as we have said, are entirely distinct in created things. In them, there is one notion of essence and another of existence. Indeed, the whole essence of created things can be conceived without existence, and existence does not enter into their definition. This is because they can both be and not be, and there is no created thing for which non-existence is repugnant. Therefore, concerning them, existence is something contingent, not necessary, and something accidental, not essential. But in God, it is otherwise. For His essence cannot be conceived without existence, and it is plainly contradictory to conceive of God as not existing. Nor can the essence of God be mentally abstracted and separated from His existence any more than the essence of a human can be separated from its being an animal or rational. For although in God there is no before and after in the way we conceive it, yet, according to our way of understanding, the first and most essential attribute of God is that He is the first being and necessary—that is, that He first and necessarily exists. And it is entirely of God's essence to be and to exist.

XVIII. Therefore, God is called by Plato αὐτὸ ὄν (being itself), which today's philosophers call "being through essence," that is, that which exists by the power of its own essence, and whose essence and nature it is to exist perpetually. And God Himself teaches this in the third chapter of Exodus, when He calls Himself "He who is," saying to Moses, "I am who I am." By this name, He signifies that being belongs to Him in a far different way than to the things created by Him. For to exist, as I have said, is something contingent with respect to creatures, but necessary with respect to God. For creatures, it is accidental, but for God, it is essential. The being of creatures is participated and borrowed, but for God, being is proper to Him, and belongs to Him primarily and through Himself. And this is also the force of that name Jehovah, which is most proper to God. For it comes from "havah," to be, as if to say "He Himself is," that which is, and τὸ ὑπάρχον (that which exists). John in the Apocalypse explains this by that periphrasis ὁ ὢν καὶ ὁ ἦν καὶ ὁ ἐρχόμενος, "who is, who was, and who is to come." And so, since God's existence is of the nature of His essence, and one cannot be distinguished from the other as if it were something else, but the concept of one enters into the concept of the other, God cannot be said in any way to be composed of essence and existence, and He is entirely free from this composition.

XIX. Nor does the fourth composition that we mentioned, namely, of nature and subsistence, or that which constitutes a person and a suppositum, apply to God Himself.

We have shown that these two are distinct in created things. For in them, nature and essence are one thing, and that which has a nature is another. Just as Peter and humanity which is in Peter are distinct. And this is because in addition to humanity, there is in Peter something that constitutes the person of Peter, namely, subsistence, which (as has been proven above) is really distinct from nature. And in Peter there is also a singular difference, which restricts and confines human nature in Peter to Peter, which otherwise is common to many. Therefore, in concrete and abstract nouns for created things, not the same thing is meant at all. For Peter is not his humanity. Nor is the humanity of Peter Peter himself. Just as Gabriel is not the nature of an angel, nor is the nature Gabriel himself.

XX. But that distinction has no place in God. For in God's divine nature, nothing is added which is different from it. For the divine nature is something singular, which cannot be multiplied. Therefore, it has no need of any difference that would make it proper to God, just as Peter's humanity is made proper by a certain singular difference. Nor is there in God any subsistence really distinct from His essence. But the divine persons and the divine essence are the same. Otherwise, it would not be a trinity but a kind of quaternity in God, namely, the divine nature and three persons, or subsistences. And this also demands divine perfection. For since nothing is lacking in the divine essence, but it is simply and absolutely perfect, and includes all perfection in its concept, nothing else is needed to subsist in it, nor can anything be added to it.

XXI. Therefore, with abstract and concrete nouns, one and the same thing is plainly signified in God. For God is His essence, and the essence of God is God Himself. A man is not humanity, nor is humanity the man himself. But deity is God, and God is deity. Similarly, any divine attribute can rightly and truly be affirmed of God, whether in the abstract or concrete. Indeed, God is not only good, but He is goodness itself; not only just, but He is justice itself. This manner of speaking is confirmed by the authority of Scripture. For the Son of God is frequently called Wisdom in the Scriptures. And He is not only called the true God, but He is truth itself; not only the living God, but He is life itself, as in John 14:6 where He says, "I am the way, and the truth, and the life." Therefore, the sentiment of Gilbert of Poitiers, Bishop of Poitiers in Bernard's time, has been rightly embraced in schools, who taught that abstract and concrete nouns do not signify the same thing in God, such as the words "God" and "deity," "Person" and "nature." And thus, in this respect also, God is altogether simple and devoid of composition.

XXII. Nor can the composition we spoke of earlier, namely, that of genus and difference, be attributed to God. For God is above every genus and is not included within any category of things. Genus is said to be what is common to many things and is predicated in the same way of many things. But nothing is properly common to creatures and God, nor is predicated in the same way of creatures and God. For if something were common to God and creatures, it would be nothing other than substance. And yet, the nature of God is more distinct from created substances than created substance is from accidents. Now, created substance is not in the same genus as accident. Therefore, much less is God in the same genus as created substances.

XXIII. Furthermore, since God does not have a genus, He cannot properly have a difference either. For difference is said to be that which contracts a genus common to

several things to a particular species. And thus, in the divine nature, certain grades cannot be distinguished, nor is it composed of various grades. Instead, it is a single simple essence that differs from all others in itself.

XXIV. There remains one more type of metaphysical composition, namely, that of actuality and potentiality. Act here is said to be whatever perfects, determines, and constitutes a thing, and in one word, any perfection is an act. But potentiality is said to be that according to which a thing is capable of being perfected and determined, and in itself capable of receiving or undergoing something. Therefore, all created things can be said to be composed of act and potentiality. For in all of them, there is something that perfects and something that is perfected. And besides the perfections that are in them in act, there is nothing that they cannot receive something else, nor are they capable of any change.

XXV. But God is also immune from this composition. For in God, there is no potentiality, namely, passive potentiality as we understand it. Indeed, God is whatever He can be: nor can anything happen to Him or be received from Him, nor can anything be taken away from Him, since He is the first being entirely independent, and He has no cause that can act on Him. And this is what schools mean when they say that God is pure act, that is, He has no mixed potentiality. For in God, there is nothing that needs to be perfected by another or receives perfection from another. Indeed, God is wholly perfect, to whom nothing can ever be added, and from whom nothing can be taken away.

XXVI. Furthermore, from these considerations, it is clear that God is the most simple, and there is absolutely no composition in Him, since we have removed every type of composition. And it is confirmed by the fact that God is the first being, and therefore the first one. For being and unity are convertible. But perfect unity excludes composition. For what is composite is in some way not one but many, since it consists of many things. Moreover, the first being has nothing prior to itself. But whatever is composite is posterior to its composing parts and depends on them. And finally, things that are different do not agree in one unless they are united by some cause. But God has no cause.

XXVII. Hence, it is also clear how true that axiom is, which is common in schools, namely, whatever is in God is God Himself. For this follows from the absolute simplicity of God. For if something were in God that God is not, then necessarily the divine nature would not be altogether simple, but there would be certain distinctions within it, one of which would not be another, and therefore God would be in some way composite.

XXVIII. From this, it also follows that all the attributes of God are one among themselves and with the divine essence, and they are distinguished not in reality but only according to our way of understanding. For since the divine essence is infinite and infinitely perfect, its entire perfection cannot be grasped all at once by us and exhausted in one concept. Therefore, we are forced to divide it into various concepts, each of which corresponds to the same thing, which, according to various respects and operations by which one thing suffices in itself, is considered in different ways.

On the Perfection and Infinitude of God

I. In the latest theses we treated of the divine simplicity, which has a necessary connection with the supreme and absolute perfection of God. For indeed in corporeal things, those which are simpler are more imperfect. Thus the elements are more imperfect than compounds, and animals are more perfect than plants. Nor is there any created thing which for its perfection does not require some composition, and which at least does not need to be perfected by certain accidents. But supreme perfection requires absolute simplicity. God is most simple, because most perfect. Therefore, after having treated of the simplicity of God, reason demands that we now treat of his perfection.

II. That is called perfect to which nothing is lacking. But perfection often designates any excellence whatsoever. But something is called perfect in two ways: either absolutely, or in a certain respect.

III. In a certain respect, that is perfect to which nothing is lacking, not simply, but in its own genus, that is, which has all the perfection congruent and due to its nature. Thus a perfect horse is one to which nothing is lacking which pertains to the equine nature, and a perfect plant which has all the perfection fitting for a plant, although, speaking absolutely, there are many perfections which a horse or plant said to be perfect does not have.

IV. But simply perfect is that to which nothing at all is lacking, and which has every possible excellence. Such perfection belongs to no creature, but is the proper attribute of the divine nature. For every creature has a certain and determinate perfection – this one has one, that one has another; but God contains in himself whatever perfection can be had, nor can any excellence be conceived of which the divine nature is devoid.

V. But this supreme perfection of the divine nature is gathered from two things: 1. From the fact that God is the cause of all things. 2. From the fact that God has no cause, but is through himself and from himself.

VI. For it is most certain that in an effect there can be no perfection which is not somehow in the cause. Since therefore God is the first cause of all things, there can be nothing of perfection in anything which is not found in God. And Scripture indicates this, when noting some perfection in things made by God, it argues from this that God has such perfection much more. As in Psalm 94, the Prophet says, "He who planted the ear, does he not hear? He who formed the eye, does he not see?" And in Isaiah 66, "Shall I who cause others to give birth not give birth myself, says the Lord? Shall I who grant procreation to others be barren?"

VII. Therefore it must be held tightly, and as a firm and certain axiom, that absolutely no excellence and perfection is found in any creature which is not in God in at least some way. But for a fuller understanding of this matter, it should be noted that there are two kinds of perfections. For there are certain perfections which are simply such, that is, which, speaking absolutely, it is better to have than not to have, and which exclude no greater

perfection. These the Scholastics call perfections simply simple. And perfections of this kind are life, intellect, freedom of will. For speaking absolutely, it is better to live than not to live, to understand than not to understand, and to be endowed with free will than not to be endowed. Nor is there any perfection, however great, which cannot consist with life, intellect and free will.

VIII. But besides, there are certain other perfections called not simply, but in a certain respect. But these are those which indeed in their genus express some perfection, but which nevertheless is necessarily conjoined with imperfection, nor can be separated from it as long as it retains its own nature. And therefore there are certain greater perfections which cannot consist with a perfection of that kind. And accordingly, speaking simply and absolutely, it is better not to have such a perfection than to have it. Of this kind is the sensitive and vegetative soul. For although in its genus it is a certain perfection to be vegetative and sensitive, nevertheless those perfections connote a certain imperfection, and there is a certain greater perfection which cannot consist with them, as for example, the perfection of an angelic nature. And therefore, speaking simply and absolutely, it is better not to be sensitive than to be sensitive, not to be vegetative than to be vegetative.

IX. Secondly, it should be noted that a perfection can be in something and be contained in two ways: namely, as the schools teach, either formally and properly, or virtually or eminently. That has a perfection formally to which that perfection belongs according to its whole nature and essence, so that it can be denominated from it. Thus fire has heat formally, water has cold formally, because heat and cold properly and according to their whole nature inhere in water and fire, so that fire can properly and without any figure be denominated hot, and water cold.

X. But to have a perfection eminently and virtually is to have in oneself something more perfect, and which contains the whole power of that perfection which is said to be had eminently –and this, either because it can produce that perfection, or because without it, it can accomplish whatever that accomplishes, excluding all imperfection. Thus, according to the mind of the Peripatetics, the Sun does not have heat formally, and is not properly hot; but nevertheless it has heat virtually or eminently, because it can produce heat, and accomplish whatever fire, which has heat, accomplishes. Thus sight and hearing are not formally in angels, for they do not have a sensitive nature; but nevertheless they have those senses virtually and eminently, because they have through their intellect in a more noble way the knowledge which man has by means of those senses.

XI. These things having been thus noted, we say that those perfections of creatures which we have called in a certain respect are indeed not properly and formally in God; nevertheless, God has all of them virtually and eminently.

XII. That they are not properly and formally in God is manifest per se. For, as has been said, they note and carry with them a certain imperfection. But in God there is no imperfection. Moreover, those perfections cannot co-exist in all the same subject. For one and the same thing cannot simultaneously have a human, equine, and bovine nature – and be simultaneously dry and humid, hot and cold. But those things necessarily constitute diverse things, and require diverse subjects. And finally, if all those things were formally in

God, they could be said and affirmed of him. Which nevertheless no one does not see to be false.

XIII. But although those perfections are not in God according to their proper notion, nevertheless they are in God, as was said, virtually and eminently, since God has in himself the power of producing them, and without them he can effect whatever they can effect. Thus God does not have formally in himself the nature of a plant or animal; but he has something more perfect in himself which contains those virtually, for they are from God whatever they are, and it is God who produced them and can produce them. He does not have ears and eyes, nor is he properly endowed with sight and hearing; but he is the one who planted the ear, and who formed the eye, and thus who without ears and eyes perceives all things which are done and said.

XIV. But those perfections which are simply such, and which, speaking absolutely, it is better to have than to lack, are found formally and properly in God. For in God they are according to their proper form and essence – life, intellect, will, wisdom, goodness, justice, and other things of this kind; and thus God can truly and properly be called living, intelligent, free, wise, just and good.

XV. But, you will say, those names properly signify certain accidents, for intellect and will are natural powers, but wisdom and justice are certain habits adorning the intellect and will. But in God there are no accidents. And therefore the perfections which are signified by those names cannot be properly and formally in God, but only eminently, like those perfections which are called in a certain respect. I respond, intellect, will, wisdom, justice, and the like can be considered in two ways. Either according to the mode in which they inhere in creatures. And thus they are accidents which have something of imperfection mixed in. Or precisely, as a certain general concept is formed of them which abstracts from all imperfection, and is common to God and creatures by analogy. In the former way those perfections do not properly belong to God. But in the latter way they formally inhere in God, and can be truly and properly enunciated of God. For when we hear those words – intellect, will, wisdom, justice – we can conceive a certain absolute perfection, and one which does not include any notion of an accident. And thus they can be rightly and fittingly attributed to God. For those perfections considered in this way are truly within the divine essence.

XVI. From these things, therefore, it is manifest that there is no perfection in anything which is not somehow in God – namely, formally, as those perfections which are called simply simple; or eminently and virtually, as the others which are called perfections in a certain respect. And this because God is the first and principal cause of all things. From which it follows that whatever perfection there is in things emanates from him, and thus pre-exists in him, so to speak; nor can any excellence at all be given which is not derived from him, and thus which does not reside in him as in a fountain. For what is derived and flows fromanother cannot but be in some way in that from which it flows and is derived.

XVII. But besides, that in God is all perfection which can be and be had, is also manifestly proven from this, as was already said, that God who is the first cause of all things himself has no cause, but is the first being altogether independent, who is from himself, not from

any other. For that the nature and perfection of created things is certain and determinate, so that this one has one perfection, but that one has another – this comes about because they received their being from another. For that distinction of theirs, and that determination, must by all means be referred to the efficient cause, which granted to each such a nature, and that degree of perfection, not another. And thus the first being, which did not receive its being from another, but exists through itself, and by the force of its essence, cannot have a certain measure of perfection, and be something determined to this and that; but is itself the fountain and first origin of all being, which contains in itself all entity and perfection.

XVIII. And certainly if any perfection is absent from God, it is necessary that that perfection either is something possible, or not. If it is not something possible, but something which involves repugnance, certainly it is not a perfection, but a mere nothing; nor can God, because he does not have it, be said to lack any perfection. But if it is something possible which is, or can be, since God is the first being, and the first cause, on which all the rest depend, it neither is, nor can be, except by the power of God, and consequently it is not absent from him, but is contained in him at least virtually and eminently.

XIX. God therefore is a most perfect being, which not only surpasses individual beings in perfection, but also has in itself all the perfection of every being, nor does it lack any excellence which is or can be. And this is the supreme perfection of God, which the Hebrew word Shaddai expresses, which is one of the divine names. For Dai in Hebrew is sufficiency. And therefore Shaddai properly signifies him to whom nothing is lacking, and who needs nothing, but in himself, and from himself has all-sufficient sufficiency. In Greek you may say αὐτάρκης, who suffices for himself and can alone accomplish all things, whence it is not badly translated "almighty."

XX. And this is the name which God assumed when making a covenant with Abraham: "I am," he says, "El Shaddai," God strong and almighty, or rather, all-sufficient. By which title God intimated that that covenant was entered into not for his own sake, but for Abraham's; nor was anything lacking of those things which he promised him. No created thing is such that it suffices for itself; some need others, nor is there any which at least does not need the continual help of God. But it is proper to God to have all things from himself, and not to need anything. And therefore creatures are capable of progress, and can always receive something; but to God nothing can harm, nothing can benefit. Nor does any good or evil ever reach him.

XXI. Moreover, from that supreme perfection and sufficiency of God it follows that he is infinite, and has an infinite essence. For since God has all perfection which can be and be had, it is certain that nothing is better and more perfect than him, or can be conceived; and thus it is necessary that he be infinite. For infinite good is better than finite good.

XXII. Moreover, the essences of created things are said to be finite for this reason, because the perfection of each one has a certain term and limit, beyond which it does not extend. Namely, this one has one perfection, but that one has another. And each is contained within its own boundaries, nor do they have the perfections of others. Thus there is a

certain essential perfection in an ox, a certain one in a horse, a certain one in a man; but a horse does not have the perfection of an ox, nor does a man have the perfection of a horse, but each of those has its own. And in sum, there is no creature, however perfect, from which some perfection is not absent. Since therefore in God the matter is otherwise, and he contains all the perfection of every being, in a most noble and most eminent way, his essence cannot be called finite, but must be infinite.

XXIII. Add that the perfections which inhere in created things are included in certain terms beyond which they do not extend. And all their power and activity has a certain sphere which it cannot transgress. But the divine perfections lack any limit at all. Nor does God only have every perfection, but every degree of all perfection without any limitation.

XXIV. And certainly what is finite and limited must necessarily have been thus limited by some cause, which attributed such a nature to it, and assigned a certain degree of perfection. But God, as was already said, has no cause above him which could have limited him, and set certain terms for him, since he himself is the first cause of all things. And therefore it is necessary that God have a nature plainly unlimited, and lacking any end and term – which is to be infinite.

XXV. Nor does only reason and sound philosophy teach this infinity of the divine essence, but also the very text of sacred Scripture. For in Psalm 145 it is expressly said of God, "Great is the Lord, and greatly to be praised, and of his greatness there is no end," or, as the Hebrew has it, En cheker, "there is no investigation," which comes to the same thing. For what has an end is not utterly uninvestigable.

XXVI. And certainly that infinity of the divine essence is sufficiently proven from this, that Scripture attributes to God infinite power, and also infinite wisdom. For the essence of God and the divine attributes are plainly one and the same, as is clear from the supreme simplicity of God, which was proved and demonstrated before. And therefore, if the attributes of God are infinite, it is also necessary that the essence be infinite. Besides the fact that a finite subject would not be capable of infinite power and wisdom. For between a subject, and what is in the subject, a certain proportion is required. But that, according to Scripture, the power of God is fully infinite is manifest from this, that Scripture expressly teaches that God can do all things, and absolutely nothing is impossible for him. For that power alone can finally be called finite which can extend thus far and no further, and thus for which something is impossible. But he who simply and absolutely can do all things – his power has no term beyond which it cannot extend, but lacks any end and term. And similarly it is often said of the intelligence and wisdom of God that it has no number or investigation – by which words, as is clear, an infinite thing is described.

On the Immensity and Omnipresence of God

I. Since the perfection of the divine essence lacks any limit at all, it follows that God, in whatever way he is considered, is infinite. For to be infinite is to lack terms, and not to be concluded within certain limits.

II. But although the infinity of God is equally diffused through all his attributes, nor is there anything in God which is not infinite, nevertheless it is usually considered especially in two things – namely, in the fact that he is circumscribed by no limits either of place or of time, but is far above all time and place, so that his magnitude has no term, nor his duration beginning or end. Of which the former infinity is called immensity, but the latter eternity – about each of which we must treat separately, and indeed now about the former.

III. God therefore is immense, because no term of his magnitude is given, and thus he is circumscribed or defined by no place. Which singular excellence of the divine nature is better perceived if one compares God in this respect with created things. Therefore all created things each have their own particular place. Just as their essence is finite, so they are in a certain and finite place. And indeed we see bodies concluded, contained, and circumscribed by a certain space of place, so that their parts correspond to the parts of space and place – a greater to a greater, and a lesser to a lesser. Which the Philosophers call being in place circumscriptively. Which mode belongs only to bodies, but is plainly alien to incorporeal substances, such as angels and the human soul. For since spiritual substances are not extended in the manner of bodies, nor do they have parts outside of parts, they cannot have parts corresponding to the parts of place, and be commensurate with place. Nevertheless they are defined by certain places. Thus they are here so that they are not elsewhere. Hence they depart, and go elsewhere. And therefore by the Philosophers they are said to be in place definitively.

IV. But it is proper to God to be everywhere, and not to be defined by any certain place. For his infinite substance penetrates all things, and is present to all. Nowhere is he so that he is not elsewhere. He is excluded from no place, and yet is included by none. He is wholly everywhere, and wholly outside any place.

V. Wherefore it was wisely and acutely said that God is a circle whose centre is everywhere, whose circumference is nowhere. Nor also without reason did the Hebrew Masters call God Makom, that is, place – since God is not contained by place, but he himself is the one who made and contains all places, so that rather all things are in him than that he is in all things.

VI. But for a more accurate knowledge of this divine immensity, note that God is present to things in three ways – namely, by power, by presence, and by essence, as the Scholastics commonly say. Which you may more clearly and fittingly call by operation, by knowledge, and by substance.

VII. For God is said to be in all things by power, since he produces, conserves and governs all things, and "works all in all," according to that of the Apostle: Acts 17, "God is not far from each one of us, for in him we live, and move, and are."

VIII. But God is said to be in all things by presence, since he sees and beholds all things which are, become, or are done everywhere, as placed before him, according to that of the Apostle, Heb. 4, "Neither is there any creature that is not manifest in his sight, but all things are naked and open unto the eyes of him." But this mode by which God is present to things is called by the Scholastics "by presence" for a special reason, since presence seems to be referred to knowledge. For according to etymology, present is that which is "before the senses." In which way we are said to be present to some place when we survey it with our eyes; and in which way the sun, although it is placed in the sky, is said to be present to us, and we to it, while we look at it.

IX. Finally, God is said to be in things by essence, because his substance is nowhere lacking, nor can be lacking; but, as we have said, it penetrates all things, and is diffused through all things, and inheres wholly through itself most intimately in each and every thing – so that there are given no recesses in any creature at all in which the whole divine essence is not found.

X. Although we say these things, we nevertheless acknowledge that the mode by which the divine essence inheres in things cannot be sufficiently understood by us, so that it cannot be expressed in words. Nor do we want to assert anything else by the aforesaid words than that the divine essence is absent from no thing at all, nor does it inhere in things by parts, since it is most simple and indivisible, as has been abundantly proved in other theses. And although that mode by which God exists in things is proper to him, and plainly singular, nevertheless a certain vestige of it seems to be given in the human soul, which is so diffused through the whole body that it is wholly in the whole, and wholly in any part, as the Philosophical schools commonly teach.

XI. In these three ways God is everywhere present in the world, according to the common opinion of the Orthodox. And indeed there is no doubt about the first two. Nor is there anyone among Christians, as far as I know, indeed not even among the infidels themselves who acknowledge some God, who denies that God is everywhere present by his knowledge and power – so that there is nothing which escapes his knowledge, and to which his power cannot reach.

XII. But about the third mode, namely about presence according to substance, there has been found one or another who denied that God is thus everywhere. For among the Papists, Augustine Eugubinus, writing on Psalm 138 according to the Vulgate version, which according to the Hebrews is 139, contends that God according to substance is not outside heaven, and dwells only in heaven. But from the Reformed, Vorstius fell into a similar error at the beginning of this century, a Professor in the Academy of Leiden, who affirmed that God by reason of his substance is only in heaven, although he is present to us on earth by his power and wisdom.

XIII. Therefore, to assert for God the praise of his immensity, against that man and any who think with him, we will now prove two things, God himself favoring. First, that in the

whole universe there is no place in which God is not present according to his substance; second, that God is not contained by the whole world, and surpasses it by his immense magnitude.

XIV. As for the first, sacred Scripture teaches most openly that there is no place in the whole world in which God is not present, and indeed by a real and substantial presence. This is especially gathered from the words of God himself, in Jeremiah chapter twenty-three, where he asserts that he fills the earth and heaven. Which cannot be conveniently taken of any presence other than a substantial one. For arguing against the false prophets, who pretended to be sent by God, and did not fear to ascribe their lies to him, not thinking that God was present as a witness and avenger, he rouses their stupor by these questions. "Am I a God at hand, says the Lord, and not a God afar off? Can any hide himself in secret places that I shall not see him? says the Lord. Do not I fill heaven and earth? says the Lord." Where he proves that no one can be hidden from his eyes, since in the whole world no place is empty of him. And certainly, if God were present to the earth only for this reason, because from heaven he sees and rules the things which are done on earth, he could not rightly be said to fill the earth. For a king who rules France by his authority cannot be said to fill France. Nor does one who, stationed in a certain tower, beholds a field from afar, fill that field.

XV. Nor do the words of the Prophet in Psalm 139 less prove that omnipresence of the divine nature: "Where shall I go from your Spirit? Or where shall I flee from your presence? If I ascend to heaven, you are there! If I make my bed in Sheol, you are there! If I take the wings of the morning and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea, even there your hand shall lead me, and your right hand shall hold me." Which words teach that God is as much on earth as in heaven, and in sum that there is absolutely no place where he is not present. Nor can those words be twisted to God's power and knowledge alone without departing from the scope of the Prophet. For since there are two ways in which someone can be so hidden that he is not seen by another – one, if he is in a place where the other is not; the other, if he is indeed in the same place, but the darkness impedes vision – the Psalmist affirms that neither avails him. And indeed he removes the former by the cited words, where he teaches that God is absent from no place. But the latter by the following words, where he affirms that to God darkness and light are alike. Nor do the words of the Prophet permit that interpretation. For when the Prophet says of the highest place, sham attah, "you are there," both the propriety of the words and the truth of the matter require that we understand the presence of the divine substance. But it is manifest that when he then adds about the lowest place, hinneka, "behold, you are there," he is speaking of the same presence, and wants to say that God is thus present on earth as in heaven, and thus that he is there also according to his substance.

XVI. To this also can be referred what is read in Isaiah chapter 66: "Thus says the Lord: Heaven is my throne, and the earth is my footstool; what is the house that you would build for me, and what is the place of my rest? All these things my hand has made." Where God proves that he cannot be included in man-made temples, not by an argument drawn from the distance of the place in which is his proper seat and dwelling, as Vorstius seems to have dreamed, but from the magnitude of his substance, by which he fills the whole world. And

certainly he who sits on a throne touches the footstool no less with his substance than the throne itself. And thus God, saying that heaven is his throne and earth the footstool of his feet, signifies that he is present to the earth with his substance no less than to heaven itself.

XVII. But besides, that God is on earth according to substance no less than in heaven is clear from the fact that he operates immediately on earth. For it is no less impossible for someone to immediately effect something where he is not, than when he is not. But that God acts immediately on earth is manifest from the creation and conservation of the earth, and then from the miracles produced on earth. For creation and conservation, and also the working of miracles, are immediate actions of God, in which God uses no instruments, but acts immediately through himself. And therefore the Apostle in Acts 17, from that perpetual conservation and sustentation of things, by reason of which we are said to live, move, and be in God, gathers that God is not far from each one of us, and thus that he does not dwell far from us in heaven, as in a habitation outside of which he is not.

XVIII. And to this also the analogy of faith leads us. For from faith it is certain that the divine nature in Christ is personally united to the human nature. And thus all the fullness of divinity dwells in Christ bodily and substantially, as the Apostle teaches in the second chapter of the Epistle to the Colossians. But Christ according to the human nature long dwelt on earth. And therefore it is necessary that the divine substance also be present on earth, unless someone wishes to dissolve the union of the two natures in Christ, or to say that the human nature of Christ was personally united with the divine nature even then when it was distant from it according to place.

XIX. Therefore there is no place in the universe where God is not present, not only by his power and virtue, but also through his essence which penetrates all things and is diffused through all things. But besides, what we undertook to prove in the second place, the magnitude of God is so great that, filling the whole universe, it is nevertheless not contained by it, but far surpasses it. Solomon teaches this in the first book of Kings, chapter eight. For after he said about the temple which he had recently built, "I have built a house for you to dwell in, a place for you to abide in forever," lest anyone think that God was henceforth to be included in that magnificent house, like the idols of the nations in their temples, he removes an absurd thought of that kind. "Behold," he says, "heaven and the highest heaven cannot contain you; how much less this house that I have built!" Where by "heaven of heavens" he understands the outermost heavens, which contain the whole world, which he asserts cannot contain, that is, hold and include God. Which words cannot be taken except of the substance of God, but not of the power of God and the exercise of his providence. For to whom so stupid and inept could it come into mind that the power and providence of God is concluded in a single house? Nor was it necessary for Solomon to meet such a thought.

XX. Moreover, that God is not included in the world, but is greater and higher than the whole world, Zophar manifestly teaches in Job chapter eleven: "It is higher than heaven, deeper than Sheol, longer than the earth, and broader than the sea." For certainly if God were concluded by the outermost heaven, he could not be said to be higher than heaven.

XXI. And to this also pertains what God, in Isaiah chapter forty, is said to have "measured the waters in the hollow of his hand and marked off the heavens with a span," and finally to be so great that before him the nations are like a drop from a bucket, like the dust on the scales; indeed, they are as nothing, and less than nothing and emptiness. By which words so great a magnitude is attributed to God that, in respect to it, this whole universe is a small thing and as if nothing. And certainly if God were concluded by the universe, and were not superior to it, his magnitude would have an end, since the world is something finite. But the Psalmist expressly affirms that there is no end of the magnitude of God: Psalm 145, "Great is the Lord, and greatly to be praised, and En cheker, there is no searching out of his greatness," that is, as the Vulgate rightly translates, "there is no end." For why is there no searching out of the magnitude of God, except because it has neither measure nor end?

XXII. And certainly, since God by his will created this world out of nothing, it cannot be denied that he could by equal faculty, if he so desired, create more other worlds to infinity, and without a fixed number – from none of which, however, would he be thought to be absent. Nor would there be any reason why he would be in this one, but not in another. Besides the fact that if God is included in this world, and is not outside this world, how could he work outside this world and create another world, since immediate action is required for production from nothing? From this, therefore, it follows that the magnitude of God has no end or limit, much less that it is confined to heaven.

XXIII. But, you will say, how is God outside the world when outside the world there is nothing? Is God in nothing? I respond that God is outside the world in the way that before the world was founded he was where the world is. Namely, God does not need a place, but is himself his own place. According to that of Tertullian in his book Against Praxeas: "Before all things God was alone, himself to himself, both place, and world, and all things." Which others mean when they say that God outside the world is in himself, just as before he was in himself. And this after Augustine on Psalm 122: "Before God made the saints, where did he dwell? He dwelt in himself." To which also pertains that of Bernard: "There is no need to ask further where he was; besides himself there was nothing." And this is the sense of those verses which are read in Dionysius the Carthusian: "Say where he was then, when besides him there was nothing? Then, where now, in himself, since he suffices for himself." To which it must be added that indeed outside this world there is no real and actual place, but nevertheless there is a possible place. Certainly God can there create bodies and places where he will be without any motion and change of place for himself.

XXIV. But what moved Vorstius and a few others to limit the magnitude of the divine essence, and to think that the substance of God is included in heaven, are many places of Scripture where heaven, opposed to earth, is described as the dwelling place of God and the place in which he resides. As what is read in Psalm 115: "The heavens are the Lord's heavens, but the earth he has given to the sons of man." And Psalm 123: "To you I lift up my eyes, you who are enthroned in the heavens." But if for this reason it must be thought that the substance of God is contained in heaven, and is not outside heaven, since God is said to dwell peculiarly in heaven, by equal reason it will have to be concluded that God was once included in the temple of Jerusalem, since God is often also said to have chosen that temple as a house and seat in which he would dwell. And besides, both the whole

Church conjointly, and each of the faithful separately, are called in Sacred Scripture the temple of God, in which God is also said to dwell. And yet who from this would gather that God is present by substance nowhere else than in the Church and its members?

XXV. Therefore it must be known that although God, as has now been shown, is said to be in certain things and persons in a singular way, for certain reasons indicated by us, this does not prevent him from existing in all things, in the way also explained above. Indeed, so great is he that, although he is certainly present in the world, yet he is not contained by the world, but by his immensity infinitely surpasses the world.

XXVI. Nor should it be feared that God will be defiled by the filth of places. And lest, if his essence is diffused through these lower and earthly things, where so many polluted and sordid things occur, he thereby contract some pollution and uncleanness. For since God is a spirit he cannot be touched by a body. And since by an infinite interval of nature he surpasses every creature, he cannot receive or suffer anything from a creature. Moreover, it is indeed true that certain things are corporally unclean and sordid with respect to us, or another creature, whose nature they offend, corrupt, or vitiate. But with respect to God no thing is sordid or polluted. But only sin, which is not a thing, but a defect and vitiation of a thing, and which God neither makes nor touches, is spiritual uncleanness and an abomination before God.

XXVII. Likewise, God is said to dwell in holy and just men, because He rules them kindly, follows them with His favour, adorns them with His grace, and works singularly within them. And since men frequently, indeed whenever they can, dwell in those places they love, therefore, to describe that highest love by which God favours the just, He is said to dwell in them. According to the saying of Christ, John 14: *"If anyone loves me, he will keep my word, and my Father will love him, and we will come to him and make our dwelling with him."*

XXVIII. But especially, in the most perfect and ineffable way, God is in Christ the man, in whom the divinity dwells most excellently, so that He is truly and properly said to be God. Hence it is said by Paul that *"the fullness of the divinity dwells in him bodily."* Bodily, I say, not only in opposition to a figure, as God was said to dwell in the Jewish temple and in the ark of the covenant, but most of all because of that hypostatic union, by which the divine nature and the human are united in one person; so that we may truly say, if I may so speak, that the divinity is incarnate and, in a manner, embodied.

XXIX. But although God, as has already been shown, is said in a singular way to be in certain things and persons for certain reasons that we have indicated, nevertheless this does not prevent Him from being present in all things, in the manner already explained above. Indeed, He is so great that, although He is present everywhere in the world, yet He is not contained by the world, but rather surpasses the universe with His infinite immensity.

XXX. Nor must we fear that God is defiled by the filth of places. For even if His essence, by being diffused through these lower and earthly things, comes where so many polluted and filthy things occur, He does not thereby contract any pollution or uncleanness. For since God is spirit, He cannot be touched by a body. Even if He were infinitely distant in nature from every created thing, He could not receive from a creature any injury or passion.

Moreover, although some things are, in a certain way, corporeally filthy and base in our view or in that of another creature, they do not offend or corrupt the divine nature, nor defile it.
For only sin, which is not a thing but a defect and privation of good, is unclean spiritually, and an abomination before God.

XXXI. Moreover, from that immensity of God, who fills all places both actual and possible, it follows that he is immobile, and cannot change place. For what changes place and is moved from place necessarily must leave one place and acquire another. But what is already everywhere, and fills all places, can acquire no place, nor leave any place. And certainly the power of moving oneself from place is indeed a great perfection in a finite substance, which, since it cannot be in many places at once, can by the benefit of that faculty successively be present in innumerable places, and thus in a certain way compensate for its finitude and smallness, so to speak. But the infinity and immensity of God makes it so that he does not need that help, since through his immensity he has in the most perfect way whatever can be supplied and acquired through local motion in a far more imperfect way.

XXXII. Wherefore when God is said in Scripture to ascend or descend, to approach or recede, to go here and there, these things must be taken figuratively, not of some change of place in God, but of the various operations which God begins or ceases to produce here or there.

On the Eternality and Immutability of God

I. Eternal is frequently said in Scripture of that which indeed has a beginning of duration, but will not have an end: thus that blessed life which God promises to those who believe in Christ is often called eternal, and eternal also is said to be that punishment which by the just judgment of God is one day to be inflicted on the impious and impenitent – as when the end both of the pious and of the impious is described with these words in Matthew, chapter 25, verse 46: "And these will go away into eternal punishment, but the righteous into eternal life."

II. Eternal is also sometimes said of that which will indeed at some time have an end, but yet on account of its long duration seems to imitate eternity – thus, although heaven and earth ought one day to pass away, yet in Ecclesiastes 1 it is said that the earth stands forever; and in the same sense in Deuteronomy, chapter 33, mention is made by Moses of the eternal hills; and to this also can be referred what in the seventeenth chapter of Genesis God promises to Abraham that he will give to him and to his seed all the land of Canaan for an eternal possession.

III. Besides, that which during a certain course ought to continuously take place is said to be done eternally. In which way that of Exodus 12 must be taken: "You shall celebrate this day with an everlasting rite," where the Passover feast is treated of, since the legal rites and Mosaic worship had to obtain until the time of emendation and the advent of our Lord Jesus Christ.

IV. Indeed, although the life of men is most brief, sometimes what is never to be finished through the whole life of a man, but ought to take place up to death, is said to be done forever – as when it is said of a Hebrew servant who in the seventh year was unwilling to use the freedom offered through the law, "He shall be a servant to his master, le-olam, forever," Exodus, chapter 21. To which pertains that of Horace: "He will serve forever who will not know how to use a little."

V. But eternal is properly said of that which simply and absolutely lacks beginning and end of duration; and this is that eternity which is usually predicated of God, and considered among his attributes. For the essence of God is altogether devoid of beginning and end. God neither began to be, nor will ever cease to be. And as the magnitude of God is so great that it cannot be contained or defined by any place, so the duration of God is not limited by any time, but precedes and surpasses all times.

VI. But Scripture teaches this openly in many places, but especially in Psalm 102, where the Prophet, comparing things which among visible things are most permanent, namely heaven and earth, teaches that those once had a beginning, since they are the work of the hands of God, and will one day have an end; but that God always remains, and perpetually both was and will be the same. "Of old," he says, "you laid the foundation of the earth, and the heavens are the work of your hands. They will perish, but you remain; they will all wear

out like a garment. You will change them like a robe, and they will pass away, but you are the same, and your years have no end." Which perpetual permanence of God David also celebrates, Psalm 92: "But you, O Lord, are on high forever." And Moses the man of God, Psalm 90: "Before the mountains were brought forth, or ever you had formed the earth and the world, from everlasting to everlasting you are God." To which also looks what he adds: "For a thousand years in your sight are but as yesterday when it is past" – because, namely, to the immense and unlimited duration of God, neither a thousand years, nor any designated time has any proportion.

VII. Therefore God in Isaiah chapter 9 is called the Father of eternity; likewise the first and the last, chapter 41 and chapter 57, the high and lofty One who inhabits eternity. To which pertains also that description by which God designates himself in chapter 1 of the Apocalypse: "I am the Alpha and the Omega, the beginning and the end, says the Lord God, who is and who was and who is to come." By which we are taught that the duration of God encompasses all times – past, present, and future – and that God can most rightly be called the beginning without beginning, and the end without end, because, namely, since he is the beginning of all things, he himself lacks beginning, nor can he have any end, since he is the end to which all things are referred.

VIII. But in this matter, reason manifestly agrees with Scripture. For whatever arguments demonstrate that there is one first Being on which all others depend, and from which they have their origin, arguments of which kind were brought forward and set forth by us in those Theses in which we demonstrated that God exists – those arguments, I say, necessarily prove that that first Being, namely God, is also eternal, and did not have any beginning of duration. For a Being which is first, and the cause of others, cannot have been made – indeed it was not made by another, otherwise it would not be first, but there would be given another Being prior to it; nor also by itself, since in order to be made it would have had not to be, in order to make, it would have had to be – which things are manifestly contradictory. But what is and was not made never began to be, and thus is eternal. Wherefore that august name of God, יהוה, which signifies that God is through himself and from himself, and he who makes it so that all the rest are, and thus the first and independent Being, includes and connotes the eternity of God. And therefore by the authors of our vernacular version it is not badly translated l'Eternel.

IX. Moreover, as the essence of God does not simply lack a beginning of duration, but it is impossible for it not always to have been, so also it is simply and absolutely necessary that it endure perpetually and never have an end. For as God is from no one, nor received his being from another, so he can be destroyed by no one, nor lose his being. Wherefore by the Apostle he is called ἄφθαρτος, incorruptible or immortal, 1 Timothy 1:17.

X. From which it is clear that that eternity which belongs to God is a proper attribute of the divine nature, which can be communicated to no creature. For since creation is the production of a thing from nothing, every creature necessarily began, and at some time was not, since it passes from non-being to being. And although some of the Philosophers think that some creature can exist from eternity, nevertheless, since God is a most free agent who acts without any necessity, if any creature were from eternity, at least it could have not been from eternity, and have had a beginning of its duration, nor would it be necessary that

it had always been; and similarly, although certain creatures will never have an end, like the Angels and human spirits, nevertheless there is no creature which cannot have an end, if indeed it had so seemed good to God; for just as he created all things from nothing, so all things at his nod can fall back into nothing – and this is the reason why in 1 Timothy 6:16 God alone is said to have immortality, namely because although certain things cannot be destroyed by any creature, yet there is nothing besides God which, speaking absolutely, cannot perish and fail.

XI. But the excellence of the divine nature shines forth not only in its perpetual and altogether necessary duration, but besides in this, that it always remains the same, nor do the gliding by ages add or detract anything to it. Since God is not only eternal, but also immutable. Most things not only have a duration circumscribed by rather brief terms, but also, as long as they endure, are in perpetual flux; for from their substance something continually flows out, and something is again added to it, until at last they entirely perish and are dissolved, as is seen in plants and animals. But if some substance is so firm that it always remains the same, at least it can receive new acts and new accidents, and to that extent is subject to various mutations. But God is devoid of all mutation whatsoever; he loses no perfection with time, nor does any accrue to him anew, but whatever perfection was ever in him, that now actually perseveres and will incessantly persevere, and whatever will ever be in him, that is now actually and was never not.

XII. Wherefore God is deservedly called pure act, because he is now actually whatever he was or will be; nor is there in him any potency by which he could put off something which he has, or take up something which he does not have.

XIII. Also by the best right the life of God is said by Theologians to be not only interminable, but also all at once, because from his life, as from ours, nothing flows away with time, but God at any moment has at once whatever is in the whole of time at once, since the progress of time adds or takes away nothing for him, as for other things which are subject to change – to which Plutarch looks in his treatise on the saying inscribed in the vestibule of the Delphic temple. "God," he says, "being one, has filled eternity with the unique now" – because, namely, in the whole amplitude of time no moment can be taken in which he has something which he did not have before, or will not have hereafter, or does not have something which he had before, or will at some time have. Whence time is deservedly compared to a river perpetually gliding by, but we to a small branch of a tree which, floating on the river, is carried away by it, but God to a tree planted in the channel by deep roots, which that river, the image of time, in constant flux glides by unmoved and constantly remaining in the same state.

XIV. Besides, from this it is that Plato, and others after him, Philosophers, pronounced that of God neither past nor future, or "was" or "will be," but only present or "is" can properly be said – because, namely, the eternal duration of God indeed encompasses all times, past, present and future; but in the nature of God there is nothing past or future; for nothing of it has passed away, as also nothing has not yet come to it, but the same and unchanged it perpetually perseveres. But now the words of past and future time were invented to signify the changes of things which pass away with time, and are measured by time; for properly and strictly speaking, what is said to have been is what is no longer, as

when in the Poet it is said "Troy was," and what is said to be future is what is not yet, as "There will then be another Tiphys." But although the words of past and future time in this sense are not congruent with God, this nevertheless does not prevent us from being able to truly say of God "was," provided we understand that he now perseveres altogether the same as he was before; likewise "will be," provided we understand that he is so from eternity and even now as he is going to be perpetually – which is to affirm the future of him, but without negation of past and present, and to affirm the past, but without negation of present and future, as when God is described in the place cited above, "who is and who was and who is to come" – which Augustine best explains in Tractate 99 on John: "Although," he says, "that immutable and ineffable nature does not admit 'was' and 'will be,' but only 'is,' yet on account of the mutability of the times in which our mortality and mutability is involved, we say not mendaciously, 'is,' 'was,' and 'will be'; he was in ages past, is in the present, will be in the future; he was because he was never lacking, he will be because he will never be lacking, he is because he always is."

XV. Moreover, God himself attributes to himself this immutability described by us, Malachi 3: "I am," he says, "יהוה the Lord, and I do not change"; and the Psalmist describes it excellently by opposition to created things which are subject to change, Psalm 102, which we just now cited, where after he said that the heavens themselves, which had a beginning of their duration, are to be changed, and also at last to perish, of God he says You are the same, and your years will have no end"; and to this James also looks, 1:17, when he calls God the Father of lights, "with whom there is no variation or shadow of turning."

XVI. Nor does reason less evidently prove that God is devoid of all mutation whatsoever. For this is necessarily gathered from his absolute simplicity, which was before demonstrated by us in the Theses published on this argument; for whatever is changed, according to something remains, and according to something passes away – namely, the subject remains, but the form or some act departs from it; and accordingly it is necessary that what is changed falls short of the highest simplicity, and is in some way composed of diverse things. Therefore, since God is most simple, and in him there is not one thing and another, it is plain that no mutation falls upon him.

XVII. The same is also evinced from the infinite perfection of God, for if God were changed, that change would be made either for the better or for the worse – both of which are repugnant to the divine perfection. For what is changed for the better necessarily lacked some perfection which it acquires through that change; and what is changed for the worse, through that change loses some perfection, and thus cannot be supremely perfect. Add that no thing is subject to change, except either from its own impotence, or from the greater power of another; but to God, who is the first and independent Being, nothing is more powerful, nor can any impotence be attributed to him, since he lacks no perfection.

XVIII. And besides, if someone wishes to run through the individual species of mutation, it will be manifest that none can happen to God. For he does not begin or cease to be who is eternal by nature. He is not changed according to qualities and accidents, he in whom there are no accidents, but whatever is in him is his mere essence. He is not increased or diminished who is incorporeal and indivisible; and finally, he cannot be moved in place who is wholly everywhere.

XIX. But this attribute is so proper to God that it cannot be communicated to any creature. For nothing can be imagined which does not depend on God as on a first cause creating and conserving, and accordingly which does not so lie under his power that it could also be reduced to nothing, God so willing, and withdrawing his concurrence.

On the Life of God

I. In the most common and general notion, and in common usage of speech, those things are said to live which in any way appear to move themselves to us; thus we say living water and living fire, because the flame seems to be stirred by many motions of its own accord, and also water gushing from a spring, to which the dead waters of ponds are opposed.

II. But properly and Philosophically, only that is said to move itself, and thus to live, which can move itself when placed in its natural place and state, and so that after it has naturally ceased from motion, and stopped working, it can again begin motion from itself. But when I say that what lives ceases from motion, I do not mean simply from all motion. For indeed in every living thing there is a certain continuous vigour and unceasing motion which does not cease except in death. But we do not say that it lives unless it can by nature cease from some motion, and again begin the same motion from an internal principle.

III. But in this definition of life, motion is not taken strictly, and as it is defined by Philosophers – the Act of a being in potency insofar as it is in potency – which motion in the subject necessarily supposes some imperfection, and for that reason is said in the schools to be the act of the imperfect; but in a general sense, by motion is understood any operation, and even that which is the act of the perfect.

IV. Moreover, the perfection of life, as can be easily gathered from the definition, consists especially in two things: first, namely, in the excellence and variety of motions and operations; then in the αὐτονομία of the agent, so to speak – that is, its independence from an external mover in acting, and its indetermination. And accordingly, those things live more perfectly which can exercise more and more excellent motions, and which are less dependent on and determined by another in acting.

V. But that we may gradually and as if by degrees rise to that life which belongs to God Most High, and about which we must treat here, it should be noted that God created and constituted many orders of living things in corporeal and visible creatures. For just as the industry and skill of men shines forth especially in fabricating various machines, which seem to move of their own accord, and serve for many uses in human life, so also the manifold wisdom of God manifested itself when, in this sensible world, he devised various automata, so to speak, and fabricated them with incomprehensible and utterly stupendous art, which we call living bodies. And certainly the works of nature are nothing else to one rightly considering them than works of divine art, just as conversely the works of human art are nothing else than works of nature insofar as it is directed by the human mind.

VI. First, therefore, many bodies adhering to and clinging to the earth can be discerned which are furnished with those organs, and endowed with that internal principle of moving which we call the soul, so that when the earth is opened by the heat of the sun, and the spirits contained in it are excited, they draw out and attract various juices from the earth, by the benefit of which they are not only nourished and grow, but produce leaves, flowers and fruits of different kinds, and also bring forth seeds, from which afterwards similar bodies spontaneously germinate and grow. And these are what we call plants, which

are said by Philosophers to live a vegetative life, of which they enumerate three principal faculties: nutritive, augmentative, and generative.

VII. But besides that first and lowest genus of living things, on the surface of the earth, in the waters, in the air itself, there are very many bodies far more distinctly furnished with many and more admirable organs, and which are also endowed with nobler faculties, and can exercise far more and more diverse motions. For not only do they have the power of nourishing themselves with nourishment received within, and of taking increase, and of procreating something similar to themselves; but besides they are not, like the former, fixed to one certain place, but are able to transfer themselves from place to place, nor are they, like plants, so determined by nature to one certain and simple kind of operations that they cannot be moved and act except always in the same way; but they often act in one way and another, and variously temper their motions, according to the diverse impressions which they receive within from various objects, by means of organs which Philosophers call the senses. And these are what are called animals, which of their own accord are stirred by various motions on the surface of the earth, in the air and in the waters, and perceive external objects through the senses; and thus above plants they possess the sensitive and locomotive faculty.

VIII. But men still much more eminent than all living bodies; in them we see a body similar to the body of brutes, except that it is furnished with more perfect organs; nor is there anything in brutes, which regards animal life, which is not found in them. But in them besides there lies hidden a certain principle of acting of a nature altogether different from that which is in brutes, from which proceed motions and actions which can in no way follow from the mere fabric of the organs, and any merely corporeal form; but must necessarily be attributed to a certain spiritual and immaterial principle – such as understanding and reasoning, knowing God and purely immaterial things, reflecting on oneself and one's own operations, and inquiring into the causes of things, and finally using liberty, and being master of one's own actions. Which argue that in men there lies hidden a soul of a kind altogether different than the sensitive and vegetative, namely, intelligent and reasoning, and therefore spiritual and immaterial.

IX. Wherefore man lives a far more perfect life than brute animals – not only because he exercises far more and more excellent actions, but because he moves himself, and acts from himself in a far more excellent way. For brutes, which lack reason and intelligence, neither set an end for themselves, nor direct themselves to an end, but are simply driven to an end by the author of nature, and are necessarily led there by impressions received through the senses from material objects. And so their operations are not in their power, nor do they properly have dominion over them. But man, using reason, himself sets an end for himself, and by choice rejects or chooses means leading to the end; nor in his actions does he necessarily depend on material objects and impressions of the senses; but directs his operations to an end deliberately and from his own judgment, and thus is αὐτεξούσιος, and master of his own actions.

X. And yet it must be admitted that among creatures some are found whose life is more perfect than human, namely, purely immaterial substances, such as Angelic spirits. For not only is their intelligence more noble, and their knowledge and power extend to far more

things; but since they are not bound to matter, they depend less on the extrinsic in acting than men, who with respect to many motions which are exercised by them or in them depend on and are determined by matter, and do not act otherwise, or rather are acted upon, than brutes.

XI. But now, if one rightly considers from the things which have been said in what life and its perfection consists, and institutes a comparison of creatures which are said to live with God, he will easily acknowledge that life belongs more properly to God than to any creature, and in a far more eminent way.

XII. For the most noble and excellent of living creatures indeed act and are moved by themselves, but in a certain respect, not simply. For not only do they have their essence and power of operating from God, and subsist and are conserved by him continually, but none of them act except acted by God the first agent, nor are any of them moved except by the power of God the first mover, in whom we live, move, and are, as the Apostle testifies, Acts 17, and who "works all in all," according to the doctrine of the same Apostle, 1 Corinthians 12. But God acts from himself simply and absolutely. For he depends on no one in acting. And since he is the first mover, he so moves himself that he is moved by no other.

XIII. Then, those which are most excellent among creatures indeed have in a certain respect power over their own acts, and are mistresses of their own actions, and therefore are called free, and αὐτεξούσιον is attributed to them; but that whole power depends on the supreme power of God, and is bent as it pleases him; and that dominion is not simple and absolute, but in a certain way precarious, and subject to the supreme dominion of God. And therefore God alone is absolutely αὐτεξούσιος, and Master of his own actions; and he alone enjoys absolute and utterly independent liberty in acting.

XIV. Besides, since the excellence of life is also estimated, as was said above, from the variety of motions and operations which are exercised by the living thing, indeed many creatures are found which move themselves by altogether various motions, and exercise manifold actions, and operate many and plainly diverse things; but nevertheless the faculties of all of them obtain a certain degree of perfection, and are limited and determined to certain kinds of actions, beyond which they can do nothing, nor are they able to accomplish anything. But God Most High can do not many things, but all things; and his power is utterly infinite and unlimited, nor is his power of operating defined and circumscribed by any terms.

XV. Add that just as creatures, even the most excellent, do not have life from themselves, but from God the first cause of all things, so also, speaking simply and absolutely, they can all be deprived of life, and cease from acting and existing, if indeed it seems good to God. But as God is from no one, so also his life can be taken away and abolished by no one. And so although certain creatures are called immortal with respect to others, because, namely, by the benefit of God they are going to live perpetually, and there is no second cause which can destroy and annihilate them; nevertheless, if creatures are compared with God, they all live a mortal and defectible life, but God alone is simply and absolutely immortal and incorruptible, and for that reason is said by the Apostle to alone have immortality, 1 Timothy 6.

XVI. Therefore, since God alone acts simply from himself, and is moved by no one, and has absolute dominion over his own operations, nor can ever be impeded by any in acting, much less be deprived of all motion and action, and also his power is plainly unlimited and undetermined, he alone also must be said to live simply and absolutely; but life belongs to creatures only in a certain respect, and by participation and dependence on God. And accordingly life is not said univocally of God and creatures, but equivocally and analogically.

XVII. For this reason nothing is more frequent in Scripture than to call God living, by which title it wants to oppose the true God whom we worship to false Gods, and to distinguish him from dead idols, which are destitute of all knowledge and power of acting.

XVIII. From this also arose the custom approved in Scripture of swearing by the life of God. For pious men in their oaths often use this formula, "The Lord lives." And God himself, when, to accommodate himself to us, he is introduced as swearing, uses these words, "As I live."

XIX. Nor is God in Scripture simply said to live, but is also called absolutely the living one, and the title of the living one is attributed to him as a certain proper name, as in Genesis 17, where that well by which God had appeared to Hagar the handmaid of Abraham is called in the person of that woman "the well of the living one who sees me." And Revelation 4, where the twenty-four elders are said to have worshipped "him who lives forever and ever."

XX. Hence also the Pagans called that supreme God whom they proclaimed the father of men and Gods Ζῆνα, as if you would say the living one, namely, from τοῦ ζῆν, which among the Greeks signifies to live.

XXI. Nor is God only called living, but life itself, as when the Son of God says in John chapter 14, "I am the way, the truth, and the life," and in chapter eleven, "I am the resurrection and the life." And certainly the supreme simplicity of God requires that he can be called life, since in him the matter is not as in creatures, in which to live and to be are distinguished as essential grades; but the life of God is his very being, nor must there be distinguished in him, as in us, a certain principle of living. Nevertheless, when Scripture says that God and Christ are life, it does not properly look to that; but rather by this it signifies that God not only lives in himself, but besides is a perennial fountain from which whatever of life, especially spiritual, is in creatures necessarily flows; and with whom we cannot have communion without becoming partakers of blessed and eternal life, according to that of Psalm 36, "For with you is the fountain of life; in your light do we see light." Nor does Christ our Lord look to anything else when he says in John chapter 5 that the Father has life in himself, and has granted the Son also to have life in himself, namely, that by this he may prove that the dead will hear the voice of the Son of God, and those who hear will live.

XXII. Moreover, here the scholastics are accustomed to ask, and attempt to explain, after Thomas, when all things are life in God; but that question is utterly frivolous and born only from a bad distinction, and little understanding of the text of the old Vulgate at the beginning of the first chapter of the Gospel according to John, where it joins those words

as one sentence, "What was made, in him was life." Although however those words, "what was made," pertain to the preceding clause, "All things were made through him, and without him was not any thing made that was made." But the following sentence begins from those words, "In him was life."

On the Knowledge of God

I. The arguments which demonstrate that God exists, also prove that he is endowed with intellect and knowledge; for by them it is established that there must necessarily be given a first cause, not only most powerful, but also best and most wise, which sets the best ends for individual things, and most suitably and fittingly leads and directs each to its end, nor does anything shine forth more clearly in the works of God than his manifold wisdom, by which he fabricated the mundane bodies and various creatures in them with a certain stupendous art, and also disposed them among themselves in an altogether admirable order; and thus it is necessary that there be in him the highest and most excellent power of knowing and understanding.

II. And certainly, since among visible creatures themselves many are found which are endowed with sense, reason and intelligence, who can doubt that their author and maker knows and perceives things in a far more excellent and sublime way? According to that of Psalm 94, "He who planted the ear, does he not hear? He who formed the eye, does he not see?" For a cause cannot be less perfect than its effect; but now it is evident that what knows and understands is simply more perfect than what is deprived of all sense and knowledge; and speaking absolutely, it is better and more desirable to understand than not to understand.

III. And indeed there is no one who, having heard the name of God, does not immediately form the notion of an intelligent nature, which is endowed with the highest wisdom and power, not even excepting the Epicureans themselves, who, although they denied that God is the author and ruler of this universe, nevertheless confessed that God exists, and did not take away from him the knowledge and contemplation of things.

IV. But Scripture especially often proclaims the intelligence and knowledge of God. Thus in 1 Samuel 2:3, the Lord is called the God of knowledge, that is, God endowed with all knowledge. With respect to which David says, Psalm 147, "His understanding is beyond measure"; but in Psalm 139 he thus addresses God, "Such knowledge is too wonderful for me; it is high; I cannot attain it." From which it is that Paul exclaims, Romans 11, "Oh, the depth of the riches and wisdom and knowledge of God!"

V. But that we may have a full and distinct knowledge, as far as the weakness of our mind allows, of this wonderful knowledge which is in God, it must be considered first what its object is, and to what it extends; second, what kind it is, and what is its nature; finally, of how many kinds it is, and what are its common divisions in the schools.

VI. As for the first, the object of divine knowledge in general is whatever can be known and perceived. For God knows all things, as John teaches, 1 John 3:20. And so, just as he is called omnipotent, so also he can be called omniscient. Which his infinity and supreme perfection, demonstrated by us elsewhere, plainly requires. For if God did not know all things, but certain things escaped him and were unknown by him, there would be absent from him some perfection, and his knowledge would have some terms and limits beyond which it would not extend, and thus would not be utterly infinite.

VII. But for a fuller and more distinct notion of divine omniscience, it is necessary to run through its various objects, and consider them separately. But the first and principal object of divine knowledge is God himself. For if intelligent creatures know themselves, how much more must this be thought of God? This the wisdom of God itself requires; for it is no small part of wisdom to know oneself. Nor can the most noble object, which is God, lie hidden from the divine intellect, which is the most noble of all. And indeed, if God did not know himself, he could not have taken counsel of creating things; for this it was necessary that he thoroughly know and have perceived his own immense forces and his wisdom, by which he could found, arrange and govern all things.

VIII. Moreover, God so knows himself that he comprehends himself. Which is not to be so taken as if the divine intellect concluded the divine essence with certain limits, as it were. For to comprehend a thing is nothing other than to know it as much as it is knowable, and so that nothing of it lies hidden from the knower, as Thomas Aquinas says; or in the divine essence, however infinite it may be, nothing can lie hidden from the divine intellect, which is similarly infinite. But such knowledge of God is proper to God himself, nor does it belong to any creature. For since all creatures are finite, they cannot grasp and comprehend an infinite thing. And to this can be referred that of the Apostle, "The Spirit searches everything, even the depths of God. For who knows a person's thoughts except the spirit of that person, which is in him? So also no one comprehends the thoughts of God except the Spirit of God," 1 Corinthians 2:11.

IX. But no less perfectly than himself, God knows all other things besides himself. For, as the Apostle says, Hebrews 4:13, "No creature is hidden from his sight, but all are naked and exposed to the eyes of him to whom we must give account." To which also pertains that of Job, chapter 28, "He looks to the ends of the earth and sees everything under the heavens."

X. But God knows things not only in general, and under some common notion, as they are considered in human sciences. Some Philosophers thought this, among whom Averroes is particularly remembered. For it is attributed to him that he taught that God only knows universals, but singulars do not fall under the divine intellect. But this is a manifest error, to which both the light of reason and Sacred Scripture openly oppose.

XI. For since God created individual things, and conferred being on each one of them by a proper and immediate efficiency, and that not rashly, nor by some natural necessity, but by a certain counsel, and from the decree of his own will, he cannot be ignorant of them. For will a free cause, and one acting from judgment, not understand its own proper work, and not be able to perceive what it itself is able to effect?

XII. Nor did God once create and produce things, but he perpetually rules and moderates them, and most wisely directs each one to its end. But he cannot do this unless things are well known and perceived by him, not only in common, but one by one.

XIII. And indeed, since God is going to render to each one according to his works – liberally rewarding, namely, those which are well done, but punishing and avenging evil deeds according to their desert – it is necessary that God know each one, and have thoroughly perceived and known all the words, deeds, and thoughts of all.

XIV. Add that since God is immense, and his essence fills all places in an ineffable way, he is present and intimately present to individual things. But would God be ignorant of, and not perceive, those things which are nearest and present to him – indeed, in which he is, or which rather are in him – when not even a man, unless sleeping or not attending, cannot but perceive those things which he touches, and which are placed before him in the light? By which argument God, in Jeremiah 23, rebukes the stupor of those who think that their frauds and hidden crimes can lie hidden from God. "Am I a God at hand," he says, "declares the Lord, and not a God far away? Can a man hide himself in secret places so that I cannot see him? declares the Lord. Do I not fill heaven and earth? declares the Lord."

XV. But since men themselves know and perceive singulars, who can with reason take away from God the knowledge of the rest? For will a man know anything which God will be ignorant of? Since whatever knowledge is found in man is as it were a certain drop drawn from the immense Ocean of divine wisdom.

XVI. Besides, a power which is most perfect of all necessarily extends itself to all things which can pertain to the object of that power. And accordingly, since the divine intellect is most perfect of all, nothing escapes it of those things which are intelligible. But everything which is, is intelligible, and thus singulars are also such, to which, according to the Philosophers, the notion of being especially belongs, and so it is necessary that they fall under the divine intellect no less, indeed more, than universals.

XVII. And certainly Scripture testifies that God knows the individual stars, and calls each one of them by its own name. Psalm 147, "He determines the number of the stars; he gives to all of them their names." An evident argument that he not only knows the nature of the stars in general, but that this and that individual star is well known and perceived by him.

XVIII. Nor should it be thought that God indeed knows individually things which are great and of some moment, like the stars, but the multitude and number of small and vile things escape his knowledge, as if it were not fitting for the divine intellect to advert separately to each one of them. Jerome seems to have thought this, writing on the first chapter of the Prophecy of Habakkuk, "It is absurd," he says, "to reduce the majesty of God to this, that he knows how many gnats are born or die each moment, what is the multitude of bugs and fleas and flies on the earth, how many fish swim in the water, and which of the smaller ought to yield as prey to the greater."

XIX. But the arguments which we just now brought forward prove that God knows no less small and vile things than great and weighty ones. For God created no less small things than great ones. He is no less present and intimately present to small things than to great ones. And thus he also takes care of the smallest things. For not even one sparrow falls to the ground without our Father, that is, without his knowledge and permission. And even the hairs of our head are all numbered, as Christ teaches, Matthew 10:29-30.

XX. Nor for this reason is the divine intellect debased, because it knows small and vile things; just as the sun is not defiled because its rays often strike and illumine dung and filth.

XXI. Indeed with respect to men it is better to be ignorant of certain things than to know them; and it is a blameworthy thing and unworthy of a great and excellent intellect, if someone adverts to small and vile things. But this happens because the human intellect,

since it is finite and not capable of many things, cannot suffice for knowing all things. And therefore if it seeks the knowledge of vile and minute things, and attends to them too much, by this very fact it must necessarily neglect those things which are of greater moment, and which it is harmful and shameful for it to be ignorant of. But in God the matter is otherwise. For the divine intellect, on account of its infinity, is not averted from the knowledge of great things by the knowledge of small things, or in any way impeded in it. Nor also is there fear that while it contemplates small and vile things, it will forget those which are weighty and momentous.

XXII. Add that with respect to God nothing can properly be called great or precious. For he needs none of them, nor can he derive any fruit from any thing which redounds to him, since he is αὐταρκής, and self-sufficient. Nor also is anything added to his magnitude. For he surpasses by his immensity things which seem however great to us to infinity. Nor are those things which seem greatest to us less distant from him than those which seem least, since between God and any creature whatsoever the distance is infinite, than which no greater can be given. And so, if God ought to know nothing which is not great and momentous before him, it is necessary to take away from him the knowledge of all things, because all things are to him as nothing, as Isaiah 40 teaches in magnificent words, "Behold, the nations are like a drop from a bucket, and are accounted as the dust on the scales; behold, he takes up the coastlands like fine dust. All the nations are as nothing before him, they are accounted by him as less than nothing and emptiness."

XXIII. But again, in another respect it can be said that before God no creature is small and vile. For God saw everything that he had made, and it seemed to him very good, since in the least things also his power, goodness and wisdom shine forth; indeed especially in those little animals which we tread upon and hold as most vile, in which it pleased God to give specimens of his virtues, and as it were miracles, which can throw one rightly contemplating them into admiration and stupor, and illustrate the glory of God not a little.

XXIV. But that Sacred Scripture may render us more certain of the divine omniscience, it especially urges that God sees and beholds things which are most hidden to men, such as the thoughts of hearts and counsels latent in the minds of men. "Sheol and Abaddon lie open before the Lord; how much more the hearts of the children of man!" says the wise man, Proverbs 15:11. And God often glories in this knowledge as proper to himself, asserting that he is the one who searches the heart and tests the minds, as is especially seen in Jeremiah 17, "The heart is deceitful above all things, and desperately sick; who can understand it? I the Lord search the heart and test the mind, to give every man according to his ways, according to the fruit of his deeds." Which Solomon, acknowledging in 2 Chronicles 6:30, attributes this glory to God, "For you, you only, know the hearts of the children of mankind."

XXV. But now, if one wishes to go through the distinctions of times, and from them distinguish the kinds of things, from there also it will be manifest that no kind of thing is unknown by God. For not only are present things known to God, however hidden, but nothing of past things escapes him, and he also foresees future things from afar.

XXVI. And certainly that the knowledge of past things must be attributed to God is clear even from the fact that God in Scripture recounts many things which happened many centuries before, and repeats the first origin of things from the beginning through Moses. This also makes it so that Scripture attributes memory to God, as when he is said to remember his covenant or oath. For although God is said to especially remember things because he takes account of them, or does something on account of them, nevertheless this very thing supposes that God well knows and holds them. Nor should those books be referred to anything else, in which God is said to write the things which happen and occur, Psalm 56:9 and Psalm 139:19. For by this Scripture intimates that God does not consign past things to oblivion, but that they remain known to God as certainly and distinctly as if they had been committed to writing by him, and were continuously read. But especially the exact knowledge of past things in God is argued by that universal judgment, in which he will one day render to each one for his past deeds, words and thoughts, whether good or evil, according to those last words of Ecclesiastes, "For God will bring every deed into judgment, with every secret thing, whether good or evil."

XXVII. But that God foreknows future things is proved by the innumerable predictions of future things scattered through the whole body of Sacred Scripture, and with which especially the books of the Prophets abound, like the book of the Apocalypse among the writings of the New Testament. And therefore Tertullian cleverly said that the prescience of God has as many witnesses as Prophets. And God claims this foreknowledge of future things as proper to himself, and wants to be discerned by it from the false Gods of the Gentiles, and to be acknowledged as the only true and living God, because namely he alone can announce future things, and actually announces them, as can often be seen in Isaiah, especially in chapter 41, where God through the Prophet thus addresses the fictitious deities of the Gentiles, "Declare the things that are to come hereafter, that we may know that you are gods."

XXVIII. Moreover, God knows not only those things which are, were, or will be, but also whatever can be, although they will never actually be. For since men themselves know that many things are possible, which nevertheless will never actually be posited, and will never exist in the nature of things, who will with reason take away from God the knowledge of things of this kind? Add that God cannot be ignorant of his own power; nor can he know his own power without knowing to what it extends. But God, besides those things which he made, or is going to make, can make and produce infinite things; and so it is necessary that he distinctly know that infinite things can be and become, which nevertheless will never be.

XXIX. But now, just as God best knows whatever is possible, so also he is not ignorant of what is impossible and cannot become. He knows that he cannot die, and deny himself, and that it is impossible for God to lie, which God himself asserts in his word. And certainly, since men themselves certainly and distinctly know that this or that cannot become, how much more must this be attributed to God? And since it pertains to the intellect to judge what is repugnant to become, and what is not, what is of this kind which can lie hidden from and escape the divine intellect, since whatever is in no way intelligible necessarily falls under the infinite intellect?

XXX. Therefore let it be concluded that God perfectly and distinctly knows all things which can be known and understood in any way whatsoever – singulars and universals, greatest and least, open and hidden, good and evil, past, present and future, finally, possible and impossible; of all which since the human mind perceives something, none of them can not be thoroughly known and perceived by the divine and infinite mind.

On Autotheos

I. Calvin in Institutes, book 1, chapters 13 and 19, explains that what some Fathers have asserted, namely that the Son has divinity and essence from Himself, can be properly understood. He writes: "Therefore, when we speak simply about the Son without reference to the Father, we correctly and properly assert that He is from Himself: and in another place, he states, 'We confess that the Son, insofar as He is God, is from Himself, without regard to His person.'" Elsewhere in his writings, particularly against Valentinus Gentilis, he asserts that Christ is "autotheos," a term and mode of speech also approved by other theologians.

II. From this, many Romanists have taken the occasion to fabricate a new heresy they call "Authotheanism," by which they try to slander our theologians. By twisting their words, they falsely and erroneously attribute to them a sentiment far from their beliefs, as if they taught that the Son of God and the Holy Spirit similarly derive their essence from themselves, rather than the Son from the Father and the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son. This would necessarily lead to either the denial of the distinct persons of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, as Sabellius taught, claiming there is only one person, or to the assertion that there are not only three distinct persons but three different essences, thus implying three gods, as the Tritheists believe.

III. However, Bellarmine, more candid than other Romanists, frees Calvin and our other theologians from this charge, acknowledging that they openly and without any ambiguity confess one essence in the divine and three distinct persons. They also teach that the Father, being unbegotten, has the divine essence from no other, while the Son has it communicated from the Father through generation, and the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son through an ineffable procession. Indeed, this has always been the consistent teaching of our theologians, and attributing contrary beliefs to them is a manifest and severe calumny.

IV. Nevertheless, Bellarmine criticizes Calvin's mode of expression when he says that the Son has the essence from Himself. Though this phrase, according to Calvin's understanding, holds a sound meaning, Bellarmine insists that it should simply be rejected.

V. Moreover, Bellarmine does not approve of the usage where the Son and the Holy Spirit, or even the Father Himself, are called "autotheos" as our theologians use the term—namely, for one who is God of Himself. This is because, according to Bellarmine, the Son, being begotten of the Father, is not God of Himself but from the Father, and likewise, the Holy Spirit is not God of Himself but from the Father and the Son, from whom He proceeds. However, the Father, being simply unbegotten and unproduced, is not even from Himself since to be from Himself implies being self-produced, which the Father is not, as He is from no one.

VI. In another sense, Bellarmine acknowledges that the Son of God, and hence God the Father and the Holy Spirit, can rightly be called "autotheos," meaning if "autotheos" signifies that He is God Himself, i.e., most truly and properly God, just as "autaletheia" in

Greek means "truth itself." Thus, Epiphanius notes that the Son of God is called "autos," heresy 69.

VII. To better understand this whole matter and clarify the position and manner of speech of our theologians, note first that they understand "autotheos" to mean God who is from Himself, but not in the sense Bellarmine attributes—as if it meant the same as being self-produced. To our theologians, "from Himself" means being from no one, not self-produced, which is impossible. In this sense, the metaphysicians' distinction of being into "being from itself" and "being from another" is most common, making it surprising that Bellarmine, well-versed in metaphysics, would argue this point and deny that the Father is God from Himself because He is from no one, while metaphysicians equate "from Himself" with "from no one."

VIII. Moreover, since God is a being from Himself, unproduced and independent, the divine essence is neither generated nor produced. Thus, true God is not one whose essence is produced by another but, in every person who can be called true God, there necessarily exists an essence that is from Himself, i.e., from no one and dependent on no one. Therefore, since Christian faith teaches that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are one true God, each of these persons necessarily possesses that primary and unproduced essence, and it is true of each that they are God from Himself, i.e., from no one. This is the intended meaning of our theologians when they sometimes call the Word and the Holy Spirit "autotheos," opposing the Tritheists who believe only the Father has an uncreated and unproduced essence, while the Son and the Holy Spirit have another essence produced by the Father. They thus believe only the Father can be called "autotheos," while the Son and the Holy Spirit do not deserve this title because their essence is from another. Nor does Calvin mean anything else when he occasionally says the Son is from Himself, having divinity and essence from no other, which can be seen clearly by examining Calvin's texts.

IX. However, Calvin and all our theologians unanimously teach and acknowledge that the unproduced and uncreated essence exists differently in the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. The Father has it unbegottenly, i.e., not received or communicated from another; the Son has the same essence communicated from the Father through eternal generation; and finally, the Holy Spirit received it from the Father and the Son through an ineffable procession. Thus, the Father not only has an essence that is from Himself but also has it from no one; the Son and the Holy Spirit, while having an essence that is from themselves and not produced by another, have received this essence—the Son from the Father, and the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son.

X. Regarding the expressions criticized in Calvin, he used them not only without error but also without danger, as it is immediately apparent to any reader what his aim is. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that the expression that the Son has divinity and essence from Himself and does not borrow essence from another is inconvenient and less proper and should not be used simply and without caution. For although the Son of God has an essence and divinity that are from Himself and not produced by another, He does not have that essence from Himself. It is true that the essence of the Son is neither begotten nor produced, but it is equally true that the person of the Son is both begotten and produced. When it is said simply and absolutely that the Son of God is from Himself and has essence

and divinity from Himself, these words taken strictly and properly seem to imply that the very person of the Son is from no one and has received His essence from no one, which is false and contrary to the opinion of all Orthodox believers. Therefore, it is safer and more appropriate to say that the divine essence in the Son is not from another, but the Son Himself is not from Himself but has received essence and divinity from another, namely, from the Father, since according to the Nicene Creed, He is "God from God and Light from Light."

On Election and Predestination

I. The word "predestination" is variously used in the Roman school. For according to some of their doctors, predestination only covers that decree by which God absolutely established from eternity to confer heavenly glory to certain human beings. But for other Romanists, predestination is more limited to the decree of conferring the means conducive to infallibly bring certain human beings to heavenly glory. Finally, others argue that both these decrees pertain to predestination. This is what Eustachius a Sancto Pauli observes in Summa Theologiae, de Praedestinatione, Q. 3.

II. The first meaning is rarer [among the scholastics]. Nevertheless, some of the older scholastics, like Gabriel Biel and Ockham, seem to understand the word "predestination" in such a way that it appears to be nothing other than that eternal council of God by which he decreed to give glory to certain people. This is clear from those things which Gregory of Valencia notes, Tom. 1. Disp. 1, Quest. 23, which is about predestination, point 3.

III. But the greatest part of the scholastics take predestination in the second way, namely for the preparation of grace, so that it is distinguished from election to glory. You can find this in Martinus Becanus, In Summa Theologiae, Tom. 1, Cap 14, Q. 2., Concl. 2.

IV. But many of the doctors of the Roman Church define predestination as not only the preparation of grace, but also the preparation of glory to which that grace pertains. According to these doctors, predestination is an eternal decree or purpose of God, by which God ordains and directs certain people to supernatural blessedness, by those supernatural means fit to the obtaining of it. The recently mentioned Eustachius a Sancto Paulo, Peter a Sancto Joseph, Gregory of Valencia, Estius, and many others hold to this view.

V. But Jansen and his disciples, following Augustine on this point, understand predestination in a sense still more general. For they think that predestination covers not only the good but the wicked, though not of sin, but of punishment. Hence, reprobates are no less able to be said to be predestined to eternal suffering by God as the elect are predestined to glory and blessedness. From this they make predestination to be twofold—one to life, and the other to death. One can see this with Jansen De Gratia Christi Salvatoris, lib. 9., Cap. 3.

VI. Election is similarly restricted by many scholastics to the decree by which God decreed to give glory to some human beings instead of others. And so, they distinguish this from what predestination means to them, that is, a decree with respect to the conferring of means fit to obtaining glory. Alphonsus Mendoza, professor at Salamanca, makes this observation in the scholastic question concerning predestination, the second section. But many others refer election, as with predestination, no less to grace than to glory. And, they want election to cover that decree regarding the giving of grace as well as a decree of conferring glory.

VII. But just as predestination in the Roman schools is received and defined variously by various theologians, so they do not all in the same way assign its effects. For those who

understand the word predestination as only denoting that decree by which God prepared from eternity heavenly glory for certain people, they do not assign any other effect than the imparting of glory itself. Nor do they wish that the gifts of grace be numbered as among the effects of predestination. This is the view of both William Ockham and Gabriel Biel, as can be seen in Gregory of Valencia, Tom. 1, Q. 23., Point 3.

VIII. But others insist the contrary, that only the means [fit] for eternal blessedness are the effects of predestination, but not the acquisition of blessedness itself. They do this because they limit the word predestination to the decree of communicating grace, and consequently they do not want the word to include the decree of granting glory. This is the opinion of Durandus, as the same Gregory of Valentia testifies in the recently cited place.

IX. Today, however, the more common belief of the doctors of the Roman Church is that the effects of predestination are not only the supernatural blessedness itself, but also those particular means by which each predestinated person supernaturally obtains this blessedness. And therefore, they enumerate three general effects of predestination which the Apostle notes in Romans 8: calling, and certainly, justification and glorification. Indeed, by the word predestination they understand both the decree of conferring heavenly blessedness to certain human beings, and the decree concerning the means by which they are led to the enjoyment of that blessedness.

X. But there are some theologians of the Roman School who enumerate far more effects of predestination: And among other effects they include the permission of those sins into which the elect fall, and therefore the permission of the very first sin. Indeed, they even assign to the effects of predestination the very creation and preservation of those who are predestined. This is what Estius especially does in 1 Sent., Dist. 40., Paragraph 7.

XI. In fact, Alphonsus Mendoza of the Augustinians (already cited above), professor at Salamanca, goes even further. For he expressly holds that the first act of all divine acts was predestination, from which all the other decrees concerning the founding of the world, creation of human beings, the permitting of sin, etc., follow. Therefore, he wants the creation and preservation of this whole world—indeed the very reprobation of the demons and of the impious, and their just damnation—to be numbered among the effects of the predestination of Christ and the elect. And, in a word, he continually insists that nothing whatsoever of any kind, whether something small, or big is brought about by God, or permitted, which is not an effect of predestination and a means ordained to bringing it about.

XII. For in his [Mendoza's] Theological Controversies (cf. the already cited first scholastic question about predestination, section six), this is his second conclusion. "The mind of God presupposes the foreknowledge of nothing future for predestination, but everything follows from it. And therefore, God decrees from eternity to do absolutely nothing, nor in time does he make or permit anything, either natural or supernatural, whether it is a thing of great importance or of little importance. And practically everything which comes into existence is an effect and means of the predestination of the elect and Christ. And, so, everything is subordinate to divine predestination as means ordained for the glory of Christ and the saints."

XIII. So, this is his third conclusion. "There is not any other providence of God antecedent to predestination, from which natural and some other supernatural effects come into being. But providence is no less unique and is itself a predestination, from which everything in the universe must follow with absolutely no exception. And therefore, according to this conclusion, the whole world—including the natural and supernatural, good and evil, substances and accidents, and all modes of being and acting in the world, not only in general, but specifically, and individually—should be considered as one complete object of divine predestination. Thus, just as absolutely nothing evades the extent of that object, so there is nothing which does not fall under that act of predestination."

XIV. But from this it is possible to deduce in what way those two doctors think that a person is the object of predestination by God, namely, in the divine foreknowledge, neither as fallen nor created, but rather simply as possible or creatable. For given that the permission of the fall of the first man, and even the creation of man himself is enumerated by them as among the effects of predestination, it is necessary that, from their perspective, foreknowledge of the fall and creation did not precede the decree of predestination in God, according to our mode of understanding, but rather followed it. And so, God was not able in predestinating mankind to consider them as fallen or created, but only as creatable by him. Which Estius with Mendoza acknowledges: "We thus do not call it 'the predestination of fallen man' as if the foreknowledge of the fall of the first man and in him the whole human race preceded in God (according to our mode of understanding) the predestination of some from the whole race of mankind to eternal life." (Distinction 40 of book 1 of the Sentences, paragraph 6).

XV. But Alphonsus Mendoza shows that not a few of the scholastics—both the older and more recent scholastics—think the same thing as he does regarding this point. Cf. the already mentioned question, section four. There, he cites for himself Jacob Naclantus, Bishop of Clugium, Albert Pighius, Peter Galatinus, Ambrosius Catharinus, and the man whom he prefers above all the others, Duns Scotus, whom he quotes many times, from which quotes it is clear that according to the subtle doctor, God predestined the elect, and willed the gifts of grace for them before he had willed this sensible world, which God willed from eternity for the sake of predestined man, on account of whom he established to create all of visible nature.

XVI. But the more common opinion in the Roman Schools is that when God predestined from eternity certain people, he considered them as fallen in Adam, and corrupt in their sin. For commonly, their theologians believe that that decree by which God predestined certain people to salvation, according to our mode of conception, followed the foreknowledge of the fall of the first man, and from that, the attendant original sin, by which the whole race of mankind has been infected.

XVII. But when one turns to look at those who are called with the singular name "Reformed" among the Protestants, many of them define the word predestination as that whole part of divine providence, by which God decreed and established with himself before the foundation of the world that which has in view either the eternal salvation or the death and destruction of every human being. And hence, they distinguish the eternal

predestination of God between that which is to life and salvation, and that which is to death and destruction. And the former they commonly call election; the latter is commonly called reprobation in the schools. This is how Zanchi, Beza, Ursinus, Perkins, Polanus, Bucanus, and many others, and even the Synod of Dordt, use the term predestination.

XVIII. Nevertheless, not a few of the Reformed doctors think that the term predestination, according to its use in Scripture, should only denote the pleasant side. And hence, by predestination they mean only those acts of the divine will and mind, by which God has immutably established with himself to lead certain human beings to heavenly life and glory, and those means afforded to them which are necessary to achieve this end. For they do not restrict predestination only to the preparation of grace, as many of the scholastics do. Instead, they understand the word predestination to include both the decree about the end, as well as the decree about the means; that is, a decree about giving glory to certain people as well as a decree about the grace which is to be communicated to them.

XIX. And they use the word election in the same sense. Since by election they understand that decree by which God from eternity selects some people from among others in order that he might make them participants of the grace of Christ in the life, and crown them with glory in the life to come, therefore both election and predestination are understood by them to be synonyms.

XX. Yet, some [Reformed] seem properly to mean by the term election: the decree concerning some certain people to be effectually called to Christ and given true and living faith. So, election, according to them, has more to do with the communication of grace than the giving of glory. This is how the term election is commonly used by Testard in his Irenicum, Louis Cappell in his theses on election and reprobation, Moses Amyraut everywhere, and others who follow the doctrine and method of [John] Cameron.

XXI. There is also some difference of opinion among the theologians in the Reformed schools around the question of in what regard and condition is mankind the object of divine predestination. First, some in their assigning an object of predestination and election ascend beyond the fall of man and even the creation of man himself. And indeed, they want the decree of predestinating certain people to salvation in God, according to our mode of conceiving it, to be prior not only to the foresight of the fall of man into sin, but even the decree regarding the creation of man. And accordingly, the object of predestination itself is man neither created nor fallen in the foreknowledge of God, but instead man creatable. This is why they are called "supralapsarians" by other theologians. Of which number are Zanchi, Beza, Piscator, Perkins, Ursinus, Gomarus, Polanus, Voetius, Twisse, and not a few more!

XXII. But the greatest part of the doctors of the Reformed schools have considered, in the act of God predestinating, its object to have been a mass of humanity corrupted by sin, and they do not think that the decree about creating mankind and the permission of the first fall of man ought to enter into the whole decree of predestination nor do they wish to make those former decrees a part of that latter decree. But in their view, the foresight of the fall

of man exists prior in God, according to our mode of conceiving it, to the decree regarding the granting and manifesting of mercy in the salvation of some people, which, by these theologians, is called election or predestination. And hence, according to them, the object of election and predestination is fallen man, having been corrupted by sin. And we ought not to extend that description and definition [of predestination and election to] before the fall of man and creation. And this view most conforms to the Canons of the Synod of Dordt. And a very great number of Reformed theologians follow that position, whose names, were we to enumerate them, would be too lengthy and unnecessary.

XXIII. But among the Reformed are found some who make the object of election to be not simply fallen man, having been corrupted by sin, but additionally those called by an external call to the participation and communion in the grace of Christ. For they do not want to make the decree of Christ being sent as a redeemer, nor [that decree] about that grace offered to people through the preaching of the word to be a part of the decree of predestination, and instead they wish to subordinate the aforementioned decrees to that decree about the giving of eternal salvation to this or that person.

XXIV. This was the opinion of George Sohnius, once a professor of theology at Heidelberg Academy. For in the second volume of his Opera, he defines the predestination of man in this way: "It is a decree of God by which he preordained from eternity all human beings foreknown by him as fallen and called to Christ by the gospel to either life or death in order to eternally make known his glory." But in explaining this definition he adds this: "That predestination was made in accordance with the prescience of God, that is, God preordained human beings foreknown to him, and therefore as corrupted by sin, and called through the gospel of Christ. For from eternity in his predestinating of them, he considered them not simply as people foreknown to him, but as people having fallen into sin and to be called again by Christ in the gospel." To which he adds afterwards: "The object or matter of predestination is fallen mankind, and called again by the gospel. For this call is universal." This is in his Exposition of the Chief Articles of the Augsburg Confession, the tract about eternal predestination, pg. 1000. Testard approved of and followed Sohnius' position in his book On Nature and Grace, in the chapter on the will and decree of grace, section 9. And to his name, it is also necessary to add all those who follow the method and doctrine of Cameron in the doctrine of the redemption of man and the doctrine of election, since they wish to stand on their own opinions.

XXV. But just as various theologians think variously about the object of predestination and election, so also it is necessary that they think different things about the effects of predestination and election. For those who hold that the object of predestination is mankind neither created nor fallen, but simply mankind creatable and able to be produced by God, place the creation and the permission of the fall among the means by which God acquires his intended end in predestination. Therefore, the creation and permission of the fall are, in their judgment, effects of predestination—indeed for some to life, but for others to death and destruction. You can see this position in Beza, Perkins, Bucanus, Polanus, and others of the same mind.

XXVI. But those who deem the object of predestination and election to be man as he is considered by God fallen and corrupt by sin, and who do not subordinate the decree of

creation and the permission of the fall to the decree about the demonstration of God's justice and mercy among mankind, even for salvation, but among others his just punishment, do not think the creation of man nor the permission of the fall should be numbered among the effects of predestination. But they only want the effects of election to be those various means by which God frees human beings from sin, and leads them to blessedness and eternal life. Among these means they place the first and principal as the giving itself of the mediator, Christ, and his being sent into the world.

XXVII. Finally, those for whom the object of election and predestination is not simply man as fallen, but additionally, called to the grace and communion of Christ, are not able to number the sending of Christ into the world and the redemption completed by his death to be among the effects of election. This follows because, according to them, the decree concerning the sending of Christ and concerning the redemption of the human race through Christ precedes the decree of election, and is presupposed by it. But the chief and proper effect of election is, according to them, the giving of true faith in time. And it follows that the conferment of the rest of Christ's benefits by which one is led to eternal life is an effect of that same election.

XXVIII. Additionally, it is plain from what has been said that the words predestination and election both in the Roman and Reformed communions are not used in the same way and sense. And both schools of theology understand the terms in various ways. However, there are certain uses of those words abundantly accepted in the Roman school which the Reformed school does not grant, and, by the same token, those words are used by many Reformed theologians in a sense which cannot be found in the Roman School.

XXIX. Hence, many of the scholastics, as we have seen, are accustomed to understand by the word "predestination" only the preparation of grace and to distinguish it from the decree of election by which glory is destined to certain people while passing over others. Thus, election is a decree about the end, but predestination is a decree about the means. But the Reformed never restrict the word of predestination in this way. Instead, they regularly mean by it, both the decree of the giving of glory as an end, and the decree of the conferring of the helps and gifts of grace so that by these efficacious and necessary means one might be led to that end. And you hardly even see among them the word election restricted to the decree concerning the communication of glory. But not a few of them seem to restrict predestination to the decree about the giving of faith, and they think the term better fits with grace than glory, which meaning is unusual among the Roman Schools. Among the latter—if you omit Jansen and his disciples—very rarely is the word predestination taken to denote anything other than the positive side [i.e., not reprobation]. And hardly ever is it made to include the decree concerning the destruction of certain people. On the other hand, predestination is a middle term among many of the Reformed Doctors, by which the decree of God is in general designated, a decree by which human beings are ordained either to life or death. Concerning this decree, thus, they constitute two species [of predestination], namely, election and reprobation.

XXX. Additionally, it is clear from what was said above that neither the doctors of the Roman church, nor of the Reformed church agree among themselves about the effects of election or predestination when it is understood as the "positive/good side." And indeed,

just as it was noted by us before, there is a variety and discrepancy of opinion over this issue both in the Roman and Reformed schools. Likewise, or nearly likewise, one will find on both sides a diversity of judgments and opinions on this subject. For just as not a few doctors of the Reformed schools number creation itself and the permission of the fall among the effects of predestination for those [predestined] to salvation, so some theologians in the Catholic church also do the same as Estius noted before, Alphonsus Mendoza, and others mentioned above. See Domingo Báñez in primam Thom. Q. 23 on the second article, second doubt. And just as many doctors in the Roman school deny and reject that aforementioned view, so also a great part of the doctors of the Reformed school deny and reject the same.

XXXI. Just as theologians in both the Roman church and Reformed church variously philosophize about the effects of election and predestination, so among both groups their judgments vary—there being not a small difference of opinion concerning the object of predestination and election, that is, as it is asked for what reason and in what respect is man the object of God's predestination. And nearly the same distinction of views which is found in the Reformed schools can be found also in the Roman Catholic schools. This is able to be gleaned from what has been previously mentioned above.

XXXII. Indeed, it is important to observe that just as there are some among the Reformed who think that the object of predestination is simply man creatable, but not man considered as already created and fallen, and think that there is no antecedent prevision of the creation and fall of the person who is chosen by the decree of predestination, so not a few in the Roman church also hold that same view—all those, namely, who think that the creation of the predestined and the permission of their fall into sin have a place among the effects of predestination, and who insist that the creation itself advanced the decree of predestination, and is a means subordinate to that end in God's predestination in order to attain that end. Concerning which number, beyond Scotus, Phigius, Naclantus, Catharinum, as we taught above, there is William Estius, Alphonsus Mendoza, and the Dominican Báñez, from whose doctrine, in the place cited above, man as a mere possibility is the object in God's predestination. And just as there are many in the Roman school who back away from this view, so also a great part of the doctors in the Reformed school also disapprove of and condemn that view. And finally, just as there are many among the Reformed who make the object of predestination fallen mankind, so also there are many in the Roman schools who commonly hold to this view.

XXXIII. But now, if anyone looks for the importance of that question about the object and effects of predestination, I respond that there is a lot of logomachy. For those who disagree on these things do not define predestination the same way. Some want, by the term, it to embrace many divine decrees, but others only want it to embrace a few. Indeed, the former deny this and want the act of divine providence to be included in predestination, but the latter affirm it. For, those who make creatable or possible man the object of predestination so enlarge the definition of election and predestination that that divine decree about the creation of man and the permission his fall is brought into it. Indeed some, like Alphonsus Mendoza, introduce in a certain way all of providence back

into predestination. Given this, it is necessary that creation be its effect, and man, as he is at this point considered "to be created" by God, is not rightly made its object.

XXXIV. But those who think that fallen and sinful man is in the divine foreknowledge the object of predestination, and consequently deny that the creation of man and permission of sin ought to be numbered among the effects of predestination, define the term in such a way that it does not embrace the divine decree about the creation of man, the permission of his fall, but that decree is presupposed by it, as something prior, according to our mode of conceiving things. But wherever there is no agreement about the definition of a thing, there is bound to be much logomachy and contention over words.

XXXV. But in this matter and in many others, this rule ought to be followed, namely that when we give some meaning of expressions, we follow, if it can be done, the scripture use, or at least we should accept no other uses than those which are accustomed to be commonly accepted in the Christian schools. Therefore, seeing that predestination is accustomed to be distinguished from common providence in the schools, and commonly the gifts of grace are assigned to the former, but the gifts of nature to the latter, creation seems less suitably to be placed among the effects of predestination, and consequently man not-yet-made by God is established as its object, but simply creatable. They enlarge the word "predestination" too much who bring in to it the decree itself of creating man, and of permitting his fall.

XXXVI. But if anyone searches deeper, asking whence it is that some theologians thus restrict the word of predestination while others extend its meaning, I respond: it stems from the fact that some attribute more, and some less, acts and effects of divine providence to the end intended by God in the predestination of certain people, which end is the illumination of the divine mercy in their salvation. For, on this point, theologians seem to agree that all the acts and effects of God's providence have been brought back to the predestination and reprobation of men, which acts and effects as such are assigned for both the manifestation of divine mercy and of justice among certain people, either in their eternal salvation or just punishment. But some deny that to be the end intended by God in the creation of man, others, however, affirm it. For the latter, the eternal decree of God concerning the creation of man begins the decree of predestination, and makes up a part of it. But this is not so with the former group with whom we more probably agree. Indeed, the creation of man does not seem to be assigned as such and directly to the manifestation of divine mercy or justice, but rather to the illustration of the divine power, goodness, and wisdom.

On the Cause of Predestination

I. In the preceding theses we observed that Predestination is taken in many ways in the Roman School. And indeed first, some restrict the word Predestination to that decree by which God from eternity absolutely determined to confer heavenly glory on certain men. But according to others, predestination only includes that decree by which God prepared for certain men means conducive to infallibly attaining heavenly glory. But today among most Theologians of the Roman School, both of those decrees are included under the name of predestination. And in this sense that word is commonly taken in this disputation.

II. Moreover, predestination taken under this notion can be considered in three ways, according to the Theologians of the Roman School. And indeed first, by reason of the act itself of the divine will, by which God destines men to salvation; secondly, by reason of the effects of that act, which are conferred on man in time, and which are all referred back to grace and glory; finally, according to the termination and relation which the divine will had from eternity to those future effects. In the former way, all the Doctors of the Roman School confess, without any hesitation, that no cause of divine predestination can be given or thought of on the part of man, just as neither can the divine will, which since it is itself the cause of all things, can have no cause.

III. But here the question is about predestination considered in the second and third way, namely, according to the effects which God, as predestining and electing men, works in men or concerning men. And also according to the extrinsic respect which the will of God predestinating has to those effects to which it is freely terminated from eternity. Namely, it is asked whether there is any cause of all the effects of predestination in us, which is not to be numbered among those effects. Or what amounts to the same, whether God in electing and predestinating these and those considered and foresaw in them something which is the reason or motive of their predestination and election, to which, namely, whatever goods befall them by force of his predestination and election can be referred, as to a cause in some way moving and meritorious – and thus whether there is in man any cause or reason why he was predestined by God, and why this one was elected rather than another.

IV. This question regards only adults. For as far as little ones departing from this life before the use of reason are concerned, it is certain among all in the Roman School that there is nothing in them which can be the cause or condition of their election. And thus the whole controversy is whether in those predestined who depart from this life in adult age, there can be assigned any cause in any way meritorious, or any reason of their predestination and election, as to all its effects – and indeed such a cause or condition which always has a certain connection with predestination.

V. On which matter there are and were various opinions in the Roman School. For first, there were found some Scholastics who thought that the meritorious cause of predestination, as to all its effects, is moral good works antecedent to the grace of justification. Namely, that God from eternity elected to grace and eternal salvation those whom he foresaw, apart from any supernatural grace, would act well morally from the powers of free will, and thus in a certain way prepare themselves for grace, and invite God

to give it out of a certain congruity. Gregory of Valencia attributes this opinion to Thomas of Argentina, Gabriel, and Ockham, old Scholastics – and likewise to Chrysostom Javelli the Dominican, who was writing in the preceding century.

VI. Others thought that the cause of predestination is merits, not indeed antecedent to grace, but subsequent to it. For they said that God from eternity decreed to confer grace on that man, and the remaining subsequent effects of predestination, whom he foresaw would

rightly use accepted grace, and would have merits from God through divine grace. Which thing they explained by the example of some King who would want to give a horse to that soldier whom he thought would use the horse well, and thus on account of the future good use of the horse, would give the horse. As Thomas refers, question 23, article 5. And Durandus in Distinction 41, book 1 of the Sentences.

VII. To this opinion approaches and almost coincides with it the opinion of a certain Henry of Ghent, an old Scholastic. For he teaches that those actions, by which predestined man cooperates with the divine call and acquires justifying grace, and constantly perseveres in it once acquired, observing God's commandments, can be considered in two ways: in one way, as they are from free will; in another way, as they are from the help of Grace. And in the former way he says they are not effects of predestination, but in the latter way. And thus he thinks that those actions, as they are from Free will, are the cause of predestination referred to its effects, and thus also to those very actions, as they are from grace. But he adds that such actions are the cause not on account of which man is predestined, as if on account of condign merit, but without which he would not be predestined, and with the intervention of which he is predestined, by a certain congruity – because, namely, it is fitting and just that God predestine him whom he sees will cooperate in that way with Divine grace. Which opinion, as Gregory of Valencia testifies, was followed in the preceding century by John Eck, in the book which is inscribed by him Chrysopassus.

VIII. Finally, some of the Scholastics judged that there is some cause of predestination on the part of the one predestined, yet not positive, but negative. For they thought that God predestines those whom he predestines, because he foreknew that they would not finally place an obstacle to divine grace through mortal sin. Which various opinions are referred to and explained by the same Gregory of Valencia, Disputation one, question 23 on Predestination, point 4.

IX. But all those opinions are commonly rejected and condemned today by the Doctors of the Roman Church. For they think, at least by far most of them, that the decree of divine predestination referred to all its effects is absolute and merely gratuitous, and does not depend on any condition or cause which God predestinating foresaw and considered in man. For this opinion Gregory of Valencia, already often mentioned, proposes and defends as the common one of Theologians. Namely, that there is no reason or cause in any way meritorious, on the part of the one predestined, of predestination as to all its effects. And that if predestination is referred to all its effects, there is no reason or cause in any way meritorious of it in the one predestined, neither on account of which, nor without which not, but it ought to be referred to the merely gratuitous will of God alone. As can be seen

in the place cited above. Where he also attributes the same opinion to many old Scholastics, such as Thomas Aquinas, Alexander of Hales, Cardinal Bonaventure, John Scotus, Giles of Rome, Gregory of Rimini, Richard Herveaus, and the Master of the Sentences himself, Peter Lombard.

X. In the same opinion is also Gabriel Vasquez, who lengthily proves and defends it in the first tome on the first part of Thomas, Disputation ninety-one. Where he explains his mind on that matter in these words: "The Catholic opinion therefore is that no cause, no beginning, or occasion can be devised on the part of the one predestined, on account of which God either in time gave his grace to him, or decreed to give it in foreknowledge. But first, this doctrine is to be understood not only of the beginning of faith, prayer, or the will of attaining salvation, or of other works which in some way are concerned with God, such as are of religion; but also of any work of moral virtue, which is referred to honest good itself alone, so that in no way can any such thing be the occasion or beginning of the donation or predestination of grace. Besides, we exclude not only a beginning which is condign merit, but also congruous or impetratory merit, or disposition; finally, any cause and occasion on account of which God gave grace to this one rather than to another, or predetermined to give it, so that the whole reason for preparing grace for this one rather than for that was the good pleasure of the divine will, but nothing even the least on the part of the one predestined." Chapter eleven of the already mentioned Disputation.

XI. The same is also taught by Peter of St. Joseph in his Idea of Speculative Theology. Where in book one, chapter nineteen, this is his fourth Resolution: "On the part of the one predestined, no cause of predestination to first grace is given." Which he proves from that of Paul, "Who makes you different from another?" From which he gathers that man is not the cause of that distinction by which the predestined is distinguished from the non-predestined, but the mere mercy of God constituting such a distinction between both – which would be false if man naturally provided God with a motive or reason for predestinating him rather than another to the aids of grace by which salvation is obtained. And the same opinion among the more recent ones is held by Dominic Bañez, Estius, Puteanus, Eustachius of St. Paul, and very many others, to refer the individual testimonies of each of whom would be too tedious and superfluous.

XII. Indeed, this is the opinion of Molina himself. For he affirms that of predestination, as to its entire effect, no cause is given on the part of the one predestined. And he proves this because whatever is in man by which he is directed to eternal life is included in the entire effect of predestination, even the very preparation for grace, which is not made except through the particular aid of God. Therefore in no way can it happen that of the entire effect of predestination some cause on our part is found. Predestination therefore considered in this way on the part of the effect has for its reason the divine will, to which the whole effect of predestination is ordered as to an end, and from which, as from a moving principle, it proceeds. From which it is that he afterwards assents to Thomas saying that on the part of predestined and reprobate men there is no cause or reason why indeed some of them are predestined by God, but others are reprobated; but the reason must be taken and rendered on the part of God. Question 23, articles 5 and 6, Disputation 1, Member 6.

XIII. Moreover, although the Doctors of the Roman Church commonly think that all the effects of predestination taken together and collectively have absolutely no cause in man, nor depend on any merit or work of man, but are conferred on man from a certain will of God altogether gratuitous and absolute, and thus no cause of divine predestination referred to all its effects is given or found on the part of man, nevertheless it is their common opinion that one effect of predestination is not only the reason but truly the cause of another effect of the same predestination, and thus one effect can be the reason and cause, at least improperly so called, of predestination, as it is referred to another effect. Which having been posited, they ask whether predestination or election of man to glory, as it is considered distinctly from the decree of conferring grace on man, has any cause in man, and was made from foreseen faith and merits, or whether it is altogether gratuitous and absolute, and according to our mode of conceiving, ought to be considered made before the prevision of faith and good works, and thus has no reason or cause on the part of man.

XIV. On which matter there are various opinions of the Doctors in the Roman Church. For although they agree that glory is given to man from merits, and that God decreed to give glory to man from merits, nevertheless many of them, and indeed the most Learned and celebrated, teach that the election of man to glory is in every way gratuitous, and depends on the good pleasure of God alone. Namely, they want God from eternity to have gratuitously destined and prepared heavenly glory for certain men, but nevertheless to have wanted them to arrive at it through merits, and for that reason to have decreed to give them grace by which they can merit the glory destined for them, so that the donation of glory falls under merit, and is not altogether gratuitous; but the decree of giving glory does not fall under merit, but is simply and absolutely gratuitous.

XV. This is, among others, the opinion of Bellarmine. For in the second book on Grace and Free Will, chapter 13, responding to the fifth testimony, he says: "The reason for predestination is one thing, the reason for execution another. For God determined in predestination to give the kingdom of heaven to certain men whom he loved without any prevision of works; yet at the same time he determined that as to execution, the way of arriving at the kingdom would be through good works. And so that proposition, 'God from eternity predestined to give the kingdom to men through foreseen good works,' can be both true and false. For if that 'through foreseen works' is referred to the word 'predestined,' it will be false, for it will signify that God predestined men because he foresaw their good works; if it is referred to the word 'give,' it will be true, because it will signify that the execution is going to be through good works, or, what is the same, that glorification is the effect of justification and good works, just as justification itself is the effect of calling, and calling of predestination."

XVI. But in chapter fifteen of the same book he expressly proves, as is clear from the very title of the chapter, "That not only to efficacious grace, but also to glory, men are elected gratuitously." And at the beginning of the chapter he proposes to refute those who distinguish predestination from election, and say that by predestination indeed infallible means to salvation are prepared for certain men, but by election they are prepared for glory. Finally, that predestination is plainly gratuitous, but election depends on the prevision of good works.

XVII. Bellarmine is seconded in this part by Peter of St. Joseph, whose Resolution is this: "The opinion which teaches that the efficacious election to glory was made antecedently to the absolute prevision of merits, and thus is merely gratuitous, is more probable." In the Idea of Speculative Theology, book 1, chapter 20, Resolution 1.

XVIII. Finally, the same thing is taught on that matter by Eustachius of St. Paul, Domingo Bañez, William Estius, and others who are called more recent Thomists, but most of all by Jansen and his Disciples, who vigorously maintain that the predestination and election of man to Glory and eternal beatitude is no less gratuitous, and according to our mode of conceiving, precedes the prevision of good works in God, than the predestination of man to grace.

XIX. But their foundation is that glory is the end, but the merits of man the means to attaining that end; but the intention of the end is prior to the election of the means. From which it follows that the destination of man to glory, by which God intends the end, precedes the decree of conferring merits through grace, as means necessary to that end; and accordingly, the prevision of the merits of man follows his election to glory, which thus cannot rest on that prevision, condition, or cause.

XX. Nevertheless, very many Theologians of the Roman School are of the opinion that not only is glory given from merits in time, but the eternal predestination or election of man to glory itself was made from foreseen merits, so that, according to them, that very decree by which God from eternity destined glory to certain men is not simply and merely gratuitous, but was made not only after the foreseen merits of man, but even on account of those foreseen merits.

XXI. This is the opinion of Martin Becanus, who after he said that many of the Scholastics think that predestination, or efficacious election to glory, was made from foreseen merits, subjoins the following words: "Moreover, this opinion, which is much more probable, can be explained in two ways. First, of conditional foreknowledge, so that the sense is that God, before he efficaciously elected some to glory, foresaw through conditional knowledge who would use the grace of God well, if it were given to them. Second, of absolute foreknowledge, in this sense: God absolutely foresaw that some would work well before he efficaciously elected them to glory. Again, each can be understood in two ways. First, God efficaciously elected some to glory from foreseen merits, that is, after foreseen merits. Second, from foreseen merits, that is, on account of foreseen merits. We say that in all ways this opinion is true." In the Summa of Theology, tome 1, chapter 14, question 2, section 3.

XXII. But in this part Becanus, as in many others, follows Gabriel Vasquez, who in the first tome on the first part of Thomas, disputation 89, establishes these two things and contends to prove them with many arguments. The former is: "No efficacious election to glory was from the will of God alone, before merits were foreseen from grace, but each one was elected to glory from foreseen merits, which he was going to do by the grace of God." The latter is: "Before foreseen merits of grace, God had no peculiar affection of giving glory towards the predestined, but had a common simple or antecedent will towards all, even the reprobate, by which he equally proposed and desired eternal life for all, as a reward and

common prize." Chapter 2. But in the same opinion as Vasquez, and as Becanus, are very many others, whom Becanus names in the place cited above, such as Pighius, Molina, Lessius, Ruardus, Driedo, Eckius, Turrianus, Stapleton, Gregory of Valencia. And from the Ancients, Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, Albert the Great, Thomas of Argentina, Henry of Ghent, Ockham, Gabriel, John Major – all of whom the already mentioned Martin Becanus affirms think the same as himself in this question.

XXIII. But as regards the Doctors of the Reformed School, all by unanimous consent establish that of predestination to grace and glory taken together and collectively, no cause, condition, or reason can be found in man, but it is merely and absolutely gratuitous, and depends on the free will of God alone. For when God elected and predestined these and those before others to grace and salvation, he regarded nothing in them by which he could in any way be moved to pursue them with such great benevolence and favour before others; nor can any reason for this be brought forward, except his sole good pleasure.

XXIV. But if someone wishes to consider separately election to glory, and to distinguish it from the decree of conferring various gifts of grace necessary for the attainment of that heavenly glory, by far most of the Reformed Theologians also assert that it is by no means conditional, but merely gratuitous and absolute, and that God elected certain men to glory by an absolute decree, before he foresaw in them any future good motions, or any good work or beginning of faith. Since God could not foresee anything of this kind in them before he decreed to give them grace plainly necessary for every good work and every act of faith. Which decree, according to our mode of conceiving, they think is posterior to election to glory, or at least not prior to it, but coherent with it, and if not subordinate, at least coordinate to it.

XXV. Nevertheless, there are some who want the decree of giving glory, according to our mode of conceiving, to be posterior to the election to faith and efficacious grace, and thus establish that God by reason first foresees the faith and good works of man, before he predestines him to heavenly glory. From which it follows that predestination to eternal life and glory is from faith, as a condition foreseen by God from eternity in the one who is elected.

XXVI. Which is the opinion of Paulus Testardus in the Irenicon, Thesis 289. "No one," he says, "will certainly deny that election to justification and glorification, if it is considered distinctly, is from foreseen faith, and its object is man believing, insofar as he is believing. For as God justifies and glorifies in time, such he decreed to justify and glorify from eternity. And what is the subordinate cause and condition of justification and glorification in time, that is the subordinate cause and condition of justification in the decree from eternity, since the execution responds very well to the decree."

XXVII. And Ludovicus Capellus also teaches things agreeable to these in the theses on Election and Reprobation, which are inserted in the System of Theses of Saumur. For there in Thesis thirty and thirty-one these are his words: "The decree of giving faith is prior, not indeed in time, for all the decrees of God are in him together from eternity, but by the nature of the thing to the decree of justifying and sanctifying, and thus also of glorifying him who believes, and is to be distinguished from them. For as it is one thing to believe,

another to be justified, another to be sanctified, another to be glorified, so also the decree of God by which he determined to give faith to man is one thing, another by which he purposed to justify, sanctify, and at last glorify the believer, according to our mode of conceiving, I say. Nor is the first separation among men made through the decree of glorifying, but through the decree of giving faith, because in reality through true faith, and in the very act, men are first separated from each other, who up to that point were equal. Nor does God first decree to glorify man absolutely, then to give faith to him, but on the contrary decrees to give faith, then to glorify. Because just as he glorifies in act only the believer, so also he decreed to glorify only the believer."

XXVIII. But from what has been said it appears that concerning the cause of election and predestination, as they regard all their effects, there is no controversy between the Reformed Doctors and most of the Doctors of the Roman Church. For both agree in this, that all the effects of predestination, taken together and collectively, have absolutely no cause in man, but are to be referred entirely to the grace and benignity of God alone. From which it follows that no reason on the part of man can be given why this one rather than that was predestined by God from eternity to glory and the various aids of grace, but it must all be referred to the mere and sole good pleasure of God, which is to be considered to depend on no condition on the part of man. But if any question remains on that matter, it is only with some of the older Scholastic Theologians, and perhaps a few of the more recent ones, with the common opinion of the School of today protesting against it.

XXIX. But whether election to eternal life and heavenly glory considered separately, and distinctly from the decree of conferring grace, is from foreseen faith and works, is doubted, as is clear from what has been said before, both in the Reformed School and in the Roman School. For in the former, as in the latter, there are found some who think that election to living and active faith, according to our mode of conceiving, precedes the absolute election to glory, and some reason can be given why this one rather than that was predestined to eternal life and glory – namely, because God from eternity foresaw that this one by the benefit of grace would believe in Christ, and would do penance, and would persevere in faith, but he foresaw nothing of the kind concerning the other.

XXX. But in the Roman School the opinion which suspends the decree of election to eternal glory on the foreseen condition of faith and works is more common and prevalent than in the Reformed School. And in the latter there are quite few compared to the others who want the prevision of living faith working through love to precede, in God, according to our mode of conceiving, the efficacious election of certain ones to glory; while the same is maintained and taught by very many in the Roman School.

XXXI. Moreover, the former question about the cause of predestination considered according to all its effects, namely, whether it is given on the part of man, is not of small moment, and regards the foundations of the Christian faith. For it cannot be affirmed that a cause is given on the part of man of all the effects of predestination, insofar as it is referred both to the aids of grace and to heavenly glory, without falling into Pelagianism, and denying that the salvation of man is gratuitous, and depends entirely on the mercy and benignity of God alone, not on any works of ours – which the Gospel so clearly and constantly affirms; and thus without teaching that grace is given from merits, and that man

through the powers of nature begins to distinguish himself from another, and to prepare and dispose himself in some way at least to salutary grace – which pious antiquity shuddered at and condemned as Pelagian and adverse to Christian grace.

XXXII. But it seems otherwise concerning that other question, Whether, namely, Election to eternal glory, as it is distinguished from Election to grace, is from foreseen faith and works – that is, Whether by nature, or by reason God first foresees that man will believe in Christ, and will embrace him with living faith working through love, before he absolutely decrees to confer on him eternal life and glory; provided it is agreed that men are elected to salutary grace altogether gratuitously, and there is nothing in them by which God is provoked to destine and bestow the aids of that grace on them rather than on others. And besides, that God by one and simple act of his will decreed from eternity at once and together whatever he ever decreed, and executes in time. Nor are there really in God many decrees succeeding each other, or really distinct from each other, as if distinct acts of the divine mind and will elicited separately and apart.

XXXIII. For if those things about which there is now agreement between the Roman School and the Reformed School are acknowledged and conceded, whatever controversy remains will not be about the thing itself, namely, how the matter stands in God, but only about the Method of arranging certain concepts of our mind. Namely, all now agree that the decree of giving glory and the decree of conferring grace are not two decrees really distinct in God, and between which there can be some real order of prior and posterior; but that God by one act of will constituted those two things. But our mind, not being able, on account of its weakness, to exhaust in one concept, and at the same time to comprehend all those respects which the one act of the Divine will has to various objects, is compelled to conceive it separately, according as it regards now this object, now that, and thus variously names it, and now imposes on it the name of one decree, now of another. And afterwards among those various concepts, which it designates with the names now of one decree, now of another, it devises some order by which they may be conveniently disposed among themselves – which order seems almost arbitrary, and can be assigned diversely without fault and reprehension, while some digest their concepts about divine decrees according to the very execution of things, but others, if there is any relation of means and end among the things decreed by God, prefer to follow the order of intention, and to conceive as prior the decree about the thing which is the end, but as posterior that which holds itself as a means to it.

XXXIV. And so I do not see what evil or danger there is, if someone conceives the decree of giving glory to someone as prior to the decree of conferring the aids of grace, because glory holds itself as the end, but the aids of grace as the means which are necessary for attaining that end; or on the contrary, if someone conceives the decree of furnishing the aids of grace as prior to the decree of conferring glory, because in reality God first communicates grace, and afterwards glory, and thus according to the order of the efficient cause, grace precedes glory – although the former order, as it is far more received in the Reformed Schools, so also seems to us more fitting. For it belongs to the wise to intend some end, but afterwards to determine with himself about the means which are conducive to obtaining that end. Perhaps, however, it would be more prudent neither to move nor to

determine questions of this kind, which do nothing for the fruit of piety, and nevertheless often excite very serious contentions.

On Reprobation

Part I

In which the Doctrine of the Roman School is expounded.

I. From the common usage of the Schools, Reprobation has long signified a certain part of divine Providence, which is concerned with those who fall away from the highest end of the rational creature, namely, eternal and celestial blessedness, and are adjudged by God to eternal punishments, for the demonstration of his justice. However, the Theologians of the Roman School do not all take this word in the same way. For under reprobation some include more, others fewer acts of divine providence: and so some use the word reprobation in a stricter sense, but others in a broader sense.

II. For many seem to restrict reprobation to that eternal ordination, by which certain ones are excluded from the heavenly kingdom, and subjected to everlasting punishments. To which pertains the definition which is in Peter Lombard, in the first book of the Sentences, Distinction fortieth. Reprobation is the foreknowledge of the iniquity of certain ones, and the preparation of the damnation of the same. To which the definition of Durandus is related in the same distinction, question two. Reprobation is the prevision of the ineptitude of someone for eternal life, and the purpose of excluding from it. And similarly Molina defines Reprobation, The eternal judgment by which a rational creature is judged by God unworthy of eternal life, and worthy of eternal punishment, with the purpose of perpetually excluding them from the celestial kingdom, or at the same time also of punishing with eternal torments, as their sin will have been.

III. But others think that reprobation includes not only rejection from celestial glory, but also the permission of the sin of the reprobate, and rejection from divine grace, at least congruous and efficacious. In which sense Thomas Aquinas takes Reprobation in the first part of the Summa, Question 23, Article 3. Where these are his words, Reprobation includes the will of permitting someone to fall into guilt, and of inflicting the punishment of damnation for guilt. And in this sense also Gregory of Valentia defines Reprobation, The act of the divine intellect, by which formally God decrees to permit the sins of the reprobate, by not giving them the singular grace by which they would be freed from them, and on account of them to exclude them from the celestial kingdom, and to punish them eternally. With which operation of the divine intellect he adds is joined the operation of the divine will, by the force of which is mandated to execution what has been decreed from eternity concerning the reprobate.

IV. But there are those who think that not every act of divine providence, by which the sins of the reprobate are permitted, and are allowed to happen, pertains to their reprobation. For from thence at least they exempt that act by which God permits them to be infected with original sin, and that also by which they think God permits that some of them fall from the state of grace and justice into sin, which acts they think pertain only to common providence, but not to the decree of reprobation: to which they only refer the

abandonment of man in sin, and the hardening, by which God, in punishment of preceding sins, permits that some fall into graver sins.

V. But others think that the permission of any sin in the reprobate must be referred back to the decree of reprobation. Indeed they think that reprobation includes every act of providence which is concerned with those who fall away from the highest end. For they do not think that there is any act of providence concerning rational creatures, which does not pertain to their predestination, or reprobation. And so reprobation is described by them, The Providence of God concerning those who fall away from eternal salvation, ordaining them to a certain end, which is the demonstration of his justice. As can be seen in Estius, and other more recent Thomists.

VI. Moreover, the Doctors of the Roman Church contend among themselves about the nature of the acts of the divine will and Providence, of which the total decree of reprobation consists. Namely, whether they are positive, or negative? Or, Whether they ought to be explained negatively, or affirmatively?

VII. And first indeed it is agreed among them, with respect to the damnation and punishment of the reprobate, that a positive act is found in the divine will, by which God wills to punish the reprobate perpetually, on account of their sins foreseen by God himself. But there are those who think that a positive act of the divine will is found besides concerning the permission of the sin of the reprobate, and concerning the withdrawal of efficacious aid or congruous grace, which being posited they would not sin, or would do penance. For they contend that that act ought to be explained affirmatively, and not only negatively. So that, according to their opinion, God had this act from eternity, I will to permit these sins. I will not to give to these and those the aids, which if they received, they would not sin. Which is the opinion of Gregory of Valentia on Reprobation point one. But especially of Domingo Bañez on the first of Thomas question 23, article 2, doubt 2, conclusion 3. And of William Estius on the first book of the Sentences, Distinction 40, paragraph 16, and of others among the more recent Thomists.

VIII. Indeed, the same more recent Thomists hold that God, in the same instant in which he elects and predestines some to eternal life, by a positive act does not will to admit others into his kingdom, and excludes them from celestial glory, before he has foreseen any of their sins, and has decreed to permit them. Which is the doctrine of Diego Alvarez in book 12 on the Aids of Divine Grace, Disputation 109, section 5, where this is his first conclusion. The eternal reprobation of God includes a positive act, by which he willed not to admit certain ones to eternal life. But in the third conclusion he affirms that the positive act, by which God from eternity willed not to admit certain ones into his kingdom, was not conditional, but absolute, anteceding in the order of reason the foreknowledge of the evil use of free will, future by hypothesis, which would be constituted in such an order of things. And consequently those Doctors do not recognize in eternal reprobation any act of the divine intellect, or of the divine will, other than positive and properly so called.

IX. But others, on the contrary, constitute the entire and total decree of reprobation from acts of different kinds, which they think are some indeed positive, but others only negative. For they think that God, in the same instant in which he elected and preordained some to

eternal life, conducted himself negatively, not positively, toward others, that is, he simply did not elect them, and did not ordain them to life, but did not by a positive act will to exclude them from celestial life. And simply as regards the withdrawal of grace, and the permission of sin, they think that God also conducts himself in the same way. Namely, that in this part nothing else is to be conceived of God, except that from eternity he did not have the will to bring aid to certain ones, and to bestow that grace on them, which being posited they would not sin, or would rise again from sin, as he had toward the predestined. And yet they want those negative acts by which God did not elect certain ones, and did not decree to give them congruous and efficacious grace, and so allowed them to fall into sin, and remain in it, to be in some way part of reprobation and to pertain to it.

X. And consequently they distinguish a twofold reprobation, one positive, the other negative. And they want total reprobation to be constituted from both. As can be seen in Puteanus in the general question on reprobation, doubt 2, conclusion 1. "Note," he says, "that by the name of total reprobation is signified in this place that which arises from negative and positive reprobation. But negative reprobation is defined, The abandonment of certain ones in the mass of perdition, and the denial of congruous grace, with the permission of some falling away from the ultimate end, and of permitting their sins for that time, or rather instant, in which God elects some to eternal life out of the mass of perdition. But the abandonment in the mass of perdition, and the willing of not giving congruous or efficacious grace, are not elicited acts from God truly and really. For God conducts himself only negatively toward those whom he abandons in the mass of perdition, in that instant in which he snatches some out of the same mass, and destines them to eternal life; and for this cause the abandonment in the mass of perdition is called negative reprobation. But positive reprobation is defined, the destining of certain ones to eternal punishments, on account of their final sins." Thus far Puteanus.

XI. Peter of St. Joseph also approves this distinction of positive and negative reprobation in the Idea of Speculative Theology, book 1, chapter 20. And it is also found in Eustachius of St. Paul, who thus proposes and explains it. "Reprobation is twofold. Negative, by which God did not will to give glory to some, and is opposed to the election of certain ones to glory. And so from this simply that God did not elect some, he is considered to have reprobated them. And to this pertains consequently the exclusion of some from eternal life: and the ordination of the same to the eternal punishment of loss, from foreseen original sin. But reprobation is called positive, by which certain ones are ordained to the eternal punishment of sense, on account of faults foreseen in them." In sum. Tractate one. Disputation 17, question 2.

XII. Moreover, just as the Doctors of the Roman Church variously define reprobation, and include more or fewer acts of Divine providence under it, so also they variously assign its effects, nor do all philosophize about this matter in the same way. However, they agree on two points. The first is that the eternal damnation of certain men, on account of their evil demerits, is the effect of their eternal reprobation, and that those eternal punishments are positively inflicted on them by God, by force of that decree, by which he adjudicated them to punishments of this kind, on account of their foreseen sins. The other is that the sins into which the reprobate fall, and by which they bring upon themselves just

damnation, are indeed something necessarily anteceding their damnation and presupposed to it; and that they happen with God knowing and permitting; but that they are not the effects of reprobation, nor is their cause to be ascribed to any decree of God, but simply to the free will of men.

XIII. But John Viguerius the Dominican, professor of Theology in the University of Toulouse, seems to be excepted from the common number in this part. For he seems to place sin among the positive effects of reprobation, although he denies that it is there from God. "The reason," he says, "is not similar concerning the cause of reprobation and of predestination, which as to all positive effects, does not have a cause in the one predestined, as reprobation does; which has only two positive effects in the one reprobated, namely, sin, and eternal punishment: free will is the cause of sin, and sin is the cause of eternal punishment."

XIV. But setting this aside, some Theologians of the Roman School do not recognize any other effect of reprobation, than exclusion from the heavenly kingdom, and damnation to the infernal punishments. And this because they take reprobation strictly for the decree alone of damning certain ones from foreseen sins, and of excluding them from glory. Nor do they think that God provides anything concerning the reprobate, from the intention of damning them, and afflicting them with eternal punishments, before their final perseverance in sin has been foreseen. And consequently they deny that the permission of sin, by which the reprobate are allowed to fall into various sins, is to be referred to reprobation, as its effect. Nor do they want the reason why God permits the sins of the reprobate, to be derived from the decree of their reprobation.

XV. But very many and most celebrated Doctors of the Roman Church number the permission of sin among the effects of reprobation. But not all in the same way. For there is no small diversity of opinions on this matter in the Roman School. In order that this may be able to be grasped better, it must be noted that God is said to permit sins insofar as he does not impede them. But God, as far as pertains to this proposition, impedes sin by giving that grace, which being posited, he sees that sin will not follow: but he does not impede, when he denies grace of this kind. And so God is considered to permit sins, when he denies that grace, which if he gave, these and those sins would not be committed.

XVI. But there is a twofold permission of sin of this kind. One by which God permits someone to fall into the first sin. The other by which he permits him to persevere in sin, and to become worse, by adding new sins to old ones, and by hardening himself more and more in evil. The former is simply called the permission of sin: the latter is specially called blinding, hardening, and aggravation.

XVII. Moreover, certain Doctors of the Roman Church think that absolutely every permission of sin in the reprobate is the effect of their reprobation. Thus in Martin Becanus in the sum of Scholastic Theology, first volume, on Reprobation question 2, this is his first conclusion. "The effects of reprobation in adults are four. The first is the permission of sin. The second, Hardening in sin. The third exclusion from the heavenly kingdom. The fourth infliction of the Punishment of sense." But his second conclusion reads thus. "The effects of reprobation in little ones are three. The first, is the permission

of contracting original sin. The second, the permission of dying in original sin. The third, exclusion from glory."

XVIII. But especially those who are called the more recent Thomists strictly hold this opinion, that the permission of any sin whatsoever, which finally issues in the damnation of the reprobate, is the effect of their reprobation, not excepting the permission of that first sin, by which our first parent failed, and fell from that innocence in which he had been created by God. Of which number is William Estius, as is clear from the things which he writes on the first book of the Sentences, Distinction 40, paragraph 11, where he proves and praises the opinion of those who teach that the permission of any sin whatsoever, even of that first one, which man, or Angel committed, is the effect of Divine providence concerning each and consequently also of the reprobation both of Angels, and of those men, who from that sin have been led, or are to be led into damnation.

XIX. But others indeed concede that some permission of sin in the reprobate is the effect of reprobation, such as is the permission of final perseverance in sin, and the permission of those sins, into which God allows the reprobate to fall in punishment of preceding sins, and because he wants to punish them for some one or more preceding offenses. But they deny that the permission by which someone already justified from sin, is permitted to relapse into sin on account of which he may be damned, is rightly referred to God reprobating. And much more do they deny that that permission, by which God permitted the Angel, or the first man, to fall into sin, innocence having been abandoned, can be called the effect of the reprobation of the Angel, or of men dying in original sin. And this because they want the permission of sin of this kind to be referred only to common providence, and the agreeable disposition of things, by which God allows rational creatures to use their liberty: And besides they think that the decree of reprobation, with respect to men, supposes the mass of the human race already corrupted by sin. Which is the opinion of Peter of St. Joseph, and of Eustachius of St. Paul, as can be seen from the things which they teach about reprobation in the places already cited before.

XX. Again, those who say that either every, or at least some permission of sin must be referred to reprobation, as effect to cause, do not all, as I have already indicated, understand this in the same way. For Estius and other more recent Thomists, while asserting that every permission of sin, with respect to the reprobate, is the effect of their reprobation, want it to be signified by this, that the permission of sin in the reprobate is ordained by God through the decree of reprobation, to the manifestation of his justice in the just damnation of the reprobate. As can be seen in Estius on the first book of the Sentences, Distinction 40, paragraph 5. "For," he says, "everything which God does concerning the reprobate, in order to the manifestation of his justice, through their just damnation, is called the effect of divine reprobation." And in the following paragraph he thence proves that the permission of sin is contained under the order of divine reprobation, as its effect, since in the reprobate it is ordained by God to the manifestation of the justice of God avenging sin.

XXI. But the Jesuits Becanus and Gregory of Valentia, when they teach that the permission of sin is the effect of reprobation, do not mean that God permits the sins of the reprobate, for the purpose that his justice may be manifested in their damnation. But they seem to refer that permission to other ends. Which Martin Becanus sufficiently indicates, while

distinguishing a twofold reprobation, or rather a twofold act of reprobation, one, namely, which is a certain rejection from grace, but the other which is a rejection from glory. And indeed he concedes that the effect of the former act is the permission of sin, and the hardening of the reprobate, but not of the latter. As can be seen in him in the place just now cited.

XXII. And similarly Peter of St. Joseph establishes that the permission of final perseverance in sin is the effect of negative reprobation, but not of positive, at least according to the ordinary law. Since from his mind, that permission indeed follows from the fact that God did not elect someone to life, and to that extent conducted himself negatively toward him, according to his mind, in which consists his negative reprobation; but it does not depend on that decree, by which God resolved to show his justice in the damnation of the reprobate, but rather presupposes such a decree as already made. Since God resolves to damn no one, ordinarily at least, except after foreseeing his final sin, that is, after he has foreseen that he will die in sin. Concerning which matter that Peter of St. Joseph must be consulted in the Idea of Speculative Theology, in the chapter on Election & Reprobation.

XXIII. But it is further asked, Whether the goods granted to the reprobate, and his very creation are effects of reprobation? The sense of which question is, Whether the creation of the reprobate, and the goods of different kinds, which are granted to them by God, are ordained by God through the decree of reprobation to the declaration of his justice, in their just and eternal damnation? This most Doctors of the Roman Church deny, as for example, Becanus, Gregory of Valentia, Eustachius of St. Paul, and Peter of St. Joseph, but the more recent Thomists, mentioned now more often, affirm it, and namely Estius in distinction 40 of the first book of the Sentences paragraph 5, where he inquires what effects are to be referred to Reprobation.

XXIV. For there he teaches clearly enough that all things which are provided by God concerning the reprobate are ordained to that end which is the manifestation of his justice; and consequently are to be referred to the decree of reprobation. For besides the permission of sin, hardening, and blinding, he says that there are many other things, which are rightly established as effects of reprobation, "Of which some," he says, "are remote, others near, others common, others singular, others indifferent in themselves, but ordained by God to the end of reprobation, but others determined in themselves." And afterwards he subjoins, "whence also it does not seem to be denied that the very creation of a reprobate man can be called the effect of his reprobation by this general reason. For men of this kind are created for the manifestation of the justice of God through their just damnation: in which way we defined the effect of reprobation above."

XXV. But in that paragraph where he expounds what are the effects of predestination, after he has said that certain effects of predestination are common to the predestined with the reprobate, for example, he subjoins these words, "As the incarnation, passion, merit and sacrifice of Christ, the preaching of the Gospel, and other things of this kind, which pertain indeed per se to the order of predestination, but nevertheless for some, who by their unbelief, and malice turn them for themselves into the matter of graver damnation, become effects of reprobation."

XXVI. Moreover, from that diversity of opinions, which obtains in the Roman School concerning the nature of reprobation, and its effects, it is ready to gather, how variously also it is necessary for them to think about its object. For those Doctors who include under the decree of reprobation all those acts of Divine providence, which are concerned with those who fall away from the highest end, and consequently number the very creation of the reprobate among its effects, which the more recent Thomist Doctors do, as has been said, those Doctors, I say, if they want to be consistent with themselves, cannot say that the object of reprobation is man who is considered as already made, and corrupted by sin, but simply man as able to be created. Which Estius acknowledges enough in distinction 40 of the first book of the Sentences, where he treats that question, Whether the permission of sin is the effect of reprobation? For responding to the sixth argument of the adverse opinion, "No necessity," he says, "compels us to say that the reprobation and predestination of men presupposes the corrupt mass."

XXVII. Nor can those who otherwise dissent from the more recent Thomists have that corrupt mass for the object of total reprobation, who nevertheless place the permission of any sin in the reprobate among the effects of reprobation, even of the first sin on account of which someone may be damned, and of original sin. Of which number are some Jesuits, and among others Martin Becanus, as is clear from the things which we have related above about him.

XXVIII. Nevertheless, very many Doctors of the Roman Church think that the reprobation of men, as also election supposes the mass of the human race already corrupt, and infected with Original sin. And so for the object of Reprobation they establish man as already fallen, and corrupted by original sin. Which opinion Peter of St. Joseph holds in Speculative Theology chapter 20, Resolution 5. And Eustachius also of St. Paul, Tractate 1 of the Theological Sum, Disputation 17.

XXIX. But those who restrict divine reprobation to the decree concerning certain men, on account of their foreseen final perseverance in sin, to be excluded from glory, and eternally damned, and think that its only effect is exclusion from glory, and the infliction of sempiternal punishment, they, I say, cannot have for the object of reprobation simply man as fallen and corrupted by sin in divine prevision, but man as foreseen dying in sin, whether that sin be actual, or only original.

XXX. But among the Doctors of the Roman Church the principal contention is about the Cause of Reprobation, Whether, namely, Reprobation, by reason of its effects, has some cause in man? And, Whether God reprobating man is moved to this by any evil merit of the reprobate man? And indeed all agree in this that Reprobation related to some of its effects, but especially to its ultimate effect, which is the eternal damnation of man, has a cause in man, namely his foreseen sin. For there is no one, as far as I know, among the Doctors of the Roman Church, who does not acknowledge that God, while by his eternal decree he adjudicates someone to eternal punishments, does this on account of his foreseen sins. But the question is, Whether reprobation related to all its effects together and collectively taken has a cause in man? And whether there is some evil merit in the reprobate, on account of which the whole effect of reprobation falls upon them?

XXXI. But this question can again still have a twofold sense. For reprobation can be considered in two ways, absolutely, or comparatively. Absolutely, as when it is simply asked, Whether he who has been reprobated is by some merit of his own worthy to have been reprobated by God in that way, that is, rejected from Grace, and Glory? Comparatively, as when it is asked, Whether there is present in the reprobate some cause, or reason, why they were reprobated rather than others. For it can happen that someone is in himself and simply worthy of some punishment, who nevertheless is not more worthy of that punishment than another who is rendered immune from it. For example, when a prince out of two thieves orders one to be hanged, but makes grace of the theft to the other, he who is hanged is worthy of hanging, and if it is asked simply, why the prince wanted him to be hanged, the reason for this will is in the thief, namely, that crime which he committed. But if someone asks, why since each was guilty of theft, the prince wanted this one to be punished by death according to his merit, rather than that one whom he dismisses free, the reason for this will is no longer in the thief, but must be referred entirely to the good pleasure of the prince. Therefore, in that way it can be asked, Whether Judas had in himself some evil merit, on account of which he was foreseen by God from eternity to be reprobated? Then supposing that in himself he was worthy to be reprobated by God, Whether a reason can be given from his side why he was reprobated rather than Peter?

XXXII. With these things thus expounded, there are two opinions on this question in the Roman School, which seem extreme, and fighting from the diameter. For there are some who assert that there is no effect of reprobation, which does not have some cause in man: and consequently that the whole decree of reprobation was constituted by God on account of some sin foreseen in man. And not only this, but besides they hold that a reason can be given from the side of the reprobate, why they were reprobated rather than others, especially, if the question is about adults, namely, their perseverance in sin, which God foreseeing from eternity reprobated them rather than others. It is necessary for those to think this way who restrict divine reprobation to the will alone of damning certain ones. For with the whole Roman School consenting, God wills to damn no one before his sin has been foreseen: and the sins in which someone dies are the reason why he is damned rather than another who does not similarly die in sins. And those Doctors of the Roman Church also come to this opinion, who want some reason, or cause of predestination to be found in man. For they think that the cause of reprobation, in whatever way it is considered, either comparatively, or absolutely, either as to all effects, or as to only some, resides with the reprobate much more.

XXXIII. But others, on the contrary, contend that total reprobation, and accepted according to the whole latitude of its effects, has absolutely no cause from the side of man, in whatever way finally it may be considered, whether absolutely, or comparatively. For they do not simply say that no reason can be given from the side of men, why these were reprobated rather than others: but besides they contend that of reprobation, as to all its effects, there is no merit in the reprobate man, and that the entire and total decree of reprobation follows the prevision of no sin. Which opinion it is necessary for all those to hold, if they want to be consistent with themselves, who teach that the permission of any sin whatsoever, which issues in the damnation of the reprobate, is contained under the decree of reprobation. For if the permission of the first sin is included under the decree of

reprobation, since the same sin cannot be the cause of its permission, it follows that it cannot be called the cause of the whole reprobation, and much less can any of those sins which follow the first.

XXXIV. But this especially follows from the doctrine of those, who refer the very creation of the reprobate to reprobation, as a cause, and consequently establish for the object of reprobation, not man made and fallen, but simply man as able to be created. Which, as was said before, the more recent Thomists do, as Alvarez, Estius, Rispolis, and others. But besides them many, who do not think with them in all things in this business also, strictly hold this doctrine, that no cause of reprobation, as neither of election, can be given from the side of men. Among whom are Cajetan, as is clear from the things which he writes on the question of Thomas about Predestination. Sixtus of Siena in Sacred Library book 6, Annotation 252. And in book 2, letter R, where he treats of the book of Repudiation. Domingo Bañez on the first part of Thomas question 23. Puteanus on the above said question of Thomas. And with Estius relating it in distinction 41 of the first book of the Sentences, Peter of Soto, Jodocus Tiletanus, Titelmannus, Guillaudus, and other writers of the previous age.

XXXV. But especially among the old Scholastics this opinion was very common and celebrated, which Giles of Rome, Bassolius, Marsilius, Gregory of Rimini, Denis the Cistercian, Lyra on chapter 9 of the Epistle to the Romans, and others held whom Estius cites in the remembered place and Vásquez on the question of Thomas about predestination, where he disputes at length about the cause of Reprobation. Thus, for example, among many conclusions which Gregory of Rimini posits about predestination the fourth is, "That no one is reprobated on account of the evil use of free will, which God foreknew he would have." The fifth, "That no one is reprobated, because he was foreknown to be finally with an obstacle to divine grace." The sixth, "That whomever God reprobated, he reprobated him without any cause in the reprobate himself." And similarly these are the words of Marsilius of Inghen, "No one predestined is predestined on account of some cause, which ought to exist in him in the future. Similarly neither is anyone reprobated reprobated on account of some cause, which ought to be in him in the future." In book 1 of the Sentences, Distinction 42, question 4.

XXXVI. But between these opinions which we have just now related, there is a certain other middle one, which establishes that reprobation considered absolutely indeed has from the side of man some reason and cause, nor did God reprobate anyone, except after some sin of his was foreseen, or evil merit, on account of which he was in himself worthy, to be reprobated by God: But nevertheless, if reprobation is considered conjointly with election, and in opposition to it, then it must be referred to the good pleasure of God alone, nor can any reason for it be assigned from the side of men. For they do not simply say that no reason can be given from the side of the reprobate, why they were reprobated rather than others, nor do the foreseen sins of any reprobate cause why he was reprobated rather than another, nor why he was elected to life: since in many of the elect the same sins are found as in many of the reprobate, or perhaps even graver ones, and Original sin is common to all both elect and reprobate. Gregory of Valentia, Eustachius of St. Paul, and Peter of St.

Joseph hold this opinion, and among the more recent Theologians not a few follow it today.

XXXVII. But among those themselves who think that from the side of men some cause is given of reprobation, at least considered absolutely, a great variety of opinions is still found, while they explain what that cause is. For there are some who constitute the cause of reprobation, as to its first effect, which according to them is the first denial of grace, and congruous vocation, by which man is rejected from the grace of the predestined, in the sin of the first parent alone, but not in any proper sin of those who are reprobated, whether that sin is established as actual, or original. For they think that the permission of any sin whatsoever, and the denial of grace must be justly attributed to the merit of the sin of the first parent: but that the permission of original sin in little ones who are reprobated, or the permission of the first actual sin in reprobate adults, who after the remission of original sin fall away from the grace of God, and relapse into sin, can justly be ascribed to no other sin. This is the opinion of Gabriel Vásquez vol. 1, disputation 95, chapter 3 and following. To which opinion Becanus approaches in the sum of Theology where he treats of the cause of Reprobation.

XXXVIII. But others, having followed Augustine in this part, think that a reason for the first effect of reprobation or rejection from the grace of the predestined, can be sought from original sin, by which they think that men presented to God reprobating are defiled; but that it must not be referred to other sins. For they think that in punishment of original sin all aids of grace are denied which are not granted, and that that sin is a sufficient cause, why God can justly deny to all, both little ones, and adults, the aids & remedies of his grace, but actually denies them to those who are reprobated: but they think that the denial of the first congruous and efficacious grace cannot be attributed to another sin.

XXXIX. To this opinion Peter of St. Joseph approaches. "It is more probable," he says, "that the negative reprobation of men was not constituted, except on account of Original sin foreseen." And a little afterwards, "It must be said," he says, "that a sin of this kind was simply the cause on account of which God willed to reprobate men negatively, even if it was not the cause, why he reprobated this one rather than that one in that way; since all were equally infected with original sin." In the Idea of Speculative Theology book 1, chapter 20, Resolution 5.

XL. But some think that in all the reprobate, the same cause of reprobation even as to its first effect must not be assigned. For they say that the cause of reprobation, from the side of the reprobate, in certain ones is original sin alone, namely, in little ones who die without Baptism: but in certain ones actual sin alone, namely in those reprobate to whom original sin has been remitted through baptism, or another remedy: finally in certain ones original and actual sin at the same time, namely in those reprobate to whom the grace of justification is never granted, and to whom original sin has never been remitted. This opinion, with Domingo Bañez relating it, Domingo de Soto held writing on chapter 9 of the Epistle to the Romans, and Peter de Soto major Professor of Salamanca.

XLI. But what is amazing among those themselves who number the permission of sin among the effects of reprobation, and with Thomas concede that reprobation includes the

will of permitting the guilt of certain men, and not only of inflicting the punishment of damnation for guilt, there are nevertheless some who teach that the cause of reprobation is the death of men and final perseverance in sin, whether actual, or original. Which latter dogma certainly cannot cohere with the former according to right reason. For the permission of sin cannot follow the prevision of final sin, since the prevision of sin is posterior to its permission. For God foresees no sin, which he has not first decreed with himself to permit. And yet this is the opinion of Gregory of Valentia. "The second opinion is," he says, "to be defended by us in every way, which asserts that those sins with which the reprobate departs from life, are the meritorious cause of his reprobation, not only as to the ultimate effect of reprobation, which is eternal punishment; but also as to that first effect, which is that permission of which we have spoken above." Vol. 1, question 23, disputation 1, point 3.

XLII. But again of those who simply deny that there is any cause of reprobation, considered as to all its acts and effects, there is not the same mind and opinion, nor are all led by the same reasons to assert this. For some constituting reprobation from two acts, one positive, which is the destining to eternal punishments, but the other negative, which is the passing over and abandonment of certain ones, while others are elected and predestined to eternal life, therefore say that no cause of total reprobation is given from the side of men: since that negative act by which the first part of reprobation consists, indeed follows the prevision of original sin, by which the whole mass of the human race is corrupted, but nevertheless is not done on account of that sin, nor is that sin its meritorious cause: since many infected with the same sin are not reprobated. Which is the opinion of Bellarmine on grace and free will book 2, last chapter.

XLIII. But others therefore deny that any cause of total reprobation is given, since the permission of any sin whatsoever, which issues in the perdition of the reprobate, is the effect of reprobation. But the permission of the first sin cannot be referred to the prevision of any sin as a cause: since no sin is prior to the first sin. Otherwise they think that God decreed to exclude no one from glory, except on account of his foreseen sins. In which opinion are most of those who deny that reprobation is from foreseen merits, or that any reason for it is given from the side of man. For they understand this about total reprobation, as has already been said, which includes the decree of denying the grace of the predestined, but not about that part of reprobation, which is the decree of rejecting someone from glory.

XLIV. But there are some who deny that a cause of reprobation is given for this reason, since God by a positive act decreed to exclude certain men from life and celestial glory, before he foresaw any of their sins. Vásquez in the place cited above attributes this opinion to Antonio Córdoba: and the more recent Thomists follow and profess it, and among others Diego Alvarez, as the things which we have related above from him make manifest.

Part II

In which is expounded the Doctrine of those who among Protestants are called Reformed by a singular name, and is compared with the Doctrine of the Roman School.

I. From the Reformed Theologians not a few seem to include under the decree of Reprobation whatever things God decreed and ordained from eternity concerning those who fall away from salvation, and are adjudged to the punishments of hell. For they refer back to the decree of reprobation the act of the divine will by which God decreed to create the reprobate and to permit any sins of theirs whatsoever: and they think that God created the reprobate with that intention, and permitted their sins, even that first one by which they are born infected, so that at last he might show himself the avenger of sin in their just punishment.

II. For taking predestination in a certain general sense, as it includes under itself election and reprobation as two species, they define it thus. "Predestination is the eternal, most just and immutable counsel of God, concerning creating men, concerning permitting their fall into sin, and eternal death, concerning sending the son into the flesh, so that he may become a victim, and concerning saving some through the Holy Spirit and the Word, on account of the Mediator, in true faith and conversion, justifying through & on account of him, raising to glory, and gifting with eternal life, but concerning leaving some in sin and death, raising them to judgment, and casting them away into eternal punishments." Which is the description of Ursinus in part 2 of the Catechetical explication, in the chapter on predestination, question 2.

III. The definition of Jerome Zanchius agrees which he conceives in these words. "Predestination is the eternal and immutable decree of God, by which he established with himself from eternity: first to create all men, then to permit them both to fall into sin, and to rush into death: then of these to gift some freely with both his grace, and eternal life in Christ, but not to deem others worthy of this grace, but both to blind, and harden them with Satan, and to destroy them with eternal destruction: and this so that in the former the divine goodness and mercy, but in the latter the divine power and justice may be declared: and thus in all God may be glorified." Volume seven, tract on predestination number 9.

IV. The description of Bucanus is related. "The decree of predestination," he says, "is that by which God, now then when constituting to what end he would found them, men to be created by him, before he founded them, decreed, according to his right and mere will, for them so to serve his glory, that some of them would be vessels and examples of his goodness and mercy, but others vessels of his wrath, that is, of just vengeance on crimes, and of power." Topic 36, question 8.

V. The same also is the doctrine of Beza, who in the brief explication of the whole of Christianity, places the decree of predestination in this, that God decreed to create men, as all other things, for his glory, but in two ways entirely different: namely, so that he may make some, whom it will have seemed good to him, according to his secret will, partakers of his glory, through mercy, but in others, whom it likewise will have pleased him to raise up for that use, show his wrath and power, so that in them also he may be glorified. Chapter

2 on predestination, Aphorism 2. And in chapter five, Aphorism one, he repeats that the Lord created the reprobate for this reason, so that he may be glorified in their just condemnation.

VI. Moreover, Gomarus, Piscator, Twisse, and Voetius approach the same opinion. And so all hold and profess it who among the Reformed are called supralapsarians, because, while assigning the object of predestination, they ascend above the fall of man.

VII. But nevertheless the greater part of the Doctors of the Reformed Church do not think that the decree concerning creating man, and concerning permitting the fall of the first man, and so the ruin of the whole human race following thence, makes a part of reprobation. For they refer back the whole decree of reprobation to that will, by which God decreed not to elect certain men, but to leave them in their own sins, and at last to damn them justly on account of their sins.

VIII. This was the opinion of the Synod of Dort, which in the chapter on divine predestination, Article XV, places the decree of reprobation in this, that God from his most free, most just, and immutable good pleasure, decreed to leave certain men in the common misery, into which they precipitated themselves by their own fault, and not to gift them with saving faith and conversion; but with them having been left in their own ways, and under just judgment, at last to damn and eternally punish them not only on account of unbelief, but also all other sins, for the declaration of his justice.

IX. With which definition most of the particular judgments of the Theologians who were present at that Synod agree. Thus in the judgment of the Theologians of Nassau, this is their first thesis on Reprobation. "The will of God by which he wisely, freely, and immutably decreed from eternity, out of the whole miserable and sinful human race, not to elect certain ones, and to damn them justly on account of their sins, is the whole decree of reprobation." And this was also the opinion of the Theologians of Leiden, as can be seen in the theses of Rivet on reprobation thesis 3.

X. Moreover, these Theologians are accustomed to distinguish a twofold act in reprobation. One is said by them to be negative, by which God decreed from eternity not to elect this one, but to pass over him, and not to lift him up from the fall: but the other positive, or of affirmation, by which he decreed to destine sinners having been left to themselves, and having abused the administration of common providence, by which they are not destitute, after long toleration, to deserved punishments, and to effect them with the same. Which are the words of Rivet in the same disputation thesis seven.

XI. Polyander agrees in the theses on reprobation published in the year 1625, thesis 19, where in reprobation he observes two distinct preordinations. "The former," he says, "is negative, which is designated by the terms of preterition and non-election, the latter is affirmative, which is designated by the word of predamnation."

XII. But if it is asked in which of those preordinations reprobation chiefly consists, here the opinions of the Doctors seem to vary. And indeed Polyander seems to place reprobation especially in this last preordination. For while defining reprobation, he expressly mentions only it in thesis 18. "Reprobation," he says, "is the predestination of certain men having

fallen into sin, and detaining the truth of God in injustice, or rejecting the Gospel preached to them in various ways and degrees, to the destruction of eternal death."

XIII. The older Doctors also of the Reformed School seem to place the reason of reprobation chiefly in the predestination of certain men to destruction and sempiternal death, as is clear from their definitions. But the Synod of Dort in reprobation especially considers the decree concerning denying grace to certain men, by which their hearts would be bent and softened to faith and repentance. As can be seen in the chapter on predestination, Article VI. "Which," it says, "that some in time are gifted with faith by God, others are not gifted, proceeds from his eternal decree, according to which decree he graciously softens the hearts of the elect, however hard, and bends them to believing, but leaves the non-elect, by just judgment, in their own malice and hardness. And here especially that profound, both merciful and just discrimination of men equally lost, or, that decree of election and reprobation revealed in the Word of God, opens itself to us."

XIV. Similarly Rivet in that disputation on reprobation, which is the fifth of those thirteen which he had on the just and gracious dispensation of God concerning the salvation of the human race, properly constitutes reprobation in that negative act, by which God from eternity did not elect certain men, but passed over them. For these are his words in thesis 8. "With these things premised we say that for that negative act, namely preterition which properly is reprobation, insofar as it is opposed to election, no cause is required, which ought to have preceded, so that it might move God to reprobate."

XV. Indeed the Theologians of Great Britain in their judgment which is had in the acts of the Synod of Dort place the whole reason of reprobation in that negative act, by which God resolved not to bestow on certain men that grace, by which the elect are led efficaciously and infallibly to faith and salvation. For thus they speak in the second chapter of that judgment of theirs. "On Reprobation, Thesis one Orthodox. Reprobation properly speaking, or non-election, is the eternal decree of God, by which with most free will he determined not to have mercy on certain men fallen in Adam to that extent, that he might efficaciously rescue them from their misery through Christ, and infallibly lead them to felicity." And afterwards they subjoin, in their judgment, reprobation insofar as it is opposed to election, does not infer, or denote any other proper actions, beyond the negation of the same glory, and the same grace, which God prepared for his sons in his election.

XVI. But the Professors of Saumur seem to restrict reprobation to the sole negation of saving grace. For they openly distinguish the decree of reprobation from the decree of damnation. And they define temporal reprobation, of which the eternal decree is that reprobation about which the question now is, through exclusion from saving grace. For thus their Thesis xxxvi reads in the former disputation on Election & Reprobation, "Damnation itself is one thing, reprobation another: also the decree of damnation is one thing, the decree of reprobation another, and the cause of each decree. Damnation is the most just infliction of punishment deservedly owed. Reprobation is the exclusion, or denial of the saving grace of God, by which man believes, and is led by true repentance." With which Paul Testard teaches agreeable things in the Synopsis of Doctrine on Nature & Grace. Thesis 294. "Reprobation," he says, "is the purpose of hardening, that is, of

delivering over to a reprobate mind, with efficacious grace of calling not granted by just judgment. But less properly and with a more extended signification beyond that purpose, the decree of condemning and afflicting, both with temporal punishments with malediction, and with eternal ones."

XVII. Moreover, just as the Reformed Theologians variously define Reprobation, and include more or fewer acts of divine providence under it, so also they variously assign its effects, or, as some prefer to speak, its consequences, and the means by which it is carried out. For those who define reprobation so broadly, that it includes the decree concerning creating man, and permitting the fall of the human race, and who want God to have created certain men for that end, that he might show and make known the glory of his justice in their just condemnation, they, I say, necessarily have to number among the effects, or means of reprobation the creation of the reprobate, and the permission of any sin which is the cause, or occasion of their perdition. Thus according to Zacharias Ursinus, the effects of reprobation are 1. the creation of the reprobate, 2. the privation of divine grace or desertion. By which name he seems to understand the permission of any sin. Catechetical Institution part 2 on Predestination question 4.

XVIII. The same is the Doctrine of Zanchius in the sum of lectures which is had in volume seven, tract on predestination number 22. "To be created," he says, "and to be allowed to fall into sins and into death are effects of predestination common to the elect and the reprobate. But to be deserted perpetually in sins, to be blinded, hardened, and finally damned are effects of reprobation proper to the impious." William Perkins also teaches that the common means of the predestination of men, both to death, and to life, is the creation of man, and the permission of the fall. But he understands that permission by which God justly permitted the defection of Adam and his posterity, by not impeding when he was able. As can be seen in his little book on predestination immediately under the beginning. To which Polanus agrees in Theological Syntagma book 4, chapter 10, where in Thesis 3 he teaches that the effects of Reprobation are the excitation, or creation of the reprobate, so that God may show his power and justice in them: Then the permission of the fall or of sin in which the reprobate perish.

XIX. Similarly Bucanus topic 36, question 38 among the common means of reprobation places the creation of man in integrity and justice, then the fall of men and their corruption. And question 39 among the peculiar means of execution of the decree concerning reprobating men he refers the infinite offspring of actual sins: which if they are means of reprobation, their permission is the effect of reprobation.

XX. But although he and others from the Reformed Theologians number various sins of the reprobate, indeed even the very fall of the first man, among the means, or consequences of reprobation, they nevertheless do not want any sins to be called effects of reprobation, and they teach that God indeed wills to permit them, but not truly to effect them. As can be seen in Ursinus and Bucanus in the cited places. Especially in Polanus in that tenth chapter of the fourth book, where treating of the effects of reprobation, he proves with many arguments that sin is not the effect of eternal reprobation. Nor do they want sins to be means per se serving the end of predestination, or reprobation, but only per accidens,

and from the ordination of God eliciting good from evil. As can be seen in Perkins in the place now indicated.

XXI. Here nevertheless some Theologians distinguish between sins, insofar as they are sins, and between the same sins, insofar as they are sometimes the punishments of other sins. And they deny indeed that sins, simply as they are sins, are effects of reprobation; but they contend that certain sins in the reprobate both are, and deservedly are called effects of reprobation, insofar as they are the punishment of preceding sins. Of which sort is the blindness of mind, and hardness of heart of those who are delivered over to a reprobate sense; which namely, as it is the punishment of preceding rebellion, must be referred to reprobation as a cause: although in itself, and under the aspect of sin, it is not a properly so called effect of reprobation.

XXII. Which is the Doctrine of Zacharias Ursinus in the place cited before. where also, which is harder, he places perseverance in sins expressly and explicitly among the effects of reprobation. Which nevertheless is approved by neither others, nor ought to be approved. Since perseverance in sins is itself the greatest sin, and so cannot be referred to the decree of God, as a cause, without God being established as the author of sin as a consequence.

XXIII. Indeed it does not even seem that it should be said that sin, as it is punishment, is from reprobation, and is inflicted by God, as Ursinus speaks. For sin is never punishment properly so called, and inflicted by God, but when God in punishment of some sin deserts the sinner, and permits him to himself, whence it happens that he becomes worse, and falls into graver crimes, that which has the aspect of punishment is that desertion, and abandonment of God: but when sins are then said to be punished by sins it is an improper locution.

XXIV. But it is asked among the Doctors of the Reformed School whether the reprobate can be said to be preordained and destined by the decree of God to sinning. To this Zanchius Responds, that no one indeed is predestined to committing sin, insofar as it is sin, but nevertheless both the elect, and the reprobate were preordained to sin, even as it is sin, insofar as from it the glory of God was to be illustrated, and is illustrated, which are the words of his sixth Thesis on Reprobation question two, which is had in chapter two of Book five on the nature of God.

XXV. But that is said harshly, and with some offense to pious ears, and it is simply false that anyone was predestined, or preordained by God to sin, as it is sin, whatever restriction may afterwards be added: although to this both the elect and the reprobate were preordained, that they might be allowed to fall and lapse into various sins, and God also preordained to illustrate his glory from their sins, which he himself permitted.

XXVI. Others here distinguish between an effective and an approbative decree, and between a moderating or permissive one, and from an effective and approbative decree indeed they deny that the sins of the reprobate come to be: but they contend that they are truly and legitimately attributed to the decree of God which they call moderating and permissive: so that, according to them, men can be said to be preordained to sinning by a permissive decree, but not by an effective one. Which is the doctrine and distinction of Bucanus topic 36, question 40. To which the Doctrine of Perkins is related in the book on

Predestination, Response to the third accusation. But to others, and more rightly, it seems that harsh Locutions of this kind must be avoided.

XXVII. But setting this aside, since most of the Reformed Theologians think that the total decree of reprobation includes no other acts of the divine will, than that by which God decreed to leave certain men in the mass of sin, and at last to damn them justly on account of their sins, it follows from their opinion that the permission of the sin of the first man, and of original sin following from it, is not to be referred to reprobation, as its effect, but only pertains to common providence.

XXVIII. And much more is it necessary for them to assert the same about creation, which from their mind, does not depend on reprobation, as from a cause, but from a certain decree of common providence, which according to our way of conceiving, precedes the decree of reprobation, and is presupposed by it.

XXIX. But the permission of those sins, which in the reprobate follow original sin, and the negation of grace which is conferred on the elect, and at last eternal death, which is repaid to the sins of the reprobate by the just judgment of God, they reckon and acknowledge as proper effects and consequences of reprobation. As can be seen in the Theses of Rivet on Reprobation.

XXX. In this part nevertheless Peter du Moulin recedes from the common opinion. For he simply denies that the permission of sin is the effect of reprobation. And he disapproves the definition of Thomas, who says that the decree of reprobation is the will of permitting someone to fall into guilt, and of inflicting the punishment of damnation for guilt. "For," he says, "the permission by which God permits sin does not pertain to predestination, but to providence, however much it may serve predestination." In the Anatomy of Arminianism chapter 26, number 4.

XXXI. But those who restrict the decree of reprobation to the will alone of denying to certain men efficacious and salvific grace, by which the elect are gifted with true faith and repentance, which the Professors of Saumur do, as has already been said, and Testard in Irenicum, they, I say, do not think that damnation is the proper and immediate effect of reprobation, but only the negation of that efficacious grace, which works faith and repentance in the elect.

XXXII. But just as the Reformed Theologians variously define reprobation, and include more or fewer decrees of God under the name of reprobation, nor assign its effects in the same way, so also their opinions vary concerning its object. For those who think that the decree concerning creating man, and permitting his fall makes a part of reprobation, as Polanus, Beza, Zanchius, Gomarus, Ursinus, Bucanus, Twisse, and others, they want the object of reprobation considered according to all its acts to be, not man fallen and made, but simply man able to be created. Which opinion Voetius the Professor of Utrecht most fiercely defended a few years ago.

XXXIII. But some teach that the object of predestination generally taken, and so of reprobation, is man, considered indeed as made, but as not yet corrupted by sin. Which is the opinion of Francis Junius in the Friendly Collation with James Arminius on Predestination.

XXXIV. But according to the mind of the Synod of Dort, and most of the Doctors of the Reformed School today, the object of reprobation is not man simply as created and made in the prevision of God, but whom God considers, as fallen in Adam, and infected with Original sin. For in describing the decree of reprobation they do not ascend above the fall of man.

XXXV. But according to Sohnius once Professor of Heidelberg, the object of reprobation, as also of election, is not man simply as fallen in Adam, and corrupted by sin, but besides as called by God, and called and invited to faith and repentance, either through the Word, or through the works of nature and providence. As can be seen in that author in the tract on eternal predestination.

XXXVI. But with him in this part the Theologians of Bremen seem to agree in their judgment offered to the Synod of Dort, and the Salmurians in their Theses, and others who assent to them in the Doctrine on universal Grace. For they think that God, before he decreed to make any distinction between men through election and reprobation, determined to prepare Christ as redeemer for all in common, and to call and invite all to the participation of that grace by various grades and ways: and only then, when he saw that all, if left to themselves, would be unbelieving and impenitent, decreed to overcome the hardness and contumacy of certain ones by his grace, but to harden others, by not bestowing similar grace on them, and by permitting, that they resist God calling and inviting, and do not obey him.

XXXVII. Now as regards the cause of reprobation, that is, that question, Whether there is given from the side of man a cause, or certain condition from the prevision of which God was moved and induced to reprobate this or that man, or through which this and that one is worthy to have been reprobated from eternity, the Reformed Theologians also go away into various opinions. For those who describe reprobation so broadly, that it includes the eternal counsel of God concerning creating the reprobate, and permitting any of their falls: and who constitute the object of reprobation man, not made and fallen in divine prevision, but simply man able to be created, and number creation among the common means of reprobation, and the permission of the fall of the first man, they, I say, constantly and concordantly affirm that of the whole reprobation, and of all its acts and effects together and collectively taken, no reason or cause is given from the side of man, from the prevision of which God was impelled to reprobate this or that man, and through which this and that one by some merit of his own was worthy that the whole effect of reprobation should fall upon him. And so they not only contend that it depends on the good pleasure of God alone why that one was reprobated rather than this one, but also that God reprobating foresaw nothing more in the reprobate, why they were worthy to be reprobated by God, than he foresaw something in the elect, by which they would deserve to be elected by God, and predestined to life. Whence it follows that total and entire reprobation, in whatever way finally it may be considered, whether comparatively, or absolutely, must be referred to the sole and mere will of God: nor can any reason for it be sought and given from the future sins of men.

XXXVIII. If anyone nevertheless considers the effects of reprobation one by one and separately, they acknowledge that certain of them have merit in man and are justly brought

upon the reprobate by their sins. As, for example, the punishment of eternal damnation, which is the ultimate effect of reprobation, from the opinion of all Theologians, is inflicted on no reprobate, except on account of his sins, and evil demerits. And they think the same about hardening and blinding, and about that desertion by which the impious are delivered over to a reprobate sense, which are most just punishments by which God is accustomed to vindicate the contempt of his grace.

XXXIX. But if it pleases to divide the decree of reprobation into various acts, and partial decrees, and to consider separately that act of the divine will, by which the reprobate are destined and ordained to eternal death, the Theologians already mentioned, who from the fact that, while assigning the object of predestination, they ascend above the fall of man, are called supralapsarians, do not seem to think entirely the same thing, but to go away into different opinions. For many of them contend that God from eternity destined certain men to the eternal torments of hell, before the prevision of any guilt to be future in them: and consequently that the decree concerning damning these and those men has no reason or cause from the side of men: indeed that decree must be conceived as something prior to the decree concerning permitting the sins of the reprobate; which latter decree follows the prevision of the sins into which the reprobate, with God permitting, fall.

XL. This is the express doctrine of Polanus in Theological Syntagma book 4, chapter 10. On the efficient cause of eternal Reprobation. where this is his second Thesis. "The impelling efficient cause on account of which the decree of reprobation, whether affirmatively, or negatively, was made by God, is not sin, to which pertains also the evil use of free will." But in the third Thesis he denies that the eternal prevision of sin is the cause of the decree of reprobation. And this because, according to his opinion, in the same chapter where he explains the nature of reprobation, God in the decree of predestination first ordained creatures to their end, namely either to life, or to eternal death; then only subordinated means to executing his counsel; among which means the sins of the reprobate have a place.

XLI. Jerome Zanchius also teaches the same thing in book five on the Nature of God, chapter two. where he refutes those who indeed confess that the mere will of God, but not the foreseen sins of men, is the cause of negative reprobation, which is that decree by which he determined not to have mercy on certain ones, and to deny them his grace; but of affirmative reprobation; that is, of that decree by which God resolved to adjudge certain ones to eternal punishments, they contend that the cause is the sins of the impious, but not the will of God alone, whom he says are deceived in this, that they assert that the primary cause, why God destined certain ones to eternal death is their foreseen evil works, and deny that it is the will of God alone. Since sins, from his mind, are indeed the cause of damnation in the impious, but not the cause of the divine decree concerning damning and punishing them, which in God, according to him, precedes the prevision of all sins, and so the decree concerning permitting the fall of the human race: which, according to him, as a decree concerning means, is subordinated to the former decree, as to a decree concerning the end. "This," he says, "was the first thing which God constituted from eternity concerning the reprobate, namely the destining of certain men to sempiternal destruction. But to this were ordained their sins, and to sins desertion, and the denial of grace."

XLII. With these Beza also agrees in the brief explication of the whole of Christianity, chapter two, Aphorism five. Where he says, when it is a question of the destruction of the reprobate, although the whole guilt remains within themselves, nevertheless the Spirit of God conveys us up to that lofty mystery, which precedes in order all the causes of their damnation; of which secret indeed no other cause is known to men, beyond the just will of God himself. And Beza also was followed by Piscator, which is manifest even from this, that he makes the decree concerning permitting the fall of Adam far posterior to the decree concerning damning the reprobate, and inserts many other decrees, as William Twisse relates in the Perkinsian vindications, Digression one, on the object of predestination.

XLIII. Moreover although that Twisse reprehends Piscator and others in this, that they establish that the decree concerning damning certain ones is prior in reason to the prevision of sin, at the same time nevertheless he also denies that that prevision in God is prior to the decree of damnation. For he teaches that the decree concerning damning certain ones, and the decree concerning permitting their sins, and the very prevision of those sins are in God by nature and reason at the same time, and are coordinated things, but not subordinated. And consequently he nevertheless agrees with them in this, that foreseen sins are in no way the cause, or reason why God by an eternal decree assigned certain ones to sempiternal damnation.

XLIV. But Perkins, although otherwise from the number of those Doctors who are called supralapsarians, affirms indeed that the entire decree of reprobation in God precedes all consideration of sin in the men to be reprobated, and so that no reason for it, or motive can be assigned from the side of men, but that it must be referred to the sole will of God: but nevertheless he reckons that that act of the divine will, by which certain men are ordained to punishment, has in God a certain preceding prevision and consideration of sin. For he teaches that of the decree of reprobation there is a twofold act. The former, according to him, is the purpose of deserting certain men, and of declaring justice in them. Of this act he affirms that an impulsive cause outside God cannot be given: since, as he thinks, it arises from the mere good pleasure of God, no respect having been had either of good, or of evil in the creature. He says that the second act of reprobation is the ordination to punishment, or to just destruction. But he again distinguishes this ordination, according to the various mode of thinking into simple and comparative. Simple ordination for him is that by which this one, say Cain, or Judas, is ordained to punishment. And he says that this is done by God with respect to Original or actual sins, and that sin in divine foreknowledge precedes it by reason of order, although he denies that it follows thence that sin is the cause of the decree of damnation. But he says that comparative ordination is that by which one, not another, and in an equal condition this one more than that one is ordained to punishment. And of that comparative reprobation he asserts that the cause is the mere will of God, even without respect to any sin.

XLV. In which matter he seems to err. Since, just as he before collects, that just as God damns men on account of sin, so he decreed to damn them on account of sin: so we can collect that just as God damns this one rather than that one, since this one not that one dies in sins: so also he decreed to damn this one rather than that one, because he foresaw that this one rather than that one would die in sin.

XLVI. As it pertains to those for whom the object of reprobation is man fallen and corrupted by sin, all agree in this that God addicted no one to damnation by his eternal decree, except from his sin foreseen, and on account of his sin to be future. Indeed from their doctrine it manifestly follows that the entire decree of reprobation, in God has a certain previous consideration of sin once to be future in the man to be reprobated.

XLVII. Nevertheless to that question, Whether the decree of reprobation has some cause in man, which impelled God to reprobate this and that one, very many of them respond through the distinction. Namely, as has already been observed, they distinguish two acts in the decree of reprobation. One negative, by which God decreed to pass over certain men in the communication of salutary grace and eternal glory, which he destines for the elect. But the other positive, by which he resolved to addict them to the eternal supplices of hell. And they deny that the cause of that former negative act must be sought in the merits of men, but they assert that it must be referred to the will of God alone. But of the latter positive and affirmative act, by which certain men are destined to eternal damnation, they confess that the cause must not be referred to the will of God alone, but to the foreseen sins of those who are foreknown to be about to merit that damnation. Which doctrine is handed down by nearly all the Theologians, who were present at the Synod of Dort by common consent, As can be seen in their judgments, which are found subjoined to the Canons of that Synod in its acts.

XLVIII. But others add another distinction expounded by us above. For if reprobation is desired comparatively, and it is asked, for example, why Judas was reprobated rather than Peter, then they deny that the sins and evil merits of men are the cause of it: whether regard is had to that former negative act, which is called non-election, or preterition, or even to the latter affirmative act, which they call predamnation. For although God foresaw demerit of damnation in Judas, before he ordained him by his decree to damnation, nevertheless in many of the elect he foresaw sins which would have sufficed for their damnation, unless he had decreed to use mercy toward them.

XLIX. But if reprobation is considered absolutely, and the question is, Whether this one, or that one was worthy by some merit of his own whom God would reprobate, then they respond that the foreseen sins of the reprobate were a sufficient cause on account of which God could justly reprobate and reject them, and that not only with respect to the latter act, which is predamnation; but also with respect to the former, which is preterition and the denial of grace, although they affirm it less boldly and explicitly, than about the latter. Which is the Doctrine of Rivet disputation on Predestination. For thus he speaks in thesis thirteen. "It is one thing to inquire concerning the cause why the reprobate are worthy of reprobation, another why God reprobated this one rather than that one? The former must be sought and established in sin, but the latter in the secret will of God alone."

L. But Louis Cappel in the first part of the Theses on Election & Reprobation, which are inserted in the second Volume of the Saumur Theses, denies indeed that the decree concerning not electing, or passing over certain men in the communication of salutary and efficacious grace, has a cause from the side of men, if the elect and reprobate are compared among themselves; although if this preterition is considered absolutely, they who are

reprobated are worthy of that preterition by their own merit and sin, and were considered as such by God, while the decree of reprobation was framed by him.

LI. But as regards the decree concerning damning certain ones, in whatever way finally it may be considered, he affirms that its cause and merit is in the sins of men. Namely, their foreseen sins, were not only the cause why they were adjudicated to eternal damnation by the decree of God, but also why they rather than others. For he does not want anyone to be preordained to eternal damnation, except from the prevision of final unbelief and impenitence. as can be seen in thesis 36. But in the following thesis these are his Words. "Of reprobation, if it is considered in itself and absolutely, the cause is sin, that is, man as a sinner deserves to be reprobated by God, or is worthy to whom God may deny, if he wills, his grace and the gift of faith, he is unworthy to whom God may confer so great a benefit. But God Reprobates no one, or excludes from grace, except him whom he considered lying in sin and corrupted, and foresaw from eternity." But in thesis 38 "Of reprobation," he says, "considered comparatively no other cause is than the mere good pleasure of God."

LII. Moreover those Theologians who teach that reprobation, at least considered absolutely, has from sin foreseen in men a cause, motive, or reason, do not explain for the most part what sin they mean. Whether Original sin alone, Whether also actual, and Whether final impenitence alone, Whether also other sins? Nevertheless the most celebrated Molinaeus in the Anatomy of Arminianism chapter 26, after he asserted in number 6 & 7 that sin is the meritorious cause of reprobation, not however the cause of the distinction between the elect and the reprobate, in the following paragraph asserts that men are reprobated not on account of original sin alone, and on account of the stain which is common to the reprobate with the elect, but also on account of actual sins, which they are going to commit in the whole course of life.

LIII. But if it must be said, not what perhaps each one thinks, but what follows from the Doctrine of each one, and what it is necessary for each one to think, if he wants to stand by his own principles, since according to the greatest part of the Reformed Doctors, and especially of those by whom the Synod of Dort consisted, the object of total reprobation, and considered as to all its acts, is the human race as fallen in Adam, and infected with Original sin, but not men, as already contaminated by actual sins and vices, they necessarily have to say that reprobation, as to its first act, which is preterition, or non-election, does not have the preceding consideration of any sin, besides Original, and so if they say that there is in man any worthiness or merit of preterition and non-election considered absolutely, they must refer it all to Original sin.

LIV. But truly, if reprobation is considered as to the latter act, which is predamnation, and a certain ordination to eternal death, since they say that on account of what sins someone is damned, on account of the same having been foreseen from eternity he was ordained and destined by the decree of God to damnation: but it is manifest that men are damned not on account of original sin alone, but on account of any actual sins committed in the whole course of life, indeed that no one is damned, except he who perseveres in sin unto death, thence it follows, according to their opinion, that reprobation, as far as it regards this act, and insofar as it is conceived, as the preordination of certain men to eternal death, and

sempiternal torments, was not made except from final perseverance in sin having been foreseen, and so on account of it, and with respect to it.

LV. Whence also it can be evidently and openly collected that final perseverance in sin is the cause and reason of reprobation, as to that ultimate act, not only when reprobation is considered absolutely, but also when it is considered comparatively. For God does not simply damn this and that one, because he dies in sin, but also when it is asked, why God adjudges this one rather than that one to eternal death, it can be responded rightly and truly, that God does that for this reason, because this one dies in sin, but that one rises again from sin before death. And just as those Doctors about whom we are now treating conclude, that just as God damns men on account of the sin in which they persevere unto death, so also he decreed to damn them on account of the same sin, so also they ought to conclude, that just as God damns this one rather than that one, because this one and not that one ends life in sin, so also he decreed to damn this one rather than that one, because he foresaw that this one rather than that one would be about to end life in sins.

LVI. But those who want the object of election and reprobation to be man called to the participation of the grace of Christ, whether through the express and explicit preaching of the Gospel, or in some other way, they can admit that not only Original sin, but also actual sins, and vices voluntarily contracted by man, are the cause of reprobation, not only as to the latter act which is predamnation, but also as to the former, which is preterition, at least when reprobation is considered absolutely. For if God electing and reprobating men, considers them as resisting the divine vocation as much as is in them, and if left to themselves, he certainly sees them worthy to be rejected, not only with respect to original sin, in which they were conceived and born, but also with respect to actual sins, by which they voluntarily polluted and contaminated themselves: although he sees no worthiness in them, why these rather than those, should either be converted by grace, or left to their native depravity and contumacy.

LVII. But from these things it can be gathered that the more common and probable opinion in the Reformed Schools concerning the cause of Reprobation, is that which establishes that Reprobation, as to that act which is preterition or non-election, indeed has some merit and reason from the side of the reprobate man, if reprobation is considered in itself and absolutely, but does not have it, if it is considered comparatively. But if the question is about that other act which is predamnation, and destining to death, then the perseverance of man in sin is its merit and cause, in whatever way finally someone may consider it.

LVIII. But now, if someone according to those things which have been expounded by us, compares the Doctrine of the Roman School about reprobation, with the Doctrine of the Theologians of the Reformed Church about the same article, he will easily see that there is properly no question and controversy about this matter, which divides the Reformed Church from the Roman Church. For there is nothing concerning the nature, object, cause and effects of Reprobation, which the Roman School denies by unanimous consent, but the Reformed School affirms, or the contrary. But if the Doctors of the Roman Church condemn anything by common consent in some of the Reformed, that also many others of the Reformed reprehend in them. And vice versa, if in anything the Reformed

commonly recede from the opinion of certain Doctors of the Roman School, in that also they are condemned by many Theologians of their communion.

LIX. But scarcely anything of such sort occurs in this business. For in the various questions which are moved concerning Reprobation, there is great diversity of opinions, as appears, both in the Roman School and in the Reformed School. And there is scarcely any which does not have both its adversaries and its supporters in each School. For on both sides there are both those who include more acts, and those who include fewer under the name of Reprobation, and consequently who assign to it more, or fewer effects also.

LX. And as certain of the Reformed number the creation of man and even the permission of the first fall among the effects, or means, as they speak, of Reprobation, some from the Doctors of the Roman School also do the same. But as most of these call back such effects, not to reprobation, but only to common providence, the greatest part of the Reformed Doctors also does the same.

LXI. But both by common consent deny that sins are effects of reprobation, and so it is imputed to the Reformed by calumny that they affirm the contrary, and place sins among the effects of Reprobation. But if something slipped from one or another of the Reformed which seems to pertain to that, as when Zacharias Ursinus, imprudently and against his own doctrine, numbers perseverance in sin among the effects of reprobation, we see the same thing happened to Viguerius the Dominican, whose words have been related by us in the preceding Theses. It must nevertheless be confessed that some of the Reformed used certain harsh words and locutions in this matter, which gave some appearance and occasion of calumny, as can be seen in the examples cited before, and especially from Jerome Zanchius. But most of the Reformed abstain from them, nor approve the way of speaking of the rest.

LXII. Besides, as many of the older Reformed in assigning the object of reprobation ascend above the fall of man, so also from the doctrine of most of the old Scholastics, it cannot be assigned otherwise. But most of the more recent Theologians in each School constitute fallen man the object of reprobation.

LXIII. Finally concerning the cause of reprobation the Theologians both of the Roman Church and of the Reformed Church seem to contend among themselves in the same way. For among both there are those who deny that from the side of the men who are reprobated, any cause or reason of total reprobation can be given in whatever way it can be considered either absolutely, or comparatively, but refer it to the good pleasure of God alone.

LXIV. There are also those who think that some cause and merit of reprobation, at least considered absolutely, is found in the sins of men. And besides who refer that cause to original sin alone, and also who refer it not to original alone, but to sins both original and actual at the same time.

LXV. To these most of the Doctors of each School here distinguish reprobation into negative and affirmative, or positive. And indeed they teach that a cause of negative reprobation cannot be given from the side of men, but they refer it to the will of God alone.

But they acknowledge that the cause and merit of positive and affirmative reprobation resides in the reprobate themselves.

LXVI. In this question nevertheless there is one thing which a few of the Reformed affirm, which however the Doctors of the Roman Church condemn by unanimous consent. Namely, that the predestination of certain men to eternal death and destruction was made from the mere good pleasure of God, and that no cause and reason for it must be sought in the sins of men, since the permission of them is the effect of that kind of predestination.

LXVII. But by far the greatest part of the Doctors of the Reformed School also rejects this opinion. Nor does the opinion of certain Doctors of the Roman Church, which we related in the preceding disputation, abhor much from it. Of those, namely, who teach that God by a positive decree excluded certain men from eternal and celestial glory, before any prevision of sin in them, and that the permission of any sin is the effect of that decree, by which God resolved to declare and manifest his justice in certain men. Which opinion Diego Alvarez and William Estius hold and defend, and with them some other more recent Thomists.

On the Order of Divine Decrees in Election and Reprobation

I. The Doctors of the Roman School lay down as a certain and immovable foundation for this question that in God, who is most simple, there are not many acts of will and intellect, which are the same in God with his very essence; but that God by a single most simple act willed and ordained whatever things he willed and ordained from eternity, and consequently that in God there are not many decrees, between which there is a true and natural order of prior and posterior. But while we think that the divine intellect and will are referred and terminated to various objects, thence various conceptions are formed, which are called the decrees of God, and are conceived as if they were many, when that which corresponds to them in God is really one.

II. Since therefore God willed and ordained many and diverse things about the ultimate end of men, and the means conducing to that end, as the act of the divine will and intellect is referred to this and that end, and to these and those means, about these and those men, it is divided by the human mind into many, among which reason constitutes a certain order, according to which human conceptions of that divine act variously considered ought to be disposed and arranged.

III. And this is the whole of that which the Roman School asks, when it disputes about the order of divine decrees concerning the elect and reprobate. And certainly since all agree how the matter holds itself in God, namely, as we have already said, that there is only a single decree in him, in which there is not given prior and posterior, thence it follows that the question can only be about the order of human conceptions, which matter seems nearly arbitrary: since one can multiply those conceptions and divine decrees at will, and besides reason can devise various orders, according to which those conceptions can be arranged, and with respect to which one decree of God, is conceived now as prior, now as posterior to another.

IV. For if someone begins that order from the final cause, the decree about the object which has the nature of an end will be conceived as prior to the decree about another object, which to that end has the nature of a means. But if someone rather has regard to the efficient and disposing cause, then the decree about the means, which promote the end and dispose to the end, will be thought prior to the decree about the end. Whence it happens that among the doctors there is great diversity of opinions about this matter.

V. Among the old Scholastics John Scotus Philosophizes thus about this matter. From his mind, God first had at the same time present to his view Peter and Judas, for example, and efficaciously decreed to bless Peter, before he foreknew his merits: but about Judas he decreed nothing concerning glory, but conducted himself negatively about him. Secondly he determined to call Peter, and to give his grace to him: but about Judas he conducted himself negatively in the same way. In the third he predetermined to permit, that Judas should fall into sin up to the last of life, and from those two negations posited he foresaw

that he would die in sin. Fourthly God foreseeing the exit of each decreed to give glory to Peter, and to punish Judas with eternal punishment, As Gabriel Vásquez relates vol. 1, disputation 95, chapter 1. Where he testifies that many more recent authors follow the opinion of Scotus in this part. Nevertheless some add, As Córdoba, and Diego Alvarez, that God in that first instant, before any works were foreseen, decreed, not indeed to punish Judas with the punishment of sense, but to deny him blessedness and glory.

VI. According to Bellarmine this was the order of predestination in the divine mind, according to our mode of understanding. First God foresaw, if he should found man, that he would fall with all his posterity, and at the same time saw that he could free either all, or some, in various ways, according to his choice. Then he willed to found man, and to permit that he should fall, and to free certain ones mercifully from the number of the fallen, with the rest having been left in the mass of perdition. Thirdly he devised remedies suitable for saving the elect, among which the incarnation and passion of the Saviour had the first place. Fourthly he approved those remedies, and then elected Christ and us in him before the foundation of the world. Fifthly he disposed, ordained, and in a certain way commanded that it should so be done.

VII. But Becanus thus explains the order of predestination and reprobation. "From our opinion," he says, "this is the order of predestination and reprobation. First God determined to create the whole human race for eternal blessedness, and with a simple affection desired all to arrive at it. Secondly from this will he decreed to give them grace in the state of innocence, permitting to them the free use of will, in which is contained also the permission of sin. Thirdly he saw the first man with his whole posterity fall, that is, he saw the actual sin of Adam in which all sinned. I say nothing yet about the Original contracted in each one. Fourthly willing to prepare a remedy for fallen man he predestined Christ and his merits. Fifthly he determined to apply the merits of Christ in a different way to men. For he willed to preserve the blessed Virgin from Original sin through the merits of Christ, he permitted all the rest to be conceived in original sin. These again are divided. For he reprobated certain little ones on account of original sin, to others out of mercy alone he granted baptism or another remedy, and predestined them to life. But to all adults he provided sufficient grace, although he decreed to bestow greater on another. Sixthly he absolutely saw that these would use grace well, those badly. Seventhly he absolutely willed to give to these eternal reward, to those punishment and eternal damnation." In sum of Theology vol. 1, chapter 15, question 5.

VIII. But truly according to Gregory of Valentia, "First God saw from eternity not only the natures of all men but also their sins, if indeed those also, since they are committed by the vice of nature alone, pertain also to the natural order. Secondly he prepared for them a Redeemer by predestining Christ. Thirdly he willed to confer on all on account of the foreseen merit of Christ sufficient aids of grace, and for the most part also abundant ones, by which they could obtain salvation by the benefit of Christ the Redeemer. Fourthly those whom he saw (I do not say because he saw, but whom he saw) either through their cooperation with the aid of God, or through the application of baptism to finish life in divine grace, he mercifully predestined: but others, because they either did not cooperate with divine grace, or because baptism was lacking to them, he did not deem worthy of the

benefit of predestination, but rather on account of sins, either actual, or original, in which he foresaw that they would finish life, he justly reprobated."

IX. Finally Eustachius of St. Paul in the first part of the sum, thus conceives the series of divine acts in the business of predestination. "In the first place," he says, "God determined from eternity that he would found this whole Universe, and in it both angels, and the first parents, and through them all other men to be future. Then with the creation of all things having been foreseen he determined that he would permit, that some angels, and the first parents, as the heads of the whole human race should fall into sin, which indeed would be propagated ordinarily into all posterity through the way of generation; and thus from the universal multitude of men to be future there would be made a certain mass as it were of perdition. Thirdly with that fall of the Angels and first parents having been foreseen, and the universal mass of perdition, he determined that he would send his son in the flesh at least passible, beloved and elect above all, and the head of all to be elected and predestined. Fourthly with the future mission of Christ the first elect and predestined having been foreseen; he elected to glory not only the good Angels in him, but also certain men from the Mass of perdition: and at the same time he both positively reprobated the evil Angels, and also at least negatively reprobated the rest of men, and consequently excluded them from eternal glory for eternity. Fifthly with election having been presupposed, and the future glory of the elect having been foreseen, and the exclusion of the reprobate from it, he determined that he would bestow on the elect the means by which they would infallibly arrive at the aforesaid glory, namely the grace of calling, justification, and final perseverance, with which grace he certainly foresaw that they would cooperate: but to certain of the reprobate he determined that he would permit, that they should die in original sin alone, and thus destined them only to the punishment of loss; but to others, and those adults, he determined that he would permit, that they should Fall for their liberty into certain actual sins. Then with their first sins having been foreseen he determined that on account of them he would withdraw, or deny special aids, by which they would without doubt be converted: indeed also, as we judge probable, at least for some time, even the necessary and sufficient aids. And besides he determined that he would permit that they should fall into other subsequent sins, and should finally persevere in them. With all which things having been foreseen, he determined that he would addict them to eternal supplices." Tractate 1, disputation 16, question 5.

X. And thus the Doctors of the Roman Church divide, multiply, and dispose the divine acts about the elect and reprobate according to their choice, so that here there are nearly as many opinions as there are heads. But lest we delay over every minutia, which occur here the questions of some moment seem to be these. Whether we ought to conceive that first of all God decreed to show the glory of his mercy in certain men, but in others to manifest his justice avenging and vindicating sin. Then for this end decreed to found men, and to permit that they should fall into sin, then to lift certain ones out of that fall, but to leave others in sin and perdition, and the rest which regard election and reprobation. So that to the decree concerning manifesting the glory of divine mercy and justice the decree concerning creating man and permitting his fall is subordinated. Estius affirms it, and some other more recent Thomists: but most of the Doctors of the Roman Church deny it.

XI. Likewise whether before the decree of predestination and reprobation a conditional knowledge must be presupposed in God, by which God foresaw, before any decree of his, in what way these and those men would use their free will, if they were called in this and that way, and were gifted with these and those aids of grace, Whether, namely, they would cooperate with grace, or whether they would resist it and place an obstacle by their contumacy. Not a few Doctors of the Roman Church deny it, and especially the Dominicans, but nevertheless very many affirm it, especially the Jesuits.

XII. Besides, Whether the decree concerning permitting the fall of the human race, and also the decree concerning sending Christ the Redeemer precedes the entire decree of predestination and reprobation, or whether it is included in it, and makes a part of it? Very many deny it, some affirm it.

XIII. Then also whether the absolute and fixed decree concerning giving glory to certain men ought to be conceived as prior to the decree concerning giving to them efficacious grace and final perseverance? Which many affirm, and many also deny.

XIV. Similarly whether in reprobation the decree concerning excluding certain ones from glory, and denying eternal life to them is prior to the decree concerning rejecting them from grace, and the prevision of the evil use of their free will? Diego Alvarez affirms it, and some other more recent Thomists, but the rest deny it.

XV. But whether the decree concerning damning certain ones, and ordaining them to eternal punishment precedes in God the decree concerning permitting their sins, and the prevision of those sins, the Doctors of the Roman Church deny by common consent.

XVI. But as regards the Doctors of the Reformed Church they Philosophize in the same way concerning the divine decrees in general as the Theologians of the Roman School are accustomed to. For all agree in this that one decree of God is not prior to another in time and duration. And this because they acknowledge that all the decrees of God are no less eternal than God himself. But in eternal things one cannot precede another in duration.

XVII. Besides the same Theologians commonly teach that God is most simple and utterly devoid of all composition. Whence it follows that all things in God are really one and the same. And just as the divine will is not really distinguished from the very essence of God, so the acts of the divine will are distinguished neither among themselves, nor from the divine will itself really, or from the nature of the thing, but only according to our mode of conceiving. And consequently just as one cannot be really distinguished from another so also one cannot be by nature prior or posterior to another. Therefore since the divine decrees are acts of the divine will, it is manifest that one cannot by nature precede another, nor can a properly so called order of nature be found among them. But the order which is conceived among the divine decrees depends on and is constituted by reason alone.

XVIII. But that this may be understood better it must be known, that although God is most simple, nevertheless on account of his infinity, his whole perfection cannot be perceived by us at the same time, and exhausted by one conception. And therefore we are compelled to divide it into various conceptions, to which indeed one and the same thing corresponds, which according to diverse respects, and various operations, for which one through itself suffices, is considered by us in different ways. But nevertheless our

conceptions are distinguished from one another, and can be variously compared among themselves, and a certain order can be established among them, with analogy drawn from those things which are observed in created things.

XIX. Thus since God understands and wills through his essence, we form one conception of the divine intellect, and another conception of the divine will, of which conceptions one is not the other. And also by comparing those conceptions among themselves, we say that the divine intellect is prior to the divine will: since we observe that rational creatures, in whom the intellect is distinguished from the will, understand by nature prior to willing.

XX. Similarly although there are not really many acts of the divine will, but only one entirely simple and undistinguished, nevertheless, since the same act of the divine will is terminated to many and diverse objects, and so has various relations, it is conceived by us after the mode of many. For we cannot conceive at the same time so many and so diverse respects. But on that account we necessarily have to conceive separately the divine will, insofar as it is, for example, concerning creating the world, and insofar as it is concerning destroying it, insofar as it is referred to the salvation of certain ones, and insofar as it is referred to the damnation of certain ones, insofar as it regards the permission of sins, and insofar as it regards their forgiveness. And thus as many as are the diverse objects of the divine volition, and respects to external things, so many acts of the divine will can be conceived, which are really the same divine volition, but only diversely related and considered.

XXI. And these are what we call divine decrees. Which our mind compares among themselves, and arranges in a certain order among themselves, with analogy drawn from those things which happen in the human will. And this is that whole which is asked among Theologians, namely, in what order our mind ought to arrange the various conceptions which we form concerning the divine will. Whence it is evident that the question concerning the order of the divine decrees is rather Philosophical, than Theological, and such that Theology could easily lack it.

XXII. And certainly Christian piety and faith did not introduce it, but rather the too great temerity of men breaking into the secrets of God. Whatever it may be we think it such, that concerning it good men, with faith and charity safe, can dissent among themselves, nor ought they to move quarrels and exercise hatreds among themselves on account of it. For it is not disputed concerning a certain order of divine acts which is really present in God, but only concerning the order of various conceptions, which we form concerning one simple act of God. Which conceptions, since they are nothing other than the works of our mind, seem to be able to be composed among themselves in many and various ways, of which none will be inconvenient, and absurd, as one will follow this, that one another analogy.

XXIII. And certainly it often happens that what in one respect is conceived, as something which is by nature prior, in another respect is rightly conceived as something posterior. Thus more general things are prior to more particular things, if regard is had to the nature of the one generating; and more particular things are prior to more general things, if regard is had to the nature of the one intending. And consequently here it is not so much

contended about the thing itself, which some deny, others affirm, as about the various method of handing down and explaining the same thing.

XXIV. But that this may be more clearly evident it must be known that not all the Doctors of the Reformed School seek the reason of prior and posterior in the divine decrees from the same foundation. For in this business the Theologians proceed by a twofold way. For some, so that we may arrange the decrees which we conceive in God in a decent and fitting order, think that attention must be paid to the order which God observes in execution: nor do they want the order of executing to be one, but truly the order of decreeing another: but that the decrees about things must be composed among themselves in the same order, in which order the things themselves which have been decreed exist in time.

XXV. And this is the opinion of many Theologians who receive the decrees of the Synod of Dort: and especially of those who follow the opinion of Cameron in the article on Grace and Predestination. As can be seen especially in Paul Testard in the Synopsis of doctrine on Nature and Grace, number 278. Where treating of the order of the divine decrees he teaches that it is safest in arranging the divine decrees to follow the same order which the decreed things themselves observe among themselves in time. "For," he says, "God decreed to do things from eternity in the same order in which he executes them in time, and it is impossible to know the decrees of God otherwise than from posteriors."

XXVI. According to which in the following he teaches that the first decree of God about man is that by which he resolved to create man in the state of intact and mutable nature. Which Decree was followed by the prevision of the fall of Adam sinning freely, and submerging himself, and the whole human race to be propagated from him by the natural law of generation into the deep whirlpool of misery. But to this prevision he subjoins in God the affection of mercy toward the human race. Whence he says arose the second decree which he divides into many, namely into the purpose. I. Of giving Christ to the world as Mediator, Victim, treasury of Grace. II. Of justifying and glorifying believers made one with Christ through faith, according to the mode of revelation and testimony, of condemning those rejecting grace by unbelief, and punishing them with eternal penalties. III. Of testifying to the world grace prepared in Christ by means sufficient in themselves to elicit faith in some degree at least. IV. Of efficaciously calling certain ones from the world not comprehending the light shining in the darkness, and miserably abusing the testimony of grace sufficient in itself, and otherwise about to perish in unbelief with the rest, to whom they are not better, and so of justifying and glorifying them: of leaving the rest to the hardness of their own heart, deserting, hardening, damning, and so also of punishing them with eternal penalties.

XXVII. With this order Joshua Placaeus also agrees, although he does not want the order of the divine decrees to be sought from the order alone in which things exist in time. For he wants the first decree of God about man to be the decree concerning creating him, but afterwards the decree concerning permitting his fall, which two decrees, according to him, are not included in predestination, but are presupposed by it. But when with the two former decrees having been made, God had before the eyes of his foreknowledge the human race lost, he was inclined, as he says, by a certain mercy which he calls necessary, that he willed to save all believers out of the whole human race. But since the justice of

God, unless satisfaction was made to it, could not allow that, he decreed to send his son, through whom all believers might be justified and saved. Which he decreed to signify to the human race with the command of believing. But because he foresaw that it would happen that no one of men, although invited by the preaching of the Gospel, would truly believe, unless to the preaching of the Gospel there was added the efficacy of the spirit overcoming all the malice and resistance of the human heart, he decreed on account of Christ efficaciously to call certain ones to faith, so that having been gifted in that way to Christ, they might first be justified through him, then glorified, according to the order constituted by the preceding general decree.

XXVIII. But about reprobation he acknowledges one general decree concerning damning all persevering in unbelief: but another by which he determined, not to indulge to many lying in their native unbelief equally with the elect that internal efficacy of the spirit, which having been indulged, justifying faith is infallibly generated in the elect. Whence follows their final unbelief, and at last damnation, to which they are adjudged from unbelief foreseen. All which things are found explained more extensively in the special tract, whose title is, "Defence of the opinion of Joshua Placaeus concerning the Order of the decrees of God."

XXIX. But others on the contrary think that the decrees of God must be disposed in an order plainly contrary to that in which the decreed things are carried out to execution. And this because in constituting the order of decrees, which are acts of the divine will, attention must be paid to the order not of execution, but rather of intention. But now, according to the Philosophers, what is prior in intention is posterior in execution.

XXX. This among others is the opinion of Piscator, as Twisse relates in the defence of Perkins against Arminius, Digression one on the object of predestination. For in chapter seven of the Response to the Preparation of Conrad Vorstius Piscator enumerates eight subordinated decrees of God, according to the executions of the divine decrees, gradually succeeding according to the spaces of times. Of these he wants the first to be concerning manifesting the glory of God through the mode of mercy in the elect, through the mode of justice in the reprobate. The second concerning saving the elect and damning the reprobate. The third concerning justifying and sanctifying the Elect, but not the reprobate. The fourth concerning calling the Elect, but not the reprobate. The fifth concerning reconciling the Elect through Christ the Mediator, but not likewise the reprobate. The sixth concerning electing certain men from the fall, but reprobating the rest. where he takes election and reprobation for certain external and temporal acts of God, but not for the decrees of God, which acceptation nevertheless is most customary. The seventh concerning the permission of sin in Adam. The eighth and last concerning the creation of man.

XXXI. Zanchius does not so break up the divine decrees, but nevertheless he also wants the order of the divine decrees to be gathered from the event and order in which things happen, according to that rule, What is first in intention, that is, in counsel and thought, that is last in execution. As can be seen in him on the Nature of God book 5, chapter 2.

XXXII. But here the opinion of William Twisse is singular. For about the elect and reprobate he does not want it to be conceived that there are except two decrees, which are

subordinated, and of which one is prior to the other. One is concerning the end, the other is concerning the means. The decree concerning the end is that by which God determined to illustrate his glory in exercising mercy toward certain men, justice vindicating toward others. The decree concerning the means is that by which God decreed for this end to create men, to permit that they should fall, to prepare a Redeemer and Saviour for certain ones, and to gift them with faith in him, to justify, and glorify them: but to leave others in sin, to harden, blind, and at last damn them. Which decree concerning the means is posterior to the decree concerning the end and subordinated to it.

XXXIII. But if anyone divides that decree concerning the means into many acts, he will indeed conceive many decrees of God, one, for example, concerning creating man, another concerning permitting his fall: one concerning sending Christ, another concerning ingrafting the elect into him through faith: one concerning glorifying and blessing the elect, another concerning calling, and justifying them: And similarly one concerning damning the reprobate, and another concerning permitting their sins, and hardening them in them. But he contends that all those decrees are not subordinated among themselves, but coordinated, nor must one be conceived as prior to another. As can be seen in his Perkinsian defence, Digression on the object of predestination, and elsewhere very often.

XXXIV. Similarly he acknowledges indeed that God through that decree concerning illustrating his glory, determined to manifest not only his justice and mercy, but also his wisdom and omnipotence, and other virtues. But if anyone again wants to divide this decree concerning the end into many, which are concerned with the singular virtues of God, and to compare, for example, the decree concerning manifesting his own goodness, power, and wisdom, with the decree concerning showing the glory of mercy and justice, he teaches also that those decrees must be conceived at the same time, nor must the order of prior and posterior be sought among them. Nevertheless he adds that God indeed at the same time decreed to illustrate the glory of all his virtues, but nevertheless in such a way that the explication of the rest of the virtues served the explication of divine justice and mercy. Of the same work book 1, part 2, section 2.

XXXV. But although nearly every single Theologian, while ordering the decrees of God, disagree from one another in certain apexes, nevertheless all those Doctors who, as we mentioned before, constitute man as not yet fallen and made in divine prevision the object of election and reprobation, and number among the effects common to election and reprobation the creation of man and the permission of the fall, they, I say, all agree in this that the first decree which must be conceived in God about men is that by which God resolved to show in certain men the glory of mercy, but in others the glory of his justice: To which decree they subject and subordinate as posterior to it the decrees concerning creating man and permitting his fall, and concerning giving Christ the Mediator and Redeemer to the elect; but leaving the rest in the fall and perdition. Which decrees again, as is evident from the things said, they variously and not all in the same way divide and order.

XXXVI. But all those who teach that the object of predestination is man whom God in his eternal foreknowledge considers as already fallen and corrupted by sin, by this very thing necessarily have to confess that the decrees concerning the creation of man, and

concerning the permission of that first fault, which rendered the whole human race liable to sin and perdition, are prior to the decree of predestination, nor make a part of it. But nevertheless most of them order the acts of the divine will, and also of the divine intellect about the elect and reprobate far otherwise, than those mentioned above, who follow the opinion of Cameron in the doctrine of grace and predestination.

XXXVII. And lest I relate the opinions of each one, this is the more common opinion among them concerning the order of the divine decrees in the business of predestination. First they establish that God, when he foresaw from eternity the fall of the first man, and thence to be derived the corruption into the whole human race, decreed to use mercy toward certain men designated by him in his eternal counsel, by liberating them from merited perdition, and gifting them with eternal salvation: but in others to show his justice, by passing over them, and leaving them in their native corruption, and owed malediction. The second decree of God, according to their opinion is that, by which God decreed to send his son into the world to redeem and reconcile those whom he destined to eternal salvation, but not likewise those whom he passed over in the former decree. Then they subjoin a third decree to that other by which God determined to gift the elect unto salvation with faith and repentance, but to deny that grace to the rest, who are called reprobate, and to permit them to their own corruption and malice. But this desertion is followed in God by the prevision of their final unbelief and impenitence. And at last the decree concerning damning them eternally and afflicting them with sempiternal punishment.

XXXVIII. To these things are briefly reduced back what most of the Reformed Doctors Philosophize concerning the order of the divine decrees: although still more and more minute distinctions of opinions could be observed among them: But those are enough, so that thence we may gather what is their opinion about those principal questions which we briefly touched on above, and at the same time what can here be of controversy between the Roman School and the Reformed School.

XXXIX. And indeed first to that question, Whether according to our mode of conceiving the decree concerning illustrating the glory of his mercy and justice in certain men designated by him is prior in God, namely, of justice in these, of mercy in those, but posterior the decree concerning founding men, and likewise the decree concerning not impeding, but permitting their falls and sins, to that, I say, question the Theologians Respond diversely, as is evident from the things said, in each School both Roman and Reformed. Evidently those Doctors who, both in this and in that School, in assigning the object of predestination ascend above the fall of man and his creation, they, I say, affirm that in God the decree concerning manifesting divine mercy and justice precedes, but the decree concerning the creation of man and the permission of his fall and sin follows: because, namely, they think that the creation of man and the permission of sin were from the intention of God certain means destined to the manifestation of divine mercy and justice.

XL. But others, who are far greater in number in each School, think that the decree concerning creating man and permitting his fall is prior in God to the decree concerning exercising justice toward the reprobate, mercy toward the elect. And that since they think

that God proposed to himself, when he resolved to create man, the exercise of his goodness power and wisdom, but not of justice and mercy. And besides they think it is abhorrent to reason that we should think that God decreed to free certain men from owed misery, or to show his glory in their just destruction, before he took counsel concerning creating them, and could foresee their guilt and misery. Since it is agreeable that we think first concerning effecting some work, than concerning either repairing, or destroying and casting it away: nor can we with reason take counsel concerning punishing the guilt of someone, or relieving misery, without first considering him as guilty and miserable. Which also seems to us far more probable.

XLI. But whether conditional knowledge must be premised in God to the decree of predestination, by which before any decree of his he foresaw in what way both these and those men would use their free will, if they were called in this and that way, and were gifted with these and those aids of grace, very many of the Reformed deny with the Dominicans and more recent Thomists, but especially Twisse and Rutherford, who have written ex professo against the middle knowledge of the Jesuits. Nevertheless some in God seem to admit that conditional knowledge, as Louis Crocius Professor in the School of Bremen, Gomarus and Walaeus, and others of whom we made mention in our Theses on Middle Knowledge. But nevertheless that opinion, which in the Roman School is today most common, seems rarer in the Reformed School.

XLII. Besides from the things said it appears that most of the Reformed teach that God by an absolute decree determined to save and glorify these and those men, but to use his justice toward others, before he decreed to send Christ the Redeemer into the world. Nevertheless on the contrary those who follow the doctrine and Method of Cameron think: that God decreed to send his son into the world first, before he absolutely determined to gift these and those men with salvation and glory, but to exclude others from it. But Twisse thinks that those decrees concerning sending Christ and concerning saving and glorifying certain ones are coordinated, and one must not be conceived as prior to the other. But in the Roman School the more common opinion holds that the decree concerning sending Christ precedes the decree concerning saving certain men. Although not a few approach the first opinion of most of the Reformed.

XLIII. Similarly neither the Doctors of the Roman School, nor also of the Reformed School agree among themselves, whether the certain and fixed decree concerning giving glory to these and those men, ought to be conceived in God as prior to the decree concerning giving to them efficacious grace, and final perseverance. Very many affirm it in the Reformed School: but the Theologians of Saumur, and certain others recede from the common opinion in that. Since they want the decree concerning giving faith and repentance to precede in God: but from foreseen faith and repentance glory to be decreed to certain men. As can be seen in the Irenicum of Testard, and the Theses of Louis Cappel on election and reprobation. But Twisse, conformably to the principles posited by himself, establishes that the decree concerning giving glory is neither prior nor posterior to the decree concerning giving faith and efficacious grace: but that these two decrees in God must be conceived at the same time, nor is one subordinated to the other.

XLIV. But as in the Reformed School the opinion of those who establish that the decree concerning conferring glory on certain men is prior to the decree concerning gifting them with faith and justifying and sanctifying them prevails: so on the opposite in the Roman School the more common and received opinion holds today at least, that the decree concerning gifting the elect with faith and justifying them is prior to that concerning crowning them with celestial glory.

XLV. Moreover that difference of opinions among the Reformed does not arise only thence, that in arranging the divine decrees some think that the order of execution, but others rather of intention must be followed: but also thence that it is doubted and disputed among them, whether with respect to God decreeing, celestial glory must be conceived as a certain end, but the sanctity and justice with which the faithful are clothed in this life as a means destined to it, which some affirm, but others deny; since sanctity and justice, which is a moral good, from its kind is something more excellent than felicity and celestial glory, which they conceive as a certain Physical good.

XLVI. But whether God decreed to exclude certain ones from life and celestial glory before he foresaw any sin of theirs, and to that decree the decree concerning denying grace by which they would avoid sin is posterior, which a few Doctors of the Roman Church affirm, it also comes into disputation among the Reformed. And there are enough many who affirm that, namely, all those who are called supralapsarians, except one Twisse, who denies also that the order of prior and posterior must be sought between these decrees. But other Reformed, and indeed in far greater number, deny that, and think that the decree of God concerning rejecting certain ones from eternal life follows the prevision of some sin at least in them, and so the decree concerning not giving grace, by which he would have preserved them from that sin.

XLVII. There remains scarcely one thing which in this business the Doctors of the Roman Church condemn by common consent, but some Reformed affirm, namely that the decree of God concerning damning certain ones, and punishing them with eternal punishment in God is prior to the decree concerning permitting their sins, and the prevision of any sin. Polanus holds and teaches this in his Syntagma, where he treats of reprobation. Beza in various places. Piscator in the place alleged above. And especially Zanchius book 5 on the Nature of God chapter 2. "This was," he says, "the first thing which God constituted from eternity concerning the reprobate, namely, the destining of certain men to sempiternal destruction. But to this were ordained their sins, and to sins desertion, and the denial of grace. Therefore the affirmative part of reprobation was prior in the mind of God, that is, the destining to eternal death, for the sake of showing his wrath, and by that illustrating his glory. But the negative part was posterior, that is, the decree of not having mercy, so that by that reason they could be justly damned."

XLVIII. But this opinion is commonly rejected by the rest of the Reformed, and certainly rightly so. Since neither is damnation the end of sins, or of the permission of sin, nor does damnation exist in time prior to sins. And so there is no reason on account of which damnation ought to be thought decreed by God prior to the permission of sin. For, in my judgment at least, the order of the divine decrees ought to be taken from the analogy of the human will proceeding ordinately: so that we conceive that God decreed that first which

he would have willed first, if he willed in the mode of a man using reason. Moreover in those things which among themselves have the nature of means and end, it is certain that we by nature will and intend the end first, before we will the means to the end. And consequently also in God the decree concerning the end must be conceived as prior to the decree concerning the means. But in those things which compared among themselves are not as means and end, if some order of the decrees of God must be established, it ought to follow the order of the existence of things, and be sought from that order which is discerned among the things themselves, while they exist successively in time.

On Remonstrant and Lutheran Opinions on Predestination

I. After we have expounded and compared among themselves the Doctrine of the Roman School and of the Reformed School about the nature, object, effects and causes of Predestination, Election, and Reprobation, and also about the order in which they arrange the divine decrees in this business, it seemed not useless briefly to subjoin what is the opinion about the same matters of those who in Belgium call themselves Remonstrants, and also of the Theologians of the Augsburg Confession.

II. And indeed first, so that we may begin from the use of words which obtains among them, the Remonstrants are accustomed to take predestination in two ways. First so that it may signify that general decree, by which God constituted, by his most free will, not to save or damn this and that one precisely, but in general to save believers, and to reprobate unbelievers, that is, to designate and institute in his mind one certain way, according to which he wills to save and damn, when it was possible and free for him to act and proceed by another way and reason about the salvation or perdition of men, and to determine and decree otherwise about that whole business.

III. Secondly so that it may signify the special divine decree by which he resolves, according to the preceding decree, to save these, but to destroy those, that is, to destine these considered as faithful to eternal life, to addict those considered as unfaithful, or who are unwilling to believe to eternal death and destruction.

IV. The former act, according to them, simply and in general, ought to be called predestination to life and to death: but the latter, predestination of this or that one to life or to death.

V. Similarly a twofold election is distinguished by them: the former is to grace, and the latter to glory. Election to grace for them is not a certain decree by which God absolutely determined to gift this and that one with repentance and faith, but simply thus to call men to communion and participation of the singular benefits which are comprehended in the Gospel, that they may be able to believe if they will, and sometimes also may believe: and they can also, if it pleases, not believe, and also sometimes not believe.

VI. But election to glory for them is that by which God wills eternal life and glory for men. But again this election is established by them as twofold. For they observe that glory can be considered in two ways, either under the aspect of end, or under the aspect of reward: and similarly the act of the divine will is twofold; One by which God loves and intends some good of man, and so procures and offers to men means suitable for acquiring that good: but the other by which he simply determines and decrees to confer some good actually and in reality on men.

VII. Whence it happens that they conceive that God first desires and wishes the blessedness and glory of men, as a certain end to which his will is borne; then from that affection and love of eternal glory and salvation, which he would desire to be communicated to his

creatures, he is as it were efficaciously moved to conferring and supplying those means which are necessary for obtaining that end. But by reason of that affection they contend that God can be said to will the salvation of men, and indeed efficaciously, although it often happens that men do not rightly use the means offered by God, and fail of the end which God intends. For they say that he is thought to will the end efficaciously, or something under the aspect of end, who by love of the end is moved to seek, or supply, those means which conduce to obtaining that end and are necessary for it, whether the end itself is obtained, or not.

VIII. But besides they acknowledge another act of the divine will, by which God wills to confer glory actually and in reality on certain men, as the reward and prize of faith and obedience rendered by them. Each of these acts of the divine will is called by them Election to glory. And by the former they say that men are elected to glory under the aspect of end, but by the latter are elected to glory under the aspect of reward.

IX. That former election to glory precedes election to grace; because from it arises the decree of communicating those means through which glory can be arrived at; the latter follows election to grace, since it presupposes in the elect man the right use of those means.

X. Besides since, from their hypothesis, any means whatsoever offered through grace can be refused and rejected, hence it is that, with the former election to glory posited, they teach that the collation of eternal glory and salvation is not necessarily posited, and so he who is elected in that way can perish for eternity. But election to glory under the aspect of reward has the actual and real communication of eternal salvation conjoined to itself.

XI. Finally that election to glory under the aspect of end extends itself commonly and without any discrimination to all those who become partakers of divine gracious vocation, but the latter pertains to those alone who persevere in faith and obedience unto death.

XII. To this distinction another is related. For since they suppose that some can have true faith and charity for a time, and remain for some time in the state of grace, but afterwards fall away wholly, and also finally from true faith and grace, they want that as long as they retain true faith and charity, these can and ought to be called elected in a singular way, in opposition to those who called to grace, and thus comprehended by that general election described by us a little while ago, nevertheless resist grace, and do not use it rightly, whom they also think can be called, reprobated for that time: although afterwards changed for the better they persevere in faith and charity to the end, and thus become from the number of the Elect, and are gifted with eternal life: just as the former finally become reprobate, and are addicted to eternal damnation.

XIII. Moreover they say that election of those who believe for a time is incomplete, revocable, and not peremptory: to which they oppose the election of those who persevere and die in faith, which at last they say is complete and irrevocable, and, as they love to speak, peremptory, because it always and infallibly has conjoined to itself the communication of eternal blessedness.

XIV. And so, from their mind, election can be divided into general, by which God wills in a certain way the salvation of all, and offers and communicates to them means necessary to salvation, so that they can use them, if they will. And particular, by which are elected those

who respond to the divine vocation, and rightly use the means offered through grace. But again that particular election must be distinguished into incomplete and revocable election, which is suited to those who for a time only adhere to Christ through true faith and charity: and into complete and peremptory election, by which those alone are elected, whom God considers as dying in faith and grace, and adhering to Christ to the last breath.

XV. They similarly distinguish reprobation into reprobation from gracious vocation which happens through the Gospel, and into reprobation from glory, or eternal felicity. However, they want no one simply rejected or reprobated from grace. For this is their sixth thesis concerning the decree of predestination, which is had in their Synodical writings, where they declare their opinion on Predestination. "Neither from eternal life, nor from means sufficient for it was anyone rejected by some absolute and antecedent decree: so that the merit of Christ, vocation, and all the gifts of the spirit can avail for salvation for all, and truly profit, unless they themselves turn them to their own destruction by the abuse of the same."

XVI. But reprobation from glory and eternal life, also from their sense, must be distinguished into incomplete and revocable reprobation, and into complete and peremptory reprobation. By that former incomplete and revocable reprobation those must be thought reprobated who remain unbelieving for some time, and can be brought to better fruit by no admonitions and exhortations, as long as they remain such. Because they are in that state, in which if they persevere, they are to be eternally rejected from the face of God and condemned: even if it happens that afterwards they change life for the better through faith, and constantly remain in that faith to the end of life. But complete and peremptory reprobation falls upon those alone whom God sees to die in unbelief and impenitence.

XVII. Moreover when they speak of Election and Reprobation simply, they do not understand for the most part election to grace and reprobation from the same grace: But election to glory, and reprobation from the same glory, and still not any kind whatsoever, but peremptory and irrevocable.

XVIII. But they establish the first and adequate object of such peremptory and irrevocable election to be all and only those believing in Jesus Christ by the aid of divine grace, and persevering in that true faith, or dying. But on the contrary they establish the first and adequate object of peremptory reprobation to eternal and lamentable destruction to be all and only unbelievers, that is, either those unwilling to desist from their unbelief, or those not persevering in true faith. For they want no one rejected from eternal life apart from the consideration of antecedent unbelief, and perseverance in unbelief. As neither, from their opinion, did God decree absolutely to gift anyone with life and eternal glory, without the previous consideration of his final perseverance in true faith and charity.

XIX. But in assigning the object of reprobation, they observe that by the name of unbelievers they do not understand unbelievers only negatively so called, such as are infants, the deaf, and the insane, and those also who have never heard anything about the Gospel, such as those nations to which the preaching of the Gospel has not yet come: but here they call unbelievers those alone whom God calls to faith, and to whom he offers and

supplies all means necessary for believing, and who nevertheless are unwilling to believe, and spurn the grace offered by God.

XX. But of that Election which they call incomplete and revocable, according to their mind, the object are all those who believe for a time, although they are at some time going to fall away from faith. And similarly of revocable and not peremptory reprobation, which is opposed to that election, all those must be thought the object who resist grace, and refuse to believe the Gospel, although they are at some time to be changed for the better, and to be brought into the obedience of faith, and so finally to persevere in faith.

XXI. Finally of that general Election, which they call election to glory as end, from their doctrine, it must be said that the object is the whole human race, which God considers as fallen and miserable, and so needing his aid and grace, so that thence it may be able to emerge, and arrive at glory and eternal felicity:

XXII. Now as it pertains to the fruits or effects of election, of that Election which they call peremptory, and which is always understood by them, when there is talk of Election simply, they do not want the gifting and sending of the Saviour to be the fruit or effect, since, as is evident from the things said before, that election presupposes faith, and is from faith foreseen in the Saviour.

XXIII. But much more they deny that of reprobation, which is opposed to the already mentioned election, the effect or consequent is the negation of the Saviour, or the negation of grace by which one can believe in Christ the Saviour, and the impenitence and unbelief which follow thence: since unbelief, from their opinion, is something antecedent to reprobation.

XXIV. But of that general and indefinite predestination, or by which God resolved not these and those precisely, but in general all and only the faithful and believing to save, they teach, that faith can be said in some way the fruit, because from that decree flows the necessity of another decree concerning conferring such means without which faith cannot be conceived and had, indeed through which faith both can be, and is accustomed to be engendered. But nevertheless, from their mind, faith is only abusively called the fruit or effect of election even of that one: since with it posited, as they say, it can nevertheless happen that no one believes, and all remain altogether unbelieving.

XXV. Indeed not even of that election which is to grace, can faith otherwise be called the effect, than through the same catachresis, according to their opinion. For they do not acknowledge that faith is the infallible effect, and necessary consequent of election itself to grace: but only in this way, that without election to grace faith cannot be engendered, and by the benefit of that alone it is engendered and effected in all who believe: when otherwise with grace of whatever kind posited from the side of God to which someone is said to be elected, faith can always not follow from the fault and stubbornness of man.

XXVI. But as regards the causes of election and predestination, they teach indeed that the general decree, by which God resolved in general to save believers, and to reprobate unbelievers, is most free, and has no other cause, than the pure will and choice of God. Nor can that decree, as they say, be said to have the prevision of anything, as the occasion or cause of itself. For they establish that the dignity, or merit, or any intrinsic prerogative

of faith here by no means comes into consideration, why namely, God willed to select it from the order of all other things; or why he decreed to save apart from it, and to save men through it alone: but only the good pleasure of the Divine will to have place here.

XXVII. But of the other decree, by which God definitely and peremptorily predestines those indeed to life, but others to death, they teach that a reason and cause from the side of men can be given and assigned. For that God elects these and those to life and glory, the reason is their perseverance in faith, which God foresees from eternity, and so faith of theirs in this decree must be considered as a cause without which not, and a condition rendered by them. Which nevertheless does not hinder, from their mind, that this decree can be thought gratuitous: because faith for that reason is not a cause which either impels, or effects by virtue, merit, or intrinsic dignity and perfection that God wills to save this believing one.

XXVIII. But in those whom God by his decree rejects from eternal life, and reprobates, unbelief and contumacy must be considered, not only as a cause without which not, but also as a meritorious cause on account of which God wills to condemn this man, and exclude from eternal life: since the intrinsic foulness, baseness, and malice which is in unbelief, deserves that.

XXIX. Moreover the Remonstrants in their Synod constitute this order of divine decrees in Election and Reprobation, where they declare their opinion about the first article on Predestination. "First," they say, "God for the praise of his overflowing goodness decreed to create man to his image. 2. Having created man in this way he placed a law on him, which it was, not only possible, but also most just to be fulfilled by him, with the commination of death having been added besides if he should transgress it. 3. When Adam most freely had transgressed this law, and consequently had involved not only himself, but with God so ordaining, all his posterity through natural generation in the evil of death and condemnation, the affection indeed of mercy remained in God for liberating miserable man, but because justice which had been injured obstructed it, and the truth of divine commination, by which favour should be done for such a transgressor, it did not will to go out into act the mercy of God, unless satisfaction was made to justice first, and before all it was made manifest, that God seriously hated sin, and loved justice. 4. But so that divine justice might be satisfied, God willed to constitute a Mediator, who for all sinners might become an expiatory victim, and for them undergo death, and who through his blood, poured out for the reconciliation of the same, might acquire the right by a certain law of conferring on them salvation and eternal life. 5. With this blood having been poured out, or considered as poured out, God decreed that all those who truly believed in that Redeemer, and persevered in faith to the end of life, by mercy of grace, should become partakers of salvation and eternal life through him: but those who were unwilling to believe in him, and were going to persevere in that unbelief and disobedience of theirs, should be punished on that account with the penalty of eternal death and condemnation. 6. But because it could not happen, that sinners from themselves, or by their natural powers, would believe in this their Redeemer, and would persevere in such faith, and consequently so that they would not be arraigned guilty of unbelief: hence it is that God decreed to supply to them means necessary and sufficient for faith and repentance, by which they

would either actually and in reality be rendered suitable for conceiving faith, or would be disposed, prepared, and as it were advanced by certain grades more and more to conceiving faith at last. From which at last flows the ultimate decree, concerning saving by name those, who by the benefit of those means were going to believe, and to persevere in faith: but damning, or reprobating from salvation all those who were going to remain impenitent and unbelieving to the end of life, or at least to die in unbelief."

XXX. Moreover the opinion of the Theologians of the Augsburg confession, who are called Lutherans, is nearly the same in this part as that of the Remonstrants, or Arminians, except that they treat this question less subtly and curiously, nor do they dissect the matter so much: And they use certain words in a slightly different sense, not approving their use which obtains among the Remonstrants. As that they employ predestination in a middle sense, and assign two species of it, one to life, and the other to death. Likewise that they call that affection by which God wills all men to be saved election.

XXXI. But with them they deny that God by an absolute decree precisely elected anyone to salvation and life before the prevision of his final perseverance in faith and obedience. And much more that God by such a decree excluded certain ones from glory and eternal life before the prevision of their final impenitence and unbelief.

XXXII. Nor also do they want that God simply and absolutely elected certain men to faith and repentance, but rejected the rest from that grace. Since they teach that God by a certain general affection wills and desires salvation for all men, and from that affection procures for them all means necessary and sufficient for salvation. Indeed that God, as much as is in him, wills to be efficacious in all men through the Word and Holy Spirit. But that the Spirit of God works faith in certain ones, but by no means in others, according to their doctrine, is from this that those indeed admit the efficacy of the spirit working through the word, but others despise the Word of God and resist the Holy Spirit.

XXXIII. And so they want that of the decree of reprobation, by which very many men are excluded from the kingdom of God, and adjudged to infernal punishments, the cause and merit is with the men themselves, namely their foreseen impenitence and unbelief.

XXXIV. But they teach that the decree of predestination and election to life is indeed gratuitous, and does not have a cause and merit in man, but nevertheless, as has already been said, they deny that it is absolute: since none are elected by God to salvation, except from their foreseen faith and repentance, and indeed such as perseveres all the way to death.

XXXV. But in ordering the decrees of God they think that the same order must be preserved which is discerned in the very execution of the decrees, not otherwise than the Arminians. For they teach that first God decreed to create all men to eternal life in Adam. Then he foresaw that Adam with all his posterity would fall. But afterwards he decreed to send the son as a remedy for the fall, who in turn would restore life for all men. And because medicine does not profit without application, he also decreed to offer the benefits of the son through the word to the whole world, and to kindle faith in the hearts of men by the efficacy of the Holy Spirit. But then he foresaw that certain ones would madly repudiate the word and offered goods; but that certain ones by the efficacy of the Holy Spirit through

the word would perseveringly believe in Christ. Which foreknowledge at last was followed by Election and Reprobation. For he reprobated those, but elected these in Christ.

XXXVI. And so election for them is nothing other than the eternal decree of God by which he ordained to life and eternal glory those whom he foresaw about to believe perseveringly in Christ by the efficacy of the Holy Spirit through the word. But reprobation is the adjudication to eternal death made from eternity by the just judgment of God of those whom God foresaw about to die in unbelief and impenitence. Which things drawn out more extensively can be seen in John Gerhard in Theological Commonplaces, Vol. 2, tract on Election and Reprobation. Likewise in the Book of Concord, Title on Predestination.

XXXVII. But now the Augsburg Theologians teach indeed that in the composite sense the elect cannot perish, and the reprobate cannot be saved, that is, it cannot happen that someone is at the same time elect and perishes, reprobate and is saved: But nevertheless they teach that in the divided sense he who is elected can fall from grace, in which case he would not be elect; and he who is reprobate can embrace grace, in which case he would not be reprobate.

XXXVIII. But to the question, Whether someone can be certain of his own election they respond that concerning this an absolute certainty cannot be had, but nevertheless the faithful both can and ought not to doubt concerning their election, but to conceive a certain confidence concerning it.

On the Immortality of Adam

I. The first man, before he sinned, was not subject to death, as we all are now, but in a certain sense was immortal, is a fact admitted by all Doctors of the Roman Church. For by common consent they defend against the Pelagians that the necessity of dying, which now hangs over us, arose from sin and would not have had a place if man had remained in that original integrity.

II. However, to better understand what their opinion on this matter is, they observe that the first man in a state of integrity was in some sense mortal and in some sense immortal. For someone can be called mortal in two ways, and likewise immortal in two ways. In one way, a person is mortal who necessarily has to die. In another way, a person is called mortal who can die. And again, in one way, a person is immortal who cannot die. In another way, a person who does not necessarily have to die.

III. In the first way, according to their view, Adam in the original state was not mortal, but only in the latter way. For he did not necessarily have to die: nor would he have actually died if he had persevered in original justice. But still, it could happen that he might die, as indeed happened after his fall. Through sin, both he and all his posterity became mortal in the first way because they incurred the necessity of dying. Similarly, man in a state of innocence was not immortal in the first way; for he was not such that he could simply not die. However, he was immortal in the latter way, as he could avoid dying, and if he remained faithful in the service of God, he would not have experienced death.

IV. From this, one can deduce the difference between the immortality of the first man in a state of integrity and that which will befit the righteous after the blessed resurrection. For the saints after the resurrection will be in no way mortal: they will not only be free from the necessity of dying but will be completely incapable of dying and incurring death or mortality by sinning. And thus, they will be immortal in both ways, because they will not only be able not to die but will also be incapable of dying, and death will never have any power over them.

V. However, in explaining this matter, some diversity can be noted among the Doctors of the Roman Church. In this, they all agree that Adam in a state of integrity could avoid dying and indeed, if he had not sinned, would never have died. But they dispute among themselves whether Adam, remaining innocent, should only be said to have been able not to die, or whether it can also be said that he could not die in that state.

VI. Some say that man, even in his state of innocence, could always have died, and that the immortality of the first man consisted only in that he was not subject to the necessity of dying, as we are now due to sin. For man, even while remaining in integrity, could have died if a force had been inflicted on his body by another who had forsaken the first innocence, although such an event would not have happened because God, by his providence, would have averted all danger.

VII. Furthermore, they add that the first man and all his posterity would have eventually died by natural necessity, namely due to the conflict of the elements of which the human

body is composed, unless God had transferred them to a state of immortality before that happened. And such a death, if it had occurred, would not have been penal for man any more than for beasts, but natural for both. Hence, it follows that man, although persevering in integrity, always had the possibility of dying; nor can it truly be said of him that he could not die in that state, although he could avoid dying and was not subject to the necessity of dying. Estius attributes this opinion to Scotus and some others. In book 2, sentences, distinction 19, number 2.

VIII. However, he himself, there and in the following number, testifies that he, along with many others, is of a different opinion. For he entirely believes that man, while maintaining the first innocence, could not die. Not only because it would have happened that man, persevering in the service of God, would not have died, but also because the order of things once established by God necessarily required it, nor could it have been otherwise.

IX. To understand this, he notes that man was not instituted by God as a mere servile creature, as the nature of brutes is instituted, which therefore are naturally subject to death and can be killed for the utility of man: indeed, some creatures become the food for others through death. But God made man, like the angels, by his nature free and the lord of other things, and, moreover, as a partner and friend of God himself through grace and justice. Hence it is understood that man was so constituted that nothing adverse would happen to him as long as he remained in the friendship of God: but that it would always be that these two would be joined together and follow each other: to be good and to be happy; likewise to be innocent and to be free from misery. And this law is perpetual, as divine justice demands, so that if it were taken away, the order of the universe would be deformed.

X. However, he says this should be understood according to the order once instituted. For, he says, if we speak of the absolute power of God, there is no doubt that God could have constituted human nature without any injury to it, as the Lord of all creation, so that even if man had maintained his innocence in his soul, his body would be similar to brute animals in condition, subject to death and other things no less than they are. Therefore, although Adam in the state of innocence could have sinned and by sin become subject to death, and thus it is true in a divided sense that Adam in integrity could die, he insists that it is false in a conjunct sense because he could not die as long as he maintained his innocence.

XI. However, whatever way the theologians of the Roman School explain this immortality of the first man, they all now seem to agree that it should be called supernatural, not natural, as natural is opposed to supernatural. This is especially affirmed and proven with many arguments by Bellarmine, in his book on the Grace of the First Man, chapter 9. And Becanus in his Summa of Scholastic Theology, volume 1, treatise 5, chapter 4, question 1.

XII. Indeed, there were some in the past century among the Doctors of the Roman Church who believed that the immortality of the first man was not a benefit of grace, but his natural condition. However, this opinion was condemned by Roman Popes Pius V and Gregory XIII in a singular bull, in which they condemned many articles of some recent theologians. Among those articles is this one, article 75: The immortality of the first man was not a benefit of grace but his natural condition. As Bellarmine himself testifies in his book on the Grace of the First Man.

XIII. To more distinctly understand the opinion of the Doctors of the Roman School on this question, it seemed proper here to refer to what Gul. Estius accurately and clearly explained in the second book of sentences, distinction 19, number 9. There, in response to the question, Whether the immortality of the first state was natural to man, he answers through many and various distinctions. And he teaches that it was in some sense natural to him and in some sense above nature; just as death is in some sense natural to fallen man, in some sense against nature.

XIV. Firstly, he says, something is called natural that is present from the first institution of nature. And in this sense, he says that immortality was natural to the first man, but death was against nature, since man was initially instituted as immortal, that is, free from the necessity of dying.

XV. Also, it is said to be natural what each being naturally desires. And in this sense, he also concedes that immortality is natural to man and death is against nature, since all creatures by nature desire immortality, but avoid death.

XVI. Furthermore, natural can signify what is inherent from birth, whether it is good and suitable for nature and agrees with natural desire, or not. And thus, he also admits that immortality was natural to the first man, but mortality is natural to us. For he was created immortal, while we are born subject to death.

XVII. Again, he adds that natural can be said of what has a cause in nature itself. And also, he says, in this way immortality was in some sense natural to the first man. For in the best constitution of the human body as an internal cause, and in the tree of life as an external cause (both of which were natural for that effect), immortality consisted.

XVIII. However, he teaches that the same immortality was also supernatural to man in another sense: partly due to justice, from which that good constitution of the body and consequently immortality itself depended. For, he says, that justice was supernatural, as through it the soul was subjected to God and adhered to Him as its supernatural good and end. While this subjection lasted, there was a certain supernatural power in the soul by which it could preserve the body from all corruption. Partly due to the body or the matter from which man was made. Since it was earthly, it did not have the cause of immortality in itself, but rather of mortality. Therefore, although the first man had some cause of immortality in his nature, it was not full and total. Rather, if we separate supernatural gifts from him and consider only the natural, he was mortal, so that it was necessary for him to die. For he was composed of contraries, whose conflict necessarily eventually leads to the corruption of the composite itself. Thus, in this way, immortality was supernatural to the first man. However, because supernatural is properly opposed only to what is called natural in the fourth way from the modes already enumerated, and not in the first, second, or third way; according to which, however, immortality cannot simply be called natural to the first man; because natural causes alone, as we said, were not sufficient to grant it to man; therefore, it is more correct to call immortality absolutely supernatural to an integral man rather than natural. Hence the proposition that the immortality of the first man was not a benefit of grace but a natural condition was rightly disapproved by the Apostolic See,

especially if its sense is that immortality was so due to human nature that God could not have created it mortal. This is known to be utterly false.

XIX. As for the Doctors of the Reformed School, they also unanimously teach that man in a state of innocence was somewhat immortal. Nor do they explain that immortality in a dissimilar way. For like the Doctors of the Roman Church, they distinguish between the immortality by which someone cannot die and that by which someone can avoid dying and is free from the necessity of dying. In the first way, they teach that only the blessed after the resurrection will be immortal; but in the latter way, only man in a state of integrity was immortal; so that in that state there was the possibility of dying, which is not in the blessed, but there was not, as there is in us now through sin, the necessity of dying.

XX. Josué Placaeus explains this matter in his Theses on the State of Adam before the Fall, Thesis 32. He says, "Adam was not immortal in the way we will be after the blessed resurrection: for he could die, just as he could sin. Nor was he mortal as we are mortal in this state of sin: for he could avoid dying, just as he could avoid sinning."

XXI. Similarly, Paraeus says that the immortality by which man was corporeally immortal before sin was the power not to die or the negation of the act of dying based on the hypothesis of union with an originally perfect soul, even though the body of man was in itself mortal. He says, "Immortality signifies, first, the absolute and natural impotence of dying. In this way, only God has immortality. Thus, the Fathers deny, and we deny, that man was immortal by nature. Second, the impotence of dying by the grace of creation: thus, angels and human souls are immortal. Third, the impotence of dying by the grace of a gift: thus, the bodies of the blessed will have immortality. Fourth, the power not to die or the negation of the act of dying based on some hypothesis, even if it is mortal in itself. Thus, man before sin was corporeally immortal, based on the hypothesis of union with an originally perfect, immortal soul." In his book Against Bellarmine on the Grace of the First Man, chapter 9.

XXII. Tilenus also, in his Disputation on the External State of the First Man, thesis nine, says, "It is certain that the immortality of the first man was not exactly the same as the glorious immortality of the blessed. For just as it is one thing to be able not to sin and another thing not to be able to sin, so it is one thing to be able not to die and another thing not to be able to die. The former is of nature, the latter is of glory. The former immortality removes the act of dying but does not exclude the possibility; the latter abolishes and extinguishes both."

XXIII. However, they insist that the immortality which befitted man in his original integrity should rather be called natural than supernatural, and indeed that the first man was in some sense naturally immortal. This is the doctrine of the Theses of the cited Disputation of Tilenus, thesis eight. Where he asserts that man is truly said to be naturally immortal. However, in thesis two, explaining his mind more distinctly, he teaches that the body of the first man was indeed corruptible by itself, being composed of contrary and conflicting qualities: but nevertheless was to be preserved incorruptible by the pact of God, if man had remained in God's service without sin.

XXIV. Thus, Josué Placaeus also pronounces on this matter in the thesis already cited. He says, "Adam's ability not to die was as natural as his ability not to sin. The dominion of death was no more natural than that of sin. Indeed, he had the possibility of dying by nature, but the necessity from sin." He gives this reason for it, that it is just for physical faculties to follow the condition of moral ones, which have dominion in man: Hence he concludes that in Adam the same was true of life and justice. And therefore, since justice was natural to him, the ability not to die must also have been natural.

XXV. However, Paraeus distinguishes between integral nature and corrupt nature. And he says that Adam's immortality, with respect to integral nature, was natural; but with respect to corrupt nature, not immortality but mortality, which is the necessity of dying, is rightly called natural. And further, he distinguishes between integral man and his body considered in itself. And he maintains that immortality was natural to man, not to the body in itself, in the ninth chapter of Bellarmine on the Grace of the First Man. However, in the fifth chapter, he teaches that whatever lay adjacent to the principles of nature for its perfection was natural to integral man; and without which nature in its principles was not at first constituted.

XXVI. Moreover, in this question, it is entirely certain, and as appears from what has been said, agreed upon by the common consensus of both the Roman and Reformed Schools, that man before sin was free from the necessity of dying, but that in him, as in the possibility of sinning, so also was the possibility of dying. And that man was immortal in no other sense than this.

XXVII. Nor do the theologians of the Roman School, as we have shown above, deny that the immortality which belonged to the first man before sin can in some respect and sense be called natural, namely, in so far as natural signifies what is inherent from the first origin and not adventitious and superadded. Also, in so far as natural is opposed to what is contrary to nature and signifies what adorns and perfects the same nature.

XXVIII. The only remaining question is whether this immortality should be called natural or supernatural with respect to integral man, speaking simply. Protestants affirm this, while the Doctors of the Roman School deny it.

XXIX. However, this question is only about the name with respect to those Protestants who define natural, as Paraeus does, as that without which nature in its principles was not originally constituted. In this sense, as we have seen, the Doctors of the Roman School admit that immortality was natural to the first man.

XXX. A real difference remains only among those Protestants who claim that, without any supernatural help, integral man could have avoided death forever, and the Roman School, which denies this by common consent.

XXXI. However, since it is established that the necessity of dying, which now hangs over us, is not from nature but from sin, and if man had persevered in his original integrity, life would always have been joined with his justice by the most wise and equitable ordinance of God, this question does not seem to be of such great importance.

XXXII. However, to more distinctly reveal what my opinion is on this matter. I observe that in the Reformed Schools, there are two opinions concerning the perpetual life of integral man. For some think that the first man, if he had remained in the service of God according to the natural covenant made with him by God, would have indeed lived perpetually, but only an earthly and animal life, which would never have been changed into a celestial and glorious one. This is the doctrine of Moses Amyraldus in his Theses on the three divine covenants.

XXXIII. However, the more common opinion holds that if man had never fallen from his original integrity, he would have been eventually taken up to a blessed and glorious immortality in the heavens, after some period spent on earth, as seemed fit to divine wisdom. And this through a change similar to that which the pious and holy men, whom the last judgment will find alive on earth, will experience.

XXXIV. If we follow this more common and probable opinion, it is certain that man would never have lived perpetually without supernatural assistance. For that change through which man would have been taken up to celestial life would not have been natural, but supernatural.

XXXV. However, that man could have lived forever with an earthly and animal life, as the former opinion asserts, without any supernatural gift or help, seems in no way probable to me. Nor can I understand how a body composed of elements, and therefore naturally and in itself corruptible, could be preserved from corruption forever without any supernatural help. In this matter, I follow the judgment of Peter Molinaeus, who also has no doubt that man, however perfect his natural bodily constitution might have been, would need supernatural help and the continuous assistance of God to preserve this immortality. In his Theses on the State of Innocence, Thesis 50.

On Original Righteousness

I. The common doctrine of the Roman Church is that the first man, before he sinned under the instigation of the Devil, was endowed with true justice and holiness, by which he was pleasing and acceptable to God for eternal life. This is clearly taught by the Council of Trent itself in the fifth session, decree on Original Sin, where it pronounces anathema on anyone who does not confess that the first man Adam, after he transgressed the command of God in Paradise, immediately lost the holiness and justice in which he had been constituted. Furthermore, it condemns anyone who asserts that Adam lost the holiness and justice received from God for himself alone and not also for us.

II. Furthermore, that justice and holiness, according to the mind of the Doctors of the Roman Church, did not only consist in the fact that the mind of man was imbued with true knowledge of God, sufficient for the attainment of eternal beatitude, and his will embraced God with pure and chaste love; but also in the fact that the flesh obeyed the spirit and the body obeyed the soul without difficulty and resistance, and the sensitive appetite followed the direction of reason so that it never rebelled against it or drew man to different directions. Consequently, Adam in that state of integrity experienced no struggle between flesh and spirit, nor any rebellion of the members against the law of the mind, as we often feel in ourselves; but he was inclined to good and averted from evil without struggle and difficulty, nor did he have in himself that concupiscence with which we are now born and which persists in us until death.

III. The question arises whether that justice and holiness were natural to the first man or not. To answer this question, the Doctors of the Roman Church observe that "natural" is taken in various ways. First, natural is said of everything that is had from birth, and in this way, natural is opposed to adventitious. Second, natural is called that which is consonant with nature and which does not destroy nature but rather adorns and perfects it. In this sense, natural is opposed to what is against nature. Third, natural is called that which is either a part of nature or flows from the principles of nature or is apt to flow from them. In this sense, the body and soul, and the faculties of sensing and understanding, and the operations which are exercised by these faculties without the aid surpassing nature, are called natural. Thus, natural is opposed to supernatural.

IV. Now indeed, some among the Doctors of the Roman Church hold that the justice and holiness, which the entire Roman Church confesses were found in the first parents before sin, were natural in every way, not only in so far as natural is distinguished from adventitious or from what is against nature, but also in so far as it is opposed to supernatural. They do not consider that justice to have been a supernatural grace, but to have belonged to the natural state of man not yet corrupted and to have been a condition owed to integral nature. This is testified by Medina in 1. 2. question 18, article 2. "Some Doctors," he says, "understand by man constituted in pure natural things, man constituted in integral nature with the gift and vigour healing nature, so that he could remain and persevere in good and the duty of virtues if he wanted." This opinion without doubt seems to be Augustine's. And these are those notably learned men who, according to Bellarmine,

hold that Thomas himself thought the same with other more approved authors, and that they held the opposite of what Bellarmine himself teaches.

V. However, this opinion was condemned by Roman Popes, namely, Pius V and Gregory XIII, in the last century. For among the many articles condemned in a singular Bull of these Popes, this is the twenty-first: "The elevation and exaltation of human nature into the fellowship of the divine was owed to the integrity of the first condition, and hence it should be called natural, not supernatural." The twenty-sixth is expressed in these words: "The integrity of the first condition was not an undue exaltation of human nature, but its natural condition." As Bellarmine reports in his book on the grace of the first man, chapter 1.

VI. Therefore, the common opinion of the Doctors of the Roman Church is that justice and holiness can indeed be called natural in so far as natural is opposed to what is against nature and signifies what is consonant with nature and what does not destroy nature but adorns and perfects it; or also in so far as natural is opposed to adventitious and signifies what is inherent from origin or from birth. For they admit that our first parent was created in justice, and therefore they call the justice with which he was endowed in the state of integrity original. But they deny that this justice was natural in so far as natural is opposed to supernatural; because, according to their mind, it did not flow from the principles of nature but was a gratuitous gift of God which elevated man above his natural condition.

VII. However, to explain their mind more clearly in this part, they observe that something is said to be supernatural in two ways: per se and per accidens. It is called supernatural per se, which by its very nature is not apt to flow from the principles of nature, such as the ascent of Elijah to heaven in a fiery chariot, the strength of Samson, and other things of that kind. It is called supernatural per accidens, which is sometimes obtained by a divine miracle, although it usually flows from the principles of nature. Such was the sense of seeing restored to the man born blind by the Lord, the wisdom granted to Solomon by divine means, and many other things read in the Scriptures.

VIII. Now they want the gift of justice in the first man to have been supernatural not only per accidens, because it was granted freely and immediately and in a way surpassing nature by God, but also per se and in its very nature because that justice which adorned the first man neither flowed nor could flow from the principles of nature, even uncorrupted. For they do not consider that man, even if not yet infected by sin, by his own natural powers, could know and love God as much as required by justice and holiness acceptable to God for the reward of eternal life and beatitude. Nor could the body, sense, and appetite be so perfectly subjected to the soul and reason by natural powers alone and gifts that there would be no rebellion of the flesh against the spirit in man, nor any difficulty and resistance in doing good, nor any proclivity to evil, as was the case in integral man, in whom there were no disordered and rebellious movements of concupiscence against right reason.

IX. This is the doctrine of Bellarmine in his book on the grace of the first man, chapter 4. There, his fourth proposition is: "That rectitude with which Adam was created and without which after his fall all men are born was a supernatural gift." To explain this proposition, he observes that man naturally consists of flesh and spirit and therefore shares

his nature partly with beasts, partly with angels: and indeed, regarding the flesh and communion with beasts, he has a certain inclination to corporeal and sensible good, to which he is drawn by sense and appetite: but regarding the spirit and communion with angels, he has an inclination to spiritual and intelligible good, to which he is drawn by intelligence and will. From these different or contrary inclinations, there arises a certain conflict in the same man, and from this conflict a great difficulty in doing good, while one inclination impedes the other.

X. Then he says that divine providence at the beginning of creation, to provide a remedy for this sickness or weakness of human nature, which arose from the condition of the material, added to man a certain remarkable gift, namely original justice, by which, like a golden bridle, the lower part was easily subjected to the higher part and the higher part to God. Thus the flesh was so subjected to the spirit that it could not move against its will, nor become rebellious to it, unless the spirit itself became rebellious to God; but the spirit was still in the power to become rebellious to God or not. Hence, it follows that the justice of the first man was indeed natural in so far as natural is said of everything that is had from birth, and in so far as natural is said of what is consonant with nature, but it was not natural in so far as natural is distinguished from supernatural and signifies what flows from the principles of nature.

XI. The adversaries, he says, believe that the rectitude in which Adam was created was natural to him in this last sense (namely, in so far as natural is opposed to supernatural), that is, it was like a certain health due to nature, and apt to arise from nature well constituted, that is, not corrupted: and now men, who lost that rectitude in Adam, lack a certain natural good, as a beast would lack if it were born blind, or lame, or feverish. And now if that original justice were divinely restored to any man, they would say it is a supernatural gift per accidens, not per se, as we said about eyes restored to a man born blind. But we believe that the rectitude even of the lower part was also a supernatural gift, and indeed per se, not per accidens, so that it neither flowed from the principles of nature nor could it flow. And because that supernatural gift was, as we shall immediately prove, when it was removed, human nature left to itself began to experience that conflict of the lower part with the higher, which would have been natural, that is, it would have followed from the condition of the material unless God had added the gift of justice to man. Therefore, the state of man after the fall of Adam differs no more from the state of man in pure natural things than a person stripped differs from one who is naked, and human nature is not worse, if you remove the original guilt, nor does it labour under more ignorance and weakness than it would if it were constituted in pure natural things. Therefore, the corruption of nature does not arise from the lack of some natural gift, nor from the addition of some bad quality, but solely from the loss of the supernatural gift due to Adam's sin. He proves this opinion to be common among the old and recent scholastic doctors by citing many of their testimonies afterward.

XII. But although the Doctors of the Roman Church today generally agree that the justice and holiness of man in integrity and innocence was a certain supernatural gift and grace properly so called and added to nature, among them there remains a notable difference of opinions here. For some of them want the justice and holiness of the first man to have been

supernatural and belonging to grace rather than to nature, yet in a certain way due to innocent nature. So that it was impossible for the first man to be constituted and created by God without such grace: because, they say, this would have been repugnant to divine goodness, justice, and wisdom. Otherwise, it would have happened that God would create man either evil or miserable, or rather both. For one who neither knows nor loves God with pure and chaste love, as befits a rational creature, and in whom bodily senses and appetites drag reason unwillingly and resistingly to lower things, and do not obey the commands and dictates of the mind but rebel and agitate against it, cannot help but be evil and miserable. But it is contrary to divine goodness to create man evil and sinful, or at least miserable, without any fault of his own.

XIII. Therefore, they do not think that every duty is incompatible with grace, but only that which is based on good works and merits. Therefore, although God, when creating a rational creature, must, according to his goodness and wisdom, confer gifts and provide aids necessary for pursuing God with pure and chaste love and living a just, tranquil, and blessed life, those gifts and aids, according to their view, do not properly belong to nature but to grace: because such gifts and aids are not due in any way to the merits of the creature, and the creature is not sufficient by itself for those things unless it is helped by God above nature.

XIV. This is the doctrine of those who follow the teachings and views of Jansen, as can be seen in the brief Catechism they published on grace. For there, in chapter four, after asserting that the first man was created in a state of holiness and justice, knowledge, and divine love, God simultaneously forming nature and communicating grace, they teach that man could not have been created in any other state: because God can create nothing that is not ordered: and now a rational creature would be disordered unless it were created in a state of grace. They prove this from the fact that the essential order of an intellectual creature is to tend towards God as its centre and origin. But it cannot tend there except by the help supplied by grace. Hence, it follows that such a creature would be outside its proper order if, not yet corrupted by sin, it were deprived of grace.

XV. These views are derived from Jansen himself, who in his posthumous book titled "Augustinus," extensively collects, proves, and amplifies the same doctrine from Augustine. Especially in the first and second books on the state of pure nature, where he confirms with many arguments and shows that man could not have been created in a state of pure nature without any grace: because by the sole powers of nature, even uncorrupted, without the aid of grace helping nature, man cannot love God with any true love, nor be blessed by any contemplation and enjoyment of God. Therefore, if God were supposed to create man in a state of pure nature without any grace, He would necessarily create him both evil and miserable: which is utterly repugnant to the goodness and wisdom of God. And he further teaches that the grace of love for God, in which the first man was created, truly retains the character of grace, although God grants it not from any debt of justice but from the fittingness of the creature's weakness, from the law of his wisdom, his kindness, and mercy, and his own rectitude. Otherwise, all sins and love flowing down to inferior things would ultimately be attributed to God, who commanded that love to be bound to Himself as its beginning and end. These are the very words of Jansen in book 1 of the state

of nature, chapter 20, whose title is "How Good Will, in which a rational creature should be created, is Grace."

XVI. For as can be seen there, according to his view, even what is most properly called grace does not conflict with any duties or connaturalities, decencies, congruities, and equities arising from other sources than from the right of the creature. Therefore, although nothing is more connatural to a creature made in the image of God than to be created with the knowledge and love of God, and nothing more fitting, decent, and just with respect to God than that the rational innocent creature, ordered to God as its natural end, should be endowed with what is necessary to attain that end, and God should in a way owe it to Himself and His attributes: nevertheless, that knowledge and love of God, without which no creature can enjoy God, deserves to be called grace even with respect to innocent creatures; both because it is not due to any merits of the creature, and because such knowledge and love surpass the natural powers of any nature unless it is helped by God above nature.

XVII. But the more common opinion of the Doctors of the Roman School differs from this. For they believe that the justice and holiness which was in the first man was not only a supernatural gift and did not pertain to nature but to grace: but also something wholly undeserved by human nature, even innocent and not yet sinful, so that nothing repugnant to divine wisdom, goodness, and justice would have been for man to be created without such justice. Hence, they posit among the possible states of man the state of pure nature, or as they call it, man in pure natural things. In this state, according to their view, man would be neither just nor unjust: neither guilty of any sin nor endowed with any grace.

XVIII. For as Jansen, already mentioned, reports and explains the mind of the Scholastics on this part, in the first book of the state of pure nature, chapter one, according to them, pure nature is called pure in a negative sense, because it has nothing superadded, either good or bad, that is not due to it: so neither does it have sin, nor the punishment accompanying sin, nor any gift of grace surpassing nature.

XIX. To easily understand what this state of nature includes, they direct us to look at fallen nature, in which whatever we find besides the guilt of sin, they profess belongs to pure nature. Indeed, their solemn rule is that pure nature differs from fallen nature as a naked person differs from one who has been stripped, who differ in no other way than that the latter has lost what the former never had: so that pure nature behaves like a negation, fallen nature like a privation.

XX. Therefore, when they teach that man can be created by God, without any preceding sin, in a state of pure nature, they mean that man in that case would be created without ordination to eternal beatitude, or the clear vision of God, and consequently without faith in the intellect and without charity loving God in the heart. Furthermore, the rebellion of the flesh against the spirit, which we experience in ourselves, would be entirely natural to such a man. So much so that the merely natural order would demand that God allow those two contrary appetites to conflict with reciprocal motions, neither withdrawing his concurrence nor suppressing their mutual conflict and hostility with some superadded gift.

XXI. And therefore, with regard to the internal powers of the soul, there would be such ignorance in pure nature, such weakness in thinking, judging, and living well, and such proneness to sin, as we experience in fallen nature. But with regard to external things, it would be greater. For besides the fact that sensible objects that excite concupiscence would be the same, the evil counsel and example of wicked men would then more powerfully provoke to evil. For the knowledge of God and virtues that was communicated to Adam, the memory of God's promises and threats, the recollection of his previous state and past fall, and the promise of the coming Christ, with the hope of His redemption, which were diffused from the head to posterity through tradition, could mitigate the ease of sinning in fallen nature; so that in this respect blindness, general corruption of morals, and proneness to sin would seem more inclined in pure nature.

XXII. This is the doctrine of Bellarmine in the seventh chapter of the book already cited. Where, responding to the seventh objection, he affirms that man, created in pure natural things, would be such as we are, regarding bodily mortality, rebellion of the members, ignorance, difficulty, and similar things. And later, in the solution to the eighth objection, he denies that the natural impulse of our flesh is more rebellious now than it would have been without grace: and that pure natural things would have been healthier before sin than they are now after sin. And in the following, he concedes that man could have been created in such a state of pure nature that there would be a propensity to vice and an impulse of sensuality in it. And he contends that nothing absurd would follow if God denied grace to a man thus created in pure natural things, which grace is necessary to remedy such evils and for man to reach eternal beatitude.

XXIII. However, Bellarmine denies there that a man created in pure natural things would therefore be under the power of the devil. In this, he departs from the opinion of Ruard Tapper. For he affirms that man can be created by God without original justice. And then not only would the aforementioned weaknesses, difficulty, and ignorance have a place in him, but also he would be afflicted by all those evils we experience, including damnation and vexation by demons. For, he says, man could be created without original justice and would be afflicted by all the evils we now experience, namely diseases, damnation, vexation by demons, and all others, which, however, would not be punishments and penalties in him, but merely torments as they are in beasts. In the explanation of the second article of the Faculty of Louvain, page 72, where he deals with original sin.

XXIV. As for the Protestants, and those who among them are called Reformed by a special name, they also, by common consent, teach that God created man in true justice and holiness: according to Ecclesiastes, God made man upright. For that rectitude could consist in nothing else but conformity with the will and law of God, in which man's justice consists. They also think that Paul alludes to this when he exhorts the faithful to put on the new man, who was created according to God in justice and holiness of truth. Where it is manifest that he alludes to the first creation, in which man is said to be created in the image and likeness of God; to which, in his view, belongs that holiness and justice which Christ works in the faithful by His Spirit.

XXV. However, they do not place that holiness and justice in which the first man was created by God solely in the fact that he acknowledged God as his Creator, as was fitting,

and adhered to Him with pure and sincere love; but also in the fact that all his faculties were so well constituted and ordered that the lower faculties obeyed the higher, and the higher obeyed God without difficulty and resistance; nor was there any inclination to evil or difficulty and resistance in doing good, such as is now found in all and each individual. Therefore, according to their opinion, in the newly created man, there was nothing disordered or immoderate. Nor did any struggle or conflict of his faculties among themselves have a place in him: but all his faculties, in the highest concord and order among themselves, conspired to the same end, namely that to which he was created by God, the author of nature.

XXVI. Moreover, they contend that this justice was natural to the first man before the fall and should be called so. Not because it constituted part of the essence of human nature, or because it necessarily flowed from the principles of human nature: but because it was something created with nature and belonging to the innate endowments of human nature not yet fallen... Therefore, according to their doctrine, that original justice was a natural gift, not a supernatural one. And it related to the soul of integral man in the same way that the just proportion and beauty of the members, vigour, and decor related to his body, which were found in him then and which regarded a certain natural, not supernatural, perfection of man: although they were not of the essence of man, nor did they necessarily flow from the principles of human nature.

XXVII. But to more clearly and certainly understand the Reformed School's opinion on this question, it will be worth briefly summarizing how some of its principal Doctors explain their views on this matter, especially since there may seem to be some diversity among them. First, therefore, Tilenus, in the first part of his "Syntagma Theologicum," in the thirty-third Disputation, Thesis fourteen, asserts that that justice can rightly be called natural, in the sense in which natural and supernatural are mutually opposed and distinguished from each other. In Thesis seventeen, he says that this original justice was as natural to the first parent as was the very nature and substantial form received through creation. Therefore, in the preceding Thesis, he affirms that this quality immediately shone forth from the original image of God in man, as accidents usually do from their subjects.

XXVIII. Amesius, in "Bellarminus Enervatus," volume four, chapter one, explaining how original justice was natural to the first man, says: "We do not say that that justice was an essential part of physical nature or flowed in a physical manner from its principles but was a moral condition owed to that nature, which was created to act justly."

XXIX. Josué de la Place, in the "Syntagma Theologorum Salmuriensium," in the Disputation on the state of Adam before the fall, Thesis eighteen, says that the original rectitude of the first man should be numbered among natural gifts, since it was nothing other than congruity with the law of nature; and a perfection that was created simultaneously with nature, and which was to be propagated through natural generation, and therefore a natural perfection corresponding to the natural faculties of man. In Thesis twenty-six, however, he concedes that original justice was indeed grace, that is, a gratuitous gift proceeding from the same three persons by whom nature itself was created: and it was not grace in the sense in which this name is opposed to nature, and signifies the effects of divine favour with which God pursues sinners in Christ.

XXX. Peter Molinaeus explains his view on this matter as follows. He contends: "We assert that Adam before the fall naturally knew and loved God. Nor do we acknowledge any proclivity to rebellion in integral nature, because there was nothing to be restrained, although there was something to be governed. Nor do we think that Adam's purity before the fall was an extrinsic bridle or a repressive force, but a natural virtue." In his Disputation on the state of Innocence, Thesis XXV, in the "Thesaurus Theologorum Sedanenium."

XXXI. Pareus, in his book against Bellarmine on the grace of the first man, says that what is in man above the principles of nature or native endowments is supernatural for his perfection. He distinguishes nature as integral, such as it was in the state of creation before the fall, and as corrupted, such as it is in the state of sin. Hence, he observes that supernatural is said in two ways. Either it signifies what is above integral nature, or what is above corrupted nature. Now, he concedes that original justice was supernatural in the latter sense because it surpassed corrupted nature. But he denies that it was supernatural in the former sense, because it was not above the native endowments and perfections of integral nature. In chapter five, he says that original justice can be defended as natural good for the first man, no less than the faculty of seeing, feeling, etc. Because from an enlightened mind, illustrious knowledge about God and divine things flowed naturally, although through free will, just as vision flows from the eye, etc. But he adds that it is not necessary to insist on this, because for Adam, it was natural, not only what constituted his nature or flowed from the principles of constituted nature by itself: but also whatever lay adjacent to the principles of nature for its perfection, and without which nature was not primitively constituted in its principles. He affirms that our theologians mainly refer to this sense of the word natural when they contend that original justice was natural for the first man. Hence, he concludes that Bellarmine perverts the state of the question when he teaches that the question here is not whether original justice was natural for the first man in the sense that natural signifies what is present from birth, which is conceded on both sides, but whether it was natural in the sense that natural is distinguished from supernatural and signifies either what constitutes nature or what is apt to flow from the principles of nature.

XXXII. Finally, Ramburtius, in the "Syntagma Theologorum Sedanensium," in the Disputation on the image of God in man and original justice, Thesis twenty-seven, pronounces his opinion on this question: "We hold that original justice comprised the entire integrity and holiness of man, and that it was natural to man so that it was inherent in Adam's nature as soon as it existed to love and obey God, and that this gift distinguished man as soon as he was created. We do not mean by this that this holiness flowed from the powers of nature; but that this integrity was natural to man so that in the state in which he was created by God and remained, there were no disordered movements in him: just as we say that some knowledge of God is natural, in that there is nothing more natural than that which is so inherent in nature that it cannot be removed without, so to speak, destroying nature." Therefore, this justice shone in Adam as soon as he was born, and he experienced nothing contrary to this justice.

XXXIII. From this, it appears that many of the Reformed openly teach that original justice was natural to the first man because it was a perfection of the natural order, due to a rational creature not yet corrupted by sin, as it shone forth from the faculties of human

nature, which is still assumed to be pure and innocent: just as health and good physical condition result from a body rightly disposed according to nature. However, others, like Pareus, seem to call that justice natural to the first man only because it was a certain perfection created with the first man and belonged to his native and original endowments. And when they deny that it was supernatural, they only mean that it was not something superadded to the original and native endowments of man.

XXXIV. However, regardless of how it is addressed and by what reasoning it is said that original justice was natural to the first man, the common opinion of the Reformers seems to be that it is entirely repugnant to the divine goodness and wisdom for God to create a man without original justice, one who neither recognizes nor loves God as he should, and who is prone and inclined to evil, with his senses and appetites resisting reason and rebelling against the divine law. Nor do they think that such a lack of love towards God, an inclination towards evil and vice, and the rebellion of sense and appetite against the mind and divine law in a rational creature can be free from sin and guilt. Thus, they find it absurd and injurious to the Creator to say that such a rebellion of the soul's faculties and the resulting proneness to evil and resistance to good in the whole man could be a consequence of man's composition from a rational soul and an organic body, which would necessarily and naturally result unless God added something above nature that subjected reason to God and the lower part of the soul to reason.

XXXV. Therefore, they plainly consider the state of man in pure natural things, often mentioned in the Roman School, to be fictitious and impossible; in which it is supposed that man, not corrupted by sin, is yet devoid of justice and holiness, not adhering to God with pure and chaste love, but driven by his own concupiscence towards lower things, ignorant of what is necessary for true happiness, weak and impotent to do good, and prone to vice by a precipitous inclination, as can be gathered from the dissertations of Reformed Doctors who dispute against Bellarmine and other Doctors of the Roman School about original justice.

XXXVI. However, Pareus does not dare to assert that human nature could not be created without original justice. "Nor do we say," he states, "that human nature could not have been created by God without original justice. For we place no limit on divine power. We only say that God, when creating man in integrity, could not deny Himself; He could not create an integral man without integrity." In book 1, Bellarmine on the Grace of the First Man, chapter 6, response to the fourth argument.

XXXVII. Furthermore, although Reformed Doctors claim that original justice was natural to the first man, many of them do not want to affirm that the first man lacked all supernatural grace and was only adorned with natural gifts from God. This is especially seen in Peter Molinaeus, in the previously cited disputation on the state of innocence, theses 49 and 50. He says: "We do not deny that there were certain supernatural gifts in Adam. For if he derived some knowledge from revelation, or if he had anything that human nature, however pure, could not attain without a special and extraordinary gift of God, it was undoubtedly supernatural; and Adam, persevering in integrity, would not have propagated it to posterity. Moreover, just as it is undoubted that man, however perfect in natural bodily constitution, needs supernatural help and the continuous support of God

to preserve this integrity, so Adam, though his nature was pure and holy, still needed continual supernatural help to preserve that purity. For even inanimate and irrational things are sustained by divine influence."

XXXVIII. Similarly, Ramburtius acknowledges supernatural gifts in Adam, in the twenty-ninth thesis of the disputation just cited. He says: "Nor do we remove supernatural gifts from Adam. For the grace of God adorned these same natural gifts, lifting them up daily: just as grace does not destroy nature but directs it and raises it higher than it can strive on its own. Therefore, the first man was not only an excellent creature but also a son of God, adopted to inherit the heavenly inheritance, that is, not only did he have reason by nature as a faithful servant, understanding the Lord's will well and executing it perfectly, but also by grace, the dignity of a son, hoping for the paternal blessing and inheritance."

XXXIX. Similar views can be read in Tilenus. He says: "The Papists criminally and slanderously assign to us the opinion of the Pelagians, as if we contend that there were no supernatural gifts in the first man, while we attribute theological virtues to him ourselves." In the thirty-eighth thesis on original justice. A little earlier, explaining more distinctly wherein the grace given to Adam consisted, he says: "As Adam's will had the ability to act justly and holy by nature, so that he would actually act and love God above all things: he was effectively moved by grace. But just as the vine does not lack its natural power to produce wine because it needs external aids, such as sun, rain, and cultivation, to actually produce, so the rectitude of will and the grace of affections in Adam were not unnatural, although they were exercised and assisted by the auxiliary grace."

XL. Therefore, that Doctor refers to supernatural grace in the first man both the actual help by which he was stirred to do good and the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity with which he was adorned. But it is difficult to understand how those virtues could have been supernatural gifts in Adam, and yet his rectitude or original justice was natural to him, or how there could be justice and rectitude acceptable and pleasing to God without faith, hope, and charity. And as in the earlier references from Ramburtius, the learned man seems to assert that the justice and holiness of the first man were natural, not supernatural, yet did not flow from the powers of nature. For how can what does not flow from the powers of nature not be supernatural? Unless we say, as Pareus does, that what is adventitious and added to native endowments is called supernatural, while original justice is called natural only in the sense that it was inherent in man from the beginning and created with him, and thus pertained to his native endowments, as he himself seems to explain. Although what he adds does not quite fit: that the justice of the first man was natural to him, just as some knowledge of God is natural to us. For the knowledge of God which he calls natural does not surpass the powers of nature.

XLI. From what has been explained so far, it is clear that the Roman School and the Reformed School agree that the first man before the fall was endowed with true justice and holiness, through which he recognized God as was fitting with his mind and loved Him with his will, and had nothing disordered in himself, nor anything that rebelled against the divine law and will, or that did not rightly submit to reason.

XLII. It is also clear that the theologians of the Roman School, at least most of them, agree with the Reformed in teaching that the first man was created in that justice and holiness, and therefore the first man never lacked it, but it was inherent in him from the beginning.

XLIII. Consequently, what follows is that most of the Doctors of the Roman Church acknowledge with the Protestants that original justice was natural to the first man, in so far as natural signifies the same as native and is opposed to what is adventitious and superadded.

XLIV. Indeed, from what we have previously mentioned, it is clear that in the Roman Church there are those who, like most of the Reformed, teach that original justice belonged to the gifts of nature, not of grace, as opposed to nature: and therefore it was natural to the first man, in so far as natural is opposed to supernatural.

XLV. Furthermore, as can be inferred from what has been said, many in the Roman Church concede to the Reformed that original justice, whatever it should be called, whether natural or supernatural, was a perfection so owed to innocent man that, consistent with divine wisdom and goodness, he could not have been created without it: and therefore the state of man in pure natural things, as described by the common view of the Roman School, and in which it is supposed that man was not a sinner but devoid of justice, prone to vice, and struggling with concupiscence against right reason, is something merely fictitious; and which the goodness, justice, and wisdom of God in the nature of things never allow to exist.

XLVI. Conversely, the Protestant Doctors concede to the Roman School that original justice was not natural to the first man, in the sense that natural signifies what constitutes nature or what necessarily, or in a physical manner, flows from the principles of human nature. Moreover, many Doctors of the Reformed School do not deny that the first man had certain supernatural gifts: and that some grace was necessary for man, even when innocent, to act rightly and justly. Indeed, some of them acknowledge that original justice did not flow from the powers of nature.

XLVII. However, there is a controversy here between the Roman School, with very few exceptions, and the Reformed School, about whether original justice was natural or supernatural to the first man. The common consensus among Reformed Doctors is that it was natural, not supernatural; on the contrary, most theologians of the Roman School insist that it was not natural but supernatural. This controversy seems to be real concerning some theologians, but verbal concerning others. It is real concerning those who believe that original justice was a perfection of the natural order corresponding to the natural faculties of man and that it belonged to nature, not grace. The theologians of the Roman School mean the opposite when they assert that this justice was supernatural. But the same controversy is verbal concerning others, who teach that this justice was natural to the first man only in the sense that it was inherent in him and should be counted among his native endowments. And when they deny that this justice was supernatural, they only mean that it was not something superadded to man's original endowments, which many theologians of the Roman Church concede.

XLVIII. Furthermore, there is a question between the Reformed School and many theologians of the Roman School about whether it is repugnant to divine wisdom and goodness for man to be created without original justice, and whether the state the Roman School calls pure nature should be numbered among the possible states of man: In which man is not corrupted by sin but is still devoid of true justice, labours under much ignorance and weakness, and is drawn to evil by his own concupiscence, with appetites rebelling against reason, as is the case in the state of corrupted nature. This is affirmed by the common opinion of the theologians of the Roman Church, but the Reformed School unanimously denies it, with perhaps one or another exception.

XLIX. And certainly, if we hold this view, very serious absurdities will follow. Firstly, it will follow that concupiscence, through which the flesh fights against the spirit, and which the theologians of the Roman School admit to having the nature of vice and a moral evil even after original sin is remitted, which displeases and is hateful to God, and which John denies to be from the Father, could have had God Himself as its author; for, according to this hypothesis, God could have created man with it. Nor does Bellarmine's response, that this concupiscence would have arisen from the material besides God's intention, as rust from iron, whose maker, therefore, is not the blacksmith, remove the force of the argument. For the blacksmith did not create the material of the iron from which rust arises, just as God created the material of our body. And yet, without the blacksmith's fault, rust cannot be in the iron that comes from his hands.

L. For assuming that God creates a man with the same ignorance, proclivity to evil, and resistance to good with which we are now born from Adam, and does not want to help him with any supernatural grace, which the Scholastics commonly think can happen, that man will neither love God nor regulate his acts and affections according to the rule of right reason but will indulge his lust in all things and necessarily rush into various wickednesses as occasion arises, as a man born from Adam would do if he were entirely deprived of all divine grace. And therefore, God would be the author of sin; as He created a man who, through no fault of his own but as it seemed good to God to form him, cannot avoid sinning and, by a certain vice and impulse of nature, rushes headlong into various crimes and cannot love his Creator as he should. Or it must be said that a rational creature can exist which is not bound to recognize and love God and could defile itself with all filth, indulge in wrath, lust, and gluttony, ravage its kind with rape and murder, and commit other acts that the law of nature and the eternal law forbid, and yet would not be guilty of any crime and sin for this. Both of these are highly absurd and involve a certain manifest impiety.

LI. Once it is conceded, however, that man cannot be created by God without justice and holiness, the other question does not seem so important: Whether that justice and holiness in which God created the first man, and without which he could not have been created by God, belong to the endowments of nature or of grace, and whether it should be called natural or supernatural. As long as everyone agrees that it is a gratuitous gift of God, which was not due to any merits of the creature.

LII. Reason, however, seems to require us to say that it belonged to the endowments of nature and was natural rather than supernatural. For it is not supernatural but natural that

pertains to the right constitution of nature and without which nature is neither healthy nor rightly constituted. Now, human nature without that holiness and justice which was inherent in integral man is not healthy but sick and cannot be said to be rightly constituted; since the rebellion of the lower faculties against reason and the proneness of the whole man to rebel against God is a disease and a certain vice of rational nature.

LIII. Furthermore, it is natural for a rational creature not corrupted to lack what is necessary to achieve its natural end. But the end of a rational creature is to recognize, love, and worship God. For this purpose, it was created by God. However, it cannot achieve this end if it is created without justice and holiness; and if it is considered as deprived of those gifts that we lost through Adam's sin.

LIV. Nor is there any natural faculty whose natural perfection does not correspond to it. Moral faculties, by which man is capable of virtue and vice, are natural to man no less than others. And what else can be the natural perfection of these but justice and holiness, which is now in question?

LV. Add that it belongs to the endowments of nature in a rational creature not corrupted but pure to conform to the law of nature and compose itself according to its rules. And therefore, whatever cannot conform to the law of nature and submit all its movements to it belongs to the endowments and order of nature. But a man destitute of all justice and holiness and subject to those weaknesses with which we are born today cannot compose himself according to the law of nature. Therefore, that holiness and justice by which such weaknesses are removed must be considered to belong to the gifts of uncorrupted nature.

LVI. Hence, it does not seem quite consistent with reason that some of the cited Reformed say that, although that justice and holiness in which the first man was created was natural to him, he nevertheless needed some supernatural help to be moved and stirred to do good. For although it is certain that without the continuous help of God man can never do anything good, not only in spiritual matters but not even in civil and human matters: therefore, even before the fall, man needed the perpetual help of God, in whom we live, move, and have our being: Nevertheless, it is not necessary that this help was of a supernatural order; but the help that did not surpass the order of nature primitively instituted by God could have been sufficient for this. For the help required for an uncorrupted and untainted creature to act according to its nature and tend to its natural end should be considered to belong to the order of nature.

LVII. However, this does not contradict what many Reformed distinctly teach, namely that there were some supernatural gifts in the first man. For God could add whatever He pleased above nature's original endowments and the aids necessary for it; but what and how much that was, we do not dare, in the absence of Scripture, to define. However, it is certain from Scripture that there was some supernatural knowledge in the first man: since God revealed Himself to him above nature and taught him His will by express word.

LVIII. Nor does it follow from the fact that man consists of a terrestrial body and a spiritual soul that there is a natural conflict of sense and appetite against reason in him: and therefore, such conflict and rebellion cannot be removed except by a supernatural gift. For man indeed has a natural twofold inclination, one towards earthly good, as he is corporeal,

and the other towards spiritual good, as he is endowed with an intelligent soul: but just as the soul is far superior to its body, so it is proper for the rightly constituted nature that the movements and inclinations of the body are subjected to the commands and judgments of the soul, and thus the appetite obeys reason. However, when things are otherwise, there appears to be a certain disorder of nature.

LIX. Nor, granted that the rectitude inherent in man was natural and not supernatural, is it as difficult as Bellarmine thinks to show how the corruption now within us, through which reason is forced to submit to the affections, invaded human nature. For that vice originated in the higher part of the soul when it began to turn away from God and direct itself toward the object of the sensitive appetite as its end. Consequently, there arose a disorder in man's moral faculties. For their original rectitude consisted in directing all their movements and affections towards God as the highest end, under the command of the mind and reason. From this end, reason cannot deviate and substitute earthly goods for it without being shamefully and contrary to its nature compelled to serve sense and appetite, whose object is now their highest end.

On Free Will

Part I

In which the Doctrine of the Reformed School is Expounded.

I. Most Doctors of the Roman Church usually attribute to Calvin and others who share his religious views the notion that they take away free will from man and deprive him of all freedom in action, or at least teach that free will was entirely lost and extinguished in man through sin. This can be seen in the Jesuit Bailly's Catechesis, which Rivetus refutes in his Summa of Controversies, Tract 4, Question 4, where he disputes against the Reformed as if they simply deny free will: and in the Jesuit Martin Becanus, who says that the Lutherans and Calvinists affirm that free will was entirely abolished by the sin of the first parent. In Summa Theologica Scholastica, Tract 1, Cap. 2, Question 9.

II. However, the consistent opinion of all Reformers is that free will, simply considered, and according to its proper nature and essence, is something that cannot be separated from a rational creature: and therefore the faculty of acting freely was not entirely removed from man by sin: indeed, that a man corrupted by sin acts just as freely in what he does as he did before sin; and that if he is left to himself, he freely indulges in sin; and if he is moved and stirred by grace to strive for a better life, those acts are also free, nor is anything prejudiced against the freedom of his will by the efficacy of God's grace.

III. Among them, it is also agreed that free will, which is inseparable from man, is not an act or a habit but rather a certain faculty of the soul: and yet by this name is not meant a faculty distinct from the mind and will; but that free will belongs to man as he is endowed with intellect and will.

IV. However, not all explain in the same way wherein lies the freedom by which a man is said to be free in acting, and from which his free will is named. And first, indeed, many of the Reformed teach that the freedom by which man is said to be of free will is not simply opposed to servitude or necessity, but rather to coercion. And they usually speak as if only coercion would take away freedom, and they describe freedom as immunity from coercion.

V. Yet it is not their opinion that anything done spontaneously and without coercion is free. For they acknowledge that animals act spontaneously and yet are deprived of freedom. Therefore, they also require that one who acts is not simply driven by the impulse of nature but acts from counsel and reason. Therefore, according to their view, the full definition of freedom will be, if one says that it is immunity from coercion in him who acts from the judgment of reason.

VI. Thus, Marcus Wendelinus, in Christian Theology, Book 1, Chapter 5, in explanation of Thesis 18, defines free will as "an affection of the will, by which it chooses or rejects the thing shown by the intellect, by its own motion, without coercion." And a similar definition is given by Zacharias Ursinus: "Therefore, free will is the faculty or power of willing or not willing, or of choosing or rejecting the object shown by the intellect, by its

own motion, without coercion." In Catechetical Explanations, Part 1, Question 8, number 1.

VII. From this view, it follows that freedom properly consists in the willingness with which the will follows the judgment of the intellect, not in any indifference of the will or a power to the opposite, without which the freedom of the will can still consist; although indeed the will is indifferent to many of its acts, as Wendelinus teaches in the place just cited. Where, after delivering the already mentioned definition of free will, he adds: "In general, it is sufficient for the freedom of the will that what some add, that by free will the will remains in its nature apt to choose the opposite or to suspend action, does not pertain to free will in general. Because the freedom of the will also consists without indifference to either opposite, which they call the liberty of contrariety. And therefore, there is also freedom, which is determined to one of the opposites: such as in the blessed, who act freely well, so that by confirmation in good they cannot act badly. Indeed, not even the liberty of contradiction is simply necessary for the freedom of the will: because the blessed freely praise God, who yet cannot but praise."

VIII. Therefore, although he and those who agree with him acknowledge a difference between the acts of the will; namely, that with respect to some the will is determined, but with respect to others, it remains in its nature apt to the opposites; yet they think that the will should be called free with respect to both, and that both are freely produced and elicited by the will. And therefore, they distinguish indeed between what is simply voluntary and what is out of choice: but they do not distinguish between voluntary and free. For they think both are equally extensive and that whatever is voluntary is thereby free: nor do they think that any necessity that does not overturn the nature of the voluntary overturns the nature of freedom. Therefore, although God is good by nature, they teach that He is freely good because He is not coerced but voluntarily good. As can be seen in Zacharias Ursinus in the place already cited: "Free, that is, spontaneous, which is opposed to what is involuntary and coerced: not to what is necessary. For free can consist with necessary but not with coerced, as God and the holy angels are necessarily good: yet not coerced but most freely: because they have the principle of their goodness in themselves, a free will."

IX. Others distinctly affirm that the freedom by which man is said to be free in acting is not merely immunity from coercion, which is the necessity inflicted by the force of an external agent against the inclination of what is said to be coerced: but that this freedom is also opposed to natural necessity, or determination by nature to one. Moreover, the necessity they call natural arises from matter in their view in two ways. Either the external action does not depend on any internal action by which it is commanded: but once the faculty and the external material object are placed, the action cannot but be exercised, and indeed such and so much action. This necessity is subject to all things devoid of sense and reason. Or the external action depends on the command of the internal, so that it can be suspended and not always done in the same way, but yet the determination arises only from some material thing: as happens in animals, whose external actions depend and are commanded by sense and admit great variety, even around one and the same object, as their senses are variously affected both internally and externally; but their sense itself is always

moved and determined by some material object. But man is free from both kinds of necessity. For in those acts with respect to which he is said to be of free will, he is not determined by an externally applied matter, nor even by sense alone in acting. But as an intellectual agent, he acts and desires from the judgment and command of reason.

X. In this way, they constitute the freedom of will. And because those who act from the judgment of reason have the knowledge of the end, and set it before themselves, and direct and accommodate their actions to it: and so they are in a way masters of their actions. On the contrary, inanimate things and brute animals, which are led by sense alone, do not know their end; and therefore they do not refer themselves to it, but only tend towards it like slaves, indeed doing what is commanded, but not knowing why it is commanded, nor wherefore. Nor do they act for the sake of an end, but are moved towards the end by a higher agent. Moreover, the sense and appetite of brutes are restricted to material things; but the will of men, following the guidance of the mind and reason, which has for its object not only sensible but also intelligible things, not only present but also future, deals with all kinds, modes, and degrees of goods, and is not confined within any, so to speak, limits: whence arises the greatest variety of desires, choices, and also external actions.

XI. These broader views can be seen in Joshua Placeus, a professor at the Academy of Saumur, in his treatise on the free will of man, where he concludes what he previously discussed at length. "Therefore, the natural liberty of the will consists in this, that since it is free from coercion, necessity of matter, and sensible things, it can have as its object both immaterial and material things, both intelligible and sensible, both future and present, both honest and useful or pleasant, and their opposites, all orders, degrees, and relations of goods and evils at all times and places, and can choose at will the ultimate end, intermediate ends, and means conducive to them by the practical judgment of the mind, without which it is not even rational, let alone free." And later, he repeats that in his view not every necessity is contrary to the will, that is, to the freedom of the will, but only that which arises from coercion, or from matter without sense, or from sense without reason. "Also, freedom consists in immunity from threefold necessity, namely, coercion, determination by matter, and determination by sense."

XII. However, some think that the immunity from coercion and necessity of determination by matter or sense is not sufficient for the freedom of human actions; rather, they believe that freedom also excludes any natural necessity, even if it does not arise from matter or sense. Nor do they think it is enough for an action to be free if a person acts in any way from the judgment of reason; they also require such a judgment to be the conclusion of some deliberation and consultation, and thus only those things are done freely by us about which we can consult and deliberate. Therefore, since there are some acts of our will to which it is determined by nature, and about which no one ever consults and deliberates, such as the act by which we desire to be happy and do not want to be miserable, they do not consider the will to be free regarding these; nor do they think it acts in the manner of a free cause with respect to those motions which are suddenly excited in the will by some vehement perturbation, before our mind can collect itself and deliberate. Hence, they distinguish between the voluntary and the free, and they assert that the voluntary is broader than the free since not all voluntary actions are free.

XIII. This is the doctrine of Andreas Rivetus, formerly a professor at the Academy of Leiden, in Summa of Controversies, Tract 4, Question 3. He states, "We acknowledge that the notion of freedom cannot coexist not only with coercion properly so called but also with natural necessity, by which an agent is determined by nature to one thing; and it is not sufficient for freedom if a person does something spontaneously, which also pertains to natural causes, but deliberation, prior consultation, and the judgment of reason are necessary, which do not occur where there is determination by natural necessity." He adds, "We distinguish these three things in freedom, which fully explain the nature of free will: 1. That there is freedom in the subject, namely, in the will, which always acts spontaneously, without coercion, from its own internal principle; but freely, without necessity, with consultation and deliberation. Without the first freedom, the nature of the will is destroyed by coercion, which imposes necessity so that it cannot act voluntarily, as they call it, elicited. But without deliberation from the indifference of the intellect, it cannot will freely, namely, if it were determined by nature to one thing. And therefore, free will, according to Thomas, is said to be an elective power. And with Bellarmine, we acknowledge that it pertains to the essence of free will that one has the option of various things, and the choice is made with the full and perfect judgment of reason."

XIV. A similar doctrine is held by Moses Amyraut, recently a professor at the Academy of Saumur, in his treatise on the free will of man, pages 61 and following. First, he distinguishes between two motions of the will: one which is not separated from the knowledge derived from reason, but is of such a nature that the knowledge from which it arises and flourishes is not itself the result of prior consultation; the other which is not only joined with some knowledge but arises from that knowledge which has been preceded by consultation, i.e., consultation has come before it. And this latter is nothing other than a conclusion made from deliberation, considering and comparing multiple objects or one and the same object in different ways, so that the mind, weighed down by the considerations here and there, finally inclines to one side. Then he observes that the motion of the will, which follows no consultation and deliberation of the mind, is still twofold: namely, the will is carried in one way to the end, that is, to happiness and blessedness itself; in another way, to the means which are thought to lead to that end.

XV. Afterwards, he shows that neither of these motions pertains to free will. Not the former, because free will is what Aristotle called προαίρεσις (proairesis). "Now," he says, "every προαίρεσις (proairesis) is preceded by some deliberation. But no one consults about the ultimate end, but is carried to it not only necessarily but also voluntarily." Not the latter either, because although this motion differs from the former, it is also equally sudden, arising either from some perturbation or from the presence of some great and unexpected object, so that it anticipates all consultation. Hence, he concludes that such a motion is indeed ἐκούσιον (ekousion), that is, spontaneous and voluntary, but not προαιρετικὸν (proairetikon), that is, free and elective. And therefore, it is rightly said that the first impulses of our passions are not in our power; because only those things are in our power about which we can consult, whether to undertake or omit them; and therefore, those things which precede all deliberation are not considered to be in our power. Hence he finally concludes on page 65, "It remains, therefore, that those things about which we can deliberate are thought to pertain to our free will, and we also say that those things

which we have thus deliberated about are done freely by our will, in that the deliberation and consultation are followed by an inclination; in which we have often said the essence of free will consists."

XVI. But besides the necessity which is from coercion, from matter, or from sense, or from any other determination of nature, there is a necessity conceived to arise from some external cause, such as from God Himself, thus moving and impelling the very faculty to impose a true necessity of acting, that is, to take away the power of acting otherwise from the agent; although the one acting is supposed to act willingly and not unwillingly. This necessity is called motivational and impulsive by the School. However, there are some among the Reformed who think that this necessity also conflicts with human freedom and who believe that no properly so-called necessity, which in the Schools is called necessity of the consequent, as opposed to the necessity of the consequence, can coexist with it.

XVII. This is the opinion of William Ames, formerly a theologian at the University of Franeker: "We," he says, "concede that free will, in what it acts, is free from all necessity, so that it cannot properly act necessarily as to the exercise of its act, although it acts certainly and infallibly with respect to divine ordination." In Bellarmine Enervatus, Volume 4, Book 4, Chapter 1.

XVIII. The same opinion is held by Robert Baron, formerly a professor at the University of Aberdeen, in his general metaphysics adapted to theological use, where among many other things, he asserts these two points: first, that the will, in eliciting its actions, is not bound or constrained by absolute necessity, which they call the necessity of the consequent. Second, that the will, even of a fallen man, is not held by any motivational or impulsive necessity with respect to God. "He also," he says, "gave men free will, and consequently does not entirely take away that faculty by imposing necessity, either by His eternal decree or by temporary motion and influence." Section 12, Disputation 1, on the freedom of the will, number 17.

XIX. But to make my own view clear, I think the first opinion, which defines freedom as immunity from coercion in one who acts from the judgment of reason, does not differ in reality from the second opinion, which opposes freedom not only to coercion but also to the necessity that arises from matter or sense, which others call physical necessity. For when it is stated that immunity from coercion is not worthy of the name of freedom unless it is in one who uses reason, it evidently presupposes that for freedom it is required that the agent follows the judgment of reason, not that it is determined by matter or sense. Therefore, this second opinion does not differ from the first except that it is proposed more distinctly and explicitly.

XX. However, in both, there is this inconvenience that they completely confuse the free and the voluntary and assert that all acts of the will are free. For according to the common sense of men and the usual way of speaking, only that is said to be free for us which is in our power, which can be otherwise, and about which we can consult and deliberate. Now, as we have shown above, there are some acts of the will to which it is so determined by nature that it can in no way be otherwise, and about which no deliberation can be instituted. Furthermore, all acts that proceed freely from us can be subject to some precepts

and commanded or prohibited by some divine or human law. But this does not apply in any way to those acts regarding which the will is entirely immutably disposed, so that it could not, nor can ever, act otherwise in any state. Finally, since those with whom we contend acknowledge and recognize a great difference between the acts of the will, namely, that some are so in our power that we can consult and deliberate about them; and can, according to the various judgments of the practical mind, either do or omit them, or even do the opposite; but that the case is entirely different with others; why do they not want to designate things that are naturally distinct with distinct terms, and according to the usual practice in the Schools, to appropriate the name free to those and voluntary to these? Since it is the part of a wise person not to depart from the common mode of speaking without necessity.

XXI. However, among those learned men who seem to confuse free and voluntary actions, there are some who note that the freedom of the will, or free will, is understood in two ways: broadly and strictly. The freedom of the will in general, or broadly taken, according to them, is nothing other than an intellectual spontaneity, that is, a spontaneity guided by the light or judgment of the intellect. Thus, this general freedom of the will properly consists in the fact that the will has dominion over its actions to such an extent that it cannot be coerced but moves and restrains itself, acts or does not act, at its own discretion, based on certain reason, consideration, or judgment.

XXII. This is the freedom that, according to them, the will exercises in all its actions, not only when it deals with means directed to an end, or with things that contribute little or nothing to the end, but also when it deals with the end itself. Therefore, the necessity that follows the nature of the will and is in agreement with it, and by which it is determined to pursue the highest end, does not in the least overthrow or diminish this freedom of the will.

XXIII. However, more strictly used, freedom or free will is restricted, according to them, to means related to the end, or to things that contribute little or nothing to the end, and pertains to those things that are in our power, and is rightly defined by Aristotle as spontaneity arising from prior deliberation, or deliberative desire for things that are in our power. In this sense, free actions are those that are purely contingent and can be done or not done by us at our discretion. In this respect, freedom includes a certain indifference, and the will is free only to the extent that it is indifferent, namely, when it can act or not act regarding the same object, and when it can choose this or that, or its opposite. And in this sense, God does not love Himself freely, because He wills and loves Himself by a natural necessity; nor does a person freely will to be happy and not want to be miserable, because they will this by a certain natural necessity.

XXIV. This is the doctrine of John Strang, Doctor and Principal Professor of Sacred Theology at the University of Glasgow, in his treatise on the will and actions of God concerning sin, book 3, chapter 14. After explaining and elaborating on these points, he says he does not deny that the term free will can be correctly used in the stricter sense, although in another and broader sense he asserts that all actions of the will are free. Similarly, the illustrious Alexander Morus, in his Dissertation on Grace and Free Will, thesis 28, proposes two definitions: one of free will broadly taken, the other of free will

strictly taken. According to the former notion, free will is described by him as the most proper gift of an intelligent nature, by which it wills or averts nothing except what it has understood to be good or evil. According to the latter notion, the will, as it chooses the means shown by the intellect after consultation.

XXV. Hence, it is clear, as Strang acknowledges in the cited passage, that the dispute is merely verbal between those who assert that all actions of the will are free and those who deny it. Those who affirm it take freedom in a broad sense, as the inclination by which the will follows the judgment of the intellect, in which sense no one denies that every action of the will is free in every respect. However, those who deny it understand freedom as the indifference and indetermination of the will by nature regarding those acts that fall under deliberation and consultation. In this sense, it is evident and agreed by all that the will is not free regarding some of its acts. But since the broader sense of freedom is less accepted and customary, as far as possible, when we speak simply, it is more appropriate to deny than to affirm that the will is free in those acts in which it exercises only the former, not the latter and stricter, sense of freedom.

XXVI. Furthermore, the third opinion seems unduly timid in not daring to assert the freedom of human actions from all properly called necessity; namely, in not prejudicing anything against the immutability of divine decrees and the efficacy of divine grace or the determination of the will by the judgment of practical reason. For the efficacy of divine providence and grace, the force and immutability of divine decrees, and thus also the rights of the divine mind over the will do not require that human free will be subjected to any properly called necessity, as the most learned men among the Reformed have shown, and we also hope to demonstrate, with God's help.

XXVII. Therefore, with Ames and Robert Baron, we are not afraid to say that human free will is opposed to any properly called necessity and that no human act, if we speak strictly and properly, is free unless we assume in humans the true and intrinsic power to act otherwise, or at least to suspend their act and refrain from acting. For by properly called necessity, we mean that which determines the agent to a certain action in such a way that there remains no true and intrinsic power in the agent not to act or to act otherwise.

XXVIII. Therefore, human freedom in action is not ill-defined as a certain indetermination and indifference concerning its acts. However, it should be noted that by this indifference is not meant, as some seem to suspect, a precarious state of a person wavering and uncertain about which way to turn; but rather the true power to act or not to act, and to direct their action this way or that; which remains even in one who has determined himself by his own judgment and choice to these or those actions and for whom it is certain and established to do this and not another thing.

XXIX. Therefore, the common definition, according to which human freedom is established in this: that, all things necessary for action being set, a person can act or not act, do this or that, although some misuse it, can have a good and proper sense. For in all deliberate actions, which alone are properly and strictly free, a person not only before acting but also while acting, has the true and real power not to act or to act otherwise. A person cannot indeed do two opposite things at the same time, or both act and refrain

from acting simultaneously; but when they do this, they retain the power to perform the opposite act or to refrain from that action. As the Scholastics say, in free will there is a simultaneity of power to opposites, but not a power of simultaneity, that is, the power to hold opposites simultaneously. The reason for this is that the power for one act is not opposed to the power for its negation or for the contrary act; but two contrary or contradictory things cannot exist simultaneously in the same subject.

XXX. Besides the authors of the fourth opinion, John Strang also acknowledges this in the aforementioned third book, chapter 15. Although he denies that this is the definition of freedom in general, he nevertheless admits that it applies to free will taken more strictly, as long as, with all prerequisites for action in place, active indifference remains, which is entirely free from any preceding necessity, whether it arises from divine predetermination, the nature of the will itself, or the certain condition of the object. Page 698. However, this stricter sense of freedom is the most customary and should therefore be considered the most appropriate. He explains this matter on page 696: "In matters relating to the end or in indifferent matters, where it is not necessary for the intellect to judge them to have a necessary connection with common good, it is true in the divided sense, both of elicited and commanded actions, that the will, not only with all prerequisites for action set, but even when the will is determined, whether by God or by itself, to act and while it acts, retains the power to act this or that way, or to act or not to act. Hence, in such matters, the will, not only before it is determined and acts, but also while it is determined and acts, remains free and acts entirely freely, because even while it acts, it retains the power by which it can refrain from acting, although hypothetically it is determined or acts, it cannot but act; because whatever is, given that it is, necessarily is, simply because it is a contingent thing. Therefore, once divine determination is set, whether by effective grace or any other reason, the necessity of the consequence is inferred, that the act of the will determined by God follows infallibly, but there is no necessity of the consequent, as its nature remains contingent."

XXXI. Andreas Rivetus does not disapprove of defining free will as such a faculty of the will, by which, with all prerequisites for action set, one can act or not act, provided it is understood not in a composed sense but in a divided sense. That is, if someone says, with all preceding prerequisites set according to the order of reason or time for action, free will can operate or not operate, meaning that, with the same prerequisites, there simultaneously exists in free will the faculty or power by which it can act or not act if it wills, as Diego Alvarez distinguishes. For even the effective motion of God, by which the will is determined to such an act, does not take away from free will the power to perform that act or to perform the contrary act, but only ensures that, with free will being able to act or not act such an act, it infallibly, yet freely, performs it. These are the words of that very learned man in Summa of Controversies, tract 4, question 3. He adds that created free will, not only before it is determined to one act but even in the very instant in which it is determined by God and determines itself to the same act, simultaneously has the power by which it can produce the contrary act if it wills, but not to have the contrary act simultaneously, because two contrary acts cannot be in the same power simultaneously, but successively.

XXXII. Louis Crocius, while he lived as a Doctor and Professor of Theology at the Bremen School, gives this and no other definition of freedom: "The freedom of human will is its natural property by which, with the rational or sensitive good proposed by the intellect, and with all prerequisites for action set, it can choose to undertake an action or suspend it." In Theological Synthesis, book 3, chapter 37, thesis 3. There he adds that free will was called the same by the ancient Fathers. And in the explanation of the same thesis, he notes that the freedom which is the natural property of the will is opposed to necessity, whether it is from an external cause compelling or from nature intrinsically determining to one absolutely.

XXXIII. However, when freedom is constituted in a certain indifference to action, and in the fact that the one who is said to be free can act or not act, do this or that, it must be carefully noted that this should not be understood as if it pertains to the essence of freedom that one who is free can do good or evil. For the ability to do evil is not something that pertains to the perfection of freedom but rather is a certain imperfection accompanying freedom in a created person, and which is accidental to freedom. For God, who is the freest in action, cannot do evil; nor can the holy angels, since they were confirmed by God in grace. And this is also the prerogative of the Blessed Souls, who, once admitted to the vision of God, can no longer sin. Nevertheless, neither the holy angels nor the Blessed Souls have lost their freedom because of this.

XXXIV. Conversely, the ability to do good and to perform actions that are pleasing and acceptable to God is a certain perfection that can be absent from a free agent while the nature and essence of freedom remain intact. For by all consensus, freedom in action remains in demons and the angels of darkness, nor is it entirely lost in humans condemned to eternal damnation by God, and yet neither the Devil nor the condemned humans can do good or perform any action that is approved by God. Indeed, neither in this life can a person corrupted by sin and devoid of God's grace perform anything that is truly good and pleasing to God, according to the saying of our Lord, "Without me you can do nothing," and the corresponding statement of the Apostle, "Not that we are sufficient of ourselves to think anything as of ourselves: but our sufficiency is from God." Yet the hardened and utterly forsaken person retains their freedom in action. John 15:5; 2 Corinthians 3:5.

XXXV. It indeed contradicts divine goodness, justice, and wisdom to form any intelligent, rational, and therefore free creature that cannot do good and that has some necessity of doing evil implanted in it by God. For God, the Supreme Good, cannot create anything that is not good. But a creature that was produced good by God can become evil through its own fault and vice and can develop habits by acting wrongly, by which it is so determined to evil that it can no longer do good; with a will, that is, hardened in evil, and unable, without the help of divine grace, to extricate itself from the snares into which it has voluntarily fallen.

XXXVI. However, a creature that has been cast into this necessity of doing evil by its own fault still acts freely in the things it does wrong. For the bad habits by which its mind and will are hindered do not prevent it from consulting and deliberating about what it does, and the will voluntarily, without any compelling force, follows the judgment of its depraved reason. Indeed, even one who cannot do good can abstain from individual evil

acts, nor is he compelled by any necessity to commit this or that sin. For instance, when the Devil, by his temptations, moves and solicits someone to rebel against God and obey the flesh, he could refrain from tempting; and when a person, by God's just judgment, blinded and hardened, commits some crime such as murder or adultery, he could refrain from defiling himself with that murder or adultery, nor can he pretend any necessity for doing so.

XXXVII. Having thus explained the nature and essence of human freedom, it remains to inquire to which faculty of a person it properly belongs. The common opinion of the Doctors of the Reformed School is that human freedom indeed originates from the mind and reason, but it properly belongs to the affection of the will. For the fact that a person can choose among various things, and now embrace this and reject that, is because they can judge variously about things and apprehend different reasons of good and evil in them: but still, no act is considered free in a person unless it is either elicited or at least commanded by the will. Therefore, only the acts of the will are considered free in themselves: acts performed by other faculties are free only to the extent that they depend on the will, and are done either with its consent or at least with its negligence and connivance. This is what the Schools mean when they say that freedom is formally in the will alone, but only radically in the intellect: Thus, Louis Crocius states on this matter in the cited passage, "Freedom, which is attributed to the will, properly belongs to the will, although its root is in the intellect and reason."

XXXVIII. However, some among the Reformed think differently on this matter. Among them is the most illustrious Moses Amyraut. To explain his view on this question, he observes that freedom is attributed to three types of acts. Firstly, to the acts of those faculties which the will commands. Secondly, to the acts of the will itself. Thirdly, to the acts of the intellect. In the first respect, according to his opinion, freedom is nothing other than the ability to live or act as one wills. For we are considered free to the extent that we do what we want without being compelled or hindered. In the second respect, freedom is defined by him as the ability to will as we judge should be willed and as each one is determined by their own judgment to that, not by another's. For just as bodily actions are considered free because they depend on a free principle, namely the will, so he says the actions of the will are free because they similarly depend on a free principle, namely the judgment of the intellect. He states that the freedom of the intellect lies in its autonomy, that is, in the fact that the intellect acts from itself and through itself and is self-determined, that is, capable of its own operations because, namely, it is neither compelled by force nor dependent on external command for exercising them. This most learned man elaborates on this matter in his book on free will, Section 1, pages 20 and following.

XXXIX. From this doctrine, it follows that the freedom found in external actions depends on the will; but the freedom that pertains to the acts of the will depends on the intellect. The intellect is free in itself, and thus freedom primarily and chiefly belongs to the intellect and is to be placed in it as in its proper and natural seat. Therefore, freedom is not formally, as many hold, in the will alone; in the intellect, it is only causally and radically, as this most learned man argues and seeks to prove in his book, pages 30 and following. He chiefly supports this argument because, in his judgment, the intellect is naturally more

autonomous than the will; since the will follows the guidance of the intellect and is subject to its governance, for which reason it is called the guide by the Greeks. He considers it absurd that freedom should be formally in that faculty which is subject to the rule of another rather than in that which is bound by the laws of no other faculty.

XL. And yet, at the end of the same section, he concludes that freedom, properly speaking, is not formally in either the intellect or the will when considered separately, but in both faculties conjointly. Because, namely, a person is not considered free simply by judging or simply by willing, but by willing from the judgment and counsel of reason. Just as humanity is not formally in the intelligent soul nor in the sensitive nature alone, but in the person composed of both natures. Therefore, according to his opinion, free will is not one of the rational faculties in a person, nor is it something in which one part belongs more to the intellect and another more to the will; but it is the disposition and inclination of both faculties, intellect and will, working together according to their nature, so that a person, insofar as he is human, is considered free. Although, just as in defining a human being, the consideration of reason far excels that of the animal nature, so in defining free will, the role of the intellect seems far superior to that of the will. For while many other things have the ability to desire, only a human being among visible creatures is considered to desire freely because he alone is endowed with intellect.

XLI. However, he does not want the intellect, considered in any way, to be the principle of freedom in a person, but only insofar as it pronounces on things to be done or desired, not only in general but also in particular; and so that it impels a person to act or restrains him from action. In this respect, it is called the practical intellect, which dictates in particular cases what should now be done or not done, desired or avoided. Nevertheless, he does not consider any judgment of the practical intellect sufficient for acting freely; he requires a judgment that is the conclusion of consultation and deliberation. So, in his opinion, the practical intellect in any way and simply in a person is not the principle of free actions, but only insofar as it judges things to be done, that is, after prior deliberation and consultation, as seen in the cited section, pages 31 and following.

XLII. Furthermore, the very learned Josue Placeus, colleague of Amyraldus when he was alive, shares this with him: he believes that freedom is not formally in the will alone; nor that only the will but also the intellect is a free faculty. However, he differs from his colleague in that the latter distinguishes between the freedom that belongs to the intellect and the freedom that belongs to the will, assigning a specific definition to each; whereas Placeus believes that the same freedom by which the will is called free also applies to the intellect. For this freedom, in his view, consists in immunity from three types of necessity: coercion, determination by matter, and determination by sense. This immunity, he believes, equally pertains to the intellect. Moreover, his opinion is opposed to the former in that if the will and intellect are compared, freedom seems to belong more to the will. This is because he believes that command and dominion in a person belong more to the will than to the intellect, as the intellect does not move the will by its act as if by command, but by the object it proposes to it; whereas the will moves and applies the mind to understanding by its act, as if by command. Nevertheless, this learned man believes that certain acts of our mind are free and therefore morally good or bad, which are not done by

the command of the will nor depend on its consent as a principle, such as faith and the heresy opposed to it. This can be seen in his posthumous works, Treatise on Free Will, pages 163 and 164.

XLIII. The renowned Alexander Morus agrees with these learned men, considering that the intellect and will share free will between them; and that free will is nothing other than the intellect and will insofar as these two faculties concur and are bound together by some bond or union. As for in which faculty it rather resides, he leaves it undecided. For, as he says, the judgment of the intellect terminates in the will, and the freedom of the will has its root in the intellect. So, in his opinion, free will can be said to be the intellect insofar as it moves and affects the will, or the will insofar as it is moved by the intellect. Or, in the words of Aristotle, "the intellect commanding, and the will choosing."

XLIV. As for my opinion, I believe no act of any faculty, even of the mind itself in a person, is free unless it somehow depends on the will, and is done by its command or consent, so to speak, as if a person could not have omitted it if they had wished. For who would call an act free which a person could not have done otherwise, even if they most wished, and to which the will is in no way supposed to have concurred directly or indirectly, mediately or immediately? And since every free action can fall under a precept and assume the character of virtue or vice, it must proceed from the will in some way. For so far it is commonly accepted in the Schools, according to Augustine's opinion, that sin does not have the nature of sin if it is not voluntary, that is, if the will is not in some way its principle and cause, as the common sense of the faithful interprets this saying.

XLV. Nevertheless, it does not follow from this that freedom is said to be formally in the will alone. For just as every free action owes its origin in some way to the will, so every free action arises from some consultation and deliberation of the mind. And just as the intellect elicits no action freely which the will could not have impeded, so no act of the will is free about which the mind could not have consulted and deliberated. Hence it follows that free actions are to be referred equally to the mind and the will, and therefore, if it is concluded that freedom is formally in the will, it can also be concluded that it is formally in the intellect.

XLVI. But I think it should rather be said that freedom is formally in neither the intellect nor the will but in the person insofar as they act through the intellect and will. Since freedom, properly speaking, is not an affection of this or that faculty but something arising from the mutual relation and concurrence of multiple faculties; and therefore, it cannot be properly attributed to any specific faculty, but only to the suppositum in which those faculties are found. Thus, if we speak precisely, neither the mind nor the will should be called free, but the person himself, insofar as he uses those faculties in a certain way. When the will is called free, it is not a formal statement, as the Schools say, but a causal one: because, namely, the will joined to the intellect is the cause of actions in respect to which the person is said to act freely. This observation is not entirely without merit, as will be seen in the following. For it helps to solve certain difficulties into which many fall while seeking the whole concept of freedom in the will and not simply in the person.

XLVII. Whether the intellect contributes more to human freedom than the will, or the will more than the intellect, is a matter that theologians do not need to define, and which even the prince of modern philosophers, Aristotle, neglected to investigate more closely. Therefore, we, like certain most learned theologians, leave it undecided.

XLVIII. However, no matter how the Doctors of the Reformed School vary in explaining the nature of freedom and to which faculties it belongs or does not belong, they nevertheless easily accept the definition of free will given by Bellarmine, On Grace and Free Will, book 3, chapter 3. Namely, that free will is the free power to choose one thing over another among those things that lead to some end, or to reject or accept one and the same thing at our discretion, attributed or granted to intelligent nature for the great glory of God. This can be seen in Robert Baron's General Metaphysics, section 12, Disputation on the Freedom of the Will, where he not only approves this definition but also explains it accurately in parts. The same definition is not disapproved by Pareus, who, although he makes some remarks on it, admits that regarding free will considered absolutely, there is no controversy between us and Bellarmine, writing in the place already mentioned of Bellarmine. Nor does the definition that he substitutes as plainer and fuller differ much from Bellarmine's; namely, that it is the power of willing, not willing, choosing, rejecting the object shown by the intellect, by a spontaneous and deliberate motion without coercion, and the aptitude of the will to will or not will the opposite. Similarly, Ames confesses that this definition can have such a meaning that there is no cause for contention about it, in Bellarmine Enervatus, volume 4, book 4, chapter 1.

Part II

In which the Doctrine of the Roman School is Explained.

I. The nature and essence of free will raise many questions and debates among the Doctors of the Roman School. These matters, however, pertain more to metaphysicians than theologians. It is not my intention to list and examine all these issues but only to briefly touch upon those relevant to the current controversies and debates among the Christian Schools.

II. Therefore, we will omit discussions about the kind of free will—whether it is an act, habit, or power, and to which of the things in the soul it should be referred. Although some ancient scholars taught that free will is neither a certain power nor a certain habit, but rather a certain act, a view attributed by Bellarmine to Hervaeus Natalis, others believed that free will is not an act or a power but a certain natural habit arising from the intellect and will. This view was held by Cardinal Bonaventure, a celebrated Doctor in the Roman School. Nevertheless, the entire Roman School now agrees that free will is a certain power and faculty.

III. Again, assuming that free will is a certain power, the question arises as to what that power is. Thomas and Bonaventure, according to Bellarmine, report that some have felt that free will is not a single and particular power of the soul but rather a certain universal power that encompasses, as species under it, all the powers of the soul, both sensing and understanding, which produce any free acts. Others, like the notable Scholastic Alexander of Hales, a teacher of Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure, said that free will is indeed a certain particular power but one distinct from the intellect and will. However, this question can also be passed over since now all Schools agree that free will is not something distinct in reality from the intellect and will.

IV. But further, it is questioned whether free will consists of both faculties and pertains to both, or if it should be restricted solely to the will. Some, like the highly regarded Doctor Durandus of the Roman School, have believed that free will encompasses both faculties, namely the mind and the will, and that not only the will but also reason is formally free. Indeed, they think that liberty belongs first and more to reason than to the will.

V. To this opinion adheres the very celebrated Peter Gassendi, a provost of the Diocese of Digne in Provence, in his treatise on Liberty, Fortune, and Fate, which is found at the end of the second volume of his works. He says that he believes that liberty is primarily and perfectly in the intellect and secondarily and dependently in the will. His foundation is that, according to the commoner sense of the Roman School, liberty is situated in a certain free indifference and indetermination of power. Reason is indifferent in judging about things to be done and can judge about them in this or that way. Thus, whatever indifference there is in the will concerning things to be desired arises from this indifference in reason. For the will can reject or embrace one and the same object and choose this or that among various objects because reason can pass various judgments about these objects as diverse aspects of good or evil present themselves.

VI. Moreover, he does not want the mind to be free in every respect but only insofar as it is indifferent to many objects and is flexible enough by nature that, considering something as true, it can judge now one way, now another about anything, and now hold one judgment, now another about it as true. However, it cannot dissent from what appears true nor assent to what seems false, nor change its judgment about anything unless a greater or lesser appearance of truth or falsehood presents itself on the part of the object. So he compares the human mind to a balance that tilts now this way, now that way, as weight is added or taken away from one or the other scale. Once one scale is depressed, it cannot be lifted unless weight is added to the opposite scale, as he explains more extensively in the cited volume, page 82.

VII. However, this opinion is generally rejected in the Roman School. For most of its Doctors think that the intellect is not formally free but that liberty is formally and solely in the will. Therefore, they teach that free will is not a power different from the will nor anything other than the will itself, but considered in a certain respect and manner, so that although the will and free will are the same power in reality, free will is distinct from the will in reason.

VIII. Indeed, from their perspective, the will extends more widely than free will, both regarding objects and actions. For whatever is done by free will is also done by the will, but not vice versa. And whatever is an object of free will is also an object of the will, but not everything that is an object of the will is also an object of free will. For example, the highest end, that is, happiness, is an object of the will but not of free will, to which only the means to the end pertain. Hence, those acts by which we wish to be happy and not to be miserable are actions of the will but not of free will because the will is directed towards the ultimate end not freely but naturally.

IX. Moreover, although Scholastic theologians generally hold that the intellect is not free per se and formally, they acknowledge that in it lies the root and, at least sine qua non, cause of that liberty which is in the will. This arises from the fact that the human intellect not only proposes various objects to the will but also compares them and perceives various aspects of good and evil in the same object and somehow demonstrates them to the will. Hence, the will can reject or embrace one and the same object and choose this or that among various objects, in which the exercise of liberty is situated.

X. They are chiefly moved to deny that the intellect is formally free by the fact that to act morally well or badly is proper to that faculty which is formally and per se free. But virtue and vice properly belong to the will alone, and no action deserves praise or blame, reward or punishment unless it proceeds from the will. Therefore, the operations of the intellect do not have the nature of sin or merit unless they are voluntary and, in a certain way, commanded by the will.

XI. What seems to be most important in this question is what properly constitutes the liberty by which the will is called free and in which the nature of free will consists. On this point, there is no complete agreement among the theologians of the Roman Church. But to better understand their differing opinions, it is first necessary to note what the usual acceptations and distinctions of liberty are in the Schools.

XII. Therefore, liberty is opposed to 1. Servitude, 2. Coercion, 3. Necessity. Further, servitude, and thus the liberty opposed to it, is either proper or metaphorical. Properly speaking, servitude is that condition in which those who are servants among men are under the power of their masters. Metaphorical servitude occurs when dominion over men is figuratively attributed to certain things. Thus, those who indulge in sins are said in Scripture to be servants of sin, and those who, by the just sentence of God, are doomed to destruction and death are similarly called servants of death and corruption. The servitude opposed to that by which men are enslaved to sin is another servitude, namely, the servitude of righteousness, which is liberty from sin, or as it is called in the Schools, the liberty of grace. And to the servitude of misery, or death and corruption, Scripture opposes the liberty called the glory of the children of God.

XIII. Furthermore, the Doctors of the Roman Church note that the liberty discussed here, from which free will is named, is not that liberty which is opposed to servitude, whether proper or metaphorical. This is because men who are servants by condition do not therefore lack free will, nor have those whom Scripture calls servants of sin been deprived of it through sin.

XIV. There is no doubt that the liberty discussed here primarily excludes coercion; but the question is whether it opposes only coercion and not necessity, and whether it suffices for a rational agent to have immunity from coercion alone. Indeed, not a few of the older Scholastics seemed to hold the opinion that liberty of the will, considered in general, is opposed not simply to necessity but only to coercion.

XV. Thus, without a doubt, Bonaventure held this view. He states in the second book of his Sentences, distinction 7, question 2: "Regarding what is said, that to will freely and necessarily are opposed, it must be said that there are two kinds of necessity: one from an external cause, like the necessity of coercion, and this is opposed to willing freely. But there is another necessity from an internal disposition, and this is not opposed; indeed, it coexists with liberty. Such is the case in the free will of demons, who are so glued to evil that they in no way wish to separate from it." And in distinction 25, question 2, he says: "Free will can be considered in two ways: either as it is free or as it is deliberative. If we speak of it as it is free, then I concede that it can exist not only in relation to the contingent but also to the necessary, as is evident in God, in Christ, and in angels and blessed men. For since there are two types of necessity, namely, coercion and immutability, the necessity of coercion is repugnant to the liberty of the will, but the necessity of immutability is not; because the will is called free not because it wills this in such a way that it could will the opposite, but because it wills whatever it wills by its own command. For it wills something in such a way that it wills to will it, and therefore in the act of willing it moves itself and governs itself, and is thus called free, even though it is immutably ordered to it." And a little further, he states: "The act of free will, as it is free, can not only be about the necessary but can also be necessary in itself."

XVI. Bonaventure derived this doctrine from his teacher, Alexander of Hales. In several places, Alexander establishes the essential liberty of free will in freedom from coercion. His words are particularly noteworthy: "There are two kinds of necessity: inevitability and coercion. The necessity of coercion removes free will, but not the necessity of inevitability.

Therefore, although there is the necessity of inevitability in angels, they nonetheless have free will" (Summa Theologica, Part 2, Question 72, Member 3, Article 3).

XVII. This doctrine was also followed by another disciple of Alexander of Hales, Thomas Aquinas. He writes: "The natural necessity according to which the will is said to necessarily will something, such as happiness, does not contradict liberty, as Augustine teaches in the first book of 'The City of God.' For the liberty of the will is opposed to violence or coercion. However, there is no violence or coercion in the fact that something moves according to the order of its nature; rather, coercion is in the prevention of natural motion, just as when a heavy object is prevented from descending to the centre. Hence, the will freely desires happiness, although it necessarily desires it. Thus, God, by His will, freely loves Himself, although He necessarily loves Himself" (Quaestiones Disputatae de Potentia Dei, Question 10, Article 2, Response 1).

XVIII. Hence, he teaches that a work can be worthy of praise or blame, merit or demerit, because it is spontaneous, not coerced, and voluntary, even if the will is determined to one thing regarding it. In his commentary on the third book of Sentences, he writes: "The necessity of coercion, which is opposed to the voluntary, removes the nature of merit and demerit, but the necessity that arises from the perfection of goodness or evil does not remove it, but rather establishes the will confirmed to one thing." And in the same book, to explain how Christ could merit by free will determined to one specific act, namely, the love of God, he says: "It must be said that even if it were determined to one specific thing, like the love of God, which He could not not love, nonetheless, from this, He does not lose liberty or the nature of merit, because He tends to it not out of coercion but spontaneously, and thus is the master of His own act."

XIX. Scotus's doctrine is not different in this respect. For he clearly and openly teaches three things about the liberty of the will: 1. That the liberty of the will can coexist entirely with necessity. These are his words: "Liberty stands with necessity to will in the will. For in it is the liberty of willing because it elicits the act delectably and electively and remains in the act." 2. That the will, whether it acts necessarily or contingently, always acts freely, never naturally. He writes: "The will always has its proper mode of causing, namely, freely." And again: "The will, as the will, is a principle of its acts freely. Therefore, the will cannot be naturally active, just as nature, as a principle distinct from the will, cannot be freely active." 3. That this holds not only in creatures but also in God Himself, who loves Himself most freely, although by a necessary will. He writes: "The divine will necessarily wills its own goodness, and yet it is free in willing it" (Quaestiones Quodlibetales, Question 16, as cited by Jansen in his Augustine, 'De Gratia Christi Salvatoris,' Book 6, Chapter 25).

XX. Moreover, in the following centuries, other Scholastics followed these luminaries in great numbers, such as Thomas de Argentina, who held that "the necessity of coercion removes the nature of merit, but the necessity of immutability arising from the perfection of virtues does not remove it but increases it." Marsilius of Inghen, according to whom "the necessary and inevitable, not by nature but by grace, does not remove the nature of what is praiseworthy." Gabriel Biel, according to whom "the act of beatitude is freely elicited, thus contingent although immutable and perpetual. I say freely and not contradictorily, which liberty suffices for the nature of merit." Nicholas of Orbellis, whose words are taken

from Bonaventure: "Free will is said simply not because it wills this as it could will the opposite, but because it wills whatever it wills by its own command, because it wills something in such a way that it wills to will it, and therefore in the act of willing it moves itself and governs itself, and therefore it is called free, although it is immutably ordered to it." Finally, Stephen Brulefer, who teaches that "the act of free will, even as it deliberates, can be about the necessary and is always contingent. The act of free will, as it is free, can not only be about the necessary but also be necessary in itself." All these and many other places are extensively cited by Jansen in his aforementioned book, 'De Gratia Salvatoris,' Book 6, Chapter 29 and following.

XXI. Indeed, some theologians in the Roman School in the last century still retained this opinion, such as Alphonsus de Castro of the Order of Friars Minor, in his book on heresies under the word "Liberty." He states, "There is still another liberty that opposes necessity or, more correctly, coercion." And he adds, "When we say that human will is free, this should be understood of this liberty." Alphonsus's words were later adopted and made his own by Joseph Angles, Bishop-designate of Bossanen, also of the Order of Friars Minor, writing on the second book of Sentences. After discussing the liberty of grace and the liberty of glory, he says, "Thirdly, there is liberty that opposes necessity, or more correctly, coercion. And this is the liberty of nature, which we are discussing presently." And later, when he distinguished three kinds of liberty—one from coercion, another from sin, and a third from misery—his conclusion is, "Regarding the first kind of liberty, which is free will in man and angel: The reason is that neither the will of evil angels, nor of good ones, nor of evil humans can be coerced." In the following, after posing the question of whether the acts of free will are only of contingencies or also of necessities, he observes from Bonaventure that free will can be considered in two ways: either as it is free or as it is deliberating. Then he adds two conclusions: 1. The act of free will can be, and is, of necessities. The reason is that in God, angels, and blessed humans, there is free will, which indeed immutably and necessarily proceeds to its act because God by nature, and the angel and blessed human by glory, are immutable. 2. If free will is understood in the second way, its acts are of contingencies. The reason is that we do not deliberate or consult about necessities and impossibilities, but about contingencies, which it is in our power to do or not to do (On the Distinction 24 and 25, Question 1, Articles 1, 2, and 34).

XXII. However, it can easily be inferred from those very things that have been cited so far that when these doctors affirm that the liberty of the will is opposed not simply to necessity but rather to coercion, they do not mean that the nature and essence of liberty consist in being immune from coercion, as those who dispute against them seem to assume. For they admit that many things act not under coercion, yet not freely. Indeed, nothing is free for them unless it acts from the judgment of the intellect. But they only mean that in one who acts from the judgment of reason, only coercion destroys liberty, not necessity. And it is indeed impossible for someone to act under coercion and yet freely simultaneously; but it is possible for someone to act freely, even if necessarily.

XXIII. Furthermore, their opinion is not that liberty is always accompanied by necessity, nor that free will, especially in humans, is indifferent and undetermined regarding most of its acts. They acknowledge that humans, as long as they are alive, not only act freely but

are also so disposed that they are bound by no natural or properly so-called necessity in their actions but can act and refrain from acting, do this or that, and exercise contrary acts regarding the same object. But they think that liberty, simply considered, does not consist in such indifference and indetermination to act, nor always have it as a companion; rather, it can remain and be preserved without it, and sometimes even be found in one who is not indifferent to act but acts inevitably and immutably.

XXIV. For besides that liberty which in the schools is called the liberty of contrariety or specification, by which one can do this or that or even perform contrary acts, and the liberty of contradiction or exercise, by which one can at least refrain from acting and suspend action, they posit a kind of liberty of complacency, found in one who is not driven by any external force or any blind and brute impulse but moves to some action by his own judgment, even though because of the evident light by which he is led, he cannot persuade himself to elicit a contrary act or even desist from that action. This distinction is not only given by Gabriel Biel in the words cited earlier but also by Johannes Viguerius, Doctor and Professor of Theology in the University of Toulouse. He says, "Speaking of the indetermination or liberty of the will concerning the ultimate object of the end, in the homeland it is entirely determined, nor is it free, either regarding specification or exercise: it is not free, either regarding specification or exercise: it is not free by the liberty of contradiction or contrariety; it is, however, free by the liberty of complacency, because it is pleased and delighted in that object" (Theological Institutions, Chapter 3, §3, Verse 1).

XXV. They think that he who acts from a certain judgment of reason, whether necessarily or contingently, acts freely because he always acts and desires by his own command, and so he wills something in such a way that he wills to will it, approving his own will as he tacitly or expressly reflects upon it, and thus in the act of willing, he moves and governs himself, as Bonaventure says in the place cited above. Or, as Scotus puts it, "The will, because of the firmness of its liberty, imposes necessity on itself in eliciting the act and in persevering or fixing itself in the act" (Quodlibet 26).

XXVI. And Cornelius Jansen, Bishop of Ypres, attempted to renew and illustrate this opinion of the old Scholastics in this century, as can be seen in his book titled 'Augustinus,' especially in the sixth book on the Grace of Christ the Saviour. There he extensively teaches that liberty is opposed not to any necessity but only to that which comes from an external force contrary to the agent's inclination, which we call coercion. And this is because in one who acts from the judgment of reason, only coercion destroys liberty, not the necessity of inevitability and immutability. Thus, a free agent is not opposed to a necessary agent, just as a natural agent is not opposed to a contingent agent, but a free agent is opposed only to a natural agent, just as a contingent agent is opposed only to a necessary agent. Hence, it is no more contradictory for someone who acts freely to act necessarily than it is contradictory for something that acts by nature to act contingently; because just as a natural cause can be hindered from acting by another cause, so a free cause can be determined to one thing in acting immovably and immutably.

XXVII. Moreover, according to him, one acts freely who acts from the judgment of reason; and therefore, since the will is a rational appetite, he thinks that the will and nature are entirely opposed, and the will can no more act by the mode of nature than nature can act

by the mode of a free cause. Thus, just as no action of a natural cause can be free, so also no action of the will can be natural and not free: hence, the free is as extensive as the voluntary, and whatever is voluntary is therefore free; because the will always and essentially preserves its own mode of operating distinct from nature.

XXVIII. Nevertheless, he acknowledges that some motions arise in the will that are not free for that reason: namely, those sudden motions that prevent the full judgment of reason and are commonly called first motions. For although they flow from the will without violence, they lack what is essential to liberty in his opinion because they are not within a person's control and occur without full rational awareness, and in a way against and contrary to the will, because when the will reflects upon those motions, it does not consent to them and would altogether wish they were not present (De Gratia Christi Salvatoris, Book 6, Chapter 37).

XXIX. Therefore, according to that man's principles, it must be said that the voluntary can be understood in two ways. 1. In a broader and less proper sense, as it encompasses all motions that arise in the will in any way whatsoever, and in this sense, the voluntary is more extensive than the free; because in this sense, first motions are voluntary, but not free. 2. Strictly and properly. And thus, all those and only those acts of the will are voluntary, which occur with rational awareness and with a judgment formed after consideration. And in this way, the voluntary and the free are coextensive and do not differ in extent. Hence, since the will is directed to the ultimate end with full and certain rational judgment, it is as free in regard to that as when it desires the means that seem to lead to that end. Not only those living in this life, when they will to be happy and do not will to be miserable, perform a free act of the will; but even the blessed in heaven, when they adhere to God, whom they see clearly, with their entire will, since in both cases the will follows the fixed, certain, and evidently constant judgment of the intellect in this matter, and when it reflects on itself, it approves its own act as much as possible.

XXX. Indeed, he does not consider a certain indifference and indetermination of the will regarding the act that is called free, by which the will can act contrary, or at least omit or suspend that act, to pertain to the common notion and proper essence of liberty. In his view, liberty solely consists in the fact that the free agent governs itself and its act, and moves itself, not being acted upon and moved by another, which he argues applies even to those acts to which the will is determined necessarily and immutably.

XXXI. For, as expressed by Scotus, the necessity found in the will is not prior to the will in such a way that the will is understood to fall under necessity as if it were being impelled into action and fixed in the act, for if that were the case, the will would be acting and not acting, and liberty would not stand in such an act. Rather, it is a concomitant necessity, so that the will is understood to fall under it in such a way that, because of the firmness of its liberty, it imposes necessity on itself in eliciting the act and in persevering or fixing itself in the act (De Gratia Christi Salvatoris, Book 6, Chapter 37).

XXXII. And to show more clearly that a rational agent, in all that it wills and desires, acts and moves itself in a certain way, even if its act of will is necessary and immutable, he observes that the power of acting and moving itself, which is proper to a free agent, lies in

the fact that both reason and will, to which the faculties of liberty pertain, can reflect on their own acts; so that reason can judge its own judgment, whether it has judged rightly; and similarly, the will can not only will and desire but also will its own volition and desire. And because in every rational motion, whether necessary or not, such self-reflection is always present, either tacitly or expressly, the rational agent always moves and governs itself in all its movements, thus exercising its own liberty.

XXXIII. For, according to him, the true signs of liberty are doing what is pleasing, what appears to be good. Hence, he concludes that the blessed in heaven, in loving God whom they see clearly, move themselves perfectly and have perfect control over their acts, and thus are most free, because they judge with the fullest and most tranquil judgment that they ought to love God, and they judge themselves to judge most rightly in this matter; their will, in loving, wishes to follow reason, and wishes to will this, and does not wish to cease. The necessity that appears in that act arises from the will itself and from the perfection of its dominion and liberty, because it makes itself necessary, not by the movement of nature, but by the perfect movement of liberty, moving and determining itself.

XXXIV. Although that doctor does not consider it essential to liberty that the will be indifferent to its acts in such a way that it can act or not act, or even act contrary, he nevertheless openly admits, with the old Scholastics, that such indifference exists in the will of wayfarers; for their liberty is not only free from coercion but also from immutable voluntary necessity, that is, it is indifferent to either. He only denies that liberty in general human free will is situated in that indifference. Indeed, he considers this indifference a certain sign of liberty in a rational creature, but not the cause or reason of liberty. Therefore, it can be present or absent in the will's decision without the loss of liberty. (De Gratia Christi Salvatoris, Book 6, Chapter 34). These followers of Augustine, who are called Jansenists by their opponents, state in their book titled "Manuale Catholicorum," Thesis Apologetica & Dogmatica Viginti Prima, that the essence of liberty does not at all consist in indifference. For, according to the holy fathers, "Where there is will, there is liberty." Indeed, from Saint Prosper, "Free will is a spontaneous appetite for what is pleasing to oneself." And from Saint Damascene, "The liberty of the will is nothing else than the will." And shortly thereafter, "What is done voluntarily, even if done necessarily, is still done freely. For God necessarily loves Himself and yet freely."

XXXVI. In that writing called the "three columns," where they distinguish the various senses of the five famous propositions condemned by the Roman Pontiffs Innocent X and Alexander VII, they attribute the following sense to the third proposition as good and approved by them: "For meriting and demeriting in the state of fallen nature, liberty from the necessity of infallibility is not required in man, but liberty from coercion with the judgment of reason suffices if the essence of liberty and merit is considered precisely, although in the state of fallen nature, the indifference of power is always found, which the will, even under proximate necessary grace and effective grace, can not will, but not such that it would ever not will with the same grace." There they acknowledge that in the state of fallen nature, indifference is always attached to liberty. Therefore, in those articles presented to the bishop of Convenarum, they do not hesitate to say, "That for meriting and demeriting in the state of fallen nature, liberty from coercion is not sufficient; but

liberty from necessity is required. Although, they say, grace that is per se efficacious determines the will infallibly and insuperably to act and thus the will never dissents from that act; it does not introduce necessity because it does not take away the power to dissent."

XXXVII. However, the opinion that sets the liberty of the will opposed not to necessity, but only to coercion, has been condemned by the Roman Pontiffs. For Bellarmine mentions a decree of Pius V, which was later renewed by Gregory XIII, in which, among many other propositions, these are also marked for censure: "What is done voluntarily, even if done by necessity, is still done freely." And, "Only violence opposes the natural liberty of man."

XXXVIII. Therefore, the common doctrine of the Roman School today is that liberty of will does not suffice solely in immunity from coercion, but also requires immunity from necessity, at least absolute and natural, by which things are determined by nature to one thing and simply cannot act otherwise than they do. In this regard, both those who are called the more recent Thomists and those who are called Molinists agree.

XXXIX. Therefore, they do not want what is voluntary to be considered free if the will is necessarily determined to it, as is the will of the blessed spirits to love God, whom they see clearly. Consequently, they conceive of the voluntary as a kind of genus that encompasses under it two species, namely, the free, which is done with choice and preselection, and the voluntary strictly and properly so-called, which is done willingly but not freely, because it is done necessarily and immutably. They make spontaneity a genus of the voluntary, for things that act willingly not only include those endowed with intellect and will, but also brute animals that lack reason, and even inanimate objects like a stone tending downward. For to act willingly is to act by the impulse of nature.

XL. Therefore, they distinguish between willingness or complacency and liberty: they do not want any liberty to be properly so-called except that which is either of contrariety or specification, by which one can elicit contrary acts concerning the same object or desire contrary or disparate objects; or at least of contradiction or exercise, by which one can act and suspend or inhibit the action.

XLI. They do not consider liberty to exist without a certain indifference and indetermination of the free agent to act; they consider only those acts to be free whose contrary one can do, or at least omit them and cease from them: according to the common description of liberty, which is said to consist in the fact that a free agent, all prerequisites for action being given, can act or not act, do this or that.

XLII. Some more recent Thomists, however, observe that indifference to act or not act is indeed a property of human liberty that cannot be separated from it; but they do not consider the essence of liberty to consist in it; rather, it consists in independence and eminence above finite goods, and in the power of ruling, or in a certain dominion, by which one refers oneself and one's own to the ultimate end. This can be seen in a recent writer, Vincent Baronius, a Dominican, in the third part of his Dogmatic Theology, concerning the principles of human liberty and the knowledge of God against Theophilus Raynaud, S.J., Disp. 1, Art. 3, §. 1. But according to the more common modern doctrines of the school, the very essence of liberty is to be constituted in that indifference to act or not act.

XLIII. Moreover, the doctors of the Roman Church, by that indifference which either constitutes the essence of liberty or at least necessarily follows it, do not mean a state of the will in which it wavers between two opposites, inclining to neither more than the other, but rather suspended in some sort of equilibrium, slightly impelled now this way, now that way. They acknowledge that liberty is found in one who is not indifferent to act in that sense; but whose will, strongly inclined to certain actions due to deeply impressed habits, and who has a firm resolve to act in a certain way and not otherwise, from which he can scarcely be diverted. However, the indifference in which, according to their view, the liberty of choice is situated, is nothing other than the true power of acting and not acting, which remains even in one who is determined to act by a fixed and constant purpose of mind and will.

XLIV. Furthermore, it is to be observed, according to the common sense of the doctors of the Roman Church, that liberty does not require indetermination and indifference to acting well or badly. The necessity of liberty lies in the ability to act well, and even less in the ability to act badly. For they acknowledge that God is the freest agent, who nevertheless cannot act badly: just as Christ as a man could not either: nor can the angels and celestial spirits, who, by a singular favour of God, are immutably confirmed in good, yet they are no less free. Conversely, as they admit, the demons and the spirits of the damned in hell can do nothing good, yet they act freely, and free will remains in them. For, although they are determined to act well, and the latter to act badly, they can nevertheless abstain from these and those acts, and choose among many good or bad options. As seen in Puteanus in 1. 2. quest. 10, art. 1, 2, 3, 4. dubit. 3. And in William Estius in 2. sent. dist. 14. § 5.

XLV. However, the description where liberty is said to be that by which, all prerequisites for acting being given, the free agent can act, not act, do this and that, is not explained in the same sense by all theologians of the Roman School. To understand this, it should be noted that those words can have multiple meanings. Firstly, those words can be taken as if they signify that the free agent can act and not act simultaneously and at the same time exercise contrary acts. This sense is manifestly false and is rejected by all. For they all admit that in a free agent, act and cessation from act, or one act and its contrary, cannot coexist; and therefore, those words mean nothing other than that the free agent simultaneously has the power to perform contrary acts, and that in it is found the power of acting and the power of not acting, which in the schools is expressed by saying that it attributes the simultaneity of power to the free agent, not the power of simultaneity.

XLVI. Secondly, the sense of this description can be that, given all the prerequisites for an act of free will, whether from the side of the object, or from God and the intellect itself, that act can both follow or not follow, and a contrary act can be substituted for it: so that although an act and its privation, or a contrary act, cannot be composed and joined together; nevertheless, with all the prerequisites for some act of the human will, for example, conversion and love of God, its privation and even a contrary act can be joined and often in fact are joined: and so, notwithstanding any light of the object and even attraction, any dictate and judgment of the intellect, and finally any divine motion that impels to conversion, and yet precedes the actual determination of the will, conversion can in fact not follow; and it often happens in fact that these same conditions being present, in

one person conversion is joined, but not in another, because the will has so determined itself in one and otherwise in another.

XLVII. And this sense is proved and admitted by those who are called Molinists in the Roman School. For they do not want to assert that anything that prepares, moves, and impels the human will to consent, whether from God or the intellect, cannot coexist with the dissent of the will. They hold that any judgment of reason and any divine motion can be combined, not only with the act to which they pre-move and direct the will but also with the absence of that act, indeed with a contrary act: so that the same divine grace in one produces conversion to God, and in another not, because one voluntarily chose to follow the guidance of divine grace, and the other did not. Thus, they say, a free agent, given all the prerequisites for acting, can, in a composite sense, act and not act, do this and that. For if one understands that in a free agent act and cessation from act, one act and its opposite, can be combined, they admit that the composite sense is false, and only the divided sense, which opposes it, is true. If one contends that not indeed with the act itself, but with all the prerequisites for acting, the privation of the act and its opposite can be combined, that composite sense, according to them, is true.

XLVIII. However, those who are called recent Thomists think differently. According to their doctrine, both of those composite senses are false. They think that not only the privation of an act or its opposite act cannot be joined with the act itself, but neither can the negation of the act coexist with those things required for acting, among which there is a certain divine premotion. This is because, given the prerequisites for some act, that act follows certainly and infallibly; it can never happen that it does not follow. Nevertheless, they concede that, given all the prerequisites for acting, a free agent can act and not act, do this and that: because, although the negation or suspension of the act cannot coexist with these prerequisites, the power of not acting or even acting in a contrary manner can perfectly well coexist with them. Just as the dissent of the will cannot coexist with the actual consent of the will, but the power of dissenting remains: and the act of sitting cannot coexist with the act of walking, although the power of walking, which is not taken away by the act of sitting, does not contradict it. Therefore, the prerequisites for acting, whether from the part of God or our intellect, necessarily bring the act itself with them by consequence, and yet they do not take away the power of not acting. Because they indeed make the will act, but they make it act in such a way that it can not act and does not lose the power of acting otherwise.

XLIX. Diego Alvarez, Archbishop of Trani and Salpi, a principal recent Thomist, explains his view on this matter: "It must be said that for the liberty of the will to necessarily require that, given all the antecedent prerequisites according to the order of reason or time for the act, it can operate or not operate, so that with the same prerequisites there stands simultaneously in free will the faculty and power by which it can operate or not operate if it wills. And this is proven, for if any of the prerequisites for operating were to take away from free will the faculty or power of not operating or of operating in a contrary manner, it would be the effect of the efficacious motion of God, by which it is predetermined to such an act: but such a motion does not take away from free will the faculty of not operating that act or of operating in a contrary manner, but only makes it so that, although

free will can operate and not operate such an act, it infallibly and freely operates it... However, it is not of the essence or definition of free will that, given all the antecedent prerequisites according to the order of causality for the operation of such an act, it can not operate the same act in a composite sense if a composition is made between such prerequisites and the lack of such an act or the contrary act. Therefore, these two are incompatible, that is, that in free will, for any instant of time, all the antecedent prerequisites according to the order of causality for the production of such an act should be present, and yet it does not produce it but produces the contrary act. Nevertheless, this impossibility simultaneously stands with the liberty of the will." In sum, from his work on the helps of Divine grace, book 4, chapter 4, numbers 5 and 6. Therefore, to avoid all equivocation, this is, according to him, the legitimate definition of free will: free will is the faculty of will and reason for acting or not acting, and for acting one way or another.

Part III

In which the state and the significance of the questions concerning this matter are collected and examined as they are debated in the Roman and Reformed Schools.

I. In the previous theses, we briefly and clearly, as far as we could, presented the doctrine of free will in humans, considered absolutely and in itself. First, according to the Doctors of the Reformed School, and then according to the minds of the Doctors of the Roman School. And above all, we have made it clear that there is no controversy about the free will of humans concerning the question of whether it exists. For all the Reformed admit that not only was man endowed with free will when first created by God, but that the same free will remained in fallen man, neither completely extinguished nor lost, although it was greatly weakened by man's fall and reduced to the servitude of sin until it is brought into freedom by the grace of Christ.

II. Secondly, it is evident from what we have previously explained that both Schools agree that free will is not an act or habit, but pertains to the faculties of the soul. Nor is it a faculty distinct from the intellect and will. The significant questions about the nature of free will in humans today can be summarized as follows: Which faculty does free will refer to? And in what does the freedom, by which our will is said to be free, consist?

III. As for the remaining contention around these questions, as can be seen from the preceding theses, it is not properly between one School and another but between private Doctors who have various opinions and philosophies about these matters within each School. Indeed, almost no opinion in one School about these issues does not have some supporters in the other School. And there is no opinion rejected by the Doctors of one School that is not also opposed by some within their own School.

IV. To start with, when it is asked to which faculty free will pertains, a large part of the Theologians of both Schools believe that the freedom of human will, although it somehow originates from reason and has its foundation in a certain independence of practical judgment, nonetheless belongs solely to the will as its subject. The Schools say that freedom is only in the intellect radically, or as a necessary condition, but formally in the will alone. So free will is nothing other than the will, either simply as it follows the judgment and dictates of reason or as it chooses one among several means suggested by reason, accepting or rejecting this or that.

V. However, just as some Reformed Doctors deviate from this common opinion, so too in the Roman School it has had its opponents, both in the past, such as Durandus, and more recently, such as Gassendi, who believe that freedom is not only in the will but also in the intellect, and even more in the intellect than in the will. Although it must be admitted that Reformed Doctors deal with this question more freely and with greater diversity of opinions, some make freedom common to both will and intellect, though they hold that it pertains more to the will according to some, like Joshua Placeus, and more to the intellect according to others, like Moses Amyraldus. Others assert that freedom is not an attribute of this or that faculty but arises from the mutual relation and concurrence of multiple faculties in a person. Therefore, the subject of freedom is not this or that faculty but simply

the person, insofar as he uses his intellect and will in a certain way. We also adhere to this opinion, considering that a person is free not simply insofar as he wills, nor simply insofar as he judges, but insofar as he desires and wills based on a deliberate judgment of the mind and a certain counsel of reason.

VI. As for the nature of freedom, as is also clear from what has been explained in previous discussions, there is no less variety of opinions in both Schools. First, we abundantly proved that in both Schools there are those who, against others' objections, teach that the freedom of the will is opposed not to necessity simply, but only to coercion. However, we also made it clear that this controversy is either merely verbal or at least not of great importance. Those who affirm that freedom in general is opposed not to necessity but only to coercion concede to those of a different opinion that mere immunity from coercion is not sufficient for freedom, nor does freedom properly consist in it, but rather in that a free agent moves and acts of itself, by a certain reason proper to an intellectual agent, which is not found in inanimate things or brutes.

VII. Moreover, although they believe that only coercion hinders freedom in a rational agent, not necessity, they nonetheless acknowledge that free agents in most of their actions are not only free from coercion but are not determined to one thing by any necessity. Therefore, they consider some acts of a free creature to be necessary, but most to be contingent.

VIII. Thus, they note a threefold liberty in free agents. The first is what is called in the Schools the liberty of contrariety or specification, by which someone can do this or its contrary or something different. The second is called the liberty of contradiction, by which someone, although unable to do this and its contrary, can nonetheless act or refrain from action. Both these kinds of liberty are opposed to necessity and determination to one thing and are accompanied by a certain contingency of actions. Finally, they add a third liberty, called simple or complacency, by which the will and intellect of a free agent, while reflecting on themselves, either tacitly or expressly, approve their own actions and somehow command themselves; thus, by a certain peculiar reason, they move and act of themselves, as the intellect judges that it judges rightly and ought to judge as it does, and the will wants to will and fixes and confirms itself in its own act. This liberty can exist without the liberty of contrariety or contradiction and is consistent with a necessary and immutable determination to one thing.

IX. However, when liberty is extended to necessary and immutable actions, they admit that it is taken in a broader sense; liberty strictly understood pertains only to contingent matters, which can be so or otherwise.

X. Those who maintain that liberty is opposed not only to coercion but also to necessity concede to theologians of a different opinion that the will, or a free agent, acts necessarily concerning some of its actions, while concerning most others it acts contingently. Moreover, although they believe that the will is free only concerning those actions that are not necessarily but contingently elicited by it, they nonetheless acknowledge in those very actions to which the will is immutably and necessarily determined, there is a certain liberty and complacency of the will, which consists in this, that while the will reflects on its act, it

approves it and commands it to itself, insofar as it not only wills simply but also wills to will and acquiesces in its own act.

XI. Hence, as I said, the contention here is verbal, not real. Both sides agree on how things are in themselves. That is, the will, concerning some actions, acts necessarily, while concerning most others, it acts contingently. The will enjoys the liberty of contrariety or contradiction concerning some actions but is determined to one thing concerning others, that is, it cannot do the contrary or refrain from acting. And yet, in those actions that the will elicits necessarily, it pleases itself, wills its own actions most strongly, and approves them.

XII. The only remaining question is whether those acts that the will elicits necessarily and inevitably, and in respect to which it is entirely determined to one outcome, can be called free. Some deny this, stating that such acts cannot be called free but only voluntary, as there is no liberty in them except that which pertains to contrariety or contradiction. Others, however, concede that while these acts are not free in the stricter sense (where one could equally will or not will, or will something different or contrary, or at least could suspend willing), they can and should still be called free in a broader sense, which includes simple liberty or complacency. Thus, the question reduces to whether simple complacency, which pertains to the will in all its acts, whether necessary or contingent, deserves to be called liberty in a broader sense—a question that seems to be merely about terminology.

XIII. Indeed, among those who teach that liberty in general is opposed not to necessity but to coercion, Strangius, a Doctor of the Reformed School, expressly affirms this. After teaching extensively that the will is free not only when it deals with means but also when it deals with the end, and that God freely loves Himself and men freely desire happiness because the liberty of the will in general is nothing other than intellectual spontaneity, he later acknowledges that liberty is also used more strictly to refer to things within our power and is restricted to means related to the end, or to things that contribute little or nothing to the end, in which case liberty includes a certain indifference and free acts are merely contingent. He also notes that in this sense, many deny that God loves Himself freely and that the blessed in heaven love God freely. He concludes with these words: "It does not seem to us to be worth disputing about this matter, for otherwise it would only be a matter of terminology. For we do not deny that the term free will is rightly used in this way, although we have said that these actions are free in another sense." (De voluntate Dei lib. cap. 14. pag. 687.)

XIV. Among those who teach that liberty is opposed not only to coercion but also to necessity, Guilielmus Estius, a theologian of the Roman School, acknowledges the same. For in response to certain objections raised against Bonaventure's view, he replies: "Bonaventure teaches that free will can be considered in two ways: either as free or as deliberating. And indeed, insofar as it is free, he says it can apply to what is necessary, as is evident in God and the blessed; for although they have the necessity of immutability, they do not have coercion. However, insofar as it is deliberating, it only pertains to the contingent, for no one deliberates about what is necessary and impossible." From this distinction, it is clear in what sense he said that free will, insofar as it is free, also pertains to necessary acts and can have a necessary act. For 'insofar as it is free' means no more than

'insofar as it is voluntary and uncoerced.' Thus, it is the same as saying that the will, insofar as it is free from coercion, pertains to actions that are necessary. However, 'insofar as it is deliberating,' that is, as he explains, insofar as it consults whether to choose this or that, pertains to the liberty proper to free will as such. Therefore, Bonaventure does not differ in substance from others but speaks less conveniently, beyond common usage.

XV. The controversy that remains in the Reformed School among theologians who agree that the liberty of the will is opposed not only to coercion but also to necessity seems to be of little importance. While some simply teach that all properly called necessity is opposed to liberty, others concede that liberty is opposed to natural necessity, yet contend that various forms of necessity can coexist with the same liberty of the will: namely, that a free agent can be imposed with a certain necessity to act by the efficacy of grace and divine providence, or even by the practical judgment of the mind, which does not harm liberty.

XVI. Those who maintain that all properly called necessity is opposed to liberty understand by necessity only that which not only determines the agent to act but also takes away from it the power not to act or to act otherwise, or which places the agent in a state where it not only acts certainly and infallibly but also truly cannot not act. And this not only in a composite sense but also in a divided sense, and therefore makes it so that the agent, whether it is acting or prepared to act, does not have the power not to act or to act otherwise, like the power of a sitting person to walk even while sitting, and vice versa, the power of a walking person to sit even while walking.

XVII. Therefore, they concede that the motion of divine grace and the efficacy of divine providence, or even the final judgment of practical reason, can so determine a person to act and will that the action follows necessarily, which is called free, and it is impossible that, given the motion and efficacy of divine grace and providence, the act does not occur to which God, whether through the motion of grace or the efficacy of common providence, prepares, moves, and determines the person. But they do not consider this necessity to be properly called such, because with it there remains a true power not to act. For God moves a person whom He calls according to His purpose to believe in God and to love God and neighbour, so that although faith and love infallibly follow and, given such motion, it is impossible for a person not to believe and love, this does not take away the power not to believe and love. For with divine motion, the contrary act cannot coexist, but the power for the contrary act can. Just as it is necessary for a sitting person to sit while sitting, and for a walking person to walk while walking, and it is impossible for a sitting person not to sit and for a walking person not to walk, and yet the true power of walking remains in the sitting person and the power of sitting in the walking person, not in a composite sense as if they could walk and sit at the same time, but in a divided sense, because any act, although it excludes the contrary act, does not exclude the power for it.

XVIII. Therefore, according to this doctrine, a person effectively moved by God to do this or that, or impelled by his own practical judgment, indeed acts necessarily with a certain necessity of infallibility, yet at the same time retains the true power not to act. And although he can indeed not act, he will certainly act, and it is impossible for the absence of action to be joined with such judgment or such divine motion.

XIX. Those who teach that various forms of necessity can coexist with liberty and that he whom grace moves or his own judgment impels to act cannot not act mean nothing more than that it is impossible for a person moved by God to a certain act, by that grace which is said to work willing and doing in humans, or at least by the efficacy of common providence, or even by the judgment of his own reason, not to elicit the act to which he is thus supposed to be moved and excited. Therefore, from the supposition of such grace and aid and such judgment, it necessarily follows that the person will act in this or that way.

XX. However, they readily concede that a person moved by grace, for example, to pray and give alms to the poor, is not thereby entirely deprived of the power not to pray and not to give alms; indeed, with the act of praying and giving alms, the power to refrain from those acts or even to perform contrary acts can coexist as the power to be silent coexists with the act of speaking, and the power not to sit or even to walk coexists with the act of sitting.

XXI. Both sides, therefore, agree that he whom divine grace or the efficacy of divine providence and the judgment of his own reason move and impel to act, must act, since his action cannot be separated from that motion of God and the determination of his judgment. Yet, with such action, and therefore with the motion of God to such an act, the power to refrain from it or even to perform a contrary act can coexist, as has been repeatedly explained and stated.

XXII. Thus, when some assert that he whom God moves to this or that act must act, while others contend that no properly called necessity impels him to act, they differ in words but agree in substance. The former say that such a person acts necessarily because it is impossible for his action to be separated from divine motion, which the latter do not deny. According to the latter, no properly called necessity binds him to act because with his act, and much more with the motion to the act, the power for the contrary act or at least for the absence of the act, can coexist, which the former readily concede.

XXIII. Therefore, it also appears that the remaining disagreement among the Doctors of the Reformed School can be easily reconciled. Some affirm that the liberty of the will includes a certain indifference of the free agent, whereby, given all the prerequisites for acting, it can act or not act, do this or that; others deny that such indifference is included in liberty or pertains to liberty at all.

XXIV. For those who believe that liberty cannot exist without some indifference of the free agent, they do not understand this indifference as a state in which the agent does not incline more to one side than the other but stands in an equal balance to be pushed this way or that, which those who disagree strongly oppose. There is not one among those who support this indifference who does not believe it can also be found in someone who firmly and certainly decides that this and no other action should be taken, and whose will, with deeply rooted habits that can be hardly shaken, is vehemently inclined in one direction or the other. Thus, by the term indifference in this context, they mean nothing other than a true and intrinsic power not only to act but also to cease from action, not only to do this but also to do something different or opposite. This power is found not only in someone who is uncertain and hesitant about whether to act or not but also in someone who no

way hesitates or doubts what should or should not be done, and who is determined with a fixed and unmovable purpose to act in this and no other manner.

XXV. Moreover, when they say that a free agent, given all the prerequisites for action, can act or not act, do this or that, they do not mean that, given all that is required for a particular act of will (among which is the motion of divine grace and the practical judgment of the mind), the will can refrain from acting and that the absence of action can be joined with all those things by which the will is moved and disposed to act. For they admit that it is impossible for God to move a person with His effective grace to an act of piety, and yet the act not be performed, or for someone, having considered all things, to judge that he should act or desire this here and now, and yet not to do and desire the same. What they mean is only that the one who is moved by reason to act, although he will infallibly and certainly act and it is impossible that he does not act, nonetheless retains within himself the true power not to act and to act otherwise, which remains not only in someone who is immediately prepared and disposed to act but even in the one who is currently acting. For although the absence of the act or a contrary act cannot coexist with a particular act, the power for that contrary act can indeed coexist, as has been repeatedly emphasized.

XXVI. On the other hand, those who argue against the need for some indifference in the agent to have free will seem to signify by indifference a state in which the will does not incline more to one side than the other and is equally flexible in either direction, which no theologian in Christian schools has ever considered liberty to consist in.

XXVII. Similarly, when they say it is false that a free agent, given all that is required for action, can act and not act, do this and that, they do not mean that the factors that prepare and impel to act take away from the free agent the faculty to act otherwise or to suspend action. For they acknowledge that this faculty is not taken away by the act itself, much less by the factors that impel to act. Nor do they deny that one who pities a needy person by God's grace always retains the power not to pity, and one who despises the pleasures of this world retains the faculty to seek and embrace them, which is not taken away by divine grace. Thus, they intend nothing more than this: given all that is required for action, it cannot happen that a free agent does not act, although otherwise he retains the faculty by which he could not act or act differently. For example, it cannot happen that, given all that is necessary from God for producing faith and conversion in a person, that person is converted and believes, although the faculty remains in him always, even when he believes and is converted, by which he could not believe and not be converted.

XXVIII. It is clear, then, that when these theologians deny that liberty consists in some indifference of the agent, they have two things in mind: one, that liberty does not consist in the state of someone who is in doubt about whether to act or not, and the other, that given the motion and efficacy of divine grace and providence, and even the practical judgment of one's own reason, it cannot happen that a free agent does not act according to the effective motion of God and his own judgment, which those among the Reformed who teach that liberty includes some indifference to act readily concede. Furthermore, from what has been said, it is no less evident that those doctors who support this indifference only mean that the motion of God and the practical judgment of the mind

move a person to act in such a way that, on the one hand, he acts certainly and infallibly, but on the other hand, the power not to act or to act otherwise is not taken away from him. Just as when a person actually acts, the same power is not taken away from him by the act to which he is moved and impelled.

XXIX. From all these things, it is clear that the doctrine of the Reformers on this matter, rightly explained and understood, and in the sense intended by those who propose it, does not differ in substance from the opinion of those who are called the more established Thomists in the Roman School. Although they contend that liberty is opposed not only to coercion but also to natural and properly called necessity, they nonetheless acknowledge that given all the prerequisites for action, the act of a free creature follows necessarily with a certain necessity of infallibility. For although a free agent always retains the power not to act even when he actually acts, and more so when he is immediately ready to act, given all that is required for action, both from God and from the intellect, the will acts certainly and infallibly, and it is impossible for the action not to follow. According to their doctrine, all the prerequisites for action can indeed coexist and be consistent with the power not to act or to act otherwise, but not with the absence of action, and much less with a contrary act.

XXX. Thus, by indifference to act or not to act, in which, according to their view, liberty is to be constituted or which at least is necessarily joined to liberty, they do not mean anything other than what has already been described. That is, they neither conceive of a free cause as doubtful and uncertain whether it will act or not, nor do they mean that given all the prerequisites for action, it can happen that a free agent both acts and does not act, but rather that there is a true power not to act and to act otherwise, which remains in a free cause when given all the prerequisites for action, not only is it immediately ready to act, but it will certainly and infallibly act, as Alvarez very clearly and distinctly explains his opinion on this matter in the sum of his work on the aids of divine grace, book 4, chapter 14, from which the words quoted from the same Alvarez in the previous dispute are taken.

XXXI. Indeed, the same opinion is held by Diego Alvarez and others who are called recent Thomists, as is by the Doctors of the Reformed Church. This is confirmed by the testimony of the learned man, Andreas Rivetus, who was a professor at the University of Leiden some years ago. He expressed his opinion on human free will using words taken directly from Alvarez. In the summary of controversies, tract 4, question 3, he admits that the definition of free will, saying it is the faculty of the will by which, given all prerequisites for action, it can act or not act, can be tolerated as long as it is understood in a divided sense, not a composite sense. He states, "If someone says that, given all the prerequisites for action according to the order of reason or time, free will can act or not act, so that the faculty and power to act or not act remain in free will with those same prerequisites, as Diego Alvarez distinguishes, because even the effective motion of God, by which the will is determined to a particular act, does not take away the faculty of free will to act or act contrary but only ensures that, while free will can act or not act, it infallibly acts freely." This means that, in a contingent and free cause, there is the power for either opposite but not the power to hold both opposites simultaneously. This is because the power for one act does not conflict with the power for the contrary act, nor do they conflict in the same

subject, so created free will, not only before it is determined to one act but even at the instant it is determined by God and itself to the same act, simultaneously has the power to produce the contrary act if it wills but not to hold both contrary acts at the same time. All these words are either explicitly quoted or at least borrowed from Diego Alvarez, including the conclusion that Rivetus agrees with: it is not the essence or definition of free will that, given all prerequisites for a particular act, it can not act in a composite sense if the composition is made between such prerequisites and the lack of that act or its contrary. That is, with the help of God's effective aid, it cannot happen that free will does not produce an act of love or elicits an act contrary to the love of God.

XXXII. Thus, there remains no real or significant controversy for the Reformed except with those who are called Molinists in the Roman School, named after the famous Jesuit Louis Molina, who wrote and taught about a hundred years ago. They understand the indifference to act or not act, in which free will consists, and the common definition that it is that by which, given all prerequisites for action, the will can act or not act, very differently from the recent Thomists, as we have demonstrated in the previous dispute.

XXXIII. They do admit with others that by indifference, they do not mean a state in which the will does not incline more to one side than the other but hangs between two opposites as if suspended in balance. They acknowledge that liberty is not prejudiced by habits that strongly incline the will to this or that action and are difficult to change. Moreover, they do not deny that in a certain composite sense it is false to say that the will can act and not act, do this and that. That is, if someone thinks this means that the act and its lack or two contrary acts can exist simultaneously in the will. They also admit that indifference, in which the essence of liberty consists, does not mean the power to do good or evil. They acknowledge that free will remains even in one who cannot do good, as in the damned spirits, and even more so in those who cannot do evil, as in the saints who see the face of God and reign with Him in heaven.

XXXIV. However, they strongly defend that the will is so undetermined and indifferent that, given all prerequisites for action, whether on the part of God, the object, or the intellect, it can happen and often does happen that the will does not act. Thus, none of the things that antecedently move and incite the will to act can ensure that the action of the will follows, and it often does not follow. Therefore, with all those things that precede the action of the will and are required for it, the power to not act or act otherwise can be genuinely joined and composed, but also the absence of action and even the contrary act. As is clear from what has been said, not only the Reformed but also those recent Thomists deny this. They believe that with the prerequisites necessary for action, either on God's part or the intellect, the power not to act or act contrary can indeed coexist in the will, but given these, the will always acts, and it cannot happen otherwise. Because from this hypothesis, the will acts certainly and infallibly, although it retains the power not to act.

XXXV. Moreover, since this issue has often been raised and discussed among the Roman Pontiffs and the assembly of Cardinals appointed for this purpose, they have not yet defined it, and they have allowed their members to hold and defend either opinion at will. However, just as the Roman Pontiffs Paul V and Clement VIII seemed to favour the Thomists' opinion at the beginning of this century and the end of the previous one, their

successors Innocent X and Alexander VII have seemed more favourable to the opposing doctrine in recent years. Thus, it has become much more common in the Roman School and is held by the majority of theologians.

XXXVI. Moreover, just as some Roman Catholic doctors, such as those called Jansenists and even recent Thomists, attack the Molinists with common weapons along with those Reformed who subscribe to the Synod of Dort, so do those from the Reformed, who are called Remonstrants or Arminians in Belgium and others who do not follow the Synod of Dort, strongly defend the doctrine of the Molinists in this matter.

XXXVII. Their opinion is mainly rejected by the Doctors of the Reformed School because it diminishes the efficacy of divine grace and attributes more to free will than is proper in the matter of salvation. For Scripture teaches that whatever good is in us should be entirely attributed to divine grace, according to the Apostle's words, "What do you have that you did not receive?" But from this doctrine, it follows that man can believe and love God, should indeed be attributed to the aids of grace that move and incite man to faith and love, but that man consents to the moving grace and determines himself to believe and love God, depends so much on free will that it is not properly an effect of divine grace, since the grace being present, that consent often does not follow. Thus, divine grace can be said to be only its condition or a cause without which it does not happen.

XXXVIII. Moreover, Scripture teaches that divine grace makes the difference among men, that is, between those who are converted and those who are not, between believers and unbelievers, between those who obey God's call and those who resist, according to Paul's words, "Who makes you different?" But from the doctrine of those we are now discussing, it follows that it is not divine grace, but simply the human will that makes this difference among men. It supposes that with equal grace offered to many, this one believes, that one does not; this one is converted, that one is not. Consequently, it should not be attributed to any efficacy of grace that this one believes and is converted rather than that one but only to the free determination of the human will, because this one chose to consent to the moving and prevenient grace, while that one did not.

XXXIX. Additionally, if divine grace only moves, prepares, and incites people to will and perform what God commands, so that the willing and performing can still not follow and often does not follow, then grace indeed produces in man the necessary powers or dispositions to will and perform good but not the willing and performing itself. But the Apostle testifies to the contrary, saying that God works in us both to will and to act according to His good pleasure (Phil. 2:13).

XL. Finally, if, given all the prerequisites for action, even on God's part, not excluding any efficacy of grace, it can always happen that the will does not act, then there is no divine grace, at least ordinary grace, by which human conversion infallibly and certainly follows, and by which all who are given it, without exception, come to Christ. But Christ Himself teaches that there is a certain grace of God that no one receives without coming to Him. For He says, "Everyone who listens to the Father and learns from Him comes to me" (John 6:45).

XLI. Indeed, if many of those drawn by the Father's grace and taught inwardly by God still do not believe in Christ or come to Him, how could Christ offer this as a reason why not all who hear the Gospel come to Him, that is, that it is necessary for those who come to Him to be drawn and taught by the Father? He says, "Do not murmur among yourselves. No one can come to me unless the Father who sent me draws him. It is written in the Prophets, 'And they shall all be taught by God.' Everyone who has heard and learned from the Father comes to me" (John 6:44-45). Certainly, if those who do not believe the Gospel are drawn by the Father's grace, it would be absurd to say, "Do not be surprised that those to whom the Gospel was preached did not believe the Gospel, because it is necessary for those who believe in the Gospel to be drawn by divine grace."

XLII. Since there exists a certain divine grace, indeed common to all the elect, by whose motion and impulse the conversion of man infallibly and certainly follows; and yet, by the consent of all, the conversion of man to God is a free act of the will: it is clear that liberty is poorly constituted if, given all the prerequisites for action and the ordinary motion of grace, the will can always either act or not act, not only in a divided sense but also in a composite sense, so that the lack of action to which grace moves a person can coexist with that motion of grace.

XLIII. Therefore, the common description of Free Will, which is defined as the faculty by which, given all prerequisites for action, one can act or not act, do this or that, is less safe than the one proposed by Alvarez: "Free will is the faculty of the will and reason to act or not act, and to do one thing or another." Or even that of Bellarmine: "Free will is the free power of choosing one thing over another from those that lead to some end, or of rejecting or accepting one and the same thing according to our judgment, attributed or granted to us for the great glory of God."

On How Divine Concurrence can be Reconciled with Free Will

I. Durandus, a celebrated figure among ancient Scholastic theologians, believed and taught that God concurs with secondary causes remotely and mediately only; namely, because He gave all things their own nature and essence and conferred upon them the power to act, and continuously preserves both by His power: with the condition that each creature, having once received its power from God and continuously preserved, performs its own motions independently without God immediately and directly influencing their acts and effects. From this follows that God is only a remote cause of the acts of creatures, while the creature itself is the proximate and immediate cause.

II. Among more recent theologians, a certain Louis of Dole from the Capuchin order, whose book was published with many approvals from Doctors, aligns with Durandus' view. He says that for God to concur with man in action is nothing other than creating free will for natural acts or giving the power or habit of acting in supernatural ones, by which the will itself does everything in every supernatural act without any other immediate divine concurrence promoting the action. As reported by Samuel Rutherford, Professor of Theology at the University of St Andrews, in his Scholastic Disputation on Divine Providence, chapter 25.

III. According to these Doctors, there is no difficulty in reconciling divine concurrence with the freedom of human acts since God does not immediately concur with them but mediately only through the free will that He created once and continuously preserves.

IV. However, this opinion is generally rejected in the Roman School. Except for very few, the Doctors of the Roman Church, both ancient and recent, agree that God cooperates with secondary causes in such a way that there is no action of a secondary cause that does not proceed directly from God as well as from the secondary cause, and that no action can be exercised by a creature unless God confers being on that action directly and immediately.

V. They derive this from certain Scripture passages. The principal one is found in Acts 17:28: "In Him we live and move and have our being." For when the Apostle says that we live in God, that is, by Him, and have our being, he sufficiently teaches that God is the one who gave us our nature and all faculties initially and continuously preserves them; therefore, when he adds that we also move in God, he seems to clearly teach that all our movements and actions, like nature itself, proceed immediately from God and are done by His power.

VI. They also refer to what Christ says in John 5:17: "My Father is working until now, and I am working." For that continuous operation attributed to God there cannot be more conveniently explained than by the continuous influence by which God concurs in all

actions of created things and produces them together with them; especially since it is clear that Christ understands there an operation similar to what He had just performed in healing the lame man.

VII. They also infer this from all those places where Scripture singularly attributes to God things that are done daily in nature through secondary causes. For example, when it is said in Psalm 104 that God waters the mountains from His upper chambers, makes grass grow for the cattle and plants for people to use, and in Psalm 135 that He brings forth the wind from His storehouses, and in the New Testament that He clothes the grass of the field and gives each seed its own body, Matthew 6:30, 1 Corinthians 15:38. It seems that Scripture would not have used such language if in these matters no singular and immediate action of God intervened and they had no other proximate and immediate cause than nature itself created by God.

VIII. To these testimonies from sacred Scripture, they also add an argument derived from natural reason. For they reason that no created substance can remain in nature unless God preserves them immediately by His influence; much more, therefore, similar influence is needed for the motions and actions of substances: for how could it be true that accidents depend less on God for their preservation than substances themselves? Since what is necessary for the preservation of a thing is more reasonably necessary for its first production, it follows that nothing at all can be produced by secondary causes unless the actual and immediate influence of the primary cause intervenes simultaneously.

IX. From these and similar reasons, the Doctors of the Roman Church conclude almost unanimously that God concurs and cooperates with all secondary causes, whether necessary, free, or contingent, in each of their actions, and indeed directly and immediately. However, when asked what this cooperation of the primary cause with the secondary cause is and in what it consists, there is great variety of opinions among Scholastic Doctors.

X. Thomas and most of his followers, especially Dominicans, teach that to explain divine concurrence, it is not enough to simply say that God influences various acts and effects of secondary causes and grants and preserves their being as He created and preserves the secondary causes and their powers: but they also contend that it is required that God moves and applies the secondary causes to work, without which they would do nothing at all. This, they say, is required by the dependence of secondary causes on God as the first mover. For according to them, God is called the first mover because He moves and applies all other causes to their operations antecedently, and therefore produces all the effects of secondary causes first in nature, though not in time. As Estius expresses it in the Second Sentences, distinction 24, paragraph 14.

XI. This seems to be the doctrine of the Roman Catechism itself, published by the order of the Council of Trent, whose words at the end of the explanation of the first article of the Creed are: "God not only sustains and governs all things by His providence but also impels to motion and action with His intimate power those things that move and act, in such a way that while He does not hinder the efficiency of secondary causes, He nevertheless prevents it; since His most hidden power extends to each thing and, as the wise man testifies, reaches from one end to the other mightily."

XII. Therefore, they assert that God excites and applies the secondary cause to act, and that before the creature operates, it is effectively moved by God in all its actions, and that God is the one who acts and makes the creature act and do whatever it does and acts: so that without this divine pre-motion, the creature can do nothing at all, and given this pre-motion, it is impossible in the composite sense for the secondary cause not to do and act what it is pre-moved by the first cause to do.

XIII. However, according to their view, this divine pre-motion applies no less to free agents than to necessary ones, which raises a considerable difficulty regarding how this can be consistent with the freedom of creatures. If our will cannot act without being first moved and applied to action by God, how can it be considered the master of its own act and indifferent to acting or not acting, since it does not have in its power that divine motion and application required for each of its acts? And again, when God moves and applies the will to action, how can it be said that the will acts freely when it cannot help but act and cannot resist the divine motion?

XIV. To solve this difficulty, Bellarmine says that the influence or power of God, by which the will is moved and applied to action, is received in secondary causes according to their disposition. That disposition, according to which the motion of God is received in the will, is, for Bellarmine, nothing other than a certain preceding negative determination, both of God's influence and of the elicited act of the will. Specifically, in his view, this consists in whether the will allows itself to be moved by the object presented by reason, or does not allow itself to be moved. He calls this determination negative because it does not consist of a positive act but in the negation of an act; yet the will is no less free to act than not to act. Thus, he believes that the will is truly free and determines itself even if God moves and applies it to action because the divine motion itself is in its power. For, he says, if the will allows itself to be moved by the proposed object, God applies and moves it to elicit the act; if it does not allow itself, God does not apply or move it, since God freely bound Himself when He created the free will. (On Free Will, Book 4, Chapter 16).

XV. Therefore, according to Bellarmine's view, although the will requires a preceding divine motion and application to act, it always remains the master of its act because it somewhat has that motion in its power, as previously explained. And although, given God's motion, it is impossible for the will not to be moved, the will is always free in acting because it was in its power not to be moved by God by not disposing itself through that negative determination to receive God's motion, which was within the power of the will.

XVI. However, this solution of Bellarmine does not please many who agree with Thomas, that the will, like all other secondary causes, requires a certain previous divine motion and application to act. They assert that God moves the will according to His will, without any consideration of such a preceding negative determination in the created will. And they assert that He not only moves it simply but effectively impels it to act in a certain way, so that the will is determined by God to act or will this and not another, prior to its own determination.

XVII. And this is what they call predetermination, which they also call physical, not as physical opposed to supernatural but as physical opposed to moral. They mean that God

predetermines created wills to act not merely by proposing, persuading, or attracting, which are proper to a moral cause, but by immediately moving the will itself and exerting a true, real, and properly said action on it, which is proper to what is called a physical cause.

XVIII. They assert that such predetermination applies not only to the good acts of free causes but also to the evil ones. For since they believe it is the dependence of the secondary cause on the first so that it can do nothing at all unless moved and applied to act by the first as its instrument, they teach consistently with this doctrine that even for those acts accompanied by some malice and wickedness, the created will is so pre-moved and predetermined by God that given God's motion, it must act and do this or that.

XIX. Nevertheless, they deny that this results in making God the author of sin, because God does nothing more in the act of sin than what is positive in it and thus good; and consequently, He moves and determines to nothing else. The wickedness and moral fault attached to such an act are not something positive requiring a properly efficient cause but only a privation of the due rectitude that arises from the defect of the created will.

XX. This doctrine is accurately and distinctly presented by Didacus Alvares in his comprehensive work on the aids of divine grace, Book Two. Indeed, in the seventh chapter of that book, he titles, "That God by a previous motion inherent in the created will moves, applies, or predetermines it to all its particular good acts, while preserving its liberty." And in that chapter, these are his words, "By this motion and application, God truly transforms the will from one state to another and makes it willing from unwilling." He further states, "God, by this actual efficacious motion in the manner of a physical cause, that is, truly efficiently, predetermines the will of man to good free acts so that the will moved by God through such aid freely and infallibly determines itself to produce a second free act."

XXI. The ninth chapter bears the title, "That God by a previous motion truly efficiently moves free will to the act of sin, as far as it is an act and as it is a being." The chapter begins with these words, "What has been said about the predetermination of the will to good acts must be extended to the act of sin, as far as it is an act and a being. Hence, whatever entity is found in any act of sin, even if otherwise it is intrinsically evil, must be traced back to God as the first cause pre-moving and predetermining the created will to such an act as it is an act and as it is a being." He then shows how it does not follow from this that God is the cause of moral evil present in such acts, stating that the deformity of sin or moral evil does not follow intrinsically and by nature from the act of blasphemy or hatred of God as an act, nor as a being in the general nature, even in the individual, but as it proceeds from the defective will of the creature. Therefore, the moral evil and defect of sin should be referred to the deficient will, not to God.

XXII. And these points are consistent with what is read in Estius in the above-cited passage, where he expounds the same doctrine and brings many confirmations to it. He concludes thus and objects to the freedom of human will: "Since, therefore, it is clear from what has been said that our will is effectively moved and determined by God as the first cause, the first mover, and therefore is preceded and predetermined by Him, it remains to be explained how this effective motion and determination, or rather divine pre-motion and predetermination, is consistent with the freedom of our will. For it does not seem that what

is effectively moved and determined in one direction by a prior cause can be free to do otherwise."

XXIII. To this, he responds, "Regarding the nature of free will; it suffices that from the previous judgment of the practical intellect, it chooses one of the opposites, while still being able to choose the other from a different judgment of the same intellect; because, namely, the root and foundation of free will lie in the intellect, insofar as it can consider various aspects of good in opposites and propose them to the will. But the nature of free will does not include that while the free agent chooses from previous judgment, it is not moved by a superior cause to judge and choose so. Therefore, since the divine motion predetermining the will does not hinder a person from having full and perfect judgment of reason and judging that one means is contingent and the other is necessarily connected to the end, and could also choose otherwise from a different judgment, it follows that such a motion does not harm the freedom of our will. For it is proper to the uncreated will to have its choice from no prior cause."

XXIV. Alvares attempts to reconcile the physical predetermination of the human will to its acts by the impulse of the moving God with the free choice of the same will in another way. After proposing this objection to himself, "If the prior divine influence is necessary for the cause so that the will may act, it follows that without it, the will cannot act, thus its freedom will perish," he responds, "This prior motion or immediate influence on the cause is not necessary for the will to be able to act if it wishes; for it has that by its own power or through supernatural habits; but it is necessary only for it to act actually. Hence, from the fact that the will is not moved by God with that prior motion, it does not follow that it cannot will or act; but it only follows that it will not actually act."

XXV. In the same book, chapter 6, in response to the second argument, from the fact that God predetermines someone to will this or that, he denies that it follows, absolutely speaking, that it is not in their power to will otherwise. Although given the divine predetermination, it is impossible in a composite sense for them to will a different object. In one word, he distinguishes between willing and acting, and the ability to will and act; and he concedes that without that predetermining influence, the will never acts, but with it, the will never does not act. Yet, he maintains that with that influence, the will has the power not to act, and conversely, without it, the will has the power to act, namely in a divided sense. In his view, with that predetermining influence, the will's power to not act or act differently remains, but the opposite act or cessation of the act does not. Conversely, without that influence, the power to act remains in the will, although it is never brought into action. He concludes that someone omitting an act that is commanded does so freely and sins because they could have fulfilled the command with sufficient aid from God. However, due to their own fault, they impeded themselves from receiving that necessary motion from God.

XXVI. But the majority of the doctors of the Roman Church today reject that opinion and assert that the pre-moving and predetermining influence of God on the human will to its individual acts completely undermines the freedom of human choice. Furthermore, they argue that it follows that God is the author of sin since, according to this view, He

predetermines people even to intrinsically evil acts and imposes a certain necessity of doing evil upon them.

XXVII. Therefore, they philosophize very differently about the concurrence of God. First, they establish that when God concurs and cooperates with secondary causes, He does not do anything or imprint on the faculty itself that acts, for example, on our will. Instead, He only immediately influences and acts on the action and effect of the secondary cause, producing it at the very moment it is produced by the secondary cause.

XXVIII. Then they consequently teach that the action of the first cause concurring with the secondary cause is not an action really distinct from the action of the secondary cause but the same action insofar as it receives its being from the first cause. Thus, when God, for example, concurs with the will in the act of willing or not willing, He does not exert an action in the will distinct from the action of the will itself but only confers being on the action of the will together with the will and preserves that action. Consequently, divine cooperation in this respect is not something different from our volition but our very volition insofar as it immediately depends on God for its production and preservation.

XXIX. Furthermore, as also clearly follows from what has been said, they deny that the secondary cause is moved by the first cause to act or determined by the same in acting to produce such an action. Therefore, according to their opinion, the secondary cause, and consequently the will, does not act because God moves it and applies it to action. Rather, God cooperates with it because it disposes itself to act. The divine concurrence and influence is something indifferent in itself, which is determined by secondary causes to various kinds of actions.

XXX. These and many similar points are elaborated at length by Luis de Molina in his "Concord of Free Will with the Gifts of Grace," question 14, disputation 26. He first asserts that God concurs with secondary causes in their operations and effects in such a way that just as the secondary cause immediately elicits its operation and produces its term or effect, so God immediately influences with it in the same operation and produces the term or effect through that operation or action. Secondly, he asserts that when God concurs with secondary causes, He influences as a universal cause with an indifferent influence towards various actions and effects. This general influence is determined to specific kinds of actions and effects by the particular influence of the secondary causes, which varies according to the nature of each in acting. Just as the influence of the sun, which is also universal, is determined by the influence of a man to produce a human being, and by the influence of a horse to produce a horse. If the cause is free, it is in its power to influence in such a way that this action rather than that one is produced, such as willing rather than not willing or walking rather than sitting, and this effect rather than that one, namely this artifact rather than another. Or it may even suspend its influence entirely so that there is no action at all. Thirdly, he asserts that the influence of God through universal concurrence is not sufficient for the production of any effect without the particular influence of the secondary cause by which it is determined, nor is the particular influence of the secondary cause sufficient without the influence of God through universal concurrence by which it is assisted, which, according to the ordinary law, He never denies. These two influences mutually depend on each other to exist in nature. Indeed, there are not two actions but one numerically, which

as it comes from God influencing in this way is called universal concurrence, but as it comes from the secondary cause, for example from fire causing heat, is called the concurrence or influence of the fire. This action is specified not because it is from God through universal concurrence but because it is from the fire with God cooperating through its particular power.

XXXI. The doctors who hold this explanation of divine concurrence think they can easily show how such concurrence can be reconciled with the freedom of human actions. For since two kinds of freedom are usually attributed to the will—one concerning the exercise of the act and the other concerning its specification—this divine concurrence, as explained, prejudices neither. Not the former, which concerns the exercise, since this concurrence does not impose the necessity of acting on the will. For the will does not act because God acts but rather conversely, God acts because the will acts, although they both begin to act at the same moment in time and nature. Scholastic terms express this by saying that the will acts prior in nature to God, not by priority of the instant in which but of the order from which.

XXXII. Although the will can do nothing at all without God concurring, according to the law established by God when He created it free, that concurrence is always available to it because God willed and decreed from eternity to concur with every work of the free will when it determines itself to act. Nevertheless, the will is equally free concerning the specification of its act. For that the will acts well or badly, avoids or seeks this rather than that, does not proceed from any power of divine concurrence but from the proper determination of the will, which freely uses the divine concurrence, indifferent in itself, to produce an action of this rather than that kind.

XXXIII. As for the Reformed theologians known as Remonstrants or Arminians in Belgium, they recognize no other divine concurrence with secondary causes than that general and indifferent one, which is determined by the concurrence of the secondary cause. This can be seen in Jacobus Arminius, from whom all others derive their name. In his dispute against Perkins, he not only affirms that this divine concurrence is indifferent in itself but also that it contributes nothing to the will of the creature by which it might be inclined, helped, or strengthened to act. He asserts that the created will has God's concurrence in its power, ready and available, before it acts (In Anti-Perkins, p. 733). Similar teachings are found in Grevinchovius against Amesius (sect. 32, p. 368) and Corvinus against Tilenus (cap. 9, p. 354).

XXXIV. Some of the Reformed theologians who subscribed to the Synod of Dordrecht also seem to share the same view with the Molinists and Remonstrants in this matter. They acknowledge no other divine concurrence with secondary causes than a simultaneous and indifferent one, whereby God does not influence the cause itself but acts together with it in its effects and actions, which do not determine the secondary cause to this or that specific kind of action but are variably modified by the nature or even the liberty of the secondary cause.

XXXV. This is certainly the opinion of Robert Baronius, a Scotsman who, during his lifetime, was a professor of theology at the University of Aberdeen. This can be seen in his

"Metaphysics adapted to the use of Theology," where he discusses the divine concurrence and its harmony with our free will. He professes to hold the same view as Fonseca and Suarez, namely, that this concurrence is indifferent in itself and is determined by the secondary cause to a specific type of action. He asserts that there is no need for God to pre-move secondary causes but that it suffices for Him to influence their effects and actions simultaneously with them. Therefore, the divine concurrence and influence are really nothing other than the action of the secondary cause insofar as it receives its being from the first cause and depends on it (Section 8, Disputation 3, "On the concurrence or cooperation of God").

XXXVI. John Strangius, also a Scotsman and professor at the University of Glasgow, seems to be not far from this opinion. Although he considers that the action to which God and the creature simultaneously concur is by nature prior from God than from the creature, and that God's influence on that action is by nature prior to the creature's influence, he denies that God concurs only with a general influence, as He concurs in the same way with the generation of a human and a horse. He asserts that God's influence is special for special effects, not morally but physically. He contends and proves, with many arguments, that for all and each of the actions of creatures, the pre-motion and pre-determination of God, as defended by the Thomistic school, are not necessary (De voluntate et actionibus Dei circa peccatum, lib. 2, cap. 3).

XXXVII. By pre-motion and pre-determination, he means the action of God by which He excites and applies the secondary cause to act. Hence, prior in nature and reason to the creature's operation, He moves it really and effectively to all its actions, making the creature act and do whatever it does. Thus, without this pre-motion of God, the creature can do nothing at all, and once it is given, it is impossible in a composite sense for the secondary cause not to do what it is pre-moved to by the first cause. He acknowledges this pre-motion and pre-determination of God for the works of grace and many other operations of the will whenever it pleases and is necessary. However, he denies that it pertains to the general concurrence of God or is universally applied to all actions of creatures, especially those necessarily accompanied by sin (Lib. 1, cap. 4, sub finem).

XXXVIII. He testifies that he is mainly moved to this view because he considers that if God necessarily determines devils and wicked humans to all sinful actions, it follows that our sins could justly be imputed to God. This is also the reason Robert Baronius mentioned above felt greatly compelled.

XXXIX. Moreover, both believe that this pre-determination should be rejected because it offends the freedom of the will and seems irreconcilable with it. Strangius, however, distinguishes between liberty broadly accepted, which is essential to the will and found in every act that is spontaneous and rational, and liberty in a stricter sense, which consists in a certain indifference of the agent and pertains to the will concerning most of its acts. According to him, the former liberty is not overturned by divine pre-motion and pre-determination, by which God gently moves humans as is fitting for an intelligent creature. However, it cannot coexist with the latter liberty, which is based on indifference and with which any preceding determination, not in the will's power, conflicts. How the simultaneous concurrence of God, which is always available to the created will, does not

harm that liberty has been explained above. These theologians do not reconcile it with the strictly defined liberty of the will any differently than the doctors of the Roman school (Strangius, De Voluntate Dei circa peccatum, lib. 2, cap. 8).

XL. However, many Reformed theologians agree with the Thomistic school that God not only concurs and cooperates with each act of creatures simultaneously but also pre-moves and pre-determines creatures to these and those acts effectively. This applies to both necessary and free causes and to both good and evil acts, although God does not move or pre-determine to the malice and wickedness of the act but only to what is positive and naturally good in it. Just as, according to their view, the secondary cause can do nothing and act without such pre-determination, so also, once it is given, it is impossible for it not to act and operate.

XLI. William Ames acknowledges that such pre-motion and pre-determination of secondary causes, especially human will, must be admitted. Otherwise, in his judgment, the subordination of the first cause and secondary causes in their operations would be abolished. All operations of the human will would be removed from the dominion, providence, and effective governance of God. Man would be not a subject but a partner of God. Indeed, God would depend on the nod of man even in matters of the greatest importance in the administration of the entire world. Man would not say, "If God wills, I will do this or that," but rather God would have to say, "If man wills, I will do this or that" (In Bellarmino Enervato, vol. 4, lib. 4, cap. 2).

XLII. Samuel Rutherford, a Scot, and professor of theology at St. Andrews University a few years ago, holds the same view. He refutes with many arguments the concept of God's general and indifferent concurrence, which is determined by the concurrence of the secondary cause, as a fabrication and impious. In his view, such concurrence is injurious to God because it takes away God's freedom in deciding and introduces an abhorrent dependence of God on the fickle will of His creature. It presupposes that God is determined by the creature and not vice versa. Furthermore, it nullifies the use of prayers in which we ask God to bend our hearts and those of others as our salvation requires, since this cannot be done without an operation by which God determines human wills. For the same reason, it would be pointless to give thanks to God for goods procured through free agents. Nor would the riches that come to humans through free acts of commerce be from God. Finally, it would deny the particular providence of God, which Scripture often commends (De divina Providentia, cap. 25).

XLIII. In his Apologetic Exercises on divine grace, he asserts that God, in all acts of both nature and grace, determines the will through a truly real impulse in the manner of a physical cause. He adds that the main question is not whether this pre-determination should be called physical but whether God determines free acts in such a way that the will cannot be moved without being moved by it. He argues from Scripture that the necessity of the will is caused by God's motion, by which it is inevitably moved. If someone concedes this, he says he is ready to abandon the term "physical pre-determination," even though God determines the will in the manner of a physical cause (Exercit. 3, cap. 1).

XLIV. The English theologian distinguished God's concurrence from His pre-determination, although he considers both necessary for all actions of the creature. He acknowledges that concurrence is simultaneous in nature and time with the creature's operation but insists that a prior motion in the will itself is also necessary. "We admit," he says, "a simultaneous concurrence in nature and time with the act; but we say that this concurrence includes a prior motion in the will itself, not in time but in nature" (Vindiciae, lib. 2, part. 3). In the same book, he rejects the Jesuit's concept of indifferent and undetermined concurrence with these words: "I indeed consider that concurrence is as evidently wrongly established as the noonday sun shines."

XLV. From the reasons given by Amesius and Rutherford, it is clear that they primarily want to deny and abhor as a major error the idea that God's operation and efficacy concerning the creature is merely a concurrence that is indifferent and indefinite in itself. Certainly, not all who assert a general concurrence of God necessary for each act of creatures intend to affirm that it is indifferent in itself and variously determined by secondary causes. Besides this general concurrence of God, they acknowledge a great force and efficacy of divine providence in procuring, promoting, moderating, and directing various events, especially concerning human wills and the acts freely elicited by them, as Strangius diligently notes in many places.

XLVI. As for reconciling this pre-determining concurrence with the liberty of the will, according to Amesius, it must be said with Didacus Alvarez that the pre-determination of God does not prevent the will from acting freely, since it indeed ensures that the will acts certainly and infallibly, but it does not take away the power to act otherwise. Similarly, Twisse says that God moves the human wills to act in such a way that whatever is done is done in accordance with their free condition. Hence, at the very moment they act, they can choose not to act, namely in a divided sense. For in a composite sense, it is utterly impossible.

XLVII. According to Rutherford, liberty involves a twofold indifference: one objective, when the intellect proposes to the will something eligible as a means to the supreme good that is not absolutely necessary, and another internal, vital, elective, whereby the will can choose to will or not will, preserving both the essence of liberty and its natural mode of action. Neither indifference is prejudiced by God's pre-determination. Not the objective, because it does not prevent the intellect from proposing an eligible object to the will as suitable for achieving an end but not necessarily connected to it. Nor the internal, because even when God determines the will to choose this or that, He does not prevent it from having the natural power to choose otherwise. Finally, all these theologians agree that God's pre-motion and pre-determination indeed impose a certain necessity on the acts of the will, but only a hypothetical necessity, which does not conflict with liberty, as only necessity from external force or natural determination does.

XLVIII. There are also some Reformed theologians who appear to share the same view with Durandus and Ludovicus à Dola of the Roman School concerning God's general concurrence necessary for all acts of creatures. The distinguished Moses Amyraldus does not seem to acknowledge any other general concurrence of God, whereby He concurs with all secondary causes, except for the continuous efficacy by which He sustains and maintains

the nature of each thing and the powers given to it by nature. From this, he concludes that this concurrence has nothing to do with liberty. "For," he says, "let nature and its powers remain without the help of such concurrence; they will certainly operate freely. Therefore, let the concurrence come, which does nothing other than maintaining their natural state and preserving them from falling away. Liberty will suffer no detriment from this" (De libero Arbitrio, cap. 4, sub finem). These words sufficiently indicate that in this matter, the distinguished man shares the same opinion with Durandus, the old Scholastic.

XLIX. However, besides this general concurrence, he acknowledges the great efficacy of divine providence, whereby the acts of our will, whether good, evil, or indifferent, are determined in time according to His eternal decree. But he reduces all the efficacy of divine providence, which exerts itself in good, to two actions: the proposal of the object, which manifestly does not violate liberty, and the internal disposition of the subject, which consists in liberating the faculties from impediments that have been added to their natural constitution or even elevating them in some way above their natural state. In this, it is equally evident that nothing prejudices human liberty.

L. Similarly, concerning evil acts, he teaches that there is a twofold providence: one external and the other internal. The external, he says, is occupied with two things. Either, he says, it deals with the proposal of objects that are suitable to move the faculties, or it consists in God's action of allowing and permitting the devil to exert his power, so that the effectiveness of the objects is aided. The internal act of God, which intervenes in the evil deeds of humans, consists, according to him, in God either obscuring or completely removing from the mind one of the many objects inducing to evil that the man meditates upon or procuring that one object is presented in such a way that it is most apt and suitable to move. In all these, nothing can hinder human liberty.

LI. Finally, concerning indifferent acts, he similarly attributes God's efficacy to the proposal of objects, the administration of causes that can aid the objects, and the internal operation that makes one object prevail over another and presents itself to the mind in a way suitable to move it. Yet, through these operations, which everyone confesses do not harm liberty, he wishes all human acts to be effectively determined by God, and the eternal decrees of God concerning them to be certainly fulfilled. This is because the human faculties, namely the mind and will, are determined to certain actions by the objects presented to them, which are congruent and suitable to their affection and disposition. Hence arises a certain necessity in their operations, which agrees perfectly with liberty and suffices to ensure that whatever God has most certainly determined and ordained in His eternal counsel will also certainly and inevitably be carried out by humans.

LII. The learned and subtle theologian Joshua Placeus agrees with other theologians that the will in its actions depends on God as the first cause, as do all secondary causes in their actions. However, he modestly refrains from defining the extent and degree of that dependence, nor does he want to impose his judgment on the various questions about God's concurrence and cooperation with all secondary causes that are commonly debated in the schools. His words are: "The will depends on God as the first cause, upon whom all secondary causes depend in their actions. But the extent of this dependence of secondary causes on the first cause is hotly disputed among the Pontificians. It is agreed by all that

God concurs with every cause so that it operates according to its faculties. But most contend that this concurrence is immediate, proximate, and identical with the very action of secondary causes, while some disagree. The Dominicans and Jesuits fight vehemently over this immediate concurrence, the former for what they call physical pre-determination, the latter strongly against it. As for me, moved by reverence for the infinite majesty of God, I do not dare to define the extent of the dependence of the secondary cause on the first. It suffices for me, as long as it does not attribute any stain of our sins, however slight, to God, that it cannot be too great" (Tractatus de libero Arbitrio, p. 174).

LIII. He then reconciles this dependence of the will on the first cause with its liberty after a few intervening points. "However the will depends on God, and whatever God works in it, it always retains the liberty which we said consists in immunity from the threefold necessity of coercion, determination by matter, and determination by sense."

LIV. Pareus' view is not much different. He condemns the temerity of scholastic doctors who raise and determine various questions about God's concurrence. "Because," he says, "they have dared to investigate and define with reckless curiosity what cannot be known and explained sufficiently." He judges the opinion of Cajetan, who seems to find the concord of free will with divine providence inexplicable and unintelligible in this life, to be the safest because the judgments of God are inscrutable, and His ways unsearchable. In general, he wants this to be held as certain: the human will is governed by the nod of God and inclined where He wills. To reconcile this with our liberty, he says that something is not free if it is governed by another without its own deliberation and choice. But that which God governs by presenting an object to the intellect and effectively moving and influencing the will to choose this or that spontaneously is nonetheless freely chosen, even if inclined by the nod of God to where He wills. He compares it to a beginner learning to write letters freely, though his hand is guided by a tutor. He adds and often repeats that God indeed determines the human will by His concurrence but not by a physical, brute, or violent determination, but by a spontaneous one, joined with its own judgment and choice (Animadversionibus in Bellarmini librum quartum de libero Arbitrio, cap. 14).

LV. As for me, I greatly commend the modesty of these learned men. It seems to me reckless and overly bold to definitively determine the mode of divine concurrence by which the first cause cooperates with secondary causes when our limited understanding cannot penetrate and scrutinize the abyss of divine power and wisdom. Nor is this matter sufficiently grasped by reason or clearly revealed in Holy Scripture.

LVI. Above all, I cannot perceive how it can be stated that God physically pre-moves and pre-determines free causes to acts that are intrinsically evil without making God the author of sin. For who can grasp, for example, that God, by some prior influence on every movement of the human will, imposed a necessity on the first man to desire the forbidden fruit and to eat it, or that He daily pre-determines men to blaspheme and hate Him, yet the guilt inseparably connected with these acts is not to be attributed to God Himself?

LVII. But as long as God is not considered the author of sin, I agree with the very learned Placeus that the dependence of secondary causes on the first cause in their actions cannot

be stated to be too great. And it seems most probable to me, according to the common opinion of the schools, that God immediately concurs in all and each act of creatures.

LVIII. Above all, I am most certain of this, which I think all theologians would agree with: the power and efficacy of divine providence, even concerning evil acts, should not be restricted to a general and indifferent concurrence. Instead, God, in His infinite wisdom, procures, promotes, directs, and moderates various events, even those involving human wickedness, in many ways known to Him.

LIX. It is equally certain to me that, however God acts and operates in free causes, He always acts in accordance with their nature and does not prejudice their liberty in any way. Therefore, when He effectively moves human wills to this or that act, He does not take away their power to act otherwise.

On the Concord of Human Freedom with Divine Foreknowledge

I. Socinus and his followers, unable to understand how future contingencies, which do not have a necessary and determined cause, can be certainly foreknown, deny that such certain foreknowledge of these future events exists in God.

II. But it is surprising that people who attribute divine authority to Scripture could entertain this notion. Nothing is more evident from Scripture than that God knows all future events, as demonstrated by the prophecies recorded in Scripture. As Tertullian aptly put it, the foreknowledge of God has as many witnesses as there are prophets created by God. Prophets, inspired by God, could not have predicted events that occurred many centuries later and were freely performed by humans unless these events were known to the eternal God.

III. Moreover, it can be proven from countless examples in Scripture that God predicted many things to be freely done by humans centuries in advance. For instance, in Genesis chapter fifteen, God predicted that the Egyptians would afflict Abraham's descendants for four hundred years, and by doing so, they would grievously sin and provoke God's wrath. "Know for certain," God said to Abraham, "that your descendants will be strangers in a land not their own, and they will be enslaved and oppressed for four hundred years. But I will judge the nation they serve as slaves."

IV. Similarly, in Deuteronomy chapter thirty-one, God is recorded as saying to Moses, "Behold, you will rest with your fathers, and this people will rise and play the harlot with the gods of the foreigners of the land, where they go to be among them, and they will forsake me and break my covenant which I have made with them." These predictions were certain and infallible, as the events that followed clearly showed.

V. Likewise, the prophets, in many places, foretold the future unbelief of the Jews at the time of the Messiah and the subsequent rejection of this people because of their unbelief. This is especially noted in Isaiah chapter fifty-three. "Who has believed our report? And to whom has the arm of the Lord been revealed?" It is also foretold that their unbelief would be so great that they would despise their own King, the Messiah, and even wound Him, subjecting Him to the most bitter and shameful death and numbering Him among transgressors and sinners. Jesus Christ our Lord, while on earth, predicted all these crimes and atrocities in detail, adding that all these things must be fulfilled as written by the prophets concerning the Son of Man.

VI. A notable prediction by Christ is that of Judas, who would betray Him, long before Satan had entered Judas's heart. In fact, centuries before Christ's advent, God had predicted this betrayal through the prophets. Christ testifies that David's words in Psalm

forty-one, "He who eats my bread has lifted up his heel against me," refer to Judas (John 13). Peter also, reflecting on what is written in Psalm one hundred nine, says that the Scripture had to be fulfilled, which the Holy Spirit spoke by the mouth of David concerning Judas (Acts 1).

VII. Additionally, one could point to the prophecies of Daniel about the impiety, arrogance, lust, and cruelty of Antiochus Epiphanes against the Jews and the profanation of God's temple. Similarly, Paul speaks of the coming of that son of perdition who would sit in the temple of God, exalting himself above all that is called God, and leading many into error with false signs (2 Thessalonians 2). All these actions, though to be freely committed by humans, could not have been predicted clearly and distinctly by the Spirit of God in Scripture unless God had certain and distinct knowledge of all future events, no matter how contingent.

VIII. Indeed, if God does not know all future events, especially those to be freely done by creatures, He cannot be considered omniscient. He could not truly be said to know all things if some things escape His knowledge.

IX. Consequently, it would also follow that God is not free from all change. For if God knows things as they happen, then, before these events, He did not know them, and He learns something new when these events occur. This implies a change in God from not knowing to knowing, which cannot be conceived without some mutation in God. Hence, it would follow that God's knowledge is not perfect, for according to this hypothesis, it increases and grows daily with new knowledge.

X. The objections raised by Socinians against this clear truth have no real force. They argue that Scripture depicts God as being affected by grief and repentance due to human sins. For example, "The Lord saw how great the wickedness of the human race had become on the earth, and that every inclination of the thoughts of the human heart was only evil all the time. The Lord regretted that he had made human beings on the earth, and his heart was deeply troubled. So the Lord said, 'I will wipe from the face of the earth the human race I have created'" (Genesis 6). From this, they conclude that God did not know for certain the extent of human wickedness before it happened. Otherwise, it seems unreasonable to say that He was grieved and regretted making humans after seeing their wickedness. No one regrets their actions unless they gain some new knowledge or something unexpected and unforeseen happens.

XI. Indeed, it seems clear that God learns something new regarding human free actions from His own words to Abraham in Genesis chapter twenty-two. After Abraham showed his readiness to sacrifice his son at God's command, the Lord said, "Now I know that you fear God, because you have not withheld from me your son, your only son."

XII. Moreover, Scripture appears to teach that some events happen differently from what God expected, as it affirms that some things are done by humans contrary to what He hoped for. For example, God laments the disobedience and rebellion of the Jewish people, saying, "What more could I have done for my vineyard that I have not done for it? When I looked for good grapes, why did it yield only bad?" (Isaiah 5:4).

XIII. It must be stated, however, that Scripture often attributes human features and emotions to God in a figurative and metaphorical sense, not in a literal or proper sense. Consequently, many things said about God must be understood in a way that is befitting of Him. Therefore, when Scripture says that God was grieved or repented, it does not need to be taken literally, any more than when it is said elsewhere that God's heart was moved or smoke ascended into His nostrils. Indeed, when Scripture takes repentance in a proper sense, it expressly removes it from God. For instance, when Samuel says to Saul, "The Strength of Israel will not lie nor relent. For He is not a man, that He should relent" (1 Sam. 15:29). Thus, repentance in God signifies not an emotion but an effect. When Scripture says that God repented, it means that God did something that a man who repents of his deed would do; that is, He decided to destroy humans from the earth because of their wickedness, just as a man destroys his work of which he repents.

XIV. Similarly, God is said to be grieved because of human sins, not because He feels any emotion similar to our sorrow, but simply to signify that human sins are greatly displeasing and unacceptable to Him. These sins are such that they would cause sorrow to God if He were like us. Thus, in this case, sorrow is taken for what in a capable subject would generate sorrow.

XV. Likewise, in Isaiah, the Lord is said to have expected grapes from His vineyard, but it produced wild grapes—not because God was uncertain or doubtful about what the people of Judah, represented by the vineyard, would do after so many means were applied to lead them to true piety, but because He had done what ought to have led them to righteousness. If one human had done this for another, he could legitimately expect and hope that their heart would be softened and turned towards love and willing obedience.

XVI. When God says to Abraham, "Now I know that you fear God, because you have not withheld your only son from Me" (Gen. 22:12), He does not mean that He was previously uncertain about Abraham's piety or that Abraham was not sufficiently known to Him. Rather, it signifies that Abraham, by being ready to sacrifice his own son at God's command, gave a certain and undeniable proof of his love and fear of God—evidence that could convince anyone who had previously doubted or been unsure.

XVII. Nor does the argument taken from Numbers 14 have greater weight. There, God is said to have sworn to bring His people into the land of Canaan, yet, because of their sin and unbelief, He later swore that He would no longer do so: "As surely as I live," says the Lord, "I will do to you the very things I heard you say. In this wilderness, your bodies will fall—every one of you twenty years old or more who was counted in the census and who has grumbled against Me. Not one of you will enter the land I swore with uplifted hand to make your home, except Caleb son of Jephunneh and Joshua son of Nun" (Num. 14:28-30). For who among humans would be so foolish as to swear seriously to do something that they already knew they would not do? Or what could be more unworthy of God than to swear to do something only with words, not with intention?

XVIII. But it is true that God often swore to give the land of Canaan to the descendants of Abraham, and the words we cited above refer to those numerous oaths. However, this oath specifically concerned those Israelites who were rebellious in the desert, as proven by

the words, "Not one of you will enter the land I swore with uplifted hand to make your home" (Num. 14:30). Here, the word "you" indefinitely designates the Israelite nation, not specifically the individuals constituting it at that time. Nor would it be absurd to say that God had specifically promised entry into the land of Canaan under oath to those individuals, not unconditionally but on the condition that they would fulfill their duty, even though He foresaw that they would not fulfill it. And it would not be foolish for a man to swear to someone that he would do this or that, provided he remains within the bounds of a good man's duty, even if he is certain that the other person will not fulfill their duty.

XIX. But those who today argue that there is no certain foreknowledge of future contingencies in God are primarily motivated by the belief that if God certainly foresees what humans will freely do, and indeed from eternity, then humans cannot be seriously admonished, encouraged, and entreated to repent and convert. For why should someone be diligently urged and compelled to do what you already know for certain they will do? Or what is the use of soliciting and entreating someone whom you know for certain will not do what you ask?

XX. However, far from hindering God's serious admonitions, exhortations, and entreaties, the foreknowledge of human obstinacy or obedience necessitates that God seriously intends to act with humans in this manner. For divine admonitions, exhortations, and entreaties are means by which human obedience is procured, and they presuppose certain conditions without which humans cannot be said to be rebellious and contumacious against God.

XXI. Furthermore, it does not discredit divine wisdom for God to admonish, exhort, and invite to repentance those whom He knows will not heed His commands and invitations. Even the opponents admit that some, through divine judgment for their obstinate malice, are so blinded and hardened that they cannot repent. Yet they cannot deny that God uses admonitions and entreaties with these individuals, as He does with others, as shown by the example of Pharaoh. Therefore, if divine admonitions, threats, and entreaties can apply to these individuals without violating God's justice or diminishing His wisdom, why should the same not apply to others whom God, from eternity, knows will not obey from their own free will and purpose?

XXII. Therefore, any arguments derived from Scripture against the eternal foreknowledge of God, by which He certainly and distinctly knows all future events to be freely done by creatures, are futile. It follows now to see how the liberty of creatures in acting can coexist with this eternal foreknowledge of God. This matter is not without difficulty and has long exercised the minds of scholars. Since it is impossible for divine foreknowledge to be mistaken, it is impossible for events foreseen by God not to happen. Therefore, everything happens necessarily, and it is impossible for human will not to produce and elicit the acts foreknown by God from eternity, which seems to utterly destroy human freedom in action. For how can that be called free which cannot fail to happen or be otherwise?

XXIII. Many theologians of Christian schools respond to this, rightly in my judgment, that divine foreknowledge imposes no necessity on things, for it is not the cause of things,

but rather the things themselves can be said to be the cause of divine foreknowledge in a certain manner. In other words, things are not future because God foresees them as future; rather, God foresees them as future because they truly will be.

XXIV. Regarding the objection that it is impossible for things foreseen by God from eternity not to happen, and therefore everything happens necessarily since God foresees all future events, it must be said, according to the common opinion of the schools, that it is indeed impossible for foreseen events not to happen, but only in a composite sense, not in a divided sense. These terms imply that it is not possible for something to be foreseen by God as future and yet not happen simultaneously. Nonetheless, simply and absolutely speaking, the thing foreseen can fail to happen if considered in its nature and without reference to God's foreknowledge. For example, Judas, whom God foreknew would betray Christ, could have chosen not to betray Christ if he had so willed. God's foreknowledge did not impose necessity on him to betray Christ. Nor does it follow that divine foreknowledge could be mistaken because if Judas had not betrayed Christ, the betrayal would not have been foreseen; instead, God would have foreseen that Judas did not betray Christ.

XXV. Therefore, it is indeed necessary for all those things that God foresees to happen, once that foreknowledge is assumed, just as it is necessary for all those things that we ourselves see happening, once our vision is assumed. But just as our vision does not change the nature of things nor make it necessary in itself what is by its nature free or contingent—though from the hypothesis that we see something happening, it cannot but be happening—so the foreknowledge of God changes nothing in future events nor takes away their freedom or contingency, though what is foreseen by God as future, and thus assumed to be future, cannot but be future. For just as from the hypothesis that something is actually happening, it is impossible for it not to be happening, in the same way, from the hypothesis that something is future, it cannot but be future.

XXVI. In a word, just as from the vision of present things a certain necessity is induced, but only hypothetical, and what is called in the schools consequent necessity, which is fully consistent with their freedom or contingency, so from the foreknowledge of future things it follows that they will necessarily occur, but with a necessity only from the hypothesis and what is usually called infallibility, which does not prevent them from being in themselves absolutely free and contingent. For if there is a necessity that removes contingency and freedom, it is only that which is called antecedent and absolute, not merely consequent or consequential.

XXVII. Others, however, attempt to reconcile divine foreknowledge with human freedom in a different way. They believe this proposition is false: "Things are known by God because they are future"; and this one is true: "Things are future because God foresees them." For according to them, God's knowledge is the cause of things. Yet they do not believe this prejudices human freedom, because God from eternity not only foresees that humans will do this or that but also foresees the manner in which they will act, namely, freely and contingently. Therefore, given God's foreknowledge, it indeed follows necessarily, for instance, that Peter will speak, and this divine knowledge is in some way the cause that Peter will speak; but that he will speak not just in any way, but contingently and freely.

Hence, they say, from God's foreknowledge the actual exercise of human freedom is rather inferred than destroyed. For such foreknowledge does not take away from Peter's will, speaking freely, the power by which he can choose not to speak if he wishes; rather, it presupposes such power in him. This is the doctrine of those who are called the modern Thomists, as can be seen in Diego Alvarez's Summa of the Work of Divine Grace book 1, chapter 11.

XXVIII. Some Reformed theologians, more simply and somewhat confusingly, respond to this difficulty by saying that divine foreknowledge does indeed introduce some necessity to all future things, but not all necessity conflicts with freedom, but only that which is from coercion or physical determination.

XXIX. Thus Christian theologians, in various ways, try to show how human freedom can stand alongside the foreknowledge of all future events by God. But there is no less difficulty in explaining how, given the freedom by which creatures can act or not act, their future actions can be foreseen by God certainly and infallibly. For how can something be known for certain that in itself and in its causes has no certain existence but can equally not be as well as be?

XXX. To extricate themselves from this difficulty, Scholastic doctors work hard and try in various ways to explain how God foreknows future contingent and free events. Firstly, those who are now called the modern Thomists lay two foundations for that certainty by which God foreknows all future contingencies from eternity. One is that all future things are present to God in eternity, not only in objective existence, or in known existence, but also in real existence and according to their proper existences. For they say, God stands in relation to future contingencies as one on a high watchtower, from which he sees the entire road concerning those passing along it; for even though one goes after another and the later does not see the former, he who is on the watchtower sees all at once and has them present before him. So likewise, God has present to Himself in the watchtower of eternity all things past and future, though these follow those. These are the words of Diego Alvarez in book 1, chapter 8, where he further proves this presence of future things in eternity from the fact that eternity is an indivisible duration, wholly existing at once; hence, whatever coexists at any time with eternity, coexists with it wholly and consequently is wholly present to it.

XXXI. At the beginning of the next chapter, he concludes from this that the actual existence of things in eternity, considered from the perspective of divine eternity, is the proper reason why God certainly knows all future things, even contingent ones. And this is because, though they are contingent in themselves, as they are present to the knower, they are considered as determined and determinately true in relation to that measure in which they are present and in relation to the knowledge by which they are known as present.

XXXII. The other foundation they think supports the certainty of divine knowledge concerning future contingent things is the absolute decree of the divine will. For, as Alvarez says in the same place, the certainty of divine knowledge can also be derived from another principle, namely, the comparison of future contingencies with the absolute and effective decree of the divine will, predetermining all future things, even free ones, with all their

circumstances, if they are good, or permitting them if they are evil. And to explain more clearly what that effective decree of the divine will permitting evils is, he observes in the following passages that two decrees are presupposed on the part of God for infallible foreknowledge of sins. One is the absolute decree of producing the act of sin as far as it is an act and a being; the other is the decree of not giving the effective help to avoid sin or the decree of permitting its malice, which is attributed only to the created and defective will. And in these two decrees, he asserts that all future sins are certainly known, for when God does not support and does not help the sinner to avoid falling, it is infallibly certain that he will sin.

XXXIII. However, there are other doctors in the Roman school who reject as vain and fictional the presence of future things in eternity according to their proper existences and affirm that all future contingencies, whether they result from free secondary causes or from other natural causes, are certainly and infallibly known in the sole divine decree by which He has determined them to happen. This opinion is often attributed to many ancient scholastics, such as Scotus, Richard, Hervaeus, John Major, and many others. Many theologians among the Reformed also embrace this opinion, teaching with Calvin that God foresees future things in no other way than because He has decreed that they will happen. Especially William Twisse, a celebrated English theologian, explains, defends, and illustrates this doctrine of Calvin in detail, almost throughout his dissertation on middle knowledge against Penot and Suarez.

XXXIV. But neither of these views is approved by most of the more recent theologians of the Roman School. For not only do they reject the supposed real presence of future events in eternity, according to their own real existence, but they also do not acknowledge any effective decree of God by which the acts of free causes are predetermined, antecedent to their own determination. Therefore, to provide some account of divine foreknowledge concerning future contingents, they resort to another explanation. First, some believe that things which will happen contingently and freely are known by God in their proximate cause, that is, in the will, not taken in a bare sense, but as it is applied here and now, with this judgment, this object, this inclination, and finally with all other things that can either hinder or determine it to will.

XXXV. Bellarmine leans toward this view. "It seems probable to us," he says, "that God sees future free actions only in the human will." And shortly afterward, he adds, "God, therefore, who perfectly knows all the inclinations and the whole nature of our soul, and again does not ignore everything that may occur in each deliberation, and finally has a clear view of what is more suitable and appropriate to move such a soul, endowed with such inclination and nature, infallibly concludes in which direction the soul will be inclined." He adds that in the contingent cause itself, precisely considered, there is no determination; but if one combines with the contingent or free cause all that can occur and hinder, and sees the inclinations and aptitudes both of the cause itself and of all objects and circumstances, which only God can do, then some determination arises, and for that reason, it will be true to say, "this will happen at such a time." On Grace and Free Will, book 4, chapter 15, response to the sixth argument.

XXXVI. Others simply say that God certainly knows future contingents because whatever will be at any time, whether contingently or necessarily, before it happens, it was true that it would happen: but whatever is true is certainly known by the divine intellect, for no truth can be hidden from the infinite intellect, which is divine. Therefore, according to them, the certainty of divine foreknowledge must be sought from two sources: first, from the infinite power and perspicacity of the divine intellect; second, from the determined truth of future contingents. These are the words of Becanus, a Jesuit, in his Summa Theologiae, volume 1, treatise 1, chapter 10, question 11, first conclusion.

XXXVII. But each of these opinions seems to suffer from significant difficulty. Firstly, concerning that real presence of future events in eternity, insofar as they are thought to coexist with eternity itself from eternity according to their real existence, it seems to be a mere invention. For, in order for one thing to coexist with another, both must exist. What does not exist cannot coexist. Therefore, since contingent things have not existed from eternity, they could not coexist with eternity from eternity. Nor does the presumed indivisibility of eternity help here. For to that which admits no division or succession in itself, things that happen in time can coexist successively. Just as a pole fixed and immobile in water is not always surrounded by the same water, but perpetually by new and different water. Nor is it necessary that what once exists in God's eternity should always coexist with it, any more than it is necessary that what coexists with His immensity in one place should coexist with Him everywhere.

XXXVIII. Furthermore, since among those things that God foresees will happen, there are many sins and moral evils, it is extremely difficult to understand how God could foreknow future events of any kind in an absolute decree of His will. For indeed, God can effect and determine good things without any prejudice to His goodness and wisdom; but it is contrary to divine goodness to move and predetermine the wills of creatures to things that are evil in themselves. For who can say that God absolutely and effectively determined, by some decree, the will of the angels who fell, to exalt themselves against God in pride, or the will of the first parents to desire the forbidden fruit, without thereby making God the author of sin? Or who can believe that the wills of men were singularly determined by an eternal decree of God, antecedent to any foreseen determination of the created will, to acts of blasphemy and hatred against God, without making God the cause of these sins?

XXXIX. Nor do I understand how the future acts of a free cause can be certainly foreknown in it, considered in those circumstances in which it is proximally disposed to act, unless we assume that a certain necessity of acting is imposed on it by the proposal of the object in such circumstances, which also carries significant difficulty. For it follows that Adam, as he was affected and disposed before the fall, had a necessity of sinning imposed on him by the temptation presented to him and the circumstances accompanying it; which can hardly be admitted without seeming to excuse him from guilt.

XL. As for the fourth opinion, which seeks the certainty of divine foreknowledge in the infinity of the divine intellect and in the determined truth of future contingents, it states nothing that is not certain and indubitable. For since it is evident that divine predictions of future contingents exist in the Scriptures, it is manifest that true propositions about them can be formed: for God affirms nothing but what is true. And every true proposition

must have truth in reality corresponding to it. And thus, since it can be determinately and truly said that these or those things will happen freely and contingently, it follows that their truth is determined. Nor is it less evident that, given the truth of future contingents, it is perceived and known by the divine intellect, which is infinite. For since truth is the object of the intellect, the infinite intellect extends to all truth; otherwise, it would not be infinite but would have limits and an end, for it could not grasp some truth.

XLI. But though this opinion contains nothing but truth, it does not fully address the question, nor does it remove the chief difficulty. For what is most difficult to understand here is how contingent things, which can either happen or not happen, derive their future status from mere possibilities and pass into the nature of future things from eternity, so as to be perceived by God under that aspect. For nothing existed outside God from eternity to which this change could be attributed, except by referring it to the divine will's decree.

XLII. Furthermore, it is difficult to understand how something supposed to depend on a cause that is in itself indeterminate, and which can equally produce or not produce it, can be certainly known by the divine intellect, since in itself and in its cause it has no certain existence. For the divine intellect, no matter how infinite, cannot see what does not exist, nor change the nature of its object. Nor would its perception and apprehension be true if, as some say, it knew more in the cause than actually happens in the thing itself. Becanus, volume 1, treatise 1, chapter 10, question 7.

XLIII. Therefore, since darkness surrounds us on all sides when we scrutinize this matter, and we encounter obstacles and entanglements from which we cannot extricate ourselves sufficiently, I consider it safer and more honest to openly profess our ignorance here and seriously employ David's words: "Such knowledge is too wonderful for me, too lofty for me to attain." Although I do not wish to measure others' minds by my own limitations and do not condemn modest inquiry into this matter, I am easily led to believe that this mystery belongs to those of which the wise man speaks: "Do not seek what is too difficult for you, and do not investigate what is beyond your power." Nor should it seem surprising if our mind, defined by such narrow limits, cannot perceive how the divine intellect, which has no boundaries, knows and comprehends things far beyond our understanding.

XLIV. Nor does this in any way affect the certainty we should have both about God's foreknowledge and human freedom, both of which have a firm and unshakeable foundation in Scripture, supported by the light of reason and, concerning human freedom, by our own experience. For there are many things, not only in divine matters but even in nature, indeed within ourselves, whose existence we cannot doubt, yet the manner and reason for which our mind cannot investigate and scrutinize without ensnaring itself in difficulties from which it cannot free itself. What is clearer than light and vision? But what is more difficult than to penetrate and explain what the nature of light is and how vision occurs? What is more evident than that the body's members are moved in countless ways by the mere will? Yet how hard it is to grasp and explain how this happens! Or what is more confirmed by daily experience than that pregnant women, by the mere power of imagination, produce many wonders in their offspring, yet what have philosophers proposed on this matter that satisfies a prudent person in the least? Therefore, if in human affairs the thing itself is certain, although the manner of the thing is uncertain or entirely

unknown to us, how much more should this apply in divine matters, which are far removed from the senses and vastly exceed our mental grasp?

On the Concord of Human Freedom with Divine Decrees

Part I

Concerning the Knowledge Attributed to God of Contingent Future Events Not Absolutely, but Conditionally, Which Is Called in the Schools Middle Knowledge, or Conditional Knowledge.

I. Among the ideas developed in the Schools to reconcile human freedom with the certainty and immutability of divine decrees concerning human actions, the concept of conditional knowledge has become particularly prominent. This notion was initially proposed by the Jesuits Luis de Molina and Francisco Suárez, and later adopted by many others, both within the Roman School and among Protestants. Therefore, intending to discuss the concord of human freedom with divine decrees and to present various scholarly opinions on the matter, we have decided, with God's help, to begin with this concept of conditional knowledge.

II. Thus, the majority of Roman School scholars hold the view that God not only foreknows what will happen freely and contingently but also those things that, although they will never happen, would occur freely if certain conditions were met. For example, God not only knows what each individual will do until the end of their life, given the various circumstances determined by His providence, but also what each would do if the state of affairs were entirely different and different opportunities for action were presented.

III. Moreover, since the foreknowledge of things that are absolutely future necessarily follows from a decree of the divine will, which has decided to create these agents and place them in this or that state of affairs and to cooperate with them as necessary for action, they claim that this knowledge of things that are not simply future but would be future under certain conditions precedes every free decree of the divine will. Namely, according to our way of understanding, God, before considering any decree about any matter, certainly and distinctly knows what any possible creature would freely do if He chose to create it and not withhold His cooperation and to present it with certain objects under those circumstances.

IV. Although this knowledge precedes any free decree in God, it is clear from what has been said that the condition under which the thing is said to be future includes a decree—not one that is actually conceived in God, but one that would necessarily have to be made by God for the thing to be possible. Therefore, that conditional futurity, which is the object of this knowledge, does not depend on a decree already made by God, but on one that is supposed to be made by God for the thing to be truly future. In other words, according to our way of understanding, God is conceived as thinking thus: If I were to decide to create this angel or human and not withhold my cooperation in this state of affairs, this would happen and not otherwise, although it could act otherwise.

V. Gabriel Vázquez observes this in the first part of Thomas's work: "Nevertheless," he says, "we must say that God knows future events under a condition, in such a way that the condition also includes God's decree to cooperate with free will, thus: God knows well that if I were to give Peter this or that vocation in this situation and cooperate with it as required and not miraculously withhold my cooperation, such a work would be done; however, I could withhold it if I wished: but whether God would withhold or grant cooperation in this case, He has not yet decreed." (Tom. 1. disp. 67. cap. 4.)

VI. Francisco Suárez writes similarly: "Moreover," he says, "the whole effect simply depends on the will of God, whether it be done or not, and consequently, even in those conditionals, the antecedent must include the divine will, namely, if He wills such an effect, or at least wills to permit and cooperate with it; and in this way, even that knowledge has a relation to the divine will under the supposed condition." (Book 2 on the knowledge that God has of future contingents proposed conditionally, chapter 6.)

VII. Furthermore, they do not think it necessary that, to act in time, free causes must be pre-moved and pre-determined by God to this or that act, nor do they think that the divine decree on which the absolute or conditional futurity of free acts depends is a decree to pre-move and pre-determine free causes. Without such a decree, either simply posited or at least supposed, they believe that God certainly foreknows whatever free agents will do, either absolutely or conditionally. To this end, it suffices to assume or suppose a decree in God to provide cooperation, which they consider necessary for action and which is, in their view, always available to free agents, neither applying nor pre-determining them to act.

VIII. They call this knowledge "middle knowledge" because it holds a middle ground between the knowledge called in the Schools "knowledge of vision" and that called "simple intelligence." By the knowledge of vision, they mean the knowledge by which God knows things that exist outside Himself at different times, namely past, present, or future things. All of these God knows from eternity as clearly, certainly, and distinctly as if they were present to Him in actuality, just as we see things directly in front of us. Therefore, it is called the knowledge of vision, in analogy to bodily vision, by which we see objects presented to our eyes. This knowledge is also called "free knowledge" because it follows from the free decree of the divine will to create and preserve things, without which nothing could exist or be seen as present or foreseen as future. Hence, if God had decreed to create nothing, such knowledge could not be attributed to Him.

IX. By simple intelligence, they mean the knowledge by which God knows and understands all possible things and all their essences and connections, whether necessary or possible in any way. This knowledge is called "natural," not free, because, according to our way of conceiving, it precedes every decree of God regarding the creation of things and could not fail to be in God even if He had decreed to create nothing outside Himself.

X. The knowledge they attribute to God of future contingents under some condition is called "middle" by them because it does not entirely coincide with the knowledge of vision, nor with the knowledge of simple intelligence but partakes of both. It is not about merely possible things and abstracted from all consideration of existence, as is the knowledge of simple intelligence, nor is it about things absolutely future at some different time due to

God's decree, as is the knowledge of vision. Instead, it partly resembles free knowledge because it is about things that would freely be future if the condition were met, and it is within God's freedom to establish that condition; it partly resembles natural knowledge because it precedes every decree of God and God could not lack it even if He had not decreed to create the world or anything.

XI. Nevertheless, some do not call this knowledge of future contingents conditional simply "middle," but conditional simply, because they believe it can be easily referred either to the knowledge of vision, according to some, or, according to many others, to the knowledge of simple intelligence. Among these are Vázquez and Gregory of Valencia. Vázquez observes, however, that it does no harm if, for the sake of doctrine and clarity, a third member is constituted between the two kinds of divine knowledge. This disagreement is one of words, not things, and it does not matter much if people speak differently in this matter. (Tom. 1. disp. 67. sub finem.)

XII. Furthermore, they believe that such knowledge in God, by which He certainly foreknows future contingents under certain conditions, can be proved by scriptural testimony and arguments based on reason. First, they cite various examples from Scripture of predictions concerning events that did not actually occur but would have happened given certain conditions. For example, in 1 Samuel 23:11-12, when David asked the Lord if Saul would come to capture him if he stayed in the city of Keilah, and if the inhabitants of Keilah would hand him over to Saul if Saul did come, the answer was that Saul would come and the inhabitants of Keilah would hand him over, provided he stayed in the city. Therefore, God certainly foreknew both outcomes, which depended on the free will of Saul and the inhabitants of Keilah, under the condition that did not materialize because David fled, and thus neither event actually occurred.

XIII. A similar example is when God forbade the Israelites from marrying the daughters or sons of people who were outside the covenant of God, giving the reason that otherwise, these external nations would seduce and incline the hearts of the Israelites toward their gods. "You shall not intermarry with them, giving your daughters to their sons or taking their daughters for your sons, for they would turn away your sons from following me to serve other gods" (1 Kings 11:2). Hence, it is evident that God certainly foreknew that the hearts of the Israelites would be seduced if they engaged in such illegitimate marriages. This was fulfilled in Solomon due to the condition being met, but not in most other Israelites because that antecedent condition did not occur in them.

XIV. From the New Testament, they strongly emphasize Christ's words in Matthew 11:21: "Woe to you, Chorazin! Woe to you, Bethsaida! For if the mighty works done in you had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented long ago in sackcloth and ashes." Here, Christ affirms that the Tyrians and Sidonians would have repented if God had applied the same means to them as He did to the Jews. Thus, God knew from eternity that their repentance would have occurred under that condition. They also emphasize that the Lord, in a certain rapture of Paul, commanded him to leave Jerusalem quickly because they would not accept his testimony about Him. God foresaw that if Paul preached Christ to the Jews, they would not believe his testimony (Acts 22:18).

XV. Additionally, they think that many arguments based on reason can prove that such knowledge exists in God. First, because propositions about future contingents under certain conditions are either true or false, just like propositions about things that are absolutely future, they are also the object of divine knowledge, since no truth can be hidden from an infinite intellect, such as the divine. That propositions about future contingents under certain conditions are determinately true or false is evident because a contradiction can be true between them, just as between propositions about absolutely future things. For example, these statements are completely contradictory: "If Peter is placed in such circumstances, he will sin" and "If Peter is placed in such circumstances, he will not sin." In all contradictions, one part must be true, and the other false.

XVI. Furthermore, if it is true that Peter, placed in such circumstances, will sin, then it was true not only before he was placed in those circumstances but also before he was decreed by God to be placed in them, that if he were placed in them, he would sin. Therefore, God knew before His decree that this would be future under such a condition. And it is logically prior that something is conditionally future before it is absolutely future.

XVII. Moreover, a wise person, before deciding anything, should have in mind what will follow from the things they decide to do. Since God has decreed everything most wisely, He must have known, logically prior to decreeing to create this or that being and presenting them with certain objects, and cooperating with them in this or that way, what would follow from all these things and what the creature would freely do or omit under those conditions, which is the knowledge we are discussing.

XVIII. Additionally, unless we attribute such knowledge to God, infinite questions could be posed to Him, similar to those David proposed, to which God could not respond with certainty and clarity unless it was a matter that could not be known, which seems to detract from divine omniscience. For example, one might ask what someone who died peacefully in Christ would have done if they had been offered martyrdom. Or if a certain man had sought to marry a particular woman who married another, would he have gained her consent? Or if a certain person were chosen as king of Poland, how would he have conducted himself in that kingdom? And countless other such questions. Since wise and experienced men can conjecture about such things, it is not plausible that God simply does not know them. It seems unworthy of God not to know with certainty what humans can infer with probable conjecture. If someone says that God knows such things and can respond distinctly and clearly about them but that such knowledge presupposes a free decree about the future of these things in such cases, it would follow that there are infinite decrees in God about things that will never actually occur, which seems very absurd.

XIX. However, many Doctors of the Roman School, especially those called the more recent Thomists, deny the existence of any middle knowledge in God, besides the natural knowledge, called the knowledge of simple intelligence, and the free knowledge, called the knowledge of vision. They argue that God does not have any middle knowledge through which, before any act of His will, He would know those things that are neither simply possible nor absolutely future but would be future under this or that condition and would be freely done by intelligent creatures if this or that circumstance were given.

XX. They believe that nothing is in any way future, whether absolutely or conditionally, except by virtue of some decree that actually precedes in God and by which God has determined to effect or at least permit what is said to be future. Therefore, before the decree of the divine will predetermining the will to one part of a contradiction or contrariety, it is not knowable what a man will do in particular or what he would do if placed in such circumstances, but only what he could do. This is because, before such a decree, the thing is neither future nor not future but merely possible and indifferent to being future or not future.

XXI. Thus, they do not deny that some things are contingently and freely future under certain conditions and that these are certainly known and predicted by God, as when God predicted to David that Saul would come to seize him if he stayed in the city of Keilah, and that the inhabitants would hand him over to Saul if Saul came to the city. However, they maintain that this certain foreknowledge of God follows from a free decree in God, by which He has determined that these things will happen if this or that condition is fulfilled. For example, God foreknew that Saul would come and the inhabitants would hand David over because, given that condition, God had decreed to permit both and to predetermine the will of Saul and the inhabitants of Keilah to the substance of those acts. This is explained in detail by Didacus Alvarez in his work on the aids of divine grace, Book 1, Chapter 6, titled "That besides natural knowledge, which is called the knowledge of simple intelligence, and free knowledge, which is called the knowledge of vision, there is no middle knowledge, even in God." In the following chapter, he also dissolves the objections of different doctrines of the Doctors.

XXII. Concerning the Protestants, their opinions on this matter are also varied. First, those called the Remonstrants in Belgium seem to unanimously accept and acknowledge that middle knowledge as described thus far, believing that God foresees not only what is absolutely future but also whatever would be freely future, in any order of things God may choose to place free agents.

XXIII. Initially, Simon Episcopius refers to the traditional distinction of three kinds of knowledge in God, dating back to Molina's time, as convenient: "It should be noted," he says, "that three kinds of knowledge are usually attributed to God. One, which is necessary and practical, and is called simple intelligence, which by its nature precedes every act of free will, by which God knows Himself and all possible things. The second is free knowledge, called vision, which follows the act of free will, by which God knows everything He has decreed to do or permit in the same order as He decreed to do or permit it to happen. The third is middle knowledge, by which God knows what men or angels would freely do under certain conditions, if placed in this or that state or order. We will not examine whether this distinction of divine knowledge is correctly made, but we do not doubt that it can be done conveniently and for the sake of clarity." (Institutiones Theologicae, Book 4, Chapter 19, On the order and mode of divine knowledge.)

XXIV. Nicolaus Grevinchovius extensively disputes this knowledge in his response to the Dissertation on General Redemption and Election from Foreseen Faith, on pages 393 and following. William Ames examines this response in his book titled "Scholastic and Brief Reply to Nicolaus Grevinchovius's Response." Similarly, Curcellaeus sufficiently

demonstrates his approval of this middle or conditional knowledge, which is attributed to God in the schools, when he praises Gomarus for acknowledging such knowledge in his later theses on the Eternal Decree of God and Predestination, having been taught by Arminius; in his opinion, this greatly removes the immense obstacle that would make God the author of the first sin of man and, consequently, of all other sins flowing from it. This is noted in the preface to the book titled "Examination of the Theses of Franciscus Gomarus on Predestination" by Jacobus Arminius.

XXV. Among the Reformed who subscribed to the Synod of Dordrecht, some acknowledge this conditional knowledge in God, by which He knows, before any decree of His will, what any free cause would do in any given order of things, according to its inherent liberty. Among these, Franciscus Gomarus, previously cited by Curcellaeus, should be noted. Writing on Matthew 11:21, after observing that the repentance of the Tyrians would have been the same kind as that of the Ninevites, which is common to both the elect and the reprobate, believers and unbelievers, he adds these words: "That Christ asserts the future repentance of the Tyrians under the condition of witnessing His miracles, rests on the indefinite foreknowledge of His divine nature, by which He knows what would have followed any given antecedent, even if neither occurred. For given the condition, it is well known that either they would have repented, or they would not have repented, according to the principle that two opposites cannot both be true at the same time. But which of these would have been, since the matter was contingent, only He foresaw who sees all things with His infinite knowledge, and not only predicts necessary things but also future contingents with certainty." A similar passage is found in Ezekiel 3:6-7, as Baldwin Walaeus notes in his commentary on the historical books of the New Testament regarding the cited passage from Matthew.

XXVI. Robert Baronius also explicitly supports the view of Fonseca, who posits a certain conditional knowledge in God, preceding His free decree, which precedes the absolute foreknowledge of future events. For example, God first knew only conditionally what would happen if Eve, seduced by the serpent, tempted Adam; but after He decreed to permit Adam to yield to his wife's persuasion, He then absolutely foreknew Adam would fall.

XXVII. And so he explains his and Fonseca's view on the matter. Just as those who wisely undertake a great work first consider what will result from it before they absolutely and determinately decide to do it, so, understanding God in our manner, He, before He determined by His absolute and determinate will to create the world, considered what would happen if He arranged heaven and earth and everything in them in the order and manner He eventually did; and by a certain hypothetical knowledge, He knew what would happen if everything were arranged in that way and order. Furthermore, God not only knew what would happen if natural causes were arranged in that order and manner, but also what would happen if free causes had the opportunities to act or not act as they have now or had previously. For God, whose judgments are incomprehensible, certainly knew what would happen if such and such occasions were presented to humans or angels; for example, God knew by this conditional knowledge what would happen if Adam's wife, seduced by the serpent, persuaded Adam to eat the fruit. This is discussed in his "General

Metaphysics for Theological Use," section 12, dispute 2, numbers 55 and 56, and in many other places in the same dispute.

XXVIII. Especially noteworthy is Antonius Walaeus, a professor at the University of Leiden, who acknowledges in God the middle knowledge, by which future events are known hypothetically, even if they are not absolutely future or have not yet occurred. He believes, for example, that God foreknew Adam would abuse his freedom if God created him with such freedom, endowed him with such gifts, and allowed him to be tempted. He also holds that this is the case for other events dependent on the free will of angels or humans. He supports this view with scriptural passages cited above and many others, such as Matthew 24: "Unless those days had been shortened, no flesh would be saved; but for the sake of the elect those days will be shortened," and "if possible, even the elect would be deceived," meaning that without special grace, they would not be preserved. From these and similar passages, he says it is clear that such knowledge exists in God before any of His decrees about what will certainly occur. (Commonplaces, on the knowledge of God, p. 160, quarto edition).

XXIX. However, he also notes that it is not necessary to establish this hypothetical knowledge as a third kind of knowledge because it belongs to the knowledge of simple intelligence. He says: "It is absolutely necessary that God has foreseen from eternity all possible modes of secondary causes, whether acting alone or with others, and therefore what would certainly happen or not happen if He produced those causes, preserved them, and cooperated with them in this or that way, or disposed or allowed them to be disposed of in this or that way. No Christian will deny this."

XXX. But he warns that this knowledge should not be abused to consider the decree of election based on the good use of human free will, as those do who claim that before choosing a person, God foresaw how they would respond to this or that prevenient and concurrent grace offered in this or that order of things or state, so that free will determines the grace of God, not the other way around. Nor should it be used to deny all effective divine operation in converting human will beyond moral instruction, because, as he hopes to demonstrate later, God acts not only morally but also physically in the human will when He converts it.

XXXI. Paul Ferris, a celebrated minister of the Word of God in Metz, also admits this conditional knowledge in God, which precedes His free decree. He writes: "God foresaw by His so-called conditional knowledge what a person would do in any given situation; therefore, if He created him with free will and allowed him to be tempted, and left him to himself, given his own innate liberty and the weakness of his nature, he would fall, and everyone would perish unless He chose to save some to demonstrate His justice in them and His grace in others." Later, explaining the divine providence regarding human fall, he states: "First, God foresaw that man would fall if created with free will and allowed to be tempted. Then, because He saw it was expedient, He willed it to be so, not forcing man, but creating him that way, allowing the temptation, and permitting him to be left to himself." He adds a little later: "God decreed nothing concerning man's fall without first foreseeing, given man's liberty and temptation, that he would infallibly fall." (In "Vindiciae pro Scholastica Orthodo", pp. 203, 209, and 210).

XXXII. However, many other Reformed theologians reject this middle and conditional knowledge in God as vain and superfluous, though not all for the same reasons or on the same grounds. First, some concede that all propositions that affirm or deny something contingent under any condition are determinately true or false and therefore can also be known by God; there is no doubt that God certainly knows and apprehends all truth. Consequently, they affirm that there is no question about future contingent and conditional events, imaginable by human or angelic intellect, to which God cannot respond clearly, given this or that condition, that the matter would be so. Nevertheless, they deny that it follows from this that there is any conditional knowledge in God that precedes His free decree. They argue that God indeed knows these things, but from His free will's decree, which not only predestined the modes and connections of things future in time but also of those never to be future, only possible, with this distinction: that He willed these to happen and those not to happen. These are the words of Matthias Nethenus, quoted by the famous Gilbert Voetius, and approved by Voetius himself, in the first part of "Theological Disputations," in the theses on conditional or middle knowledge in God, section three, number 18.

XXXIII. To explain their view more clearly, these learned men assert that they consider two states in the object of divine knowledge: possibility and futurity, but three moments. The first moment is when God, by contemplating His omnipotence, saw what could be done by Him without contradiction. The second is when He, by an absolute decree, predestined all possible things, their modes, connections, and concatenations, in Himself, that is, what would be cause, what effect, what means, what end, what before, what simultaneous, what after, or not, but with this caution: if He willed them to be future. The third moment is when, among those things predestined under such a condition, He made a distinction, leaving some under that condition and adding such a decree, "I do not will them to be future," and removing the condition from others and substituting such a decree, "I will them to be future." In the third moment, the matter is finally extracted from the state of possibility into the state of futurity; in the first two, it remains in the state of possibility, but with this distinction: that in the first, God knows them through nature and before any act of will; in the second, after the act of will. These are also their words in the third section, number 13. From these words, it is clear that they do not regard future contingents under a condition as truly future but as merely possible, and yet they want their knowledge to pertain not to God's natural but to His free knowledge.

XXXIV. Furthermore, they acknowledge that they derived their doctrine from Samuel Rutherford, the Scot, from whom they take this as a most certain foundation: that the will of God is not indeterminate, dubious, or suspended concerning any entities, whether actual or potential, whether ever to be actualized or never to be actualized, as it is found in created will, but is determined by the eminence of its act concerning every entity from eternity. Hence, they conclude that God necessarily wills or does not will all possible concatenations and connections of entities, and thus in all conditional propositions about future contingents, it is true from the definite and certain will of God that if such a condition were met, this would follow and not otherwise.

XXXV. Indeed, that same Rutherford, recently a professor of theology at the University of St. Andrews, a learned and subtle man, using the same principle, affirms that God knew that the inhabitants of Keilah would deliver David into Saul's hands if he stayed among them, and that the Tyrians would repent if they saw the signs, and other similar things, by free knowledge in the predetermining decree, by which He absolutely predestined the concatenation of all possible entities. He says this pertains to the admirable providence of God, whose will is not indeterminate and suspended concerning any entities, whether actual or possible. (In "Apologetic Exercises for Divine Grace," chapter 5, on middle knowledge.)

XXXVI. Others believe that many or rather countless propositions about future contingents under some condition can be made and imagined, which do not fall under divine knowledge and do not express anything that can be known and understood by God, not because they think God ignores any truth or that there is something truly future that God does not know will be future, but because they believe these propositions do not signify anything determinately true or false; and what is denied or affirmed in them as future under a certain condition is not more future than not future, but indifferent to both.

XXXVII. For example, someone might affirm that if God created another world and certain angels in it, in these or those circumstances, those angels would persevere in their duty and love for God. According to their view, what is affirmed in this conditional proposition is neither true nor false, and therefore cannot be known as such by God; rather, the matter is in itself merely possible and indifferent to either happening or not happening. God knows it to be so; therefore, if it is said that such a proposition contains no truth knowable by God, nothing is thereby detracted from divine omniscience.

XXXVIII. They consider the view of those who attribute to God infinite decrees about contingent connections of any possible with another possible, even in those where no order, subordination, or coherence appears, to be absurd. As if God had decreed whatever would be in infinite worlds to be created by Him, given infinite different conditions. This is the view already reported by Samuel Rutherford and in the theses of Voetius, which is expressly rejected by John Strangius in his treatise "On the Will and Actions of God concerning Sin," book 1, chapter 5, and book 3, chapter 13, and also by Turretin in his dissertation on middle knowledge, book 3, page 472.

XXXIX. Nevertheless, they do not deny all knowledge in God of what would or would have been contingently future under some condition that never was or will be. They acknowledge that some such things are predicted in Scripture and therefore were known and foreseen by God. But they contend that this knowledge did not precede the free decree of God's will. Not that they admit certain conditional decrees in God, by which He wills something to happen under a condition that will never be fulfilled, or even explicit and formal decrees about the connection of two events, neither of which will actually exist, but because from some absolute decrees of God about things actually to be, it follows that given such a condition, this and that would have been future.

XL. For example, God knew that Saul would come to the city of Keilah and the inhabitants of Keilah would deliver David into Saul's hands if David stayed in that city because He had decreed to deliver David from Saul's hands, not by some miracle or extraordinary change of mind either in Saul or in the inhabitants of Keilah, but through David's retreat and flight. Hence it follows that David would have been delivered into Saul's hands if he had stayed in Keilah, although we do not posit such an explicit decree in God as "I will that the inhabitants of Keilah deliver David if he stays among them."

XLI. This is how William Ames explains the matter in his response to Grevinchovius's "Response," chapter 15. He says: "It is worth careful contemplation: the decree of God can be conceived either as formal, established, and explicit or as implicit and virtual, which is included by virtue of another decree. The latter exists only in future conditionals that never occur because they would exist by virtue of an actual decree if this or that were supposed. God decreed to deliver David from the hands of the men of Keilah by means of flight, not by changing their minds beyond the usual order. From this actual flows that conditional contingent: if David does not flee, he will be delivered. And in this sense, every future conditional rests on a free decree and is understood by the knowledge of vision, which is not only about things that are absolutely future but also about those that would follow from an actual decree already made, given this or that condition."

XLII. Furthermore, the main foundation on which Turretin, Rutherford, Voetius, Ames, and others rely, while denying the existence of conditional knowledge of contingently future events in God before His free decree, is this: in their view, nothing is future before God has decreed it to be future. Therefore, they conclude that before the decree of God, nothing can be conceived and known as future. They prove that nothing is either absolutely or conditionally future before God decrees it to be future by asserting that no cause can be imagined or thought of by which something possible from eternity becomes future, except by God's decree. For nothing temporal can be the cause of what is eternal; thus, the futurity of things that occur in time, which is from eternity, must be attributed to some eternal cause, which can only be the free decree of God, as Turretin repeats multiple times in his dissertation on middle knowledge.

XLIII. Voetius, or Nethenus speaking for him, after many disputations against middle knowledge, concludes thus: From what has been argued so far against middle knowledge, it is clear that the entire difficulty of the present controversy falls on this point: Whether conditionally free future events, by their nature indifferent to futurity and non-futurity, could have passed into the state of being future from eternity other than through the divine decree, which is the cause of all futurity. This is the foundation of foundations on which the entire structure rests; this is the postulate that we cannot concede to our opponents, nor can they prove to us.

XLIV. Strangius, who does not agree with the aforementioned theologians that the futurity of any event from eternity depends solely on God's free decree, contends by another argument, which he considers invincible, that free contingents cannot be known by God as future under any hypothesis unless the determination of the created will is necessarily inferred. His argument is as follows: Conditionals whose consequent does not have a necessary connection with the antecedent cannot be certainly known, and therefore

cannot be known by God, whose knowledge is most certain and completely infallible. But such are the conditionals posited as the object of middle knowledge. He proves the major premise by saying: Unless the object is certainly true, it cannot be certainly known; for as long as the matter is uncertain, it cannot be certainly known. Nothing is certainly true that is not necessarily true, necessarily either absolutely or hypothetically. Therefore, for conditional knowledge to be certain and infallible, its object must be a necessary conditional proposition; however, no conditional proposition is necessary in which the inference is not necessary (Treatise on the Will of God concerning Sin, book 3, chapter 11).

XLV. To briefly explain my own view: First, it is certain, and, as evident from the preceding, conceded by all, that nothing can be freely future under any condition or be known as such unless the condition under which it is said to be future includes God's decree not to withhold the concurrence necessary for the creature to act. Namely, all propositions about future conditionals must be explained and understood thus: This or that creature, placed in such and such an order of things, will do this or that, provided God wills to concur with it as He usually does, and that He concurs is necessary for the creature to be able to elicit its action.

XLVI. Second, I also believe it should be conceded that all propositions about free and contingent future conditionals, in which such a condition is understood, are determinately true or false. At least, the recent Thomists and others who agree with them on this matter, and who otherwise vehemently oppose middle knowledge, cannot deny this. For, according to their view, in order for the creature to act, it is necessary for God to pre-move and pre-determine it. Given God's pre-determination, the creature's action necessarily follows; according to their hypotheses, this conditional is infallible and necessary: If God wills to place such a creature in this or that state and denies it nothing necessary for action, it will do this or that, since that condition includes God's decree to pre-determine it to act.

XLVII. And indeed, the reasons that suggest that absolute propositions about future contingents have determined truth or falsehood also seem applicable to these conditionals. Namely, it cannot be otherwise than that of two contradictories, one is true, the other false. Likewise, in any true disjunction, at least one part must be true. For example, this disjunction is true: If Peter is placed in such a circumstance, and God does not deny him His usual concurrence, he will sin or he will not sin. These two also mutually contradict each other: Peter, if placed in that order of things, and God does not deny him concurrence to act, will do this; and Peter, if placed in that order of things, and God does not deny him concurrence to act, will not do this.

XLVIII. If someone says nothing is future except dependently on God's decree, and thus before God's decree, the thing is no more future than not future, but indifferent to being future or not future, and therefore neither can be truly affirmed of it, I respond: For a thing to be absolutely future, a certain decree of God is indeed required, on which its futurity depends. But for a thing not to be simply future but only future under some condition, a decree that actually exists in God is not required; it suffices that a decree, according to the hypothesis, would be posited in God.

XLIX. Furthermore, it is certain and conceded by all that no truth, of whatever kind, escapes the divine intellect; hence, since propositions about freely future contingents under the often-mentioned condition have determined truth, they are also the object of divine knowledge. Therefore, God knows what each possible creature would do if He willed to place them in this or that state and deny them nothing necessary for action.

L. This proposition, which follows from the previous one, cannot be denied by those who think no action can be elicited by creatures without God's prior and pre-determining concurrence. For it is evident that God cannot fail to know what each possible creature would do if He willed not only to create them but also to apply and pre-determine them to act. Turretin acknowledges this, who, after observing that Suarez teaches that conditional propositions about future contingents, which are the object of divine knowledge, include in the antecedent the divine will, namely, if He wills such an effect, or at least wills to permit it and concur with it, adds: According to this sense, we concede those conditionals which the Jesuits imagine ("Dissertation on Middle Knowledge," book 3, page 465).

LI. It is equally evident, according to the principles of the same doctors, that such knowledge by which God knows what any possible creature would do in this or that state, if He willed to supply the necessary concurrence for action, exists in God before He has decreed anything about things. For, before we conceive of God as decreeing anything, it is true that if God willed to move and pre-determine any creature by His concurrence to act, it would undoubtedly do that to which it was moved and determined. And the truth of this proposition does not depend on any preceding decree of God, by which the connection of that possible decree with the event that would follow from it is determined.

LII. Indeed, it seems entirely fictitious and not only repugnant to wisdom but also to divine goodness, that decree by which some assert, as we mentioned above, that God predestined all possible connections and concatenations of events before He decreed anything to be future. For if it were so, it would be necessary for God, before deciding to create this world, to have conceived such decrees within Himself: if I will to create Adam, I will that his fall necessarily follows from his temptation; if I will to create David and have him see Bathsheba, I will that the concupiscence of this woman necessarily follows from that sight. Similarly, I will that such occasions of sin result in such sins, if I decide that such occasions will exist. Indeed, I will that in infinite worlds to be created by me, these and those contingently possible events will have an inseparable connection with these and those events of the same nature. Certainly, these decrees are not only utterly idle, frivolous, and useless but also highly unworthy of the goodness and justice of Him who is God unwilling of iniquity.

LIII. Therefore, it cannot be reasonably denied, and must be conceded by all, that there is in God a certain knowledge of what would be freely and contingently future under a certain condition before we conceive any actual decree in God about future things. The entire difficulty lies in whether the condition under which something is said to be future must include a decree to pre-move and pre-determine the secondary cause to act, or whether it suffices that the decree, which according to that condition would be posited in

God, is only about providing a certain concurrence that is indifferent in itself and which is determined by the secondary cause to a certain kind of action.

LIV. All those theologians who believe that nothing happens without God's concurrence applying and pre-determining the secondary cause to act, assert that no proposition about contingent and conditional futures has any truth, and therefore can be known as true, unless the condition supposes a decree about pre-moving and pre-determining the free agent. They argue that the futurity of any action depends on such a decree, indeed, according to some, as its sole and solitary cause, and without such a decree, no action of a secondary cause can be future. However, I hold the opinion that secondary causes perform many actions in time that are not pre-determined by God. For we cannot see how God would not be the author of sin if He pre-determined free causes to acts that are inherently sinful and intrinsically evil, for example, blasphemy and hatred of God. If some action of a free cause can exist without God's pre-motion and pre-determination, then it is not necessary to posit or suppose in God a decree to pre-move and pre-determine the creature to act for any action to be future or to have been future; but it suffices to decree the providing of a certain concurrence without which the creature cannot act and which is truly necessary for its action.

LV. In particular, I cannot in any way accept what William Twisse asserts in many places, that God's decree and His will are the sole and unique cause of the futurity of any event. For example, is God's decree the sole cause of why Adam was to become disobedient to God? And similarly, why those angels who fell were to elevate themselves in pride against God? Who can bear to hear someone say this? Or who can say this without making God manifestly the author of sin?

LVI. But, says that learned man, the futurity that existed from eternity cannot have a cause that is not also eternal. For nothing temporal can be the cause of what is eternal. But nothing existed from eternity except God Himself, who operates externally only by His free will. I respond that this argument assumes futurity to be something real, distinct from the future thing itself, and that it requires some cause other than the future thing itself. But this is utterly false. For futurity is nothing other than a certain rational relation and an external denomination of the thing that is said to be future; it is not some entity distinct from the future thing and requiring a different cause from the future thing's own cause. This is evident from the argument itself. For the argument rightly assumes that nothing existed from eternity except God; hence, the futurity that is said to have existed from eternity was either nothing real or was God Himself.

LVII. Therefore, what is the cause of a thing's existence in time is also the cause of its being future from eternity. Just as what causes a thing to have existed at some time causes it to be called past forever. No more is an eternally existing cause required for a thing to be future from eternity than an eternally enduring cause is required for a thing to be past forever. A future cause suffices for a future effect, just as a past cause suffices for a past effect.

LVIII. Therefore, since God is not the cause of sin in time, it is so far from the truth to say that God's will is the sole cause of the futurity of sin, that I simply and plainly believe it should be denied that it is the cause of this futurity, whether solely or along with a

secondary cause. It is true indeed that man does not sin without depending on God's will. For he could not sin unless God permitted him to sin. And thus, the futurity of sin depends on God's decree to permit the sin. But just as God's will is not therefore to be called the proper cause of man's actual sinning, so it does not follow that God's decree is the proper cause of the futurity of sin.

LIX. But there are also some who assert that certain free acts are absolutely future, and as such are foreknown by God without any decree to pre-determine free causes to those acts, like the most learned Strangius; however, they deny that future free contingents can be known by God from any hypothesis that does not necessarily infer the determination of the created will, and therefore that does not include an absolute decree about their futurity, as can be seen in Strangius's work on the Will of God concerning sin, book 3, chapter 11.

LX. His reasoning is, as we mentioned earlier, that nothing can be known for certain that is not certainly true: nothing is certainly true that is not necessary either absolutely or hypothetically. Hence, he concludes that conditional future events cannot be the object of divine knowledge, which is infallible and most certain, unless the condition includes something from which the stated future necessarily follows. But if this reasoning were valid, God could not foreknow any contingent as absolutely future unless He had first decreed it to be absolutely future; which Strangius does not admit, as he acknowledges that men perform many actions freely to which they are not pre-determined by God.

LXI. But, says that learned man, whatever God foresees as absolutely future, no matter how contingent it is in itself and could simply not be, is nonetheless necessary hypothetically, not indeed from the hypothesis of some divine decree pre-determining it, but from this hypothesis itself, that it is future. For just as whatever is, while it is, is necessarily, so also whatever is future, from the hypothesis that it is supposed to be future, is necessarily future, and thus can be certainly known by God.

LXII. But what the most learned man thinks should be said about absolutely future things can be applied with no less reason to conditionally future things. For I would say in the same way that God certainly foresees what would be freely future under some condition; because although the free cause could act otherwise, and that condition would not impose a necessity to act, nonetheless it would actually act so. From the hypothesis that it would act so, it is necessary that it acts so when the condition is posed, and thus it is something that can be certainly known by God.

LXIII. Therefore, I see no reason to deny that God has knowledge of what would be freely future under a certain condition, even if that condition does not include a decree to pre-determine the free cause to this or that action. And if there are any arguments that seem to overturn this knowledge, such as the incomprehensibility of how God infallibly knows something future that might not be, those arguments also conflict with the foreknowledge of contingents that are absolutely future; which, however, the word of God places beyond all doubt in God.

LXIV. But certainly, we should not presume so much of ourselves as to dare to limit divine knowledge and deny that God knows something because we cannot comprehend how He knows it. For the divine intellect, being altogether infinite, undoubtedly knows more than

we can grasp and attain. At least the one who thinks that God knows things that perhaps are not knowable errs less dangerously than the one who denies that God knows what He truly knows and what is within the object of divine omniscience.

LXV. I add that this knowledge of conditional futures, as we have described it, has no necessary connection with the various errors that many use it to defend and bolster. Especially, we maintain that it in no way conflicts with efficacious grace, nor is it necessary to use it to reconcile the efficacy of divine grace with the freedom of human will, as we will show in the following, with God's favour.

Part II

The Opinion of the Doctors of the Roman Church is Explained.

I. The common and accepted doctrine of theologians, drawn from clear scriptural evidence, is that the eternal will of God is the cause of all things, and that everything, including human actions, is subject to the immutable decrees of divine providence. Nothing happens without the eternal preordination and determination of God, whether it is caused by inanimate objects, humans, or angels.

II. However, this seemingly eliminates liberty in both angels and humans. No one can resist God's will. Thus, if God wills angels and humans to do what they do, they cannot act otherwise, and so they do not act freely and are not masters of their own actions. Furthermore, if human actions are determined by the immutable decrees of God, it appears to nullify the indeterminacy and indifference of will in action, which is the basis of freedom.

III. This difficulty has seemed so great to some scholastics that they have openly confessed their ignorance in this matter, believing it to be a concept beyond the grasp of the human mind as long as it is burdened by the mortal body. Among these is Cardinal Cajetan, a very celebrated scholastic. For as acute and subtle as he was, he could never satisfy himself in this matter and thought that the harmony between free will and divine providence is inexplicable and incomprehensible in this life, as seen in his commentaries on the first part of Thomas, Question 22, Article 4.

IV. Nevertheless, other theologians of the Roman School are confident that they can resolve this knot and therefore contrive various explanations. They do not all hold the same views, whether regarding divine decrees or the nature of human liberty.

V. Firstly, the more recent Thomists teach that everything that happens in the world, including free acts of will, is specifically pre-determined and pre-defined by God with an absolute and effective will, prior in reason to any foresight of the determination of the created will, whether absolutely or conditionally future. This is explicitly stated by, among others, Diego Alvarez, Archbishop of Trani and Salpa, in his "Summa of the Work on the Aids of Divine Grace," Book 2, Chapter 5, which begins with these words: "From divine scriptures, if they are attentively considered, we have that God by his absolute and effective will has pre-determined all acts, even free ones, in particular, as future in time, prior in reason, to the divine intellect knowing those acts to be future, even on the hypothesis that the created will would be placed in such an order of things and in such circumstances."

VI. The same doctrine is taught by Matthew de Rispolis in his treatise titled "The Status of the Controversy of Predeterminations and Predefinitions with Free Will." In Book 1, Question 1, he teaches and endeavours to prove at length that in God there are eternal predefinitions and pre-determinations of acts of will, and this in particular, by an absolute decree that presupposes no conditional knowledge of the future determination of the will itself, if it were placed in such a state of affairs. This view is also supported by William Estius, as is evident from what is read in his comments on the 39th distinction of the first book of Sentences and on the 24th of the second book.

VII. These authors do not exempt even evil acts of the will from this eternal predetermination by God. They hold that such acts are also pre-defined by an absolute and effective decree, at least as far as what is real and positive in those acts is concerned. They acknowledge that the malice itself, which is nothing other than the privation of due rectitude, is not efficaciously decreed by God but merely permitted. This is especially evident in Diego Alvarez's cited "Summa of the Work on the Aids of Divine Grace," Book 2, Chapter 9, which begins: "What has been said about the predetermination of the will to good acts should also be extended to acts of sin, as far as the act and being is concerned. Therefore, whatever entity is found in any act of sin, even if it is otherwise intrinsically evil, should be reduced to God as the primary cause, moving and predetermining the created will to such an act as far as it is an act and insofar as it is being."

VIII. Although, in their view, God has pre-determined by His eternal decree everything that happens in time by any causes whatsoever, they assert that this does not prevent many things from happening not necessarily but contingently and freely. For the eternal providence of God has not prepared necessary causes for all events and effects but some free or contingent causes. He has not only determined that this or that will happen but also the manner in which each thing will happen. Therefore, He willed that some things happen necessarily and others contingently and freely. Thus, far from the eternal providence of God removing human freedom, it means that whatever there is of liberty and contingency in things must be referred to God as the first cause because God not only willed things to be but also determined the manner and mode in which each should exist by His will.

IX. Therefore, according to these Doctors, the fact that God decreed from eternity that humans should do this or that, and that their wills should be inclined to these or those objects, does not affect human liberty. For God did not simply decree that they should do this or that but also that they should do it freely, that is, that they should choose this or that as most suitable and beneficial to themselves from their own rational judgment, and indeed in such a way that from a different judgment they could choose the opposite. This, in their view, is where human liberty properly consists, and hence it is not overturned by the determination of the divine decree.

X. They believe, as they say, that it is irrelevant to free will whether its choice is impressed upon it by a prior cause or not, provided that choice is made from the judgment of the practical intellect, which can consider different reasons for good among opposites and present them to the will.

XI. If someone says that the name "free will" designates a cause independent of any prior cause with respect to its free action, they respond that this is a false and undeserved assumption, and such free will belongs only to God, who is entirely independent of any superior cause. Created beings, however, are no less dependent on the First Cause in their free actions than necessary causes are in their necessary actions.

XII. To the objection that, given the divine decree concerning a human will's action, the human will cannot act otherwise and thus loses its indifference in action, which is the basis of freedom, they respond that it is not possible for God's decree to coexist with the will not

acting or acting differently. However, God's decree does not prevent the will from retaining the ability to act otherwise. The decree determines the act, but the faculty remains flexible towards the opposite. Thus, when a person acts according to God's decree, it can truly be said that he can act otherwise because God has decreed that he should act in such a way that he remains able to act otherwise. Hence, while in a composite sense it is not true that, given God's decree, the will can act or not act, it is true in a divided sense: the act opposite does not coexist with the divine decree, but the faculty for the opposite act does.

XIII. If someone argues that given the divine decree about an action, it is impossible to say that a person can act otherwise, as this would imply that God's decrees could be frustrated and invalidated, which is simply impossible, they deny this consequence. They argue that if a person acted otherwise, which is assumed to be possible, God would have decreed otherwise. They do not believe that this conflicts with the immutability of divine decrees because a person retains the power to act otherwise while executing them. This only conflicts if it is said that a person can do the opposite of what God has decreed, which these theologians do not claim.

XIV. Similar points can be found in William Estius' cited works and in Diego Alvarez's "Summa on the Aids of Divine Grace," Book 2, Chapter 6, where he dissolves objections against the predetermination of the will from an extrinsic divine decree. To the objection that, according to his view, a person cannot will anything other than what God wills him to will by an effective decree and can only perform predetermined acts by God, and thus we do not freely will what we will but out of absolute necessity because we cannot do otherwise if God wills us to do it, and by the same reasoning, we do not freely omit acts commanded, he responds that just as it is one thing to be able to run and another to actually run, so it is one thing to be able to will or produce an act in particular and another to actually produce it. Therefore, for a person to be truly able to will something, it is not required that from eternity there be an absolute and effective decree in God predetermining his free will to will the same object, although such a decree is required for him to actually will it. Hence, the absence of such a decree in God does not imply that a person cannot will such an object in absolute terms, but only that he does not actually will it. Nor does it follow that if God predetermined me to will this particular thing, it is not in my power to will otherwise, although from the supposition of the divine effective will, it is impossible in a composite sense for me to will another object.

XV. To the objection that predetermination by the divine decree to this or that act removes the indifference to acting, which is the essence of liberty, he responds that the indifference which opposes determination to one thing necessarily is of the essence of liberty, and that free will retains this indifference even in the instant in which it is efficaciously predetermined by God to act. In the very instant in which it acts, free will does not lose its indifference, understood as the potentiality and privation of the second act, as opposed to determination to either side by way of liberty, which consists in the faculty to do either.

XVI. If someone insists that it is of the nature of a free power that, given all the prerequisites for acting, it can act or not act, but given the effective decree of God predetermining our free will to act in this particular instance, the will cannot fail to act because no one can resist God's will, he responds that it is of the nature of a free power

that, given all the prerequisites for acting, it can act or not act in absolute and simple terms. However, it is not inappropriate that from the supposition of the divine effective will, it cannot, in a composite sense, fail to act in the way it is predetermined by God.

XVII. Finally, if someone says that necessity opposes liberty and that if God predetermines us by His effective will to act, every action of ours will be necessary because whatever God wills to happen must necessarily happen, he responds that all acts predetermined by God necessarily happen with the necessity of consequence and from the supposition of the same decree, but not with absolute necessity that would overthrow liberty. In fact, from the same predetermination follows the actual exercise of our liberty because God not only predetermined the will to will such an object but also predetermined that it should will it freely.

XVIII. Again, if someone insists that the necessity induced by the divine decree removes the liberty of the created will because what is necessary from the supposition becomes simply necessary concerning something when it is not within its power to remove or establish the supposition from which the act necessarily follows, and it is not within the power of the created will to remove or establish the supposition of the divine effective decree predetermining created free will to act since that decree is from God alone and in no way depends on the free operation of our will, even foreseen by middle knowledge, and therefore acts of the will that are said to be necessary from the supposition of the same divine decree are absolutely and simply necessary and thus not free, he responds that when the antecedent supposition of some act is on the part of the first and most universal cause, namely God, it can be that something is necessary from the supposition concerning the created will and yet free to it simply, even though it is not within its power to establish or remove the supposition from which that necessarily follows with the necessity of infallibility. It is different when the antecedent supposition is on the part of some created cause that is extrinsic to the will. This is because only God, who is the author of the created will, by his infinity and omnipotence, can immutably conform it to his nature and efficaciously move and apply it to produce an act in particular, not only according to its substance but also according to the mode of liberty, which no created cause can do because it is limited and finite and inferior to the will itself.

XIX. However, this way of reconciling human liberty with the decrees of divine providence does not satisfy many doctors of the Roman School. Therefore, among them are some who, to resolve this knot, deny that any free acts, whether of the natural or supernatural order, are predetermined by God from eternity. According to their view, no such acts are predetermined by God in time either, because they believe that predetermination, like predefinition, is incompatible with liberty. John Strangius mentions that Suarez, in his third book on Aids, Chapter 17, Numbers 1 and 2, refers to them.

XX. Gabriel Vasquez, in his first volume on Thomas, Disputation 99, Chapter 5, attributes a similar opinion to some of his contemporaries. He says that some, oppressed by this difficulty, say that God did not will our works individually from eternity but only in general and universally determined that He would cooperate with each one according to his determination. He adds that they embrace this opinion to defend that God's

predefinition imposes no necessity on our will against its liberty. Moreover, if it were necessary for God to predefine and will the works of grace individually from eternity, it would follow that those who do not work or consent to the call would lack something necessary for acting, namely that decree, and thus it is no wonder they do not work since they cannot do so without it.

XXI. Some theologians, while admitting that God has eternally foreordained individual human acts, argue that this foreordination follows the foreknowledge of the future determination of the human will. They believe that no human actions, including supernaturally good ones, are individually foreordained by an absolute decree of God before the foreseen determination of our will, not only conditionally but also absolutely future. This is the doctrine of Leonard Lessius, a Jesuit, in his treatise on Predestination.

XXII. Gabriel Vasquez, in the previously cited work, attributes the same opinion to Ambrosius Catharinus, Antonio de Corduba, Julio Sirenus, Osorius, and several others. He asserts that they teach that God has not foreordained our actions, whether good or evil, in their substance before the foreseen determination of our will. Instead, the determination to one part rather than the other, whether in good or evil actions concerning their substance, is indeed from us and from God, but the primary root and cause of it is free will. From this, they infer that our determination precedes God's predestination and foreordination. They also assign the same order in works of grace regarding consent and cooperation, although they admit that preceding and accompanying grace, that is, vocation, precedes our cooperation with God. For, as Vasquez reports, they distinguish three instances: the first in which our will is prevented by grace; the second in which it determines itself to consent or resist the calling; the third in which God cooperates with it. Therefore, according to their view, God knows to what the will is going to determine itself, both in works of grace and in natural works, before He decides to cooperate with it in this or that act, and thus before He foreordains any of our actions.

XXIII. These theologians easily reconcile our free will with divine decrees since, according to them, divine decrees follow the foreknowledge of the determination that will arise from our will as its first root and cause. Hence, no necessity precedes our actions from divine decrees any more than from God's foreknowledge, but only a subsequent necessity that does not abolish but presupposes our freedom.

XXIV. Others here use a double distinction. First, between the absolute foreknowledge of future events and the conditional foreknowledge of future events. Absolute foreknowledge is where God foresees something as simply and truly future. Conditional foreknowledge is where God foresees not what is simply and absolutely future but what would be future if certain conditions were met. For example, what Adam's will would be inclined and disposed to do if created in a certain state and presented with certain objects. This is the knowledge called "middle knowledge" in the schools, which we discussed extensively in previous theses.

XXV. Given this, they concede that God's decrees concerning human acts, whether to permit or to cause them, precede, in God, according to our way of conceiving, the foreknowledge of the determination of the human will that is absolutely future. For

example, they believe that God decreed to permit Adam to desire the forbidden fruit and to cooperate with him in that act before He absolutely foresaw that Adam's will would determine itself in that direction. Similarly, He decreed to prevent Paul with His grace and cooperate with him in the act of conversion before He absolutely foresaw that Paul's will would determine itself to this.

XXVI. However, they insist that God did not decree or determine anything about human free actions before He foresaw in which direction the human will would incline and determine itself, given that it would be placed in this or that state of affairs. God did not absolutely will that the same will elicit these actions rather than those until He foresaw what each person would do and will if such or such occasions for acting were presented to them.

XXVII. This, they say, is their doctrine: that God, before any decree about creating and causing things, eternally foresaw what would happen given any condition and foresaw the infinite forms, dispositions, and modes of things, knowing what would result from each. Specifically, they teach that God could not be ignorant of what would happen if He created free causes, namely humans and angels, and ensured that the occasions for acting that were later offered and will be offered were presented to them, and placed them in the circumstances in which they were later placed and will be placed, as well as what would happen if these circumstances were varied in infinite ways, and entirely different occasions for acting were presented.

XXVIII. After God foresaw and considered what would happen if humans and angels were placed in these or those circumstances and stirred to act by these or those objects, and what good He could elicit from them, and how He could direct these or those to the manifestation of His glory, then, according to these doctors, God decided to create humans and angels in the state in which they were later created and to ensure that these occasions for acting, rather than others, were presented to them, and to cooperate with them in the actions to which He foresaw their wills would determine themselves, provided He did not deny His cooperation. This decree was followed by absolute foreknowledge, by which He foresaw that they would act in this or that way.

XXIX. Thus, they believe that God ordained and foreordained human actions only because He willed to create them in that state and provide them with those motives, aids, and occasions for acting from which He foresaw they would act in such a way and elicit these rather than those volitions, while always leaving it within their power to act either way without imposing any necessity on them to act in this way rather than another.

XXX. In this way, it might seem there is no obstacle to saying that God has foreordained all free actions, whatever they might be. However, the authors of this opinion distinguish between good and evil acts. They indeed concede that good acts can rightly be said to be foreordained by God's eternal decree. But they think otherwise about evil acts. For although God decreed to place humans in the state where He foresaw through middle knowledge that they would act evilly, He neither wills nor approves their evil acts. The foreordination of God includes or presupposes the approval of the Divine will. But

although evil acts are not foreordained by God, their permission is foreordained because their permission is good.

XXXI. This is the doctrine of Fonseca, among others. He states that before any foreknowledge of free acts, none of them were foreordained from eternity because otherwise, the freedom of the created will would be abolished. But after the foreknowledge of future free acts in a conditioned state, only good acts are foreordained by God because He alone approves them. Although evil acts are not foreordained, their permission is foreordained, which God approves. (In 6. Metaph., chap. 2, question 5, section 7)

XXXII. These doctors believe that reconciling providential decrees with our free will is not difficult if their hypothesis is admitted. For according to them, Divine Providence allows our wills to act according to their own inclinations, and God has decreed to lead and variously influence human minds only by presenting internal and external objects and other reasons that do not take away the power to act either way but allow, as the schools say, the specification of their action. Hence, the certainty of God's decrees rests on the infallibility of His middle knowledge, through which they claim God knows, before any decree of His will, which way the created will would incline and tend if these or those occasions for acting were presented to it, not through any force or efficacy that necessarily moves the will to act in this way.

XXXIII. However, Gabriel Vasquez is not satisfied with this solution to the difficulty. He agrees that the authors of the previously explained opinion assert that God, before establishing His decrees concerning free acts, foresees through a kind of conditional knowledge where the will would incline and to what it would determine itself if certain circumstances are set. Yet, he cannot accept their concession that God's decrees concerning free acts in God are, according to our way of conceiving, prior to the absolute foreknowledge of the determination of that same will. For if it is granted that God has foreordained acts of our will in any manner before He absolutely foresees what the will's inclination and determination will be, he believes it gives rise to a certain antecedent necessity that contradicts the freedom of future acts.

XXXIV. He does not, however, side with those who believe that God absolutely foresees to what the will is going to determine itself before He decides to cooperate with it in this or that act and foreordains its act in any way. This is because he judges it impossible for our will to act or determine itself in nature before God works with it. Hence, he concludes that it cannot be understood in eternity that the will's determination exists without God's decree to cooperate with it. Moreover, he finds that this opinion seems to detract from the cooperating grace of God. Since, he argues, our will not only needs God's excitation to act but also His cooperation to consent to this excitation, it equally needs it to determine itself to consent. Thus, how can the will be understood to be determined in any prior manner without the cooperation of grace?

XXXV. Therefore, Vasquez proposes a different concept: God's foreordination of our specific works does not precede the determination of our will in the order of cause nor follow it but accompanies it. Hence, he concludes that the necessity which follows the position of God's decree is not an antecedent but a concomitant necessity to our freedom

and determination. Therefore, our freedom is neither hindered nor harmed by this necessity, as only antecedent necessity prejudices freedom, not the one that either follows or accompanies freedom itself.

XXXVI. The foundation of his opinion is that no operation on God's part, which precedes the consent of our will, imposes necessity on the will to consent. The divine cooperation through which God brings about the very consent of our will in no way precedes the determination of our will but exists simultaneously with it in time, nature, and reason. Consequently, God's decree to effect that consent cannot be prior to the foreknowledge of the determination of the human will. For things that are entirely simultaneous in time cannot have an order of precedence and subsequence in divine foreknowledge and decrees. From this, he concludes that no free act of our will was foreordained by God before the foreseen free determination of our will. Instead, the foreknowledge of that determination and God's decree foreordaining the act of our will must be conceived as simultaneous in God.

Part III

The Doctrine of the Reformed School is Explained.

I. Jacob Arminius and those who follow his teachings in the Netherlands, known as the Remonstrants, agree with Molina and his disciples in explaining the nature of human liberty. They seem to reconcile it with the decrees of Divine Providence in the same manner. At least, this is the aim of Arminius in his response to Article 7, found on page 143 of his works. Here, he does not deny that God has predetermined future contingencies with His eternal decree. However, he distinguishes between two types of divine determination by which He decrees something to happen: one where, given any divine action, motion, or impulse, the secondary cause remains free in terms of its power and use of power to act or not to act, so that it can suspend its action if it chooses; the other where, given such divine action, motion, or impulse, the secondary cause does not remain free, at least not in the use of its power to suspend its action, as it necessarily inclines to one side before the act is determined and produced by the free creature. If the term "determination" is understood in the first sense, Arminius does not deny such divine determination concerning future free and contingent events. But if the term "determination" is taken in the second sense, he entirely denies that God has determined future contingencies to one side with His decree.

II. Moreover, Arminius does not distinctly explain how it can simultaneously be true that a certain action is determined by God's eternal decree and yet the will always remains indifferent to that action, always being able to either produce or not produce it. However, from what he adds, it can be inferred that the matter stands thus: God, in executing His decrees concerning human actions, moves the human will only by presenting and administering objects and arguments that indeed induce them to will but always leave it within their power not to be moved by those objects. Arminius' disciples, like Nicholas Grevinchovius among others, explicitly employ the concept of middle knowledge to solve this issue, much like many Jesuits, as was explained in the preceding theses.

III. Among those Reformed theologians who otherwise seem to be opposed to Arminian doctrine and subscribe to the Synod of Dordrecht, some also follow this approach to reconcile the decrees of Divine Providence with human free will. Among these is Robert Baron, formerly a professor of theology at Aberdeen in Scotland. In his "Metaphysics adapted to the use of Theology," he praises and openly subscribes to Fonseca's doctrine on this point (Section 12, Disputation 2, Number 65).

IV. In that passage, he proposes two conclusions of Fonseca that he finds very useful for establishing the harmony of Divine Providence and human free will. The first is that no free acts were predestined from eternity before the foreknowledge of those acts. He explains this as meaning that before God foreknew or foresaw in which direction human wills would incline if certain occasions were offered to them, He did not absolutely will that the will elicit these actions rather than others, nor did He decree to concur in eliciting these actions rather than others. The second conclusion is that after God, according to our way of understanding, foresaw in which direction our wills would incline when certain occasions were offered, He decreed from eternity to concur with our wills in eliciting, at

this or that time, these or those actions He foresaw they would incline to. For example, God from eternity foresaw that Adam, if tempted by his wife, would desire the forbidden fruit, and therefore decreed to concur with Adam in eliciting the desire for the fruit.

V. Thus, Baron believes the order of the Divine Decree regarding the first sin can be explained as follows: First, God has conditional foreknowledge, by which He foresees that Adam would desire the fruit if such an occasion were presented; He also has foreknowledge by which He knows He can direct that action of Adam to His glory. Second, because He foresaw He could bring great good out of Adam's evil action, which Adam would perform if such an occasion were presented, namely, the manifestation of His glory, He willed that the occasion be presented to Adam—that is, He willed to permit Eve, seduced by the serpent, to tempt Adam. Third, according to absolute foreknowledge (not conditional), He foresaw that Adam's will would incline to desire the fruit at the time Adam would be tempted. Fourth, partly to not deprive Adam of the use of his free will, partly to manifest His glory, He decreed to concur with Adam's will in eliciting that volition. Hence, it is evident that Adam did not fall or desire the fruit because God decreed to concur with his will in eliciting that desire; rather, God decreed to concur in eliciting that action rather than another because He foresaw Adam's will would incline to it when such an occasion was presented.

VI. From this, Baron concludes that God's decrees of Providence do not impose necessity on us to will this or that. Furthermore, God's decrees are not the causes of why we elicit this or that volition at this or that time, and consequently, from the infallibility of the divine decrees, it does not follow that all our free actions occur by causal necessity. Rather, from the infallibility of the decrees, it only follows that our free actions occur necessarily by a necessity of consequence, which is not causal or motivational. Hence, the decrees of Divine Providence no more take away the freedom of our will and the contingency of our actions than God's foreknowledge does. Just as a thing does not occur because it is foreknown, so we do not perform this or that action because God decreed to concur with us in eliciting these actions; rather, God decreed to concur in such actions because He foresaw we would act thus.

VII. John Strangius, a Scottish theologian renowned among his contemporaries, philosophizes uniquely here. He concedes that God's eternal decrees encompass all human acts, but not in the same manner. Regarding evil acts, he argues they fall under divine decrees not because God decreed them to occur but because He decreed to permit them and to bring good out of them and to direct them to various ends. He denies, however, that this permission makes them happen necessarily.

VIII. Concerning acts that are not inherently evil, he believes all these acts can be said to be decreed and predestined by God but not all in the same way. Some, he says, God decreed absolutely, while others He decreed conditionally, allowing us free choice among options that are all permissible.

IX. He believes that God has absolutely decreed and predestined all truly good acts and those that contribute to eternal salvation, to which He has determined our will from eternity and effectively determines it in time. Besides good human works, he also considers

many other acts that are not inherently evil, to which human will is determined in time by God and thus were absolutely decreed and predestined by God from eternity, such as the heroic deeds of Cyrus and those of Pharaoh towards Joseph, and countless others of the same kind.

X. However, he thinks that for many acts, even those not inherently evil, God does not absolutely predetermine the human will but permits free choice among several permissible options. He also believes that not all acts of the will, even those that are not sinful, were absolutely predestined by God in His eternal decrees but only conditionally, taking into account the determination of the created will.

XI. For example, he says, the three options God permitted to David in the twenty-fourth chapter of the second book of Samuel were all permissible, that is, David could lawfully choose any of them. God's permission concerning these acts was not only physical but also moral. God permitted David free choice to choose any of the three punishments and did not restrict him to one. Hence, God did not decree that David should choose only one, but foresaw his future choice. Therefore, it can rightly be said that God simply decreed the plague and the death of seventy thousand men. God decreed to bring about what David would choose, and God foresaw that David would choose this.

XII. He illustrates this with a similar example among humans. If a king grants his servant the option to choose this or that reward or favour, he certainly did not decree to restrict him to one but decreed to give him whatever reward or favour he would choose. Much more can this be said of God. For while a king grants his servant a choice, perhaps unaware or uncertain of what he will choose, God, who can hide nothing, knew from eternity what David would choose.

XIII. Towards the end of the chapter, he explains the same matter more precisely with these words: "Whenever God permits the choice and option of created will to two or more options, whether to act or not to act, it should not be thought that God restricts it to only one part. But if we combine the decree of permission with God's foreknowledge of the future event, it can be said that God has predestined every licit act that occurs because He grants this freedom to the will and cooperates with it, and the same has been decreed from eternity. Not that God first foresaw the future event and then decreed that it would happen—that would be absurd, namely, to decree the future which He had already foreseen to be future before the decree—nor that God first and absolutely decrees and then foresees it as future. For in that case, He would neither permit nor decree to permit the free choice of will to act or not to act. But in the same instant, He foresees and decrees (or predestines). Certainly, in eternity, nothing is before or after; thus, since foreknowledge and predestination are from eternity, neither is prior or later. We indeed, in our way of understanding, distinguish different rational moments in the eternal actions of God. But even according to these rational moments, we do not say one is before or after the other."

XIV. To reconcile divine decrees with human will's freedom, he distinguishes between two kinds of freedom of the will. One, taken more broadly and commonly, is essential to the will and consists in the will being moved by its own motion and the judgment of reason. The other, taken in a stricter sense, consists in a certain indifference of the will to two or

more opposites. He acknowledges that divine decrees, by which the acts of the will are absolutely predestined, remove this latter kind of freedom because they predetermine the will to one action and do not leave it indifferent to act or not act. However, he believes they do not deprive the will of the former kind of freedom, as it is perfectly consistent for the will to follow the judgment of reason and be moved by its own natural motion, and yet be predestined by God to act in a certain way and be predetermined in time because God moves the will gently and in a manner that is congruent and suitable to its nature.

XV. On the other hand, the divine decrees, by which He permits evil or has only relatively predestined certain acts of the will, according to him, leave the will free not only in the former and broader sense but also in the latter and stricter sense, because they do not take away from it the indifference to act or not act before the determination of the will itself. For God's permission leaves the will in a state where it can act or not act as permitted. The acts that are relatively decreed by God are not predestined before and apart from considering the determination of the will itself. This is more extensively explained by the same Strangius in Book 2, Chapter 8.

XVI. Therefore, according to this man's doctrine, although a person in many actions performed in this life enjoys that freedom which lies in the power of determining themselves to opposites, concerning many other acts that are absolutely predestined by God's decree, they do not retain this freedom but only that which consists in acting willingly and according to their own reason's judgment. He particularly thinks this applies in a person's conversion to God and in works of grace. For, he says, without God's predetermination, a person cannot convert or act piously; and with God's predetermination, they cannot fail to convert or act piously. Hence, in these works, although we acknowledge that the essential freedom of the will remains, we deny that the liberty, in the stricter sense used here, has any place.

XVII. Here also, the distinguished and celebrated Moses Amyraut seems to follow a unique approach. He believes that whatever is done by humans, whether good, evil, or indifferent, is designated and predestined by God's eternal decrees and that these decrees are executed most certainly and inevitably. Yet, he maintains that neither human liberty is violated nor is God made the author of sin.

XVIII. To explain how these can coexist, he supposes that human faculties, such as intellect and will, are determined by their objects. The will necessarily follows the judgment of the intellect and cannot will otherwise than what it judges should be willed. If the intellect, being disposed in a certain way, is presented with an object under such light—that is, equipped and armed with these or those reasons—such that there is proportion and suitability between the object and the intellect as it stands, the intellect must be determined to assent or dissent, and to make a determinate judgment about the object presented, as the proportion or suitability between the intellect and the object demands.

XIX. He does not think that this necessity or determination, which he says arises from the suitability of the object with the faculty, conflicts with liberty because he does not define liberty as consisting in the indetermination and indifference of the free faculty and its immunity from all necessity but thinks it only conflicts with the necessity imposed by an

external force, matter, or sense, which can be called physical or brute necessity, or at least that which removes all deliberation and consultation.

XX. Furthermore, he states that the effectiveness of Divine Providence, by which divine decrees are executed concerning human actions in general, consists in God preserving human faculties and in various ways offering or removing objects to them. Hence, the actions designated by God's decrees arise necessarily and infallibly, yet in a manner consistent with the nature and disposition of the free faculties and the conditions of the objects presented to them, and therefore remain free because no force is applied to the faculties, and the offering and presenting of any objects do not violate their liberty in any way.

XXI. Specifically, regarding good actions, besides what has already been said, he attributes nothing more to God than that He purges the faculties themselves of innate vices, endows them with new strengths, and elevates them above their native and original condition, by which actions it is clear that their liberty is in no way harmed but rather helped.

XXII. Concerning evil actions, no matter how much they fall under divine decrees, he believes it can be easily shown from his principles that God can in no way be called their author because God does not incline human minds and wills to evil, nor does He corrupt them in any way, but only permits them to exercise their own movements voluntarily. Divine providence, concerning them, only deals with the fact that these rather than other objects, and for this rather than that reason, are offered to them or permitted. From this, however, these or those actions necessarily result, as the relation of proportion and suitability between such objects and faculties disposed in a certain way demands. Thus, divine decrees about them and concerning them are executed infallibly, and yet the faculties themselves move freely because no force is applied to them, and they act according to their nature and disposition.

XXIII. Therefore, since God does nothing concerning human faculties, whether directed towards good or evil, that conflicts with their native liberty, and yet these or those acts follow infallibly from God's operation, whether good or evil, and since God decrees nothing from eternity other than what He executes in time, he concludes that these things are perfectly consistent: humans act freely, and while they act freely, they inevitably accomplish what has been constituted and designated by God's eternal decrees. These matters are discussed in greater detail by that most learned man in his disputation on free will, Chapter 4."

XXIV. However, to address this difficulty, many theologians from the Reformed School take a somewhat different approach. They not only teach that everything done by humans is predestined by God’s eternal decrees, but they also believe that these decrees have their effect not only, as that most learned man thinks, through some change in free faculties—consisting of their restoration or the addition of new strengths—but also through the proposal of various objects, both internal and external, and additionally through physical and real efficacy, by which the faculties themselves are pre-moved and predetermined to these or those free acts.

XXV. Namely, this is their doctrine: By the absolute and energetic, as they call it, decree of God, everything done by causes, even free and contingent ones, is decreed and ordered. This decree can never be invalid, but it is absolutely necessary for those things decreed by God to be fulfilled. Hence, even those things done by contingent and free causes necessarily happen with respect to this decree and cannot happen otherwise.

XXVI. Furthermore, they contend that this kind of decree applies not only to good actions of free causes but also to evil ones. For both, according to God's decree and will, occur. However, they distinguish this absolute and energetic decree into an effective decree by which God determines to effect something and a permissive decree by which God determines to permit something. They subject not only good actions of creatures but also evil ones to this effective decree, considering them in themselves and in what is positive in them, as distinct from the malice that denominates them. For they believe that both good and evil actions are determined by God not only by decreeing but also by moving and applying secondary causes to act this way or that. However, they teach that the malice of evil actions is not effected by God but only permitted.

XXVII. Nonetheless, they believe that the decree by which God determines to permit evil, though not effective, is still efficacious. Therefore, they attribute everything that happens, both good and evil, to God's decree, which they call by the Greek term "energetic," which they then subdivide into effective and efficacious. According to them, it is just as necessary for evil to occur by God permitting it as it is for good to occur by God approving and effecting it. Hence, they insist that it can and should be truly said that God wills evil to happen by permitting it, because God's will is directed not only to the permission of evil but also to the occurrence of the evil action itself.

XXVIII. Yet, they do not believe that this implies God is the author of sin. For although evil occurs by God's decree, it is not done by God's action but by the creature failing with God's permission. And although the positive aspect of any evil action is referred to God as the efficient cause, this does not make God the cause of evil, because the entity of any action, however evil, is good, while the malice formally consists in a certain deprivation of rectitude.

XXIX. If anyone objects that God seems to be the author of what He wills to be and to occur, because God's will is the cause of things, they respond that willing something per se is different from willing something as to its occurrence. Moreover, they argue that God primarily and properly wills not to prevent sin and only consequently wills the occurrence of sin because it occurs since God does not prevent it.

XXX. They also distinguish between two kinds of God's will: general and special. Special will, according to them, is that by which God simultaneously approves and effects something. The object of this will depends on it and follows it as an effect follows its cause. By this will, they teach that God wills good and does not will evil as evil, according to the saying, "God is not willing iniquity." General will, in their view, is that by which God wills something not to be and also wills not to prohibit certain things for certain reasons, and consequently, wills their occurrence, which He does not simply approve. This will is understood as God's decree by which He wills something not in terms of approval and

effecting by Himself but only in terms of a certain permitted effecting by others. Thus, they say, the thing to be done does not depend on God's will but only on the will of the deficient creature. By this will, they say that God wills sin, such as the fall of Adam, not simply but only because He wills it to occur.

XXXI. To reconcile the necessity imposed by God's decree on any events with their contingency and freedom, they first distinguish between absolute necessity and necessity that arises from a hypothesis. Absolute necessity is that by which something simply cannot be otherwise. Necessity from hypothesis is that by which something that can simply be otherwise cannot be otherwise once a certain condition is set. Furthermore, they distinguish between necessity of coercion and necessity of infallibility. Necessity of coercion is imposed by an external cause that forces things to act in this or that way. Necessity of infallibility is that by which something is certain and immutably future, yet if we consider the cause of the thing itself, it could either occur or not occur or occur differently. This kind of necessity is meant by the axiom, "Everything that is, while it is, necessarily is."

XXXII. With these distinctions established, they say that what happens by free and contingent causes happens necessarily with respect to the divine decree, but not absolutely, only based on the hypothesis of that decree. Moreover, they assert that this necessity is not of coercion but only of infallibility because God has preordained that these things happen. However, this kind of necessity does not remove the freedom of secondary causes but rather establishes it, since freedom and necessity do not mutually exclude each other, but freedom and coercion do. For, they say, it is not only necessary according to God's decree that a contingent and free cause acts but also that it acts contingently and freely. Because God, by His decree, not only determines the individual events but also their manner and way.

XXXIII. They add that God moves free causes in a way that is suitable and congruent to their nature, namely by gently bending the will and inclining it through the objects presented by the intellect, not otherwise than that a person consults and deliberates with themselves about what they are going to do and chooses what seems to them best according to their own judgment. Indeed, a free cause is thus determined by God's decree and the motion following the decree to act this or that way while retaining the power not to act or to act differently, not in a composite sense but in a divided sense. Because, although the opposite act or cessation from the same act is not consistent with divine preordination, the power to perform the contrary act or to suspend the act is perfectly consistent with it. This doctrine is found in the little book by William Perkins on the manner and order of predestination and its vindicator, Twisse, and many other distinguished men among the Reformed, as can be seen at length in the second book of Twisse's vindications of this little book by Perkins.

XXXIV. Although I respect the intellect and learning of all these men, I cannot fully agree with any of the aforementioned views. They do not remove all scruples. None of their views, in my opinion, are free from significant difficulty.

XXXV. The opinion that establishes a conditional foreknowledge of the future inclination and tendency of the will in this or that direction if such an occasion for action is presented and that states God preordained human actions only because He willed to create them in that state and present those occasions for action, from which He foresaw they would act in such a manner and elicit these rather than those volitions—not from any necessity imposed by the objects themselves or by any action of God, but because they would determine themselves in such a way while it was in their power to do otherwise—although it avoids many inconveniences urged against other opinions, it is difficult to reconcile with the victorious and inherently efficacious grace that subjects free will to itself and is not to be subjected to free will, as taught by the orthodox school.

XXXVI. Furthermore, even if God foresees what the will would do before deciding anything about us, based on the hypothesis that it is placed in certain circumstances and certain motives are present, yet if God predetermines something to be simply future before the absolute foreknowledge of our will's determination, a certain antecedent necessity arises. Since what God predetermines must necessarily happen, this necessity seems just as contrary to freedom as if no such conditional knowledge preceded it, as that knowledge does not make such a decree of God within our power.

XXXVII. In John Strangius's opinion, it seems entirely implausible to me that among those things done deliberately and considerately by humans, he distinguishes some as having one kind of freedom that consists in indifference and the ability to act or not act or to do this or that, while others have only a simple freedom that does not require the indetermination of the will but only that a person acts willingly and with judgment. He thinks this kind of freedom applies not only to all good actions but also to many actions that are neither good nor bad in themselves. Since we experience using our reason and judgment in the same way and have the power to choose in all civil actions and good actions, why should we think that some are freer than others or that not the same kind of freedom applies to all?

XXXVIII. Moreover, what compels us to say that when God moves us to good works, He takes away from us the power to act otherwise by His grace, when the efficacy of divine grace can be established without this? Divine wisdom certainly has reasons to ensure that we act in this way, and that we do so certainly and infallibly, without taking away from us the power to perform the opposite act or to suspend our own actions.

XXXIX. This is also unsatisfactory in the opinion of Moses Amyraldus, which supposes that the mind and will in all its actions are determined by objects in such a way that if these or those are presented to them in this manner and with this reasoning, they necessarily act in this or that way and cannot act otherwise or refrain from action. For if rational faculties, no less than brute ones, are determined to a certain action by their objects, what distinction will there be between the spontaneous movements of brutes and the free actions of rational creatures? And how can they be called free agents, masters of their own actions, and have their own actions in their power, if objects impose the necessity of acting on them no less than on other agents?

XL. Especially if we conceive that the first man was imposed with the necessity of eating from the forbidden fruit, through objects which, according to God's decree, and with divine providence arranging and managing, were presented to him; and that Adam could not abstain from it, considering both the strengths he had received from God and the inducements by which he was led to this act. I do not see what fault could be imputed to him that would be worthy of punishment, and how God would not be the author of his sin, since this illicit act necessarily followed from the proportion of the strengths that God had granted him, along with the temptations and various objects presented to him, not by his fault but by God's ordering and arranging.

XLI. Finally, we cannot approve in the opinion of many distinguished doctors what they say that God wills evil to happen, although He does not effect it but only permits it. For we do not think it is correct to say that God wills what He does not approve. And it cannot be said that evils happen with God's approval. Nor do we understand the sense of the distinction they make between evil and the occurrence of evil, saying that God does not will evil itself, but nevertheless wills the occurrence of evil; and that God does not will the evil itself but wills that evils happen; or, what is the same, wills the existence of evils. How can the existence of a thing be distinguished from the thing itself, and how can someone not will a thing and simultaneously will that the thing exists?

XLII. It is equally harsh to say that the very actions to which malice is necessarily annexed are predestined by God's effective decree. For how will God not be the author of sin if He predestined by His eternal decree that action by which someone hates God Himself and blasphemes His name, and according to His decree, moves and predetermines a person in time to that type of action?

XLIII. It seems manifestly absurd to follow from what they say that evil, even as evil, is preordained by God's decree, which although not effective is nevertheless efficacious and such that it necessarily follows from it. What shall we say then, that by God's decree it was necessary for the first man to rebel against God and to transgress the commandment received from Him? And how could he be justly punished for sin when he was imposed with the necessity of sinning without any preceding fault? And should not the guilt of this transgression rather be referred back to Him from whose decree such harsh necessity is supposed to have arisen?

XLIV. I know that those great men who use such expressions do not admit these consequences, and reduce their words as much as possible to a good and acceptable sense. But however much such harsh expressions are softened by kind interpretation, they cannot but offend the ears of the Christian people and inject various scruples into the minds of the listeners without any necessity. Why then insist on these modes of speaking, which are neither explicitly expressed in scripture nor used by the ancient doctors of the Church?

XLV. But someone may say, why do you criticize the opinions of others? If you have something better, bring it forth, or accept what is given. I respond that some things in this matter are certain and indisputable to me, while others are unknown. It is clear from scripture, and reason itself also supports it, that all things are governed by God's providence and are subject to divine decrees so that nothing happens without God's knowledge or will.

Whatever is done well should be referred to Him as the author of all good things, but the blame for all evil rests solely with the creature. Yet no evil happens unless God permits it by His certain counsel and does not prevent it; and God moderates the evil actions of men and uses them in such a way as to draw many goods from them and direct them to various and excellent ends.

XLVI. It is no less certain by reason and experience, and also confirmed by the authority of scripture, that men act freely, whether they act well or ill, and are so moved that they are rightly deemed worthy of praise or blame, punishment or reward, as they have acted well or ill.

XLVII. From these it follows that human liberty should be acknowledged in such a way that nothing is taken away from divine providence; and conversely, the force and efficacy of divine providence should be so extolled that the liberty of the creature is also asserted. However, as long as the liberty of the rational creature in acting is preserved, and care is taken not to transfer the creature's fault to God as if He were the cause or author of sin, nothing too much can be attributed to the decrees and efficacy of divine providence.

XLVIII. But to explain in detail what the nature of divine decrees is and how God governs and moves rational creatures in such a way that they always act freely according to their nature, I confess is beyond my comprehension. I do not doubt that divine wisdom and power, both of which are infinite, abundantly provide reasons by which this effect is achieved; but I do not think it is within my narrow understanding to grasp them. For in what I have read or been able to devise, I have found nothing that fully satisfies me, and in which my mind could rest as a known and understood thing. Therefore, I prefer to frankly admit my ignorance in this part rather than to claim to know what I am aware I do not know and to present to others as true what I am not fully persuaded of myself.

XLIX. Nor am I ashamed of this ignorance of mine. For it is safely ignored what God has not openly revealed in His word and what human reason cannot investigate by itself. Now, sacred scripture clearly teaches that all things are governed by divine providence and that nothing happens without His will or permission and that all His works are known and determined by God from eternity. But the manner in which God moves secondary causes, what the nature of His decrees is, and how He executes them and brings all things to their destined end, sacred scripture does not reveal, nor does it strive to satisfy human curiosity on this matter.

L. Indeed, it sufficiently indicates that this is a matter which God willed to be hidden and inaccessible to human intellects and into whose depth the eye of our mind cannot penetrate. This pertains to the saying of God in Isaiah: "For my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways, declares the Lord. For as the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways and my thoughts than your thoughts." And also the saying of the Apostle in the Epistle to the Romans: "Oh, the depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable are his judgments and his ways past finding out! For who has known the mind of the Lord? Or who has been his counsellor?"

LI. Nevertheless, I do not disparage the efforts of learned men who strive to shed some light on these matters and to see how far our mind can rise in such a great matter, provided it is done with due modesty and a true and serious recognition of our weakness, and that everyone presents the conjectures and thoughts of their own mind in such a way that they also listen to the reasons of others and do not think that they alone are wise, contending and wrangling bitterly with those who do not immediately subject themselves to their dictates. But these things, however they may be, should be reserved for the schools and not easily brought before the common people, lest they raise difficulties that infuse scruples into minds, which the added solutions cannot clearly and effectively dispel.

On the Veneration of Images

Part I

In which is explained the Doctrine of the Roman Church.

I. In the Roman Church, many, especially those who are more thoughtful among the common people, and even some Doctors, complain that they are slandered when they are said by Protestants to worship the images of God, Christ, and even the Saints who have died. They profess not only themselves but also their Church to be entirely opposed to this worship, and they do not attribute the worship of adoration to anything except to the one true God. Therefore, we thought it worthwhile to carefully inquire into the true doctrine of the Roman Church and School regarding the veneration and adoration of images, so that no one might attribute a foreign opinion to it, and also to see whether the Reformed justly accuse the Roman Church of the adoration of images.

II. In order to be certain of the true doctrine of the Roman Church concerning the veneration of images, we must first consult the Councils that are considered General in that Church and approved by the Roman Pontiff. Moreover, we must see what is the universal and accepted practice of that Church. Finally, we must examine what the common consensus of the Doctors received in that Church states about this matter: for from these three sources can be drawn the true and genuine Doctrine of the Roman Church. And what is defined in the General Councils of the Roman Church, confirmed by its universal practice, and held and embraced by the common consensus of its Doctors, can safely be held as a doctrine of Roman faith.

III. Furthermore, there are three Councils that the Roman Church considers Universal, which deal with images and their veneration. The first and oldest is the Second Council of Nicaea, held in the year of Christ 787, during the reign of Constantine and his mother Irene. The second is the Council of Constantinople, held in the year of Christ 869, during the reign of Basil. The third is the Council of Trent, held over several years in the sixteenth century, as is well known.

IV. Regarding the Second Council of Nicaea, which in the Roman School is called the Seventh Universal, its consistent and manifest doctrine is that the images of Christ and the Saints are to be venerated. For in the letter of this Council to Constantine and Irene, these words are found towards the end: "In this confession and without any doubt, we believe that the depiction of venerable images is accepted and pleasing before God, and that those who display the images of our Lord Jesus Christ and also of the undefiled Virgin Mother of God, indeed of the glorious Angels, and of all the Saints, should venerate and greet these images. But whoever is not so disposed, but labours and doubts concerning the adoration of venerable images, our holy and venerable Synod anathematizes him." Tom.3. Conc. Edit. Cologne Edition of 1606, page 391, letter A.

V. In the same Council, in the second session, after the reading of the letter of Pope Adrian to Tarasius, the Pope's legates asked whether they agreed with it or not; among other things,

Tarasius responded, "We agree and confirm the power of the letters read, and according to the ancient tradition of our fathers, we receive and desire these images, to venerate them in the name of Christ our God, and of our undefiled Lady the Mother of God, the Virgin, and of the holy Angels and all the Saints." To these words of Tarasius, the Synod itself added, "The whole holy Synod so believes and so teaches." Same volume, page 313, letter B.

VI. Furthermore, the Fathers of this Synod distinguish that adoration, which they believe should be given to images, from veneration, as something that imports more than simple veneration. For they condemn those who confess that they venerate images but refuse to adore them: as seen in the fourth session, where, after reading certain words of Anastasius, Bishop of Theopolis, Tarasius the Patriarch speaks thus: "Therefore all who confess that they venerate the holy images but refuse adoration are rebuked by the holy Fathers as hypocrites. For since they truly refuse adoration, which is a symbol of honour, they are known to do the contrary, namely, to revile the holy ones." Same volume, page 335.

VII. However, this Council carefully distinguishes the adoration it commands to be given to images from a certain worship which it wants to be peculiar to God; which worship it sometimes simply calls Latria, and sometimes even Latria in spirit, because it chiefly consists in the internal acts of faith, hope, trust, invocation, and similar things. Thus, Tarasius, after the cited words, in which he professes to agree with the letters of Pope Adrian and to adore the images of Christ, the Virgin Mother of God, and the Saints with him, immediately adds, "But we openly testify that we refer and attribute Latria and our faith only to the one true God."

VIII. Similarly, in the fourth session, the words of Anastasius, Bishop of Theopolis, are reported and approved: "Let no one be offended by the word adoration. For we adore both men and holy Angels, not, however, that we render Latria, that is, divine worship. For Moses says, 'You shall worship the Lord your God, and Him only shall you serve': where you will carefully observe that in the latter statement (namely Latria) he added 'only,' but did not add it to the former. Therefore, it is allowed to adore, but by no means to serve with Latria. Nor is it permitted to render Latria, which properly means to worship God."

IX. These are consistent with what is read in the seventh session in the Synodal Letter to the Emperors, which we cited above: "The divine Scripture says, 'You shall worship the Lord your God, and Him only shall you serve': it places worship absolutely, and does not add 'only' to signify the different notion and equivocation of the words. But it said 'you shall serve only,' which is why we attribute Latria only to God and refer it to Him."

X. The adoration, which they think should be given to images and is distinguished from Latria worship, they call honorific and teach that it is an emphasis or demonstration of honour, as found in the words of Anastasius, Bishop of Theopolis, mentioned above, "For what else," he says, "is the adoration of anyone than an emphasis of honour shown to them?" They constitute this emphasis of honour in certain external signs and testimonies of honour, which if anyone refuses to give to the images of Christ and the Saints, they consider him a hypocrite, even if he otherwise professes to venerate them, that is, to regard

them reverently. This is seen in the words of Tarasius, which follow the words of Anastasius and were previously related by us.

XI. As for what these testimonies of honour are, due to the images of Christ and the Saints, the Synod explains in various places. Namely, according to the Synod, they are such as kisses and embraces, as well as the offering of lights and incense. This can be gathered from what is read in the definition of the Synod, which is found at the beginning of the seventh session. There it says that the images of Jesus Christ, the Virgin Mother of God, and all the Saints should be dedicated and placed in Churches and other public and private places: not only that all who contemplate them may be brought to the memory and recollection of the prototypes and their desire, but also that they may offer them veneration and honorific adoration, not (it says) according to our faith, true Latria, which belongs only to the divine nature, but as we approach the type of the venerable and life-giving cross, and the holy Gospels, and other sacred objects, with the offerings of incense and lights, as has been piously accustomed among the ancients. For the honour given to the image reflects upon the prototype, and whoever venerates the image also venerates the subject depicted in it." Same volume, page 386.

XII. These are consistent with what is read in the first Synodal Letter to the Emperors: "These, namely the images of Christ and the Saints, are also to be venerated, that is, to be kissed and loved; for in the ancient Greek dialect, the words adorare (to adore) and φίλειν (to kiss) and ἀγαπᾶν (to love) mean the same. The preposition προς signifies desire, as in προσκυνεῖν. Hence the letter concludes that the word προσκυνέω signifies embrace and intense love." Same volume, page 390.

XIII. The doctrine of this Synod is confirmed by the Council called the Eighth General, held, as we said, in the city of Constantinople, in the year of Christ 867. For in the tenth session, this is its third Canon: We decree that the sacred image of our Lord Jesus Christ is to be venerated with the same veneration as the holy Gospels. For just as all obtain salvation through the syllables pronounced from the Gospel, so also the learned and unlearned alike derive benefit from the images painted and depicted in colours. For what the speech expresses through syllables, this the painting represents and teaches through colours. Therefore, whoever does not venerate the image of Christ the Saviour, shall not see His face at His second coming. In the same way, we venerate and adore the image of His undefiled Mother, and the holy Angels, as they are depicted in the pages of the Holy Scriptures, and of all the Saints. Whoever thinks otherwise, let him be anathema. But that this Council compares images, in terms of the worship of veneration, with the Gospel, refers to the custom of the Greeks, who venerate and adore the very codex of the Gospels with certain rites, as they do with the image of the cross.

XIV. Finally, the Council of Trent subscribed to and sanctioned the decrees of those prior Councils, teaching indeed that images do not possess divinity or any power for which they should be worshiped, nor should any trust be placed in them, but nevertheless they deserve veneration and honour, and that they should be kissed, and that the head should be uncovered and prostrated before them; because the honour given to them is referred to the prototypes they represent; so that through the images we adore Christ Himself, and venerate the Saints whose likenesses they bear. The words of this Council are in the twenty-

fifth session: Further, that the images of Christ, the Virgin Mother of God, and the other Saints should be held and retained in Churches, and that due honour and veneration should be imparted to them, not because any divinity or power is believed to reside in them, for which they should be worshiped, or that anything should be sought from them, or that any trust should be placed in the images, as was once done by the Gentiles who placed their hope in idols. But because the honour given to them is referred to the prototypes they represent, so that through the images we kiss and uncover our head and prostrate ourselves, we adore Christ and venerate the Saints whose likenesses they bear, which was sanctioned by the decrees of the Councils, especially the Second Nicene, against the opponents of images.

XV. From these it is clear, according to the doctrine of the Roman Church and the decrees of its Councils, first, that some worship, honour, and veneration are due to the images of Christ and the Saints. Secondly, that such worship is legitimately shown by kissing the images, saluting them, embracing them, prostrating oneself before them, and uncovering one's head, and offering incense and lights to them. Finally, that this worship is rightly expressed by the word adoration; but not that images are to be adored as gods, and worshiped with Latria, that is, with the highest and absolute adoration, which is reserved for the one true God alone; but that the adoration that should be shown to them is to be understood as relative and referred to the prototypes, and terminated in them. Therefore, nothing is to be asked of the images, nor is any trust to be placed in them, nor any divinity or power attributed to them.

XVI. However, what and what kind of adoration, according to the mind of the Roman Church, is due to the images of Christ and the Saints, cannot be more certainly gathered than from the solemn and universal practice of that Church. By this name, the worship that is openly exhibited to images in the churches of the Roman Church, known and seen by all, through certain solemn and public ceremonies, in which the Roman people constitute a part of their piety, is rightly considered meritorious; not objected to or disapproved of by the ordinary pastors, bishops, or the Pope; but on the contrary, it is publicly approved and defended by many Doctors and Bishops, while others silently consent by their silence and not speaking against it.

XVII. Such is not only the custom of saluting, kissing, and bending the knee before the images of Christ and the Saints, and also offering incense and lights to them, which, as we have seen, are expressly approved by the Councils of the Roman Church; but also the accepted custom of placing images on altars, adorning them with precious garments and ornaments, carrying them in solemn procession through public streets, dedicating vows to them, consecrating gifts to them, and undertaking religious pilgrimages to them.

XVIII. These things are done throughout the whole Roman Church, and are not publicly disapproved of by any who are eminent in authority, doctrine, or dignity in that Church, and who are considered orthodox, but on the contrary, are publicly approved and defended by many. For example, by Jesuit Coster in his "Enchiridion of Controversies" in the chapter on the use and veneration of images. Therefore, he says, Christians who adore and pray to Christ in His image with knees bent, heads uncovered, and hands joined, asking for mercy, help, and assistance from Him, are not to be reprehended. Nor are those who adorn the

images with garments, ornaments, and similar things. Nor is the custom of Christians reprehensible, but commendable, by which they light candles before the images in honour of the Saints. Finally, the custom of carrying statues and images in processions is approved by ancient usage and rightly commendable.

XIX. Similar things are seen in John Molanus, the theologian of Louvain, who in his book on the history of sacred images, defends and promotes their public procession, placement on altars, and the practice of adorning them with precious garments. For in the second book, chapter thirty-four, the title is, "The Procession of Images in Supplications is Defended against Superstition." And the title of chapter thirty-nine is, "The Images of the Saints are Not Profaned and Pagan, but Religiously Adorn the Altars." And the title of the following chapter is, "The Images of the Saints are Rightly Covered with Gold and Silver, and Adorned with Crowns or Precious Garments."

XX. But in some, the practice of the Roman Church seems not to be in full agreement with the decrees of its Councils. For as we have seen above, the Second Nicene Synod, along with Anastasius, teaches that it is not allowed to ask anything from the image. And similarly, the Council of Trent teaches that nothing is to be asked from the image. Yet in the public use of the Roman Church, there are some prayers directed to the images themselves.

XXI. For in the Breviary of the Roman Church, established according to the decree of the Council of Trent and published by the command of Pope Pius V, there is found this prayer directed to the cross, as distinct from Christ: "O Cross, more splendid than all the stars, famous throughout the world, much beloved by men, holier than all, which alone was worthy to bear the ransom of the world, sweet wood, sweet nails, bearing a sweet burden, save the gathered company praising you today." On the Feasts of May 3rd and September 14th.

XXII. In the hymn which begins, "The royal banners forward go," and which is customarily sung on the Saturday before Passion Sunday and on other solemn days, the cross is adorned with various praises which distinguish it from Christ, and it is called "Beautiful and bright tree, adorned with the purple of the King, chosen to touch so holy limbs. Blessed is the wood on which hung the price of the world." Then this prayer is conceived: "Hail, O cross, our only hope, in this time of the Passion, increase the grace of the pious and grant forgiveness to the guilty."

XXIII. And Thomas Aquinas, the chief of the Roman School, recognized that this prayer is directed to the cross, as distinct from Christ. For from this he concludes that the cross is to be worshipped with Latria, using this argument: "We offer Latria to that in which we place our hope of salvation; but we place our hope of salvation in the cross of Christ: for the Church sings, 'Hail, O cross, our only hope, in this time of the Passion, increase the grace of the pious and grant forgiveness to the guilty.' Therefore, the cross of Christ is to be worshipped with Latria." The conclusion of the article is conceived in these words: "The cross of Christ, on which Christ was crucified, is to be worshipped with Latria both because of its representation and because of the contact with the members of Christ; but

the image of the cross in any other material is to be worshipped with Latria only because of its representation." In the Summa, part three, question 25, article four.

XXIV. However, those who, to avoid this absurdity, today want to interpret the cross by a certain metonymy as referring to Christ Himself in such prayers, do violence to the very words. For what laws of speech allow the cross to be taken for Christ crucified in those places where it is opposed to Christ, and is distinguished from Christ, and is celebrated as ennobled by the contact of Christ's body?"

XXV. There is also a certain prayer, said to have been issued by Pope John XXII, with the concession of ten thousand days of indulgences for those who devoutly recite it while gazing at the Veronica, to which this prayer is directed. The Veronica is called a certain image of the face of Christ imprinted on a cloth, which is said to be kept in the church of Saint Peter in Rome, as well as in a certain city in Spain, according to Marineo Siculus in the fifth book of his "De Rebus Hispaniae." This image is called Veronica by the name of the woman to whom the cloth is said to have been given, which was applied to the face of Christ, stained with blood and sweat, and retained His likeness. Furthermore, this is how the prayer, which is read in the book titled "Antidotarius Animae," goes:

Hail, holy face of our Redeemer,
In which shines the appearance of divine splendour,
Imprinted on a cloth of snowy whiteness,
Given to Veronica as a sign of love.
Hail, glory of the age, mirror of the Saints,
Which the spirits of heaven long to see;
Purify us from all stain of vices,
And join us to the company of the blessed.
Hail, blessed image of the Lord's face,
Marvelously adorned with eternal grace:
Shed light in our hearts by your given power,
And take away the bonds from our senses.
Hail, strength of our Christian faith,
Destroying the heretics who are of vain mind:
Increase the merit of those who truly believe in you,
The image of Him who is the King from the bread.
Hail, our joy in this harsh life,
Fleeting and fragile, soon to perish:
Lead us to our homeland, O blessed figure,
To see the pure face of Christ.

XXVI. Moreover, the Council of Trent decreed that it should not be believed that there is any power in images for which they should be worshipped. But the practice of the Roman Church presupposes the opposite; not only in the aforementioned prayer, in which the image of the face of Christ is attributed the power to shed light in hearts, but also in others that are more solemn and customary in that Church. For when the Bishop blesses a cross made of stone or metal, he has a prayer addressed to our Lord Christ, which is included in the Roman Pontifical under the title "On the Blessing of a New Cross." In this prayer,

contrasting the true cross on which Christ was affixed with the cross made of metal or stone, he asks Christ the Lord to sanctify the cross to be consecrated with the holiness of His true cross and to grant that, by the merit of this stone or silver cross, the souls of the servants of Christ may be free from all committed sin. The words of the prayer are:

> You owe no other more fitting service than that which the dedication of the body affixed to you then offered; nor is there any offering more familiar to you than that which was consecrated by the familiar extension of your hands. Therefore, receive this cross with those hands with which you embraced that other one, and sanctify this one with the holiness of that one; and just as through that cross the world was cleansed from guilt, so may the souls of your most devout servants, by the merit of this cross, be free from all committed sin; and by the intercession of your true cross, may they shine with perpetual triumph.

XXVII. There is also a prayer directed to God the Father, in which the Bishop asks that the sign of the cross which he holds in his hands may be a saving remedy for the human race and a protection and defence against the darts of the enemies. The prayer is conceived in these terms: We ask you, holy Lord, almighty Father, eternal God, that you deign to bless this sign of your cross, that it may be a saving remedy for the human race; the solidity of faith; the progress of good works; the redemption of souls; and a comfort and protection and defence against the fierce darts of the enemies, etc. Those who have such a prayer to God, if they trust that they will be heard, must necessarily believe that this stone or metal cross thereby receives power from God, through which it can procure various blessings for men, both temporal and spiritual, contrary to the definition of the Council of Trent. For otherwise, how could it be said that it was made, as the prayer asks, a saving remedy for the human race and a defence against the fierce darts of the enemies?

XXVIII. The same applies to those wax images, commonly called the "Agnus Dei," which the Pope is accustomed to consecrate in the first year of his Pontificate, and also afterwards, every seventh year, to serve as symbolic images of our Lord Jesus Christ, who is the true Lamb of God who takes away the sins of the world. For while the Pope consecrates them, he repeatedly prays to God with many prayers, asking that those images may receive power against diabolical deceptions, against storms, against pestilence, against epilepsy, and other evils and inconveniences. This can be seen in the book of sacred ceremonies, in the chapter titled "On the Consecration of the Agnus Dei." Among many similar prayers, one is in which the Pope, after some prefatory remarks, addresses God thus: Just as that Lamb, whose blood was used to anoint the doorposts and lintels of houses after it was sacrificed, delivered your people from Egyptian persecution at midnight: and just as that innocent Lamb, immolated by your will on the altar of the cross, Jesus Christ, your Son, delivered our first parent from diabolical power, so may these spotless lambs, which we offer to be consecrated in the sight of your Divine Majesty, receive power. May you deign to bless, sanctify, and consecrate them, so that, sanctified by your abundant blessing, they may receive the same power against all diabolical deceptions and the wiles of the wicked spirit, so that no storm may prevail against those who devoutly carry them, no adversity may dominate, no pestilential aura or corrupted air, no epilepsy, no storm at sea, no fire, nor

any iniquity may dominate or prevail against them; may mother and child be preserved in safety, etc."

XXIX. Indeed, Pope Urban V. was quite confident that his prayer had been heard when he sent three Agnus Dei to the Greek Emperors, along with these verses, which are transcribed at the end of the already cited chapter:

Balm and pure wax, with the water of chrism,
Make the Lamb, which I give you as a great gift,
Sanctified through mystical waters as if born from the font.
It drives away lightning from above, all malignant
Sin it breaks, as Christ's blood does, and it assuages.
The pregnant are preserved, and childbirth is delivered.
It grants gifts to the worthy, destroys the power of fire:
Carried purely, it rescues from the waves.

Given these facts, according to the mind of the Pope, who is the head of the Roman Church, these wax lambs are to be excluded from the number of images, which the Council of Trent declares have no power for which they should be worshipped.

XXX. Regarding the Doctors of the Roman Church, some of them seem to teach contrary to what we have found defined by the Councils of that Church. For there are those who simply deny that images should be worshipped and claim that it is a slander to say that they worship the images of Christ and the Saints, as we have already observed above. Yet the Councils of the Roman Church, namely the Second Nicene and the Constantinopolitan, which is called the Eighth General, approved by the Council of Trent, have anathematized those who say that adoration is not to be given to images. However, the intention of these Doctors is not to condemn the already mentioned Councils or in any way depart from their doctrine. For when they deny that images are to be worshipped, they mean this in terms of the highest and absolute adoration, which is given to something as the ultimate end and first principle and primary author of all good, which adoration they acknowledge to be due only to God; but not in terms of relative or inferior adoration, which they do not deny can be given to images, and which the Councils of the Roman Church sanction as to be given to images alone.

XXXI. On the contrary, among those who are eminent in the Roman School, many do not simply teach that images are to be worshipped, but insist that the images of God and Christ are to be worshipped with latria, which the Roman School usually designates as the highest worship, proper to God alone. However, the Councils of the Roman Church carefully distinguish the adoration they want to be given to the images of Christ and the Saints from latria, as we have shown above. But even they do not wish to appear to disagree with these Councils and think that their view can be easily reconciled with the definitions of their Synods. They say, namely, that the images of God and Christ are indeed to be worshipped with latria, but not for their own sake, but because of the prototypes, and thus that latria is not absolute but relative; or at least that latria is given to them not per se, but per accidens, as they are considered together with the prototype, constituting one entity with it. And the Councils, which do not want latria to be given to any images, are to be

understood as speaking of absolute latria, not of relative; or of latria per se, not of latria per accidens.

XXXII. Therefore, the Doctors of the Roman Church, although they speak somewhat differently, nevertheless agree among themselves regarding those things which have been sanctioned and defined by the Councils of that Church. First, namely, that images are to be held and retained in churches not for mere commemoration, but that some worship and honour are due to the images of Christ, the Blessed Virgin, and other Saints, and can rightly be given to them. Secondly, that this honour can rightly and sensibly be expressed by the word adoration. Thirdly, that the signs of reverence and submission shown to those images by uncovering the head in salutation, kissing them, bending the knee before them, and finally offering incense and lights, are legitimate marks of honour and by no means blameworthy.

XXXIII. Consequently, Vázquez rightly asserts, according to the mind of the Roman School, that it is a Catholic truth that adoration should be given to images, that is, signs of servitude and submission, by embrace, lights, offering of incense, uncovering the head, etc. And so, he does not simply classify as erring those who, in the time of the Seventh Synod, judged that images should be retained everywhere, not just for decoration, but also to arouse the memory of the exemplar among the faithful, so that they might venerate the exemplar in front of the images, but who did not show any sign of honour or submission to the images, neither by kissing, nor by bodily inclination, nor in any other way, because they said this was idolatry. Therefore, they did not kiss the images, nor bow their bodies to them, nor offer incense; but standing straight before them, being reminded of the exemplar, they directed their minds to it alone. For this reason, they were condemned in the Seventh Synod, and against them it was defined in that Synod that it is not enough if one says he venerates images unless he also adores them. In the third part of Thomas, vol. 1, disputation 106, chapter 1 and 2.

XXXIV. However, from this error Vázquez in the same place defends Holcot, Durandus, and Pico della Mirandola, whom he shows did not deny that we should embrace images, salute and kiss them, and uncover the head before them; even if they said that images are only improperly adored by this, and that it is not properly adoration of the image but of the exemplar. Therefore, at the end of the second chapter of the aforementioned disputation, he affirms that it is a crime and an intolerable error to judge that images should not be adored in any way.

XXXV. But although the theologians of the Roman School by common consent acknowledge that images are to be worshipped and adored in some way, and that it is pious and laudable to devoutly kiss them, burn incense to them, light candles before them, and bend the knee or prostrate oneself before them, they do not agree among themselves on what the nature and character of this worship should be. This is observed by Vázquez in the already cited disputation 108, chapter 1. For while all Catholics, he says, against the Iconoclasts easily agree that some worship, adoration, is to be given to images, they vary in the manner or very nature of the adoration.

XXXVI. To better understand this disagreement, first of all, we need to note and explain certain distinctions commonly used in this question to clearly explain their position. First, they observe that something can be honoured either per se or per accidens. Something is honoured per se, they say, when it is the subject in which the reason for veneration resides; per accidens, when it is something connected with the thing that is worshipped but is not itself the reason for worship. For example, when a king is honoured, the person who is the king is honoured per se; the royal robes and other adjuncts and accidents are honoured per accidens, except for the royal dignity which, although it is not the thing that is honoured, is that by which the person is honoured. Thus, the person is honoured per se, as is the royal dignity, while the other things are honoured per accidens.

XXXVII. Secondly, they say something can be honoured either for its own sake or for another reason. It is honoured for its own sake, they say, if it has within itself a reason for veneration that does not depend on anything else; and in this way, only the nature of reason is venerable. Something is honoured for another reason if it has within itself a cause for honour, but that cause entirely depends on something else. And in this way, the signs of sacred things are venerable; they have in themselves a relationship of resemblance or representation of a sacred thing and hence some excellence, but that excellence depends entirely on the sacred thing itself.

XXXVIII. Thirdly, they note that something can be honoured either properly or improperly. Something is properly said to be honoured when it is truly honoured for its own sake. It is said to be honoured improperly when it is honoured in place of another. An ambassador of the king is sometimes honoured as an ambassador, and in that case, he is properly honoured, even though he is honoured for another; sometimes he is honoured in place of the king with the honour proper to kings, and in that case, he is improperly honoured; properly, the king is honoured in him. This becomes clearer when a funeral is held in the absence of the body, around a statue, and all the actions that would be done around the body are done around the statue, etc. All these distinctions are found in Bellarmine's second book on the Church Triumphant, chapter twenty.

XXXIX. With these observations in mind, the Roman School inquires whether images are to be properly adored or only improperly. There were some among the old scholastics who acknowledged that images are to be adored in some way, and that it is lawful to kiss them, bow before them, and perform other signs of honour around them, but they did not thereby consider images to be properly but only improperly and abusively adored because these actions, although done around images, are not done in honour of the images but in honour of the prototype, and the images are not the terminus to which that adoration is referred.

XL. This opinion is attributed to Durandus, Holcot, and Pico della Mirandola, but it is generally rejected by more recent scholastics and is considered rash. This can be seen in the works of Vázquez, Suarez, Bellarmine, Gregory of Valencia, Puteanus, and others who commonly assert that images are properly and truly to be adored.

XLI. Although recent theologians agree that images are properly and truly to be adored, they nevertheless dispute among themselves about the manner and nature of this

adoration. They all admit that images should not be adored for their own sake but only for the sake of the exemplar they represent and whose likeness they bear. But the question is whether, although the image is adored for the sake of the exemplar, it can still in itself be a complete object of adoration, so that it is adored with an adoration different from that given to the exemplar, and which thus terminates in the image itself, making the image alone, not the exemplar, the proximate and immediate material of the adoration. Just as the ambassador of the king is honoured for the king, whose name he represents, but can still be honoured in a way that terminates directly in himself, with a different and lesser honour than that due to the king himself

XLII. Some, like Gabriel Vázquez, reject this manner of adoration as superstitious and foolish because, they say, it is foolish for a rational creature to subject itself to an irrational creature and exhibit servitude to it. Therefore, they contend that an image, per se and without the prototype or separate from it, cannot be licitly adored; not only because it must be venerated for the sake of the exemplar as the remote reason, just as the ambassador is honoured for the king, but also because whoever adores an image must venerate in it and through it the exemplar as the terminus and proximate material of veneration. These are the words of Gabriel Vázquez in volume one on the third part of Thomas, disputation 109, chapter 3.

XLIII. However, many others teach that it is licit and proper to adore images without at the same time adoring the exemplar, so that the images themselves are the proximate and complete terminus of adoration. Among these is Francisco Suarez, who affirms that although it is true that images can only be adored for the sake of the exemplar, they can nevertheless be properly adored in themselves without directly adoring the exemplar as the object. Volume one on the third part of Thomas, disputation fifty-four, section 5.

XLIV. Likewise, Bellarmine holds this view, stating that the images of Christ and the saints are to be venerated not only per accidens or improperly but also per se and properly, so that they themselves terminate the veneration as considered in themselves and not only as standing in place of the exemplar. The Church Triumphant, book two, chapter twenty-one.

XLV. This is also the doctrine of Puteanus, who acknowledges that the image of Christ, and therefore the image of any saint, can be adored so that the material object of our adoration is the image alone. In the third part of Thomas, question twenty-five, article three.

XLVI. Among these theologians who teach that images can be adored without at the same time adoring the exemplar, and with a peculiar worship that terminates in the images themselves, there is a question about what kind of worship this is and what it should be called. According to Bellarmine, the worship properly due to images is a certain imperfect worship that analogically and reductively pertains to the type of worship due to the exemplar. He explains it this way: Images are not properly subject to latria, hyperdulia, dulia, or any other kind of worship given to rational nature. A lifeless and irrational thing is not capable of such worship; rather, it is a certain inferior and varied worship according to the variety of images. Therefore, the worship due to images of the saints is not properly

dulia but a lower form of worship, which can be called dulia in a certain respect or analogically and reductively. Similarly, the worship due to images of the Blessed Virgin is not simply hyperdulia but hyperdulia in a certain respect or analogically and reductively. Finally, the worship due to images of Christ is not true and simple latria but a certain inferior worship, which is nevertheless reduced to latria as the imperfect to the perfect. The Church Triumphant, book two, chapter twenty-five.

XLVII. According to others, it should simply be said that the image of Christ, when adored alone and separately from the exemplar, is indeed owed latria, but relative, not absolute. This is the first conclusion of Puteanus on article three, question twenty-five, cited above. When the material object of our adoration is only the image of Christ, and the reason for adoring is Christ alone, represented by that image, this adoration is not properly latria, or as others say, it is not absolute latria. Rather, it is latria that is given because of the created excellence that exists in the thing worshipped, not because it is a created thing, but because it has some relationship to the uncreated excellence.

XLVIII. Moreover, according to this doctrine of Puteanus, it should similarly be said that the images of the Virgin Mary are to be adored with hyperdulia, not absolute but relative; and the images of other saints are also owed relative, not absolute dulia.

XLIX. Furthermore, there is a question among the Doctors of the Roman Church about whether the image and the exemplar can and should be adored simultaneously with one and the same act of adoration, namely, while considering the exemplar as clothed in the image and the image as containing the exemplar, and as if animated by it, so that in the mind of the adorer the image and the exemplar constitute one thing. Some Doctors of the Roman School do not acknowledge this mode of adoring images and consider the adoration of the image to be always a different act from that by which the exemplar itself is adored. This is the opinion of Martin Perez de Ayala in his book on Traditions, where he deals with the cult of images, and of Ambrosius Catharinus in his singular work on the adoration of images, as testified by Vázquez and Suarez in the frequently cited disputations.

L. However, many Doctors of the Roman Church are of the opinion that an image can and should be adored with the same adoration as the exemplar, so that the image is adored for the sake of the prototype, and the prototype is adored in the image with one and the same act, of which the adequate object is both the exemplar and the image together. This opinion is extensively supported and explained by Francisco Suarez, in his first volume on the third part of Thomas, disputation fifty-four, frequently mentioned before. To clarify his position, Suarez observes that although the image does not really contain the prototype in its own being, it does contain it representatively. Therefore, when a person is presented with such an image, they apprehend the prototype as if it were truly present in the image and conceive both together as one. Thus, with this apprehension, the worshipper's mind is carried by one act of adoration, primarily towards the prototype and concomitantly towards the image, so that by kissing the image, they adore Christ himself; not through deception, since they do not judge the image to be Christ, but through the simple and vivid representation of the prototype in the image, as if it were present.

LI. Vázquez, on the other hand, believes that the image can indeed be adored with the same act as the exemplar, but he contends that images cannot be adored except with the exemplar, and must be adored with it. "The widespread and ancient theological opinion, which I consider true," he says, "is that the motion of adoration towards the image passes into its prototype and exemplar so that they both fall under the same veneration, and the image cannot be adored by itself, without the exemplar, or separated from it." He further teaches that not only can the image be adored with the exemplar in the same act of adoration, but also that the image in itself, unless it contains and is joined with the exemplar, is not capable of any veneration or adoration and therefore is to be venerated only with the exemplar, which together with it constitutes the complete and proximate terminus of adoration. Disputation one hundred and eight, cited above, chapter three.

LII. The foundation of his opinion is that no inanimate or irrational thing without a rational element is capable of honour, worship, reverence, or adoration in itself. This is because adoration is the will to show a sign of submission due to some excellence. Now the mind's submission and servitude are directed only towards what one apprehends as superior and endowed with greater excellence, which, in relation to humans, an image without the exemplar cannot be considered. He elaborates on this in chapter nine of the aforementioned disputation. He also asserts that anyone who venerates an image in itself, without the exemplar in it, can be accused of folly or idolatry: either because they subject themselves to an irrational thing and exhibit servitude against right reason, or because in submitting to it, they attribute to it some divinity, dignity, or virtue, which is a heathen error, not a Christian religion.

LIII. Moreover, as can be gathered from the aforementioned points, Vázquez notes that an act of adoration consists of two parts. One is the external sign of submission, such as kneeling, bowing the head, etc. The other is the internal affect of submission, by which one, from an apprehension of excellence and dignity, desires to show that sign to someone as excellent. Without this, the external sign would not be adoration and worship; it could be done in jest or mockery. The external sign and the internal affect of submission are not two adorations, but from both, one act of reverence and honour is constituted, just as in general a virtuous act is constituted by the internal and the external.

LIV. Again, therefore, the question arises whether, when the image and the exemplar are adored together with one and the same act of adoration, both parts of that act, i.e., both the internal affect of submission and its external sign, pertain and are terminated not only to the exemplar but also to the image. Vázquez, consistent with his stated foundation, believes that when the image and the exemplar are adored together, only the external sign of submission pertains and is terminated to the image, while the internal affect of submission is directed only towards the exemplar and regards only it. For in chapter seven of the frequently mentioned disputation 108, he states that it is manifestly gathered from various testimonies of Councils and Fathers that the adoration of the image and the exemplar is one and the same, not as theologians usually think, but in such a way that there is one act of submission which is directed solely towards the exemplar, while the external sign of it regards only the image and, through it, the submission passes in thought and desire to the exemplar itself.

LV. Francisco Suarez, however, asserts that when the image and the exemplar are adored together with one and the same act, not only the external sign of submission but also the internal submission of the mind is directed towards the image and that submission regards not only the exemplar but also the image with the exemplar: so that the entire and complete object of that adoration is the image, not just what is external and sensible in that adoration. "It must be said," he states, "that it is rightly possible for the prototype in the image and the image for the prototype to be adored with one interior and exterior act." Volume 3 in the 3rd part of Thomas, disputation 54, section 3. And he adds that when someone apprehends the image and the prototype as one object, the person is carried to worship that object with a single movement of the body and a single act of the will: it is not necessary to distinguish formal reasons in such an act. He concludes from this that the image is also adored not only with an external act, which is insufficient for adoration, but also with the internal movement and intention of the worshipper, not merely abusively, but truly and properly.

LVI. Furthermore, from this hypothesis, that the image can and should be worshipped with one and the same act of adoration as the exemplar, it follows that images can and should be worshipped with the same kind of worship as the exemplar. Therefore, the images of saints can be worshipped with dulia, which is the worship proper to saints; the images of the Blessed Virgin can be worshipped with hyperdulia, which is her proper worship; and the images of God and Christ can be worshipped with latria, which is the worship due to God. This is also acknowledged and taught by many scholastics with Thomas Aquinas.

LVII. The theologians of the Roman School attempt to show in various ways how an image can be worshipped with latria without committing the crime of idolatry. First, Bellarmine says that sometimes the image serves as a substitute for the exemplar, and what is done around the image as if it were present is done around the image with the mind fixed only on the exemplar, not on the image, and then it can be said that the image is worshipped with the same worship as the exemplar, not properly but improperly. Thus, according to him, on Good Friday, when the crucifix is gradually unveiled and presented for adoration, many acts pertaining to the worship of latria are done around the image of the crucified, but all those acts are understood to be offered to Christ himself through the image: at that time, properly speaking, the honour of latria is not given to the image but only to the exemplar, yet it can be said that the image is also honoured with latria improperly.

LVIII. Moreover, he teaches that the image of Christ can be worshipped with latria not only improperly but also properly, though accidentally, not per se: if someone worships Christ as he is objectively present in his image, and venerates him thus represented and as if clothed in the image. Then necessarily, the image is worshipped with the same worship as Christ himself because the image is at that time conceived as conjoined with the exemplar being worshipped. Whoever worships someone also worships all that is conjoined with them; just as one who worships a robed king worships both the king and the robes. But this worship is accidental, not per se because in that case, the image is neither the suppositum that is worshipped nor the reason for the adoration but something adjunct.

Bellarmine believes that it is forbidden to worship the image with latria properly and per se, but not to worship it with latria improperly or accidentally. However, since what is true only improperly or accidentally should not simply be affirmed, he does not want to say that latria is due to images, but rather the opposite, especially if the sermon is to the people. The Church Triumphant, book 2, chapters 22 and 23.

LIX. Vázquez, however, addresses this difficulty differently according to his own principles. Although he insists that the image should be worshipped along with the exemplar in one act of adoration and not otherwise, in that act, as already explained, he distinguishes two parts: one is the submission of the mind itself, and the other is the external sign of that submission. He does not want the former, the submission of the mind, to regard the image in any way or to terminate in it, but to be referred only to the exemplar. Only the latter part, the external sign of submission, he wants to be given to the image and through it to pass to the exemplar. Thus, when someone kneels or bows before the image, they do so, according to his opinion, as a sign of servitude and reverence, which is thought to be due not to the image but to the prototype alone. He interprets the term "latria" to signify not the external sign of submission and reverence in itself, but the affect of subjection, and the sign itself as it is completed by the internal affect of servitude toward God. Therefore, he concludes that the Second Council of Nicaea rightly denies that latria should be offered to images because they are not to be given that internal submission in which latria properly consists.

LX. Nevertheless, he contends that it can be said absolutely that images are adored with the adoration of latria. Although images are not given that affect of servitude, which is called latria, they are worshipped accidentally with latria because they are given external worship through signs derived from the affect of latria towards the exemplar. He considers this sufficient to say that the image is worshipped accidentally with the prototype, not per se, with the adoration of latria.

LXI. Finally, Francisco Suarez, who believes that the image can be worshipped with the exemplar in one and the same act of adoration, both internal and external, not only abusively but truly and properly, also teaches that the image of Christ can be worshipped truly and properly with the adoration of latria. This act, being one and indivisible, terminates both in the prototype and the image. He does not think this contradicts the Councils of the Roman Church, which prohibit offering latria to images or any other creatures. For when the image of Christ is worshipped in this manner, the act of latria primarily tends towards Christ and only secondarily towards the image. Although, in his judgment, a creature cannot be primarily worshipped with latria, it can be worshipped with latria concomitantly; just as the king's robe is worshipped with the honour given to the king. He adds that the same act of adoration, by which Christ and his image are worshipped, is absolute latria with respect to Christ and relative latria with respect to the image. This is because that honour is given to Christ due to his excellence, and to the image due to Christ's excellence, whom it represents. He finds no contradiction in worshipping a creature with latria as long as that latria is relative and not absolute, that is, as long as the worship given to the creature is for the sake of God and not for the creature itself.

Part II

In which the Doctrine of the Reformed Church is Explained and Confirmed.

I. From the points raised in the preceding theses, it is evident that the councils of the Roman Church do not indeed teach that any images should be considered gods or that any power should be attributed to them for which they should be worshiped with the highest and absolute worship. However, these same councils consistently state that images, not only of Christ but also of the Virgin Mary and other saints, are worthy of some form of worship, not for their own sake, but because of the exemplar they represent.

II. We have also clearly demonstrated that the worship which the Roman Church offers to images, according to the common practice of its school and indeed the definitions of the councils to which it submits, can rightly be expressed with the term "adoration." Thus, this worship, according to the teachings of those councils and the practice of the Roman Church, is legitimately and piously rendered to images by bowing, kneeling, uncovering the head, kissing them, and offering candles and incense.

III. From this, it is clear that the doctors of the Roman Church unjustly complain about Protestants attributing to the Roman Church the adoration of images, as if this were a calumny. For what calumny is there in attributing to the Roman Church what its school teaches should be done and what it professes to do in its councils, declaring it rightly and piously done under anathema?

IV. There is no reason for them to say that the adoration they offer to images is not the highest and absolute adoration which they acknowledge to be owed only to God; nor do they consider images as gods, but they only worship them with a certain inferior adoration, which is referred to the prototypes. For when Protestants accuse the Roman Church of worshiping images, they do not intend to attribute to the Roman Church that it considers images as gods, nor do they worship them with another adoration than a relative one and which is below the highest. Moreover, they are so far from that, that they do not even think it can be attributed to the more intelligent and not utterly foolish pagans without injury. For their wise men and philosophers often declare that they do not consider stone or wooden images as gods, nor do they worship them with any other mind than to honour the deities of which they are signs and representations. Since, therefore, Protestants believe and say that images are worshiped by the Roman Church in no other way than that which it approves and professes, it is clear that they do not impute anything to it in this matter by calumny.

V. However, although the whole Roman Church and school agree that some form of worship is to be given to images of Christ and the saints, and that this worship can rightly and appropriately be signified by the term "adoration," it has been shown that the Roman school doctors disagree greatly among themselves in explaining the nature of this worship, diverging into various opinions on this matter. To better understand this variety and briefly present it, it should be noted with Francisco Suarez that adoration can be directed to an image in three ways: first, by directing the whole intention of the mind to the exemplar represented in the image as the object properly, for itself, and solely worshipped, and not

to the image; second, by directing the adoration to both the represented exemplar and the image in which it is represented, forming from both together in the mind one adequate object to which it is directed and which is the adequate material around which the adoration revolves, according to the intention of the worshiper; third, by directing the adoration to the image alone as the matter or thing worshipped in itself, but to the exemplar only as the reason for worship. (Tomus Primus in Tertiam Thomæ, Disputatio 54, Sectio 4).

VI. Some of the older scholastics believe that images should only be worshipped in the first way, that is, it is lawful indeed to bow and kneel before them and to offer candles and incense, but the worshiper should direct his whole mind's intention not to the image itself but only to the exemplar represented by the image as the object worshipped properly and for itself. Hence, they conclude that images are only worshipped improperly and abusively. However, in the more recent school, this opinion is entirely rejected as rash and improbable, and it is established as something certain and indubitable that images are to be worshipped properly and truly.

VII. Therefore, others teach that images can be worshipped not only in the first way but also in the second way, meaning that it is lawful not only to worship the exemplar in the presence of the image but also to direct and terminate the adoration to both the exemplar and the image together, forming one total object from the two in the mind. However, they reject the third mode of adoration as illicit, in which the image alone is worshipped as a thing worshipped in itself, even if it is worshipped because of the exemplar, which is the reason for that adoration.

VIII. Conversely, some reject the second mode of worship, in which the exemplar and the image are worshipped together with one and the same act of adoration as one total object, but believe that images can and should be worshipped not only in the first but also in the third way, so that the adoration is directed to the image alone as the thing worshipped in itself, while the exemplar is only indirectly regarded, namely as the reason why the image is worshipped. Although the image should be worshipped in itself and for itself, it is not worshipped except for the sake of the exemplar, just as a means is loved for itself and in itself, although it is not loved except for the end.

IX. Finally, most theologians of the Roman Church believe that images can be rightly and piously worshipped in all three ways, namely by directing adoration properly and for itself either to the exemplar alone, to the image alone, or to both the exemplar and the image together as one total object.

X. Again, those who believe that the image and the exemplar can and should be worshipped together with one and the same act of adoration differ among themselves in that some think that only what is external in adoration refers to and terminates in the image, while the internal movement of the heart is referred to the exemplar alone. However, many others contend that the image can be worshipped together with the exemplar not only with the same external act of adoration but also with the same internal submission of the mind, as was more fully explained in the previous theses. In these, it was also shown that the worship given to the image, according to the opinion of many, is of the

same kind and nature as that given to the exemplar itself, so that the images of Christ are to be worshipped with latria, those of the saints with dulia, and those of the Blessed Virgin Mary with hyperdulia. According to others, however, the worship that is properly and for itself given to images is of a different and inferior kind and order than the worship of the exemplar itself, but nevertheless is analogically referred to and reduced to it.

XI. But whatever may be said about this diversity of opinions in the Roman school, all its doctors agree on this, as has often been stated: 1. That some form of worship is to be given to images of Christ and the saints. 2. That this worship can rightly be signified by the term "adoration." 3. That this worship is legitimately rendered by uncovering the head, kneeling, and offering lights and incense before the images.

XII. All such worship, by whatever name it is called, Protestants unanimously reject as superstitious and contrary to the word of God. And this is the status of this controversy between the Roman Church and all Protestant Churches: whether it is pious and pleasing to God to bow, uncover the head, burn incense, light candles, and perform similar religious rites before images, whether of Christ or of the saints. This the Protestants unanimously deny, while the doctors of the Roman Church affirm it as something decreed by their Church under anathema and confirmed by its solemn and universal practice.

XIII. Furthermore, what moves the Protestants to hold this opinion is the express command of God contained in the Decalogue and often repeated in sacred Scripture: "You shall not make for yourself a carved image, or any likeness of anything that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the waters under the earth; you shall not bow down to them nor serve them." Where, since God simply forbids us to worship or serve any likeness of things in heaven, on earth, or in the waters, they rightly conclude that images of God, or Christ, or the saints reigning in heaven are not to be worshipped with any adoration or service, just as no other images are to be; since both images of Christ and of the saints are among the likenesses that represent things in heaven, to which God's law abrogates all worship.

XIV. To this, the Doctors of the Roman School respond in various ways, but their arguments are not difficult to refute. First, some indeed concede that by this command of God, all worship and adoration of images are prohibited, whatever form they may take, and that it was God's intention that no images, whether of any creature or of God Himself, should be erected and set up for worship in a manner suitable for adoration. However, they contend that this command is positive and ceremonial, and thus was abrogated by the Gospel, like other things that pertained to legal rites, and that the Church is no longer bound to observe it. This is the opinion of Gabriel Vasquez, which he proposes and attempts to defend extensively in the first volume of his work on the Third Part of Thomas, in Disputation 104. This view is also embraced by Jesuit Lorinus, writing on the seventeenth chapter of the Acts of the Apostles. They follow Ambrose Catharinus, Martin de Ayala, and Dominic à Soto, writers of the previous century.

XV. But if this prohibition, "You shall not make for yourself a carved image, etc.," is a positive law that temporarily forbids any images of God or any creature to be proposed for worship, then indeed it constitutes a particular commandment that should not be

confused with the first commandment, "You shall have no other gods before Me," which is a moral commandment and purely natural law. It is clearly different to acknowledge the one true God and have no other gods before Him, and to worship that God in no image nor make any figure for adoration and worship, especially according to the hypothesis of the Roman School, which believes that those who offer adoration and worship to images of God and the saints do nothing against that law, "You shall have no other gods before Me." Consequently, in the Decalogue, not ten but eleven commandments should be counted, and it should be called the Hendecalogue instead of the Decalogue; although Moses named this summary of divine law the ten words, that is, ten commandments. If, as the Roman Church wishes, the law against coveting contains two commandments, one prohibiting the coveting of a neighbour's wife, the other prohibiting the coveting of a neighbour's house, it follows that there are seven commandments in the second table, to which should be added not just three, but four commandments from the first table, since the prohibition against making any images for worship would necessarily constitute a particular commandment.

XVI. But from where do they infer that the commandment by which God forbids any images to be set up for worship is positive and ceremonial? Indeed, we infer from the words of the Apostle Paul, in Colossians 2:16, that there is something ceremonial in the fourth commandment, in so far as it precisely commands the sanctification of the Sabbath, that is, the seventh day of each week, where he advises the faithful not to be condemned in food or drink, or in part of a feast day, or a new moon, or Sabbaths, all of which were shadows of things to come, of which the body is Christ. But where has Christ or the Apostles signified anything similar regarding the prohibition against making any images for worship? And is there a single word in the New Testament that suggests to Christians that it is permissible to worship God and His saints in images, which was not allowed before?

XVII. And certainly, it is clear that this law is not positive, which only concerned the Jews, but moral, which obliges all men universally and always; because the worship of images and their making to represent divinity is reproached to the nations in God's word, as is frequently seen among the Prophets. Nor is it usually blamed on the nations that they transgressed the positive laws given to the Israelite people by Moses; but only that they violated the moral law impressed on the hearts of men by nature.

XVIII. Nor is this only in the Old Testament, but also in the New Testament, where it is a crime against the nations to dare to depict God in images and represent Him under the form of men and various animals. For Paul, in the first chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, accuses the wise men of the nations of foolishness in that they "changed the glory of the incorruptible God into an image made like corruptible man—and birds and four-footed animals and creeping things."

XIX. Nor should anyone argue that the foolishness of those wise men from the nations was not simply because they set up images for God, but because they imagined God to be corporeal and distinct with various members, similar to humans or various animals in external form. Whatever might be said of the rude and heathen common people, and the Epicureans attributing to their inert and unworthy God the form of humans, it is certain that those wise men of the nations, about whom the Apostle speaks, who expressed God

under various human and animal forms to worship Him, especially the Egyptians to whom he seems particularly to refer, did not think that the images of men or animals consecrated to God were similar to God in external form and bodily features, but only thinly and symbolically represented God and were mere weak likenesses and obscure signs of divinity, as expressed by Plutarch and Maximus of Tyre.

XX. Indeed, regarding the figures of animals, or even the living animals worshipped by the Egyptians, Plutarch in his treatise on Isis and Osiris extensively teaches that various virtues and benefits of the deity were mystically and symbolically represented by them. According to Augustine in his work "The City of God," Varro testifies that the ancients who made images of gods in human form followed this view because they believed that the human soul, which is in a human body, is most similar to the immortal mind, just as if vessels were placed to denote the gods, and an oenophore would be set up in the temple of Bacchus to signify wine, through that which contains what is contained; thus by an image that has the human form to signify the rational soul, since by such a vessel that nature is usually contained, and they wished the gods to be of that nature. (Book 7, Chapter 5).

XXI. These sentiments are echoed by Maximus of Tyre, in his discourse on whether statues should be set up for the gods. After establishing that God is the father and creator of all things, older than the sun, older than heaven, greater than time and age, he adds, "Since His essence surpasses our senses, we seek assistance from words, from men and animals, from figures of gold and silver, etc., to reach an understanding of the divinity through these means."

XXII. From these points, it is evident that the wise men of the nations gravely sinned when they represented God under various figures and proposed to worship Him in those forms, even if they only attributed mystical and symbolic significance to those figures; thus it is not only by positive law but by moral law, which perpetually obliges all men, that the Decalogue prohibits setting up any likenesses of God or anything else for worship.

XXIII. This is why the ancient Doctors of the Church, with common consent, affirmed that the Decalogue contains nothing other than a brief summary of the moral and natural law, to the observation of which all are universally bound, except only the commandment of the sanctification of the Sabbath, or the seventh day; in which they observed something ceremonial, namely, the precise and strict observance of the seventh day from creation and scrupulous cessation from all work: although in substance, and as far as it commands a certain day to be solemnly sanctified to God, it is also moral.

XXIV. This can be seen in Irenaeus, Book 4, Chapter 34, "The words of the Decalogue the Lord spoke to all alike; therefore, they remain with us, receiving extension and increase, but not dissolution through His coming in the flesh." Tertullian, in his book on Idolatry, Chapter 4, speaks of the law forbidding making any likeness of things in heaven or on earth as a law given by God to the whole world: "The divine law proclaims, 'You shall not make an idol'; and adds, 'Nor any likeness of anything that is in heaven above, or in the earth beneath, or in the waters under the earth.' He has forbidden such arts to the whole world." And in the next chapter, he says, "If you observe the same God, as indeed the author of the law, you have His law, 'You shall not make any likeness.'" Similarly, Cyprian refers these

words of the second commandment, "You shall not make for yourself a carved image," as pertaining to Christians, in his book 3, to Quirinius, Chapter 59. Especially Augustine explicitly states, "The Decalogue pertains to us primarily, which is contained in those two stone tablets, except for the carnal observance of the Sabbath." (Against Two Letters of the Pelagians, Book 3, Chapter 4).

XXXV. Nor should it be objected that Jeroboam, about the calves he had made, said, "Here are your gods, O Israel, who brought you up out of the land of Egypt," just as the Israelites in the desert had said about the golden calf. For from what was said before, it is evident, first, that although the words are in the plural form, they nevertheless have a singular meaning, according to the nature of the Hebrew language and the frequent use in Scripture. Furthermore, the name of God was attributed to these calves because they were symbols and images of God, not because they were believed to be the very deity itself that had miraculously brought the Israelites out of Egypt before they even thought of forming the calves. Just as today, those who call a certain image dressed in imperial and papal attire "God the Father" do not therefore believe that image, without any figure and literally, to be God the Father, but only its symbol and representation.

XXXVI. It is also trivial that Bellarmine adds, to make it seem probable that the Israelites did not intend to worship the true God in the calf, that they are said to have forgotten their Saviour God when they worshiped the calf; Psalm 106: "They made a calf in Horeb and worshiped a molten image. They forgot God their Saviour, who had done great things in Egypt, wondrous works in the land of Ham, and terrible things by the Red Sea." For in Scripture, they are said to have forgotten God, not only when faith and thought of God were utterly erased from their minds, but when they acted as if they did not remember God, openly disobeying His commands, however much they professed to believe in the true God. Thus, in Psalm 90, the prophet severely rebukes thieves, adulterers, and blasphemers, accusing them of having forgotten God: although many who indulge in such vices retain some faith in God and have not entirely erased the memory of God from their minds.

XXXVII. But it can be more plausibly objected that God, through the prophet, reproaches Jeroboam, saying, "You have made for yourself other gods and molten images to provoke me to anger, and you have cast me behind your back" (1 Kings 14:9). How, then, can it be said that by making calves, he made for himself other gods, if he worshiped God in those calves? Moreover, in 2 Chronicles 11, it is said that Jeroboam appointed priests for the demons and for the calves he had made. It follows that in those calves, not the true God, but demons were worshiped. However, according to the Holy Scripture, they are said to serve other gods and demons who usurp worship contrary to the divine will, even if they think they are worshiping God in doing so. Whatever their intention may be, God utterly rejects such worship, and only the devil rejoices in it, as it is by his instigation that they violate God's law and institute worship condemned by it. Therefore, we must distinguish between their judgment and God's judgment: as far as they are concerned, they think they are honouring God; but God, through their disobedience, considers Himself dishonoured and sees His adversary, Satan, honoured as they obey his will in this matter.

XXXVIII. But there are Doctors of the Roman Church who acknowledge that Jeroboam and his successors, as well as Micah and the ancient Israelites in the desert, worshiped the true God in their images. However, they argue that they are not simply reproached in Scripture for this but for two other reasons: firstly, because they imagined God to be corporeal and similar to the idol; secondly, because they sacrificed to the idol, while according to Scripture, sacrifices should be offered to God alone.

XXXIX. As for the first point, it is a baseless assertion to claim that Jeroboam and his people believed God to be corporeal and similar to a bull in external form. Josephus, the historian who was closer to the time, had a different opinion and could better understand the cult practiced among the ten tribes. When he introduces Jeroboam speaking and persuading his people that it was unnecessary to go to Jerusalem to worship God, he attributes these words to him: "Just as no place is devoid of God's presence, and He is not confined to any place, but hears prayers and vows everywhere and regards those who worship Him" (Antiquities of the Jews, Book 8, Chapter 3).

XL. And indeed, since the Israelites, whom Jeroboam sought to subject to himself and detach from the house of David, had hitherto believed that God was immense and omnipresent, what would be the point of the cunning man trying to persuade them that God was a bull or similar to a bull, when he could more easily achieve his goal without this absurd idea? And how could he have made such a large multitude believe something so contrary to their previous beliefs in an instant?

XLI. Moreover, Jeroboam, when he made the calves to be symbols and images of divinity, imitated, as many believe, the custom of the Egyptians, among whom he had long dwelt, and who worshiped the bull Apis with great superstition. The Egyptians, however, did not regard the bull as the supreme God, as Bellarmine believes; but they venerated it in honour of Serapis, their highest deity, as a symbol of that deity. This is evident from Augustine in "The City of God" (Book 18, Chapter 5), where he says that Egypt, deceived by marvellous vanity, adored the bull Apis with lavish honours in honour of Serapis. This is confirmed by Plutarch, an expert in these matters and acquainted with Egyptian rites, who testifies that the animals worshiped by the Egyptians were not considered gods but only symbols of gods because the wise men of Egypt believed they observed certain divine virtues in them. This is also supported by the author of the "Recognitions," attributed to Clement of Rome. He reports that the Egyptians said the animals they worshiped were figures and allegories of certain virtues by whose aid the human race is governed (Book 5, p. 99).

XLII. Some, not improbably, believe that Jeroboam intended to imitate the cherubim placed on the Ark in the Jerusalem Temple with those calves. For the cherubim are believed to have had the face of a calf, as evidenced by comparing the first chapter of the Prophet Ezekiel with the tenth chapter. In the first chapter, verse ten, the animals supporting God's throne in his vision are described as having the likeness of a man's face, a lion's face on the right side, a bull's face on the left side, and an eagle's face for each of the four. In the tenth chapter, where the same vision is repeated, verse fourteen describes their faces as having four faces: the face of a cherub, the face of a man, the face of a lion, and the face of an eagle. Where in the first chapter it is called the face of a bull, here it is specifically called the face of a cherub, indicating that cherubim were commonly known to have the face of a bull.

Therefore, if the calves made by Jeroboam were imitations of the cherubim on the Ark, as Dr. Moncæius of the Sorbonne and Caffarellus after him believed, Jeroboam would have thought even less that the supreme deity was a bull or similar to a bull in form, as these calves were only mystical symbols of divine presence.

XLIII. The Doctors of the Roman Church say that even if Jeroboam intended to worship the true God in the calves, he nevertheless gravely sinned because he sacrificed to those calves, as sacrifices should be offered only to God and are a principal act of Latria. However, this reasoning does not align well with their own hypotheses. They teach, as shown in the preceding theses, that nothing prohibits the images of divine persons from being worshiped with Latria, the supreme worship due to God, provided it is done not directly but indirectly, not absolutely but relatively, not primarily but only secondarily and concomitantly. If it is conceded that the Israelites worshiped the true God in the calves, it is evident that all that worship was relative and not absolute; and the calves were worshiped not for themselves but for God, not primarily but only secondarily and concomitantly. If the images of God can be worshiped with other acts of Latria, both internal and external, in the manner already described, why could they not also be worshiped with sacrifices and offerings of victims in the same way? Namely, improperly, or indirectly, or concomitantly, which is how, and no other way, according to the given hypothesis, the Israelites worshiped the calves.

XLIV. Vazquez, along with other Scholastics, offers a reason why images cannot be worshiped with sacrifices, not even indirectly or relatively; namely, because in sacrifices there is a profession of divine omnipotence and dominion. However, if this reason is valid, as it indeed is, it also follows that other acts of Latria (worship) cannot be offered to images, not even relatively or concomitantly. For no act of Latria exists without including the acknowledgment and profession of some divine power and excellence, without which it could not be called an act of Latria. According to the Roman School's use, Latria differs from Dulia in that Dulia is the honour due to created excellence, while Latria is the honour due to uncreated excellence. If the acknowledgment of some divine excellence, present in other acts of Latria, does not prevent them from being offered relatively to images, why would the profession of divine omnipotence and dominion in sacrifices prevent it?

XLV. Indeed, the profession of divine omnipotence in sacrifices and the immolation of victims is no greater than in acts of hope, whereby we expect our salvation from God. Yet, according to Thomas Aquinas, the principal teacher of the Roman School, we place our hope of salvation in the cross, which is a type of image. He proves that the cross on which Christ was crucified, and even its representations, are to be worshiped with Latria because we offer to it the worship of Latria, in which we place our hope of salvation. According to his view, we place our hope of salvation in the cross, as the Roman Church sings, "Hail, O cross, our only hope, in this time of passion, increase righteousness for the pious and grant pardon to the guilty."

XLVI. But according to the truth of the matter, not only is it not permissible to offer sacrifices to images, but not even the smallest part of religious worship should be given to them, as can be clearly inferred from the story in the eighteenth chapter of the Second Book of Kings, where it is said that King Hezekiah of Judah broke the bronze serpent that Moses

had made, because the children of Israel were burning incense to it, and for this reason, the king's piety is commended.

XLVII. For if there ever existed an image deserving any veneration, it was undoubtedly that serpent. Moses, a man of great stature, had made it by God's express command; it had been an instrument of notable deliverance for the Israelites in the desert, its memory was preserved among the people, and it was a distinguished type of Christ who was to come and be lifted up on the cross. Yet Hezekiah, being moved by God, not only forbade the Jews to worship it but, out of indignation that the children of Israel were burning incense to it, he broke it into pieces. How, then, does it agree with God's will that the Second Council of Nicaea decreed that images should be approached with reverence, offerings of incense, and candles? And what small part of the honour given to the images of Christ and the saints in the Roman Church consists of the burning of incense and the offering of candles?

XLVIII. Finally, if the commandment prohibiting the making and worshiping of any likeness of things in heaven or on earth only forbids us to regard images as gods and worship

them with absolute adoration as gods, it would follow that this commandment did not forbid the idol worship instituted by the wise men of the nations. As we indicated at the beginning of this discussion, they distinguished images from the deities themselves and did not worship them with absolute adoration but with worship that, in the minds of the worshipers, referred to the deities of whom the images were symbols.

XLIX. Celsus often protests this in Origen, especially in Book 7, where he says it is ridiculous wisdom to despise statues because stone, wood, bronze, or gold polished by this or that person is not God. He adds, "For who else but a complete fool would believe these statues to be gods, not the statues dedicated to the gods?" Similarly, as Arnobius testifies in Book 6 against the Gentiles, the defenders of idols used to say, "The ancients were not ignorant that the signs have no divinity and no sense; but for the untamed and unlearned common people, they beneficially formed them with this design, that by such visible representations, they might drive away the harshness of their minds and, thinking they were in the presence of gods, might lay aside impious deeds and be transformed into human virtues."

L. Therefore, they professed to worship the invisible God in their images, saying, "We worship visible images for the honour of the invisible God." This is found in the author of the "Recognitions," attributed to Clement of Rome, in Book 5. Similarly, Lactantius says, "We do not fear them themselves, but those whom the images represent and to whom they are consecrated" (Institutions, Book 2, Chapter 2).

LI. Whatever may be said of the rude and foolish populace who perhaps among the pagans sometimes revered images as if they were the deities themselves, at least those who established and defended pagan superstition did not think, as Arnobius says, that the materials of gold and silver were gods and sacred deities in themselves, but worshipped the gods through these images and venerated the divine presence in them. Therefore, even if

they sinned against God's commandment, "You shall have no other gods before me," when they joined other false gods to God, they cannot be said to have transgressed the commandment prohibiting the making and worshiping of any likeness if we are only forbidden by it to regard and worship images as gods. Nevertheless, despite their explanations and excuses, as reported by the ancient doctors of the Church, they are considered to have gravely violated this prohibition.

On the Veneration of Angels and Saints

Part I

In which the Doctrine of the Roman Church is Explained.

I. First of all, the Doctors of the Roman Church, especially Bellarmine, observe that worship in general comprises three different acts. First, an act of intellect, by which we apprehend the excellence of the one we worship. Second, an act of will, by which we internally incline ourselves to them, and intend to perform some interior or exterior act to demonstrate their excellence and our subjection. Third, an exterior act, by which we bow our head, bend the knee, or show some other sign of subjection. (On the Beatitude of the Saints, Book 1, Chapter 12)

II. Secondly, they observe that there are as many kinds of worship or honour as there are kinds of excellence; because honour or worship is due to a person because of their excellence. But with regard to the present topic, there are three kinds of excellence. The first is divine and infinite excellence, which corresponds to the first kind of worship, called Latria by the theologians of the Roman Church. The second is human or natural excellence, which is found in human virtues, dignities, ranks, etc., and corresponds to the second kind of worship, which can be called civil worship and a kind of human observance. The third is a certain excellence between divine and human, such as the grace and glory of the Saints, which are supernatural gifts; and to this corresponds the third kind of worship, called Dulia in the Roman School.

III. Furthermore, since the Blessed Virgin, as the Mother of the Son of God, surpasses other Saints to the extent that, according to the opinion of the Doctors, she can be called our Lady and Queen, which applies to other Saints only very imperfectly, the Scholastics divide this third kind, which they call Dulia, into proper Dulia and Hyperdulia, assigning the latter to the Blessed Virgin and the former to other Saints. Although the common practice is to use the terms Dulia and Hyperdulia to distinguish this specific worship from other kinds, this usage has not yet been officially sanctioned and defined by the Councils of the Roman Church. Therefore, Martin Perez, a Spanish bishop, in his work on Traditions, as reported by Bellarmine, testifies that he does not much approve of the name Dulia taken for the worship of the Saints, since Dulia properly signifies servitude, and we are not servants of the Saints, but fellow servants.

IV. Indeed, even those who most approve of this use of the terms Latria and Dulia as employed in the Roman School acknowledge that those terms are confused in profane writers and in common usage; indeed, in the Sacred Scripture among Greek interpreters, Dulia sometimes refers to human servitude; often, however, both in the New and Old Testaments, it is used for the worship of the supreme God alone. However, they contend that the Theological School has not without reason devised this distinction between Latria

and Dulia. For when there is a manifest distinction between the worship of God and the Saints, it was appropriate to designate each worship with a distinct term to avoid equivocation. They also believe it was appropriate to choose the terms Latria and Dulia for this purpose; because Latria in the New Testament is used only to signify the worship of God, whereas Dulia is used for all kinds of servitude, both to God and to humans.

V. Whatever the case may be, just as it was permissible for the ancient Church to invent new terms against old heretics, such as the terms "Trinity," etc., so it was also permissible for the later Church to invent certain new terms or at least to use terms previously used in another sense against later heretics. Moreover, the fact that we are not properly the servants of the Saints, but fellow servants, does not prevent the term Dulia from being apt to signify the observance with which we venerate the Saints, because in the Scriptures Dulia is not only taken for the servitude of slaves but also for honourary subjection, as when the Apostle says, "By charity serve one another," (Gal. 5). Although we are not slaves of the Saints, we are in a certain imperfect sense their servants, in that they move and assist us to good works by their example and intercession with God. Furthermore, due to the majesty and glory they possess, we who are still pilgrims from the Lord are much inferior to them.

VI. Furthermore, the Doctors of the Roman School observe that these three kinds of worship are not univocal, that is, of the same nature, nor are they contained under the same univocal genus; but they are only analogous due to a certain proportional similarity, which exists between divine excellence and the worship due to it, and created excellence and the worship corresponding to it. Just as excellence is not said univocally and in the same manner of the excellence of God and creatures, so they teach that the worship due to excellence should not be said univocally of the worship of God and creatures.

VII. If someone asks whether the worship due to the Saints should be called religious or not, they respond that religion, strictly and properly speaking, signifies a special virtue that has for its object the worship of God and is distinct in species from the virtue with which we venerate the Saints: which is a kind of observance of another order. However, sometimes the term Religion is taken more broadly, namely for any virtue by which we worship God, or the friends of God, and other sacred things, and which is distinct from political and purely human worship. In the former sense, they deny that the worship of the Saints is an act of religion, but in the latter sense, they concede it. Or, what amounts to the same thing, they say the Saints should be venerated with the worship of religion, not primarily but secondarily.

VIII. Similarly, when it is asked whether the Saints are to be adored, and whether the worship due to the Saints should be called adoration or not, they respond in the same way: adoration is sometimes taken strictly for the worship of Latria, which is appropriate to God alone; and in this sense, the Saints are not to be adored. However, adoration is sometimes taken more broadly and extended to human worship and the worship due to creatures, and in this broader sense, the Saints should be adored, and their worship can be called adoration.

IX. However, it should be noted here that among the Scholastic Doctors, the term adoration has a stricter and broader meaning. In the broader sense, adoration includes all

the worship that is to be given to either God or the Saints, but sometimes it is taken more strictly for certain specific acts of worship due to either God or the Saints. Thus it is that Scholastics sometimes include sacrifice, the administration, and reception of Sacraments, petitions for grace and forgiveness, the beating of the breast, the construction of temples, the institution of feasts, vows, and oaths among the acts of adoration. Sometimes they want adoration to be a special act of religion distinct from sacrifice, prayer, vows, oaths, etc. As can be seen in Thomas Aquinas in the second part of the second question 84, where he assigns the first place among the external acts of Latria to adoration, and by adoration, he understands that by which one presents his body to God to be venerated. Therefore, adoration taken in this strict sense consists of external signs of submission exhibited from an internal affection to the one we wish to worship. Such signs are prostration of the body, kneeling, or something similar.

X. Moreover, they teach that Latria, which is the worship proper to God, is easily and best distinguished from Dulia, which is the worship due to creatures concerning internal acts. For internal Latria is a certain supreme prostration and inclination of the will, with the apprehension of God as the first principle and last end, and thus the highest good, which is the kind of adoration appropriate only to God. Internal Dulia, however, is a much lesser inclination of the will, with the apprehension of a certain excellence more than human indeed but much below the divine.

XI. But as for external acts, they say it is not easy to distinguish Dulia from Latria; because almost all the external acts with which either worship is exhibited are common to both Dulia and Latria. However, they exclude sacrifice and what pertains to it, such as temples, altars, and priests, which they believe belong solely to the worship of Latria. For it is not lawful for anyone to offer a sacrifice except to God, or to dedicate temples, altars, and priests.

XII. Although the Doctors of the Roman Church do not want sacrifices to be offered to the Saints, they consider it permissible to offer sacrifices in honour of the Saints, not to the Saints themselves, but to God. Therefore, it is common in the Roman Church to celebrate Masses in honour of the Saints. Although according to the doctrine of that Church, the Mass is properly called a sacrifice, in which the true body of Christ is daily immolated and offered to God the Father. Hence they call Masses by the names of the Saints, such as the Mass of Saint Roch, the Mass of Saint Anthony, etc. They call Masses in this way where there is a particular commemoration of a Saint, and through his merit and intercession, God's help is implored, and solemn thanks are given to God for the glory granted to this or that Saint.

XIII. Although the Doctors of the Roman Church do not want sacrifices to be offered to the Saints, they consider it permissible to offer sacrifices in honour of the Saints, not to the Saints themselves, but to God. Thus, it is common in the Roman Church to celebrate Masses in honour of the Saints. Even though, according to the doctrine of that Church, the Mass is a proper sacrifice in which the true body of Christ is daily immolated and offered to God the Father, they call Masses by the names of the Saints, such as the Mass of Saint Roch, the Mass of Saint Anthony, etc. They refer to Masses where there is a particular

commemoration of a Saint, and through his merit and intercession, God's help is implored, and solemn thanks are given to God for the glory granted to this or that Saint.

XIV. Furthermore, although sacrifices are not offered to the Saints in the Roman Church, various offerings are made to them, and it is customary to consecrate gifts to them in memory of the benefits believed to have been received from them, or obtained through their intercession. Many such offerings can be seen in the churches and chapels named after them.

XV. Even though the Doctors of the Roman Church deny that temples should be built for the Saints, it is nonetheless customary to name and refer to churches by the names of Saints, such as the Church of the Blessed Virgin, the Church of Saint Peter, Paul, Francis, etc. Regarding this matter, not all Doctors of that Church explain their views in the same way. First, some, as reported by Bellarmine, believe that sacred buildings cannot properly be erected except to God, just as sacrifices cannot be offered except to God. However, since many temples are consecrated to God, they distinguish among themselves by naming one after one Saint and another after another Saint; not because they are erected to them, but because the memories of those Saints are particularly honoured there, and they are invoked as patrons in those places. Thus, when a temple or sacred building is called, for example, the Church of Saint Peter, the meaning is, according to them, that the temple is dedicated to God in memory and name of Saint Peter; or that it is dedicated to God so that God may be prayed to through the intercession of Saint Peter. Similarly, a certain Mass is called the Mass of Saint Peter, not because the sacrifice is offered to Peter, but because it is offered to God in thanksgiving for the glory given to Saint Peter, and at the same time, Peter is invoked as a patron and advocate before God. (On the Cult of the Saints, Book 3, Chapter 4)

XVI. But Bellarmine himself holds a different view; for in the chapter just cited, his fourth proposition is that sacred houses can be properly erected not only to God but also to the Saints, for two reasons: first, as a temple, second, as a basilica. A sacred house has the nature of a temple insofar as it is erected for offering sacrifices; it is called a basilica insofar as it is erected to adorn the tomb of a Saint and to provide convenience for those visiting the Saint's relics. He acknowledges that it would be idolatry to erect sacred houses to the Saints as temples, but denies that it is idolatry to erect basilicas to them. Just as, he says, it is not idolatry to donate gold or silver reliquaries to the Saints, in which their relics are enclosed; so, a basilica is nothing other than a large reliquary in which smaller reliquaries and tombs are enclosed. Hence, he concludes, it is one thing to say the Mass of Saint Peter, and another to say the Basilica of Saint Peter, since the Mass is not offered to Saint Peter in any way, neither primarily nor secondarily. But the basilica is truly built for Saint Peter, if not primarily, then secondarily. Therefore, he maintains that sacred houses are truly and properly built for the Saints, not under the aspect of a temple, but as a basilica or memorial.

XVII. However, the Roman Pontifical, dealing with the dedication or consecration of sacred buildings, does not designate them by the name of Temple or Basilica but simply calls them Churches and under this name says they are dedicated in honour and name of the Saints. For example, on page 173 of the Paris edition of 1615, it orders that in the Litany recited in such solemn dedication, the name of the Saint in whose honour and name the

Church is dedicated should be mentioned in its place. Later, the Pontiff repeatedly prays to God to purify and bless the Church which he consecrates in memory of this or that Saint.

XVIII. In common usage and popular books, which are widely used among the Roman faithful, without any scruple, temples are said to be dedicated and consecrated to the Saints, especially the Blessed Virgin Mary. Thus, in a popular booklet titled "Merbodus on the Veneration and Honour of the Virgin Mary," authored by Alexis de Salo Capuchin, chapter eight begins with these words: "The Church, always led by the Holy Spirit, has at all times erected and consecrated temples and altars to the Mother of God." And later, on page 262 of the same book, it says, "Christians build temples, erect altars, and consecrate vows to her." Similarly, in the Manual of the Sodality printed in Liège in 1624, the following words are found on page 110: "We worship and venerate her with temples, oratories, and altars, which were indeed first erected to God, but in honour and memory of his most dear mother."

XIX. Moreover, what Bellarmine said earlier, that sacred houses are built for the Saints to adorn their tombs and for the convenience of those who visit their relics, and that basilicas named after Saints are large reliquaries in which smaller reliquaries and tombs are enclosed; this should not be taken as if, according to Bellarmine, it is not lawful to build a sacred house for a Saint unless their relics are present there, or as if a sacred house could only be called dedicated to a Saint because it is designated for preserving their relics. For Bellarmine himself, in the same place explaining his mind, teaches that basilicas can be built for the Saints for the purpose that those who come there, reminded by the very name of the basilica, may worship and pray to the Saint whose name it bears and in whose honour and memory it is said to be consecrated.

XX. Furthermore, he maintains that sacred houses can be built for the Saints, not only where their proper relics are found, such as bones and clothes, but also in places where they lived or performed some notable deed. For this reason, he says many churches have been erected in honour of the Blessed Mary and even of the Angels, whose relics cannot be had, namely in places where they appeared and performed some miracles. Indeed, he adds, as we commonly see, basilicas can be built for the Saints to preserve their memory, either by an image or by the name alone. For many churches are called by the name of the Blessed Virgin and are dedicated to her, although no relics of hers are seen there, nor is it reported that she performed any miracle in that place before.

XXI. Regarding the altars, which are also called by the names of the Saints and are said to be consecrated to them, Bellarmine similarly notes that the same stone is called an altar, insofar as sacrifices are offered on it to God, and is called a tomb or sepulchre, insofar as it touched the bones of some Martyr. For all altars are considered the tombs of the Saints. Thus, altars are said to be dedicated to the Saints, not under the aspect of altars but under the aspect of tombs. For it would be idolatry to erect altars to the Saints, but not idolatry to erect stone tombs for them.

XXII. But the practice of the Roman Church does not align well with this doctrine and observation of Bellarmine. For how many altars are dedicated to the Blessed Virgin in that

Church, called by her name, and yet are not her tomb or sepulchre, indeed where no relics of hers are said to be kept?

XXIII. But what is most noteworthy is that the Roman Pontifical, which describes the rites of blessings and consecrations customarily performed by Bishops, a book sanctioned by the public authority of the Roman Pontiffs, indicates that altars are dedicated to the Saints in a manner quite different from what Bellarmine established. For in that book, the consecration of the altar as a certain tomb is separate from its consecration as an altar. Indeed, as a tomb, it is consecrated with these words: "May this Sepulchre be consecrated and sanctified in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit." But when the same stone is consecrated as an altar, the Pontiff uses these words: "May this altar be sanctified in honour of Almighty God, and of the glorious Virgin Mary, and of all the Saints, and in the name and memory of Saint N., in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit." (Paris Edition, 1615, p. 229)

XXIV. It should be noted that any altar is indeed sanctified in the name and memory of a particular Saint, from whom it takes its name, and in respect to whom it can be considered a tomb, as Bellarmine says. However, all altars are sanctified not only in honour of Almighty God but also in honour of the Virgin Mary and all the Saints, to whom the notion of a tomb does not pertain. According to Bellarmine's recent teaching, it is only under this condition that it is permissible to dedicate altars to the Saints.

XXV. Although it is not permissible, according to the Doctors of the Roman Church, to institute priests for the Saints, it is nevertheless customary in that Church to establish confraternities and sodalities in honour of the Saints, especially the Virgin Mary. These confraternities dedicate themselves to their worship and veneration and, according to their particular institution, adore and invoke them.

XXVI. With regard to feasts, the Doctors of the Roman Church usually consider them among the things proper to the worship of God. However, it is customary in the Roman Church to institute feast days in honour of the Saints. To reconcile this, many of them say that feasts called the feasts of the Saints are not dedicated to the Saints properly but to God in memory and honour of the Saints. Just as temples are consecrated only to God but in honour and memory of the Saints. Similarly, the Mass sacrifice is offered only to God, but this does not prevent the Mass from being celebrated in honour of the Saints, as previously explained.

XXVII. However, others, particularly Bellarmine, maintain that the honour of feast days pertains immediately and terminatively to the Saints as well, although primarily to God and only secondarily to the Saints. They say this kind of worship is Dulia, not Latria, and is therefore an act of religion; but religion not as the name of a special virtue that disposes man to the worship of God but as a general name. This can be seen in Bellarmine's work, On the Cult of the Saints, Book 3, Chapter 16.

XXVIII. The Doctors of the Roman Church also consider the vows made to the Saints as part of their worship. It is very common in that Church to make vows to the Saints, especially the Blessed Virgin, which the Doctors argue is permissible. However, since theologians place vows among the acts of religion owed to God alone, there arises the

difficulty of how vows can be made to the Saints without idolatry. According to Thomas's doctrine, the answer is that vows are not properly made to the Saints: vows made to the Saints include two promises; one to the Saints, which is not formally a vow but the matter of a vow; the other to God, which is formally a vow. For example, when someone says, "I vow to the Blessed Mary that I will make a pilgrimage to such a place," he promises this pilgrimage to the Virgin, but this promise is not a vow; and at the same time, implicitly and tacitly, he promises to God that he will fulfill the promise made to the Virgin, and this second promise is truly a vow.

XXIX. However, this solution does not satisfy Bellarmine, because this observation of Thomas can indeed be applied to vows that include a promise made to a mortal man. For example, when someone vows obedience to a prelate, the vow is really made to God alone, although obedience is promised to the prelate. For in that vow, he intends to worship and honour not the prelate but God. But when someone vows fasting or a pilgrimage to the Saints, he intends to honour the Saints religiously. Furthermore, some promises made to the Saints appear to be not only the matter of a vow but a formal vow. Thus, when someone vows to join a religious order, he formulates the vow in this way: "I vow to God, and the Blessed Mary, and all the Saints, to obey such and such a prelate." Here, only the promise made to the prelate is the matter of the vow, while the other promise made to God and the Saints is formally the vow itself.

XXX. Therefore, Bellarmine, following Cajetan, answers differently, namely that vows are made to the Saints not as creatures participating in reason but insofar as they are gods by participation, and as God dwells in them by glory, so that vows said to be made to the Saints are made to God in the Saints; just as curses directed at the Saints are called blasphemies because God is cursed in the Saints.

XXXI. Nevertheless, Bellarmine maintains that those vows made to God in the Saints do not terminate solely to God but also to the Saints, so that they are indeed made to them, just as alms given to Christ in the poor are truly given to the poor themselves. To show that there is no idolatry in this, he says that the vow is not made to the Saints and God in the same way; something is truly and properly promised to the Saints just as it is promised to God, but not with the same end or intention. For when someone vows and promises something to God, he does so as a sign of gratitude to the first principle of all goods and in recognition of the benefit received from Him as the first author, and therefore that promise is an act of Latria; but something is promised to the Saints as a sign of gratitude only to mediators and intercessors through whom we have received benefits from God; and therefore that promise is not an act of Latria but of Dulia.

XXXII. Bellarmine considers both promises, the one made to the Saints and the one made to God, to be correctly called vows: namely according to the usage of Scripture, in which he admits a vow is said to be made only to God; but according to the usage of the Church. According to which, a vow is a general term, used analogically for promises made to God and the Saints. Among these vows, some distinguish that a vow made to God is absolute, while the one made to the Saints is relative: namely, because although it terminates in a way to the Saints, as has been said, it ultimately refers to the glory and honour of God.

XXXIII. Moreover, Bellarmine's doctrine, already explained, about vows made to the Saints and directed to them, is common and popular in the Roman Church, as it is taught in books commonly used by the Roman faithful. For example, a book called the Manual of the Sodality of the Blessed Mary states: "To this we give honour with the vows made to her, not only as we vow to God out of love and reverence for his mother Mary, calling her as a witness to the obligation by which we bind ourselves to God, and establishing and hoping for the fulfillment of the vow by her glorious and powerful intercession, but also by terminating the vow and promise in her." (Chapter 2, part 3, number 7)

XXXIV. Moreover, the theologians of the Roman Church also consider an oath as an act of Latria or Religion, that is, worship due to God alone. And yet in the Roman Church, it is customary to swear by the Saints and by their relics. To excuse this, they say with Thomas Aquinas that one should not swear except by God, primarily and principally; but it is permissible to swear by creatures, at least secondarily, insofar as divine truth shines in them. Thus, they swear by the Saints, not according to themselves, but as they believed and observed divine truth. This can be seen in Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 2.2, question 89, article 6.

XXXV. But among the acts of worship due to the Saints, in the Roman Church, particular commendation is given to what is called adoration, which consists of external signs of submission and reverence arising from an internal and true affection of the soul, such as the prostration or bowing of the entire body, genuflection, uncovering of the head, and similar actions. This is the adoration which Gabriel Vasquez contends and tries to prove in several ways that the Saints are to be adored. (In the third part of Thomas, first volume, disputation 97, where the second chapter begins with these words: "The opposite Catholic opinion, confirmed by the perpetual use and tradition of the Church, is that the Saints are owed sacred adoration.")

XXXVI. Particularly, those popular books that the Doctors and Rectors of the Roman Church put into the hands of the faithful strongly commend both internal and external adoration of the Blessed Virgin; and they require their devotees to testify to their reverence for the holy Virgin by frequent bowing and genuflection, both privately at home and publicly in churches. This can be seen especially in the Method of Venerating and Honouring the Virgin, published in Italian by Alexis de Salo, a Capuchin, which was later translated into French and frequently printed with many approvals from Doctors. In the Preface, the author testifies that his aim is to teach many devout and excellent ways of revering and adoring with the deepest (as he says) reverences, that is, by bowing of the body or genuflection, the Queen of Heaven, our lady and mistress. And later he promises first to show the excellence of such adorations. Second, how pleasing they are to the holy Virgin. Third, he will prove with four reasons that she is most worthy of being adored. Finally, he will deal with the way in which these adorations or genuflections are to be practiced and can be devoutly performed both internally and externally.

XXXVII. However, although the Doctors of the Roman Church teach that the adoration given to the Saints pertains to Dulia and not to Latria, some of them question whether the Virgin Mary can also be adored with Latria. And to that question, they answer affirmatively. This can be seen particularly in the works of the Jesuit Francisco Mendoza.

When the question is posed, "Can the Blessed Virgin be adored with the adoration of Latria?" he notes that three kinds of dignity can be observed in the Virgin. The first dignity consists in her holiness, for which she should be venerated with the adoration of Dulia. The second dignity is that she is the Mother of God, for which she should be adored with the adoration of Hyperdulia. The third is that she touched our Lord Jesus Christ, for which reason he considers the Virgin to be adored with the adoration of Latria. Just as, according to Thomas, the cross and nails and other things that touched the body of Christ should be venerated with the adoration of Latria. After considering many objections, he concludes the question as follows: Nevertheless, it must be said that the Blessed Virgin can be adored with the adoration of Latria because of her physical contact. Thomas does not absolutely deny this, but only when there is a risk of scandal or idolatry, as his interpreter Cajetan explains. Therefore, if someone is capable of discerning the reasons for adoration and avoiding all scandal, he could adore the Blessed Virgin with the adoration of Latria because of her contact with Christ. Although this adoration of Latria is not primary and absolute, it is secondary and relative, stemming from the same disposition of religion. (In Virid., Book 2, on Sacred Flowers, Problem 4, as referred by Charles Drelincourt in On the Honour Due to the Blessed Virgin, Volume 1, page 355.)

XXXVIII. The doctrine of the Jesuit Francisco Suarez, a highly renowned figure, aligns with this. Inquiring into the primary reason why the Blessed Virgin should be adored, he teaches that there can be three reasons for adoration in the Virgin. The first reason for which the Virgin can be adored, he says, is extrinsic, similar to the cross or the nails of Christ. Just as the cross touched Christ and was an instrument of our redemption, so the Blessed Virgin most perfectly touched Christ and cooperated in our redemption. Thus, the Blessed Virgin is adorably extrinsically, that is, insofar as she touched Christ, so that the entire reason for this adoration is Christ. He speaks of the adoration of Latria, at least relatively and secondarily, according to this reasoning. Therefore, he immediately adds: And yet it should be observed that, although this reason considered speculatively is sufficient for the Virgin to be adored, practically or in use, she should not be adored in this way, especially in the common and public adoration of the Church, not because this is intrinsically evil, for it truly is not. For if someone is capable of discerning the reasons for adoration, avoiding all danger and scandal, there is no disorder or malice in such adoration. But he says the common use of this adoration should be avoided, both because of the risk that someone might attribute divine excellence to the Virgin, and because the greater honour is given to the person adored when she is worshiped absolutely for her intrinsic and proper excellence with an adoration inferior to Latria than if she were adored with relative Latria because of her contact with the divine person. Therefore, he wants the Virgin to be commonly adored for other reasons, namely both for her intrinsic holiness and for her dignity as the Mother of God; which corresponds to a worship inferior to Latria and distinct from Latria. (In the third part of Thomas, question 37, article 4, disputation 22, section 2.)

XXXIX. There is no need to be surprised that such eminent figures in the Roman School, like Vasquez, Suarez, Mendoza, and many others, openly assert as a Catholic truth that the Saints are to be adored; although many in the Roman Church deny this and many others affirm that God alone is to be adored and that they worship no one other than God. For

there is no contradiction between them: those who deny that the Saints are to be adored understand this in the sense of the highest and absolute adoration, which belongs to God alone. But those who say the Saints are to be adored mean a form of adoration lower than the highest, which the former do not deny to the Saints.

XL. But the chief part of the worship that is given to holy men and angels in the Roman Church consists in their invocation and prayers directed to them, both vocally and with the mere affection of the heart and internal speech of the mind. To accurately understand the doctrine of the Roman School on this matter, it should be noted that their theologians generally assume that the Saints reigning with Christ do not know everything that happens here on earth, but at least all that pertains to and contributes to their own beatitude. They believe that it contributes to the beatitude of the Saints to know the worship given to them and the prayers and petitions by which the faithful on earth seek their help. Therefore, these theologians are certain that the deceased Saints perceive and understand the prayers of the living directed to them.

XLI. How the Saints hear and perceive the prayers of the living is not certain or defined among them, but various opinions exist. Costerus, in his Enchiridion, says there is no doubt that the Saints in heaven know what we do on earth through the intermediaries of angels and those who migrate from this life; especially that divine revelation makes known to them what is done by men to promote their glory. For God, who desires the perfect joy of His saints, hides nothing from them that could in any way affect or complete this joy. Such are the prayers poured out to them by the living and all that is undertaken for their glory.

XLII. However, according to his view, things are revealed to the absent differently than to the Saints enjoying eternal glory. To the former, secrets are made known by inspiration; to the latter, by the contemplation of the divine essence, in which all things are seen, like in a mirror, and are much more perfectly known than in themselves. He added that it is not unreasonable to admit that the Saints in heaven see our deeds on earth. Since they are not impeded by any corporeal bulk, neither the distance of places nor the bodies interposed prevent them from hearing our prayers, seeing our actions, and thus seeing in our hearts and thoughts what we wish to be manifest to them. Just as without an external voice or sensible sign, angels speak to each other and to souls and are heard and understood in turn; so men by their will alone can reveal internal desires and thoughts to spirits, both good and evil, and be understood by them, despite being clothed in a body or separated by any distance, however great. The thoughts and mind of the unwilling, however, are known to no one but God alone, who searches hearts and reins and to whom God chooses to reveal. (Cap. 12. on the Veneration of Saints in the explanation of the second proposition.)

XLIII. Indeed, Henri Holden, a Doctor of Paris, affirms that it can be demonstrated by natural reason that any pure spirit perfectly knows and understands the nature, motions, and actions of all corporeal things. Thus, he attributes gross ignorance to those who think that the Saints reigning in heaven do not hear the prayers of mortals. (In the Analysis of Divine Faith, Book 2, Chapter 7.)

XLIV. However, Bellarmine considers two opinions to be the most probable among the many on this subject. One is of those who say that the Saints see in God, from the beginning of their beatitude, all things that pertain to them in any way, and therefore also our prayers directed to them. The other is of those who think that the Saints do not see our prayers in the Word from the beginning of their beatitude, but that these are revealed to them by God only when we make them. Just as the Prophets knew the future by God's revelation, and many Saints on earth had the gift from God to know the thoughts of men and even the most hidden deeds. The former opinion seems to Bellarmine simply more probable, while the latter is more suitable for convincing heretics. (On the Beatitude of Saints, Book 1, Chapter 20.)

XLV. Secondly, the Doctors of the Roman Church assume that the Saints in heaven not only know the needs of the living but also pray to God with greater charity for their salvation than they did on earth. They not only pray in general for the Militant Church but also specifically for the needs of individuals who seek their help and patronage. Therefore, the Saints can rightly be called our intercessors, advocates with God, and mediators, not of redemption, which belongs to Christ alone, but of intercession.

XLVI. They note, however, that the Saints do not intercede for us directly with God, but their intercession relies on the merit of Christ, through whom they ask for benefits for us from God. These are the words of Bellarmine: "The Saints are not our immediate intercessors with God, but whatever they obtain for us from God, they obtain through Christ." (Book 1, on the Beatitude of Saints, Chapter 17, Proposition 2.)

XLVII. Furthermore, although the theologians of the Roman School teach that there is no mediator of redemption except Christ, whose death and obedience rendered to God the Father is the only price by which we are redeemed from eternal death, they nevertheless maintain that the Saints can help us not only by their prayers but also by their merits. Not that by their good works they have merited for us grace and salvation, and other benefits we need, as Christ has merited for us; but because God is often moved and induced by their holy works and the piety and charity they have excelled in to grant us various benefits, though He is not bound by any right or special promise to do so. Hence, in the Liturgy of the Mass, they are accustomed to pray to God through the merits of the Saints whose relics they believe they possess, thereby presenting to God the outstanding deeds the Saints have done and suffered for His glory, so that He may be more easily and willingly moved to grant what they ask of Him.

XLVIII. Furthermore, the Doctors of the Roman Church also hold that the faithful living are governed and directed not only by angels but also by the spirits of blessed men. Bellarmine seeks to prove this in many ways in his work on the Beatitude of Saints (Book 1, Chapter 18). Similarly, Costerus believes it is clear from Scriptures that the Saints reigning in heaven with Christ care for and administer earthly affairs, having authority to compel, restrain, and punish the impious and to rescue the pious from their hands. He adds that the Saints, by the benefit of their glory, can accomplish whatever kings can with their power, the wealthy with their riches, and the wise with their wisdom. Therefore, he argues, if kings defeat enemies with their armies, the wealthy help the needy, and doctors heal with their art; the Saints can do these things no less than angels, one of whom

destroyed 185,000 in one night, another restored Tobit's sight, took money from Gabael, and enriched the entire family at the marriage of his son, and another liberated Peter from prison, etc. (In the Enchiridion of Controversies, Chapter 12, in the explanation of the fourth proposition.)

XLIX. Furthermore, it is customary in the Roman Church for individual kingdoms, cities, and villages, as well as various guilds and professional groups, to have a particular patron Saint to whom they especially commend themselves. Thus, Luke is considered the patron of doctors, Ivo of advocates, Crispin of shoemakers. Spain has long taken the Apostle James, and the Dominions of Venice the Evangelist Mark as their patrons. Similarly, in various other cases. Moreover, it is also customary to turn to specific Saints for help in certain diseases, dangers, and needs. For example, those in danger at sea seek the help of the Apostle Paul and Nicholas of Myra, Margaret is called upon by women in labour, Roch by those suffering from the plague, Apollonia by those with toothaches; each is believed to provide particular help in these situations.

L. However, the Doctors of that Church warn that all Saints can intercede equally for any needs, and it is free for each faithful person to turn to any Saint to obtain any necessary blessings with their help. It should not be thought that God has assigned specific duties among the Saints in such a way that one is responsible for one matter and another for another, but rather that people of various nations and professions, and in various needs, turn to different Saints based on occasions such as the art or profession the Saint practiced, the type of suffering and death they gloriously endured, the particular gifts of divine grace in which they excelled, a notable miracle they performed either before or after their death, or simply based on some allusion or affinity of names. For example, doctors have chosen Luke as their patron because he practiced medicine. Sailors turn to Paul and Nicholas because, by Paul's favour, God saved the lives of 276 people from shipwreck, and similarly, it is said that God miraculously saved a ship from shipwreck at the prayers of Bishop Nicholas of Myra. This can be seen in Cardinal Perron's work, refuting the response of the King of Great Britain (Book 1, Chapter 3), and also in Jaubert, Archbishop of Arles (Volume 2, against Molineus' Shield, Chapter 1, Section 24).

LI. And these are the foundations on which the doctors of the Roman School build the invocation of saints. However, how the saints should be invoked, and what the difference is between the invocation that God claims for Himself and the one by which we implore the help of the saints, is explained in the Catechism issued by the decree of the Council of Trent. It states: "For we do not invoke God and His saints in the same way; we pray to God that He Himself may either give us good things or deliver us from evil; but we ask the saints, who are gracious to God, to take up our cause so that they may obtain for us from God the things we need." Hence, we use two different formulas; for God, we say, "Have mercy on us, hear us;" for the saint, we say, "Pray for us." Catech. Rom. part 4. cap. 6. sect. 1. num. 3.

LII. Similarly, Bellarmine asserts, "We are not permitted to ask the saints to grant us glory, grace, and other means to happiness as if they were the authors of divine benefits. Therefore, according to him, we should ask nothing from the saints except that they may obtain for us from God what is useful to us." De Sanct. Beatitudine lib. 1. cap. 17. Cardinal

Perron calls the former invocation, by which someone is invoked as the author of good things, an absolute prayer. The latter, by which someone is asked to pray for us, is called a relative prayer, which terminates not in the saint but in God. And he teaches that the former should be reserved for God alone, while only the latter should be used for the saints. Adversus Regis Magnæ Britanniæ responsum lib. 5. cap. 1.

LIII. Nevertheless, in the public worship of the Church, many prayers are directed to the saints, in which they are not simply asked to pray for us but to have mercy on us, to deliver us from the evils of body and soul, and to grant us the good things we need. Thus, in the hymn "Lux mundi beatissima," these words are addressed to the Blessed Virgin, "We beseech you to be present, with our supplicant voices, Come now, sweet Lady, Remove our troubles, Confer heavenly gifts." And in the hymn "Ave Maris Stella," this prayer is made to her, "Unique Virgin, Among all gentle, Free us from sin, Make us gentle and chaste; Grant a pure life, Prepare a safe journey, That seeing Jesus, We may always rejoice." In the hymn "Memento salutis author," these words are found, "Mary, Mother of grace, Mother of mercy, Protect us from the enemy, And receive us at the hour of death." Finally, in the antiphon "Alma Redemptoris Mater," Mary is addressed as follows: "Virgin before and after, From Gabriel's mouth taking That 'Hail,' have mercy on sinners." In the Litanies, not indeed received by the public use of the Roman Church but added to Bonaventure's Psalter and published for the use of the Roman faithful, after the Blessed Virgin is often invoked under various titles and praises with "Pray for us," she is finally also addressed, "Be propitious, Spare us, Lady. From all evil, deliver us, Lady. From the wrath of God and His indignation, From dangerous despair, From precipitating pride, From disturbing lust, etc., Deliver us, Lady. Sinners, we beseech you to hear us; That you may preserve the Holy Church, most gracious Lady, We beseech you to hear us." Finally, she is addressed, "Mother with your most holy Son, have mercy on us; Most beloved Mother, Lady, have mercy on us." In the Psalter of Our Lady published in French in Paris, by Claudius Chappelet in the year 1601.

LIV. Similarly, a hymn about John the Baptist begins with these words: "Glorious Baptist of Christ, Who reveal Christ to us, Look upon us with mercy, Cleanse our sins." And in another hymn addressed to him, it is said, "Remove the guilt of our polluted lips, Holy John." To the Apostle John, this prayer is made: "We beseech you, we pray to you, Holy Apostle of God, remove the plague, take away the ulcer, and comfort the afflicted: Drive away disease, slay the enemy, and remove scandal." And in another hymn addressed to John, it is said, "We beseech you with humble hearts, Heavenly Senator: Grant us to see the face of the Word, Who teaches us to believe the Word."

LV. To Saint Martin, this hymn is usually sung, "Martin, equal to the Apostles, Favour us who celebrate your feast, Who wish your disciples to live or die, look upon us. Do what you did before, Now make the prelates glorious, Increase the honour of the Church, Crush the deceptions of Satan. You who thrice conquered Chaos, Raise those sunk in guilt: You who divided your cloak, Clothe us in justice." Finally, to Saint Benedict, it is said in the hymn about his translation, "Grant us to climb the narrow path, Bestow the eternal kingdom." And in the hymn about Saint Nicholas, which begins "The heavenly hall exults," this prayer is directed to him: "O venerable Pontiff, Pious and not tardy Workman,

To all who with faithful hearts Seek you in danger, Remove the threats of death, Grant the help of life: That after the exile of the flesh, We may be with you in glory."

LVI. To reconcile these prayers and many other similar ones used in the Roman Church with the above doctrine, Bellarmine notes that when he said, "We should only ask the saints to pray for us," he was not speaking of the words but the sense of the words. For as to the words, he says, it is permitted to say, "Saint Peter, have mercy on me, save me, open the gates of heaven for me. Also, give me bodily health, give me patience, give me strength, etc., provided we understand, save me, and have mercy on me, by praying for me, give me this or that through your prayers and merits." De Sanctor. Beatitudine lib. 1. cap 17.

LVII. Similarly, the Roman Catechism, after saying that to God we say "Have mercy on us" and to the saint "Pray for us," adds by way of explanation, "However, it is also permissible to ask the saints themselves in another manner, that they may have mercy on us; for they are very merciful: so we can pray to them, moved by the misery of our condition, to help us by their grace and intercession with God."

LVIII. However, Bellarmine's exposition just mentioned, which states that prayers to the saints, whatever words they use, have this meaning according to the mind of the Roman Church, that the saints provide what is asked by praying and obtaining it, and not otherwise. This exposition, I say, does not adequately fit those prayers addressed to the saints in which they are not simply asked to absolve sins, sanctify hearts, and open heaven, but to do so by command, power, and authority, such as many prayers found in the public worship of the Roman Church.

LIX. Thus, in the hymn which begins "Exultet cælum laudibus," it is said to the apostles: "You who close heaven with a word, and release its bonds, release us from all our sins by your command, we ask. The salvation and sickness of all are subject to your command. Heal the fields from diseases, restoring us to virtues." This is consistent with what is often said to the apostles in the Breviary: "You who close temples to worship, and release their bonds with a word, release us guilty from sin by your command, we ask. The sickness and health of all are subject to your command. Heal languid minds, increase us in virtues." A specific prayer for Peter is composed as follows: "Now good shepherd Peter, kindly receive the prayers of the suppliants, and by your power, release the bonds of sin, which you close and open heaven with a word." This also pertains to John the Baptist: "Now powerful through the merits of our Lord, repel the hard stones of our hearts, smooth the rough path, and direct the winding ways." Here, the saint is asked to provide these things as one powerful through his merits.

LX. Certainly, reason does not allow us to say that what we obtain from God through prayer is done by command, power, or authority. Therefore, the authors of these prayers intended not simply to ask the saints to obtain the goods they requested through their prayers to God, but also to regard the saints not only as intercessors with God but also as dispensers and administrators of these goods under God. Costerus also attests to this view, asserting that the saints are administrators of God's goods. He concludes that the saints should be asked both to intercede with God for us and to help us directly. In the Enchiridion, chapter 12, in the explanation of the fifth proposition, Costerus,

commenting on the hymn Ave Maria Stella, on the words "Solve vincula reis," uses the gloss: "Solve by prayers, solve by merits, solve by authority, solve by command. You can remove all external bonds by a mere nod and will." And explaining other words of the same hymn, "Mala nostra pelle," he says: "Therefore, remove our evils by prayer, merits, and power."

LXI. Moreover, a large part of the worship given to the saints in the Roman Church consists of praises, titles, and elogies with which they are adorned, which are diligently accumulated in their prayers, hymns, and other devotional books. This kind of honour is especially given to the Blessed Virgin. Thus, she is called absolutely Queen and Lady in their hymns and litanies, Queen of Heaven, Queen and Lady of the World, Queen of Angels, and even Glorious Monarch. She is called Mother of Mercy, Mother of Grace, and the Fountain of all grace; also, the Gate of Heaven, the Happy Gate of Heaven, the Window of Paradise, the Ark of the Covenant, the Star of the Sea, the Morning Star, the Health of the Sick, the Refuge of Sinners, the Help of Christians, the Light of the World driving away all schisms. She is also saluted as the Hope of the World, Our Hope and Life, and the Light driving away all schisms and clouds. She is also said to have saved the world through her, lifted it up, defeated death, and granted life. Examples of these can be found both in the ordinary litanies of the Holy Virgin and in ecclesiastical hymns, along with the Book of Psalms printed in Paris by William Chaudiere in 1582; where the aforementioned hymns are also found.

LXII. Furthermore, in the Paris Breviary, on the Feast of the Assumption, it is said to the same Virgin: "Rejoice, Virgin Mary, you alone have destroyed all heresies in the whole world." And on the second day within the octave of the Assumption, these words are read about her: "She who is closely united to God of hosts, deserves to be called powerful in her own way over hosts and virtues. She is our Warrior, of whom it was said to the ancient serpent, 'She shall crush your head.'" Later, it is recounted that King Philip the Valiant, who obtained a notable victory over the Flemish rebels, dedicated the horse and armour in which he had conquered to the most glorious Virgin. Finally, there is a hymn at the end of the works of Almainus, which Antoninus testifies is publicly sung in the Roman Church, in which these words are said to the Virgin Mary: "Mediatrix of men, Cleanser of sins, Comforter of all, Pardon of sinners, Cleanser of crimes." And in the litanies added to Bonaventure's Psalter, mentioned above, Mary is called the Health and Beatitude, and the Illuminator of Hearts.

LXIII. Private doctors strive to add something to these praises, devising new praises and titles to exalt the Blessed Virgin. Thus, Viegas in the Apocalypse says that she is the Princess and Mistress of all creatures. Jacobus de Voragine says that she rules in Heaven, in the World, and in Hell. Costerus says she is the Queen of Queens, and is absolutely called the Queen of all places and all creatures. The writer under the name of Anselm, in his work on the Excellencies of the Blessed Virgin, says that Mary is the supreme Lady and the only Mistress of heaven and earth. Salazar, a Jesuit, says that the Virgin Mother of God is truly and properly, and not metaphorically, Queen and Supreme Empress because she is the Mother of the supreme King and Emperor of all things; not by any election or privilege, but by natural right. Similarly, Mendoza says that this dominion of the Virgin is not

metaphorical but proper and genuine, derived from maternal dignity. Not only is she the Queen of the world, but she also makes the kings of the world. Finally, the aforementioned Salazar says she is the Queen by political and civil empire; the Lady by direct dominion of all things, and the mistress by power over servants and slaves. And by divine right, she has acquired spiritual dominion over souls.

LXIV. Not only do they subject all creatures to the Virgin as their proper Lady, but they also attribute dominion and authority to her over Christ Himself, now gloriously reigning in heaven. This is related to the old rhythmic prose, often cited by us: "Rejoice, heavenly Matron, You wanted to call yourself the handmaid of Jesus Christ: But as divine law teaches, You are His Lady: For the law and reason teach, that the Mother rules over the Son. Therefore, pray humbly, And command sublimely, That in the evening of the world, He may lead us to the supreme kingdom." These are in harmony with those inserted in the old Paris Missal: "O happy Mother, Expiating our sins, By the right of a Mother, command the Redeemer."

LXV. And although these have been erased from some missals, they have been replaced in others not long ago, and many doctors of the Roman Church approve and defend them. Thus, Cardinal Damian, speaking of the Virgin Mary, says: "She approaches the golden tribunal of the Divine Majesty, not asking but commanding, as a Lady, not a servant." Likewise, Albertus Magnus, in what is called the Bible of Mary, says: "Mary prays as a Daughter, commands as a Sister, and rules as a Mother." Pelbartus of Temeswar says: "Therefore, the supreme dominion of the Blessed Virgin is real, for she rules not only over creatures but even over God as a Mother over her Son. Furthermore, for the salvation of those who pray to her, she can not only pray to her Son, as other saints do, but also command Him with maternal authority. Therefore, the Church prays, 'Show yourself to be a Mother'; as if to say to the Virgin, 'Command imperiously and with maternal authority, pray for us.'" Finally, Bernardinus de Bustis, in whose writings these words are found: "This is a true proposition, that everything is subject to the dominion of the Lord, including the Virgin. And again, this is true, that everything is subject to the dominion of the Virgin, including God."

LXVI. Nor are their more recent followers ashamed; Francis Costerus, a Jesuit, serves as a witness, who addresses the Virgin in this way: "All others pray as servants, but you, as a Mother with authority, are heard out of reverence for you." Also, "What does it mean to be the Mother of God? The Mother is the cause of the Son, the Mother is superior to the Son, honour is due to the Mother from the Son, and the Son is bound to obey the Mother." Another witness is the Jesuit Salazar, who believes that the most holy Virgin has parental authority over her Son so that nothing escapes her universal dominion. And Mary rejoiced in a certain royal power over Christ by maternal right; and that Christ, being both God and Man, was subject to her maternal power and quasi-domination, just like other sons. It is not likely, given the divinity to which His human nature was united, that Christ was emancipated from parental power, which other parents naturally hold over their children. Indeed, he believes this right still remains with the holy Virgin, and that she often uses it. He says, "The most holy Virgin often used this right and power, but especially when she intercedes with her Son for us." Another witness is John of Argent, also a Jesuit, whose

words are cited about the Blessed Virgin, "As if forgetting her condition, assuming dominion over her Son, she placed her throne above the very throne of God." And he further professes that he believes Jesus still serves Mary; "Lord Jesus, most lovable Saviour, allow me to do something for your Mother; and if you do not want to believe this, at least allow me to serve you while serving your Mother." Hence, he gives the Blessed Virgin this title, "that she is the Lady of God; this is," he says, "the supreme dignity of the Blessed Virgin, the highest and most adorable power, that God is subject to her, and she has dominion over Him."

LXVII. Not only is the Holy Virgin called the Lady and Queen of all in the Roman Church, but she is also given the name of Goddess by many. This is frequent in their sacred poems, as in this one by Lipsius, "Then to you, Goddess, will every age and sex offer praises." Also, "Is not Judas a Goddess in this generation?" And in this one by Coster, "Lead us, Goddess, to the blessed superiors." And many others. Moreover, those who write prose not rarely give the title of Goddess to the Blessed Virgin: thus Mendoza, a Jesuit, says that through prayer, the Virgin becomes as a Goddess to the whole creation; thus Philippus Beroaldus says, "What greater praise can be said of our Goddess than that she nurtures us with maternal affection and indulgence?" Similarly, Ambrosius Catharinus, one of the fathers of the Council of Trent, citing Augustine, says, "Augustine used the word 'Goddess' for our Lady, which I will not hesitate to repeat." Also, "It is not fitting to call her a mere human who is the Mother of God, who is clothed with the sun, crowned with twelve stars, and has the moon under her feet. Certainly, Goddess, you who were so much a part of the Divinity, that you alone were preserved as the paradise of God, to be cultivated by God's hands." Even Cardinal Bembo, writing on behalf of Leo X to a certain Italian city, advises them to donate better wood for the use of the house of Loreto, "lest you seem to have mocked not only us but also the very Goddess with a useless gift of poor wood." Antoninus and Bernardinus de Bustis also assert that the Blessed Virgin can rightly be called the Goddess of Goddesses, but in consolation of sinners, they prefer to call her the Queen of Mercy.

LXVIII. This can also be referred to what Alexis de Salo and John of Argent say, that God is in the Virgin not only by essence, power, and presence, as in other creatures; nor only by grace, as in the soul of the just; but in a much more excellent way, that is, by identity.

LXIX. Moreover, the dominion attributed to the Virgin according to their doctrine is not an empty name or merely an honourary title, but a true and real power, which she is considered to exercise in many ways over the human race. For they say she is the one who dispenses God's grace and various gifts to all others: thus Jesuit Salazar affirms that all the flow of grace and help is conveyed to us through the Virgin as through the moon; and all spiritual goods are in the power and discretion of the Virgin; indeed, if we are to believe him, "the faithful, while they live in the world, are carried in the womb of the Virgin, who breathes nothing good of the spirit or inspiration that is not inspired by Mary." It may be said, "All live by the spirit of Mary." Cornelius a Lapide similarly says, "She is the treasurer of divine graces; and Christ placed in her the fullness of all good, so that the Lord willed that we should have nothing except through her hands." Similarly, Pelbartus teaches that Mary is the dispenser of all grace, having jurisdiction and authority in all temporal

processes of the Holy Spirit, so that no creature has obtained any grace or virtue of the Holy Spirit except according to her dispensation; and if we believe him, "All gifts, all virtues, and graces, and all good things, which she wills, when she wills, how she wills, and as much as she wills, are administered by her hands."

LXX. Therefore, Bernardinus de Bustis, often mentioned, says that God made the Virgin his Cellar; because God loved her so much that He willed that we should have nothing except through her hands. Hence Alexis de Salo says that the Virgin Mary is the neck through which our Saviour, who is the head, flows into the Church, providing all spiritual motion and sensation, being the trunk through which the root supplies life to the branches, producing flowers, fruits, and leaves. She is the basin that receives the abundance of living grace waters and distributes them through her channels to others according to each one's merit and capacity. Jesuit Osorius confirms this, saying that all our good depends on the Virgin; and that the Son, to honour the Mother, committed all the dispensation of grace to her. Salazar even decrees that all other saints can do nothing, and no good flows from them, except through the Virgin as the moon intercedes and moderates their influx.

LXXI. They do not only want this to be understood of spiritual goods but also of temporal ones. Thus Salazar philosophizes about this matter, "Generous men and lovers of their wives, and greatly trusting them, usually commit to them the keys and custody of their money and all domestic expenses; they themselves, meanwhile, attend to more serious duties. Similarly, God, the Greatest and Best, has given to His most holy spouse Mary the same, granting her the custody of temporal goods and the keys, so that whatever of these goods is spent in this great house of the world, it passes through the hands of Mary and is distributed at her discretion."

LXXII. Some even go so far in the Roman Church as to say that Mary is the cause of things and that she made the world and preserves and governs it. For example, Gabriel Biel says: "To her, that is Mary, all things look as to their medium, as to the ark of God, as to the cause of things, as to the business of the ages, and those who dwell in heaven and those in hell, and those who preceded us, and we ourselves, and those who will follow, and the children of our children, and those who will be born from them." And Alanus, who is venerated as a saint, says in similar words: "This Mary is the Lady of all, who made the whole world, and who preserves and governs all things in it." Therefore, Salazar, following Bonaventure, does not hesitate to say to the Virgin, "By your arrangement, most holy Virgin, the world perseveres, which you and God founded from the beginning."

LXXIII. Nor do these seem sufficient to them; they add that the Virgin has done more for God than it seems God Himself has done for mankind. For after Bernardinus the elder, who was canonized, had made a long comparison between God and the Blessed Virgin, he concludes with these words: "Therefore, rendering each one their due, that is, what God did for man and what the Blessed Virgin did for God, you see that it can rightly be said that Mary has done more for God than God did for man; hence God is greatly obligated to us because of the Virgin." This is elaborated and cited in its place by Andrew Rivet in his Apology for the Most Holy Virgin Mary and by Charles Drelincourt in his books written accurately and extensively on the honour due to the Blessed Virgin Mary; from which these

few things have been excerpted out of many, and to which the curious reader is referred if they wish to read more of this kind and inquire with the authors.

LXXIV. However, these things are said only by private doctors and are not defined by public authority, but the fact that they are not disapproved by the Roman Church is made clear by many and significant signs. Firstly, it is gathered from this, that those who have spoken more harshly on this matter are counted among the saints, such as Bernardine of Siena, Antoninus, Alanus, and Bonaventure. Another significant indication is that the books in which such things are found are approved by many doctors and bishops, and even by some popes. Especially notable is that these statements are diligently inserted and emphasized in books intended for the people and aimed at fostering popular devotion, and this is done not only without prohibition or objection but rather with the open favour of bishops and other pastors.

LXXV. Furthermore, it is evident when Protestants raise these objections, men of great weight and renown in the Roman Church are unwilling to openly condemn them but instead strive to excuse them by all means. This can be seen in the writings of Cardinals Bellarmine and Richelieu, and in those of Peter le Camus, the bishop celebrated for his numerous writings, in his discussion with Charles Drelincourt regarding the honour due to the Blessed Virgin Mary.

LXXVI. Finally, the same is demonstrated by the Expurgatory Indices, which carefully note and order the deletion of what seems suspicious or even ambiguous in the writings of the Roman Church's authors. However, they leave untouched those passages that cause scandal to the Reformed and are often observed and objected to by them as greatly exceeding all bounds of reason and measure. For example, the propositions we have cited from Bernardino, Bembo, Costerus, and Catharinus are not marked by any censure in the Expurgatory Indices. These indices, however, order the deletion of the following propositions from Augustine's writings: "We have not set up temples to the saints nor sacrificed to them. Temples should not be built for angels. It is not lawful to build temples for the saints. To build temples for creatures is sacrilege." Therefore, we rightly conclude that those to whom the censorship of books in the Roman Church is entrusted consider these propositions to be either disapproved or suspicious, but not those about which we are now speaking and in which the aforementioned praises are attributed to the Blessed Virgin.

LXXVII. Moreover, it seems that the honour given to the saints in the Roman Church is greatly increased by the cult of their relics and the images set up in sacred places and worshiped in various ways. However, this should be reserved for special discussion. Here it only remains to note that it is indeed a matter of faith in the Roman Church to believe that the saints can be lawfully and piously invoked. However, they admit it is not necessary for each individual believer to pray and invoke the saints, for someone can attain salvation by invoking God through Christ without such invocation. As can be seen in Henry Holden's "Resolution of Faith," Book 2, Chapter 7: "Indeed, we profess that the saints can be invoked without any harm, but we do not assert that all Catholics are bound to the actual exercise of such invocation as a Christian truth. For some Catholics may indeed be saved who have never invoked the saints crowned in heaven.

Part II

In which the Doctrine of the Protestants is Explained, Compared with the Doctrine of the Roman School, and confirmed by various Arguments.

I. In the previous theses, we briefly and clearly explained the Doctrine of the Church and the Roman School regarding the cult and veneration of Angels and Holy Men. To summarize what was stated earlier: The Roman Church bestows a certain kind of veneration on Angels and Holy Men, which is intermediate between the worship due to the Majesty of God and the honour given to those who stand out among men either by civil dignity and authority, or by gifts, virtue, and excellence that nevertheless do not exceed the order of nature.

II. This cult is not of the same univocal kind as the worship that properly belongs to God, but it bears some analogy to it. However, it can be called religious, not in the proper and strict sense, but in a broader and less proper sense. Similarly, the term adoration can also be applied to it, although adoration is often restricted to the worship proper to God.

III. To make this cult more easily distinguishable from the divine, the Schools have designated each with a specific term: they assigned the term Latria to the divine worship, and the term Dulia to the veneration due to Holy Angels and men. This Dulia is further distinguished into hyperdulia, which is attributed to the Blessed Virgin, and dulia properly so-called, which is appropriate for the rest of the Saints; although they acknowledge that in the usage of Scripture this distinction between Latria and Dulia is not always strictly observed.

IV. Furthermore, they argue that the honour which is due to the Saints is greatly different from the divine worship in terms of internal acts and can be easily distinguished; however, this is not the case with external acts and the external signs of worship and honour, which are commonly used in both the worship of God and the veneration of Saints, except for sacrifice and what specifically refers to sacrifice, such as altars, temples, and priests.

V. Indeed, they do not consider it lawful to offer a sacrifice properly so-called to any creature, although it is very common among them to honour and venerate Saints with sacrifices offered to God in their honour. And this not only in such a way that thanks are given to God for the grace and glory bestowed upon them, but also so that they may be invoked in solemn liturgy, and divine assistance may be implored through their prayers and merits. What is more, the very sacrifice of the body and blood of Christ, as they believe, is offered to God through their merits and prayers. For example, in the Mass of Saint Andrew they say, "May our sacrifice be acceptable to you, O Lord, through the intercession of Blessed Andrew the Apostle, in whose honour it is solemnly offered, that by his merits it may become acceptable."

VI. Similarly, although altars, according to the doctrine of the Roman School, should not be consecrated to Saints under the notion of altars, we have shown that their doctors believe they can be consecrated to them under the notion of tombs. Indeed, according to the practice of the Roman Church, each altar is sanctified not only in honour of God but also in honour of the Blessed Virgin and all the Saints. In the same way, temples, according

to the opinion and usage of that Church, are not constructed for the Saints as such, but they can and should be built and dedicated to them under the notion of sacred houses and basilicas, in which they are solemnly worshiped and invoked with various rites.

VII. Thus, it is customary throughout the Roman Church to worship Saints in those buildings dedicated to them and named after them, with various rites performed before their relics, statues, and images, by bowing the body and bending the knee, lighting candles, and burning incense, and offering all kinds of gifts. To these they add feast days specifically dedicated to the veneration of the Saints, societies named after them and instituted in their honour, and also frequent vows made and religiously fulfilled in their names.

VIII. However, the principal part of the cult rendered to Saints is their invocation, through which the help and assistance of the Saints departed in Christ are privately and publicly implored. It is assumed that they intercede not only in general for the Church Militant but also for individual members; indeed, they are considered to be the guardians, patrons, and protectors of the human race, who can see the needs of individuals and hear prayers conceived in the heart alone.

IX. Nevertheless, the Doctors of the Roman Church profess that Saints are to be invoked not as if they themselves grant the goods we need, as if they were their authors and dispensers, but that they may obtain them from God by their prayers and merits. This does not prevent them from frequently asking for any blessings of body and soul simply from the Saints, and using the same forms of prayer to the Saints as they do to God, although they say they direct them to the Saints with a different sense than to God.

X. As for the theologians of the Reformed Church, the doctors of the Roman School are accustomed to charge them with denying all cult and honour to the Saints and simply teaching that Saints should not be venerated. But they are far from that, and all unanimously profess the contrary. They concede that not only divine but also created excellence deserves its own cult and honour; and that the greater the excellence of grace and glory that God communicates to the Saints, which surpasses all civil dignity and natural gifts and privileges, the greater honour and observance are owed to them.

XI. However, no matter how great that observance with which we ought to honour those whom God has adorned with saving grace in this life and crowned with glory in the next, they contend that it differs only in degree from the honour we are bound to give to those who stand out among others by civil authority and dignity, or by some natural virtue and excellence; but it is entirely different in kind from the honour that the divine Majesty demands and requires.

XII. As to what name this honour should be designated by, they consider it of little importance, provided it is clear in what matters it should be constituted, and by what acts and signs it should be testified and exhibited. They do not want it to be simply called religious, because religion properly and directly pertains only to divine worship; but rather civil, or as Augustine puts it, social and affectionate. Not that they confuse it with that worship which civil dignity and certain natural excellence require: for this, as mentioned, it surpasses at least in degree. But since there is a double citizenship, one earthly and the

other heavenly, they think it can be called civil by denomination taken not from the earthly city, but from the heavenly; to which grace and glory pertain, and to which that cult and honour should be rendered.

XIII. Abraham Ramburtius explains his view on this matter as follows: "It should be known," he says, "that there is a double honour. There is religious honour due only to God; and there is civil honour given to creatures. Civil honour is further given either in respect of the worldly city, which encompasses all the duties of reverence, love, and fear that are owed to men, even if they are alien to the faith. Thus, we honour princes, parents, elders, wise men, and fellow citizens. Or civil honour is said in respect of the heavenly city, with which we honour the domestic household of faith: and this includes the mutual love with which we embrace each other, as in Romans 12:10; the respectful opinion we hold of our brothers, as in Philippians 2:3; and the solicitude with which the members are mutually affected. Moreover, the observance and reverence, according to the various conditions, excellent gifts, and even the glory of those who constitute that heavenly city. And in this sense, we honour the holy Angels with love, as Augustine says, not with servitude, but with the cult of affection and society, just as in this life we honour the Saints of God; as mentioned above. We praise them in a due manner; we love, imitate as much as we can, and proclaim their virtues, so that our zeal may increase and be inflamed." (The Treasury of Sedanen Theses, vol. 2, Theses on Religious and Idolatrous Cult, thesis 16.)

XIV. Vossius teaches similar things in his Theological Theses. After stating that the honour owed to Saints, Angels, and men should not be called religious or servile cult, since it is merely human and civil cult, he immediately adds: "This appellation indeed seems ridiculous to Bellarmine, but unjustly; because those Saints were men; and together with the Angels, they are 'fellow servants' with us, as the Apostle teaches, who shows that they share a common servitude with us. But Bellarmine confuses the secular and ecclesiastical cities, of which one is by nature, the other by grace. For we are called citizens of one city, one Republic, and one people, both by reason of the heavenly as well as the earthly city. A part indeed is in the homeland; a part is on pilgrimage from the homeland, as the Apostle says, but although they are absent from us, and we from them, yet both they are present with each other, and we with each other, and God is present with both in the Son through the Holy Spirit. Therefore, since nothing prevents us from being called citizens of one city, there will be no reason why the civil honour given to heavenly citizens should not be called civil just as much as that given to earthly citizens; for although these honours differ in degree, both are civil." (Disputation 7, thesis 47 and following.)

XV. Daniel Chamierus, however, philosophizes somewhat differently on this matter. He observes that civil cult can be understood in two ways: formally and causally. Civil cult formally is that which is in itself truly civil and distinct, even separate from religious cult. Civil cult causally, whatever it may be in itself, is nevertheless from merely civil causes. Otherwise, a cult that is formally civil can be from non-civil, but supernatural causes. And such, in his view, is the honour owed to Saints reigning with Christ. Although their dignity is supernatural, and therefore the cult owed to them is not causally civil, it is nevertheless entirely distinct from religious cult; and therefore formally civil, unless one prefers to call it officious. (Panstratia, vol. 2, book 19, chapter 5, numbers 2 and 3.)

XVI. Although he does not wish to call the honour by which Saints should be venerated religious, but rather civil or officious, he nonetheless acknowledges that it flows from religion and is an act of religion, not elicited but impetrated. This is seen in the first chapter, number 11, of the book already cited, where he teaches that the cult of God is essentially distinguished from the cult of men by religion. This means there are two kinds of cult: one religious, the other civil. The former is an elicited act of religion; the latter, an impetrated act of the same. For to worship God, he says, is religion itself: just as to love is love itself: and religion is to worship God, just as love is to love. But civil cult flows from religion, that is, from the cult of God: just as in the Samaritan, washing and binding wounds flowed from love. Indeed, it is an effect of religion, not religion itself: just as an effect is not the cause

XVII. Charles Drelincourt observes that something religious can be said in two ways: first rigidly and exactly, as religion properly signifies that which binds souls to God and prescribes the manner of worshiping Him. In this sense, he teaches that only God should be religiously worshiped: nor should the honour by which Saints are venerated be called religious in this sense; for it is entirely of the same species as that by which we honour the faithful living on earth and differs only in degree. But sometimes religious is said in a broader sense to mean all that which not only constitutes the essence of religion but also depends on it and flows from it. And in this sense, he concedes that the honour by which we venerate the Blessed Spirits and the Holy Virgin, the mother of Christ, can be called religious. (Response to the question of Peter le Camus, already mentioned, page 27.)

XVIII. However, the commonly made distinction of religious cult into Latria and Dulia is generally rejected by the doctors of the Reformed School. This is for two reasons. Firstly, because there is only one cult that deserves to be properly and simply called religious: namely, the cult proper to God. The cult rendered to creatures, even the most excellent and holy, cannot be called religious except improperly and equivocally. Secondly, because in the use of Scripture, the terms Latria and Dulia are often confused. For in the Greek interpreters of the Old Testament, the term Latria is sometimes used for human service; but more often, both in the Old and New Testaments, it is restricted to divine cult alone.

XIX. Some Reformed theologians, however, testify that it does not seem inconvenient to them if the term Latria is reserved for divine worship, as proper to it; and the term Dulia is particularly applied to the honour and observance given to creatures, to distinguish it from divine and religious worship. This can be seen in Chamierus. For after establishing for certain that religious cult is entirely due to God, and civil cult pertains to creatures, he adds that for signifying this matter, we can use the terms Latria and Dulia: provided we understand that these names do not indicate different degrees, as if one were more and the other less, but different kinds: so that religious cult and civil cult are entirely different in kind; nor can both Latria and Dulia be compared to each other. (Panstratia, vol. 2, book 19, chapter 1, number 11.)

XX. Gerardus Johannes Vossius in his Theological Theses presents similar views. He states that the distinction between the terms "latria" and "dulia," where the former is said to belong to God alone and the latter also to creatures, is not observed either in the Holy Scriptures or in classical writers, as even Valla, Vives, and others acknowledge. Indeed, the

term "dulia," unless taken metaphorically, is less fitting for Saints than for God because in terms of religious worship, it pertains not to the creature but to God, as recognized by Pontifical Perezius, although Bellarmine disputes this in vain. Nevertheless, we do not disapprove of those who support this distinction, partly because a prudent person should avoid all ambiguity, partly because it does not seem useless to apply different names to cults that differ entirely in kind, such as those of God and creatures, to avoid homonymy, and partly because Augustine did not reject this. Thus, we do not deviate, nor do we support the cause of the Romanists in any way because, as Calvin acknowledges in discussing this distinction, the issue is about the matter, not the term. Namely, what we condemn in the Romanists is that they do not keep their worship pure for God but transfer a large part of divine honour to the Saints.

XXI. Moreover, to see in what this honour consists, which they confess is owed to the blessed spirits in heaven, whether of men or angels, the doctors of the Reformed School state in general that no cult can be lawfully offered to them other than that which is suitable for a creature that is absent or is as if absent, with whom we have no mutual commerce.

XXII. Therefore, they remove from that cult all that, according to the doctrine of Scripture, pertains to divine worship. For a cult to be considered divine, it is not necessary, in their view, for the one offering it to consider the object worshipped as the supreme Deity, upon whom everything depends, who depends on nothing, and who is the first principle and ultimate end of all things: and thus, to terminate their worship absolutely in Him and intend to refer it to no other superior. But it suffices that the cult be such that it truly cannot befit a creature because it presupposes something divine in it; even if the one offering such a cult mistakenly judges otherwise.

XXIII. Therefore, they consider a cult to be divine if it presupposes that the one worshipped, although invisible and not exposed to any senses, can still be viewed by all who worship him, at any time and place, as present; and although requested and invoked simultaneously by countless people scattered everywhere on earth, with various petitions, can perceive and understand all their requests, even those conceived only in the mind, and can help each one at the same moment with the aid they ask from him. Even if the one using such a cult professes that the one he worships is not considered by him as God, but only as a friend and minister of God, in whom he thinks he honours the supreme God Himself: because whatever humans can imagine and presume, in reality, such majesty and power belong to none but God.

XXIV. Moreover, the Reformed theologians believe that many acts and signs pertain to divine worship, no less than sacrifices. These include, in their view, feast days, sacred buildings, and offerings dedicated and hung in sacred buildings, oaths, vows, and prayers by which we ask for the goods of the body and soul, especially the gifts of grace and glory, from anyone. Thus, just as, in the judgment of the Roman School, it would be considered latria to offer sacrifices to a creature under any pretext and would not be excused by saying that one offers the sacrifice to some creature, not absolutely, but relatively, not as to God Himself, but as to a certain friend and minister of God, to whom ultimately that honour of sacrifice, from his intention, is finally referred: so also, according to the Reformed, one is not purged from the crime of offering divine worship to creatures if one dedicates sacred

buildings to them, offers them gifts, makes vows to them, swears by them, and asks them for grace and glory, no matter how much one professes to render and exhibit these things to creatures otherwise than to God Himself, and thus intends to refer these things to God's worship and glory.

XXV. Therefore, they consider it absolutely unlawful to dedicate sacred buildings to angels and saints received into heaven, not only to offer sacrifices to them but also to worship and invoke them with any rites, although they do not condemn the custom of the ancient Church, in which it was customary among other things to build sacred buildings to preserve the memory of the martyrs and give thanks to God for the victories obtained through His grace by them, and for this reason, Eucharistic sacrifices were offered to God, which greatly honoured the holy men. This can be seen in Andreas Rivetus' "Consideration on the Third Article of the Judgment of a Learned Man" regarding his "Apology for the Blessed Virgin," found at the end of that Apology.

XXVI. Likewise, they deny that it is lawful to consecrate feast days to angels and blessed men, since feasts pertain to the solemn worship of God, although they see no objection to making special and solemn commemorations of certain saints on certain days, giving thanks to God for the benefits bestowed upon them and through them, and presenting their virtues and notable deeds to the Christian people for imitation. For such feasts are dedicated to God alone, although they greatly honour the holy men, as is customary in the Anglican Church; in whose liturgy the feasts of the Apostles and certain other holy men are commemorated.

XXVII. Similarly, they completely disapprove of the custom of swearing by the Saints and consider it as prohibited as swearing by any creatures, just as offering sacrifices to them is prohibited because Scripture condemns not only those who swear by those who are not gods but also those who offer sacrifices to anyone other than God alone. They see no more reason to swear secondarily by the Saints because divine truth shines in them than to offer sacrifices to them secondarily because they exhibit signs of divine omnipotence and goodness.

XXVIII. They hold the same opinion about vows, which Scripture commands to be made and fulfilled to the Lord alone, and they believe it is no less contrary to true piety to vow to the Saints, considering them as gods by participation or as impetrators of the goods we need than to offer sacrifices and victims to them under the same title.

XXIX. Finally, they do not believe that those escape the crime of divine majesty's violation who in their prayers address the Saints with the same formulas as God, asking them for grace and glory, and any goods of the body and soul, even though they do not consider the Saints as the primary authors of those goods, but only as their dispensers and administrators under God: just as the crime would not be avoided by someone who, under a similar pretext, wanted to offer sacrifices to the Saints.

XXX. Furthermore, the doctors of the Reformed School believe that it is not only unlawful to transfer what pertains to divine worship to angels or saints received into heaven, but there are also many forms of worship and honour, which we can rightly use

towards living humans on earth, that reason and piety forbid to use towards the spirits of the dead.

XXXI. Thus, we courteously greet holy men with whom we converse, uncover our heads to them, and bow our bodies: but we use such signs of honour only towards those present. It would be absurd if someone, in honour of a holy man traveling among the Americans or Chinese, were to bow his body or bend his knees here in France, at home, or in a sacred place. Therefore, since the Saints reigning with Christ in heaven are as far from us as heaven is from earth, they think it is entirely unreasonable to use such signs of honour towards them.

XXXII. Daniel Chamierus, among others, observes this. After establishing that the honour due to Saints is of the same kind as that which ought to be rendered to the living and differs from it only in intention and degree, which create various levels but do not change the species, he notes that this honour should be distinguished in its acts. Some acts are owed to the Saints, which can be rendered to any absent persons. But whatever is rendered only to those present, such as genuflections, salutations, bowings, and many similar things, should not be rendered to the Saints, and much less those things that are for the needy, such as clothes, lights, bread, and wine. (Panstratia, vol. 2, book 19, chapter 2, number 20.)

XXXIII. Moreover, part of the honour we render to those with whom we converse here, or with whom we have mutual commerce, includes asking those of whose piety we are convinced to help us with their prayers to God, and to pray with us for the goods and help we need. No one would ask a pious man living far away, with whom no epistolary commerce is possible, by voice or heart, to pray to God for him: as if someone had addressed Paul in Rome, bound, from Jerusalem long ago, and implored his prayers to God, either verbally or with silent and inward speech. Therefore, Protestants and the Reformed do not ask Saints in Christ who have died to pray for them with the same freedom as they ask the living because those in heaven enjoy beatitude and glory far from us, and there is no reason left by which we can communicate our inner feelings to them.

XXXIV. If anyone supposes that the Saints reigning with Christ in heaven can simultaneously behold all people in any part of the world, hear their prayers, know their thoughts, and even provide the help they are asked for, and perceive and acknowledge whatever is done in their honour; this, they believe, attributes something divine to the Saints, and the signs of honour we are discussing no longer pertain to human but to divine worship.

XXXV. You may ask, then, what remains, according to the doctors of the Reformed Church, by which we can honour and venerate the Saints? I respond, according to them, this honour consists in the pious and frequent commemoration of them; in holding them in high regard; in celebrating their praises when the occasion arises; in diligently recalling and remembering their virtues and notable deeds; and especially in following their example, embracing their teachings, and striving with all our strength to emulate their faith, love, zeal, courage, patience, and humility by which they have shown us the way.

XXXVI. Thus, according to Frederic Spanheim, the honour due to the Blessed Virgin Mary (from which one can judge the honour appropriate for other Saints) consists firstly in the respectful and notable remembrance of the honour with which God distinguished her above all creatures in His gracious goodness, so that she might be and be called the mother of Him who is the Father and Lord of all. Secondly, it consists in proclaiming her virtues as described to us in the Holy Scriptures: her piety, love, humility, steadfastness, and other such virtues that shone uniquely in this excellent instrument of God and should be set as an example for all. Thirdly, it involves the commendation of the glory and blessedness she enjoys in heaven. (Dubia Evangelica, part 2, dub. 48, num. 4.)

XXXVII. Similar views on the honour we render to the Blessed Virgin are taught by Charles Drelincourt. He says, "The honour we render her consists of several things: First, we venerate her memory, speak of her with all reverence, and greatly delight in her praises. Next, with all our heart and all the strength of our souls, we praise God for the grace and benefits He has given us through her. Thirdly, we embrace the faith and religion that issued from her mouth and strive to follow the teachings that the Holy Spirit has left us through this instrument of grace. Moreover, we set her as an example for living rightly, just as for believing rightly. We strive to imitate her piety, love, zeal, purity, humility, patience, constancy, and all the Christian virtues in which she was enriched to an excellent degree. Finally, we extol her blessedness and happiness." (Book on the Honour Due to the Blessed Virgin Mary, chapter 2.)

XXXVIII. Andreas Rivetus elaborates further on the honour owed to rational creatures, whether angels or humans: "If angels are present, we do not know when and where unless they appear to us in a visible form, as happened in the past. Otherwise, we know that some are often present with us and help us; but because we have no verbal communication with them and they are not omnipresent, nor do they scrutinize the recesses of our hearts, we do not usually exchange words with them or greet them with external signs. This we do with present humans and the patriarchs did with angels, whom they hosted at home, thinking they were men. Outside this occasion, we speak of angels (meaning the angels of light) with honour and reverence, valuing their nature, duties, and prompt obedience to God, and propose this for our imitation."

XXXIX. Speaking of humans, he says, "If there were those who shone with great virtues, especially piety towards God and merits for the Church, their memory is sacred and venerable to us; we speak reverently of them, recall their virtues, propose them for our and others' imitation, pursue them with due praises, and if there is anything else we can render to those we do not see and who do not hear us, we offer it. This kind of honour and worship is more esteemed because it is free from all flattery and can only come from a mind persuaded of their excellence and valuing their dignity without any regard for personal gain."

XL. He then advises that we should increase the degrees of respect and veneration according to the measure of God's gifts in such persons and their greater or lesser excellence, giving each their due measure of honour. But we do not serve as slaves those whose works we do not need and who cannot benefit from our services. For we are not servants of the deceased Saints, but co-heirs of the same inheritance and followers of their

footsteps as much as we can, which they greatly desired while living, by setting an example in imitating Christ for us to follow.

XLI. He finally adds that we should particularly praise and honour the Blessed Virgin for the great gifts she received from God. He says, "If she were living with us on earth, we would consider it a great honour to receive her in our homes, render all services due to parents, converse with her reverently, greet her with respect, and receive her most holy advice. But since she does not dwell among us on earth, nor do we see or hear her, nor should we believe she is infinite or omnipresent, now that she lives in heaven after fulfilling her role in God's plan, we honour and revere the Blessed Virgin in all ways and means by which the absent can be rightly honoured and glorified, except for the worship of religion, which is due only to Him who is omnipresent, omnipotent, and scrutinizes hearts and minds. We obey His will by proclaiming the Blessed and Blessed among women: and we do so for many reasons; because she believed, because it happened to her according to the Word of the Angel; because she gave birth to the Son of God, cared for and nursed Him as an infant, rendered Him the best maternal services, acknowledged Him as her Saviour even as a child in the manger; because she believed His words when many contradicted, and because after an exquisitely pious and holy life in this world, she peacefully slept in the Lord and returned her most holy soul to God, enjoying in heaven the beatitude promised by God to those who honour Him, and being exalted in glory according to the measure of grace received here, as God knows. We pursue such with praises, celebrate their memory with grateful hearts, speak of them reverently, propose their virtues as an example for all Christians, especially pious women, and exhort everyone to imitate them in what is worthy of imitation." (Apology for the Blessed Virgin Mary, book 2, chapter 1.)

XLII. Likewise, John Dallaeus in his book "On the Object of Religious Worship" teaches: "For we refuse to worship the angels and other blessed spirits with adoration and religious prayers, not out of any contempt for them but from a sense of our duty to God, to whom alone we believe prayers and other religious worship should be offered. While preserving this worship for God, we nevertheless acknowledge the great excellence of the divine work in all the heavenly spirits, the exceptional wisdom, faith, love, sanctity, and blessedness of the Blessed Mary, the saints, martyrs of Christ, and faithful ministers, and often and gladly celebrate their remarkable deeds, words, and struggles in the cause of piety whenever the occasion arises, and we propose them for our imitation to ourselves and others according to our abilities, and we only use their names and memory with praise, which all show that the saints of God, both angels and humans, are honoured and esteemed by us as is fitting."

XLIII. Furthermore, the honour due to both angels and saints received in heaven, according to the opinions of both divine and ecclesiastical authors, is considered to consist entirely of two things: praise and imitation. The former involves thinking and speaking well of them as the distinguished ministers of God, and the latter consists in faithfully and diligently imitating their conduct and the service they rendered to our common Lord and God.

XLIV. In this praise and imitation of the holy angels and men, the doctors of the Reformed School believe that care must be taken not to attribute to them titles and commendations that are due only to God and Christ. They should also avoid speaking of things they have

not seen, nor attribute anything to them that is not established by the word of God. Since sacred Scripture does not teach or indicate that the saints who have died in Christ preside over human affairs or are appointed by God as patrons and guardians of the living, they do not wish to celebrate them as such, nor do they attribute to them the ability to pray for individual believers, to hear and answer individual prayers simultaneously, as this is not revealed by any divine revelation.

XLV. Whether the saints at least pray in general for the Church Militant, some among the Reformed are unwilling to affirm for certain and suspend their judgment on the matter, as Charles Drelincourt frequently mentioned, who considers it uncertain whether the saints pray for the Church and places this among the hidden things of God, not revealed to us because Scripture nowhere clearly and expressly teaches it. (On the Honour Due to the Blessed Virgin, vol. 2, p. 106, num. 179, and following.)

XLVI. Similarly, Chamier, when posed with the question of whether the souls of the Saints pray for us in general, that is, universally for the Christian Church and the entire body of the faithful, declares that it is not established by any certain argument. Although he admits it has some degree of plausibility, he leaves the matter undecided so that each may follow their own judgment. (Panstratia, vol. 2, book 8, chapter 3.)

XLVII. Others, however, readily concede and consider it probable that the Saints reigning with Christ in heaven at least pray in general for the Church fighting here on earth. This seems quite consistent with the love they possess and the communion that exists between the Church Militant and the Church Triumphant. Andreas Rivetus expresses his opinion on this matter, saying, "We do not deny that the Church of the Saints reigning with Christ is concerned for the members fighting here. But that care is general, not from knowledge of individual conditions but from their general awareness that, since the whole Church is not yet received where they reign, there are always some fighting on earth, for whose preservation and completion they pray to God, always seeking the increase of His kingdom." (Summary of Controversies, second tract, question 48.)

XLVIII. Peter Moulin holds a similar view. He says, "The blessed spirits, although they do not see what is happening here, nor do they know individuals, are aware that the Church is constantly engaged in perpetual struggles against its adversaries. And since their love has been increased rather than diminished by glorification, it is consistent that they are concerned for the Church Militant." (The Treasure of Theses from Sedan, vol. 1, Theses on the Parts of the Saints, thesis 3.)

XLIX. However, whatever the case may be, the Reformed Theologians unanimously deny that the Saints are and can rightly be called our Intercessors and Advocates. They argue that only one who can hear and perceive all prayers of everyone at all times and who has the office of presenting and commending them to God deserves the title of our intercessor with God. They believe this role belongs solely to our Lord Jesus Christ. No one would say that the faithful here on earth are our intercessors and advocates merely because we ought to pray for one another out of mutual charity.

L. They also reject the notion that the blessings we receive should be attributed to the merits of the Saints, or that anything should be asked of God through their merits. They

assert that the Saints, who owed everything they were to divine grace, could not merit anything for themselves or others, strictly speaking. Nevertheless, they acknowledge that through the communion of Saints, the good and pious works performed by individual members of the Church through God's grace can somehow draw God's blessing and favour upon the entire body. Indeed, they believe that God, considering the pious and righteous, sometimes spares the wicked among whom they live and grants them time and means to repent, as the Lord professed to Abraham that He would have spared Sodom and Gomorrah if ten righteous people had been found there.

LI. Furthermore, from what has been presented in these and the preceding theses, it is clear that there is no controversy here about whether blessed humans and Angels are worthy of some honour and veneration and should be regarded with affection by us. This is freely admitted and taught by the Reformed Theologians, and the contrary cannot be imputed to them without slander.

LII. Moreover, it is evident that the Roman School Doctors and the Reformed agree that the veneration owed to human Saints and Angels does not belong to the same univocal genus as the divine worship and therefore is not of the same species. They agree that such veneration is not religious in the proper and strict sense but only in a broader and less proper sense, according to which the honour given to Saints can be called religious, as distinguished Reformed Theologians expressly admit.

LIII. We have also shown that the Roman School Doctors acknowledge that the distinction of religious worship into Latria and Dulia is an invention of the School, and that this distinction, as used in the Roman School, is not exactly maintained in Scripture. They admit that Dulia is often restricted to the worship proper to God, while Latria is sometimes extended to human service. Conversely, the Reformed School Doctors do not strongly oppose the use of Latria for divine worship and Dulia for the veneration owed to creatures, for the sake of distinction.

LIV. Therefore, the entire difficulty and question reduce to this: In what does the honour consist that can be legitimately rendered to the holy and blessed creatures, especially the Blessed Virgin Mary? Specifically, whether sacred buildings can not only be named after Saints and Angels for the sake of designation but also constructed so that in them the Angels and Saints who have been received into heaven are publicly invoked and venerated with various rites, including bowing the knee and bending the body before them, burning incense, lighting candles, and offering various gifts? Whether it is permissible to swear by them and make vows to them, relatively to God, that is, insofar as God's truth shines in them and God dwells in them by His glory? And finally, whether we can ask them to pray for us, not simply, but to direct prayers to them, though in a different sense, yet conceived in the same words and forms as those we direct to God? This is affirmed by the Roman School Doctors and confirmed by the practice of the Roman Church, but denied by Protestants by common consent.

LV. Furthermore, it is in controversy whether it is permissible to celebrate the Saints who have died in Christ as the guardians and patrons of the human race, to whom the management of our affairs has been entrusted by God; and to regard them as such

mediators and intercessors before God who can at all times hear and perceive the prayers of all men, whether conceived in the heart or spoken aloud, and present and commend them to God, and assist us by their suffrages and merits. Especially whether the Blessed Virgin should be acknowledged and proclaimed as the Queen of heaven and the entire world and the Lady of all creatures; as the one through whom the world was saved, and who alone has destroyed all heresies, and as the Mother of mercy, the Mother and fountain of grace, our life and hope of salvation. All these are approved by the practice of the Roman Church but disapproved and condemned by Protestants.

LVI. Moreover, Protestants are scandalized by many other praises heaped upon the Blessed Virgin and the Saints by certain private Doctors, but not disapproved or prohibited by the Roman Church: such as the title of goddess attributed to the Virgin Mary, the Saints being called tutelary deities, as in an inscription I remember reading a few years ago in a church dedicated to Saint Peter at Troyes, "Peter, Helena, and Mascidia, Tutelary Deities of the People of Troyes." And that the Virgin Mary is attributed dominion and authority over her own Son, and the power to dispense all the gifts of grace and nature under God and to communicate them to whom she will. She is called the illuminator of hearts and the cause of things; indeed, she is said to have founded and created the world and to preserve and govern all that is in it. Many such things, for the sake of brevity, are omitted here.

LVII. Therefore, Protestants prove that blessed spirits, whether human or angelic, should not be venerated with the type of worship given to them in the Roman Church when sacred buildings and altars are constructed and dedicated in their honour, candles are lit, incense is burned, and knees are bent before them as if they were present, vows are made to them, various offerings are given, and oaths are taken in their name; and finally, when solemn prayers are directed to them for help and aid, and hymns are publicly sung to them in thanksgiving for benefits received from God, and so forth. Nor should Angels and Saints in Christ be venerated in this way, Protestants argue first because such worship should not have been devised by humans without God's word. Otherwise, it would be offered without faith since no one could be sure it is pleasing and acceptable to God without His word. Therefore, if it is clear that such worship is not based on any command or revelation from God, it can be justly rejected among those practices condemned by the Apostle. It is clear that this entire worship has no foundation in God's word because there is no precept or example of it in the entire Scripture, whether Old or New Testament.

LVIII. As for the Old Testament, the Roman Church doctors themselves admit that the worship given to deceased Saints, as it is practiced among them, was not used in the Old Testament Church. They explain this by saying that the souls of the Saints at that time did not yet enjoy the heavenly glory and beatitude to which they were elevated after Christ's advent, but were detained in a sort of prison, which they call the Limbo of the Fathers. However, there is no reason why the worship given to Angels, if legitimate, should not have been given under the Old Testament. Indeed, if Angels were ever to be worshiped, they should have been worshiped most then, when God frequently used the ministry of Angels in governing the ancient people, and their appearances were frequent in the Jewish Church. For God often used them as messengers among the faithful. However, in the Church of the New Testament, God has spoken to us through the Son, to whom, not to

Angels, He subjected the world to come, as the Apostle teaches in Hebrews 2:5. Yet, it cannot be shown from sacred Scripture or from any historical and Jewish sources that any part of public worship was given to Angels: for example, no chapel or oratory was consecrated in their honour, no festivals were celebrated, not even a single candle or grain of incense was offered or lit for them; nor were any prayers addressed to them in public assemblies of the faithful, nor hymns sung to them, nor any form of adoration exhibited. On the contrary, it is universally agreed that nothing prevented, and it would have been most fitting, to honour Angels with such worship among the Jews, if it were permissible among us.

LIX. Under the New Testament, Christ and the Apostles made no changes in this matter; nor did they establish any new worship by which Angels and the spirits of the righteous admitted to the vision of God would be venerated. Indeed, there is no command, example, or even the slightest indication of this in the entire New Testament Scripture: nowhere are we admonished to invoke Angels or deceased Saints, seek their help, sing hymns to them publicly, or honour them with incense, sacrifices, sacred buildings, or any other external acts of adoration.

LX. Not only is there a complete silence on these matters in the New Testament writings, but nothing similar can be found in the ecclesiastical tradition of the first three centuries. There were many illustrious writers among Christians during that time whose works survive and are widely known: such as Tertullian, Cyprian, Lactantius, and Arnobius among the Latins; and Justin, Athenagoras, Irenaeus, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, and many others among the Greeks. Nowhere in their writings is there any mention of worship similar to that in the Roman Church today being given to Angels and deceased Saints, or even proposed to be given. On the contrary, there are many and very clear indications against it.

LXI. Firstly, the ecclesiastical writers of the second and third centuries after Christ were mostly of the opinion that the souls of all the faithful, even the most holy, were kept in certain places outside of heaven until the day of final judgment, and were not admitted to the celestial homeland until after the resurrection of the body. Some of them, indeed, by a special prerogative, assign a special place to the martyrs, which they call Paradise. But by that name, they do not mean the highest heaven, where the martyrs see the Lord face to face; rather, they refer to a certain sub-celestial region, the bosom of Abraham, where the souls of the rest of the righteous rest, a more pleasant and delightful place, but not capable of heavenly glory, as shown in detail by the renowned Johannes Dallaeus against Cardinals Bellarmine and Perron. Therefore, it is evident that the dogma of the veneration and invocation of Saints, as now held in the Roman Church, had not yet been received as Apostolic tradition in those early centuries of Christianity. For that worship is based on the hypothesis of the highest glory and beatitude of the Saints, which, according to the Roman School, the souls of the Saints were not admitted to before Christ's advent; hence, they admit that the Saints had not yet been solemnly venerated and invoked. (*On Penances and Satisfactions, book 5, chapters 3, 4, 5, 66, and On the Object of Religious Worship, book 3, chapter 22.)

LXII. Furthermore, it is evident from the most ancient liturgies that have survived that the early Christians offered prayers and supplications to God for all the deceased, even the most holy, the martyrs, the apostles, and indeed the Virgin Mother of God. In these liturgies, they ask God to grant them rest in the land of the living, bestow upon them the goods of His promises, and provide them with good rest and remembrance; not simply, as Bellarmine futilely contends, offering thanksgiving for them. Indeed, since the time when the religious veneration and invocation of Saints was publicly accepted, it has been considered an oracle of Augustine's saying, "It is an insult to the martyr to pray for the martyr." And no one would ever consider using the solemn invocation that the Roman Church teaches should be given to the Saints reigning with Christ for those who need our prayers commended to God.

LXIII. Furthermore, when the wise men of the Gentiles professed to acknowledge only one supreme God, they still regarded other beings they called gods as ministers of that supreme deity, worshipped in a secondary place. When Christians were accused of neglecting these lower powers, which were nonetheless worthy of some veneration, the early Christians honestly admitted that they worshipped only one supreme God, defending this as legitimate and right. They did not concede that any part of religious worship was owed to the good and holy ministers of God, nor did they distinguish religious worship into supreme and subordinate, or absolute and relative worship. This would have been demanded by candour, charity, and prudence if they had shared the same views on the veneration of Saints and Angels as the present Roman Church.

LXIV. In response to this accusation from the pagans, they replied with Arnobius: "For the worship of Divinity, it is sufficient for us that we have God the first, the Father of things and Lord, the Creator and Governor of all. In Him, we worship all that is to be worshipped, and venerate what should be venerated. Since we hold to the head of Divinity itself, from which all Divinity of all the divine beings, whatever they are, is derived, we consider it superfluous to go through each one individually, since we do not even know who they are, what their names are, or their numbers, which we cannot comprehend, or explore." He then illustrates this with the same analogy of royal courts that the pagans used in this matter: "Just as in earthly kingdoms, we are not compelled to individually adore those established in the households of kings by necessity, but in the worship of kings themselves, whatever is connected to them is understood to be comprehended in silent honour; so too, whoever these gods are, whom you propose to us, if they are royal offspring and originate from the principal head, even if they receive no individual worship from us, they understand themselves to be honoured collectively with their King and included in His veneration." (Against the Gentiles, book 3, beginning.)

LXV. This aligns with what Origen teaches on a similar topic. For Celsus argued that while one should never deviate from the worship of God and should keep the soul directed to Him in all work and thought, this does not preclude the placation and propitiation of various powers established under God, and that this redounds to the honour of the supreme deity. Origen, a distinguished doctor of the early Church, responds: "To ensure that the Angels of God are favourable to us and do everything for us, our first affection for God is sufficient, as is our disposition, as far as human nature can, imitating the judgment

of the Angels who imitate God. Secondly, our grasp of the Word of God and the Son of God to the best of our ability. Also, the living God, the Lord of all, must be placated by us, and to have Him favourable, we must pray, who is propitiated by piety and all virtue. But if anyone wishes to have others under this supreme God favourable as well, let him consider that just as with a moving body, its shadow also moves; so, when one has the supreme God favourable, it follows that all His friends, Angels, souls, and spirits, who are worthy of God's favour, are also favourable, not only being well-disposed themselves but also assisting those who want to worship God, placating Him, and praying and petitioning together with us; so that we may dare to say to men who choose and follow better things with a firm purpose of mind, that whenever they pray to God, innumerable sacred powers, uninvoked, pray together with them, presenting themselves as companions to our fragile and mortal race, and, so to speak, competing and collaborating with us in this struggle." (Against Celsus, book 5.)

LXVI. It is very noteworthy what Origen says, that innumerable sacred powers, by which he designates Angels and Blessed Spirits, wish to worship God together with us, praying indeed, but uninvoked. For he not only teaches in general that only one God is to be worshiped and religiously adored indivisibly and inseparably, but also that our prayers should be directed to Him alone, and not any form of prayer or invocation should be used towards Blessed Angels or any other creatures. "Away with this council of Celsus," he says, "which commands us to pray to demons (that is, spirits who minister to the highest God, according to the Platonic manner and usage of speech) who ought not to be heard at all. For prayers ought to be offered only to the Supreme God; and indeed, they should be offered to the only-begotten Word of God, the firstborn of all creation, who should be invoked as the High Priest, so that He may bring our prayer, which reaches Him, to His own God and our God, His Father and our Father." (Against Celsus, book 8.) In the fifth book of the same work, he says, "Every prayer and supplication, every intercession, and thanksgiving should be sent up to the Supreme God, the Lord of all, through the living Word, God, and the High Priest who is above all the angels. But we will also pray to the Word Himself, and intercede with Him, and give thanks to Him, and offer our prayers to Him, if we can understand the proper and catachrestic use of prayer. For it is unreasonable to invoke angels from us, who have not received the knowledge of their nature, which is placed above men. And even if we comprehend their nature, which is wonderful and mysterious, this very knowledge of their nature and their appointments and orders will prohibit us from daring to pray to anyone other than the Lord who is above all, and who is abundantly sufficient for all things, through our Saviour, the Son of God." (Against Celsus, book 5.)

LXVII. Here it is also to be noted that Origen, like many other doctors of the Christian school of his age, believed that the sun, moon, and stars are certain rational living beings, endowed with virtue and illuminated with the light of knowledge from that wisdom which is the splendour of eternal light. Nor did he in any way disagree with Celsus, who proclaimed them as the most illustrious heralds of higher things, and truly celestial angels, being thoroughly convinced that the sun, moon, and stars offered prayers to God, the Lord of all things, through His only-begotten. Therefore, if, according to Origen's opinion, the angels of God are worthy of some religious worship, the sun, moon, and stars should be

considered worthy of the same. However, when Celsus questioned why the Jews did not worship the sun, moon, and planets, Origen not only denied in general that it was lawful to worship and adore these creatures but also affirmed that it was unlawful to supplicate them and sing hymns to them. "We judge," he said, "that it is not proper to pray to those who themselves pray. Rather, the sun and the stars themselves would want us to be directed to God, whom they themselves pray to, rather than being directed to themselves, or dividing the power of prayer we have from God and attributing a part of it to themselves. And he adds, since the Lord is with us everywhere and is near us, it is absurd to seek to pray to Him who does not reach everything, to the sun and the moon, or any other star. Finally, when Celsus writes that it would seem that we honour the great God more if we also sing hymns to the sun, moon, and stars, Origen responds that he knows the contrary: 'For we sing hymns only to God, the Lord of all, and to His only-begotten Word.'" (Against Celsus, book 5.)

LXVIII. Nor should anyone say, along with Cardinal Perron, that when Origen denies that angels are to be prayed to and invoked, he is speaking about the absolute prayer, not about what is called relative prayer, which the Roman School teaches is the only kind to be used with angels. For Celsus himself, against whom Origen argues, did not consider angels, or as he speaks with Plato, demons, to be worshipped with the highest and absolute worship, but with that which refers to the supreme God, of whom they are ministers. Therefore, since Origen denies that they are to be invoked in the manner that Celsus and other wise pagans desired, it is clear that, according to Origen, it is not lawful to use either absolute or relative invocation with them. Moreover, Origen, when he says that they pray for us uninvoked, clearly indicates that they should not even be asked to pray to God for us: which is to deny them relative prayer, not just absolute.

LXIX. Therefore, when Origen, in the eighth book against Celsus, insinuates a certain form of honour and respect due to the true ministers of God, Gabriel, Michael, and the other angels and archangels, this honour, according to Origen's teaching, can in no way consist in any form of their adoration and invocation, which he contends belongs solely and indivisibly to the one supreme God; but in the acknowledgment and celebration of their blessedness, glory, and holiness, and also in the pious imitation of their obedience and love towards God, which he admits is how we should honour the holy angels.

LXX. But to return to Holy Scripture, not only does it not contain any command or example of worshiping angels or deceased saints, but it also repeatedly teaches that only one God is to be worshipped, and that religious worship should be given to Him alone; therefore, no religious worship is to be offered to angels or saints who have died in Christ. The doctors of the Roman School respond that Scripture only prohibits giving creatures that highest and absolute worship, which belongs to someone as the first principle and ultimate end, to which they have appropriated the name Latria, but that it is not forbidden to give a lower form of religious worship, which they call Dulia, to God's ministers and friends, such as angels and the spirits of the just received into heavenly glory.

LXXI. But the sacred Scripture, when it prohibits worshipping and serving creatures, does not simply forbid recognizing them as the first principle and ultimate end and worshipping them under this aspect; but it forbids exercising any acts of religious adoration towards

them under any pretext, such as publicly invoking them, singing hymns to them, offering incense to them, dedicating sacred buildings and feast days to them, swearing by their name, making vows to them, and similar acts.

LXXII. This is clearly proved by the fact that the wise men of the Gentiles are accused by the Apostle of worshiping and serving the creature rather than the Creator because they religiously worshipped the sun, moon, and stars, heroes, and spirits. And yet it is certain that these wise Gentiles did not regard the sun, heroes, and spirits as the highest gods, but as ministers of the highest God, whom they called the Father of gods and men, and whom they believed to be honoured in those lower gods. (Romans 1:25)

LXXIII. Thus Orosius reports that the pagans used to admit that they did not follow many gods, but revered many ministers under one great God. Similarly, the ancient writer of the Recognitions introduces the same pagans as saying, "We also say that there is one God who is the Lord of all. But these are gods. Just as there is one Caesar, who has many judges under him, such as prefects, consuls, tribunes, and other powers, so we believe that there is one God of all, who has arranged these [gods] in this world under Him, subject to the greater God, but also dispensing affairs in this world." (Orosius, History, book 6, beginning; Clement, Recognitions, book 5)

LXXIV. Therefore, when Celsus, in Origen's work, affirms that those who worship many gods, by worshipping one who is subordinate to the supreme God, are pleasing to the supreme God: "For no one is to be honoured unless he whom the supreme God wants to be honoured: therefore, whoever worships his subjects does not offend him whose subjects they all are." He wants the lower powers under the supreme God to be worshiped in such a way that God is never left out, neither by night, nor by day, neither in private nor in public, neither in any thoughts nor in works, but always with the soul intent on God, whether with or without these [powers]. (Against Celsus, book 5)

LXXV. This is consistent with what Hierocles teaches: the gods should be recognized and worshipped as distinct from their author and parent, but their dignity should not be excessively elevated; ultimately, all worship should be referred to their single creator, whom you may properly call the supreme and best. (Hierocles, On the Golden Verses of Pythagoras)

LXXVI. Therefore, since the wise men of the pagans worshipped the sun, moon, and spirits with a certain inferior worship, not as supreme gods, but only as ministers of the supreme God, and referred all this worship to the honour of the supreme God, as is evident from the cited testimonies; and yet are said by the apostle to have exhibited Latria, that is, divine worship, to the creature, it is clear that those who worship angels and deceased saints with prayers and hymns, vows and oaths conceived in their name, various offerings, sacred buildings, and feast days dedicated to their honour, cannot be purged from the crime of Latria, even if they protest that they do all these things not as to supreme gods, but as to God's ministers and friends, and therefore gods only by participation; and that these acts are ultimately referred to the honour of the supreme God.

LXXVII. Nor should anyone say that the pagans are accused by the apostle of offering Latria to creatures because they offered sacrifices to them, which by all admission pertain

to the worship of Latria. For the sacred Scripture condemns the Gentiles not only for sacrificing to creatures but also for worshipping them with a holy kiss. From this crime, the holy man Job declares himself to be free, saying, "If I have seen the sun when it shined, or the moon walking in brightness; and my heart hath been secretly enticed, or my mouth hath kissed my hand." (Job 31:26-27)

LXXVIII. Moreover, according to the hypothesis of the doctors of the Roman School, if it is permitted to worship creatures even with Latria, provided it is not absolute but relative, no solid reason can be given why it should not be permissible to sacrifice to them relatively. And if it is good and pious to make vows to angels and saints reigning with Christ, and to swear by them, insofar as God dwells in them by glory and divine truth shines in them, and they are gods by participation, why should it be impious and forbidden to offer sacrifices to them on this account and in this respect? Nor did the ancient doctors of the Church reserve sacrifices alone for the divine worship which it is unlawful to give to creatures; but as we have seen above, they also reserved prayers and hymns, which they teach should be directed only to God, the Lord of all.

LXXIX. But sacred Scripture not only says in general that one God is to be worshipped and that Latria is not to be given to creatures, but also specifically forbids giving any religious worship to angels. If it is not permitted to worship angels religiously, much less will it be permitted to apply such worship to deceased saints; since angels surpass humans in the excellence of their nature, and are not inferior to saints in grace and glory. The Apostle Paul expressly condemns the religious worship of angels. "Let no man beguile you of your reward in a voluntary humility and worshipping of angels, intruding into those things which he hath not seen, vainly puffed up by his fleshly mind." (Colossians 2:18) Here the Apostle simply prohibits the worship of angels. It cannot be reasonably denied that those who build sacred buildings in honour of angels, dedicate feast days to them, solemnly invoke them in religious places, seek their patronage and protection with prayers, and bow their knees and prostrate themselves before them as if they were present and looking on, do indeed worship angels religiously. Therefore, according to Paul's mind, such people are either deceived by them or vainly puffed up by their fleshly mind.

LXXX. If, according to the Apostle's judgment, any such worship was due to angels, if it was permissible to dedicate feasts and oratories to angels, to sing hymns to them in the public assemblies of the faithful, to invoke them and prostrate themselves before them, he would not have simply condemned the worship of angels; but if there was anything excessive in the religious worship of angels introduced by impostors among the Colossians, he would have distinctly noted it and separated the legitimate worship of angels from the illegitimate in some way: as the doctors of the Roman School would undoubtedly do if any sect were to arise now which, in their judgment, attributed too much to angels in this regard.

LXXXI. To this, the doctors of the Roman Church respond with various arguments and inventions; but their vanity immediately becomes apparent to anyone who weighs and considers the matter without affection and prejudice. Cardinal Perron wants to understand by the term "worship of angels" not the worship given to angels but rather that which was taught by angels; and by this term, he conjectures is meant the Jewish religion,

or Mosaic rites, since in other places the law is said by Paul to have been ordained by angels in the hand of a mediator. Hence, according to his interpretation, the Apostle's goal is to recall the Colossians from Jewish worship and the ceremonies of the Mosaic law. (Against the King of Great Britain, book 5, chapter 6)

LXXXII. But this interpretation of Perron is entirely new and unheard of among Christians until his time. For not only do the ancient writers, such as Origen, Chrysostom, Hilary under the name of Ambrose, Pelagius under the name of Jerome, Theodoret, Theophylact, and Oecumenius, understand by the worship of angels that which has angels as its object; but no interpreter of the Roman Church, before Perron, ever took Paul's words in that sense. Nor could the authority of such a great Cardinal persuade the most learned men in that Church after him to approve of this interpretation. But it was explicitly rejected by them as empty, as among others by the Jesuit Petavius, a notable antiquarian. (Theological Dogmas, volume 3, book 2, chapter 9, paragraph 16)

LXXXIII. Certainly, in sacred Scripture, the Mosaic law is nowhere called the worship of angels, nor can any example of this nomenclature be found among any authors, whether profane or ecclesiastical. Nor, even if this term were used, could it be applied to this passage of Paul. For Paul, in the preceding verses, abundantly fortified the Colossians against the fraud of the Judaizing impostors, saying, "Let no man therefore judge you in meat, or in drink, or in respect of a holy day, or of the new moon, or of the sabbath days: which are a shadow of things to come; but the body is of Christ." What need would there be to repeat the same matter in those obscure and ambiguous words? Moreover, Paul asserts that those who introduce the worship of angels walk in things they have not seen, that is, they intrude into things they do not know and babble about unknown matters: which indeed fits well with the worshippers of angels, who utter many incomprehensible things about the nature, orders, and offices of angels; but it does not fit those who are addicted to the Mosaic law; since the Mosaic discipline is accurately explained in the sacred volumes and open to all who wish to know it.

LXXXIV. Therefore, the theologians of the Roman School resort to another solution to defend their Church's faith and practice against such clear apostolic law. The solution of many of the more learned among them is that the Apostle does not condemn the religious worship and invocation of angels or saints, but only false, superstitious, and idolatrous worship. They say that Simon Magus, Cerinthus, and their disciples taught such worship. But this is merely their invention, which has no foundation in the Apostle's words or doctrine. For the Apostle does not teach or imply that there is a kind of pious and legitimate worship of angels, but simply and in general condemns the worship of angels. Therefore, whatever errors the ancient heretics may have had concerning the nature, offices, and worship of angels, it does not prevent Paul's prohibition from also being violated by those who today worship angels with religious worship and exhibit any kind of religious worship to angels and saints. The Apostle absolutely prohibits the worship of angels, not just the kind said to have been taught by Simon or Cerinthus. It is clear that those who worship angels and saints with prayers, hymns, basilicas, oratories, feasts, donations, and all kinds of offerings, as is customary in the Roman Church, are indeed worshipping angels and saints; and consequently, what the Roman Church does in this

regard is condemned by the Apostle, no less than what Simon or Cerinthus or similar heretics are said to have done.

LXXXV. The doctors of the Roman School respond that the rites and acts by which they honour angels and saints do not constitute divine worship, because they venerate angels and saints not as gods, but as ministers of God and our intercessors with God. They argue that the term "religion" or "worship" is properly applied to the worship given to God alone. However, from the Apostle's text, it can be sufficiently inferred that those he rebukes, and from whom he warns us to be cautious, did not regard angels as gods, but as messengers and ministers of the supreme God and our mediators and intercessors with God, as indicated by the very name "angel," which means messenger. Furthermore, these deceivers professed to be Christians and venerated angels under the pretext of humility, as if they were unworthy to approach God directly and therefore needed the mediation and intercession of angels. Hence, it is clear that they venerated angels with a certain subordinate worship, considering it inferior to that due to the supreme God. Therefore, according to the Apostle's mind, those who venerate angels with a certain inferior worship also fall under the prohibition of angel worship.

LXXXVI. We can gather the nature of the religion of those pseudo-Christians, who were called Angelici by the ancients, from the Council of Laodicea, which included this canon in the code of universal Church canons: "It is not right for Christians to abandon the Church of God and go to invoke angels and hold assemblies, which is forbidden." What it means to invoke angels is explained by Theodoret, who, commenting on the epistle to the Colossians, says, "Those who defended the law also led people to the worship of angels, saying that the law was given through them; and this vice continued in Phrygia and Pisidia. Therefore, the Synod convened in Laodicea in Phrygia prohibited praying to angels. Even to this day, the oratories of Saint Michael can be seen among them and their neighbours." These people, led by a sense of humility, persuaded others that since the God of the universe could not be seen, touched, or comprehended, they should seek to gain divine favour through the mediation of angels.

LXXXVII. Therefore, according to the Fathers of the Synod of Laodicea and Theodoret's explanation of its canon, invoking angels and praying to them to gain divine favour is an illicit worship of angels and a sin against the Apostle's precept condemning the worship and religion of angels. Building oratories for angels, including Saint Michael, as part of the practice of the Roman Church, aligns with this condemned practice. Dionysius Petavius, a Jesuit, acknowledges that the Roman Church seeks the protection and patronage of angels through prayers and vows, and venerates them as mediators to God. They also build oratories and basilicas in their honour and dedicate feast days to their worship.

LXXXVIII. It is absurd, as Estius observes, to interpret Theodoret's reference to oratories dedicated to Saint Michael as places consecrated by heretics for their illicit worship of angels. He argues that these places, once polluted by the idolatry of heretics, were converted by the prudent bishops of the time into oratories dedicated to Saint Michael. It is irrational to imagine that Theodoret meant to say that the ancient heretics used to pray to angels and that the Synod of Laodicea prohibited this, and that therefore, the places where they prayed to angels were prudently converted into oratories of Saint Michael by the Orthodox.

Theodoret does not hint at such conversion or the supposed prudence of the bishops. Theodoret's point is to prove that the vice of invoking angels persisted for a long time in Phrygia and Pisidia, as evidenced by the oratories dedicated to Saint Michael seen there even in his time. Such oratories were not found in other parts of the Christian world.

LXXXIX. Furthermore, the fact that sacred Scripture regards prayer and invocation as an integral part of divine worship, and as a distinguished and principal duty of our religion towards God, confirms that neither angels nor the blessed spirits of the just are to be prayed to or invoked. Therefore, the temple of God is called a "house of prayer" in Scripture, and the prayers and invocations of the faithful are proposed as a spiritual sacrifice. We are taught to invoke only Him in whom our faith rests. As the Apostle says, "How then shall they call on him in whom they have not believed?" (Isaiah 56:7, Matthew 21:13, Psalms 14:1-2, Hebrews 13:15, Romans 10:14).

XC. The doctors of the Roman Church respond that the prayer proposed by Scripture as part of the worship proper to God is absolute prayer, which asks someone to be the author and giver of blessings; not relative prayer, which asks someone to pray to God for us and to obtain from Him the things we need. They claim that they invoke angels and saints not as the authors of blessings, but only as their intercessors and our advocates before God. Therefore, they argue that they do not ask angels and saints for anything other than to pray to God for us, just as we ask the faithful living on earth to assist us with their prayers to God.

XCI. However, the Roman Church, when invoking angels and saints, does not simply say to them, "Pray for us"; nor does it merely ask them to intercede with God for us. Instead, they use many prayers directed to them in the same form as those addressed to God, not only in private devotions but also in public and solemn worship. In these, the Blessed Virgin is asked, "Protect us from the enemy, and receive us at the hour of death"; "Grant us a pure life, and a safe path"; "Free us from our sins, make us meek and chaste." John the Baptist is asked, "Look upon us with pity, and wash away our sins." John the Apostle is asked, "Remove the plague, take away the ulcer, and heal the sick"; "Drive away disease, defeat the enemy, and remove scandal." Similar things are said to many other saints, as we have extensively shown in the first part of these theses.

XCII. They respond that when they pray to the saints in this manner, their intention is not that the saints themselves grant and bestow these blessings by their own power, but only that they obtain them from God by their merits and prayers. Therefore, although the words may suggest otherwise, they mean only that the saints, by their intercession, obtain what they ask from God. But certainly, nothing compels them to think and speak differently. If they ask the saints for nothing more than to pray to God for them, why do they use the words of absolute prayer to them and not simply reiterate the solemn "Pray for us"?

XCIII. Certainly, it is acknowledged by all that it is permissible to ask the saints living among us to pray to God for us. However, it would not be tolerated for someone to address a holy man living on earth as they address the Virgin Mary, saying, "Remove our troubles, grant heavenly gifts"; "Free us from sins, make us meek and chaste." Or to say to Saint

Benedict, "Grant us to ascend the narrow way, giving us eternal rewards." Or as in the hymn to Saint Nicholas, "Take away the dangers of death, grant the help of life; so that after the exile of the flesh, we may be with you in glory." If any Apostle had been addressed with such a prayer, they would have rebuked it as impious and commanded that such things be asked from the Lord, not from them. Therefore, should we think that now, in heaven, they would be pleased with what they once regarded as impious and sacrilegious while living on earth?

XCIV. Moreover, in the usage of the Roman Church, there are not a few prayers directed to saints in which blessings of grace and glory are asked of them, and they are requested to bestow them on us by the power entrusted to them and by divine command and mandate. This is clearly different from obtaining such blessings for us from God through their prayers. For example, it is said to the Apostles in general, "You who close the heavens with a word, and open them, free us from all sins by your command, we beseech you." This is followed by, "Health and sickness of all, heal the sick by your power, restoring us to virtues." Likewise, "Free us from guilt, we beseech you." And specifically to the Apostle Peter, "Release the bonds of sin by the power entrusted to you, which closes and opens heaven to all."

XCV. Even if the Roman Church asks nothing else from the Saints than that they pray to God for us, this cannot be legitimately defended by the example of prayers that believers request from each other; when, for instance, they ask their brothers, when pressed by some necessity, to assist them with their prayers to God. For from the fact that Scripture admonishes us to assist each other with prayers and to seek mutual help in this way, it does not follow that someone living in Europe could, without foolishness or even impiety, verbally or mentally address a holy man living in China or America, and ask him, as if seeing and hearing, to intercede with God for him and obtain what he feels he needs. How then can we conclude that we can piously and reasonably request from Saints who have died in Christ, whether by voice or by the mere affection of the heart, to pray to God for us; when they are now received into heavenly Paradise and are as distant from us as the highest heaven is from the earth; nor do we have any means of communication with them until we enjoy a similar blessedness; and no method of mutual conception? Therefore, from the prayers that believers on earth request from each other while they are still fighting together, it no more follows that Saints who have already been received into heaven can be invoked by us, than it formerly followed, according to the doctrine of the Roman Church, that the souls of the fathers detained in Limbo could be invoked by the believers living at that time.

XCVI. The Roman School Theologians indeed suppose that the spirits of the just admitted into heaven, despite such a great distance, know and perceive what is happening on earth; and that the Saints can simultaneously hear the prayers of all who invoke them, see their needs, and observe their intimate thoughts and hidden affections, and certainly know them. However, this should not be assumed without God's word and clear reason: to pronounce this based on our conjectures and suspicions is plainly to step into things unseen.

XCVII. Nor is it our duty to prove the contrary; although many arguments could be brought from Scripture in this matter. For, to abstain from imploring the prayers and help

of the deceased Saints, it is enough that we do not know whether they hear us, nor do we see this revealed in God's Word. It is incumbent on those who affirm this to prove what they say; and the knowledge of our affairs that they attribute to the souls of the Saints must be demonstrated with an invincible argument or a clear oracle of Scripture. Otherwise, this devotion to the pious souls of the Saints will be entirely shaky and will be done without faith.

XCVIII. How weak and trivial are the arguments from Scripture to support such a significant matter will become easily apparent to anyone who examines them. Firstly, they argue that the saints reigning with Christ in heaven know what happens on earth, and thus perceive the prayers of all who invoke them, and see their thoughts and hearts, by citing examples of certain individuals while alive knowing distant and future events, and even the secrets of the heart. For example, Elisha, who said to his servant Gehazi, "Was not my heart with you when the man turned from his chariot to meet you?" And Samuel, who said to Saul, "I will tell you all that is in your heart" and about the donkeys of your father which you lost. Similarly, Peter knew that Ananias and Sapphira had deceived regarding the price of the field, even though he was absent. And Paul, seeing the heart of the lame man, knew that he had faith to be healed. But what kind of conclusion is this: the prophets and apostles knew certain hidden things, relevant to their office, revealed by God; therefore, the souls of the blessed, received into heavenly glory, know what happens on earth, see the needs of all who invoke them, and perceive prayers conceived either by voice or by heart and affection? From this, it indeed follows that God can reveal the needs, actions, and thoughts of those living here to the blessed spirits of the just, as He pleases; but whether He does this or not cannot be concluded from this in any way. 2 Kings 5, 1 Samuel 9, Acts 5, Acts 14.

XCIX. If anyone argues that the duty assigned by God to the deceased saints requires them to have knowledge of our affairs because they are appointed by God as our patrons and intercessors, they are proving an unknown by another unknown. For the word of God nowhere teaches that the saints enjoying heavenly glory are given to us by God as patrons and mediators who intercede with God for us; indeed, the contrary is sufficiently evident from sacred Scripture. Nor can it be said that it pertains to the beatitude of the saints to hear the prayers of those invoking them, as this would add to their greater glory. For if the invocation of saints in Christ who have died is a superstitious and illicit practice, devised only by men, it in no way pertains to the glory of the saints to know who is invoking them. And it should first be proven that it is pleasing and acceptable to God that the saints reigning with Him be invoked before it can be supposed with any probability that such invocation contributes to their glory.

C. Moreover, Roman School theologians argue that the saints triumphing in heaven are not ignorant of what humans do and what happens in this lower world; indeed, they assert that even the secret thoughts of humans are not hidden from them, on the grounds that such knowledge does not escape the angels. For Christ Himself testifies that the righteous in heaven will be like the angels of God (Matthew 22:30). Therefore, since they ought to be equal to angels, it is not thought that they are surpassed by angels in knowledge of our affairs. Now, it is believed that heavenly angels know what happens on earth and the inner

movements and affections of human hearts because they are said to rejoice over one sinner who repents more than over ninety-nine righteous persons who do not need repentance. For if the repentance of sinners is known to them, surely they know what happens in the world, not only externally but also internally in the heart of the sinner, where true repentance and sorrow for sins occur. Luke 15:10.

CI. But it is not surprising that angels, who are "ministering spirits sent to serve those who will inherit salvation," as they are present with us and engage with us in their ministry, know what pertains to us, especially the repentance and conversion of sinners, to which they are appointed by God's command. However, as we have already said, it cannot be shown from the word of God that a similar duty has been assigned to the blessed souls of the righteous. Nor does it help to affirm that Christ said the righteous in heaven will be like the angels; for this equality or similarity with angels should not be extended beyond Christ's purpose, which is to teach that the righteous, after the resurrection, will lead an angelic life, free from the necessities and infirmities of this life, neither marrying nor being given in marriage, as is clear from Christ's words in Matthew. Moreover, it does not follow that each angel knows the thoughts and prayers of each individual human, simply because Christ says that the angels rejoice over one sinner who repents. Just as we can truly say that there is great joy in the Church of God when one sinner turns to God; it does not follow that each member of the Church knows the thoughts, words, and deeds of all others.

On Mortal and Venial Sin

Part I

In which is explained the Doctrine of the Roman School.

I. The Doctors of the Roman Church observe that venial sin is spoken of in three ways, either from the cause, or from the event, or from the very nature and essence of the sin itself. They call that sin venial from the cause, which is committed through ignorance or infirmity. This kind of sin is not called venial to distinguish it against any mortal sin whatsoever; but against mortal sin from malice. For although sins from ignorance or infirmity are often purely mortal, yet they are all called venials, because there is something in them that diminishes the wickedness of the fault, and by reason of which he who has sinned is nearer to pardon. Of this kind of sin the Apostle speaks when he says, "I was a blasphemer, and a persecutor, and injurious; but I obtained mercy, because I did it ignorantly in unbelief." 1 Tim. 1.

II. They call that sin venial from the event, which is any sin that is expiated through repentance, and actually obtains pardon from God, however grievous and atrocious it may otherwise be in itself. And so in this sense venial sins are not absolutely opposed to mortal sins, but only to those which are never actually remitted, and on this account lead to eternal death.

III. Finally, they call those sins venials from the nature and essence of the sin itself, which, as they judge, do not contend against the charity of our neighbour, and do not induce the guilt of eternal punishment. And this is the proper acceptation of venial sin among them. And understood in this sense, venial sins are considered to be simply and absolutely opposed to mortal sins; by which name they designate more grievous sins, which cannot consist with the love and charity of God, and render the person guilty before God's tribunal of eternal punishment.

IV. Therefore they believe that there are certain sins which can by no means be compatible with the love and charity of God, and into which man cannot fall without being altogether turned away from God, and becoming His enemy, and thus being totally deprived of spiritual life, which consists in our conjunction with God through His grace dwelling in us; and falling into new guilt of hell and eternal death, which he can by no means avoid if he be overtaken by death in that sin, and unless before death he rise again from that sin by a new grace of God, and be again reconciled unto God. So that if a just person commit such sins, he altogether falls from his justice, nor can he any longer be accounted just and holy: nor is there found in him that sanctification, "without which no man shall see the Lord." And these are what they call deadly sins, because they are as certain deadly wounds which bring death upon the soul, entirely extinguishing the life of grace in it, and rendering the person guilty of hell, which in the Scriptures is called the second death.

V. But besides these sins, they teach that there are certain lighter sins, which indeed somewhat retard man's course towards God, and diminish the fervour of Divine love; yet

they do not altogether turn man away from God, nor extinguish the love of God in him. And therefore through sins of this kind man does not become God's enemy, nor is he deprived of spiritual life, since they do not expel that grace which is the principle of that life. Nor do such sins bring upon him the guilt of eternal death, but only of some temporary punishment: so that by them a just man is neither stripped of his justice, nor loses that holiness which is necessary that one may see God. And hence, although death should overtake a man with sins of this kind upon him, yet he is not for this reason to be excluded forever from salvation, and adjudged to eternal torments in hell. Whence it is inferred, that sins of this kind are indeed wounds of the soul, but easily curable; not, however, diseases or deadly wounds: and therefore they are rightly called not deadly, but only venial sins.

VI. Moreover, they divide these venial sins again into two kinds; for they teach that some are venial from their kind, and others only from the imperfection of the work.

VII. They call those venial sins from their kind, which have indeed for their object something evil and inordinate; but which is not repugnant to the love of God and our neighbour: such as an idle word, immoderate laughter, and things of this kind. And they oppose to these mortal sins from their kind, as perjury, adultery, and the like; which openly contend against the love of God and our neighbour.

VIII. Those they call venial from the imperfection of the work, which, although they might be mortal from their kind, are yet rendered venial through the imperfection of the work; because, namely, the mere imperfection of the act causes them not to be judged repugnant to divine love and charity.

IX. And again, they divide venial sins from the imperfection of the work into two members: for some of them they call venial sins from subreption, others from the smallness of the matter. Those from subreption they call venial, which are not fully voluntary; such as sudden motions of anger, cupidity, envy, and other like emotions, which exist in the mind before reason could fully deliberate whether they should be admitted or not. Which are indeed sins, since they might have been prevented or immediately repelled if reason had been watchful: and yet they are venials, since they were without the full consent of the will. From the smallness of the matter they call those venials, which are committed in a small and light case; such as the theft of a penny, which neither notably injures one's neighbour, nor is a thing which among fair judges could dissolve friendship.

X. But although the Doctors of the Roman Church unanimously teach that there are certain lighter sins which can consist together with true justice and holiness, and do not dissolve man's friendship with God, nor involve him in the guilt of eternal punishment and death, and on this account are called venial sins – while there are other more grievous sins, which immediately constitute man from just to unjust, and render him God's enemy, and therefore liable to eternal punishment and death, and on this account are called mortal sins – nevertheless, it is not settled and determined among them with absolute certainty, whether those lighter sins have this from their own nature, and are such in themselves, that it is repugnant to the Divine justice to impute them unto eternal death, and on account of them to reject man forever and altogether; since on account of their lightness they can

justly deserve only temporary punishment and wrath: Or whether indeed they might justly be punished with perpetual exclusion from the kingdom of God, and with the everlasting fires and torments of hell; but that they are not imputed unto so great a punishment, but only unto a temporary one, is to be attributed to the will and clemency of God, who has appointed by His law the punishment of eternal death only for more grievous and atrocious sins, but threatens and actually inflicts on the lighter ones only certain temporal punishments, although if He should choose to use strict justice, He might deal far more severely and vehemently with man.

XI. For there are some among the Doctors of the Roman Church, and indeed of no mean repute, who teach that all sins may be justly punished by God with eternal death; but that the reason why some of them are imputed only to temporal punishment, and do not bring upon the sinner the guilt of eternal death, and are on this account distinguished from mortal sins, is to be attributed to the clemency and forbearance of God, who in this particular does not choose to use His full right against man. This is the opinion of that John Gerson, who was Chancellor of the University of Paris about two hundred and sixty years ago, and a most celebrated theologian among those of the Sorbonne, which he argues at length and maintains in a treatise entitled "On the Spiritual Life," in the first reading; where, treating of the essence and aggravation (as he terms it) of sins, he lays down this conclusion: "Every sin, inasmuch as it is an offense against God, and against His eternal law, is from its own condition and unworthiness deadly, according to the rigor of justice, and separative from the life of glory."

XII. And in the following he confirms this his opinion by many arguments: for he proves that every offense against God is in itself deadly, from the fact that it may be justly punished by God with the punishment of death, both temporal and eternal; yea, even with annihilation. And this because no such punishment is so evil, as any offense against God is evil. But that death and annihilation are not so evil as the very offense against God itself. Hence he deduces, that every death and annihilation would rather be to be endured, than that any, even the smallest offense, should be committed against God; because the opposite being granted, a case might be given in which an offense against God might be lawfully committed; namely, if death and annihilation could not be avoided otherwise.

XIII. Moreover, he says, every offense against God, unless it were remitted, would exclude forever from the glory of God, and be punished without end; otherwise the disgrace of the fault would remain without the honour of justice. But that the offense is diminished or remitted, is from the mere liberality of God remitting it, and no longer imputing it. Finally, an offense against God is not less to be shunned, than that good is to be chosen, in order to obtain which no offense against God ought on any account to be committed. But for an infinite good no offense against God ought to be committed; and if any one possessed infinite good things, he might be justly despoiled of them all by God, if he fell into any offense against God.

XIV. After this, from the same conclusion he deduces several corollaries, the first of which is this: "No offense against God is venial from itself, but only by respect to the Divine mercy, which does not in fact choose to impute every offense unto death, when it most justly might." And so it is concluded, that mortal and venial sin are not distinguished in

their essence intrinsically and essentially; but only by respect to the Divine grace, which imputes this sin to the punishment of death, and another not.

XV. But his third corollary is as follows: "We are obligated to make satisfaction to God, and to give thanks to Him from the fact that He does not impute our venial sins unto death, just as we are bound to do for the remission of mortal sins; since in each case alike the mercy of God concurs, not imputing sins otherwise than to a temporary punishment, which from their unworthiness are imputable to death, one by possibility, the other by the statute law. And perhaps it might be said the same even of all our justices, which as far as they are ours, are as a menstruous cloth, especially after sin, or in the absence of grace."

XVI. John, Bishop of Rochester in England, in his refutation of the thirty-second Article of Luther's Assertion, teaches things agreeable to these, where, after having quoted Luther as saying, "A venial sin is such, not from its own nature, but from the mercy of God;" he subjoins, "That a venial sin is such only from the mercy of God, in this I agree with you: but since we also believe that even a mortal sin may through the mercy of God become venial, I would have you explain to us more openly, what distinction you think ought to be established between mortal and venial sin." And he afterward states this distinction, that mortal sin immediately expels grace from the soul, and brings the sinner himself into a state of hatred to God; but venial sin does not do this. And a little after, he grants that venial sin is damnable, if judged with strictness. Yet he afterwards denies that it follows that venial sin is mortal; "For," says he, "mortal sin expels grace from us, wherefore also it must deservedly come under damnation; but venial sin does not in like manner do this. This difference is sufficiently ample, that venial sin cannot be called mortal."

XVII. But when towards the end of the last century, this opinion was held and publicly affirmed by some theologians in Belgium, it was, together with many other of their assertions, specially condemned by the Popes Pius V. and Gregory XIII. in a certain Bull as erroneous. In which Bull, among many other articles, they condemn this one also: "No sin is venial from its own nature, but every sin deserves eternal punishment;" as Bellarmine relates, Book I. "On the Loss of Grace and the State of Sin," Chap. 10, par. "Confirmatur."

XVIII. Whence it is that the Roman School does at this day, by common consent, establish the contrary, namely, that certain sins are venial from their own nature, and not merely from the mercy and indulgence of God; although this has not yet become with them an article of faith, and a thing altogether certain and determined.

XIX. Moreover, although it is the common doctrine of the Roman School, that venial sin does not from its nature deserve eternal death, yet it teaches nevertheless that venial sin is punished with eternal punishment, in those who depart this life with mortal sin, and are adjudged to hell. And this, after Thomas Aquinas, who asserts that eternal punishment is due to venial sin, if it be found in any one of the damned together with mortal sin, because in hell there can be no remission. 1, 2, quaest. 87, art. 5, in the 3d argument.

XX. Scotus indeed thought differently: for on the Fourth Book of Sentences, dist. xxi. quaest. 1, parag. "In ista quaestione," he teaches that to a venial sin, which remains in conjunction with a mortal sin, eternal punishment is not due in another life; but that at

length the punishment of it in hell comes to an end, the punishment alone which is due to mortal sins continuing forever.

XXI. But the common opinion of the Roman School maintains the contrary, namely, that the punishment of venial sin in the damned will be perpetual. And this because every sin, however light, renders the person deserving of torment and punishment, as long as it remains in him, and is not retracted and expiated by some repentance. But in the damned there is given no repentance, and no expiation of sin; and therefore in them the stains contracted even from venial sins remain forever. For they cannot retract or expiate any sin whatever by any act of love or contrition; since these things have no place in hell. And thus, since the stain and pravity of venial sin eternally perseveres in them, they also remain eternally deserving of torment and punishment on account of it.

XXII. Yet they deny that it follows from this, that venial sin is not venial from its own nature, and deserves eternal punishment in itself. Because those who are not in mortal sin, if they sin venially, are not on this account deprived of grace, charity, and spiritual life: and therefore in them this sin may be easily removed and obliterated, by some act of love and contrition. Which being posited, even if God should will to remit nothing from that punishment which is due for this sin, they would remain obligated not to eternal, but only to temporary punishment. But that in the damned this sin can neither be removed as to its guilt, nor even remitted as to its punishment, is something accidental, and because in them it is found in conjunction with mortal sins, on account of which they are forever deprived of the grace of God and spiritual life.

XXIII. Hence they gather that venial sin differs from mortal sin in its nature and essence in two ways: First, in that mortal sin, since it extinguishes the life of the soul, and expels the grace of God from the soul, leaves no principle remaining in man by whose power it can be removed and obliterated: but for this it is necessary that, as it were, God should raise man anew from the dead. Whereas the case is otherwise in venial sin, as has been already said. Secondly, in this, that if we conceive mortal sin to have been retracted through some act of contrition and love, and so to have been removed from the soul as to its pravity and stain thence left; yet if, nevertheless, God wills to remit nothing to man from His own right and the punishment which He might exact, he who has committed such a sin remains obligated to eternal punishment, on account of the Divine law having been once violated by it. Whereas, the guilt of venial sin being removed, no debt of eternal punishment can remain upon man, but only a debt of some temporary punishment. Which is the doctrine of Bellarmine, On the Loss of Grace, Book I. Chap. 14, Answer to the 3rd Objection.

XXIV. But here the Theologians of the Roman Church inquire, Whether venial sin is against the law of God, or only beside the law of God. And indeed there are many among them who think that venial sin is not so much against the law, as beside the law; and in this they constitute the difference between mortal and venial sin, that mortal sin is against the law, venial only beside the law. Which is the opinion of Bellarmine, Book I. On the Loss of Grace and the State of Sin, Chap. 11, in the Explanation of the fifth Argument. But others judge that both venial and mortal sin are against the law of God; which opinion Vasquez maintains, Tom. I. on the 1, 2, Disp. 143, Cap. 3.

XXV. But they who think that venial sin is to be affirmed not so much against as beside the law, observe many things by which they explain and soften this their opinion. And first, they say that they do not mean to deny that there is some law which prohibits venial sin; and therefore, that venial sin is against the law viewed materially, that is according to the thing commanded or prohibited. But their meaning is, that venial sin is not against the law formally considered, that is in reference to the end of the law, which is charity, because such a sin does not take away charity. As may be seen in Eustachius à S. Paulo, in the 2nd part of the Summa Theologica, Tract 5, Disp. 7, Quaest. 1, towards the end.

XXVI. Others note that venial sin is not said simply to be against the law of God, because by the law of God are commonly understood those precepts which bind under mortal sin, and the observance of which is necessary unto salvation; according to that saying, "If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments." Yet they concede that in a certain sense it is true that venial sin is against the law, because, generally, every sin is a transgression of the law; and moreover, because it cannot be doubted that venial sin is repugnant to right reason, which is a certain impression of the Divine law in us. These things are from Peter à S. Joseph, in his Idea of Moral Theology, Book 2, Chap. 3, Resolution 5.

XXVII. But Bellarmine maintains that it is rightly said that venial sins, of whatever kind they may be, are not against the law, but beside the law: because if they are against any precept of the law properly so called, as those venial sins which are said to be from subreption; such as the desire of an unlawful thing not fully deliberated, they are not perfectly voluntary: and for this very reason they are not perfectly against the law, except materially, because the law is properly set for our will alone. Or if they are perfectly voluntary, the precept which they transgress is not perfectly and in strictness a law. For, says he, since the end of the precept is charity, and precepts are to be measured from their end, if any precept be established concerning a matter which pertains very little to that end, as if it were prohibited by a special precept that no one should utter an idle word, that precept could not be perfectly and strictly, and as others speak, by way of eminence a law. On the Loss of Grace and the State of Sin, Book I. Chap. 11, towards the end.

XXVIII. But they who teach that venial sin is against the law, and some precept, and not merely beside the law; distinguish between precepts necessary for the preserving of charity and obtaining of salvation: and precepts which are indeed useful for this, but not necessary; and the violation of which does not hinder salvation. And they say that venial sin is not, like mortal sin, against some precept necessary for obtaining salvation and preserving charity; but beside it. Yet they deny that it should therefore be denied that venial sin is against some precept which is simply a precept, although it be not one of the principal precepts necessary unto salvation. As may be seen in Gabriel Vasquez in the disputation just cited, Chaps. 3 and 4.

XXIX. Consonant to these things are the teachings of Becanus the Jesuit in his Scholastic Summary of Theology, Tom. 2, Tract 2, Chap. 2, Quest. 7, where his first conclusion is this: No venial sin is properly against the end of the law. But his second is, Although no venial sin is against the end of the law, yet every venial sin is in some way against the law, whether perfectly or imperfectly.

XXX. And indeed he says that venial sins, from their kind, are perfectly against the law; as immoderate laughter, an idle word; and also venials from the smallness of the matter, as the theft of a thing of little moment; if such sins be committed deliberately. But those sins which are venial from the defect of perfect deliberation, such as the sudden and indeliberate motions of anger, hatred, envy, pride, lust, etc. are imperfectly against the law. As for example, an indeliberate motion of concupiscence is imperfectly against that law of the Decalogue, "Thou shalt not covet."

XXXI. Hence he gathers that venial and mortal sin are not against the law in the same way. First, because mortal sin is so against the law, as to be also against the end of the law; which venial sin is not. Secondly, because every mortal sin is perfectly against the law, but many venials imperfectly. Thirdly, because all mortal sins are against some law which is simply necessary unto salvation, but not so deliberate venials.

Part II

In which the Doctrine of the Protestants is set forth and confirmed, and the State of the Controversy is examined.

I. The Protestant Theologians, first of all, with one consent establish that every sin, by its own nature, deserves eternal death, and the hatred and wrath of God; and that there is no sin, however light it may seem in the judgment of men, which cannot be punished by God with everlasting punishment, and exclude man from the love of God, if God should deal rigorously with man. According to that of the Mosaic law, "Cursed is every one who does not abide by all things which are written in the book of this law."

II. Nay more, they teach that in the reprobate and impenitent, any sins whatever, even the smallest, such as an idle word, shall sometime be actually punished with eternal punishment. According to that saying of Christ in the Gospel, "But I say unto you, that for every idle word which men shall speak, they shall give an account thereof in the day of judgment." For according to the common doctrine of the Christian Schools, after the day of judgment no other punishments than eternal ones shall have place.

III. But on the other hand, they teach that there is no sin so grievous and atrocious, which cannot obtain pardon from the mercy of God, through the faith and repentance of the sinner: Except only that sin which they call the sin against the Holy Ghost. By which name they understand the total, voluntary, and deliberate rejection from determined malice of the Divine truth once known and tasted. Which sin is remitted neither in this nor in the future world; because it is impossible (according to the doctrine of the Apostle, Heb. 6) that those who have fallen into such a sin should be renewed unto repentance.

IV. Nay rather they teach that in the elect all sins, however atrocious, are remitted and pardoned gratuitously; nor are punished with any punishment, properly and strictly so called. And this because, being moved and excited by the grace of God, before the end of life they are sincerely converted, and renounce sin, and by faith take refuge in the merit and righteousness of Christ; and on account of this they obtain from God remission of their sins.

V. Yet although they maintain that any sin whatever deserves of itself eternal death, and rejection from the love and favour of God, they are far from holding with the Stoics that all sins are equal and alike. For they confess that there is found a great difference between sin and sin, and that one is by far more grievous and atrocious than another; and therefore, although some eternal punishment corresponds to every sin, yet there are various degrees among the punishments of sins, and one should be punished by far more mildly than another. As the Gospel teaches that that servant who knew his lord's will and did it not, shall be beaten with more and severer stripes than he who violated it in ignorance, although this last shall not pass with impunity.

VI. On this point the Later Helvetic Confession, which is found in the Harmony or Collection of Confessions, and which was confirmed by the subscriptions not only of the neighbouring Churches of the Zurichers and Bernese, and others whose confession it is, but also of the more remote Hungarian, Polish, Scotch, French, and other Reformed

Churches, speaks distinctly. For in that Confession these words are read verbatim: "We confess that not all sins are equal, although they flow from the same fountain of corruption and unbelief; but some are more grievous than others, as the Lord said, 'It shall be more tolerable for Sodom than for the city that rejects the Word of the Gospel. "We therefore condemn all who have taught things contrary to this, especially Pelagius together with all Pelagians, as also the Jovinians, who make all sins equal with the Stoics."

VII. Moreover, from this disparity and inequality of sins, and the lighter or more grievous nature of some compared with others, it comes to pass that God, dealing graciously with His sons whom He has adopted in Christ and regenerated by His Spirit, according to the gracious covenant of the Gospel, in so far pardons certain lighter sins in them, that even though they are not without sins of this kind, into which they daily fall, and should die in some one of them, yet He does not on that account declare them unworthy to be admitted into heaven, and made partakers of eternal glory and felicity. And therefore sins of this kind may consist with a good conscience, and purity of heart, and that measure of sanctification which God requires of us in this life, that in the other we may enjoy and see Him. Nor do sins of this kind expel peace of conscience and spiritual joy, and hope and confidence of the remission of sins and eternal salvation, from the believing and godly man. Of this kind of sins are, for example, an idle word, immoderate laughter, a vain thought, and the flaws and defects cleaving to the good works even of the pious, in which they ever come short of the perfect standard of the law.

VIII. But there are other more grievous sins, which cannot consist at the same time with a good conscience, and with that righteousness and holiness without which no one shall see the Lord, and to which all who are truly pious and believing are renewed in this life through the grace of Christ. Whence it is that the Gospel itself absolutely declares that those whose ordinary course is to commit sins of this kind, and who are overtaken by death in any one of them, shall be excluded from the kingdom of heaven. And therefore they who fall into sins of this kind, and for some time persevere in them, are bound with the guilt of eternal death, and lose (so to speak) their present fitness for entering into the kingdom of heaven; nor for that time can they retain peace of conscience, confidence of salvation, and the joy which is the fruit of the Holy Spirit, and the companion of sincere piety and probity. Nor is there good ground to hope for the salvation of him whom sudden death overtakes while committing any grievous crime of this kind; such, for example, as adultery, idolatry, and deliberate homicide.

IX. And indeed these things are evidently gathered from the Sacred Scriptures: for the Sacred Scripture teaches in many places that no one lives without sin; as when it says (James 3), "In many things we all offend;" and Solomon in Ecclesiastes, "There is no just man upon the earth that doeth good and sinneth not;" and John in like manner, "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us." Whence it necessarily follows, since no believers, however pious and studious of righteousness, live without sins in this life, that there are some sins which may consist together with true righteousness and holiness, and along with which a good conscience may be preserved, and those gifts and fruits of the Spirit, which the Scripture declares to be the properties of the pious in this life. James 3, Eccles. 7, 1 John 1.

X. But this same Scripture no less clearly and frequently inculcates that those more grievous sins, which it calls the "works of the flesh," exclude man from the kingdom of heaven; nor can he who commits sins of this kind please God, and become an heir of His kingdom. "Be not deceived," says Paul, "neither fornicators, nor idolaters, nor adulterers, nor effeminate, nor abusers of themselves with mankind, nor thieves, nor covetous, nor drunkards, nor revilers, nor extortioners, shall inherit the kingdom of God." Also, "Now the works of the flesh are manifest, which are, adultery, fornication, uncleanness, lasciviousness, idolatry, witchcraft, hatred, variance, emulations, wrath, strife, seditions, heresies, envyings, murders, drunkenness, revellings, and such like; of which I tell you before, as I have told you in time past, that they who do such things shall not inherit the kingdom of God." Whence it appears no less evidently that those who are accustomed to commit flagitious sins of this kind, and whom death overtakes while engaged in any one of them, cannot be partakers of eternal salvation; and therefore all sins of this kind are altogether inconsistent with that holiness to which life and eternal glory are promised; nor along with them can a good conscience be retained, nor legitimate confidence of eternal salvation: but as long as any one remains involved in any one of sins of this kind, so long is he held bound by the guilt of eternal death and perdition, not only according to the rigor of the law, but also according to the very equity of the Gospel. 1 Cor. 6, Gal. 5.

XI. The Theologians of Great Britain clearly deliver this doctrine, in their Judgment concerning the Fifth Article of the Remonstrants, which is inserted in the Acts of the Synod of Dort: for there, in the chapter concerning Perseverance, as it respects the elect themselves, and the certainty of it as to the thing, this is their second Thesis: "Although the elect, being placed in this state" (namely, of adoption and salvation), "by reason of the remains of concupiscence, in every good work omit something, and daily commit lighter sins of subreption, negligence, and inadvertence, yet neither is the state of their justification shaken thereby, nor the use of their hereditary right to the heavenly kingdom intercepted."

XII. To which Thesis they immediately subjoin this declaration and confirmation: "According indeed to the rigor of the law, every sin, even the lightest, is deadly, and excludes the sinner from the favour of God and the kingdom of heaven. But with those His sons already adopted and justified in Christ, God never deals according to strict law. There are indeed some sins, on account of which God denounces anger and indignation against these His sons – nay, threatens them with exclusion from heaven and eternal death, Which sins may be seen enumerated 1 Cor. 6:10, Gal. 5:19, 21, Col. 3:6 concerning which mention shall be made in the following Theses. But there are also certain other sins, on account of which the merciful God is not wont either for a time to deprive His sons of the light of His countenance, or to strike them with the fear of condemnation or death. Sins of this kind are the rebellious motions of concupiscence, concerning which the Apostle complains, Rom. 7; also the defects and flaws which cleave even to the best works of the regenerate. Finally, the daily lapses of human infirmity, which are committed without any set purpose of committing them, and are remitted by daily asking pardon. Concerning which it is said, James 3:2, 'In many things we all offend;' and 1 John 1:8, 'If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves.' Notwithstanding these sins, any one of the faithful may rightly say, 'There is no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus.' Nay, in the midst of these infirmities, God says to every justified person, as He said to the Apostle, 'My grace is

sufficient for thee, for my strength is made perfect in weakness.' They do not fall from the state of justification through their infirmities, by whose infirmity the power of God is perfected, and who can meanwhile glory that the power of Christ dwelleth in them, as is declared in the same place."

XIII. After this their third Thesis is as follows: "The same persons, being regenerated and justified, do sometimes through their own fault fall into grievous sins, and by these incur paternal indignation from God, contract damning guilt, lose their present fitness for entering into the kingdom of heaven."

XIV. Which Thesis they thus confirm in what follows: "By the examples of David and Peter, it appears that the regenerate may precipitate themselves into most grievous sins, God sometimes permitting this, that they may learn to acknowledge with humility that they were saved from eternal death, and endowed with eternal life, not by their own powers or merits, but by the mere mercy of God alone. While they continue in sins of this kind, and securely acquiesce in them, the paternal indignation of God arises against them: 'If they profane my statutes, and keep not my commandments, I will visit their iniquity with stripes, and their sin with blows.' 'Tribulation and anguish upon every soul of man that doeth evil.' Nay more, they contract damning guilt, so that while they persist impenitent in that state, they neither ought nor can persuade themselves otherwise than that they are liable to death: 'If ye live after the flesh, ye shall die.' For they are bound by a capital crime, by the desert of which, according to the Divine ordination, they are subject to death; although they are not yet consigned to death, nor are to be consigned, if we regard the paternal love of God, but are first to be delivered from this sin, that so they may be delivered from the guilt of death. Finally, in their present condition, they lose their fitness for entering into the kingdom of heaven; because into that kingdom shall not enter anything that defileth, or worketh abomination. For the heavenly crown is not bestowed except on those who have fought the good fight, and finished their course in faith and holiness. Unfit, therefore, to attain to this crown, is whosoever still cleaveth to works of impiety." Psalm 89:31, 32, Rom. 2:9, and 8:13, Rev. 21:27, 2 Tim. 4:8.

XV. But their fourth Thesis is as follows: "The immovable ordination of God requires that the believer thus wandering should first return into the way through the renewed act of faith and repentance, before he can be brought to the goal of the way, that is, the heavenly kingdom."

XVI. And to this Thesis is subjoined the following explanation: "By the decree of election the faithful are so predestinated to the end, that they are brought to that same end not otherwise than through the means instituted by God, as by a certain royal way. Nor are the decrees of God concerning the means, the mode and order of events, less firm and certain, than concerning the end itself, and the events themselves. If any one therefore enter upon a way contrary to the Divine ordination, that broad way, for instance, of impurity and impenitence, which leads directly to hell, he can never in that manner arrive in heaven. Nay, if death should overtake him while wandering in that devious path, he cannot but fall into everlasting death. This is the constant and clear voice of the Scriptures: 'Except ye repent, ye shall in like manner perish.' 'Be not deceived, neither idolaters,' etc. 'shall inherit the kingdom of God.' In vain, therefore, are they who think that an elect person wallowing in

such flagitious courses, and dying in them, shall nevertheless necessarily be saved by virtue of his election. For God indeed appointing, the salvation of the elect is fixed and firm: but God decreeing also, it is fixed and firm only through the way of faith, repentance, and holiness. 'Without holiness no man shall see the Lord.' As, therefore, it was fixed from the decree and promise of God that all who were with Paul in the same ship should come safe to land out of the shipwreck; and yet that saying of Paul's was equally certain, 'Except ye abide in the ship, ye cannot be saved:' so it was fixed that the elect servants of God, David and Peter, should arrive at the kingdom of heaven; and yet it was no less fixed, that if the former had continued impenitent in adultery and murder, and the latter in denial and perjury, neither of them could have been saved." Luke 13:5, 1 Cor. 6:9, Heb. 12:14, Acts 27:31.

XVII. Finally, after interposing some things to this purpose, they add a fifth Thesis in these words: "In that interval which is between the contracting of guilt from grievous sin, and the renewed act of faith and repentance, such a sinner stands condemned by his own desert, to be absolved by the merit of Christ and the firm purpose of God; not however actually absolved, until by renewed faith and repentance he has obtained pardon."

XVIII. Moreover, it is not difficult to show that the other Reformed hold the same thing as to the matter itself with these British Theologians: for in those same Acts of the Synod of Dort, the Theologians of Bremen, in their Judgment on the same Article, in their eleventh Thesis, teach that "The regenerate, when they fall into any grievous sins, lose a good conscience, purity of heart, and spiritual joy; which does not happen to them when they fall into lighter sins daily."

XIX. With whom Paraeus agrees, in his work against Bellarmine on the Loss of Grace, Book I. Chap. 7, where he confesses that a believer, when he falls into grievous sins (as David did), loses purity of heart, uprightness and newness of spirit, joy of salvation, consolation of grace, goodness of conscience, etc. And afterwards he teaches that in a believer who has thus fallen, the justifying act of faith does not exercise itself. "Faith," says he, "is then said to justify, when it can and does exercise its proper act of receiving the remission of sins. But this act a sick, wounded faith, oppressed with the filth of the flesh, and bound as it were with the fetters of sin, cannot exercise, nor has it power to exercise it." And below, "But to those justified persons who have fallen, God does not impute their sins, namely, if they repent; but before repentance He certainly imputes them, so as to inflict temporal punishments, and would even inflict eternal punishments, unless they repented." And at length he thus concludes: "Then, therefore, faith which remains in the fallen only in a habitual manner, cannot properly be said to justify, nor to justify them."

XX. But the Theologians of Poland, in their declaration of their opinion presented in the Conference at Thorn, expressly teach that the regenerate, as often as they fall into sins against conscience, and for some time persevere in them, do not, during that time, retain justifying grace, nor the Holy Spirit; but incur new guilt of wrath and eternal death; whereas the case is otherwise, when they sin not against conscience, but from infirmity and inadvertence. For these are their words: "We are falsely accused, as if we affirm that those once justified cannot lose the grace of God, nor the assurance of it, nor the Holy Spirit itself, although they wallow in sins at their pleasure. Whereas, on the contrary, we rather

teach that the regenerate themselves, as often as they fall into sins against conscience, and for some time persevere in them, do not retain true faith, nor justifying grace, much less the assurance of it, or the Holy Spirit during that time, but incur new guilt of wrath and eternal death: and therefore, unless by the special grace of God exciting them (which we doubt not is done in the case of the elect), they are again renewed to repentance, they would in reality be damned." On the Title concerning Grace, Sect. 2, No. 11.

XXI. To this pertains the distinction of sin in use in the Reformed Schools, according to which sin is distinguished into that which wastes the conscience, and that which does not waste the conscience. Which distinction is found in William Amesius and Lewis Crocins. For by that sin which wastes the conscience is meant that which cannot consist with true piety and a good conscience: but by that sin which does not waste the conscience is meant that which, being committed through infirmity and negligence, may be found in one who is truly pious, and has a good conscience towards God. Amesius in the Marrow of Theology, Book I. Chap. 14, No. 11; Lewis Crocins in his Compendium of Sacred Theology, Book III. Chap. 38, Nos. 23 and 24.

XXII. But the distinction of sin into reigning and not reigning, as Ursinus delivers and explains it in his Catechetical Expositions revised by the labour of David Paraeus, comes to the same thing. "A reigning sin," says he, "is one against which the sinner does not strive through the grace of the Holy Spirit, and therefore becomes obnoxious to eternal death, unless he repent and obtain pardon through Christ. Or it is every sin which is not lamented, and against which resistance is not made by the grace of the Holy Spirit, and on account of which, not only by the ordination of the Divine justice, but in reality, he who has it is guilty of eternal punishments. Such are all the sins of the unregenerate: also some sins in the regenerate, as error in the foundation of faith, and a lapse against conscience; with which the confidence of the remission of sins and the consolation of life cannot consist, until they recover themselves. For that even the regenerate may fall into a reigning sin, is sufficiently shown by the most grievous lapses of most holy men, as of Aaron, David, etc. A sin not reigning is that against which the sinner strives through the grace of the Holy Spirit: and therefore he is not obnoxious to eternal death, because he repents and obtains pardon through Christ. Sins of this kind are all the defects, inclinations, depraved lusts, and many sins of ignorance, omission and infirmity, that remain in the saints as long as they are in this life: which however they acknowledge, lament and hate, and against which they strive, and for the remission of which to themselves they continually pray on account of Christ the Mediator, saying, 'Forgive us our debts.' And therefore in these they retain faith and consolation." Part I. on Actual Sin.

XXIII. From all which it evidently appears that, as we have said, the Doctors of the Reformed School acknowledge two kinds of sins. One of lighter sins, which may consist at the same time with a good conscience, and that purity of heart without which no one shall see the Lord; and which therefore do not actually render the believing person in whom they are found, obnoxious to eternal damnation, and unfit to be admitted into the kingdom of heaven, even if he should be overtaken by death in any one of sins of this kind. The other, of more grievous sins, into which if any one fall, and before he rise again from them by repentance, he cannot preserve a good conscience, and that purity of heart

necessary to see God: but by them he becomes in reality guilty of eternal death, and obnoxious to it, and unfit to be admitted into the kingdom of heaven; so that if death should oppress him in that state, he would be to be condemned forever, and excluded from celestial glory.

XXIV. Moreover, from what has been said, it appears that the Reformed do not approve the distinction of sin into mortal and venial, as it is commonly expounded in the Roman School. Since they believe that every sin deserves of itself, and by its own nature, punishment and eternal death, they cannot admit that there are certain sins which are not of themselves deadly, but venial. Nevertheless, they do not altogether reject this distinction, but confess that it may be used in a convenient sense.

XXV. And first indeed, they allow sins to be called venials, which do actually obtain pardon, on account of the faith and repentance of the sinner, however grievous they may be in themselves: but in a peculiar sense they call mortals those which do in reality bring death and eternal perdition upon sinners, on account of their unbelief and impenitence. Which is what the Roman School calls mortal and venial from the event, as was before observed.

XXVI. In like manner they acknowledge that sins may in a certain sense be called venials, which have this from their cause, that they the more easily obtain pardon; because they are not done from determined malice, but from infirmity and ignorance. As the Apostle says that he was a blasphemer, a persecutor, and injurious, but obtained mercy, because he did it ignorantly. Which in the Schools is called venial from the cause. For those sins of Paul's, although they doubtless deserved eternal death, yet obtained mercy and pardon, because he had sinned through ignorance. Whence the Father of mercies was more easily moved to grant pardon to him who had not sinned from malice. And in this sense venial sins are opposed to those which, because they are committed from determined malice, more rarely and with more difficulty obtain mercy and pardon, and are more frequently punished with eternal death. Which distinction John Rainolds, an Englishman, relates and approves in his treatise on the Apocryphal Books, Reading 164.

XXVII. Moreover, some Reformed Doctors sometimes call venial all sins which may, by means of repentance, obtain remission and pardon: but mortal, that which cannot be remitted, but necessarily brings eternal death. In which sense the mortal sin is only the sin against the Holy Ghost, while all other sins are venials. So that this distinction is the same with that of John, in the fifth chapter of his First Epistle, where he distinguishes a sin unto death, and a sin not unto death: and with that by which the Schools commonly distinguish sin into remissible and irremissible. In this sense Gomarus, in his Syntagma of the Leyden Disputations, Disp. 13, Thesis 19, and Piscator, in the First Volume of his Theological Theses, loco 7, Disp. 2, Thesis 64, distinguish sin into mortal and venial.

XXVIII. But there are some also who take the distinction of sin into mortal and venial in another sense. For Zacharias Ursinus in his Catechetical Expositions, and David Paraeus, who revised them, say that a reigning sin may, in a peculiar sense, be called mortal, but a sin not reigning may, in a peculiar sense, be called venial. And thus a mortal sin is that against which the sinner does not strive through the grace of the Holy Spirit, and on

account of which he becomes actually and really obnoxious to eternal death. Sins of this kind in the regenerate themselves are lapses against conscience, along with which the confidence of the remission of sins and true consolation cannot consist, until they repent. But a venial sin is that against which the sinner strives through the grace of the Holy Spirit, and on account of which, God being merciful, he does not become actually obnoxious to eternal death. Sins of this kind are all the inclinations and depraved lusts, and many sins of ignorance, omission and infirmity, that remain in the saints as long as they are in this life, which however they acknowledge, lament and hate, and against which they strive, and for the remission of which to themselves they continually pray on account of Christ the Mediator, saying, "Forgive us our debts." And in these also they retain faith and consolation, as that place from Ursinus, just cited, on Actual Sin, declares.

XXIX. In like manner John Davenant, Bishop of Salisbury, seems to explain the distinction of sin into mortal and venial. For he calls, in a peculiar sense, mortal, those more grievous sins which waste the conscience, and bind the believers themselves who fall into them with new guilt of eternal death, and which, as long as they do not rise again from them, render them unfit to enter into the kingdom of heaven. But to this kind of sins he teaches that the defects which cleave to and are intermingled with their good works, although they have the nature of sin, and deserve death according to the utmost rigor of the law, do not pertain. Whence he concludes that defects of this kind ought not to be called mortal sins in an appropriate sense. As may be seen in his work, On Actual Righteousness, Chap. 35.

XXX. "It is to be noted," says he, "that sin may be called mortal, or deadly, in three ways. First, that which brings with it the absolute, certain and irrevocable desert of eternal death. In this sense the sin against the Holy Ghost alone is accounted mortal. Secondly, that sin is commonly called mortal which involves the sinner in the guilt of death, but in such a way as to be remissible; and which does not suffer him to have any part in the kingdom of God, until he revive, and return into the narrow way. Sins of this kind are all those which are recounted by the Apostle, 1 Cor. 6: 'Be not deceived, neither fornicators,' etc. 'shall inherit the kingdom of God.' The same doctrine is repeated, Gal. 5: 'The works of the flesh are manifest, which are, adultery, fornication,' etc. 'They who do such things shall not inherit the kingdom of God.'"

XXXI. "In this class are to be placed, not only those which are expressly enumerated by the Apostle, but all others also, whether external or internal, which are of the same nature, as the Apostle plainly indicated in the latter of these places, in which he said that 'they who do these and similar things shall be excluded from the kingdom of God.' But similar things are all those in which obedience is yielded to the flesh lusting against the spirit, even to the perpetration of an impious deed. For all these are commonly called mortal, because they bring the sinner under new guilt of death, and into the very way to hell, until by repentance he desist from sins of this kind: according to that saying of the Apostle, Rom. 8: 'If ye live after the flesh ye shall die; but if ye through the Spirit do mortify the deeds of the body, ye shall live.'"

XXXII. "Thirdly, any sin whatever is called mortal by some of our Theologians, which would involve him who has it, or who commits it, in death, according to the rigor of the

law, if the person were judged without the mercy of God in Christ: although now to him who is ingrafted into Christ it is not imputed unto death, but is remitted to him although he is still involved in it. In this class we place the remains of original sin which adhere to the regenerate, the defects of perfect love which are mingled with their good works; also the vicious lusts and motions against which they strive, and which by holy motions they overcome and mortify, and do not suffer to have dominion in this mortal body. All these, if you regard the nature of the thing, and the law of God, are sins, and therefore mortals, that is, deserving of death. 'For the soul that sinneth, it shall die.' 'The wages of sin is death.' But if you regard the mercy of God, and the state of the person, they are not deadly, but pardoned: the guilt of which is renewed from those who are ingrafted into Christ, and do not suffer this old man to reign in them. 'There is no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus,' Rom. 8:1. The Apostle did not say, There is nothing in its own nature damnable, or deserving death, in the regenerate; but, 'There is no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus.' Nor did he simply say, 'There is no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus;' but with this addition, 'who walk not after the flesh.' For as often as the regenerate, giving loose reins to the flesh, and obeying its lusts, fall into fornication, murder, or similar sins, they are involved in deadly guilt, nor can they ever enjoy eternal life, unless they be delivered from the same by a renewed act of repentance and faith."

XXXIII. Having observed these things, he proves that the culpable defects which cleave to the good works of the regenerate, although they are truly sins, and according to the strict rigor of the law deserve death, and are therefore sometimes by our writers called mortal sins, are not, meanwhile, to be called mortal sins in the peculiar and appropriate sense, secondly above explained. This he demonstrates by the following argument among others: "That sin is called mortal in an appropriate sense, which induces a new deadly guilt, until it be washed away by a new act of repentance. But the sin which cleaves to the good works of the regenerate, although according to the rigor of the Law it might condemn man out of Christ, yet does not so condemn the regenerate man ingrafted into Christ; nor even involve him in any new guilt. For since every regenerate person has, as it were, two men in himself, the new and the old man, whatever the old man raise a tumult, and rebel against the law, it is not imputed to the regenerate man and new man, following, in so far as in him lies, the rule of the law, and abhorring and refraining, so far as he can, the rebellion of concupiscence."

XXXIV. Similar to these are the things which Robert Baron, formerly Professor of Theology in the University of Aberdeen among the Scots, teaches at length and accurately concerning the true distinction between mortal and venial sin, in his Theological Disputation on that subject. For there, in accordance with the other Reformed, he asserts that every sin is of itself mortal, nor is any sin venial except by accident: and moreover that all the sins of the reprobate are and ought to be called mortal sins; both because by their own nature they deserve eternal death, and because in them they are actually punished with eternal death. But yet he maintains that in believers and the regenerate, some sins are with the highest reason called mortal, and others venial: and indeed, mortal sins, the more grievous and atrocious ones into which believers themselves sometimes fall; but venial, the lighter sins into which they daily run: because for those God denounces anger and indignation against them, nay, threatens them with exclusion from heaven and eternal

death; but for these He strikes them with no fear of condemnation or eternal death, nor deprives them of the sense of His favour, or confidence of remission of sins.

XXXV. For in that Disputation, Part First, Section Second, this is his first assertion: "Every sin is of itself mortal, nor is any venial except by accident." 2. "All the sins of the reprobate are mortal sins: and therefore not only from demerit, but also from the event." 3. "And if all the sins of the reprobate are mortal, it is not on the contrary to be said that all the sins of the elect are venials. For," says he, "their atrocious sins, wasting the conscience, not only deserve exclusion from the favour of God, and from the heavenly kingdom; but also actually exclude them from that degree of favour with which they were before beloved of God, and if they should persevere in them, would exclude them forever from the heavenly kingdom. Concerning which sins the Scripture positively teaches that whosoever commits them cannot be made partaker of the heavenly kingdom and eternal life, 1 Cor. 6, and elsewhere; and that God hates and abominates those who do such things, Prov. 6 and 22."

XXXVI. But his fourth assertion is this: "Some sins of the regenerate are rightly called venials; because according to the gracious covenant of God, and paternal clemency, they do not exclude them from the hope of the heavenly kingdom, nor from that degree of favour with which they were before beloved of God." Sins of this kind he says are the rebellious and involuntary motions of concupiscence. Also the defects and flaws which adhere to the good works of the regenerate. Finally, those which from the smallness of the matter are called venials; because, namely, they are committed in a light matter, or one of little moment. Concerning which sins he thinks the Scripture speaks, James 3: "In many things we all offend;" and 1 John 1: "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us;" and Ecclesiastes 7: "There is no just man upon the earth, who doeth good and sinneth not."

XXXVII. After this he enunciates his fifth and sixth assertions in these words: "That sins of this kind in the regenerate do not exclude them from the favour of God, and the hope of the heavenly kingdom, they have simply and absolutely, not from their own nature, but from the mercy of God. But truly if the lighter sins of the regenerate be considered comparatively" (that is, if they be compared with their more grievous sins), "and the question be asked, Why those rather than these are venials, and do not exclude from the favour of God? it is to be said that they have this from themselves and their own nature." "For," says he, "although, speaking absolutely, these sins are grievous, yet comparatively they are light: and this their comparative lightness, which is founded in their very nature, is doubtless the reason why God willed to punish them more clemently under the covenant of grace, than atrocious sins wasting the conscience."

XXXVIII. But in what follows he recounts at length the various discriminations between that sin which he calls mortal, and that which he calls venial. And first indeed, he says that mortal and venial sins differ in respect to avoidability, that is, in respect to the power which we have through the grace of God to avoid them. For, says he, a regenerate man can, by the power and help of grace, partly internal or inherent, which is called habitual, partly external or assisting, which they call special assisting grace, avoid those manifest works of the flesh, those atrocious sins which are recounted, 1 Cor. 6:9, 10, Gal. 5:19, 20, 21. But those lighter sins, which are called venials, no saint can for any long time avoid, much less during the

whole period of his life, through that measure of grace which God is wont to mete out to them in this life.

XXXIX. Secondly, he says these sins differ in respect to the obligation by which we are bound to avoid them. For the understanding of which thing, he notes, first, that the covenant of works, or the law precisely considered, binds to the perfect observance of each and every precept of the law, and that in all its particulars, conditions, and circumstances of exact obedience; and therefore to the avoidance of all sins, even the lightest; and that strictly and precisely, under the peril and penalty of eternal damnation. Secondly, that the covenant of grace does not simply remove the obligation of the law by which it binds us to all degrees, conditions, and circumstances of perfect obedience, and consequently to the avoiding of all sins, even the lightest. Since we are still bound to strive and aspire after that perfection, so far as in us lies, and to grieve seriously that we fall short of it, and daily to implore pardon from God for that defect.

XL. Thirdly, the covenant of grace, although it does not simply and altogether remove this obligation, yet takes away the rigor, or severity and terribleness of this obligation. For although, says he, it sets before us the entire perfection of righteousness as a thing to be sought after, and, as far as possible, attained, yet it does not require it strictly and precisely under the peril and penalty of eternal damnation. For to a certain measure of obedience indeed, which is possible through ordinary grace, it binds strictly and precisely, that is, under the peril of eternal damnation, requiring that we should actually have it. But to a farther measure, which we cannot attain by the power of ordinary grace, it binds less strictly, namely, requiring that we should have it at least in wish and endeavour. For example, to perfection by parts, as they call it, it binds precisely. For it promises eternal life on no other condition than that we should actually have it. But to that perfection which is called of degrees, it does not bind so strictly and precisely; but only requires that we should strive and endeavour to attain to it, so far as the grace afforded us will permit.

XLI. Hence he gathers that believers, even according to the Evangelical covenant, are strictly and precisely, under the peril of eternal death, bound to live without those sins which are called mortal. Because the perfection of parts pertains to this, that we should not only repent of those more grievous sins, but also abstain altogether from them, that is, that we should no more commit them for the future; according to that of Christ, "Thou art made whole, sin no more." But that they are not bound in like manner to live, for the future, without every sin, even the lightest. Because to live without those lighter sins which are called venials, pertains to the perfection of degrees, which excludes all flaws and defects of human obedience.

XLII. Thirdly, he says that mortal and venial sin differ in respect to the very acts themselves: because the foulness or deformity which is found in venial sins is much less than that which exists in mortal sins: for this reason, that in every venial sin there is something which extenuates the offense committed by it, and in a certain way excuses it with a gracious judge. Which he afterwards proves by going through those three species of venial sin which are commonly distinguished by the Scholastics. For as to the first of them, that is, venial sin from its kind, with God judging graciously, and according to the multitude of His tender mercies, the lightness of the offense (comparative, that is, since no sin is absolutely light)

which it has from the very specific nature of the act considered in itself, without respect to the mode of acting, or the particular matter in which it is committed, excuses it, as is evident, for instance, in an idle word, immoderate laughter, etc. But the second species of venial sin, that is, sin from subreption, is excused by the lightness of the offense which it has, not from the specific nature of the act considered in itself, but from the mode in which that act proceeds from the agent; because, namely, the agent did not fully and sufficiently deliberate: as, for example, in a sudden appetite of revenge, or lust. Because the appetite of revenge is not from its specific nature a light sin; but accidentally light, because it takes place from indeliberation. But the third species, that is, venial sin from the smallness of the matter, is excused by the lightness of the offense which it has, not from the proper nature of such an act, but from the limitation of it to a particular matter; as in the theft of a penny. For theft is not from its specific nature a light sin, but accidentally light, because it is committed in a matter of little moment.

XLIII. Fourthly, he says that mortal and venial sins differ in respect to the repentance required for the remission of them. First, because the ordinary and daily exercise of repentance is graciously accepted by God, and deemed sufficient for the expiation of venial sins. But as those mortal sins themselves are grievous, horrid, and rare and extraordinary in the course of a Christian life; so the repentance which is necessarily required for the expiation of them ought to be singular, more accurate, and extraordinary; such as was that of David after his adultery and murder, and of Peter after his denial of Christ.

XLIV. Then, because for the expiation of the guilt of mortal sins a special acknowledgment and confession of them, and a special grief and contrition, are required. But for taking away venial sins, for the most part that general, but humble, serious, and sorrowful acknowledgment of our corruption, joined with that general deprecation, "Cleanse thou me from secret faults," is accepted. Because those lighter and daily incurred faults for the most part escape our knowledge. Although those of this kind which are observed by us ought also to be specially acknowledged and deplored.

XLV. Thirdly, in fine, because the repentance necessary to the remission of mortal sins, and the salvation of those who commit them, ought to be perfectly practical, that is, to go forth into an actual and real cessation from all sins of this kind, as is seen from Prov. 28:13, John 5:14. For if any one, leaving some one or two mortal sins, should afterwards fall into others, he can obtain neither grace in this life, nor glory in the future, as the Apostle teaches, 1 Cor. 6:9, 10, Gal. 5:21. But on the other hand, the repentance required for the remission of venial sins is not, nor can it be, perfectly practical, as it respects sins of this kind. For as all confess, no one can live without sins of this kind: and consequently the salvation of the pious is not endangered, although before the end of life they cannot escape this kind of sin.

XLVI. Fifthly, he affirms that mortal and venial sins differ in respect to the effects which follow the acts of sin, that is, the detriment which they bring upon sinners; because the calamities and losses which from mortal sins befall believers, are much more grievous and sad than those which follow the lighter sins, or venials. He then proceeds to expound severally the three evils or detriments which follow the mortal sins of the regenerate; which nevertheless, according to the dispensation of Divine Providence under the covenant of grace, do not follow the lighter sins committed by them.

XLVII. The first evil or detriment is the exclusion of the sinner from that degree of Divine favour with which he was before beloved of God. For although, when a regenerate and elect person falls into any grievous sin, and for some time perseveres in it, God does not on that account revoke His eternal purpose of saving and glorifying him, according to which it shall come to pass that God will give him grace to rise again from that fall, and so to arrive at the destined end; yet during that time in which he remains involved in that sin, he no longer pleases God as before, but incurs the hatred and displeasure of God, according to those general declarations of Scripture, by which He declares that He hates all workers of iniquity, and does not delight in those who withdraw themselves.

XLVIII. Moreover, during this state not only are the sins committed by the regenerate displeasing to God; but also their obedience, prayers, and thanksgivings. Nay, nothing can proceed from them which for that time can be acceptable and well-pleasing to God. But that favour and complacency in which they are acceptable and well-pleasing to God, who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit, the faithful do not lose on account of their lighter sins into which they daily fall. And although these in themselves not only displease God, but also might justly cause that our whole obedience should be foul in the eyes of the Lord, and altogether displeasing to Him, yet God, notwithstanding these, accepts our imperfect obedience in Christ, and as it were turning His eyes from the blemishes which adhere to it, graciously regards the sincerity and humility of the same, and from these takes complacency and delight.

XLIX. Then when the regenerate by their own fault fall into atrocious sins, the Divine benevolence towards them is so bound and hindered, by the obstacle which their sins place in its way, that during this state He cannot confer upon them remission of sins, peace of conscience, spiritual joy, and similar gifts of the Holy Spirit. But no such thing follows from the lighter and daily sins of believers, which do not prevent God from remaining ever prompt and ready to confer upon them the wonted and ordinary effects and evidences of His saving grace, namely, confidence of the remission of sins, peace of conscience, and spiritual joy: although the lightest sins also, from themselves and their own nature, render us incapable and unworthy of the gifts of Divine grace.

L. But the reason of this difference between sins of the two kinds, he says, is, that the regenerate when fallen into those atrocious and conscience-wasting sins, cease to render that obedience which the covenant of grace requires from us, as necessary to the obtaining of further gifts of grace in this life, and the beatific vision of God in the life to come. And therefore as long as believers and regenerate persons remain involved in those grievous and atrocious sins, they are incapable of these benefits, not only from their own demerit, but also according to the sentence of the covenant of grace, until by special, extraordinary, and perfectly practical repentance they return unto God, and take away all this malignity of their actings from before His eyes. But when the elect and justified commit those lighter sins, from inadvertence, or infirmity, they do not cease to render that obedience which the covenant of grace exacts, as precisely necessary to salvation. And notwithstanding these, they are said to walk according to the Spirit; nay, and to follow the Lord with their whole heart, and walk blamelessly in all the commandments and ordinances of the Lord.

LI. The second effect of a more grievous sin, which he calls mortal, and in which he says it differs from lighter sins, which are called venials, is a manifold diminution of grace inherent in us through the Holy Spirit. For although, according to him, by even the more grievous sins the habits of faith, hope and love are not altogether done away and removed, yet they are much diminished and weakened by them, and that not only extrinsically as to the fervour and facility, or promptitude, of using these habits; but also intrinsically, as to their very entity. For, says he, these habits have a certain latitude of degrees, within which, as they are in fact increased, so also they may be diminished by acts contrary to them.

LII. And moreover, although he teaches that the remains of these habits persist even in those who sin most grievously, yet he warns that their principal acts and operations cease and are interrupted in them. For in that state they cannot exercise the acts of justifying faith, and confidence and hope concerning their own salvation and remission of their sins, nor retain spiritual consolation and peace. But nothing of this kind befalls the regenerate when they fall into lighter sins through infirmity: For sins of this kind do not prevent faith and hope, and that holy confidence which the Holy Spirit begets in us, from putting forth their wonted acts in them: but along with sins of that kind there remain in them confidence in the Divine mercy, and certain hope of salvation, and a sense and persuasion of the remission of their sins.

LIII. Finally, he teaches that the third effect of mortal sin is that a justified man, when he contracts the guilt of it, loses his present fitness for entering into the kingdom of heaven: because into that kingdom shall not enter anything that defiles, or works abomination: and the heavenly crown is placed only on those who have fought the good fight, and finished their course in faith and holiness; and therefore whosoever still cleaves to works of impiety is unfit to attain to this crown. Although, however, all sins, however light, deserve exclusion from the heavenly kingdom according to the rigor of justice, yet according to the administration of Divine Providence under the covenant of grace, sins of this kind do not take away present fitness for entering into that heavenly kingdom: But if death should overtake a man only in sins of this kind, he is not on this account excluded from heaven, nor deprived of eternal glory and blessedness.

LIV. As respects the Theologians of the Augsburg Confession, in this too they all agree that all sins are by their own nature mortal; and therefore in the unregenerate there is no venial sin. But in the regenerate some sins may be called mortal, or rather deadly, because they involve them in new guilt of eternal death, and extinguish spiritual life in them: but others venial, or rather not deadly, because they are not imputed to them unto death, but are graciously pardoned on account of Christ. Of the former kind, according to them, is every sin against conscience, and proceeding from malice; but of the latter, sins of infirmity, depraved concupiscence, and similar human lapses. But with this distinction they wish that other distinction to coincide, by which sin is distinguished into reigning and not reigning. And by reigning sin, or mortal, they teach that the regenerate cast out faith and the Holy Spirit, and lose grace and eternal life: but by no means incur these evils through sins which are called venials.

LV. On this whole subject John Gerhard treats at length in his Loci Theologici, where concerning this distinction he explains his mind in these words: "That some sins are called

venials, others only mortals, does not arise from the nature of the sins, but from the mercy of the Father, the merit of the Son, and the sanctification of the Spirit; and this division respects not all men in general, but only the regenerate; nor is it to be taken from the law, which accuses and condemns all sins whatsoever and howsoever small; but from the Gospel, which shows that to believers in Christ, sins of infirmity, ignorance, and depraved lusts are not imputed, if they resist them, that is, if being regenerate, 1. They acknowledge these evils dwelling in the heart: 2. Grieve seriously for them: 3. Seek and believe to be covered by the merit of the Mediator as by a veil: 4. By no means give loose reins to them, but resist them by the Spirit, crucifying the flesh with its affections. From all which it appears, 1. That in the unregenerate there are no venial sins, but all are mortals: 2. That venial sins are not such from the nature of the act itself, but from the condition of the sinning person, which if it be in Christ through faith, sins of infirmity are covered: 3. That the name mortal sin is not very suitable, it should rather have been called deadly and reigning: 4. Nor is the name venial sin very suitable, they should rather have been called sins of infirmity, human lapses, depraved lusts, etc. For they are not therefore called venials because they are in themselves and of themselves deserving of pardon, but because God pardons and deigns to pardon them to believers." Tom. 2, Tract 13, On Actual Sins, Chap. 19, No. 92.

LVI. But afterwards, in answering some passages objected by Bellarmine, he says: "This at least may be proved from those and similar sayings, that there is a certain difference of sins; so that some are committed by the regenerate, and yet do not actually exclude them from the kingdom of heaven, while others, if committed by the regenerate, cast out faith and the Holy Spirit, which we do not deny." In the chapter just cited, No. 100. Then in the following number he subjoins: "But often in the very lightest sins, and sometimes through inadvertence, sin creeps upon the regenerate, through which they do not cease to be just." And some things being interposed, he says: "Where there is true faith in Christ, efficacious through love, there man lives spiritually, this spiritual life he does not lose through any sins of ignorance and infirmity, provided he acknowledge them, deplore them, and cleaving to Christ, mortify the lusts of the flesh by the Spirit; but through sins committed against conscience, by which the Holy Spirit is cast out, faith and spiritual life are lost."

LVII. Moreover, from what has been expounded in these and the preceding Theses, it appears that by far the greatest part of the Doctors of the Roman School establish by common consent, that there are certain sins which of themselves and by their own nature are not mortal, but venial; because of themselves they do not induce the guilt of eternal death; nor do they extinguish the spiritual life of the soul, which consists in the love and grace of God: Nevertheless this is not yet held by them for an article of faith, and a thing altogether certain and settled: because in the Roman School there are some Theologians, and indeed of the most celebrated, who hold the contrary, and who think that all sins are of themselves and by their own nature mortal, nor do they judge that any are venial except through the clemency and mercy of God.

LVIII. Hence also it is manifest that the same Doctors of the Roman School do not deny that all sins, and even those themselves which are called venials, may be punished in those who finish life without the grace of God with eternal punishments, and are in fact so

punished, and that most justly, and according to the judgment of God, which is according to truth.

LIX. On the other hand, it is clear from what we have said, that the Theologians of the Reformed School freely confess and teach that there are various degrees of malignity among sins, and that all sins are not equal; nor are all punished by God with equal punishments; but some will be punished in the judgment of God much more mildly, and others much more severely.

LX. Besides, we have taught that the Reformed acknowledge that there are certain grievous and atrocious sins which waste the conscience: so that as long as a man perseveres in them, and does not actually and really depart from them, he cannot be accounted pious and holy, and in that state preserve a good conscience, and retain spiritual joy, and confidence of salvation: But that there are other lighter sins, which do not prevent the believer, although he daily falls into them, from preserving a good conscience, and that measure of righteousness and holiness which in this life is necessary that any one may see God in the future life; and therefore which do not take from man inward peace, and legitimate confidence of salvation and remission of sins.

LXI. Nay, we have shown that most of the Reformed openly teach that there are certain sins, into which if the believer fall he is actually involved in new guilt of eternal death, and rendered unfit to enter into the kingdom of heaven, until by repentance he has renounced them, and has actually and altogether abstained from them: so that if death should overtake him in sins of this kind, as for example robbing and committing adultery, and lying in wait for his neighbour's life, he could by no means be saved, and become a partaker of celestial life and glory: but that there are other sins which do not induce new guilt of eternal death, nor render a man unfit to be admitted into the kingdom of heaven, although death should overtake him in any one sin of this kind. Sins of this kind are, in their opinion, certain lighter sins, as a frivolous thought, immoderate laughter, an idle word, and the defects cleaving to the good works of believers, and by reason of which they come short of that highest perfection which the rigor of the law exacts.

LXII. Moreover, it appears from what has been said that most of the Protestants, namely, all the Theologians of the Augsburg Confession, and some even of the Reformed themselves, admit the distinction of sin into mortal and venial, taken in a sound sense, and call in a peculiar sense mortal sins those more grievous and atrocious sins which waste the conscience, and actually involve the regenerate and justified themselves in new guilt of eternal death, when they fall into them: but venial sins those lighter sins, which may consist with a good conscience and sense of remission of sins, and through which a believing person is not bound with new guilt of eternal death; nor rendered unfit to be admitted into the kingdom of heaven, although he should die in some sin of that kind.

LXIII. Therefore that alone remains in controversy between the Roman School and the Protestant Theologians, Whether there are certain sins which by their own nature do not exclude the grace of God, nor deserve eternal death, and for which alone God could not justly reject man, and forever and altogether repel him from His friendship, if He should

deal rigorously with him? Which the Doctors of the Roman Church commonly affirm; but the Protestants deny.

LXIV. But the principal reasons on which they rely are these: And first indeed they prove that all sins are of themselves and by their own nature mortal, from the fact that even the lightest sins, the mercy and gracious pardon of God being set aside, forever exclude the sinner from the heavenly kingdom, and consequently give him over to eternal punishment. For that which belongs to sin, the mercy of God being excluded, beyond doubt belongs to it by its own nature and of itself. But now that every sin, however light it may seem, forever excludes from the heavenly kingdom, the mercy of God being excluded, is manifest from this, that every sin, however light, stains and defiles the sinner. But nothing that defiles shall enter into the kingdom of heaven. And therefore even he who has sinned most lightly cannot enter the kingdom of heaven, unless God first mercifully cleanse him, and graciously pardon his sin.

LXV. Moreover, any sins whatever, however light they may appear to us, will after the day of judgment be punished in the impenitent with eternal punishment; according to that saying of Christ in Matthew: "But I say unto you, that for every idle word which men shall speak, they shall give an account thereof in the day of judgment." For after the day of judgment there will be no place for temporal punishments. But if any sins whatever may be punished with eternal punishment, and shall in fact be so punished in the impenitent, they are beyond doubt deserving of such punishment, and deserve eternal punishment; otherwise God would act unjustly in punishing sin with a heavier punishment than is due to it: whereas it is the common opinion of Theologians that God punishes sinners beneath what is condign. But every sin which is deserving of eternal punishment may be called and accounted mortal.

LXVI. Thirdly, that the sins which are called venials deserve of themselves eternal punishment, is thus proved: That which can never be remitted, can be punished forever, and that justly. But any sins whatever, even the very lightest, in whatever person they may be found, absolutely speaking, might never be remitted: because whenever any sin is remitted by God, it is remitted of mercy and grace; which the very name of remission imports. But whatever God does of grace and mercy, that, absolutely and simply speaking, He might not do: and therefore to the very just, simply and absolutely speaking, and without respect to the promises gratuitously made in the Gospel, God might not remit even the lightest sins, and so might punish them forever.

LXVII. Moreover, when God entered into the legal covenant with man in his integrity, He required of him obedience altogether perfect, and complete in all its parts, as a condition without which he could not attain unto eternal and blessed life, and escape the Divine malediction. Now that perfection which the law in its rigor, and as it was first given to man, demands, excludes every sin, even the very lightest. And therefore by any sin whatever, even the lightest, man in his integrity might fall from eternal life, and incur the Divine malediction. Whence it manifestly follows that every sin, however light, is by its own nature mortal, not venial. But that under the legal covenant, man in his integrity would by any sin whatever have fallen from the promise of eternal life, is evident from this, that under that covenant there was no place for pardon and remission, the promises of which are peculiar

to the Evangelical covenant. Nor did the law precisely considered, and as opposed to the Gospel and grace, give place to repentance, without which every sin excludes forever from the heavenly life.

LXVIII. Finally, every sin, even that which is called venial, offends the infinite Majesty of God, and therefore has a sort of infinite malignity, namely, objectively. And also the stain contracted from any sin whatever, of itself and the mercy of God being excluded, endures forever. Whence it follows that to every sin is due an objectively infinite punishment, which deprives of an infinite good; and moreover which is infinite extensively, that is, which endures forever, that so the punishment may have proportion with the fault. And thus every sin ought to be called mortal by its own nature, as being to be punished from justice with eternal punishment.

On Free Will After the Fall with Respect to Salvation

I. In the previously published theses, we demonstrated that the doctors of the Roman school agree with the Protestants, at least in words, that in the state of fallen nature, the free will of man can do absolutely nothing without the grace of Christ in matters pertaining to true piety and leading to eternal salvation. And yet, when the free will of fallen man is considered with respect to salvific and spiritual good, the doctors of the Roman school do not speak of it in the same manner as the Protestants.

II. Firstly, the theologians of the Roman school, although they recognize the necessity of divine grace for works of piety, nevertheless assert that man, even before receiving grace, possesses free will in divine and spiritual matters. Not that he can do anything in that regard without grace, but because, with the help of grace, he can freely embrace spiritual good and thus has the true ability to reject and turn away from it.

III. Bellarmine presents and reports this doctrine, common to the entire Roman school, in several places in his sixth book on Free Will. Especially in chapter fifteen, where his first statement is: Man, before any grace, has free will not only for natural and moral works but also for works of piety and supernatural works. The sense in which he affirms this becomes clear in chapter nine of the same book. There, he proposes the question in these words: Is man, after the fall of the first man, truly free in matters pertaining to salvation, so that although he can do nothing without the help of grace, yet being excited and assisted by preventing grace from God, he can act in such a way that he is also able not to act.

IV. And this pertains to the fourth canon of the Council of Trent, sixth session. If anyone says that the free will of man, moved and excited by God, cooperates in no way by assenting to God exciting and calling him, so that he prepares and disposes himself to obtain the grace of justification, and that he cannot dissent if he wishes but, like something inanimate, does nothing at all and is merely passive, let him be anathema.

V. Furthermore, the doctors of the Roman school greatly differ among themselves concerning the manner in which divine grace is efficacious. While some claim that grace not only bestows new strength to free will, invites and encourages man to do good, and even assists in doing well, which all admit, but also that its efficacy is such that it infallibly and irresistibly inclines and determines the will to act well, others deny this, as we have shown elsewhere. Nevertheless, all agree that however efficacious divine grace may be, it does not take away the power of free will to reject the good to which it moves and attracts man. Therefore, even those who maintain that grace is efficacious by itself and infallibly operates the act of conversion in man, agree, according to the Tridentine canon, that the power to dissent from grace and resist it always remains in man. Hence, all agree that free will, when prevented and excited by grace, can do good in such a way that the contrary remains within its ability.

VI. They thus assert that free will, with respect to salvific good itself, is not extinguished and lost through sin, but only weakened, wounded, and diminished. In this, they follow the doctrine of the Synod of Trent, whose fifth canon, sixth session, states: If anyone says that the free will of man was lost and extinguished after Adam's sin, or that it is a matter of name only, indeed a title without reality, a figment introduced by Satan into the Church, let him be anathema.

VII. They maintain that free will, even in spiritual matters, is not entirely lost and extinguished, but only weakened and diminished because, after sin, there remains in man, even before grace, a certain remote and imperfect power to perform works of piety. Although he does not have perfect and proximate power for the same works and can do absolutely nothing by himself in this regard. This can be seen in Bellarmine's fifth book on free will, chapter fifteen, where his second statement is: Man, before any grace, has remote and imperfect power to perform works of piety. His third statement is: Man, before any grace, does not have proximate and perfect power for works of piety, and therefore he can do nothing by himself in this regard.

VIII. Bellarmine's words, in which he asserts that in matters pertaining to salvation and piety, man can do absolutely nothing by himself, explain in what sense he attributes to man, a sinner and deprived of God's grace, a certain imperfect power for spiritual and salvific good. He does not believe that man can indeed perform anything in this regard without grace, even weakly and imperfectly, but only that there remains in man, after sin, a certain power which, with new strength received through grace, can freely move towards spiritual good, regarding which he could do absolutely nothing by himself before. Bellarmine himself notes this while responding to this dilemma of Chemnitz: Either man has some strength by himself, however weak, or none at all. If he has some, then he can do something without God's grace. If none, then free will is extinguished. He responds that man only has remote power and imperfect strength, and therefore can do nothing by himself. But if that power is perfected and strength is added, he can accomplish many things.

IX. However, to show how man has free will even in spiritual matters before grace, even though he cannot do good before grace, he says that in that state man's free will is free in that respect, but his freedom is as if bound and impeded. It is loosed and set free when proximate power to act is conferred by preventing grace from God. To illustrate this, he says, we experience something similar in the power of seeing. For in the absence of a sensible species, man has the power and freedom to see; for that species is not the cause of freedom or the power of seeing, but the power is remote and freedom bound until the species is received, the power is perfected, and it can act.

X. Furthermore, it should be noted that when Bellarmine says that man's freedom with respect to spiritual good was bound, not extinguished, by sin, he does not mean that free will, loosed by grace and consenting to and pursuing good, does so by the strength it already had, not by the strength newly supplied by grace. Just as a man whose bonds are loosed, when he walks, does so by the strength he already had and which was not newly added, but only hindered by some impediment. Chemnitz accuses Catholic doctors of fraud and deception in this matter. He writes that Catholics hold that free will, excited by

grace, exerts the strength it had even before it was excited and consents to divine calling by its own strength. But Catholics do not hold this. They recognize that free will exists in man even before divine grace prevents it, for free will is a natural thing not lost through sin, but they do not say or think that free will has any, even proximate, power for acts of piety, but that it receives that power from God through preventing grace. Chapter 13, Response to the first argument.

XI. Therefore, Bellarmine teaches in the same place that free will of a sinner does not have by itself the ability to cooperate in its own conversion, but receives the power to cooperate from grace. As a stone, he says, does not have by itself the ability to cooperate if it is turned into flesh, so free will does not have by itself the ability to cooperate in its own conversion. However, it can receive the ability to act through preventing grace from God, which a stone cannot.

XII. This is the doctrine of Luis de Molina himself. He teaches that the consent which our will gives to God through preventing grace, calling us, is from God not only as one who allures, invites, and excites but also as one who cooperates through the aid of grace. Thus, in that consent, there is nothing that is not truly supernatural, and therefore the adult has nothing in those things necessary for justification about which he can boast, and which he has not received from God through grace. For he reasons as follows from the preceding premises: Since the consent of free will to God exciting and calling through preventing grace is in reality nothing that is not supernatural, and simultaneously emanates from God not only as one who allures, excites, and invites our will but also as one who cooperates through the aid of grace, it follows that the adult has nothing in those things necessary for justification and which distinguish him from the unjustified, about which he can boast, as if he had not received it from God; even if in many things necessary for justification he cooperates freely and influences, so that it is within his power either to cooperate or not to influence, and thus prevent them from existing in nature. Disputation 40, on article 3, question 14.

XIII. Therefore, he immediately declares anathema those who affirm that the consent we give to God exciting us through preventing grace is natural or can be elicited without the help and cooperation of that same preventing grace. He says, therefore, according to our opinion, anathema should be declared on those who affirm that the consent of our will to God exciting and calling through the aid of preventing grace is a natural act or can be elicited without the help and cooperation of that same preventing grace. But it should also be declared anathema on those who say that the same consent is not within the power of our free will in the manner explained and that the free cooperation of our will is not necessary for the supernatural acts by which we are disposed to grace and which distinguish us from those who are not justified.

XIV. Although the doctors of the Roman school, together with the Council of Trent, assert that the free will of man cooperates with God calling and exciting, and that the human will is not only active but also free with respect to the first acts by which we are converted to God, so that it can not only consent to the alluring and drawing grace but also dissent from it, they nevertheless acknowledge that the beginning of our justification and conversion is from God alone, not from our free will, and in that respect, man is entirely

passive. This can be seen in Josephus Angles, Bishop of Bosanen, whose conclusion is, The beginning of our justification is not from our free will but from God alone, while we are entirely passive. He later proves this with many scriptural passages: Not you have chosen me, and, Without me, you can do nothing, and, No one can come to me unless my Father draws him. In the Flowers of Theological Questions, Treatise on Free Will, single question, article 3, difficulty 7, conclusion 1.

XV. To illustrate this, in the same article, he distinguishes three types of works that pertain to our justification. For he says that some works precede our justification, some are final, and some are intermediate. According to him, the first kind includes predestination itself, interior calling through inspiration, and exterior through the preacher, calling through scourges, the terror of punishments, the desire for glory, etc. The second kind includes the infusion of supernatural qualities, such as the infusion of faith and grace making one pleasing or justifying. The third kind includes intermediate works that follow preventing aids and precede justifying grace: such are acts of faith, hope, love, and penitence, disposing us to grace.

XVI. He teaches that these three types of works differ concerning their efficient cause in that works of the first and second kind, as preventing aids and habitual grace, are from God without us, just as Peter and Paul were entirely passive and did not cooperate when they were called by Christ; and also just as air is passively receptive to light from the sun: in this way, infused virtues, which are supernatural qualities, are bestowed on us without our acting in any way. But concerning works of the third kind, which are intermediate dispositions to grace, man to be justified is not entirely passive, but also active: because in this respect he freely cooperates with God, while the will elicits the act of penitence and love, and the intellect produces the act of faith. Seventh difficulty on article 7.

XVII. Moreover, Jansen acknowledges that after sin there remains in man what is called free will, by which we rightly or wrongly will and act, which, just as it is prone to evil by itself, so can it be inclined to good by grace, and freely embrace it: but he asserts, according to Augustine and the truth of the matter, that the liberty of will with respect to true and salvific good is lost and ruined in man through sin. Not that sin has deprived man of that liberty which is essential to the will and which is opposed to coercion and determination by nature: but because the liberty to do good, which is opposed to servitude, has completely perished in man through sin until the will is freed by the grace of Christ the Saviour. According to his opinion, man has become such through sin that he can only sin. Although he can abstain from particular sins, yet when he abstains from one sin, he falls into another, and he does not exchange sin for acts of true virtue. Because his affection is turned away from God and seeks its good in creatures, as long as he is lifted up, he always and everywhere deviates from the true end, and therefore whatever he does cannot be free from sin, as can be extensively seen in that author's book on the grace of the first man, chapters 6 and 7, and in the book on the state of fallen nature, book 2, chapters 6 and 7, and many other places.

XVIII. As for the Protestants, both those of the Augsburg Confession and those specifically called Reformed, they commonly teach that man in the state of sin, before the grace of Christ, is destitute of all strength in matters pertaining to works of piety that by

themselves lead to salvation and are referred to internal and spiritual acts of Christian and theological virtues. They do not think it sufficient to say that our free will is languishing and weakened, broken and diminished in this respect, but they claim it is entirely extinguished and lost: thus man before grace is to be compared not to a sick and captive man, but to a dead man, according to the custom of Scripture, which often inculcates that men are dead in sins and without grace. Hence, they do not allow it to be said that man has free will to perform works of piety and supernatural works before grace, but they claim that he is thus stripped of his liberty.

XIX. Similar things are frequently repeated and strongly urged not only by the doctors of the Reformed school but also by the theologians of the Augsburg Confession, especially in the book of Concord among them. They say, We believe that, as a dead body cannot bring itself to life and restore its own bodily life, so man, who is spiritually dead because of sin, cannot have any power to bring himself to spiritual life. Therefore, they condemn as erroneous those who teach that although man not yet regenerated is weaker in respect of free will than to be able to make a beginning of his conversion and turn himself to God by his own strength, and obey the law of God with all his heart, yet if the Holy Spirit, through the preaching of the Word, makes a beginning and offers his grace to man, then man's will, by its own natural strength, can somewhat assist in his conversion and cooperate, and apply itself to grace, prepare for it, seize it, embrace it, and believe in the Gospel. In the Epitome of Articles on which controversy has arisen among the theologians of the Augsburg Confession, article 2.

XX. And in the solid declaration and repetition of the same articles, which is inserted in the same book of Concord, they condemn the dogma of the Synergists, who imagine that man in spiritual matters is not entirely dead to good but only gravely wounded and half-dead. And although free will is too weak to make a beginning and turn itself to God by its own strength and obey the law of God with all its heart, yet if the Holy Spirit makes a beginning and calls us through the Gospel, offers his grace, the forgiveness of sins, and eternal salvation, then free will can, by its own natural strength, come to God, and in some way (at least a little, although weakly) contribute to its conversion, assist it, cooperate, prepare and apply itself to grace, seize it, embrace it, believe in the Gospel, and in the continuation and preservation of this work, cooperate with the Holy Spirit by its own strength. Article 2, in the rejection of errors, number 4.

XXI. Therefore, the same doctors of the Augsburg Confession, along with the Reformed, teach that in the conversion of man, his will is purely passive, that is, does nothing, but only receives the movement and action of the Holy Spirit in itself, which among others was the opinion of Luther himself. As the same doctors acknowledge in the place already cited.

XXII. Nevertheless, Protestants do not deny that when a sinner omits acts of faith, hope, charity, and other virtues prescribed to him in the Gospel, such omission is free and thus deserving of punishment. According to the Reformed, since man, though deprived of grace, knowingly and willingly omits acts prescribed by God, he is not prevented by any external force or physical impediment from performing them, but only by the depraved disposition of his own will, which does not nullify his natural freedom of action. To this, it can be added, according to the doctors of the Augsburg Confession, that the grace of

God necessary for doing good is in some way available to all men, and God is ready to confer it on all and each one if they do what is within them.

XXIII. Moreover, although Protestants deny that man in the state of sin has liberty with respect to divine and spiritual acts, they nonetheless admit that his will, however corrupted by sin, can in various ways be called free with respect to those acts. According to them, the corruption induced by sin does not prevent the will of man from being free with respect to any acts, not only from external force and coercion but also from any physical necessity and brute determination. They only mean that the will of corrupted man, before being liberated by the grace of God, is not free from the servitude of sin or the necessity of sinning due to vice. And hence it lacks the liberty that is opposed to servitude concerning spiritual good.

XXIV. This is how David Paræus explains the Protestant doctrine. When faced with the question posed by Bellarmine, whether man, after the fall of the first man, is truly free in matters pertaining to salvation, he says that the question is slippery and sophistical because, he says, it is unclear what kind of liberty of will he refers to concerning divine actions: whether from coercion, physical necessity, or brute determination, which liberty we grant outright; or from the servitude of sin or the necessity of sinning due to vice, or from dependence on divine motion, which cannot be arrogated to man in the state of sin without blasphemy. In book 6 of Bellarmine's "De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio," chapter 8.

XXV. Consistent with these are the teachings of Joshua Placeus in his treatise on the free will of man, chapter four, concerning free will in the state of sin. He says that in the descendants of Adam there is a faculty of willing and choosing free from threefold necessity: coercion, such as our body may suffer; determination of matter, especially as seen in stones and sticks; and sense, as fits brute animals, by which man is subject to virtue or vice and bound to God's law. He then adds, What liberty of will did Adam lose? He lost the absolute ability not to sin, situated in original righteousness, which consisted partly in the integrity, perfection, and rectitude of natural moral faculties without any vice, error, or defect, and partly in the appetite for the true ultimate end, and from that appetite, habits of living well, which would have gradually grown to the highest degree of perfection according to natural order. In place of this liberty, the servitude of sin succeeded, situated in the depravity and obliquity of moral faculties, especially the will. This depravity consists in aversion from the true ultimate end and conversion to a falsely apparent ultimate end. Hence it follows that, since everything that is desired is either the ultimate end or a means to it, nothing sound remains in our moral faculties. And not only that, but as long as we are affected in this way, it is impossible for us not to sin.

XXVI. It should also be observed here that the doctors of the Reformed school in this question distinguish between proximate and active power and remote and passive power. They concede that man in the state of sin and before grace indeed has a certain remote and passive power for spiritual and supernatural acts, but they deny that man so considered has any proximate and active power for the same acts. This distinction is used by Paræus in book 6 of Bellarmine's "De Libero Arbitrio," chapter 15.

XXVII. The theologians of Leyden also apply the same distinction in their synopsis of pure theology. In the state of corruption, they say, or in man naturally generated and bound by original sin, although he has not lost, as in the intellect, the natural liberty of choice in the will, but retains the natural faculties of the soul, which are the principles of actions and remote and passive power of receiving contrary things: yet he has lost, both in the intellect and the will, rectitude and goodness, and has instead received a contrary vicious habit. Therefore, free will, by proximate and active power, under the instigation of the Devil, in whose power and dominion it is, can no longer choose the good which is truly good, but only the evil, however seemingly good, with the choice remaining in kinds and degrees of evil, necessarily in respect of the proximate principle, yet freely, willingly, and gladly. For he chooses evil and rejects good. Disputation on Free Will, Theses 18 and 19.

XXVIII. This is also found in Alexander More's "De Victoria Gratia," disputation three, thesis 15. He concedes that it can be said that man before grace has a certain remote and imperfect power for works of piety and supernatural works, provided that by this is meant the natural power of willing and not willing, which gives man a proportion and capacity, which you do not find in stones or brutes. This means that man, however corrupted by sin, has certain natural faculties that can be moved to works of piety by God's grace, which faculties are lacking in brutes and inanimate things. And this is what others mean by remote and passive power. That is, they signify by this that man is naturally capable of receiving the aids of divine grace, by which his faculties, taking on new strength, are moved to spiritual and salvific works.

XXIX. Joshua Placeus seems to say something more, yet which amounts to the same thing in essence. He teaches that, however great man's corruption may be, he can choose not to sin if he wills, and if his will were properly disposed to not sinning. Hence, the ability not to sin in man, if he seriously wills it as he ought, is not to be attributed to grace but to nature. He affirms that this ability exists even in corrupted man, so that he can not only sin if he wills, but also not sin, provided his will, as it ought, abhors sin. Therefore, he says, those do not seem to have well considered the nature of things who attribute the ability not to sin, provided the will is rightly disposed to not sinning, to grace, when it should rather be ascribed to nature, by which it is that the reasons for willing and for sinning are in conflict. Hence, he concludes that it is futile to object to us with those passages of Scripture that attribute to man the ability to do good if he wills, namely, as he ought to will. Treatise on Free Will, chapter 4.

XXX. And to clarify his thought, this learned man distinguishes between the ability not to sin and to do salvific good conditionally and absolutely. He calls the conditional ability not to sin and to do good, by which man can not sin and do good if he wills, and provided he wills rightly, as he ought: but the absolute ability, by which man simply can not sin and do good.

XXXI. Again, he distinguishes this absolute ability into the first and second. The first he calls the natural faculty itself, by which man is capable of doing good and evil, which does not apply to brutes. The second absolute ability to do good consists in habits that determine or incline the natural ability to do good.

XXXII. Since in moral action the matter or substance of the action can be distinguished from the form, that is, moral goodness or badness, he says the first ability is the material principle of moral actions, but the second is the formal principle. Because the will, which is the natural ability by which we can do good or evil, is the willing itself: but from habits inclining or determining the will, comes willing well or poorly.

XXXIII. From this, he affirms that in us corrupted by sin, the first ability, or material principle of doing good and evil, remains, but the second ability, or formal principle of doing good, is lost through Adam's sin and not only lost but turned into a contrary ability so that a universal repugnance to that which is truly doing good according to God exists in all our moral faculties, more tenacious because it is innate from birth and confirmed by continuous practice, almost as if it were a second nature.

XXXIV. This is related to another distinction used by Placeus and many others. They distinguish between physical and moral power or impotence. Physical impotence for doing good exists when the natural power of understanding and willing, without which no one can act well or poorly, is lacking or is not in control. Moral impotence, on the other hand, is when the mind and will are present and in control but are determined by certain habits to act poorly. Or, as Placeus explains the same thing in other words, physical impotence is what lies outside the will, meaning you cannot do something no matter how much you will and strive. But moral impotence is what lies within the will itself, meaning you cannot do something because you do not will it, and the will is firmly and deeply determined by an opposite habit. Such impotence is seen in demons concerning love for God. For they cannot love God, not because they lack any natural faculty necessary to love God, but because they are utterly hardened in hatred for God by their own free will.

XXXV. Indeed, those theologians teach that even a man corrupted by sin, without any inherent or subjective grace, has a certain physical or natural power to perform works of piety, insofar as he lacks no natural faculty necessary to perform such works, nor is he hindered by any physical impediment from doing them. However, he is morally completely impotent concerning those works because his natural faculties, namely the mind and will, are so obstructed and impeded by vicious habits that he can do nothing in this regard without healing and liberating grace.

XXXVI. There are some among the Reformed who seem to disapprove of this distinction, such as Alexander Morus. He considers human impotence for good to be physical and should be called so because it is innate in us and propagated in us with our very nature. He thinks it is mistakenly called moral because, in common usage, we say something is morally impossible, not because it cannot simply be done, but because it is only exceedingly difficult and rarely done. Therefore, he prefers that, regarding this question, human impotence be distinguished into that which is involuntary and externally acquired or derived from infirmity and that which is internal and voluntary and proceeds from malignity, not from infirmity. He refers the latter type to the impotence attributed to man concerning salvific good. In "De Victoria Gratia," disputation 6, thesis 13.

XXXVII. But those who speak differently on this matter do not mean anything else. For they call human impotence concerning spiritual good moral because it is voluntary and

stems from vice, not because they think that in this regard man can do anything by himself, even if very rarely and with extreme difficulty. They also concede that such impotence is innate in man from his first origin and therefore do not want it to be called merely physical because it does not arise from the lack of any natural power or faculty but only from its vicious and culpable corruption, which others do not deny. Hence, this is merely a terminological dispute among the Reformed.

XXXVIII. Nevertheless, although Protestants generally teach that man in his first conversion is purely passive, they do not mean that the first acts by which man is converted to God, beginning to hate and detest sin, and to love God, believe in Him, and trust Him, are not vital acts elicited by man's faculties and therefore actively proceeding from him. They only mean that the grace of God precedes our will and that our will is purely passive concerning those first aids by which God begins to move our will to good and those new strengths which God gratuitously infuses into it and without which it can neither begin nor attempt any good nor cooperate with divine grace.

XXXIX. Perkins carefully warns about this. He says, "In the first conversion of a sinner, free will concurs with grace in a certain manner as a companion and cooperator. For three things are required for conversion: the word, the Holy Spirit, and the will of man. For the will of man is not entirely and completely passive, but there is also some operation of it, even in the first conversion of the soul. For when someone is converted, it is indeed by God, but not by compelling him unwillingly, but by inclining his will so that the man himself also wills his conversion. For when a man is converted, he also wills his conversion from the grace of God." And after adding some things, he says, "We must remember that even in the very first moment of conversion, the operation of the grace of the Holy Spirit and the will of man desiring it are present in man simultaneously: with this difference, however, that the operation of the Holy Spirit, as far as order and cause are concerned, is prior and moves and excites the will: this, being moved and excited to act by grace, then moves and acts itself." In "Catholico Reformato," controversy 1, chapter 1, conclusion 5.

XL. The same doctrine is also held by the theologians of the Augsburg Confession. They say, "What Luther wrote, that the human will in conversion is purely passive, must be rightly and accurately understood, namely, with respect to divine grace in kindling new movements: this is to be understood, when the Spirit of God, through the hearing of the word or the use of the sacraments, approaches the will of man and works conversion and regeneration in him. For after the Holy Spirit has worked and effected this, and has changed and renewed man's will solely by his divine power and operation, then indeed the new will of man is the instrument and organ of the Holy Spirit, so that it not only apprehends grace but also cooperates with the Holy Spirit in subsequent works." In the "Epitome of Articles on which Controversies have Arisen among the Theologians of the Augsburg Confession," article 2, which is about free will.

XLI. They later confirm the same in the solid and clear repetition and declaration of certain articles of the Augsburg Confession, which have been disputed for some time among certain theologians devoted to the same, inserted into the Book of Concord. They say, "When Luther affirms that man in his conversion is purely passive, that is, does absolutely nothing, but only suffers what God works in him, he certainly does not mean that

conversion takes place without the preaching and hearing of the word of God, nor did he mean it to be understood that in conversion by the Holy Spirit, no new movements are kindled in us, nor any spiritual operation is begun in us, but this is what Luther meant: that man by himself or by his natural powers can contribute nothing or bring any aid to his conversion, and that man's conversion is not partially but entirely the operation, gift, and work of the Holy Spirit alone.

XLII. And yet, despite this, those same theologians consider man's conversion to be so free that man can resist the Holy Spirit, who undertakes the work of conversion in us, and place obstacles, and indeed sometimes does resist and place obstacles. They say there is no efficacy of the Holy Spirit that man cannot frustrate by his obstinacy and stubbornness. This is what the theologians of Rinteln affirm in their colloquy with those of Marburg, held at Kassel by the authority of the Landgrave of Hesse. For when asked whether the grace of conversion is such that man can equally render obedience to the gospel in the power of grace or resist it and place obstacles by innate malice, they respond affirmatively, while the theologians of Marburg deny it.

XLIII. Although the Reformed deny that the grace by which God converts men is such that man can sometimes place obstacles to it and impede its effect and assert that it never happens that man resists God undertaking the work of conversion so as to remain unconverted, because the efficacy of divine grace in a sinner is such that it infallibly and irresistibly works his conversion, they nevertheless admit that this efficacy does not prevent man's conversion from being a truly free work, proceeding actively and freely from man, because, they say, however efficacious divine grace may be by itself, it does not move man except in a way congruent and agreeable to a rational and free creature. That is, it infallibly ensures not only that man does and wills, but that he does and wills freely and that in the good works to which grace moves him, he acts no less from his own judgment, choice, and deliberation than if he acted without grace.

XLIV. Moreover, although they assert that once grace is present by which God converts men, conversion necessarily follows, and the movement and impulse of converting grace and such resistance of human will, which would impede the act of conversion, cannot coexist, they also acknowledge that with the efficacy of grace, there remains the power for the opposite act and the negation of the act to which grace impels man. That is, man, although infallibly converted, always retains the true power not to be converted and to elicit the contrary act.

XLV. Ames explicitly teaches this in "Bellarminus Enervatus." Explaining in what sense a man, excited by preventing grace and assisted by God, can act in such a way that he can also not act, he observes that this ability to act and not act can be understood in two ways: first, that the power to not act is simultaneously in the same subject with grace and the aid required to act, and he says this sense is the truest. Secondly, the words can be understood to mean that grace and the aid given for a particular action, and the absence of such an act, or a contrary act, are or can be in the same subject at the same time, and he says this sense is false.

XLVI. Therefore, to the question of whether men act through free will in works of piety, he responds that if the phrase "to act through free will" means that free will acts in these works as the principal cause, he admits it. But if it means that natural liberty is the principal cause of the spiritual action and not that it receives and can act and will its own from grace, he rejects it as Pelagian. Book 4, "De Libero Arbitrio," chapter 3, on the powers of free will.

XLVII. From what has been explained so far, it is evident that Protestants do not deny that after sin and before grace, man has a certain remote and imperfect power for works of piety and supernatural works. By this term, they designate the natural faculty of willing and not willing, which, with respect to those works, gives man a certain proportion and capacity that is not found in stones or brute animals.

XLVIII. Furthermore, they admit that this power in man, remaining after sin with respect to those works, is free not only from coercion but also from any physical necessity and brute determination. Hence, many of them are not afraid to say that man before grace has the physical power to do salvific good, and he can do good if he wills, although he is morally impotent for this due to his will being hardened in evil by vicious habits.

XLIX. From the aforementioned, it is also clear that Protestants acknowledge that free will, which remains in man after sin, is the principal cause, or as others say, the material principle of pious and spiritual actions, although before grace it lacks the liberty that is the principal cause or formal principle of those actions. They affirm that free will, having recovered the liberty to do good through the aids of grace supplied by God, cooperates with divine grace not only in the acts following the first conversion of man but also in those in which the first conversion itself consists. Therefore, Protestants do not deny that all good works of man, which are attributed to grace, proceed actively and freely from the will of man, which grace moves and excites. Hence, man uses his innate and essential liberty both when he omits the acts prescribed to him in the Gospel, impelled by his own malice, and when he performs them with the help of grace.

L. We have made it equally clear that the doctors of the Augsburg Confession attribute to man that liberty by which he can not only impede the effect of divine grace but often does so in fact. The Reformed teach that grace moves and determines the free will of man to do good infallibly and irresistibly, but nevertheless does not take away from him the true power of acting otherwise and ceasing from action: so that man, having received grace, cannot dissent from it, as the School puts it in a composite sense, but he can in a divided sense.

LI. From all these things, it evidently follows that Bellarmine and other doctors of the Roman School argue in vain against Protestants as if they simply denied that man cooperates with divine grace in his conversion and that conversion itself is a free work, and that man freely elicits it with divine grace moving and exciting him. And it is clearly false and baseless to posit the state of controversy, which Bellarmine establishes between all Protestants and the Roman Church, whether man after sin is so free in those things which pertain to salvation, that although he can do nothing without the aid of grace, yet being excited by preventing grace and assisted by God, he can act in such a way that he can also not act.

LII. For among Protestants collectively considered and the Roman School also collectively considered, there is no controversy on this matter, although in each school, theologians dispute in what sense a man, having received grace, can act and not act. For there are many in the Roman School who, having posited any aids of grace, want man to be able to act and not act in such a way that it is true even in a composite sense, not only in a divided sense: that is, who claim that there are no aids of grace whose effect man cannot sometimes impede and frustrate by his obstinacy: and among Protestants, many also think and profess the same, namely all theologians of the Augsburg Confession, and also those called Remonstrants. And as they differ from those specifically called Reformed, whose doctrine is that all aids of grace necessary and prerequisite for actual conversion of man never lack their effect but infallibly overcome all obstinacy and resistance of the human heart, so too, in the Roman School, there are not a few who agree with the Reformed in this part regarding the essence of the matter and differ from the other theologians of the Roman School. They teach that divine grace is so efficacious by itself that it determines the free will of sinful man to good unerringly and irresistibly, although it does not take away from him the power of dissenting and acting otherwise. Among these are not only Jansen and his disciples but also the recent Thomists, such as Didacus Alvarez and William Estius.

LIII. On the other hand, we have made it manifest that the theologians of the Roman School, together with the Protestants, acknowledge that free will before grace is such a slave to sin that it can do nothing in matters where true and salvific piety towards God consists. Indeed, the first beginning of our justification and conversion is from God alone, not from our free will, and in that respect, man is entirely passive.

LIV. It is equally clear from what has been said that the doctors of the Roman Church, such as Bellarmine and Molina himself, do not attribute the cooperation of free will with grace to the natural powers but to the new powers that our will receives through the aid of grace. Nor is it their view that free will, when it consents to grace and follows its guidance, does so through powers it already had, whose use was merely impeded before being freed by grace, which Bellarmine falsely complains is imposed on them, but through powers that God has added to it above nature: so that the consent which the human will gives to the grace calling and exciting it is not a natural work, but a supernatural one.

LV. Therefore, it must be admitted that there is not here the controversy between the Protestants and the Roman Church that Perkins posits. Namely, whether man's will has a natural power of cooperating with divine grace in spiritual matters, which he says is affirmed by the doctors of the Roman Church but denied by ours; because according to us, the will's cooperation is from grace, but according to the doctors of the Roman School, it is from itself. They say, he notes, that man's will concurs and cooperates with the grace of God in the first conversion of the sinner by itself and by its natural power, and is only aided by the Holy Spirit. But we say that man's will indeed cooperates with grace in the first conversion; but it is not moved by itself but by grace: by which it must first be moved and raised up before it can move itself or will anything good. In this matter, Perkins is manifestly mistaken from what we have previously reported: for the doctors of the Roman School expressly teach that the human will cooperates with grace, not by its own powers, but by those newly supplied by grace. In "Catholico Reformato," controversy 1, chapter 2.

LVI. But, you may say, what then is the issue of contention between the Protestants and the Roman School when the latter affirms that man before grace has the liberty of his will not only for natural and moral works but also for works of piety and supernatural works, while the former deny it. I answer, many of the doctors of the Roman Church indeed attribute too much to free will in various ways, as we have shown in previous disputations: but concerning this precise question, the contention seems to be about words.

LVII. For when Protestants deny that man before grace has his liberty with respect to spiritual and supernatural works, they do not mean to deny that man before grace is endowed with that liberty which is essential to the will, and which is opposed to physical necessity and brute determination, even concerning spiritual and supernatural matters: therefore, man in that state can freely omit the supernatural acts prescribed in the Gospel; and when moved by grace, he can freely perform the same acts, and thus he has the true power to act or not to act, at least in a divided sense. They only mean that in that state, man is not free from the servitude of sin and the dependence on divine motion through supernatural aid; and without such aid, he can do nothing at all in the matter of salvation. On the other hand, the Roman School, when it affirms that man before grace is free in spiritual matters and those pertaining to piety, does not intend to deny that man before grace is a slave to sin and can do absolutely nothing without grace in matters where true piety towards God consists. But its view is solely that man by nature is such and endowed with essential liberty, that with the help of grace, he can freely turn towards good and always has the true power to do or not to do it.

LVIII. Similarly, when Protestants say that free will in man is extinguished and lost through sin, and not merely wounded and diminished with respect to salvific and spiritual good, they only mean that no powers remain in man after sin by which he can turn to good by himself, but whatever he can do and operates in the matter of eternal salvation should not be attributed to the powers of free will but solely to those newly supplied to him by the grace of Christ. However, when the theologians of the Roman School contend that the free will of man is not entirely lost but only captivated, bound, and wounded even in matters promoting eternal salvation, they do not mean to teach that the free will of sinful man can do anything, even with difficulty, without grace in pious and salvific works: indeed, they do not intend to teach that man, excited and assisted by grace and as if freed from bonds, cooperates with it by his own powers, but by the new powers that grace adds. They only mean that man's natural liberty concerning no object is lost through sin, but only that man's mind and will are hindered by the vicious qualities induced by sin from being properly directed towards true and salvific good: so there is no need to give those faculties anew or create a new free will in us, but only to heal the mind and will from the wounds of sin and aid them with new strengths provided by grace so that we can do good.

LIX. The doctrine of the Reformers previously explained does not differ from this, according to which they all agree that all physical powers necessary for doing good, which are nothing other than free will considered absolutely, remain in man through sin, and that only a certain moral impotence induced by sin exists, consisting entirely of vicious habits obstructing the mind and will so that they can neither recognize nor love the salvific good nor promote themselves towards it in the least until they are freed from these by the grace

of Christ. From all this, it is clear that Protestants indeed verbally contradict the Roman School but do not deny in reality what the Roman School intends to affirm, and thus, as we have said, the contention here is not about the matter itself but about words.

LX. Nevertheless, the manner of speaking used by Protestants when they say that man has lost the liberty of will for true and salvific good through sin is not universally disapproved in the Roman School; indeed, eminent and learned men in it acknowledge that it is derived from Augustine and consistent with the style of Scripture and the ancient Church, which Jansen and his disciples honestly admit, as we have shown above.

On Free Will After the Fall with Respect to Moral Good

Part I

The Doctrine of the Roman School is Explained.

I. On the necessity of grace, and on the powers of free will in human nature corrupted by sin, concerning moral good, there is great variety of opinions in the Roman School. For understanding this, it should be noted that in the Schools, moral good is sometimes taken more broadly, sometimes more narrowly. Moral good, broadly taken, signifies everything that depends on the will and reason, and affects both in such a way that therefore some reward or praise is due to man, and in respect of which man can simply be called good. Therefore, this entire good is situated in virtue and actions according to virtue, whether that virtue is acquired, infused, natural, or supernatural.

II. The opposite of this good is the evil that deserves punishment and blame, which is usually called the evil of guilt, and includes all vices and sins. This good is distinct from what is called physical or natural good, which does not depend on our will, and perfects nature in such a way that no reward or praise is due to us for it, nor can we simply be called good because of it.

III. This physical good pertains both to nature itself and its faculties, and to any benefits and gifts that perfect it outside the realm of virtue, whatever their kind, whether they arise from the principles of nature or are granted by God above nature. Therefore, this good is not called physical or natural to be opposed to supernatural good, but only to be opposed to moral good as just described.

IV. This sense of moral good is frequently used by Protestants, as can be especially seen in the theses of the Saumur School. In this disputation, however, the theologians of the Roman School take moral good somewhat more narrowly. For they oppose moral good not only to natural or physical good but also to supernatural good. Therefore, under moral good, they do not include the theological virtues, whether infused, and the acts arising from them, which are of a supernatural order; but only everything that is in accordance with right reason and the natural law, and yet does not rise above nature. Therefore, this entire good is situated in the observance of that law which is naturally inscribed in the human heart, which God has summarized in the Decalogue, and which is nothing other than the dictate of right reason.

V. Furthermore, the precepts of this law can be observed in two ways. First, only according to the substance of the works. Secondly, concerning the manner in which they are directed to eternal salvation and the promised beatitude. One observes the precept of the law concerning the substance of the works who voluntarily abstains from what is prohibited by some precept of the law, for example, from theft and murder, and who voluntarily performs something commanded by the law, such as honouring one's parents, taking care

of one's own, and assisting the needy from one's own resources. But for these to benefit us for eternal salvation, it is further required that they be done out of charity and out of that love for God which the Gospel commends, and that they be directed to the glory of God. Therefore, observing the precepts of the law in this latter way means not only performing the work commanded by the law, whether external or also internal, but also doing it out of charity.

VI. Again, the doctors of the Roman Church observe that those who observe the precepts of the law concerning the substance of the works and yet do not do so out of charity can be in a twofold difference. For they say that some precepts of the law can be observed concerning the substance of the work even with sin, and in such a way that the action should not be considered praiseworthy or honourable. For example, someone acts out of wrongful desire and with an evil end, such as someone returning a deposit to a friend or giving something to the needy, but for the sake of pleasing a prostitute and serving an impure affection. But although someone is not led by the love of God, they can observe some precept concerning the substance of the work, not out of wrongful desire, but out of a natural affection that is not evil, and without intending an evil end: or because they consider it their duty and reasonable. So that in this, they do not incur new sin, but the work they perform has a certain moral honesty. And in such an observation of the law's commandments consists the good that the Scholastics call moral, and which they oppose not only to natural good but also to supernatural good.

VII. Furthermore, the doctors of the Roman Church by common consent acknowledge that no one can observe the divine precepts, either wholly or partly, concerning the manner in which they are directed to life and eternal salvation, without the aid of special grace: namely, so that this observation is something that promotes his salvation by itself and merits grace or glory for him.

VIII. None of them also denies that grace is not necessary for observing some precepts of the law concerning the substance of the work: but in such a way that the action is not morally good and honest, as it is tainted by an evil end and wrongful desire. This is known and manifest by itself.

IX. But among them, it is questioned whether without special grace, by the benefit of general aid alone, the divine precepts can be observed in such a way that, although it is not done out of charity and is not meritorious for eternal life, yet sin is avoided in it, and the action is morally good and honest? On this matter, their opinions are varied and discrepant.

X. Firstly, indeed, many of the old Scholastics argue that man in the state of corrupted nature can, by his own powers, without the aid of special grace, observe all and each of the precepts of the natural law concerning the substance of the works and thus accomplish the whole moral good as they call it. This is the opinion of Durandus in the second book of Sentences, distinction twenty-eight, question four. There he affirms and contends to prove by several arguments that someone can fulfill the divine precepts, which are, namely, of natural law, but not of supernatural law, without grace. Therefore, he concedes that it is possible that without grace someone can be free from all sin, both of omission and

commission, although original sin remains in him, for which he would be excluded from salvation.

XI. For after he has argued against his own opinion, "No one is condemned except for the sin of commission or omission: but he who fulfills the precepts of the law omits nothing: and he who avoids all evil commits nothing: if, therefore, man can fulfill the precepts of the law without grace, then man can avoid sin without grace, then man can avoid damnation without grace: but he who is not damned is in glory: therefore, man not having grace could be in glory." He answers that without the sin of omission and commission, man would be condemned for original sin alone, unless he were freed by grace.

XII. Vasquez indeed contends that Durandus is speaking not of any grace, but only of habitual and justifying grace, and does not believe there is any Catholic doctor who taught that a man can avoid all temptation against natural law, and consequently observe the entire natural law, not only for a short time but also for a long time, without any aid of grace through Christ. For Durandus and other ancient Scholastics, when disputing about the victory over temptations and the observance of natural precepts, do not understand by grace the aid of moving grace, but habitual grace, by which we are made just. In "Prima," book 2, Disputation 189, chapter 2.

XIII. But to the one reading and considering Durandus, it is clear that Vasquez is mistaken, and that Durandus's opinion is that man can fulfill the divine precepts by natural powers and without any aid of grace through Christ. For he proves his opinion with this argument: "What man does naturally, he can do without grace by himself: but the Gentiles, who do not have the law, naturally do what the law requires, as it is said in Romans 2. Therefore, the precepts of the law can be fulfilled without grace." Hence, it is evident to Durandus that to act without grace is the same as to act naturally and by oneself. But he who does something by any aid of grace through Christ cannot be said to act naturally and by himself, even if he otherwise lacks habitual and justifying grace. Add that Durandus, writing in the same distinction, question two, objects to himself the words of Christ, "Without me, you can do nothing." To which he responds that these words are to be understood of the general influence of God, by which he preserves the principles of things in being, without which nothing would be or happen.

XIV. The same opinion as Durandus was embraced by Scotus and Gabriel Biel. For they believe with him that man, even corrupted by sin, can observe all moral precepts or natural law according to the substance of the works by his own powers, without grace, though not in order to a supernatural end, as Estius testifies in "Secundum Sententiarum," Distinction 26, paragraph 40, proposition 8. However, this opinion is commonly rejected in the Roman School today. And in Estius's judgment, it is clear that it pertains to the heresy of Pelagius and is contrary to the Catholic faith.

XV. But in the Roman School, not only were there once found, but there are still found today, those who indeed admit that all precepts cannot be observed, and all temptation cannot be universally overcome, and, as it is commonly said, collectively by man in the state he is now in: but still, that any natural precept, however difficult, and any temptation, however vehement, can be individually observed without any aid of grace through Christ.

Vasquez, in the second chapter of the above-cited Disputation, attributes this opinion to Ruard Tapper, a theologian of Louvain, in his seventh article of the Louvain Academy, paragraph "Hac confirmantur." And certainly, in that place, that doctor, speaking of works which by their nature do not exceed the powers of our nature, such as all those commanded by the natural law, says that these individual works, although we are infirm and deprived of grace, are in our power. For he says, "There is no one who cannot will and even avoid homicide and any other sin, even venial. For no passion, no fear of death can induce the necessity of following, so that it is not in our power to will and not to will, as long as judgment of reason remains free." He immediately adds, "Therefore, the necessity of sinning, which is from our infirmity, opposes inevitability concerning all, not concerning individual things, nor is it necessary for any specific sin to be committed." Vasquez testifies that this opinion was retained by some more recent theologians in his time, as he notes in the second chapter of the cited Disputation. He also adds that twenty years before, it was quite common in Spain.

XVI. But in the Roman School, a third opinion is much more common. This opinion states that man, in the state of corruption, cannot observe the precepts of natural law without the special aid of divine grace, neither all collectively nor even individually: because among them are precepts that surpass the powers of corrupt nature, such as the precept "Thou shalt not covet," and the command to love God with all one's heart as the author of nature. Indeed, when severe temptation arises, those in this opinion admit that no command of the moral law can be observed, nor any moral good performed. But when no severe temptation occurs, they contend that with only general concurrence of God and without the special aid of grace, the easier works of the moral law can be observed concerning the substance of the work, so that all new sin is avoided. For example, someone not preempted by any interior grace from God can honour their parents, assist the needy, respond truthfully when questioned, and return a deposit to a friend; not out of wrongful desire, in which case those actions would not be without vice, but out of a certain natural inclination that is not evil; nor for an evil end, but simply because they judge it reasonable and part of their duty. From this, they consider such an action to include no sin in itself, but to be truly morally good and honest, although it does not profit for eternal salvation and is in no way meritorious of grace or glory.

XVII. Bellarmine and Estius, along with many others, broadly defend and explain this opinion. However, although they admit that some of the more difficult precepts of the moral law cannot be observed without grace, they nevertheless concede that a man in the state of corrupted nature can for a brief time observe all the precepts of natural law that need to be observed during that time without grace: because, as they say, affirmative precepts of the law do not always oblige, nor do all need to be observed at the same time; but negative precepts are observed even by doing nothing, as with "Thou shalt not kill." A man can, for a time, concerning such precepts, conduct himself negatively, with no temptation arising to violate the negative precepts. This can be seen in Estius in "Secundum Sententiarum," Distinction 26, paragraph 40.

XVIII. Similar things are also read in Bellarmine. Explaining in what sense he denied that all moral precepts can be observed by the sole powers of nature according to the substance

of the work, he says, "We do not mean that someone cannot observe all for a very short time: for it may happen that sometimes no affirmative precept occurs, and no temptation is present to violate negative precepts. Therefore, the meaning of that proposition is that they cannot for any long period, during which various precepts present themselves to be observed, fulfill all solely by the powers of nature, so that all sin is avoided in every respect." In "De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio," book 5, chapter 5.

XIX. However, in the Roman School, there are not a few who affirm that no moral work can be entirely good in every circumstance without the aid of grace. This is the opinion of Gabriel Vasquez in "Prima Secundae," tome 2, disputation 190. There he cites many from the Scholastics, both ancient and recent, in support of his view, including Alphonsus a Castro, who presents this assertion as Catholic: "The free will of man by its own power, even with that common and general concurrence of God added, cannot do any good without some special aid of God, because there always precedes some admonition, attraction, inspiration, or some added gift of nature, which God grants purely by his grace to whom he pleases." In book 7 "Against Heresies," under the word "Grace," heresy 1, assertion 3.

XX. Similar teachings are found in John of Rochester, Bishop in England. He says, "I preferred to follow the opinion of the Fathers rather than the Scholastics, since in this matter they mutually contradict each other. For the Fathers assert that no one can will any good without the special aid of God, nor is that general influence sufficient. Some Scholastics, on the contrary, contend that this general influence is sufficient, so that one can without that special aid morally do good, not only in kind, but also adorned with all due circumstances." In article 36 "Against Luther," paragraph "Neither indeed can."

XXI. Therefore, according to the opinions of these Doctors, a man in a state of sin, without the grace of God, cannot do anything that is truly a work of virtue and deserves to be simply called good and honest. Because in that state, whatever works are done by man, however specious and outwardly honest they may seem, they are rendered vicious by the defect of some circumstance and contract a certain nature of sin. Vasquez carefully explains which grace is necessary for a corrupted man to be able to do good and render true obedience to the moral law in the above-cited disputation. Indeed, at the beginning of the first chapter, he notes that the question here is not whether habitual grace, which justifies and sanctifies, and which, according to him, consists in charity, is necessary for someone to act according to the moral law. Nor is it questioned whether all the works of one who is in sin are sins. Indeed, it is not even questioned whether faith itself is necessary for doing good, but only whether a man can act according to virtue without some aid of grace. Hence, he says, the controversy will not be whether an infidel can do any good, nor will it be disputed whether any good can be done without charity; nor whether all the works of one who is in sin are sins, whether he can do any good; but the controversy now is whether a man can do any good work according to virtue without the aid of the grace of God, which is indeed a very different question.

XXII. Therefore, he concedes that neither the charity which the Holy Spirit pours into the hearts of the faithful nor faith itself is necessary for someone to do good and render true obedience to the moral and natural law. But a man, not only lying in sin but even still an

infidel, can perform a morally good work. He only denies that a sinner, deprived of all divine grace, can do good and act according to natural virtue and honesty.

XXIII. The grace he considers necessary for this, he further explains in the twelfth chapter of the same disputation. There he distinguishes between two types of aid from the grace of Christ: one which is of a supernatural order by its nature, and the other which is of a natural order. And he does not consider the former necessary for any work of moral virtue, but only the latter, which is of a natural order. For his opinion is that a man can indeed perform individual works of moral virtue without the aid of grace through Christ, which by its nature is of a supernatural order, such as is necessary for the works of infused virtues; but he cannot perform any moral work entirely good according to virtue without some aid of grace through Christ, which by its nature is of a natural order and is prepared for us by the eternal mercy of God through natural causes.

XXIV. Although this aid, according to him, is of a natural order, he nevertheless asserts that it is distinct from the gift of creation and the common influx with which God concurs with all natural causes. He particularly establishes it in a certain holy thought by which he considers it necessary for us to be preempted by God for individual good works. For he proves the necessity of grace for individual good works from the preparation of thought by which we are preempted for individual works. For he says that although we have free will and our will freely inclines to either side, yet it cannot move without thought, and this first thought must be applied by an external principle rather than the opposite; it is thus that whenever a thought is excited to good, it could not have been excited, and a particular grace is received from God distinct from the grace and gift of creation. For as it was free for God not to direct us to this or that good thought, he grants us a particular benefit in this: whether this application is directly from God himself or through other external causes. For in whatever way it is done, it is ultimately referred to God: because all causes for exciting this thought are so ordained by divine providence and foreknowledge that they could be ordered otherwise or differently disposed. Therefore, he attributes this special grace of God, by which we perform all good works, even moral ones, to the good thought prepared for us by the liberal will of God.

XXV. Therefore, that Doctor establishes that not every holy thought is either faith itself or begins after faith or from faith: but he wants holy thoughts to be inspired to men by God through natural causes, even before they believe and conceive faith. And yet he observes that this kind of aid, which is of a natural order, since it consists of good thoughts that do not transcend the light of nature, can in some way be said to be above our nature, insofar as it is above our industry and diligence, without which God has prepared and granted us such a thought, since he could have instilled the opposite. And also because these aids, which God grants us to live rightly in any kind of virtue and to overcome temptations and concupiscences, are given to us by God with the intention of our beatitude, which is our supernatural end. In "Prima Secunda," Disputation 189, chapter 16.

XXVI. Hence, the same aid necessary for any good moral work, although in substance it is of a natural order, he contends nevertheless pertains to the grace of Christ. Because, namely, morally good works, which are done by such aid, even by infidels, in some way dispose towards justification and consequently towards eternal salvation and are

impetratory of justifying grace. "As Christ died for the ungodly to be justified, so also to live rightly: for by good works and a right life, even according to moral virtue, we obtain from God the spirit of compunction and justification." Therefore, he considers it sufficiently proven that this aid, distinct from the gift of creation, is necessary for each good moral work through Christ. In the aforementioned disputation 190, chapter 12.

XXVII. Therefore, although that Doctor considers some aid of the grace of Christ necessary for one to morally operate well, he nevertheless agrees with the vast majority of the Roman School that such grace can fall on one who lacks faith. And by faith, he does not only mean true faith in Christ but also any knowledge of the one true God, such as can be found not only in heretics but also in many infidels and Gentiles. For his opinion is that in any kind of infidels, even Gentiles who do not know the one true God, there can be some works of moral virtues, and sometimes there are, although this rarely happens. In "Disputation 191," chapter 2.

XXVIII. Estius embraces this opinion in "Secundum Sententiarum," Distinction 40, paragraph 3. For there he asserts that some actions of infidels are not only not sins but are also morally good, though imperfect. And he notes that by infidel he does not mean a Jew or a heretic, although such a one does not have faith, because faith is a comprehensive name of virtue, but a pagan or heathen who does not have even the knowledge of the one God to whom he can refer his actions. For he considers that such an infidel sometimes acts from a natural affection that tends towards good and directs some actions not to an evil end but to good and the ultimate end generally and confusedly known; which, in his judgment, suffices that they do not have the nature of sin. For just as the righteous in this life do not refer all their actions to God, whom they have as their ultimate end, particularly in those in which they daily offend: so he does not think it necessary that the unrighteous, though infidels, refer all their actions to that which they set as their highest love with a perverse will. Just as concupiscence sometimes steals into the righteous some movements of the will that are not referred to God as the ultimate end, and indeed cannot be referred: so, in his view, a natural instinct towards good sometimes elicits some actions in infidels that are not referred to what they particularly love as the highest good, but to good and the ultimate end, at least in general, even if who that end is in particular and distinctly is unknown.

XXIX. Similar is what Vasquez teaches, namely that for our works to be good and honest, they should indeed be referred to God as the ultimate end, but not by any preceding will by which they are said to be referred habitually, but by the nature of the work alone, without any other motion of the will. Hence, he thinks it sufficient that an infidel does a good work if he knows it to be good and loves it for the sake of the honesty of virtue itself: for by this alone such work is sufficiently referred to God. In the recently cited disputation, chapters 2 and 3.

XXX. However, this opinion of William Estius and Gabriel Vasquez is confirmed by the judgment of the Roman Pontiffs. For the opposite doctrine seems to have been condemned in the Bull issued by Pius V and confirmed by Gregory XIII. For among other propositions condemned in that Bull against a certain Doctor of Louvain, one is worded as follows: "All the works of infidels are sins, and the virtues of the philosophers are vices." As Vasquez testifies in the place already cited.

XXXI. Nevertheless, there are some in the Roman School who, contrary to what is decreed in the cited Bull, affirm that no work of infidels is morally good. This is because, for a work to be according to virtue and morally good, it must not only do what is right, but also be done when, as much, and for whose sake it is right. The end for which every work must be done is God, loved by the agent, to whom all other things should be referred. Since God alone is to be loved for His own sake, any affection that does not tend towards God as its end is evil. Hence,

they conclude that no work of infidels is good, because they do not have the knowledge of the true God, and therefore none of their actions are referred to the true God as the ultimate end. XXXII. This opinion, Vasquez, in the frequently cited 191st disputation, attributes to Gregory of Rimini, a renowned Doctor among the Scholastics, whom he notes understands by infidels those who are simply infidels, that is, Gentiles who do not have knowledge of the one true God, not schismatics and heretics, or those infidels who believe in and know the one God to some extent. Therefore, this Doctor believes that for one to do good, supernatural infused faith is not necessary, but any faith and knowledge of the one true God suffices. However, there are those in the Roman School who require not just any faith, but the faith of Christ himself, among whom is a certain Lincolnian, as reported by Vasquez.

XXXII. Particularly, this latter opinion is embraced by Jansenists and their followers. They all believe that grace, not just any grace, but one of a supernatural order, by which faith is first created in men, is necessary for a moral good work. And not just any faith, but Christian and infused faith, which we apply to God speaking in His Word with a pious affection. They believe that every good will begins with such faith, without which it is impossible to have any good work. Hence, all works, not only of Gentiles but of all who are devoid of faith in Christ, such as heretics, are true and mere sins, however laudable and good they may appear to men.

XXXIII. Jansen outlines and accurately explains this doctrine, which he attributes to Augustine, in his book titled "Augustinus, De Statu Naturæ Lapsæ," Book III. In chapter fourteen, he argues that Augustine and his disciples, and consequently the Catholic Church, which embraced their doctrine against the Pelagians, believed that the will of man, after the Fall, is so captive and stripped of the liberty of doing good that whatever is done before grace, that is, before faith, from which freedom from sin begins, not only does not contribute to piety and salvation but is not even morally good, as it is a true and properly termed sin. And there, he proposes this as the indubitable opinion of Augustine and his disciples, that no good work, not even morally, can be done by human will unless it is freed by the grace of faith. Hence, before faith, it is not free for him to abstain from sin when he meditates on doing it here and now, but wherever he turns, he is held by a certain necessity of sinning, insoluble by human powers. Thus, through Adam's fall, man lost the liberty to do good to such an extent that he not only cannot fulfill the entire moral law of justice before grace but cannot even perform a single good deed. Therefore, the necessity of sinning is induced, not only in some acts but in all acts. Before grace, man not only cannot

live without sin, because he necessarily falls at some time, but every act of his, before he believes, is sin, whether he appears to flee or embrace the temptation of sin.

XXXIV. In the first chapter of the following book, he expressly and particularly attempts to prove, according to Augustine and the truth itself, that all works done before faith, from which the Christian religion begins, are nothing but sins and that attributing moral goodness to them is false and erroneous. Consequently, in chapter eight, he shows that the virtues of the philosophers were not true virtues but vices.

XXXV. Moreover, he does not consider inert and idle faith sufficient for one to morally operate well but believes that active faith, which works through love, is required. He does not believe that any work is morally good and escapes the nature of sin unless it proceeds from the love of God and a certain heavenly charity. This is especially evident in chapter sixteen of the third book, already cited, "De Statu Naturæ Lapsæ." There, he attempts to teach from Augustine that no good work, that is, without sin, can be done by man unless the very act of doing good is loved: that is, unless the justice of the precept itself delights the mind. But to be delighted with the justice of the precept itself is nothing else, according to him, than to do good from heavenly charity, because God is justice, and justice is loved only by charity. Hence, to do good by loving the justice of the law is nothing else than to do good by loving God himself with the charity of the Holy Spirit, because God is justice and truth. Thus, in Augustine's words, he affirms that no good fruit is produced except from the root of charity. And only then, and not otherwise, does someone begin to delight in the justice of the law when faith, which works through love, is present. Moreover, in chapter sixteen of the following book, he teaches that faith is necessary for a good work because it is what obtains the aid to love God. There, he also asserts that no good work and no good will exist unless from the intention of good faith, that is, faith that works through love.

XXXVI. And as, according to him, every good work must proceed from sincere love of God, so too must it be necessarily referred to God as the end. However good in substance what someone does may be, unless he does it for the sake of God and with respect to God, he cannot avoid sin in it. He attempts to prove this in chapter seventeen of the third book often cited, "De Statu Naturæ Lapsæ," where he states that "no good work, that is, without sin, can be done unless it is referred to the end to which true wisdom directs, that is, to God loved for His own sake: otherwise, it is neither rightly done nor a good work, but polluted with the contamination of true sin." Hence, throughout that book and the following one, he frequently insists on the necessity of faith for doing good because it is what directs the intention to that end in acting.

XXXVII. Thus, he does not at all approve of what most Roman School Theologians assume and state as certain: namely, that for a good moral work, it is enough that it proceeds from a natural affection that is not evil and that the one acting does not intend an evil end, even if he does not think of God, nor even has the knowledge and faith of the one true God. When someone, among those who do not know God, is moved by some natural compassion, helps the needy, honours parents, or returns a loan or deposit to a friend because he judges it to be just and right and in accordance with reason: yet he does not refer

it by habit or act to the glory of God but rests solely in the honesty of the action, seeking virtue not for anything else but for itself.

XXXVIII. For he does not think that any affection is not evil which does not flow from sincere and pure love of God. For he believes that every affection of man pertains either to charity and the love of God or to concupiscence and evil desire, and that nothing lies between these two. Since it is absolutely necessary that all our affection and love tend either towards God and ultimately rest in God or rest and terminate in some creature, whatever it may be: if it belongs to the former kind, it pertains to charity and is therefore good; if it belongs to the latter, it pertains to concupiscence and is therefore evil.

XXXIX. This is especially evident in the nineteenth chapter of that frequently cited third book, "On the State of Fallen Nature," whose title is "There Is No Middle Ground Between Charity and Blameworthy Lust." Here, he proves that there is no middle ground between the love of God and the love of a creature. For he says, all the affections of the soul revolve around the love of some thing as their pivot: since this love can only be either of the Creator or the creature; and the former is good, the latter blameworthy, as called by the Apostle "the love of the world" and according to Augustine, the very essence of sin, which dominates in all kinds of wrongdoing: it is clear that all love, other than this charity, is blameworthy lust.

XL. And in the preceding chapter, he extensively proves that all love of the world and creatures is blameworthy, when, specifically, any creature is loved for its own sake and not for God's. From this, he concludes that all works that are not referred to God for the possession of eternal life are evil because in them men love the world, not God; and thus they serve the creature, not the Creator, and obey concupiscence or lust planted by the Devil in man, not charity, which is from God. For, he says, nothing can be imagined between the Creator and the creature, between the world and God, in acting: nor between lust and charity a middle way by which they are morally impelled in their good actions. Serving the creature with lust rather than the Creator, loving the world while acting and not God, only an impious person would deny to be a sin. Therefore, in those works, however good, philosophical, and free from sin they may appear, if they are done without faith in God, a Christian cannot doubt that those who lack faith directing their intention serve the creature, not the Creator: for it is impossible that they do not serve something while acting. Man serves what he looks to as the end of his work and loves, whether it is his own work, the object of his work, or himself who seems to perform a morally good work. By this very fact, if he aims at the vain splendour of his work, like the Stoics, or honour, wealth, pleasure, or his curiosity, as other philosophers aimed, he certainly seeks everything as the ultimate end for himself, not for God, whom he does not know at all: and thus he cannot excuse himself by any tergiversation from serving the creature in his work, not the Creator.

XLI. Therefore, according to him, it is especially blameworthy to seek virtue for its own sake and to perform virtuous duties merely for the honesty and beauty that recommend themselves to our mind. For he who does not rise higher and does not intend to serve and please God in doing so, considers his own excellence as the highest end and thinks only of serving and pleasing himself, which is undoubtedly the highest pride and greatest deviation

from the true end, and thus a very grave sin before God, however such actions may shine in the eyes of men. Nor can those who pursue virtue for this reason be excused, that virtue by its nature can be referred to God, even if it is not aimed at by one who seems to act virtuously: since all other goods of human life, which are only viciously sought for their own sake, can also be referred to God when viewed in themselves.

XLII. This the learned man elaborates extensively in the eleventh chapter and several following chapters of the fourth book, "On the State of Fallen Nature." He says, therefore, that it was the particular evil of philosophical virtue, even when it was most defective, that they sought it, delighted with a certain lofty ruinousness of virtue, so that they might excel in their own eyes, please themselves, and be pleased with themselves, who should have sought to please God, or as Augustine says, the truth, by virtue. This evil of pleasing oneself so closely adheres to those who desire to please neither God nor men that it is altogether impossible for them not to fall into it. For, as he adds shortly after, "He who does not lift his eyes to God, to please Him with the beauty of virtue, but uniquely admires it as the end of good, as the most beautiful and lofty, cannot help but either be pleased with himself because of it or seek to be pleased with himself by seeking it." For since it is absolutely necessary for the human mind to delight in something, what else can the mind that is alienated from God and despises all other vile creatures, as we suppose, be delighted with, than what it believes to be the most excellent in created things? This is the mind itself adorned with virtue, which it considers the most beautiful ornament of all. Therefore, he who does not desire to please God or other men through virtue necessarily pleases himself with virtue. Hence, he concludes that only the will to please God through virtue can avoid that virtue, not only the philosophical virtue of the Gentiles but also Christian virtue, becomes a vice by being proud of itself and ceases to be virtue.

XLIII. Furthermore, since, according to Jansen's view, there is no good work that does not flow from a certain heavenly charity and is not referred to God for possession in eternal life, it follows that there is no good work that does not pertain to the worship of God and piety and in its way contributes to the salvation of the soul. Thus, it is futile for the Scholastics to distinguish good works into those that are only morally good and cannot be counted among acts of piety and religion and therefore do nothing for eternal life, and those in which piety and religion consist and which in some way contribute to the salvation of the soul and eternal life.

XLIV. This corollary Jansen himself draws from his doctrine in the second chapter of the fourth book "On the State of Fallen Nature," where these are his words: "It can by no means be that a work which is born of faith and the love of God is not also by this very fact a work of piety, justice, the worship of God, meritorious, and beatifying. For what more excellent piety, justice, and worship of God than the love of God from faith? What more meritorious and beatifying, that is, contributing something to beatitude, than the love of God from faith?" And afterward, he declares that he agrees with Augustine that there is no good work at all, nor can there be, which does not, by this very fact, as it requires faith and the love of God as its principle, be also a work of piety and the worship of God and in some way meritorious of eternal life. And in chapter fifteen, he criticizes the division of virtues and affections used by Julian the Pelagian, saying that some make us barrenly good, while others

make us fruitfully good, that is, those that contribute or do not contribute to the attainment of eternal life, as the Scholastics teach. "For," he says, "since no virtue either is or can be, which does not perform a work from faith and the love of the true God, to whom every work of virtue must be referred, and if not referred, by the very wrong end, it is a sin: it is impossible for any virtue to be barren. For faith and the love of God can by no means be barren: but if it is barren, it must now be a vice, not a virtue."

XLV. Although that man acknowledges no good work unless it proceeds in some way from charity and faith working through love, he does not deny that sinners, that is, those in a state of mortal sin and not yet justified and having obtained the remission of their sins, can do some good works. And in this, he subscribes to the Council of Trent, which pronounces anathema on those who affirm that all works done before justification are true sins. "If anyone says," he says, "that all works done before justification, however they are done, are true sins or deserve the hatred of God, let him be anathema." Canon VII, Session VI.

XLVI. This can be seen in Jansen's "On the State of Fallen Nature," book four, chapter four. For, he says, "although it is most true that all the works of sinners, indeed even of the just, which are not referred to the end to which they ought to be referred, that is, to God, but cling to creatures, are true sins: it is false, however, that the same should be said of faithful sinners as of infidels. For by this very fact that they are imbued with faith, although they are devoid of that perfect charity by which God is loved above all, that is, justification, they can still do many good things from that faith; such as, first of all, believing itself, and willing to work, and if they still lack the strength, groaning over their weakness, obtaining justification or strength for working from faith, such works as Augustine always attributes to sinners." And later, wanting to prove that the faithful, however bound by many sins, are not devoid of some imperfect love of God, which is nevertheless sincere and the beginning of true piety, such love of God as infidels completely lack, he says: "By this very fact that they remain faithful, they cannot but have some affection of true piety and love, from which they believe in God, hope for happiness from Him, pray for the obtaining of perfect charity and justice; from which they also perform some other good things with a sincere view of God, although they do not yet love Him so as to prefer Him to all earthly loves and delights."

XLVII. He distinguishes between charity properly so-called, by which God is loved above all, and a certain imperfect charity, by which God is indeed loved freely and for His own sake, but not above all things. According to his view, the former charity is our very righteousness and can only be found in those who are justified and therefore no longer entangled in sin. The latter, however, can be found even in sinners who have not yet been freed by God's grace from the guilt of their sins, in whom certain acts of faith and love are stirred by the aids provided by Christ, by which sinners are disposed to receive righteousness from God and the remission of their sins.

XLVIII. And yet, according to him, this imperfect love is not merely, as some recent Scholastics think, a kind of implicit love of God, and involved in the intention of some moral honesty, but a true and formal love of God; without which love of the Creator, no one, according to Augustine, makes good use of creatures, whether he is faithful or

unfaithful, just or a sinner: and which love the faithful, even sinners, do not lack in some works. Therefore, according to this man's view, the charity or love we are now discussing, and which the faithful, even while lying in sin, are not entirely devoid of, is an imperfect love of God, or a certain imperfect delight in God, which precedes the commonly known charity and the love of God above all things and initiates all righteousness. As can be seen more extensively in his work, in chapter 4 of book 4, "On the State of Fallen Nature."

XLIX. Moreover, although many Roman Scholastic Theologians believe that no morally good work can be performed without the grace of Christ, and although most Doctors of that School think that at least the more difficult precepts of the moral law cannot be observed without the help of this grace, indeed that not even the easier ones can be observed if a severe temptation urges without the help of Christ, yet they all agree that man, even in the state of fallen nature, has freedom regarding moral matters, and should be said to have free will not only in civil and natural matters but also in moral ones.

L. This can be seen in Bellarmine. "There is a controversy," he says, "among all Catholics on one side, and all Heretics of this time (for there is no variety of opinions in this matter among either our side or the adversaries), whether man in the state of fallen nature has free will in choosing moral good and avoiding evil, or what is the same, in observing or transgressing the precepts of morality. And indeed all Catholics, both ancient and recent, preach the affirmative part of this as a dogma of Catholic faith." On Free Will, book 5, chapter 13.

LI. Therefore, among them, it is a Catholic dogma that man, even corrupted by sin, when he acts morally well, uses his freedom; nor is he less free when transgressing the precepts of the moral law, either by committing what they forbid or by omitting what they command: whether the grace necessary for moral action is presupposed or not. This question is different from this, and on which, as we have seen, the Doctors of the Roman School do not hold the same opinions: although none of them deny that fallen man has free will regarding moral good.

LII. Bellarmine himself explains the sense of this question in this way, "For we do not dispute here whether the law can be fulfilled by natural powers alone, nor do we ignore that the help of grace is necessary in every way, since the law alone does not justify, but rather, justified by grace, we fulfill the law. But our question is whether, given the help of grace, man is truly free to either fulfill the law or to transgress it if he chooses. As if someone were to ask whether man can freely see or not see; it should not be objected, 'what if the light is absent?' for the question is understood to be with all necessary things being presupposed. We therefore say that, given the necessary help, whatever it may be, man is truly and properly free in moral matters." On Grace and Free Will, book 5, chapter 18.

Part II

The Doctrine of the Protestants is Explained and Compared with the Doctrine of the Roman School.

I. The precepts of the moral and natural law, according to the common doctrine of Protestants, can be observed in two ways. First, absolutely, with respect to the matter of the work itself, or concerning the affection of the work considered in itself. Then, in the manner necessary for the action to be truly good and honest in the eyes of God. To observe the law with respect to the matter of the work is to do what the law generally commands or to abstain from what it prohibits: as in assisting the needy, honouring parents, abstaining from murder, theft, and adultery, without regard to the principle from which it flows or the end to which such work is referred. But for an action to be truly good and honest, it is further required that it be done from a due principle and referred to the end that God requires. If these circumstances are lacking, the action is considered vicious before God and takes on the nature of sin.

II. Firstly, among Protestants, it is questioned whether a man corrupted by sin can, without the grace of God and by his own free will, fulfill the precepts of the moral law, at least with respect to the matter of the work. To which they respond by common consent that there are some precepts of the moral law that, not even according to the matter of the work, as the Roman School speaks of its substance, can be observed by a fallen man without grace. Such is the precept not to covet and to love God with all one's strength and above all.

III. Nor do they less agree that certain precepts of the law can be observed by a corrupted man, at least absolutely and with respect to the matter of the work, without the saving grace of Christ. This can be seen in Amesius in Bellarmine enervated. "We also concede," he says, "that a man without faith, with special assistance and even without it, can perform some moral good if it is taken as the affection of the work itself considered in itself, without respect to the principle from which it flows and the end to which it should be referred," book 4, on Free Will, chapter 3. Similar things are taught by Melanchthon in the Apology of the Augsburg Confession. "The human will," he says, "can in some way achieve civil justice, or the justice of works. It can speak of God, render certain worship to God by external work, obey magistrates, parents in the selection of external work. It can restrain the hands from murder, adultery, theft."

IV. Nor does this differ from what Alexander Morus teaches, that moral goods considered absolutely can be perfected by a man in a state of sin. "For anyone," he says, "can live chastely and soberly with respect to external acts, abstain from theft and murder, regulate locomotion, attend church assemblies, listen willingly to the Gospel, and not block their ears like a deaf adder: all of which are honest and civil, and less displeasing to God when they are at least superficially practiced than when they are omitted with profane contempt." On the Victory of Grace, second disputation, Thesis 41.

V. And certainly, it is clear from experience that even a pagan man, imbued with no saving knowledge of God, can return a deposit and a loan, honour relatives, honour parents, give alms to the poor, live temperately and soberly, and do many such things: and thus do many

things among men, who are ignorant of inner things, which are splendid and praiseworthy: and from which arises a certain civil justice and honesty: such as was in Socrates, Epaminondas, Phocion, Scipio, Cato, and many others among the praised Gentiles, whose examples should put many Christians to shame.

VI. Although, however, according to the sense of Protestants, such civil justice and honesty do not require the grace of Christ; many of them still observe that it should be attributed to some special assistance of God. For men entirely left to themselves could not even achieve such civil justice, and those among the Gentiles who are praised for their virtue did not perform any laudable actions without God's special help restraining their natural corruption: without which it would have been that they would have rushed into detestable crimes no less than many others.

VII. This is the opinion of Moses Amyraldus in the disputation on Free Will. "In my opinion," he says, "if God allowed all men to follow their natural corruption and withdrew all efficacy of His Providence, both in moderating the temperament of the body and in governing or restraining or inciting to some kind of virtue, no one would refrain from injustice, lust, cruelty, avarice, and all kinds of vices, but would equal or surpass Nero, Caligula, Sardanapalus, and any others among the most desperate, page 173."

VIII. These teachings are consistent with what Alexander Morus teaches in the cited disputation. "Moreover," he says, "the liberty by which they make laws, regulate the Republic, consult for the common good, achieve victories, and excel in various virtues, even those who are in a state of sin, does not belong to them as if it were inherently from their nature. For it is from God, the Father of lights, from whom every good gift descends, as they themselves have recognized when they write that no notable man arises without divine inspiration: and reason itself persuades: for why do the children of heroes degenerate, why are those born from the same womb so different? Why do those who have received the best education become savage beasts?" Thesis forty-six. In the following thesis, he adds, "Indeed, God's provident hand sows certain seeds of a good disposition in their very birth, and then presents opportunities for cultivation, which would, however, be of little use unless God restrained the wickedness of men with the reins of His spirit: for as He wills human society to be maintained by legitimate order, He does not allow the ferocity of all to break out but restrains some with fear of punishment, others with the love of reward: otherwise, there would be utmost confusion if everyone inclined to all kinds of evils were allowed to rush into them as they are prone."

IX. Therefore, according to these doctors, if human nature is considered in itself, all men are born equal, and one is neither better nor worse than another: but the difference observed among them in this respect is to be attributed to God's secret dispensation, through which the affections of men are not indeed purified internally, but are restrained lest they boil over too violently. Although there lies in the breasts of each person a certain Lerna of all kinds of evils, yet God allows some to indulge their vices and to be agitated as if by furies: while He touches others with shame, reverence for laws, love of good reputation, and the desire for immortal fame, and keeps them somewhat in line: so that we should not attribute the fact that not all Emperors were Caligulas, or that all other men are not like Timon, to nature which is mother to some and stepmother to others, but

recognize that God allows some to their own desires while restraining and curbing others in various ways.

X. Therefore, according to Protestants, many things that are civilly good and honest can be done by a man in a state of sin and without the grace of Christ, which deserve to be attributed to a special efficacy of divine providence. And these things are such that they make those in whom they are found less evil and can be considered praiseworthy among men. Indeed, God sometimes rewards such things with some temporal reward. Thus, says Alexander Morus, God signifies how much He approves of truly good things when He does not allow even the shadow of goodness to go unrewarded. He also arranges it as an example to invite others to better conduct. And just as if all the godly flourished in this world, men would scarcely expect a future judgment: so when they sometimes see that those touched by some concern for piety fare better, they are reminded of God's providence. Finally, according to the degree of goodness that shines in the work, God measures out a temporal reward: and the short-lived and superficial good He repays to external virtue, which He reserves for a heavenly and eternal course in the spiritual realm. Already cited disputation, thesis 45.

XI. But by common consent, Protestants hold that no moral good can be perfected by man in this state of corrupt nature, without the grace of Christ, so that the action may be considered truly good and just before God, nor can it be free from sin. And therefore, whatever is done by men without the grace of Christ, even if it has the appearance of virtue and some external goodness and honesty, cannot escape the nature of sin in God's judgment; and thus the most splendid and illustrious deeds of heroes are splendid sins, masks, and semblances of virtues: as frequently said by Augustine and often cited by the aforementioned Morus, thesis 42. Bellarmine, he says, by moral works which are pleasing to God and which God requires, means: in which sense we indeed believe that a man can do nothing, and therefore the most splendid and illustrious deeds are splendid sins, masks, and semblances of virtues according to Augustine. What is read in David Pareus, he says, "We say that the moral virtues of the unregenerate, however excellent, done without faith with the impurity of the heart, although they may be most honest, just, laudable, and worthy of rewards before the world, are still sins before God, not indeed in their kind, but by accident." In book 5, Bellar. on Grace and Free Will, chapter 4. He also says that such virtues are sins by accident, because although they are good in their kind, they lack in some essential aspects: namely, because they do not arise from a due principle, nor are they referred to a legitimate end.

XII. The reason that the actions of a sinner without the grace of Christ, although good in their kind and according to the matter of the work, are considered sins according to Protestant doctrine, is that they do not proceed from the love of God, nor are they directed to the glory of God. Both are considered absolutely necessary for any work to be truly good and deemed such by God: neither of which they believe can exist in a fallen man without the saving grace of Christ.

XIII. And indeed, they prove that no work can be truly good according to the law of nature unless it flows from the love of God, by the fact that the law of nature requires man to love his Creator, from whose goodness he has whatever he is and can do, with all his strength

and above all. But he who is moved to act from the love of creatures alone, and not from the love of God, shows that he does not love God above all creatures, but prefers the love of the creature to divine love, and therefore acts viciously.

XIV. Furthermore, it is in vain for some to distinguish between a certain virtual and implicit love of God, and a formal and explicit love of God: as if someone who does not formally love God, indeed does not know God, could still be considered to implicitly love Him when he loves certain actions commanded by God, which are to be deemed pleasing to God for that very reason. For he who does not know God, or does not act from the love of God, whether actual or habitual, undoubtedly acts from self-love, and loves himself above all: nor does he love an honest action except to enjoy it and to please himself. Any self-love that is not subordinated to divine love is vicious and sinful. And to have a certain implicit praiseworthy love of God in some vicious love is completely contrary to reason.

XV. Similarly, the same law of nature requires that a rational creature direct all its actions to the glory of God: since the glory of God is the natural end of all things: for the Lord has worked all things for His own sake. And from Him, through Him, and to Him are all things. And so, the command of Paul pertains to the law of nature: Do everything for the glory of God. And therefore no action that is not referred to the glory of God can be truly good and just: since the goodness of actions is chiefly measured by their legitimate end. Prov. 16:4. Rom. 11:36. 1 Cor. 10:31.

XVI. Nor is it valid to say that actions done for a non-evil end, even if the agent does not think of it, are in some way referred to the glory of God. For example, when someone who does not know the true God gives money to the needy to help them, this action is referred to the glory of God: because all the goodness that is in created things pertains to and refers to God by itself. Nor is it sufficient for an action to be considered done for the glory of God that its end is a naturally good thing, and thus can be referred to God by its nature. Otherwise, one who labours for no other end than to acquire wealth could be said to labour for the glory of God, since wealth is in itself a good, not an evil thing. And yet such labour is undoubtedly an improper labour, and pertains to vice, not to virtue.

XVII. Indeed, to love God above all and to refer one's actions to His glory is something that pertains chiefly to the spiritual worship and piety towards God. And consequently, it must be certain that the saving grace of Jesus Christ is absolutely necessary for this, without which, as the whole Roman School admits, the free will of fallen man is entirely worthless for willing and performing spiritual good. From all these things, Protestants rightly conclude that a man without the grace of Christ, and in the simple state of fallen nature, can do nothing that obtains the true nature of moral good and is considered truly just and honest before God: Since men left entirely to themselves both err from the true end in acting and operate from an evil principle, namely, self-love.

XVIII. This is consistent with what is read in Joshua Placeus' treatise on Free Will. After teaching that Adam lost the absolute liberty not to sin and that the slavery of sin succeeded in its place, consisting in the depravity and obliquity of moral faculties, especially the will; and that this depravity consists in aversion to the true ultimate end and conversion to a falsely apparent ultimate end: from which it follows that since whatever is desired is either

the ultimate end or a means to it, nothing healthy remains in our moral faculties, and as long as we are so affected, we cannot help but sin. He gives the reason for this in these words: "For whether we desire the ultimate end or means, we always stray from the true scope, however much the unregenerate man may seem to shine with the splendour of virtues, because whatever he desires, whatever he speaks and acts, he aims at a scope that falsely appears to him to be the scope, when it is very far from the true scope, and by that very fact he sins and cannot help but sin as long as he judges wrongly about the scope." page 199.

XIX. Similarly, Alexander Morus observes that the sinner lacking the grace of God fails in various ways in any works, however excellent they may seem, so that before God, who judges according to the truth of the matter, they are really considered not good but evil, because good is from an entire cause, evil from the defect of even one circumstance. He notes four defects in such works concerning principle, subject, manner, and end. For their principle is not the Spirit but the flesh, that is, a carnal affection, and the fruits of the flesh cannot please God. The subject is a man deprived of that grace by which we render a worship pleasing to God. The manner is sought from some generosity, not from faith, without which no one can please God. And finally, the end is completely lacking, the salvation of the neighbour, the glory of God. In Victory of Grace Disput. 2, thesis 43.

XX. It is indeed true that even the works of the pious and just, done by the grace of God, also have their blemishes and defects; but these defects are only accidental, which do not destroy the essence of a good work. But the defects that vitiate the works of those who are deprived of the grace of Christ are essential defects, with which the nature and essence of a good work cannot remain intact. Since the goodness of a work chiefly depends on the end to which it tends and the principle from which it arises. But the works of a man who lacks the grace of Christ, as we have shown above, both stray from the true end, which is the glory of God; and arise from an evil principle, namely, earthly desire: by which a work otherwise good in its kind is utterly vitiated. The works of the pious and just proceed from the love of God and tend to His glory, and fail only in that the glory of God is not sought as purely in them, nor does the love of God from which they flow have as much fervour as it should. Therefore, the works of the pious are imperfect but truly good; however, the works of those who lack the grace of Christ, whatever they may be in the eyes of men, are truly evil before God and do not retain the nature of a good work: although some are less evil than others.

XXI. This is observed by Alexander Morus in the frequently cited Disputation, thesis 44. "The works of the unbelievers," he says, "are not good, but some are less evil than others. The works of the faithful, although stained with blemishes and variously mutilated and imperfectly good, are nonetheless truly good – they proceed sluggishly, but on the way of salvation; and with weak movement, but aiming at the goal: others are carried with swift course, but off the way, and they vigorously draw the bow, but not aimed at the true target."

XXII. But from the aforementioned it is easy to conclude, according to the Protestants, that there is no work truly good in the genre of morals which is not also directed towards eternal salvation and does not form a part of worship and piety towards God. For they do not consider anything as a good work that does not aim at the glory of God and originate

from the love of Him. Therefore, they do not acknowledge the distinction of good works found in the Roman School, where some are merely naturally and morally good but still truly good even in the eyes of God, although they do not contribute to eternal salvation; while others are beneficial for salvation and possess supernatural goodness. Indeed, according to them, all works that are truly good have their origin from a supernatural principle, namely the grace of Christ, and also contribute somewhat to eternal life. If they sometimes attribute some goodness to the works of those who are outside the moral grace of Christ, they designate only an external and civil goodness by that name, which does not render the work pleasing and acceptable to God, nor does it prevent it from being a sin in reality and deserving to be called such.

XXIII. However, in this matter, they do not dignify with the name of the grace of Christ those aids of the natural order that God does not deny even to the infidels remaining in their infidelity. Instead, they call the grace of Christ that which begins from faith, and not just any faith, but Christian and divinely infused faith, which is neither inert nor dead, but begins to work through love.

XXIV. Therefore, they count all the works of infidels, however splendid, among sins. And they consider as infidels not only those who are utterly ignorant of the true God but also all those who lack true faith in Christ and do not know the one true God and Jesus Christ whom He has sent. They consider the works of all such people, however excellent and honest they may seem, not as acts of true virtue, but as sins disguised with the colour of virtue, as is sufficiently evident from what has already been said. For nothing can please God without faith, and whatever is done without faith is sin, not only those things that are contrary to a wavering conscience but also those that inform the conscience from the word of God as it ought and make it certain and even able to justify a man. This is the doctrine of David Pareus. He says, "We say that for a moral work to be good, done according to the law, pleasing and acceptable to God, not only special help from the singular providence of God is required, nor only special grace of singular divine motion, but also special grace of justifying faith." In Bellarm. book 5 on Grace and Free Will, chapter 4.

XXV. Nor do Protestants simply assert that the grace by which faith is engendered is necessary for any good work, and that no one without it can render true and acceptable obedience to the natural law to God; but they also clearly teach that this grace, without which no one can work well or perform even a single truly good work, is the very regenerating and justifying grace. This is especially evident in Joshua Placeus, who denies that man can avoid sin without the grace of regeneration. These are his words: "As for moral actions, which the law either commands or prohibits, Bellarmine multiplies questions without any necessity. We reduce whatever controversy we have with the Papists about Free Will in the state of sin to this one. Can an unregenerate man avoid sin without the grace of regeneration? The Papists affirm, we deny." Treatise on Free Will, page 201. This is consistent with what is read in Amesius in Bellarmine Enervated: "First," he says, "our people teach that man can do no spiritual good before he is regenerated; but Bellarmine requires only the help of persuading and assisting grace. Secondly, our people require that help for spiritual good, which is proper to the effectively called: but Bellarmine understands general help, which at place and time is not lacking to anyone." Book 4 on

Free Will, chapter 3. By the name of spiritual good, he includes whatever is truly good in the genre of morals: for, as shown above, Protestants in this genre consider nothing truly good that does not proceed from sincere love of God, and therefore pertains in some way to piety and spiritual worship of God.

XXVI. That before justification, according to the sense of Protestants, no one can do any truly good work is evident from the fact that they note with their censure the seventh canon of the Council of Trent, which is the seventh of the sixth session: "If anyone says that all the works done before justification, in whatever way they are done, are truly sins or merit the hatred of God, or that the more one strives to dispose himself for grace, the more he sins, let him be anathema." Moreover, they frequently praise and approve what Augustine says, that good works follow the justified, do not precede the one to be justified. This is especially evident in Calvin in the Antidote to the Council of Trent on the cited Canon. And in Chemnitz in the examination of the same Council, where he deals with the preparation for justification.

XXVII. However, in this part, the doctrine of the Protestants seems not to lack difficulty. For those among them who philosophize more accurately about theological matters recognize that faith, and indeed living and active faith, is a prerequisite condition for the justification of man. Now to believe in God is a truly good work, nor is living faith without some love of God, which itself is also a good work; and thus some works that precede justification are truly good.

XXVIII. They also admit that repentance, or penance, is a condition under which the remission of sins, in which the justification of the sinner consists, is offered in the Gospel. So teaches the most famous Maresius: "The remission of sins is given to repentance conditionally, as it is offered to us under the condition of repentance and faith in the Gospel," Disputation on Repentance and Christian Liberty, Thesis 32. Similarly, Amesius in Bellarmine Enervated, book five on justifying faith, chapter three, concedes that penance precedes justification as a disposition required in order, but not as a cause. The same is seen in Chemnitz himself in the place just cited. Now in penance and repentance, many good works are involved, such as the purpose of a new life, the detestation of sin, and even some love of God, which arises from the hope of obtaining pardon from God. Therefore, not a few good works precede justification. Moreover, Amesius in the place already cited explicitly acknowledges that some love of God precedes the remission of sins, or justification, as a required disposition, although no love precedes remission as a causing disposition.

XXIX. Hence, it is that Davenant does not hesitate to assert that some good works are necessary for justification, as concurrent or preparatory conditions, although they are not necessary as efficient or meritorious causes. Among these good works, he numbers those internal ones which are of great importance before God, although they do not come into the sight of men; such as sorrow for sin, detestation of sin, humble submission to God, fleeing to God's mercy, placing hope in Christ the Mediator, forming a purpose of a new life, and other similar things. For divine mercy does not justify, he says, logs, that is, those who do nothing; nor horses and mules, that is, those who kick back and obstinately cling

to their lusts; but men, and those who are pricked and contrite, and follow the guidance of the divine word and spirit. On actual righteousness, chapter 31.

XXX. If therefore some good works precede the justification of man, then regeneration must also precede it: for indeed, according to the common doctrine of Protestants, regeneration is naturally subsequent to justification. Moreover, regeneration and sanctification of man are in fact one and the same. And therefore, the spirit by which man is regenerated is not different from that by which man is sanctified. But the spirit of sanctification, as expressly taught by the most learned and famous among the Protestants, is not promised to us in the Gospel except under the condition of faith, and that living and effective faith, which cannot exist without many good works. Nor is that spirit given except to those who seriously desire to emerge from vices and thirst and hunger for true righteousness, who request it from God with constant prayers made in faith. According to the word of the Lord Jesus, "How much more will your heavenly Father give the Holy Spirit to those who ask Him?" Luke 11:13. Now to pray to God in faith is undoubtedly a truly good work.

XXXI. And this is also consistent with the fact that among the Protestants, men of great renown recognize that there are certain dispositions to sanctification, which are aroused by the power of the spirit of God in men to be sanctified and regenerated; such as various acts of faith, fear, and love, as seen in Pareus in book 1. Bellarmine on Justification, chapter 3. Acts of faith and love cannot but be certain good works; and since they are supposed to be certain dispositions to sanctification or regeneration, they must also precede it in some way.

XXXII. If therefore, some good works, according to the very doctrine and confession of the Protestants, precede the regeneration and justification of man, how can they assert that the grace by which we are regenerated and justified is necessary for any good work, and condemn the canon of the Council of Trent, which pronounces anathema on those who say that all works done before

XXXIII. To resolve this difficulty, it must be noted that among Protestants, the grace of regeneration and justification is sometimes taken more broadly, sometimes more strictly. According to the Protestant sense, justification strictly and precisely understood is nothing other than the absolution of a sinner because of the satisfaction of Christ, which is freely given and imputed to him, and is thus conceived as a benefit distinct from the faith by which we become participants in it, and which is therefore called justifying faith. Under the grace of justification, if taken more broadly, is included the very faith by which we are justified. In this sense, Protestants take justification when they deny that any truly good works precede it. For them, to precede justification is the same as to precede justifying faith. And nothing precedes justification in this sense that does not also precede faith. Therefore, when they say that all things done before justification are not good works but sins, they mean nothing other than that before faith no good work can exist in man, but all the works of infidels are sins.

XXXIV. This is evident in Calvin and Chemnitz, where they note with their censure the aforementioned canon of the Council of Trent. For Chemnitz, condemning that canon, supposes it to pronounce anathema on those who deny that infidels can dispose themselves

to grace through their works. For, he says, "In the seventh canon, they pronounce anathema on those who deny that infidels dispose themselves to grace through their works." In the first part of the Examination, page 157, column a. In the preceding parts, understanding justification in a stricter sense, he admits that repentance, faith, contrition, and the purpose of not continuing in sin are certain preparations for justification according to Scripture. "For God," he says, "wills us to begin with the knowledge and assent of His word. And before justification, contrition must precede, that is, a serious acknowledgment of sins, the terrors of conscience recognizing God's wrath against our sins, sorrow for sin, in which contrition the purpose of continuing in wickedness is not retained but cast away. To this must be added faith, which with the recognition and trust in the mercy of God promised because of the Mediator, again raises and consoles the soul, lest overwhelmed with despair we rush into eternal ruin: but faith approaches God, seeks, desires, asks, apprehends, and receives the remission of sins." Page 155.

XXXV. Similarly, Calvin refuting the same canon of the Council of Trent uses no other arguments than those proving that nothing good can be done without faith. For example, "God does not regard external appearances, but inspects the faith of the heart. It is not until faith that hearts are purified. Whatever infidels do, they do not refer their deeds to God. Finally, according to Augustine, if any good fruit is praised in a man, the root must be sought in faith. And our religion distinguishes the just from the unjust, not by works, but by the law of faith itself: without which the works that seem good turn into sins." In the antidote to the seventh canon of the sixth session. Hence, it is clear that for Calvin to do something before justification is the same as to do it before faith and in infidelity. Nor does he mean anything other than that all works before faith are not good but evil. Accordingly, justification accepted as the remission of sins, or as the absolution of a sinner, presupposes certain acts not only of faith but also of fear, hope, and love, and the purpose of a new life, which are good and acceptable to God.

XXXVI. In the same way, regeneration or sanctification is sometimes taken strictly, for a certain habitual change in man through the infused habits of righteousness and holiness; sometimes more broadly for all those effects of divine grace in us, by which we are transferred from the state of sin to the state of righteousness and sons of God. Thus, the grace of regeneration, or sanctification, includes the beginning, progress, and completion of that effective grace by which God abolishes the dominion of sin in us and makes us servants of righteousness, or, as Scripture says, causes us to put off the old man and put on the new man, who is created according to God in righteousness and true holiness. Ames says that regeneration is sometimes taken for the whole series of aids by which we are moved towards it. Theological Disputation on the Preparation of a Sinner for Conversion, Thesis 11.

XXXVII. Regeneration taken in that first and stricter sense presupposes many acts of faith, hope, fear, sorrow for sin, love, and imploring divine help, which are undoubtedly good works and acceptable to God, by which man is prepared according to God's institution to receive the gift of the sanctifying and regenerating Spirit. Therefore, the grace of regeneration taken in that strict sense is not necessary for doing these. But without the grace of regeneration accepted in the latter and broader sense, no one can do any good

work. For it is impossible for a man to act well before God begins to work in him by His grace, to free him from the bonds of sin and bring him into the liberty of the sons of God. The first beginnings of this grace, as we have said, are referred to regeneration taken in a broader sense.

XXXVIII. And although grace is absolutely necessary for a corrupted man to do any good work, and without grace he cannot act well and in conformity with the divine law: this nevertheless does not prevent, according to the Protestant sense, that man, while acting badly, whether by committing what the law prohibits or omitting what it commands, does so freely and exercises the native power of his free will.

XXXIX. For although without grace man is a slave to sin, as Scripture says, and whatever he does he cannot help but sin: yet this necessity of doing evil does not take away his natural liberty of will. For that liberty, which is essential to every agent endowed with intellect and will, does not consist in being indifferent to doing good or evil, and having an equal capacity for both. Otherwise, neither the demons in hell nor the angels in heaven would act freely, since the former are determined to do evil, the latter to do good. Rather, this natural liberty of will consists in acting not by compulsion nor by the brute impulse of nature, but by the prior judgment and deliberation of the mind choosing what it pleases and seems fit to it. Therefore, that liberty is opposed to compulsion and natural or brute determination, but not to the slavery of sin, which does not prevent man from acting deliberately and from the dictate of his own reason, without any compulsion or natural or brute determination.

XL. Moreover, a man in the state of sin, left to himself, is indeed determined in general to do evil, but not to each particular evil action, but he can abstain from this or that: just as a man confined in prison can freely walk about within the prison. William Perkins uses such a similitude to illustrate this matter. For, he says, there are certain things which are both necessary and free at the same time, which I will show by an example. Let someone be thrown into prison, who must necessarily stay there, and cannot go out wherever he wishes. Yet such a one can move about and freely walk within the prison itself. Similarly, it is with the human will, which, although bound by the chains of sin, naturally does nothing but sin and thus sins necessarily: yet the same sins by its own free will. In the Catholic Reformed, First Controversy on Free Will, Conclusion Four.

XLI. Similarly, the presence and efficacy of grace, in the mind of the Protestants, does not in any way prejudice human liberty. Nor are the actions done with the movement and assistance of grace any less free than if they were supposed to be done without grace. For grace does not exert any force on the human will but moves it in a manner congruent with free capacity, namely with the prior and intervening deliberate judgment of the mind, and thus as not to take away from the will the power to act otherwise. Therefore, any good works are the effect of divine grace, while also being the acts of free will liberated by grace and acting not from its own strength but from those which grace supplies.

XLII. Nor is man's free will in this life so liberated by grace that he cannot act both well and badly: as Paraeus freely admits against Bellarmine. "What Christian," he says, "has ever doubted that a man endowed with grace has free will liberated and free to choose good, to

perform it by the power of grace: but also to choose and do evil from the weakness of nature, which in this life is neither regenerated nor perfectly governed by grace: whence the regenerated use the liberty of the will to act both well and badly in this life?" Therefore, there can be no question whether, given the aid of grace, a man truly has free will. In book V. Bellarmine on Grace and Free Will, chapter XIII. Which is consistent with what the same author repeats in the same book, chapter XXVIII. "In the state of grace, the renewed will chooses good so freely that while it is effectively moved by grace to choose it, it can indeed choose the opposite by the defect of nature, but does not want to because of the efficacy of grace."

XLIII. If anyone asks whether a man in the state of fallen nature is free to choose moral good and keep the commandments of God without grace, the Protestants answer negatively: therefore, most of them deny that free will with respect to moral good remained in man after the fall. By this, however, they mean nothing other than that man, by his fall, has become a slave and captive to sin, and his will has been deprived of that freedom which is opposed to the slavery of sin: although he retains that freedom which is essential to an intellectual agent, and from which human will, absolutely considered, is called free.

XLIV. Therefore, to the question proposed by Bellarmine, whether a man in the state of fallen nature has free will in choosing moral good and avoiding evil, or, which is the same, in keeping or transgressing the moral precepts, they respond with a distinction: namely, that in that state, man before grace has free will in violating and transgressing the moral precepts. However, with grace given, he can use his free will both to observe the moral precepts and to transgress them. Without grace, however, he does not have free will to keep these precepts; because, in the absence of grace, he can do nothing good, not due to a defect of any physical faculty, for he is always endowed with mind and will, which are never stripped of essential freedom, and apart from which no natural faculty is required to do good; but because his will is obstinately inclined towards evil until it is liberated by grace from God and freed from the slavery of sin, which can coexist with that former freedom.

XLV. Thus they complain that Bellarmine and others unjustly accuse them of teaching that man is never free in moral matters, whether with or without grace. As Pareus says, "Whoever said that we teach that man never has free will without grievous slander? In the state of sin, he has free will only to evil, because he is captive to good; in the state of grace, he is free to both. Does he therefore never have free will?" In Book V of Bellarmine on Grace and Free Will, chapter 28.

XLVI. Moreover, from what has been more fully explained both in this and the preceding disputation, it is clear that the Roman School agrees with the Protestants in that the precepts of the moral law cannot be observed by fallen man without grace in the manner they are ordered to heavenly beatitude, and so that their observance merits eternal life and promotes eternal salvation. Conversely, the Protestants acknowledge with the Roman School that a fallen man, without the grace of Christ, can keep certain precepts of the moral law, at least as to the external work, or absolutely, and as to the matter or affection of the work itself, as the Protestants say. What the Roman School calls according to the substance of the work. These indeed come to the same thing, although some Protestants disapprove of the latter manner of speaking: because the substance of a thing comprehends both

matter and form. Here, however, the question is not about the form of the moral work, which depends on the end and principle, but only about the matter.

XLVII. This is seen in the frequently cited David Pareus. Therefore, Bellarmine is mistaken and misleads by taking the external act of the work and the substance of the work for the same, which differ as part and whole. For the substance of a work requires both matter and form, no less than the substance of man requires body and soul. The external act commanded by the law is for matter: internal conformity and purity, which is had from faith, is for the form of the work, to which a legitimate end is also required. For the philosopher himself does not praise an act of virtue unless it is done for the end. Therefore, one who performs the external act of the work has not performed the substance of the work. In Bellarm. Book V on Grace and Free Will, chapter 28.

XLVIII. However, there is no one among the Protestants who does not condemn what some in the Roman School have taught, namely, that all and each of the precepts of the moral law, as to the substance of the work or the matter, can be kept without the grace of Christ. For the Protestants exclude from this number, as we have seen above, certain precepts which pertain to internal acts of the soul, such as the precept not to covet and to love God above all.

XLIX. Furthermore, it is clear from what we have said that the common opinion of the Protestants disapproves what the vast majority of the Roman School teaches, namely, that the easier precepts of the moral law can be kept by a corrupted man without the grace of Christ in such a way that the act is truly good and sin is avoided, although it does not benefit eternal salvation: and much more the opinion of those who in that school held that the entire law of nature can be fulfilled without grace by a fallen man, or if not all its precepts collectively, at least each individually, as many in Spain believed at the end of the last century, according to Gabriel Vasquez.

L. Indeed, it is easily gathered from what has been said that Gabriel Vasquez himself, who confesses that no morally good work can be perfected without the grace of Christ, nevertheless differs greatly from the Protestants in this: because he understands by the grace of Christ certain aids of the natural order, which can happen even to infidels who remain such. And consequently, he teaches with many theologians of the Roman School that any infidels can, by such aids, perform some truly morally good works. But the Protestants understand by the grace of Christ only that which begins with faith in Christ, and that living and effective; and therefore they deny that all infidels, that is, those who are not imbued with true faith in Christ, can perform any work truly good and acceptable before God, and which does not have the nature of sin, even if it appears honest and praiseworthy in the eyes of men.

LI. It also appears from what we have reported above that the contrary opinion, which states that faith in Christ is not necessary for someone to act morally well, is not so certain and defined in the Roman Church that it is not permissible to hold the opposite; since Jansenius and many notable men who follow him openly teach the same in this part with the Protestants, and yet Jansenius' book has not been publicly censured for this reason, although for many other things it has been.

LII. Indeed, it does not seem that in this whole question of the powers of free will in fallen man and the necessity of grace regarding moral good, there is any real and true difference between the doctrine of the Protestants and that of Jansenius. For Jansenius not only acknowledges with them that the grace of Christ and faith in Him, effective and active, are necessary for any morally good work, but also, as a consequence, that no work is truly good unless it proceeds from some sincere love of God and tends to His glory: and thus it is in vain that the Scholastics distinguish good works into those which pertain to piety and promote eternal salvation, and those which neither pertain to piety nor profit eternal salvation.

LIII. It is true, however, that Jansenius nevertheless states, with the Council of Trent, that some good works can be done by man before he is justified, and that not all works done before justification are sins and displeasing to God. The Protestants seem commonly to assert the contrary, censuring the canon of the Council of Trent, which pronounces anathema on anyone who says that all works done before justification, in whatever way they are done, are sins.

LIV. But it is clear from what has been explained above that when Protestants teach that whatever is done before justification is not a good work but a sin, and when they say with Augustine that good works do not precede the one to be justified but follow the justified, they mean nothing other than that nothing at all good can be done before justifying faith, and they include under justification the very faith by which we are justified: and thus they consider it the same thing for good works to be done before justification and to be done by one who is still an unbeliever. However, if one distinguishes justification from justifying faith itself and takes it strictly for the absolution of the sinner and the remission of his sins, the same Protestants do not deny that certain good acts and works pleasing to God precede our justification. Such is, in the first place, the very act of faith which justifies the ungodly, the sinner's refuge in God's mercy, sorrow for past sins and their detestation, the purpose of a new life, the imploring of divine grace, the hope of obtaining forgiveness, and similar acts, which naturally exist in man before his sins are forgiven and before he can be considered justified.

LV. According to the sense of Jansen, the Council of Trent does not define that good works are done before faith, but only before justification, and it does not pronounce anathema on those who say that all works done before faith are sins, but only on those who say that all works done before justification are sins. Nor does Bellarmine himself interpret the canon of the Council of Trent otherwise. He says, "The Council does not define that the works of unbelievers are not sins, but that not all works preceding justification are sins. For justification is also preceded by those works done by the faithful after they have fallen into sin. For the Council does not follow the rules of Luther, who wanted faith to be lost by every mortal sin, but the rules of the Lord, who in Luke 18 approved the prayer of the Publican, who prayed with faith for the remission of sins. Nor does the Council define that the works of faithful sinners are absolutely not sins, but only adds, 'in whatever way they are done.' To understand this, we must understand that the Council defines only that certain works of faithful sinners are not sins, namely those done with the special help of God. For the Council intended to speak about justification and those works that dispose

to justification; but only those works that begin with God's preventing grace dispose to justification, as it is held in the same Council." From these considerations, it can be concluded that there is only a verbal contention between the Protestants who deny, and Jansen who affirms, that certain good works are done before justification; indeed, there is no real controversy between the Protestants and the frequently cited canon of the Council of Trent, as Jansen and Bellarmine interpret it.

LVI. Furthermore, we have made it sufficiently clear that the Protestants teach that in the state of fallen nature, man without grace is a slave and captive to sin: but that this slavery of sin, according to them, does not prevent him from freely rushing into sin and turning away from and omitting the good commanded by the law; and in this, he fully exercises his free will; for he does this not under compulsion but by the deliberate judgment of his corrupted reason, and when he commits this or that sin, he has the power to abstain from it.

LVII. We have also seen that they readily concede to the doctors of the Roman School that divine grace, without which man can do nothing good, moves the human will in such a way that it does not in any way prejudice its liberty. And that the good works done by man through grace are also acts of free will, not indeed acting by its own strength, but moved and excited by grace. Indeed, the same Protestants do not deny that, given grace, man can act both well and badly, and even those among them who are the most rigid assertors of grace, such as those specifically called Reformed, attribute to grace such efficacy that it bends and determines the will to good, but nevertheless does not take away all power of acting otherwise.

LVIII. Therefore, the controversy, which Bellarmine calls the most important and imagines to exist between all Protestants on one side and all the doctors of the Roman School on the other, namely, whether, given the necessary aid for acting, whatever it may be, man is truly and properly free in moral matters; or whether, given the aid of grace, man is truly free in such a way that he can either keep or violate the precepts of the law, is vain and null. For the Protestants do not deny any of these things, but willingly affirm both with the theologians of the Roman School.

LIX. Nor is it contradictory to what is often read among them, that man after the fall and before grace does not have free will with respect to moral good. For by this, as we have said, they mean nothing other than that the human will before grace is a slave to sin and has no strength of its own for good, although it always retains that freedom which is essential to the will, and which, as even the Roman School admits, the slavery of sin does not take away, as is evident from the example of the demons.

On the Necessity of Grace with Respect to Saving Good After the Fall

Part I

In which the Doctrine of the Roman School is explained.

I. In the Roman School, three types of good are usually distinguished. The first is Natural Good, the second is Moral Good, and the third is Supernatural Good. Natural good pertains to the knowledge of those things which can be demonstrated and investigated by the natural light of reason, such as those things taught in human and philosophical sciences and arts. It also includes actions which are naturally or civilly good; such as eating, drinking, walking, cultivating fields, building houses, marrying, holding public office, and the like.

II. Moral good consists in the knowledge and practice of those things which the natural law prescribes and in which there is some element of virtue and honesty. Supernatural good, however, is called everything that pertains to and leads directly to eternal happiness and salvation. Hence, this good is called salvific and beatific good, or good pertaining to the salvation of eternal life. And to eternal life are directly conducive and refer all those things, and only those, in which true piety and religion towards God consist, and which are a part of it, or a beginning thereof; and which, therefore, are deserving of grace or glory before God. Such are both faith itself and the many works proceeding from faith, such as loving God, praying, repenting, hoping, trusting, and the like. Hence, this good is sometimes also called good pertaining to piety.

III. With regard to civil or natural good, the Roman School agrees that the grace of Christ is not necessary for it; and yet no work, however good, can be done by man without the assistance and cooperation of God, at least in a general way, which is necessarily required for all actions and effects of secondary causes. For indeed, God is the universal cause, who works all in all. Nor can there be any good in the creature which does not flow from the first source of goodness, that is, from God. Whence it is that thanks are to be given to God for any good of ours without exception.

IV. What the Roman School teaches about the necessity of grace concerning that good which it calls moral and distinguishes from supernatural has been fully explained by us in the preceding theses, and there is no need to repeat anything here. Now, therefore, it remains to be seen how great the necessity of the grace of Christ is in fallen man concerning supernatural good, that is, what pertains to piety and eternal salvation, according to the opinion of the Doctors of the Roman Church.

V. Today, at least, the common opinion of them is that in this kind of good, fallen man can do nothing at all without the grace of Christ. Ettius says, "The good which a fallen man can neither have nor do without the grace of Christ is everything and only that which leads to eternal salvation, and of such good is to be understood that, 'Without me you can do nothing,' John 15." Here good is sometimes called salvific good, sometimes good pertaining to piety, sometimes beatific good, as in Augustine, sometimes good pertaining to the salvation of eternal life, as in the Council of Orange. And shortly after he adds, "It is clear that not only the works that merit eternal life, such as the works of the justified, but also those that, though not yet meritorious, still somehow lead to and promote eternal salvation, must be attributed to the grace of Christ." In the second book of Sentences, distinction 26, paragraph 15, whose heading is, "That good cannot be done by man without the grace of Christ."

VI. Similarly, Bellarmine affirms and proves with many arguments that no work of piety can be begun or perfected without the special grace of God. And the same is true, "The human will can will nothing in those things which pertain to piety and salvation without the help of the grace of God." In the second and fourth chapters of the sixth book on Grace and Free Will. And the same also applies to what is read in Puteanus, "An act which by itself leads to the attainment of eternal happiness cannot be done by man without the special help of God; for it requires that everything that helps to obtain it be of the supernatural order, just as this is simply of the supernatural order." In the first part of the second, question 109, article 3, doubt 2. To which Peter of Saint Joseph in the Idea of Speculative Theology concurs. "It is certain," he says, "from faith that man can do nothing without grace that truly leads to his salvation." Book 4, on Grace, chapter 5.

VII. Louis Molina himself expressly contends that free will with the general concurrence of God can do nothing that leads to a supernatural end. And this is his conclusion: "Our free will with the general concurrence of God can do nothing, not only that merits eternal life or increases grace, but also that, as transcending the order of a natural end, is somehow commensurate with a supernatural end, even as a remote disposition to grace, both on the part of the will and the intellect: but for all this it needs supernatural assistance and help, either by the immediate influence of God or by a supernatural habit bestowed for this purpose." Therefore, since after the sin of our first parents God has determined to confer nothing of those things which are of the supernatural order and peculiarly ordered to a supernatural end upon men except through the merits of Christ, Christ was necessary for us as Redeemer, that all these things might be conferred upon us, and we might be able to merit eternal happiness before God. On the concord of Free Will with the gifts of Grace: sixth disputation on the thirteenth article of the fourteenth question.

VIII. And indeed the matter is defined by Councils accepted in the Roman Church. This pertains to that from the Council of Orange, celebrated against the remnants of the Pelagians, "If anyone asserts that by the strength of nature he can think as he ought, or choose anything good pertaining to eternal life, that is, consent to the salvation-preaching of the Gospel, without the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit, who gives to all the sweetness in consenting and believing the truth, he is deceived by a heretical spirit." And also that canon of the Council of Trent, which is the third of the sixth session, "If

anyone says that without the prevenient inspiration of the Holy Spirit and His help, man can believe, hope, love, or repent as he ought, so that the grace of justification may be conferred upon him, let him be anathema."

IX. Moreover, according to the doctrine of the Roman Church, works that lead to salvation either merit eternal life and the increase of justifying grace, or are not indeed meritorious of eternal life, but still serve to obtain justification and prepare and dispose man for it. For works of the former kind, the Roman School teaches that habitual grace is necessary, by which man is spiritually renewed and regenerated; but for the latter, it considers actual grace sufficient, which consists in a special help of God.

X. But in order for man to be moved both to faith and to other works of piety, the theologians of the Roman Schools do not think that any external aids provided by the mercy of God, however many they may be supposed to be, are sufficient, but they further assert that an internal efficacy of the Holy Spirit is required by which He works in the souls of men. Thus, for example, in order for the mysteries of faith to be believed as they ought to be, it is not sufficient, according to them, that they have been divinely revealed, and that this revelation, either in writing or orally, is proposed to us and besides that, suitable arguments are provided to persuade us that those things which are proposed as divinely revealed are indeed revealed by God; but further, a special help is required, by which the mind is internally affected and moved: while, namely, the mind is internally illuminated by the Spirit, and the will is inclined to captivate and submit the mind to God.

XI. This can be seen in Bellarmine, chapter 1, book 6, on Grace and Free Will. Where, having proposed the question, whether one who hears a preacher, or reads the doctrine revealed by God for himself, and has a suitable persuasion by miracles or another testimony by which the matter to be believed is made credible; can believe that matter without special divine illumination: he rejects the affirmative part as Pelagian and defends the negative part. This is in agreement with what Peter of Saint Joseph teaches in the fifth chapter of the fourth book on Grace, already cited, where this is his first resolution: Man cannot believe the mysteries of faith as he ought for salvation without the help of grace, even after they have been sufficiently proposed and it has been proven that they are revealed by God.

XII. To this agrees the already cited Molina: according to whose opinion, for the act of believing, such as is required for justification, the particular help of prevenient and exciting grace is necessary, not only on the part of the intellect but also on the part of the will. For when matters pertaining to faith are proposed to an adult according to his capacity, so that he may give such assent as is necessary for salvation, it is necessary that at least a supernatural illumination precedes in the intellect, and similarly a supernatural motion or affection to give assent on the part of the will; these two are called the internal vocation of God, and by means of these, God is said to draw believers to faith. Then follows the free command of the will, by which the adult commands the intellect to assent; and finally assent is given, which is called faith. In the cited book of concord, to question 14, article 13, disputation 8.

XIII. Similarly, for eliciting in a sinner acts of hope, fear, love, sorrow for sin, the intention of a new life, trust in God, and other similar acts by which he turns to God, the theologians

of the Roman Schools consider the grace of internal inspiration necessary, by which God immediately acts on the will and supplies new strength to elicit such acts as are suitable for salvation, as we have shown more fully elsewhere in the theses on the distinction of Grace into sufficient and efficacious.

XIV. But although the Doctors of the Roman Schools generally agree on these matters, and none of them openly teaches that something can be done without the grace of Christ which leads to eternal salvation, many of them nevertheless affirm many things indiscriminately which seem at least indirectly to overturn that doctrine and cannot be reconciled with it. First of all, among them it is questioned whether the supernatural precepts of God concerning the internal acts of faith, hope, love, and contrition can be kept as to the substance of the acts without the help of the grace of Christ. And there are those who do not hesitate to openly affirm this, namely, that without the grace of Christ, a fallen and corrupt man can elicit acts of faith, hope, contrition, and love as commanded in the Gospel, at least as to their substance, and thus satisfy the divine precept concerning them so that he does not sin against it.

XV. This is manifestly the doctrine of the renowned Jesuit Louis Molina. For he teaches that the acts of believing, hoping, loving, and repenting, which are necessary for the justification of an adult infidel, can be elicited as to their substance by a fallen man through the sole powers of free will with the general concurrence of God. In this case, those acts, according to him, are merely natural and not sufficient for justification and salvation. For this, acts of the same kind but supernatural, and which proceed not only from free will but also from a certain supernatural principle, namely grace, are required. Hence he thinks that they differ in species from the former, although they are exactly the same in substance. However, although such acts, produced by the sole powers of free will, cannot justify and save a man, according to his doctrine it follows that by them he can avoid the sin that would otherwise be committed against the supernatural precepts of God, by which we are commanded to believe, hope, love, and repent.

XVI. And first indeed, as regards the act of believing, he admits that the human mind cannot investigate and comprehend the mysteries of faith by itself unless they have been divinely revealed, and this revelation has been suitably proposed to man. But once those things that are to be believed have been proposed and explained, and the arguments usually brought forward to persuade men that they have been revealed by God and commanded to be believed have been applied; and finally an external vocation to faith by preachers and other ministers of the Church has occurred, he asserts that it is within the faculty of free will with the sole general concurrence of God to assent to the matters proposed as divinely revealed by an act which is merely natural and which on the part of the intellect is not sufficient for justification: and thus internal illumination of the mind, internal vocation, and attraction by supernatural help are indeed necessary to assent to those matters concerning faith by a supernatural act, such as is required on the part of the intellect for justification, but not to provide assent to them by a merely natural act. To question 14, article 3, disputation 7.

XVII. Moreover, that supernatural help, according to his view, is not necessary for the intellect to assent easily to matters of faith, against the hardness of the intellect, and

precisely, against the errors of the intellect, as Durandus thought: nor indeed for the certainty and firmness of the act of assent on the part of the believer, as Soto wished. For a heretic can assent more firmly in that way to the articles of faith than many of the faithful assent by infused faith. But that kind of help is constituted because for eliciting those acts so that they may be accommodated supernaturally and necessary for salvation, it is required that they be elicited either by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit or by the concurrence of a supernatural habit. At the end of the eighth Disputation, to the same Article.

XVIII. Therefore, according to the doctrine of this man, by the sole powers of free will and without any particular help from God, someone can assent to all supernatural mysteries as divinely revealed and because they are revealed by God, by a certain and firm assent on the part of the believer, and to which no falsehood can attach on the part of the object. And yet he who believes in this way does not believe as he ought for salvation and justification; for his assent is merely natural, not supernatural; although perhaps firmer and more certain on the part of the subject and no less infallible on the part of the object than is the assent of many from a supernatural principle, and therefore sufficient for justification.

XIX. And although such assent, according to the opinion of this Doctor, is not suitable for justifying and saving a man, yet it is sufficient for him to avoid the sin of unbelief and not to transgress the command by which we are ordered to believe the things that God has revealed to us in His word. For he affirms that those who heard Christ and saw His miracles could have avoided the sin of unbelief with the general concurrence of God by assenting to the doctrine of Christ, which was made remarkably credible by so many miracles. And from the fact that those who, having heard the teachings of faith and the reasons usually brought forward to persuade that they have been revealed by God, did not assent, are not excused from mortal sin; he concludes that it is within the faculty of free will with the sole general concurrence, by a merely natural act, to provide assent to those things. Disputation 7, already cited.

XX. Later he affirms the same thing about hope that he previously taught about faith, namely, that a man can elicit an act of hope as to its substance with the sole general concurrence of God. For, he says, everyone will easily concede that, with the assent preexisting in the intellect, by which we assent to the revealed things, it is within the faculty of free will with the sole general concurrence of God to elicit an act, not indeed supernatural, and such as is necessary for salvation, but merely natural of hoping from God for the things revealed and promised to us by Him, and thus which is called hope, not indeed Christian, but as to the substance of the act. For in that act there is no more difficulty than in the act of assenting to revealed things, indeed much less. Disputation 13, to the same Article 13.

XXI. However, that hope which he does not call Christian according to his hypothesis differs from Christian hope only because it is from the sole free will, while the latter is also from a certain supernatural help of God, by which God influences it, otherwise, both are the same in substance. Nevertheless, this difference seems sufficient to him that the latter differs in species from the former. As we have already indicated above. And as he himself teaches more extensively in Disputation 38. For, he says, we must indeed resort to the influx and causality of God, by which our acts are elevated to a supernatural being, and therefore

are of a different species from the natural being of the acts which would be elicited by us around the same objects, not less in the acts of faith, hope, and charity, that their specific distinction and commensuration of some of them to a supernatural end and not others may be explained.

XXII. In the same way, Molina philosophizes about attrition and contrition; the former being the sorrow for sin conceived because of the evils it brings upon us, with the intention of avoiding sin in the future; the latter being the detestation of the same sin arising from the consideration of God's goodness and benefits, with a similar intention of abstaining from sin in the future. Molina asserts that both can be elicited by a sinner through the sole powers of free will with the general concurrence of God. Indeed, he confirms this with several arguments, saying that this is the opinion of many Scholastics, namely, that our free will with the sole general concurrence of God can elicit not only a natural attrition, that is, sorrow for sin out of fear of God, with the intention of no longer committing mortal sin, but also a natural contrition, which includes the same intention of no longer committing mortal sin. Disputation 14, to Article 13, Question 14.

XXIII. The main reason that seems to support this opinion is that, given the greatest light of faith by which we recognize God as our Creator and the innumerable and greatest benefits, both of nature and grace, that He has bestowed upon us, even to the shedding of His own blood on the cross, by which we also know that eternal happiness is promised to the just, and eternal fire and extreme misery to the impious; and that mortal sin is such an extreme evil, and so greatly offends the divine majesty, that even one such sin is enough that if one who has committed it does not grieve for it and resolve to commit nothing similar in the future, he will lose supreme happiness and fall into extreme misery. Without a doubt, this thought is so powerful to excite and move the will that the free will of one who persuades himself of these things and considers the matter attentively, either by his own insight or by another's suggestion and exhortation, can elicit with the sole general concurrence of God, in view of the extreme evils into which he would otherwise fall, sorrow or detestation of his sins, with the intention of avoiding all mortal sins in the future, in which consists attrition as to the substance of the act; and in view of the goodness and benefits of God, a similar detestation and intention, in which the essence of contrition as to the substance of the act is placed. At the end of the first part of the already mentioned Disputation.

XXIV. However, he adds that such attrition and contrition are insufficient for salvation because they are not excited and brought about by the peculiar impulse of the Holy Spirit. And later in the fourth part, he says that the absolute intention not to sin, which he has just described and which he judges sufficient for attrition and contrition, is beyond the entire scope of the order of grace and therefore contributes nothing to a supernatural end and is a merely natural act proper to free will; which natural light and moral and natural philosophy teach should not be denied to the natural powers of free will, with God cooperating solely as a universal cause, through general concurrence, in the manner in which He cooperates with other secondary causes.

XXV. Therefore, for such acts to contribute to a man's justification and for someone to be contrite as he ought for salvation, according to his hypotheses, it is necessary that a certain

influx from God by supernatural help is added, by the power of which that act, with its substance unchanged, becomes supernatural and of a different species than it would be without that help.

XXVI. Moreover, since all true contrition arises from the love of God, by which God is sincerely and above all loved, and not only as the author of nature but also as the author of grace; if someone, by the powers of nature, without the help of grace, can elicit an act of contrition as to its substance, it follows that he can, in the same way, elicit an act of love for God above all, and indeed not only as the author of nature but also as the author of grace. Hence, Molina, insisting on his principles, also teaches that in fallen nature, man, by the sole powers of nature, with the general concurrence of God, can elicit an absolute act of love for God above all, with the absolute intention of pleasing Him in everything; which act, as to the substance of the act, will be such as is required for contrition and the justification of a sinner, and yet will by no means suffice for justification because it will be natural, not supernatural. For he does not think it leads to salvation and justification if someone loves God above all and sincerely resolves to please Him in everything as much as he can, and grieves for having offended God, with the hope of obtaining forgiveness from Him, unless some supernatural help from God influences all these things and makes them supernatural so that they can be commensurate with the supernatural end of eternal happiness. And in this sense, he explains the Canon of Trent, which defines that without the prevenient inspiration of the Holy Spirit and His help, man cannot believe, hope, love, or repent as he ought, so that the grace of justification may be conferred upon him. As if these things could indeed be done by man without the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, but the acts of faith, hope, love, and repentance would remain useless for justification unless they were made by the help of the Holy Spirit. Thus, loving God as one ought is not simply loving Him above all, but loving Him from the inspiration of the Spirit, and so with the rest.

XXVII. To clarify his opinion, he distinguishes three quasi-degrees in the love of God above all. The first is a certain weak and imperfect motion of the will, which in the Schools is called "velleity," whereby someone would wish and desire to please God in everything and above all and to keep all His commandments, from some affection of love towards God; but, overcome by his own concupiscence, he does not will it simply and absolutely, and prefers to indulge in carnal affections.

XXVIII. The second degree is where someone so loves God that he determines with a fixed will, and seriously and absolutely proposes to himself, to please God in everything and to keep all His commandments: although it may happen later that, with a change of will, he does not keep God's commandments and does not fulfill what he had previously proposed. Finally, the third degree is where someone so loves God that not only does he determine absolutely to please Him in everything and to obey His commandments, but also perseveres in that will and intention, so that he actually obeys God's commandments and leads a life pleasing to God. This third degree he calls the absolute and efficacious love of God above all, while the second he calls the absolute but inefficacious love of God above all.

XXIX. Moreover, according to his view, the second degree of love does not differ from the third in the nature of the act of love itself considered in itself. For in both, the love of God can be equally intense; indeed, perhaps more intense in the second than in the third, but the whole difference between them depends on the actual observation of God's commandments which follows or does not follow, as man, according to his innate freedom, remains constant in his intention or not. From this intention, one who has loved God more intensely can fall away, while another who has loved less intensely may persevere in his intention.

XXX. Furthermore, for contrition and the justification of man before God, he considers the second degree sufficient, where someone absolutely loves God above all, but with inefficacious love, that is, followed by transgression of God's commandments. He proves this by the example of Adam, who, before his first sin, was just and pleasing to God and absolutely loved God above all, but whose love was shown to be inefficacious by his subsequent fall. And also by the example of adults, who in the state of fallen nature are justified with an act of contrition, and thus for that time love God absolutely above all with absolute love; and later fall into mortal sin, not fulfilling what they had resolved to do by the effect of supernatural love at the time of justification. For their love, which was sufficient for their justification, is rendered inefficacious by that subsequent event.

XXXI. Now, he admits that no one can love God above all with not only absolute but also efficacious love without the help of grace. For no one can persevere in received righteousness and obedience to God without the additional help of God, as defined by the Council of Trent itself. But what he asserts is that a fallen man, by his own powers and without any special help from God, can as to the substance of the act attain that degree of love whereby God is loved above all absolutely, and with the true and serious intention of pleasing Him in everything, even if that intention cannot later be fulfilled in actually observing all God's commandments without some particular help from God. Such love, though inefficacious, is sufficient for the justification of man. As can be seen from that Doctor's often-cited Disputation 14, to article 13, question 13, sections three and four.

XXXII. Furthermore, Molina confirms his opinion by the authority of several Scholastics and cites for himself Scotus, Gabriel Biel, Ockham, and many others, among the more recent, Cajetan and Soto, whom he claims to teach that a man existing in mortal sin can, by his natural powers, elicit any act as to the substance of the act which one constituted in grace can elicit. However, many others in the Roman School hold the opposite. Among whom Peter of Saint Joseph first offers himself, whose resolution is this: A man cannot keep any affirmative supernatural precept concerning an internal act as to its substance without the help of grace. And he adds the reason, because such precepts are about acts of faith, hope, and charity, which acts, however considered, as to substance are supernatural, and therefore surpass the powers of nature. In the Idea of Speculative Theology, book four, which is about Grace, chapter 5, resolution 4.

XXXIII. But especially Diego Álvarez refutes Molina expressly; and sets conclusions plainly opposed to his conclusions, in the sixth book on the Aids of Divine Grace. First, he admits indeed that someone can assent to the mysteries revealed in the word of God by the powers of nature, but with only a fallible and opinionative human assent, which relies on

some human reason or authority; not with a firm and infallible assent on the part of the believer, whose formal reason is divine revelation; which alone deserves the name of faith, not the former. For in the forty-ninth disputation, this is his third conclusion: Man can, by the sole powers of nature, assent to the supernatural mysteries proposed to him with a certain opinionative and fallible assent, as far as the part of the believer is concerned, not indeed as revealed by God, so that divine revelation or the first truth revealing is the formal reason for assenting, but for some other motive or human reason. His fourth conclusion is as follows: Man cannot by a merely natural act, with the sole general concurrence of God, assent to all the supernatural mysteries of faith as revealed by God, with a certain and firm assent, or infallible on the part of the believer, but to elicit such an act a special help of prevenient grace is necessarily required.

XXXIV. However, in the fifty-second disputation, he denies that either contrition or attrition, as described above by us, can be had by the powers of nature without grace, even as to the substance of the acts. For this is his first conclusion there: Our free will, with the sole general concurrence of God, cannot elicit any attrition, that is, sorrow for all sins out of fear of God, with the absolute intention of no longer committing mortal sin, with the hope of pardon; but for such attrition, a special help of grace is simply necessary. And he adds that special help is required, not only by reason of faith in the punishments of hell, nor only by reason of the hope of pardon included in the said sorrow, but also by reason of the same sorrow with the absolute intention of no longer committing mortal sin. His second conclusion is: Much less can free will without the help of grace elicit an act of contrition, that is, sorrow for sins out of love for God supremely loved, with the absolute intention of no longer committing mortal sin.

XXXV. Finally, in the fifty-first disputation, he denies that a man in the state of fallen nature can, without the special help of grace, love God above all with absolute love and with the intention of pleasing Him in everything. Whether God is considered as the author of nature and to be loved according to the law of nature, or as the supernatural end and to be loved as He offers Himself in the Gospel. For this is his second conclusion: A man in the state of fallen nature, especially if he exists in mortal sin, cannot, without the special help of prevenient grace, love God above all with absolute natural love, nor have the absolute intention of pleasing Him in everything. Here he calls natural love that by which God is loved as He reveals Himself in nature. His third conclusion is: A man in the state of fallen nature cannot love God above all as the supernatural end by the sole powers of nature, even if we are talking about an act of love as to its substance, and of a faithful man.

XXXVI. He admits, however, that in the state of fallen nature, man can have a certain imperfect and conditional act of love for God above all without the help of grace, which is not a full will but only a certain velleity of pleasing God in everything. Indeed, this is his first conclusion in the aforementioned disputation: A man in the state of fallen nature, existing in mortal sin, can, without the special help of grace, have a conditional act of love for God above all, or a certain velleity expressed in these words: I would wish to love God above all and to please Him in everything. And he gives the reason that such love is not true love of God above all, nor does it turn man away from mortal sin, nor does it convert him

to God as to his ultimate end. Hence he concludes that it can be had by the powers of nature.

XXXVII. Eustachius teaches the same thing as Álvarez on this matter. For in writing on the second Sentences, to distinction twenty-six, paragraph 38, he puts forth this proposition, which is the last of that section: A fallen man cannot, by the sole powers of nature, love God above all, neither as his beatific good nor even as the author of nature, not even for a moment. But the preceding proposition, which is the sixth, states: A fallen man can love God above all in some way of love by the sole powers of nature. To which he adds that such love is not worthy of the name of true love, nor is it simply love of God above all, but only in a certain respect, nor can it in any way be called love with all the heart. However, it is usually called inefficacious love because it proceeds from an inefficacious will, because man loves God in such a way that he does not thereby resolve to obey His commandments. For, he says, a man then loves God with efficacious will when he deliberately resolves to prefer God and His worship to all other goods, so that he does not wish to offend Him for other goods that he loves. And this is simply and properly the love of God above all.

XXXVIII. Therefore, Eustachius and Molina take the distinction of the efficacious and inefficacious love of God differently. Eustachius and Diego Álvarez consider efficacious love to be that which is joined with the absolute and determined intention of pleasing God in everything and keeping His commandments, and therefore which includes the observation of God's commandments as to the preparation of the soul, although perhaps it does not follow in act because man fails from that good intention, as happened with Adam. But according to Molina, there is no other efficacious love of God except that which is actually followed by the fulfillment of God's commandments, however serious and absolute the intention of obeying God may be supposed to have been, which is later changed according to the native inconstancy of human will. And again, Diego Álvarez and Eustachius consider inefficacious only that love by which man would wish to please God in everything if carnal affections allowed, but absolutely does not will it. According to Molina, however, even that love by which man truly and absolutely resolves to render obedience to God in everything can be inefficacious if it later happens that he denies the obedience due to God by changing his intention.

XXXIX. Moreover, Eustachius denies that such inefficacious love pertains to true piety and should be counted among its works; because it does not prefer God to all things, not even in a certain desire and beginning, as does that imperfect love of God by which the grace of God prepares and disposes men for justification.

XL. Bellarmine, however, simply denies that God can be loved by man without the help of grace, not only above all but even with that imperfect love by which someone is indeed affected toward God, but does not yet prefer Him to other things. We believe, he says, that God cannot be loved without His own help, neither as the author of nature, nor as the bestower of grace and glory, neither perfectly nor imperfectly in any way: And we do not doubt that this is the opinion of Saint Augustine, indeed even of the Scriptures and Councils, whatever others may have less considerately written on this matter. Book 6 on Grace and Free Will, chapter 7.

XLI. Similarly, Vásquez generally affirms that it is more probable that God cannot be loved without the help of grace. Universally, he says, I assert that no love towards God can exist by the sole powers of nature, but must necessarily arise from some help of grace, and by the help of grace, I do not mean that which is of a supernatural order for an action that is by its nature supernatural; but the help of grace, whether it be supernatural in substance or of the natural order, according to the nature and quality of love, which nevertheless is communicated to us through the merits of Christ. He signifies, however, that he is speaking of the love of friendship towards God, not of another, that is, of the love which the Schools call of concupiscence. But we love God with the love of friendship when we will some good for God or rejoice in His good because it is His good, out of complacency with Him, and not out of complacency with ourselves. As he himself explains, Volume 2 on the first part of the second, disputation 194, chapters 1 and 4.

XLII. Especially Jansenius teaches that all true, chaste, sincere love of God, in whatever state of man, and therefore much more in the state of corrupted nature, must be attributed to the grace of God, not to the sole powers of free will. For he also distinguishes a twofold love of God: One by which God is loved freely and for His own sake; the other by which someone does not love God for His own sake but for some other thing which he hopes for and desires to obtain from Him. He calls the former that chaste and gratuitous love and holds it alone as true love of God. For the latter is not properly love of God but of that thing which someone desires to obtain through God. Therefore, the former alone is praiseworthy and leads to salvation, and for that reason, it is owed to the help of divine grace; the latter, however, is vicious and sinful and arises not from the grace of God but from the man's depraved desire.

XLIII. For if, he says, God is loved for the sake of something else, it is not true and chaste love of God, but of that thing which someone desires to obtain through God. For, as Augustine says best, Those who seek God for earthly benefits do not seek God but those benefits, because in this way God is worshipped with servile fear, not with liberal love. Such worship and love can be and often is had by wicked men, as it proceeds from a badly loved creature's desire. For both the envious and the avaricious, and heretics, and whatever else opposes sound doctrine, worship, praise, and love God, and give thanks to Him, the more earnestly as He can more invincibly fulfill their desires. To which he adds that he is not dealing with such falsely called love of God, but with that by which God is loved for His own sake, or which is the same, by which God Himself, not anything else, is loved, so that the heart is not turned downward but is upright with God. And he asserts that such chaste love of God and upright heart with God, which alone is true love of God, and not of another thing, can by no means be had without true and great and properly called grace of God, as the indubitable doctrine of Augustine. On the State of Pure Nature, book 1, chapter 11.

XLIV. Moreover, just as Bellarmine and Vásquez consider that the love of God commanded in His word cannot in any way be had without the grace of Christ, they also state the same about that divine faith by which we are commanded to receive the mysteries revealed by God; that its act, even considered only as to its substance, cannot be elicited by anyone without the special help of God. For this clearly follows from what Vásquez

teaches, and what he affirms to have been established by the common consensus of theologians of his time, namely, that the assent of believing the divine, as required by Christian faith, is of a supernatural order, not only on the part of the efficient cause but also in itself; and not only in some manner but also in substance. Hence, he concludes that there are different kinds of assent in substance, one of human faith, by which we believe the articles of faith based on human testimony, which is natural in its substance; and another of divine faith, by which we believe the same articles based on divine testimony, which is supernatural in its substance. For which he teaches that an actual or habitual light of a higher order than natural light is necessary. That natural light, however, is sufficient for us to assent to supernatural things and mysteries based on human testimony. In the first part of the second, volume 2, disputation 187, chapter 2.

XLV. Bellarmine, however, in the act of divine and Catholic faith by which we receive some mystery of faith, requires three conditions: one, that it be certainly believed, on the part of the object, that is, as divinely revealed, and that it can in no way be false; another, that it be firmly believed on the part of the subject, that is, that a man should have no doubts and would rather die than not believe an article of faith; third, that it be believed with pious affection, that is, with a certain pious inclination toward God, because a man begins to bow his neck to God and submit himself to the obedience of faith, even in matters that surpass human reason. And he denies that such an act of faith can ever be produced by man without the special help of God. Book 6 on Grace and Free Will, chapter 3.

XLVI. Moreover, those who oppose the doctrine held by the Roman School as an article of faith, namely, that nothing conduces to salvation and true piety towards God without the grace of Christ, are not only those who assert that supernatural precepts concerning internal acts of faith, hope, charity, and contrition can be kept by a fallen man as to the substance of the acts without any special help from God; but also those who teach that at least the precepts of natural law can also be fulfilled as to the substance of the acts by the sole residual powers in corrupted nature. As we have shown that many Scholastics have felt in the preceding theses.

XLVII. For keeping the precepts of natural law summed up in the Decalogue, so as to satisfy each precept and avoid sin, is a matter that greatly conduces to eternal life and salvation, since this is the way by which one arrives at eternal life. For when the young man asked, "Good Master, what good shall I do to have eternal life?" Jesus our Lord responds in Matthew, "If you want to enter into life, keep the commandments," namely those which He later enumerates: "You shall not kill, you shall not commit adultery, you shall not steal, you shall not bear false witness; honour your father and your mother, and you shall love your neighbour as yourself." All these pertain to natural law. And since among the precepts of natural law the chief one is, "You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your mind," it is plainly absurd to say that someone can love God in this way and yet do nothing conducive to salvation and true piety towards God. For what piety is there towards God if it is not to love Him with all one's heart? Matthew 19.

XLVIII. Nor does it make any difference that Durandus observes, with many other Scholastics: In divine precepts, he says, there is something that is commanded as falling

under obligation, and something that is intended finally. For what is commanded is the act of virtue as to the substance of the act alone: such as honouring parents, believing in one God, and the like; but what is intended, though not commanded, is that people by such works may be so disposed that their works may be accepted as meritorious of eternal life, which is done by grace. And so the Savior speaks in Matthew 19: "If you want to enter into life, keep the commandments." For God has promised eternal life to all who perform those things to which His law obligates; and therefore whoever satisfies this obligation and keeps the divine commandments as he is bound to do, does something highly conducive to eternal life, and to which eternal life is due by God's promise. Therefore, if no one can do anything conducive to salvation without grace, no one can perform those things to which the moral precepts obligate without grace.

XLIX. Especially contrary to the doctrine of the necessity of divine grace for those things that lead to and profit salvation are those who teach that man can, by his own powers, acquire grace or prepare and dispose himself for it in any way; but since this matter requires a somewhat longer discussion and deserves to be considered separately, it seems best to refer it to another Disputation.

Part II

I. In the Protestant Schools, natural and civil good is usually distinguished from salvific and spiritual good. To natural good pertain actions that are naturally good and necessary or useful for the preservation of life. Such actions include walking, eating, drinking, and the like. Civilly good actions are those that help and serve to protect and foster civil society and the common life, such as various offices of common life, or even those pertaining to magistrates and public and private duties that constitute families, cities, and republics. These can be easily understood; for example, practicing a craft, fulfilling the duties of a judge, soldier, husband, wife, servant, and many similar ones.

II. Salvific good, which is also called theological, spiritual, and heavenly, is that which benefits a man for eternal salvation and pertains to the true worship of God, piety, and religion; such as the acts of theological and Christian virtues, like faith, hope, charity, humility, meekness, continence, patience, modesty, kindness, etc.

III. Moreover, they do not recognize any intermediate between civil and spiritual good, namely moral good, which would include certain actions that are truly good and according to virtue, and in which there is no element of sin, but which nevertheless do not pertain to piety nor are useful for salvation. For they do not think any action to be truly good whose principle is not the love of God and which is not referred to the glory of God; and they consider anything that does not aim at this and does not proceed from the love of God to be sin, however specious and honest it may appear in the eyes of men. Hence it follows that no action is truly good which does not also pertain to piety and cannot benefit man for salvation. As we have shown elsewhere at length in the theses on the necessity of grace concerning moral good.

IV. However, since Protestants oppose moral good to spiritual good, they confuse moral good with civil good; and by moral goodness, they understand only a certain external goodness which can coexist with an action that is simply evil and which, in truth and before God, has the nature of sin. Generally, by moral good, they mean whatever has the true nature of virtue and piety, whether in conformity to natural law or to the precepts of God.

V. Moreover, with respect to civil or natural good, Protestants acknowledge that man, even in the state of fallen nature, has the use of his free will. And although men generally can do nothing without the general concurrence and cooperation of God, in whom we live, move, and have our being; and besides, for the actions of civil life, they often need some special help of divine providence, yet they do not think that the grace of Christ, which consists of certain morals inwardly stirred by His Spirit or infused habits, is in any way necessary for natural and civil actions: but they believe that man can perform these by his natural capacity and has some freedom of will for them by nature. As Perkins speaks in The Reformed Catholic, controversy 1, conclusions 2 and 3.

VI. But they hold most firmly and insist most urgently that a man once corrupted by sin can do absolutely nothing by himself in matters that pertain to piety and eternal salvation without the grace of Christ: for in this, for man to do even the least in that kind, the salvific help of divine grace is absolutely necessary, which not only helps man but also precedes

him and provides new strength: and it is not enough for man to be taught externally and aided by any external helps, but there is also a need for internal grace, by which the mind is not only illuminated but also the will is affected and moved.

VII. On this, those who are called distinctly Reformed agree among themselves, as well as those who are called theologians of the Augsburg Confession; for thus the Augsburg Confession states in article eighteen: Concerning Free Will, they teach that the human will has some freedom to achieve civil righteousness and to choose things subject to reason, but it does not have the power, without the Holy Spirit, to achieve the righteousness of God, or spiritual righteousness. This is also confirmed by Melanchthon's Apology to the same Confession, in the book which is called the Book of Concord. He says, The human will can, in some way, achieve civil righteousness, or righteousness of works: it can speak of God, offer certain external worship to God, obey magistrates and parents in external works: it can restrain the hand from murder, from adultery, from theft. But it is false that a man does not sin who does the works of the commandments outside of grace.

VIII. Indeed, concerning the necessity of grace for salvific and spiritual good, those who under the name of Remonstrants stirred many controversies among the Reformed on the matter of Grace teach the same as other Protestants. For this is found in their Confession: Therefore, man does not have salvific faith from himself, nor is he regenerated or converted by the powers of his free will; since in the state of sin, he cannot think, much less will or do, any good that is truly salvific, such as primarily conversion and salvific faith, by himself or from himself, but it is necessary that he be regenerated and wholly renewed by God in Christ, through the word of the Gospel, and the accompanying power of the Holy Spirit, that he may rightly understand, meditate, will, and perform salvific good. Therefore, we state that the grace of God is the beginning, progress, and completion of all good; so much so that even the regenerated person cannot think, will, or perform any good salvific act, or resist any temptations leading to evil, without preceding or prevenient, exciting, following, and cooperating grace. Thus faith, conversion, and all good works and pious and salvific actions that can be conceived are wholly to be attributed to the grace of God in Christ as their principal and primary cause. Chapter 17, articles 5 and 6.

IX. Incidentally, it should be observed here that the Remonstrants do not require, as the other Protestants do, that for the goodness of a moral action, which is pleasing to God and free from sin, it must be done from faith and for the glory of God: but they consider it sufficient, according to themselves, that it be rightly conformed to reason and not done for any evil end. This can be seen in Episcopius, in the Apology for the Confession of the Remonstrants, in the fourth paragraph of the sixth chapter. For, to be morally good, it is sufficient, he says, if it conforms rightly to reason, that is, if it is done from a mind truly led by the pursuit of virtue, honesty, and probity, even if it lacks the knowledge of the law and the Gospel, and is free from the intention of doing anything against the rule of divine will, and from the pursuit of personal glory. For to include formally the intention of doing only what the divine law or the Gospel commands, the pursuit of divine glory, and faith in Christ, is not required by the nature of morally good action, as is clear from the nature of the matter itself: for there have been many in every age and still are today, who have never even heard of the law and the Gospel, whom no one would easily deny to be or to have

been morally good and virtuous. However, they do not think that anyone, by such acts, so pleases God that he is therefore transferred to heaven and given eternal life. And in this sense, they explain that passage in the Epistle to the Hebrews, "Without faith, it is impossible to please God." Namely, that the Apostle does not mean that without faith no one can in any way please God: but only that without faith no one can please God as Enoch did, that is, to be transferred with Enoch to heaven and live eternally with God: as can be seen in that author there.

X. Moreover, this doctrine of both Schools of Theology, that is, both Protestants and those who are devoted to the Roman communion, they have drawn not only from Councils celebrated long ago against the Pelagians and their remnants but also from Sacred Scripture itself, in which it is very clearly taught. This includes what Christ says in John 15, "Without me, you can do nothing." And what Paul writes to the Corinthians, "Not that we are sufficient to think anything as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God." 2 Corinthians 2. Especially what the same Paul says in the first Epistle to the Corinthians, "What do you have that you did not receive? Now if you did receive it, why do you boast as if you had not received it?"

XI. Nor is this little confirmed by the same Apostle's saying, in chapter 2 to the Philippians; "Work out your salvation with fear and trembling. For it is God who works in you both to will and to do for His good pleasure." Hence, in the same Epistle, chapter 1, he testifies that he is confident that "He who began a good work in you will perfect it until the day of Christ Jesus." And for this reason also, Peter acknowledges that "His divine power has given to us all things that pertain to life and godliness, through the knowledge of Him who called us by His own glory and virtue." 2 Peter 1:3.

XII. Therefore, for all our good works we are bound to give thanks to God and continually implore the help and grace of God and Christ, that He may direct us in the way of salvation, prevent our actions by His inspiration, follow them with His aid, and inwardly move and govern us by His Spirit, so that we may be able to do what is pleasing to Him—prayers which no one can disapprove of unless they are completely impious.

XIII. But to make the Protestant Doctrine clearer, it must be noted that they make some distinction between things that pertain to piety and salvation. There are many external actions that in some way pertain to piety and conduce to salvation, such as reading and hearing the Word of God, receiving baptism, participating in the Holy Communion, attending public assemblies of the faithful, and the like. There is no question about such things here. And although these may in their own way be able to benefit salvation, it is certain among all that external actions of this kind can be done by the powers of free will, without any internal grace of Jesus Christ, and with only the general concurrence and aid of God.

XIV. Thus, by things that conduce to salvation and pertain to piety, and for which theologians teach that the grace of Christ is absolutely necessary, are understood only internal actions in which spiritual worship of God consists and which benefit salvation as they are part or a certain beginning of the salvation obtained through Christ: and they promote our eternal happiness by themselves and are referred to it. Such actions include

believing in God, trusting in Him, hoping for grace and glory from Him, sincerely loving God and neighbour, seriously grieving over sins from a sense of God's goodness, making a firm resolution to amend one's life, and the like.

XV. However, Protestants contend that these actions, by their very nature and as to the substance of the acts, promote our salvation and pertain to piety. For they do not believe that anyone can give serious, solid, and confident assent to the Word of God, truly and sincerely love God and neighbour, expect grace and glory from God according to His promises, seriously grieve over offending God, detest sin, and be inclined to strive to please God in the future without some piety that God approves and accepts. And they consider it completely irrational for anyone to say that a person can perform such actions and yet do nothing conducive to salvation when God has promised salvation to all who perform such actions without respect of persons.

XVI. Therefore, they believe these actions benefit eternal salvation, not because they are done from some supernatural principle, but simply because they are done: and consequently, they do not think the help of divine grace is necessary for those acts, which otherwise could be elicited naturally by the powers of free will, to become supernatural and thus benefit salvation: but that free will, whose natural power such acts exceed in themselves, can simply elicit them and thus do what God requires for salvation. Indeed, if anyone performs such acts without the help of grace, they believe that this would not make them less pleasing and acceptable to God; on the contrary, they rather assert that such acts would be more pleasing and acceptable to God. For it is entirely reasonable that more reward and praise is due to one who, provoked by fewer benefits and aided by fewer helps, loves equally and performs as much good.

XVII. Although, according to Protestants, the acts of faith, hope, love, and repentance, which are commanded in the Gospel, exceed the natural power of free will even as to their substance, they acknowledge that the grace of Christ is not necessary for someone to believe, hope, love, and repent in any manner whatsoever: but only to believe, hope, love, and repent as is required for salvation. For not every assent given to the mysteries of faith is that faith which the Gospel requires for salvation; but firm and solid assent, not light and superficial, and which truly rests on God's truth, not on some human testimony. Which is also fit in itself to produce good works and is not without some pious affection toward God.

XVIII. Such assent is considered by Protestants to be above the natural power of a nature corrupted by sin as to its substance. For no one can assent to all things revealed by God in such a manner without having some good thought. But from the Apostle's testimony quoted above, we are not sufficient to think anything good from ourselves, as from ourselves. Nor can it be denied that he who believes in that manner believes Christianly; but all Christian faith is the gift of God. Add that to believe in this way is to come to Christ: but Christ says, "No one can come to me unless it is given to him by my Father." John 6. And moreover, he who believes in this manner knows both the Father and the Son, but "no one knows the Son except the Father, nor does anyone know the Father except the Son, and to whom the Son wills to reveal Him." Matthew 7. And finally, how can anyone, without the internal illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit, give serious and firm

assent to all things revealed in the Gospel, with a pious affection toward God and by bringing the mind into the obedience of that truth, as the Apostle says, "No one can say that Jesus is Lord except by the Holy Spirit." 1 Corinthians 12.

XIX. However, Protestants do not consider that from this it follows that the grace of Christ is necessary to give any kind of assent to matters of faith and religion. As if someone is somewhat persuaded about these things, moved by some solid perception of the truth, but carried away by some vain prejudices, or led by mere custom and the authority of ancestors, or by some human arguments and reasons. Such assent is given by many infidels and others erring gravely in the principal matters of religion to some articles of Christian faith. For just as such persuasion does not pertain to piety, nor does it contribute to eternal salvation, so natural human powers suffice to conceive it.

XX. Similarly, anyone who hopes for the remission of sins and eternal happiness from God does not immediately produce the act of that Christian hope which Scripture commends. For such hope can only be legitimately conceived by one who, endowed with true and effective faith, lives piously and holily and follows the path of God's commandments, which alone leads to eternal happiness: or who, having fallen into sins, performs serious repentance for them, and, grievously sorrowful for offending God, resolves to avoid offending Him in the future and to abstain from all things which he knows are displeasing to God. And this is the hope that is wholly owed to divine grace and whose act, even in substance, is far above the powers of a nature corrupted by sin. But if someone, gravely erring in the principal matters of faith, and indulging in the works and vices of the flesh, nevertheless hopes that God will be propitious to him and expects glory and eternal happiness from Him, such hope is undoubtedly vain and deceitful, nor can it be counted among the works of virtues: nor can its principle be the grace of God.

XXI. Likewise, if someone grieves for sins out of mere fear of punishment, without that sorrow being joined with the resolution to avoid sins in the future and the hope of obtaining pardon from God, this is not the repentance which God demands from man and to which no one can attain without the help of God's grace: but he is led to the repentance that is required for salvation, who is not only distressed by the fear of punishment impending on him because of sin but also because he has offended God, rendered himself unworthy of God's love, and been ungrateful to His goodness; and therefore he resolves to do in the future what is pleasing to God and to avoid what offends Him, with the confidence that God will be propitious and merciful to him. The acts of this latter repentance are of an entirely different kind and substance from the former; and this is the repentance which Protestants believe is not possible for man without the grace of Christ, even as to its substance.

XXII. Finally, if it is supposed that someone loves God, not for Himself and to enjoy Him, but only for some temporal benefit to be obtained from Him, such love is inordinate and faulty and does not constitute part of true piety. But it pertains to piety, and therefore must be attributed to divine grace, only that love of God by which the divine goodness itself is loved and by which God is loved in some degree, not for another reason, but for Himself. Protestants believe that such love, which alone leads to salvation, is so owed to divine grace that its acts in no way can be elicited by man without special help from God. And because

Scripture simply lists love among the fruits of the Spirit, Galatians 5, and absolutely declares that charity is from God, 1 John 4. Hence, it follows that neither its beginning nor its slightest degree can be from us without God's grace and the inspiration of His Spirit. Which is also confirmed by Christ's absolute statement, "Without me you can do nothing," John 15.

XXIII. However, from this doctrine, founded on the Word of God and now commonly accepted in Christian Schools, namely, that nothing pertaining to true piety and salvation can be done by man in a state of sin without the grace of Christ, Protestants conclude that not only can the supernatural precepts of God concerning internal acts of faith, hope, charity, and contrition not be kept by a fallen man without special help from God, even as to the substance of the acts, because those acts, considered in their substance, constitute part of true piety; but they also assert that it follows clearly from this that not even the precepts of natural law can be fulfilled by any mortal man without the same help from God, as to their substance.

XXIV. For among the precepts of natural law, the primary place is held by the command to love God above all things, than which nothing can be thought more intimately related to true piety toward God: indeed, this is the sum of piety, that we love God with all our heart and strive to please Him in all things. If, therefore, a sinner could love God above all things and make an absolute resolution to please Him in all things by his own strength, without the help of Christ's grace, the sinner could rise from sin by his own strength and turn to God, which no one can deny to be manifestly Pelagian. For certainly, he who loves God above all things and resolves to abstain from sin and is inclined to please God in all things is undoubtedly turned away from sin and turned toward God. We could also, by our own strength and without special help from God, provoke God to love us and to communicate His grace to us; since God loves all who love Him without exception, according to that saying in Solomon, "I love those who love me." But this is against the common sense of Christians and that saying of John in his first epistle, "Not that we loved God, but that He first loved us." 1 John 4.

XXV. Nor do Protestants only conclude from this that no man corrupted by sin can keep all and every precept of the natural law without the grace of Christ, but also that not even a single precept of the natural law can be kept by a fallen man without the help of this grace, so as to satisfy the law in this respect, and thus free himself from the obligation arising from the law, and thus not admit any sin. And this is because the law is spiritual, and therefore in each precept it does not simply command or prohibit certain external works, but it wills that what it commands be done and what it prohibits be avoided out of love for justice and a desire to please and obey God, which undoubtedly pertains to piety and thus cannot be done without the help of grace.

XXVI. Furthermore, from the things expounded in these and previous theses, it is clear that not only all Protestant Schools but also all Roman School Theologians agree on this general thesis, that nothing pertaining to true piety and leading to eternal salvation can be done without the help of Christ's grace.

XXVII. But it is also evident that many Roman School Doctors do not agree either with the Protestants or with other Roman School Doctors on what things are to be considered as leading to salvation and pertaining to true piety or not. For, as we have shown, Molina with many others believes that internal acts, not only those commanded in the moral law but also those commanded in the very Gospel, such as believing in God, loving Him above all things as the giver of grace and glory, hoping for eternal salvation from Him, grieving for having offended Him, with an absolute resolution to please Him in all things in the future—all these acts, if only considered in their own substance and in themselves, do not benefit salvation nor constitute part of that true piety which is the way to eternal life and happiness: therefore, such acts, in this respect, do not exceed the natural powers of free will but can be elicited by a fallen man without the special help of Christ's grace. Such acts, however, are beneficial to salvation and pertain to true piety if they become supernatural through some aid granted above nature, their substance remaining the same. On the other hand, Protestants, along with many and the most celebrated Roman School Theologians, contend that such acts in themselves and in regard to their own substance constitute part of true piety and are something that most directly leads to eternal life: and therefore, in this respect, they completely exceed the powers of human free will and cannot be produced without the special help of divine grace.

XXVIII. This view is certainly based on evident and clear reasoning. For God has promised the remission of sins and eternal life for such acts if they are done as commanded by God and as men are obligated to perform them by the law of Christ: and consequently, if done in this manner, they are most beneficial to salvation and pertain to true piety. Now, God simply commands that we truly and not fictitiously believe the Gospel, that we hope for the forgiveness of sins and salvation from Him, that we love Him above all things and with all our heart, that we grieve for our sins out of love for Him, and firmly resolve to avoid them in the future; not that we do these things from an infused habit or from any other supernatural principle which is not in our power. Indeed, God out of His kindness supplies us with certain aids above nature so that we can perform these things, but He does not command that we have such aids. Therefore, such aids of this kind help to fulfill the command, but they do not fall under the obligation of the command nor constitute the matter of the command. We have heard that those to whom the Gospel is presented with sufficient signs and miracles or with other persuasions and arguments can, without any special help from God and with only the general concurrence of God, by the natural powers of free will, avoid the sin of unbelief, and consequently, satisfy all the requirements of the command to believe. This is specifically affirmed of those who heard Christ and saw His miracles. Nor does he think that unbelievers would be guilty of mortal sin for not believing the Gospel presented to them, unless they could at that time give natural assent to the things to be believed by a merely natural act: and thus, according to his hypotheses, it is necessary that such natural assent satisfies the divine command to believe. And by the same reasoning, he would undoubtedly easily concede that one who, by a merely natural act and without the help of Christ's grace, loves God as our Redeemer above all things, with an absolute resolution to please Him in all things, as he thinks possible, would thus fulfill the evangelical command to love God above all things, so that in doing so, he would avoid sin and free himself from the obligation arising from that command. Indeed, nothing

could be imagined more vain and absurd than to affirm that someone loves God above all things and has a serious and absolute resolution to please God in all things and yet sins against the command to love God above all things.

XXIX. Therefore, according to Protestants and also a large part of the Roman School, to believe, hope, love, and grieve for sins as is necessary for salvation and justification; and to do all these things so that sin is avoided and the obligation arising from the precepts of the Gospel is satisfied, are all the same and fall under the same. But according to Molina and his followers, it is one thing to believe, hope, love, and grieve as necessary to avoid sin according to the evangelical precepts, and another to believe, hope, love, and grieve as necessary for salvation and justification. Because to avoid sin, it is sufficient that such acts, according to their substance, are produced by men; but for them to be beneficial for salvation and justification, it is further required, according to Molina and his followers, that they are done by the benefit of some supernatural aid. Whereas, on the contrary, Protestants consider the goodness of such internal acts to depend solely on their substance; nor do they believe these acts to be more pleasing and commendable to God, and thus more beneficial to salvation, if they are done with some supernatural aid than if they were done without it. Therefore, from the things expounded above, it is clear that there is still a controversy among all Protestants, except for the Remonstrants, and among the majority of the Roman School Doctors, with whom others disagree on this point. Whether at least the fulfillment of any precept of the moral law, by which sin is avoided against each of them, and satisfaction is given to what the law obliges under penalty of death, is something that by itself is conducive to eternal salvation and in which true piety consists, and therefore simply exceeds the powers of free will in corrupted nature and for which the grace of Christ is absolutely necessary? Many of the ancient Scholastics, including Scotus, Durandus, and Gabriel Biel, and Molina and his disciples deny this, who teach that the precepts of natural law can be kept by natural powers without special help from God by a fallen man, as to their substance, if not all collectively, at least individually, so that no sin is committed against them. But on the contrary, Protestants affirm, along with many Roman School Theologians, that all the precepts of the moral law cannot be kept, nor can sin be avoided against each of them, without doing something most beneficial to eternal life and pertaining to true piety.

XXXII. Their reasoning is that eternal life is simply promised to all those who keep the precepts of the moral law, as confirmed by our Lord Christ, according to the saying, "Do this and you will live." Moreover, among the precepts of that law, the principal place is held by the command, "You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, with all your soul, and with all your mind," in the observance of which consists the essence and sum of piety. It is entirely unreasonable to say that such love of God is not pleasing and acceptable to God for eternal life unless it is done with some supernatural aid from God: rather, it seems that it should be more pleasing and acceptable to God if someone, not bound by so many benefits and aids, nevertheless pursues God with such singular love

XXXIII. Finally, from what has been said, it appears that the question still remains among all Protestants, except for the Remonstrants, and among the majority of Doctors of the Roman School: whether the observation of any precept of the moral law, by which we

satisfy the obligations imposed by that precept and avoid sin against it, is something that pertains to salvation and piety. Many Roman School Doctors deny this, and therefore teach that certain mandates of the law can be kept by a fallen man, as to the substance of the acts, without the grace of Christ, in such a way that all sin is avoided, and the obligation to the law is satisfied. Protestants, however, affirm that fulfilling the obligation of any precept, by which we discharge what the precept obliges us to do and avoid sin against it, is part of true piety and contributes to eternal salvation, because each precept does not simply bind us to avoid or perform certain things but also to do so out of sincere love for God and a desire to please and obey Him, as is fitting for a rational creature: and therefore they contend that the grace of Christ is necessary for such observance, without which the Schools agree no work can be done that is truly pious and conducive to salvation.

On the Hypostatic Union and the *Communicatio Idiomatum*

I. On this matter, most of those who profess to follow Luther's doctrine differ from the Roman Church. However, there is no controversy between us and the Roman Church on this chapter. But to make clear what is being debated, it should be known that all Lutherans agree with the Roman Church, and therefore with us, that in the one and indivisible person of our Lord Jesus Christ there are two distinct natures: the divine nature which is eternal, and the human nature which was assumed in time into the unity of the person of the Son of God. They confess that these two natures are united not only inseparably and indivisibly, but also without confusion and immutably, so that neither of these natures is changed into the other or confused with the other.

II. Furthermore, they teach and acknowledge that as each nature remains unconfused in its nature and essence, and is never abolished, so also each retains its natural, essential properties, and does not lay them aside for all eternity, and that the essential properties of one nature never become the essential properties of the other nature.

III. On the other hand, all doctors, both ours and those of the Roman Church, by common consent with the Lutherans, confess and acknowledge that the two natures in Christ are not simply united in the way that two boards are glued together, but they truly and really have communion with each other, and from this follows in Christ a true and real communication of the properties of both.

IV. But there is some disagreement in explaining the nature of both that personal union in Christ and the communication of properties of both natures. And indeed our theologians, agreeing with the Roman School in this, consider that the reason and form of that hypostatic union consists in the fact that Christ's human nature does not have its own subsistence, but is hypostatically sustained by the Son of God, and is assumed by him, so that it is part of his person which subsists in him, not outside him, and thus does not constitute a person by itself, but is considered only a part of another person, namely the Divine Word, which is therefore said to have become flesh.

V. Furthermore, from this follows such a communion of the divine and human nature in Christ, that he truly is and can be called God-man, and man-God, and also separately God and man. And so, looking at Christ, we can now say God is man, and man is God, which statements are not merely verbal and only certain modes of speaking which have no foundation in reality, for most truly and really the eternal Son of God is man born of the Virgin Mary, and no less truly and really that man whom the Blessed Virgin conceived by the Holy Spirit is God blessed above all forever, although in Christ Divinity and Humanity remain unmixed, and neither is Deity man, nor is humanity God.

VI. Moreover, from this Union of the two natures in Christ, it follows that the properties of the divine and human nature are so communicated to the person of Christ that by whatever name it is called, whether of God or of man, they can be truly said and predicated

of it. Therefore we rightly and truly say God was born of the Blessed Virgin Mary, God shed his blood for us, and the Jews crucified the Lord of Glory; and in the same way it is rightly and truly said Jesus of Nazareth is omnipotent and everywhere, and he himself who in the beginning created Heaven and earth.

VII. This communication of properties, in the opinion of our theologians, is not merely verbal, for that person who is God, since he is also man, truly and really has all the properties of human nature; and that man, namely Christ, since he is God blessed above all, truly and really has all the properties of divine nature. But if our theologians sometimes call that communication verbal, they only mean this: that each nature of Christ perpetually preserves its own properties, and does not receive the properties of the other nature, so that this communication is real with respect to the person, to whom both divine and human properties really belong, and can be truly said of it, by whichever nature the person is denominated. Therefore truly and really God shed his blood for us, and suffered for us, and truly and really that Jesus, who ascended into Heaven, rules his Church present today; but it is called verbal with respect to the natures, because, although God truly suffered for us, Divinity nevertheless did not suffer for us, and although the man Christ is present on earth today, his humanity is not on earth: because indeed the divine person suffered for us, but not according to his divinity, and the human person is simultaneously in Heaven and on earth, but not according to his humanity, and therefore in the concrete it is indeed rightly said the man Christ is omnipotent, the man Christ is everywhere, but in the abstract it can neither truly nor rightly be said that Christ's humanity is omnipotent and everywhere, just as indeed God truly suffered and died, although Divinity could neither die nor suffer.

VIII. But although the human nature of our Lord Jesus Christ did not in itself receive the properties of the divine nature, yet from its personal union with the eternal Son of God it obtained the greatest gifts that a creature can receive, such as most excellent grace, greatest wisdom, clearly singular power, and other things of this kind, which gifts, although great and excellent above what we can say and comprehend, are nevertheless not infinite, since a creature, being finite, is not capable of infinite gifts. And this is briefly the opinion of our theologians.

IX. But as for those who are called Lutherans, they seem to diverge into various opinions on this chapter. For not all explain the hypostatic union in the same way, for Brentius and Smidelinus define that hypostatic union by that communication of properties which they imagine for themselves, so that the Word assuming flesh is not formally anything else in their mind than the eternal Son of God really communicating all the properties of his divine nature to that human nature.

X. But most others distinguish the hypostatic union from that communication of properties, which they want to be its effect and consequence, but the personal union, as we also seem to place it chiefly in this, that Christ's human nature not having its own subsistence, does not subsist except in the Word, and through the very subsistence of the Word. Indeed, some of them explain the communication of properties, which takes place in Christ's person, no differently than our Doctors, and with whom there is no controversy

on this matter, among which number are both Philip Melanchthon and Nicolaus Hemmingius, Professor at Copenhagen in Denmark in the previous century.

XI. But commonly today it does not seem sufficient to Lutherans in Germany that reciprocal communication of properties of both natures in the person of Christ, which has been explained by us, nor even that outpouring of the greatest and ineffable gifts, which nevertheless are created and finite, into the human nature of Christ, which our Theologians admit follows from the hypostatic union: but moreover they want through that union, the properties of the divine nature to have been really communicated to Christ's human nature, and thus Christ's human nature to have received gifts not only created and finite, but uncreated and infinite.

XII. But what the mode of this communication is, they themselves can scarcely explain, yet the Book of Concord, which is of the highest authority among Lutherans, attempts to declare the matter thus. And first indeed that book denies that communication was made in the way that the Father from eternity communicated to the only-begotten Son with the divine nature all the properties of the divine nature, whence it follows that the Son is equal to the Father, for they do not want the human nature to be made equal to the divine through that communication of divine properties.

XIII. Furthermore, it denies that communication to be physical or natural, and to have been made through some outpouring, or transfusion of divine properties into human nature, as if Christ's humanity had them by itself and in itself and separated from the divine essence. For they do not want, for example, there to be a double omnipotence and omniscience in Christ, one indeed which is the same as Christ's divine nature, and another which is poured out into Christ's human nature, and of which that human nature is the subject, but they acknowledge there to be only one omnipotence and omniscience in Christ, namely that which is the same as his divine nature.

XIV. But when they call that communication real, they say they oppose it to the verbal communication that others teach, and they want to say that that communication was truly and really made, and does not consist only in phrases and modes of speaking.

XV. Finally, they try to explain this communication by the similarity of ignited and glowing iron, for, they say, as in ignited iron there is not a double power of burning and shining, as if fire had a peculiar power of burning and shining and iron also had a peculiar power of burning and shining, and also that power of burning and shining is a property of fire, not a property of iron, but only because fire is united with iron, therefore it exerts the power and virtue of burning and shining in and with the iron and through that glowing iron, so that ignited iron from this union has the power of burning and shining, and yet there is no transmutation of the nature of fire and iron, or any transfusion of the natural properties of both iron and fire, each of which retains its natural properties: So in Christ the God-man there is not a double glory, virtue and divine majesty.

XVI. And also the glory, virtue and divine majesty which is in Christ, is not a property of human nature, but of the Word which assumed flesh, and both the Word and human nature preserve their natural properties, nor are the properties of one transfused into the other, so that they are in it as in a subject, and yet the divine Word so shines with all its

majesty, virtue and glory in the assumed flesh, and in it, with it, and through it exerts and exercises all its virtue, majesty and efficacy, that Christ's human nature can be said to have divine majesty, virtue and glory; and thus to be able to know and do all things. Which recent Lutherans today explain in these words, namely that divine attributes are communicated to human nature, not through participation so that they inhere in it subjectively, but through union with the divine.

XVII. But whatever the mode of this communication may be, it follows according to the Lutherans' mind that the properties of divine nature are rightly and truly predicated not only of the person of Christ from either nature, whether divine or human denominated in the concrete, but also of human nature in the abstract, so that it is not only true to say, that man namely Christ is omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, which we also willingly concede, but also Christ's humanity is omniscient, omnipresent and omnipotent.

XVIII. Moreover, some of them approve and defend this phrase as good: human nature is God, Christ according to human nature is God. And also some among them want there to be such a communion between human and divine nature, that it can be rightly said, not only God is dead, but divine nature has suffered and died, as Wendelinus reports in Christian Theology Book 1. chap.6.

XIX. But whether all properties of divine nature are so communicated to Christ's human nature, that they can be directly predicated of it in the abstract, in the way already explained, is not agreed among Lutherans. Many of them thus distinguish divine properties which are operative, that is, through which God operates, such as omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence, from those properties which are not operative, such as eternity, simplicity, infinity: they say the former are communicated because divine nature operates through human nature: the latter not, because divine nature does not operate through them, and therefore although they maintain Christ's human nature to be omniscient and omnipotent, yet they do not want it to be rightly called most simple, eternal and infinite.

XX. However, in this part the Swabians contradict other Lutherans, and contend that through the communication of properties Christ's human nature has also been made eternal, immense, and of the same substance with God the Father, and that Christ's body is infinite, as the same Wendelinus reports in the place cited above. But these are few compared to the rest.

XXI. Therefore the main dispute is about divine omnipotence, omniscience and omnipresence, whether they are so communicated to human nature in Christ, that Christ's humanity is truly omnipotent and omnipresent: concerning which omnipresence of Christ's human nature, however, not all think and speak in the same way yet. For there are some who speak timidly about that omnipresence, and do not openly assert Christ's body to be everywhere, but are content to say Christ's flesh is where he wills, and can be everywhere if he wills, as Chemnitz in the book on the two natures of Christ, and thus all things are not full of Christ's body, which some condemn, others reject.

XXII. And moreover, on that ubiquity of Christ's body a certain new controversy has arisen in this century among Lutheran Theologians, namely whether Christ's body from

the very moment of conception, before the resurrection and in the state of exinanition was always everywhere: or whether that omnipresence of Christ's body should be restricted to the state of exaltation alone, so that Christ's body is indeed everywhere now from the day of resurrection, but before was not, but only in a certain place: Lutheran Theologians from Prussia and Swabia maintain the former, affirming that Christ's body from the first moment of incarnation was always everywhere according to human nature as long as he lived among men on earth, and in a weak and mortal body. On which matter frequent volumes have been published by Theologians of both parties.

XXIII. Furthermore, from this explanation, both of the Lutheran and our opinion, it appears that they unjustly criticize our Theologians, as if they taught that Christ's natures have no communication between themselves really or truly. Nor do they deny that divine attributes, such as divine omnipotence, omniscience and immensity, which are altogether the same as Christ's divine nature, are truly and really in his human nature, namely through personal indwelling, of which the Apostle says, to the Colossians chap.1. That in Christ all the fullness of the Godhead dwells bodily. For they communicate with each other as really according to our opinion as body and soul communicate in man, from which man's person is constituted, since human nature is so really and closely united to the Word, that from it arises a single person namely Christ the God man, and therefore we do not want these Propositions, God suffered and God died, also That man, namely Christ our Lord can do all things, and rules his Church present on earth, to be verbal as the Lutherans cavil, as if they were mere forms of speaking which had no foundation in reality. For we confess that truly and really God both suffered and died, not indeed human nature alone, although divine nature is not rightly said to have died, and that the Son of man Christ is truly and really omnipotent God, although his humanity is neither God, nor omnipotent.

XXIV. On the other hand, we must beware lest we deal with the Lutherans as if they taught that those things which are proper to divinity are transfused into Christ's humanity, and inhere in it subjectively, which they perpetually deny, as has been shown before.

XXV. Therefore this controversy alone remains, whether the properties of divine nature in Christ were so communicated to human nature, that it is permitted to say in the abstract, Christ's humanity is everywhere and omnipotent. In which controversy there is perhaps more logomachy and obstinacy, than real difference, for in some sense we can concede that a real communication of the properties of divine nature was made to Christ's human nature insofar as, as has been said, Divinity with all its properties really and personally indwells in that human nature, just as fire is really in ignited iron; but just as from that union of fire with iron we can indeed rightly say, this iron burns, this iron glows, yet it is not rightly said iron-ness burns, iron-ness shines, because fire in iron, not however the nature of iron itself, so acts. So also we can rightly and truly say, this man can do all things, this man is everywhere, but not Christ's humanity is everywhere and omnipotent, about which perhaps only a form of speaking can be a question with many Lutherans.

On Whether Christ is Mediator According to Both Natures

I. According to the view of the Roman School theologians, the mediation of our Lord Jesus Christ must be understood and explained as follows. A mediator is properly one who places himself between two parties that are at odds or not united, to reconcile them and bring them to agreement, or to unite them in some new covenant. Therefore, since Christ undertook to unite men to God and to bring those who had turned away from God and become enemies due to sin back into favour with God, He is rightfully called the Mediator between God and men.

II. In order for the Son of God to accomplish this, though He existed in the form of God and was equal and consubstantial with the Father, He assumed the form of a servant and became man, being like us in all things except sin. Thus, in Him now exist two natures, divine and human, which are so closely united in Christ that they constitute only one person. Therefore, Christ, in view of His person and the dual nature within Him, holds a mediating position between God and men, since He is neither simply and solely God nor simply and solely man, but both God and man. This participation in both divine and human nature, and the personal union, is called by Bellarmine "substantial mediation." There is no question as to which nature this should be attributed, as it pertains to Him by virtue of the union and conjunction of both natures.

III. However, to reconcile sinful men to God and unite them with Him, it was not enough for the Son of God to assume human nature into the unity of His person; He also had to endure and perform many things. For understanding these, it is noted that someone can act as a mediator between disagreeing parties in three principal ways: First, by conveying messages and conditions between the parties, as all intermediaries can be called mediators. Second, by praying and interceding with one party on behalf of the other. Third, by paying and satisfying one party on behalf of the other.

IV. In these three ways, Christ acted as the Mediator between God and men. He declared God's will and laws to men, He prays and intercedes for us before God, and most importantly, He offered Himself to God as redemption for us, and satisfied God for us with His death. The Roman School refers to these functions of Christ's mediatorship. This is called by Bellarmine "mediation by operation" as opposed to "substantial mediation."

V. Furthermore, concerning these mediatorial functions, the question arises: According to which nature do they belong to Christ? And, is Christ a Mediator according to both His divine and human natures in respect to these functions? Here, Scholastic theologians use a certain distinction. In Christ's works, two principles can be considered: one is the principle by which the works were performed, and the other is the principle through which and by which they were performed. The former is called the material principle, and the latter the formal principle, according to Scholastic custom.

VI. In all Christ's works, the principle that performed the works is the person of Christ Himself, who is both God and man; not merely one of His natures. For, according to the Scholastic axiom, actions belong to the suppositum (person), not to the nature which is in the suppositum. But the formal principle, or the principle through which the works of Christ are performed, is sometimes the divine nature, sometimes the human nature. Thus, when our Lord Christ walks or eats, it is not only God or only man who walks and eats, but both God and man. However, these actions were performed by Christ only through His human nature, which alone is the formal principle of such actions. Conversely, the one who sends the Holy Spirit is Christ, not only as God but also as man, although He sends the Holy Spirit only as God, through His divinity.

VII. According to this distinction, the theologians of the Roman School, by common consensus, teach that the principle performing and still performing the works of the Mediator is neither solely man nor solely God, but both together, namely, God made man. In this sense, it can be said that Christ is Mediator not only according to His human nature but also according to His divine suppositum. For it is the Son of God who redeemed the Church with His own blood, and who was made under the law for us and obedient unto death, even the death of the cross. However, if we consider the principle by which these works of the Mediator are done, that principle is the human nature, not the divine. In this respect, Christ is the Mediator according to His human nature alone, because it is through this nature, not the divine, that He exercises the mediatorial functions, such as praying, suffering, and obeying. There is no such mediatorial function that can be attributed to the divine nature as the formal principle.

VIII. Although the Scholastics attribute the mediatorial functions of Christ to the human nature alone as the formal principle, they acknowledge and teach that these functions are such that they could not have been performed by one who was merely human. For it was not simply necessary for our Mediator to obey, suffer, and pray for us, but what was required was merit, suffering, and prayer of infinite value. Such merit could only pertain to a divine person whose dignity could infinitely augment the value of His prayers and sufferings.

IX. Thus, although the works of Christ the Mediator are, as to their substance, proper to the human nature, it is the divine Word, which sustains the human nature hypostatically, that imparts infinite value to Christ's actions, making them sufficient for satisfaction. Therefore, it must be considered the primary root and principal cause of Christ's infinite satisfaction. Accordingly, when speaking absolutely of the office of Mediator, the Scholastics do not deny that it must be said that Christ is Mediator not only as God or as man alone, but jointly as God and man. As seen in Eustachius of St. Paul's Summa Theologica, part 2, tract 1, disputation 11, question 3.

X. This is confirmed by Gregory de Valentia. If the question is asked, he says, in what capacity Christ properly and immediately fulfilled the office of Mediator, it must be said that He was a Mediator only as a man. However, if the question is asked in what capacity He was entirely a Mediator, either as in what capacity He immediately exercised that office, or as in what capacity He certainly received the value of His function: it must be answered that Christ was a Mediator not only as a man, nor only as God, but conjointly as both God

and man. In 3. Thom., question 200, point 3. According to their view, one should say that Christ was a Mediator as a man united to the Divine Word.

XI. Finally, if one wishes to distill the opinion of the Scholastics from their formulas and complexities and present it in simple and clear words, it seems to reduce to this: the person who exercises the office of Mediator must necessarily be both God and man. However, none of the functions of the Mediator are divine but only human since all are from humanity as their immediate principle. Yet, these functions derive efficacy, value, and worth from the divine nature with which the human nature is united in one person.

XII. As for the Protestants, they take the term "Mediator" in a broader sense than the doctors of the Roman School. Under this office, they include many more functions. For whatever Christ our Lord performed and continues to perform in any way for the salvation of men, they refer entirely to His mediatorial office. Thus, in their sense, the functions of Christ as Mediator are as extensive as His functions as Redeemer and Saviour of men. Now, Christ not only earned and procured grace and salvation for us through His obedience and suffering, but He also applies and confers them to us, saving us not only by merit and satisfaction but also by His power and efficacy.

XIII. Moreover, Christ teaches and governs us not only as a man who is an instrument of divinity united and singularly, but also as the primary author of all truth and light, on whose omnipotence everything depends and will eternally depend. Therefore, the power and right to forgive sins, to renew hearts by grace, to send the Holy Spirit, to open hearts, to enlighten minds, to raise the dead, to bestow immortality, and many other such works are the operations of Christ our Saviour, who, as stated, not only merited these benefits for us but also confers them in reality and by His own power. Protestants attribute all these to Christ the Mediator and count them among His mediatorial functions.

XIV. Furthermore, among the mediatorial functions of Christ, they recognize many of which the formal principle is not the divine nature, but only the human nature, if we consider the substance of the work, such as praying, suffering, and obeying. However, since these acts derive their worth and efficacy from the divine nature of Christ, to which the human nature is personally united, they also do not allow Christ to be called a Mediator in respect to these functions according to the human nature alone, but teach that Christ performs them not simply as a man, but as God-man.

XV. However, they also believe that many of the functions of Christ as Mediator, in terms of the very substance of the work, have their formal principle in the divine nature, not the human nature. Such functions include sending the Holy Spirit, enlightening minds internally, effectively renewing and sanctifying hearts, raising the dead, and similar acts. Whatever Christ does as one sent by the Father to redeem the human race and save the elect, they attribute to Christ's mediatorial office, as we have already stated.

XVI. Therefore, they teach that Christ our Lord is truly called and is the Mediator between God and men according to both natures, not only because the suppositum that exercises the mediatorial functions is a divine person who is both God and man, but also because there are some operations and effects of Christ as Mediator that are from the divine nature as the formal principle through which Christ operates them, and others that are from the

human nature. Thus, in the functions of the mediatorial office, the humanity plays its part, and the divinity also has its role, with each nature having its respective actions, some of which are properly divine and others human. Although neither nature should be considered apart from the other, each acts with the communion of the other.

XVII. From what has been explained, it is clear that theologians of both the Roman School and the Reformed School agree on the following: 1. In a good sense, it can be said that Christ is a Mediator according to both natures, that is, at least if the principle that gives the works of the Mediator is considered. 2. Speaking absolutely, Christ is and should be called our Mediator not only as He is man, nor only as He is God, but as He is both God and man conjointly.

XVIII. Furthermore, from what has been said, it is clear that Scholastic doctors concede to Protestants that there are no functions of Christ as Mediator that do not depend on the divine nature as their principle, from which they derive their value and worth. Conversely, Protestant theologians do not deny that if we speak of the acts to which the Roman School seems to restrict the mediatorial office of Christ, those acts are according to their substance from the human nature as their formal principle, although the divine nature bestows their dignity and efficacy upon them.

XIX. Thus, the controversy returns to this: whether there are certain functions of the mediatorial office that, in terms of the very substance of the work, are from Christ's divine nature as the formal principle, not from the human, that is, which Christ exercises through the divine nature, not through the human. Protestants affirm this, while doctors of the Roman Church deny it.

XX. This controversy, however, seems to be of little or no importance. For converting hearts, imprinting faith on minds, vivifying the dead, sending the Holy Spirit, and similar acts, which Protestants say Christ performs mediatorial acts through the divine nature, are works that the Roman School acknowledges Christ performs. They also agree that the divine nature of Christ is the formal principle of these acts and that they are performed by Christ. The only question is whether these acts should be called mediatorial and whether they belong to Christ as our Mediator, which Protestants affirm and the Roman School denies. But since we are certain that Christ is able and willing to perform these acts for the salvation of men, it does not seem to matter much whether we say that Christ performs these acts as Mediator or by another title. This is like asking whether the title of Mediator is as broad as the title of Saviour in Christ, or whether the title of Saviour is broader and encompasses more acts than the title of Mediator.

XXI. To clarify what I think on this matter, those acts in Christ that should properly be called mediatorial seem to be those that could not have been performed except by the Incarnate Word, and which are so proper to Christ that they do not belong to other divine persons and cannot be performed by them. For the title of Mediator does not belong to the Father or the Holy Spirit, nor can any mediatorial acts be attributed to or performed by them. However, bestowing grace and glory, conferring salvation earned by Christ's merit and obtained by His intercession, and effectively illuminating minds, converting hearts, raising the dead, and similar acts are not peculiar to Christ but belong to the

undivided work of the Trinity, which is common to the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. For the Father and the Holy Spirit, no less than the Son, convert hearts, illuminate minds, vivify the dead, bestow grace and glory, and confer eternal salvation. Therefore, those acts are not properly and strictly speaking mediatorial. Thus, what Christ earns and obtains for us, grace, glory, and eternal salvation, He does as Mediator. But what He effectively bestows upon us and communicates as the primary author, He does not do as our Mediator, but simply as our Saviour and Deliverer. The title of Saviour is indeed appropriated to Him in a certain respect, just as the title of Creator is appropriated to the Father, but it is common to Him with the Father and the Holy Spirit. Hence, in my judgment, the title of Saviour is broader than the title of Mediator and encompasses more acts in Christ.

XXII. Therefore, it is peculiar to Christ that He saves us by His merit, satisfaction, and intercession, or even as a unique and singular instrument of divinity. Thus, He does this as our Mediator before God. But what He effectively applies salvation to us and transfers us by His own power from death to life is not peculiar to Christ but common to the Father and the Holy Spirit and should not be referred to the mediatorial office of Christ. Nor should anyone say that the Father, along with Christ the Son, illuminates, converts, sanctifies, vivifies, and glorifies us by His omnipotent power, but that it is peculiar to Christ that He does these things as sent by the Father to save men. For it is not enough for a divine person to act as a mediator to perform something as sent by another of the divine persons. Otherwise, the Holy Spirit, who is sent by the Father and the Son to illuminate and sanctify us, should also be called our Mediator. This, however, is alien to true theology.

XXIII. Hence, it follows that some theologians reason less correctly when they infer that the Son of God, before His incarnation and under the Old Testament, already acted as Mediator because He was sent by God the Father to procure the salvation of men, for which reason the Son of God appearing to the patriarchs in human form is often called an angel. For even if this is conceded, which we do not deny, it does not follow that the Son of God then fulfilled the office of Mediator; for this office is not adequately fulfilled by the mission of one divine person by another. Furthermore, it is granted by all Protestants that Christ is not our Mediator simply as He is God, nor simply as He is man, but as He is God and man conjointly. Given this, it is impossible that the Son of God exercised any mediatorial function before assuming human nature and before the Word became flesh.

XXIV. Indeed, all who have attained salvation from the beginning of the world were saved by Christ the Mediator, but not by any mediatorial act performed by the Son of God at that time, but by the virtue of the mediation to be performed by Christ in due time and His obedience to the point of death on the cross, by which He was to satisfy divine justice for us most abundantly. For Christ's merit, which was eternally present to God, reconciled to God all who embraced the promises of grace first proposed to our first parents by God. In this respect, Christ is called the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world in the Apocalypse because the efficacy of His future death was already exercising itself in reconciling sinners to God from the beginning of the world.

XXV. Neither can I approve of what some among the Reformed say, to show that Christ exercises the office of Mediator even according to the divine nature, that the Incarnation, by which the Son of God assumed human nature, is a mediatorial work whose formal

principle is not the human nature itself, which did not unite itself to the eternal Word of God, but only the divine nature. For the incarnation is not a mediatorial work but that by which the Mediator himself was constituted. To appoint a mediator before God is one thing, and to perform the office of Mediator is another. The former belongs to God the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit; the latter does not.

XXVI. I would also not say, with some, that Christ, according to the divine nature, offered the sacrifice to God and that on the cross the human nature held the place of the victim, while Christ, as God, acted as the priest offering the victim to God. For every priest, as such, is inferior to the one before whom he performs the priestly service. Hence, if Christ, as God, performs the priestly service before the Father, as God, He is inferior to the Father, which is contrary to sound doctrine. Therefore, our great high priest before God is indeed the God-man, but He performs the priestly service not as God but only as man. Hence, in the sacrifice of the cross, Christ, as man, was both the victim offered and the priest offering. But to offer Himself to God and to be obedient unto death on the cross, He was moved and impelled by the eternal Spirit of God, and thus by the divine nature dwelling bodily in Him. This is what the Apostle intends to teach when he says of Christ that He, through the eternal Spirit, offered Himself without blemish to God (Heb. 9:14), besides the fact that it is the divine nature of Christ that gives infinite worth and value to Christ's oblation.

XXVII. Although these things are so, and we do not think that the acts of Christ that should be listed as mediatorial include those that, by common action with the Father and the Holy Spirit, and by omnipotent power, He works for our salvation, raising us from the death of sin, illuminating, and sanctifying us, yet we still affirm that it is rightly and fittingly said by Protestants that Christ is Mediator according to both natures, divine and human. This is because Christ's mediatorial works, indeed, according to their substance, are performed by Christ through the human nature, but they derive their dignity, worth, and value from the divine nature to which Christ's human nature is personally united. However, to argue vehemently on either side about such a manner of speaking, when the matter itself is clear, would be to violate the Apostle's command, who forbids Christians to contend with each other.

On the Knowledge of Christ

I. All who acknowledge that the Son of God assumed human nature into the unity of his person teach not only that Christ the man has dwelling in him, through the grace of that hypostatic union, the fullness of all divinity, and is thus true God to whom they attribute all the attributes of power, wisdom, goodness and happiness that can truly be ascribed to God himself. But they also maintain that from that union there followed in Christ's human nature the most excellent and eminent grace and glory, and gifts that are indeed created, but as great as can befall a creature. For it was not fitting that the nature which the Son of God, equal to the eternal Father and of one substance with him, assumed into unity with himself, should lack any gifts and ornaments that a creature could receive, nor does it seem possible that a nature could be so closely united to God without him pouring out upon it all the treasures of his goodness and grace, which Holy Scripture also sufficiently teaches when it asserts that Christ was full of grace and truth, and that God did not give the Spirit to him by measure, and thus we all draw from his fullness.

II. All who put faith in the Gospel of Christ also acknowledge that Christ's human nature was not immediately and in one moment raised to that height of perfection and glory which it has now attained in heaven, for Christ reached the natural perfection of his body through various stages of growth, and did not have before the resurrection those qualities of a glorified body with which he now shines; and in order to complete the work of our redemption, he willingly submitted himself to many hardships in body and soul even unto death, and for a certain time took on various defects and infirmities of our nature. And concerning these things there is no controversy between our theologians and the doctors of the German Church, but regarding the grace, gifts and blessedness of Christ's soul, certain questions are raised on which not all our theologians are in complete agreement with the doctors of the Roman Church. But in order that the difference between the two may be more distinctly understood, the opinion of the Roman School must be briefly set forth, then it must be noted what our theologians approve in it, and what less so.

III. The Scholastic Doctors commonly teach, therefore, that the soul of our Lord Jesus Christ, from the first moment of its creation and simultaneous union with the divine word, saw the divine essence itself, in which they teach the substance of that highest blessedness which we expect in Heaven consists: Yet since Christ, as long as he dwelt on earth, lacked the glory of the body, and also by a certain singular dispensation, was subject to many passions according to the soul, such as sadness, pain, fear, which cannot coexist with blessedness that is perfect in every respect, it follows from their opinion that Christ, as long as he was on earth, was already blessed in such a way that nevertheless in some respect he could be said to be striving towards blessedness, which the Scholastic Doctors understand when they say that Christ was simultaneously a wayfarer and a comprehender. Furthermore, since the Apostle opposes faith to sight, 2 Cor. 5, and teaches that faith is of things not seen, Heb. 11, and thus faith is incompatible with the state of the blessed who see God face to face, it is also a consequence of this opinion that Christ never had faith properly so called, but in place of faith a certain knowledge of a higher kind.

IV. Moreover, since this opinion supposes that Christ always enjoyed God as the highest good through that beatific vision, it also follows that our Lord Christ did not have hope properly so called, whose object is God under the aspect of an absent good, and which one has not yet attained, for hoping and enjoying are opposed; but as the same Apostle teaches, Rom. 8, "Hope that is seen is not hope, for why would one hope for what he sees?" However, since a twofold object of hope can be assigned, one primary namely God, in the way already mentioned; the other secondary, to which pertains whatever divine aid and whatever good promised by God. With respect to this secondary object of hope and trust, all theologians acknowledge that there was a kind of hope in Christ, which no one can deny hoped for deliverance from the evils to which he subjected himself for us, and the resurrection and glory of his body.

V. Furthermore, since Scripture teaches in many places that Christ received the fullness of grace from God, and that God gave him the Spirit not by measure, the Roman School holds that this abundance and fullness of all grace was poured out upon Christ's soul at the very first moment of his conception, simultaneously and at once, so that there was afterwards no room for increase, nor did he receive the gifts of the Spirit gradually and by degrees with the progress of age, but whatever he ever had of such gifts, he always had from his very conception. By that grace, moreover, they understand the supernatural habits of charity, wisdom, fortitude, fear, and the like, which they maintain were infused into his soul in the highest degree at once in the first instant of the conception of our Lord Jesus Christ, according to that of Isaiah, chap. 11: "And the Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him, the Spirit of wisdom and understanding, the Spirit of counsel and might, the Spirit of knowledge and of the fear of the Lord, and shall make him of quick understanding in the fear of the Lord."

VI. Furthermore, although from this opinion our Lord Jesus Christ could never make any progress in these gracious habits, but always had them in the same way and degree, nevertheless the Scholastic Doctors do not deny that Christ made progress in grace according to acts, since although the habits of grace infused into his soul from the beginning received no increase, nevertheless greater works proceeded from time to time from those habits with the accession of age, and to this they refer what is said in chap. 2 of the Gospel according to Luke, that Jesus increased in wisdom and age, and in favour with God and men.

VII. But the main difficulty here is concerning Christ's knowledge. Therefore it should be known that besides that uncreated and infinite knowledge which is in Christ insofar as he is God, the Scholastic Doctors posit a threefold knowledge in Christ's soul.

VIII. For firstly, since they hold that the soul of our Lord Jesus Christ was blessed and saw God from the very first instant of its creation, it follows that Christ in the very womb of his mother had that knowledge which they call the knowledge of the blessed. Moreover, through that knowledge they teach that Christ's soul beheld the very essence of God, and knew it far more clearly and perfectly than it is given to any other creature to know and behold it, and this because of the singular and most perfect union of Christ's soul with the word. Yet they do not think that Christ's soul comprehends the divine essence, since Christ's soul is finite and God's essence is infinite, and the infinite cannot be

comprehended by the finite. But since they maintain that all things can be seen in God or in the divine word as in a mirror (or at least according to Thomas Aquinas they hold that each blessed person knows in the word all things that pertain to himself, and all things pertain in some way to Christ and to his dignity, since all things are subject to him, and he is appointed judge of all; see Eustace part 2, page 171), from this they conclude that the soul of Jesus Christ always knew and saw in God all things past and future, whether said, or done, or thought, and thus also those things which, although they neither are nor will be, are in the power of the creature and can be done by it.

IX. They do not want it said, however, that Christ through this knowledge knew all things simply and is omniscient, since through this knowledge he does not comprehend the divine essence, as said, and thus he indeed knows whatever a creature can do, but not all things that are in the power of God, that is, which not a creature, but God himself can do; for if he had known these, he would comprehend the infinity of divine power, which would be to comprehend the divine essence itself.

X. But besides that knowledge which they call the knowledge of the blessed, the Scholastic Theologians maintain that Christ's soul received another knowledge from God at its very creation, which they call congenital or infused knowledge. This, namely, is their view that Christ not only saw and knew all other things in God, but moreover that intelligible species of all things were impressed upon Christ's human mind in the very conjunction of his soul with the Logos, by means of which he could know all things; which they teach were also given to the Angels in their creation by God.

XI. Thus through this knowledge they also think Christ knew all things from his very first conception, with the sole exception of the divine essence, which the Scholastics teach cannot be known through such species, but only through the light of glory, by which they maintain it is seen immediately by the blessed.

XII. Finally, to this twofold knowledge, which from the mind of the Scholastic Doctors Christ had from the beginning of his conception, those Doctors join yet a third, which Christ and other men living on earth drew from the senses themselves and the natural light and use of intellect and reason, and this they therefore call acquired or experimental knowledge, since, namely, Christ was not endowed with it like the two preceding from the very first moment of his conception, but gradually acquired it through the exercise of the senses and the reasoning of the mind, and thus since from the Scholastics' view those former kinds of knowledge, both beatific and infused, could not be increased and grow in Christ, this experimental knowledge had its increases in him, and in respect to it some progress can be attributed to Christ. Which, however, is not to be taken as if they thought Christ learned by means of the senses and experience and under the guidance of reason some things which he previously did not know. For it is supposed that from the first moment of conception he saw all things in God's essence, and moreover knew the same things in yet another way, namely through species immediately impressed on his mind by God, but he is said to have made progress in respect to that experimental knowledge, since what he already knew before through beatific and infused knowledge, he perceived and learned in a new way, namely through knowledge received from the senses. For these three kinds of Knowledge do not properly differ in their objects: For whatever Christ learned

through the senses and experience, he is thought to have already known through infused knowledge and congenital species, and since he had that infused Knowledge, he is posited to have seen it in the word united to himself as in a mirror. And these three kinds of knowledge are so compared among themselves, that the superior eminently includes the inferior, namely beatific knowledge includes infused, and infused includes acquired or experimental, although conversely Christ's acquired knowledge does not extend as widely as his infused, nor his infused as his beatific, since Christ did not perceive with his senses all things of which he has infused knowledge from God, nor does he know the divine essence through infused knowledge, which he is held to see through beatific knowledge. Therefore they are rather three modes of knowing than three different kinds of knowledge, for the same things Christ as man is thought both to see in the word united to himself, and to know through species impressed upon and innate to him, and finally also to have grasped with the senses, and perceived by the natural light of reason.

XIII. To which it must be added, that the mind of the Scholastics may be rightly perceived, that that infused knowledge and acquired knowledge are to be conceived after the manner of habits inhering in Christ's intellect, by which it is not necessary that Christ always actually knew, and had present to his mind all things of which he is said to have had such knowledge, not only as habits, but also as acts, see Eustace tract. 1 on the Incarnate Word disput. 7. quest. 2. where he says that knowledge is habitual and actual in different respects. But as for beatific knowledge, it is to be conceived after the manner of an act by which they think Christ perpetually and incessantly contemplated the divine essence, and in it all other things, which he perpetually saw, and had present as in a mirror.

XIV. From these things, moreover, according to the opinion of the Roman School, it follows that although Christ as man is not properly speaking omniscient, since he does not comprehend the divine essence, nor does he know all things possible to God, it can nevertheless be said that he never ignored anything, and that no ignorance should be ascribed to him according to any time, so that in a suitable sense it can be said that in this respect he always knew all things, and learned nothing that he did not know before: for he is posited to have had all knowledge and science that it is possible for a human soul to have. Ignorance, however, signifies the absence of knowledge of something in an intellect which is capable of that knowledge, and therefore just as a stone is not rightly said to be ignorant, because it knows nothing, so a man is not rightly said to be ignorant because he does not have knowledge of that which he is in no way capable of knowing.

XV. It should be noted, however, that this doctrine concerning the blessedness of Christ's soul from the very beginning of his incarnation, and its consequences which have now been set forth, although commonly held in the Roman School, has not been defined by the Roman church, and thus is not held as a matter of faith even among the Pontificals themselves.

XVI. As for our theologians, however, there are various opinions among them on these matters. Jerome Zanchi in Book 2 on the Incarnation of the Son, Thesis 2, which book is found in volume 8 of his works, on these matters either does not differ at all, or very little from the Scholastic Theologians. For he teaches with them that the soul of our Lord Jesus Christ was blessed and saw God from the first moment of its union with the Word, and

thus Christ never had faith or hope properly so called. Moreover, he asserts that Christ's human nature was filled with the holy spirit and all his gifts already from conception. And he also acknowledges a threefold knowledge in Christ's soul besides the uncreated knowledge of the Logos. And firstly indeed that knowledge of the blessed through which Christ's soul from its creation, not only saw the divine essence, but in it also all things that are, were, and will be, since every blessed intellect sees in God all things that pertain to itself and its blessedness, and all things pertain to Christ as King, Lord and Judge of all, so that in this respect only the comprehension of the divine essence and its infinite power is excluded from his knowledge.

XVII. Then he also attributes to Christ's soul from its very origin that infused knowledge through which he knew all things that Angels and men can know in this life. Finally, he does not deny that to this beatific and infused knowledge was added, with the progress of time, acquired and experimental knowledge, through which Christ the Lord perceived many things by use and experience itself and knew and investigated far more things by the natural light of reason than is given to any man to know.

XVIII. Having proposed the question, however, whether the gifts of spirit and grace which Christ received in his very conception had some true increase with age, or whether the progress which is attributed to Christ in the Gospels is to be understood not of the gifts and habits themselves, but only of the acts and effects of the gifts and habits, he leaves it free to think this or that, and does not dare to pronounce anything for certain, although he does not deny that it seems to him simpler and more consistent with God's word if we say that those gifts conferred on Christ's human nature were not initially consummated in all respects, and received true increase with age, which is against the common sense of the Roman School; to which, however, he seems to accede afterwards, when he expressly teaches and often repeats that Christ's infused knowledge received at first birth was never increased as to habit, but Christ only made progress in it as to acts.

XIX. Moreover, Zanchi has this singular view, and differing from the Roman School, that he exempts from that infused knowledge of Christ the knowledge of the day and hour of the last Judgment, which he maintains Christ did not know, by acquired knowledge, nor even by infused knowledge, but only through the knowledge which they call beatific and of vision, since, namely, that knowledge is remote from angelic and human intellect in this life.

XX. Tilenus follows Zanchi in disputation 2 on the effects of the hypostatic union, where he also posits a threefold knowledge in Christ's soul, namely beatific, infused and acquired, and consequently teaches that faith or hope properly so called could not have place in Christ. In this, however, he differs from Zanchi, in that he maintains that Christ grew and made progress in that infused knowledge, not only as to acts, but also as to habits. Robert Baronius in his exercise on faith, and Junius in his notes on Bellarmine, where he touches on this question, agree with Zanchi and Tilenus.

XXI. But other of our theologians are of a different opinion. For Chamier in Panstratia volume 2, Book 4, Chapter 2, denies that Christ's soul from its very origin enjoyed that highest blessedness which it now enjoys in Heaven, for these are his words in paragraph 3

of that chapter: "Therefore we cannot approve those who, relying on their own temerity, dare to assert that already from the beginning that soul personally united to the Deity was perfectly blessed in itself, that is, actually enjoying that state which is very far removed from present misery"; which opinion he opposes to the common consensus of the Roman School. In Chapter 7, moreover, he simply asserts that there was hope in Christ, when he was here in the form of a servant. The question having been proposed, however, whether Christ had faith, he teaches that faith is taken in three ways, first for the assent which one gives to doctrine revealed by God. Secondly for the certain trust by which we promise ourselves all things that can be expected from him for our utility. Thirdly for the means by which we are justified before God through Christ our Mediator, and embrace the remission of sins in his blood. He concedes that faith taken in this third way was never in Christ, but asserts that faith in the first and second signification was in Christ, and thus contends that it cannot be denied without blasphemy that there was simply and absolutely faith in Christ. Nor yet by this does he mean that Christ had only an obscure knowledge of God and divine things: for to this argument (he who has faith does not see perfectly the divine essence, Christ always saw perfectly the divine essence. Therefore he never had faith) he responds, distinguishing faith, if it is taken in the third way it is conceded, if in the first and second it is denied. Where he seems to acknowledge that Christ's soul always saw the divine essence, although he denies that it was always perfectly blessed. See Chamier volume 20. Book 5. Chapter 20. paragraph 40. and following where he distinguishes a twofold vision of God, and denies that Christ saw God by that beatific vision.

XXII. Calvin does not raise this question, nor does he dispute about it, but nevertheless in many places he speaks of Christ as having had faith, especially in the harmony explaining the passages of the Evangelists where they deal with Christ's anguish and passion; for he says that faith always stood firm in Christ's heart, by which he beheld God present, and that he retained God by faith as propitious to him, and in this dire torment his faith was unharmed, so that deploring that he was forsaken, he nevertheless trusted in the near help of God: where by faith he seems to understand nothing other than trust in divine help.

XXIII. Louis Cappel, Professor at Saumur, in disputation 2 on the incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ, Thesis 43, judges it rash to assert that Christ always saw the divine essence, indeed he does not even dare to assert that the blessed see the divine essence, and that their knowledge consists in this. Then he indicates sufficiently that the opinion of the scholastics does not please him, who maintain that Christ was simultaneously a wayfarer and a comprehender, since these two states seem to him not to be able to consist in the same subject. In Thesis 40, moreover, he affirms that in the first moment of Christ's conception all the gifts of mind which he afterwards had were not poured out upon him at once, but that he received them in order and time, and that his human wisdom and grace was altogether less when he was born than when he grew up.

XXIV. But especially most of our theologians do not think that Christ always knew all things of which he afterwards acquired knowledge, nor do they fear to say that he sometimes was ignorant of some things which he now knows and understands. For since Christ willed to be made like us in all things, except sin, it does not seem unworthy of him

if as a boy and infant he did not know things which it is only for an adult man to know and understand.

XXV. Furthermore, from what has been said it is gathered that concerning these questions there is not properly a controversy between the Roman Church and the Reformed Churches: For just as the Roman Church has not yet pronounced anything about these things in its Councils, so also the Reformed Churches have not yet established anything in common about these matters, but they are mere Scholastic questions, about which in either communion it is permitted to think either this way or that without danger to faith, but although by the judgment of the Pontificals themselves one who thought otherwise about these proposed questions than the common opinion of the School holds is not immediately to be considered a heretic and deviant from the faith, he would nevertheless be rash, and would be judged to err, and would not escape some censure and mark. But opinions are freer among us, and it is permitted to our theologians, with the good grace of their fellow ministers and colleagues, to think about this whole matter either in this or that direction.

XXVI. However, it is not agreed between the Scholastic Doctors and at least some of our theologians, as is evident from what has been said, whether the soul of our Lord Jesus Christ, while he was still on earth, before death already enjoyed that highest blessedness which it now enjoys in Heaven; and thus whether Christ could then be said to be simultaneously a wayfarer and a comprehender (which the Roman School teaches by common consent). But some of our theologians deny this, while others affirm it, most being silent and saying or establishing nothing about it.

XXVII. Furthermore, from that matter another dispute arises, whether Christ had faith and hope properly so called, which the Roman School denies, as has been shown before. But those of our theologians who deny that Christ's soul was always perfectly blessed affirm it. Concerning faith, however, there seems to be a λογομαχία [logomachy, or dispute about words]; For the Scholastic Theologians contend that Christ did not have faith properly so called, because faith in its nature includes some inevidence and obscurity, which they think should be removed from Christ's knowledge: Our Doctors, however, although they attribute faith to Christ, nevertheless by this do not wish to diminish, or accuse of obscurity the knowledge which he had of God and divine things, but either by the name of faith they understand trust, or simple assent given to doctrine revealed by God, as is evident from what has been adduced before.

XXVIII. Moreover, from what has been said it appears that our theologians, either all or most, differ from the Roman School in this, that they think that all fullness of grace was not poured out upon Christ's soul at once and simultaneously as soon as he was conceived in the Virgin's womb, but that Christ made progress in grace with time, not only as to acts, but also as to habits; whereas on the contrary the Roman School holds that the gifts of the Spirit were conferred upon Christ in such abundance in his very first conception, that afterwards there was no place at all for increase, but whatever gifts and grace Christ now possesses in his soul, he always had even in his mother's womb in the same measure and degree.

XXIX. But the principal dispute is about the knowledge of Christ's soul, which indeed all agree now knows all things in heaven of which knowledge can fall to any creature, but they do not agree whether he always knew all things and never learned anything which he truly did not know before. And the Pontificals indeed by common consent hold that the soul of our Lord Jesus Christ was so filled with knowledge from its very creation, that it afterwards learned nothing which it did not know before, and that Christ never laboured under any privative and properly so called ignorance, but through some created knowledge always knew all things which he now knows, and which it is possible for a creature to know. On the contrary, however, most of our theologians assert that it can be truly and properly said that Christ, insofar as he is man, was sometimes ignorant of something, and that his knowledge began to have various increases with age, and thus that he knows some things in heaven which he did not know when he was not yet glorified.

XX. However, it is imputed to us by calumny that we say Christ laboured under a crass ignorance of many things, or that we attribute to Christ all our ignorance which can be without sin; for not only do we remove from Christ all culpable ignorance, but we do not even dare to determine what he knew or was ignorant of at any time, but we simply adhere to the Gospel text, where we read that Christ increased in wisdom with God and men, and that he did not know the day and hour of the last judgment as long as he was here on earth in the form of a servant.

On the Impeccability of Christ

I. Here, there is no controversy, but merely a calumny from the Catholic doctors attempting to burden our theologians. The occasion for this calumny is taken from Calvin's words in Matthew 26, found in his Harmony of the Gospels. There, Calvin, writing about Christ's prayer, "My Father, if it is possible, let this cup pass from me; yet not as I will, but as you will," includes these words among others: "He was struck with fear and constricted by anxiety, so that it was necessary for him to vacillate, as it were, with alternating prayers amidst the violent waves of temptations. This is the reason why, having prayed for the cup to pass, he immediately reins himself in, and submitting his prayer to the Father's command, he chastises and recalls the request that had just slipped out. And there, he says, 'This was not a deliberate prayer of Christ, but the force and sudden impulse of grief extorted the words, to which correction was immediately added; the same vehemence also took away the immediate memory of the heavenly decree.'"

II. From this, Bellarmine infers that, according to Calvin, Christ did something that needed to be corrected, which, he says, even if Calvin does not dare to call it a sin, it nevertheless was truly a sin if it needed to be corrected. But how far Calvin was from attributing anything to Christ that deviated even minimally from perfect purity and integrity is evident from the words that immediately precede those cited by Bellarmine: "Indeed, it must be held that Christ's emotions were not turbulent, such as ours, which might expel pure moderation from his mind; but, as far as possible, he, with a sound and unblemished human nature, was struck with fear," etc.

III. Therefore, it should be known that in speech, one often corrects what one says, not because it is bad and reprehensible, but through a figure of speech and manner of speaking, which rhetoricians call "epanorthosis," that is, correction. And in this sense, and no other, Calvin means that the Lord corrected and recalled the prayer, "Father, if it is possible, let this cup pass from me," which correction is not an amendment but an explanation and modification of what was said. For neither Calvin nor any other Reformed theologian has ever said or thought that our Lord Christ either did or said anything deserving of reprimand and needing correction; rather, they all unanimously proclaim that he was always free from any stain or blemish of sin.

On the Descent into Hell

Part I

In which the Sentiment of the Roman Church on the Descent of Christ into Hell is Explained, and the Questions Arising from it

I. Doctors of the Roman Church here understand "hell" to mean hidden receptacles where souls that have not attained heavenly bliss are detained. They distinguish four such receptacles. The first is that most terrible prison where the souls of the wicked, along with demons, are tormented by perpetual fire, commonly and strictly called hell. The second is purgatory, where the souls of the pious who die with some guilt are tormented for a definite time to be purified, so they may enter heaven. The third is that place called the Limbo of the children, where the souls of children who die with original sin are confined, who, although deprived of the beatific vision of God forever, are not afflicted with any sensible punishment. Finally, the fourth type of receptacle is where the souls of the saints who had nothing to atone for in purgatory were received before the advent of our Lord Jesus Christ; this place is commonly called the Limbo of the Fathers in the schools, also called Abraham's bosom, a term taken from Luke 16.

II. Scholastic Doctors understand these four receptacles by the common name of "hell," and although the Roman Church has not yet defined their location in its councils or decrees of its popes, the Scholastics, by common consent, place them in a certain order around the centre of the earth, and establish hell as underground places. The lowest, they teach, is destined for the torments of the damned; the next is for the purification of the souls of the pious before they can enter heaven. The third is assigned to receiving the souls of children who die in original sin. Finally, the highest and last is assigned to the spirits of the saints until the resurrection of Christ.

III. Although they teach that the Fathers of the Old Testament received the remission of all sins, including original sin, by virtue of Christ's future passion through faith, they do not believe they were released from the punishment due to original sin, which is physical death and exclusion from heavenly glory until the price of human redemption was actually paid. Similarly today, although the faithful are freed from all sins and the guilt of original sin through baptism, they remain obligated to the penalty of original sin, namely the necessity of physical death. Therefore, they believe that the Fathers of the Old Testament, although departing from this life in whatever perfection, were not admitted to the vision of God and heavenly glory, but were received in the place called the Limbo of the Fathers, where the souls departing from purgatory were also admitted after paying the due penalties.

IV. Although, according to their view, the souls of the ancient faithful enclosed in this Limbo did not enjoy the beatific vision of God, they nevertheless had a peaceful habitation there and lived without any sense of pain, except that which the delay of promised glory and beatitude might bring, which, however, they sustained with certain hope.

Nevertheless, they consider these holy souls as captives there and in some way under the power of the demons by whom they were confined and restricted.

V. When it is said that Christ descended into hell, they understand it as a real and true descent by which Christ penetrated those lowest places. They establish that our Lord Jesus Christ's soul, at the moment of its separation from the body by death, sought these subterranean abodes and remained there throughout the entire three days of death. Indeed, some believe that Christ's soul visited each part of hell, and according to real presence, was also in that prison where the wicked are tormented with demons, which is properly called hell. Bellarmine supports this opinion in his On Christ, Book 4, Chapter 16, although he later retracted it in his reviews of his works. However, the opinion of Thomas Aquinas, which the majority of the school follows, is that Christ descended in real presence of his soul only to the Limbo of the Fathers, and to the other places of hell only by certain effects. They believe that in the strict sense of hell, by the manifestation of his glory, he terrified the demons, and convicted the damned of their unbelief, compelling both to kneel and acknowledge him as Lord. Regarding purgatory, some Scholastics believe that all souls tormented there when Christ descended to hell were then delivered by a certain full indulgence of Christ, an opinion held by Dominic Soto and Ambrose Catharinus, as reported by Estius in the third Sentences, Distinction 22, Paragraph 4, who also inclines to this opinion. However, most others consider it more probable that Christ did not free all souls detained in purgatory at that time but only those who had completed their period of purification or had deserved by some special devotion to Christ's passion to be liberated by him descending into hell. They believe Christ brought some relief to the others by raising them to the hope of future life.

VI. Regarding the souls detained in the Limbo of the Fathers, Christ, according to his soul, really descending there, according to the Roman Church's opinion, conferred two greatest goods upon them. First, he granted them essential beatitude by admitting them to the beatific vision of God. Secondly, he led them out of that prison and took them to heaven, which he accomplished not long after. They believe that Christ's soul, returning to the body on the third day, brought out all the souls of the Fathers, who, after forty days, were carried up to heaven with Christ ascending.

VII. Scholastics dispute whether the descent into hell should be counted among the penalties that Christ suffered on our behalf. Thomas indeed believes so in his Summa Theologica, Part 3, Question 52, Articles 1 and 3, and Cardinal Cajetan in Acts 2. But Bellarmine and others think differently, believing that while Christ was in hell, he was indeed in a place of punishment but without suffering; he descended there not as a prisoner to be detained but as a king and liberator to free the captives there, and that it is not a punishment if a king visits prisons to free some from there; rather, this should be called condescension and humility.

VIII. As for our theologians, they acknowledge indeed that the term "hell" or "infernos" in the Vulgate Latin edition of Scripture is variably interpreted and does not simply signify the same thing, but when it is taken for a specific place of souls, they never understand by "hell" anything other than the place of the damned. Indeed, they establish only two places for souls after death, one where the souls of the saints and the pious are gathered after death

and enjoy blessed rest, which place is in heaven and is called Paradise in Scripture; the other where the souls of the wicked are thrust down and tormented with dire and eternal punishments, which they only comprehend by the name of hell.

IX. Where is that place? They do not think it necessary to inquire curiously, nor do they dare to define it. However, many, such as Tilenus in his Disputation on the Last Judgment and Ramburtus in his Theses on the True Penalties of Sin, do not find it probable that it is in the centre of the earth, because they believe that this earth will eventually be annihilated, whereas hell is a place that is eternal and will never end. Others, such as Beza and Bucanus on the descent of Christ into hell, Bullinger, and Keckermann in his Theological System, who do not believe that this world will be annihilated on the last day but only changed, do not find it improbable that hell is an underground place. But, whatever the case, few or none of our theologians precisely define the location of hell.

X. Furthermore, since our theologians generally assert that there are only two places destined for receiving the souls of the dead, namely Paradise and the abode of the damned, it follows that the souls of the pious who died in faith under the Old Testament were immediately admitted to heavenly Paradise, as they should not be thrust into Tartarus, nor did they have any guilt by which they could be excluded from heaven. They believe that the faithful before Christ, no less than we, received full remission of all sins, including original sin, by virtue of the future passion of Christ. This is the common opinion of our theologians, as they do not think the souls of the fathers were thrust into any hellish places but were transferred to the very place of the blessed upon departing from the body.

XI. However, this opinion is not universally accepted by all our theologians, as some dissent or at least suspend their judgment. For instance, Peter Martyr in his commentaries on 2 Kings 2, where he discusses the rapture of Elijah and Enoch, clearly teaches that the souls of the ancient fathers before Christ's ascension were not yet admitted to the highest heaven where the saints now reign with Christ. He writes, "Now you may ask to what place Enoch and Elijah were translated. I simply say that I do not know, for it is not taught by the divine Scriptures. However, if a probable reasoning is to be followed, I would say they were brought to the place of the fathers or Abraham's bosom, where, waiting for Christ's resurrection, they lived with the blessed fathers, and after his resurrection, they were lifted above the heavens." A little later, he distinguishes the supreme seat of the blessed, which Christ first reached after his resurrection, from Abraham's bosom, where the souls of the pious fathers were gathered. Speaking about Elijah's descent, he says, "It is not a question of that ascent above all the heavens, where Christ first entered, but of being taken to Abraham's bosom." He concedes that no one reached that sublime ascent before Christ. Enoch and Elijah went to the fathers and waited there with them for Christ, and when he came, they accompanied him to heaven along with others. Finally, he poses this objection: "In sacred history, it is expressly stated that Elijah was taken up to heaven by a whirlwind, so he does not seem to have gone to Abraham's bosom." To which he replies, "Perhaps by heaven is meant the air through which it is certain he passed, or Scripture speaks not of the initial journey to the fathers but of the later one when he ascended with Christ above all heavens." This latter interpretation is more probable. Hence, Peter Martyr concluded that the souls of the ancient fathers were not received into the heavenly and glorious seat where

pious and holy men now reign with Christ after leaving this life but were placed in a peculiar location distinct from heaven, where he believed they rested free from the torments of the damned, well off and rejoicing.

XII. Calvin, however, denies that the question of the location of souls is necessary both before and after Christ and permits everyone to have their own opinion on it. These are his words: "There are other controversies among the churches that do not disrupt the unity of faith. Why should churches be at odds if one, without a desire for contention or obstinacy, thinks that souls departing from bodies fly to heaven, while the other dares not define the place but certainly holds that they live with the Lord?" (Institutes, Book 4, Chapter 1, Paragraph 11).

XIII. Jerome Zanchius, in explaining the article of the Creed on Christ's descent into hell, offers many and varied interpretations and specifically that "He descended into hell," meaning into the subterranean place called Limbo, where, as in a prison, the fathers of the Old Testament were held captive. Christ descended to liberate them. After not rejecting any of the proposed interpretations outright, he concludes with these words, "But let the pious and Christian mind judge which of these interpretations fits best." This is found in his Compendium of the Principal Chapters of Christian Doctrine, in section 80, which is included in the 8th volume of Zanchius's works.

XIV. But whatever the opinions of some of our doctors may be, the vast majority do not believe that the souls of the fathers under the Old Testament were received into a different place than the faithful are today under the New Testament. However, all agree that although the souls of the pious who died before Christ enjoyed some degree of beatitude and heavenly glory, they had not yet reached the level of beatitude and glory they attained after our Lord Jesus Christ's resurrection and ascension into heaven, and which all faithful souls now departing from this life obtain. Our theologians teach that the knowledge of those holy souls was greatly increased through Christ's coming and his glorious presence in heaven, revealing many new things to angelic and human spirits, thus also increasing their joy and happiness. And none of our doctors have ever denied that Christ's soul, at his death, went to where the souls of the fathers were before him and remained with them until the resurrection.

XV. Furthermore, from what has been explained, it is clear that our theologians, like the Romanists, teach that there are certain hells distinct from the graves and that by this name is not only designated the state and torments of the conscience of the damned but also a specific place intended for receiving the souls of the dead, namely those who depart from this life outside the grace of God. There is no controversy about this.

XVI. Our doctors also, as it appears, concede to the Romanists that the souls of the fathers who preceded Christ, wherever they were, did not attain that level of beatitude before Christ's coming which they now enjoy in heaven with Christ and awaited Christ's coming and presence with some anxious desire. All theologians, both ours and the Romanists, as is evident, agree that our Lord Jesus Christ's soul immediately after it was separated from his body went to the place where the souls of the fathers were and stayed with them for the entire three days of death, bringing them great joy and an increase in happiness.

XVII. On the other hand, the doctors of the Roman Church do not deny that the souls of the ancient fathers, although not yet admitted to the vision of God, were nevertheless free from pain, enjoyed great peace, and even experienced considerable joy from the certain hope of glory, which they awaited according to God's promise.

XVIII. The question is whether hell is an underground place, which the doctors of the Roman Church affirm, while most of our theologians doubt and find improbable. Secondly, whether besides the place of the damned and heaven, which is the seat of the blessed souls, there are other specific receptacles for souls included under the name of hell, which the doctors of the Roman Church affirm, but our theologians generally deny.

XIX. Thirdly, it is questioned whether the souls of the saints who died before Christ were held by some guilt until his death, by which they were excluded from heavenly beatitude and glory, and whether they were in some way still under the power of the devil. Or were they, being free from all guilt, immediately after death, able to begin to enjoy the very substance of heavenly beatitude? The former is affirmed by the doctors of the Roman Church, while the latter is affirmed by our Church.

XX. Fourthly, whether the soul of Christ after his death truly descended to certain subterranean places, and whether this is what is meant by the article of the Creed about Christ's descent into hell. This is affirmed by the Scholastic doctors, but our theologians deny it.

Part II

In which various opinions of our theologians concerning Christ's descent into hell are reported.

I. Robert Bellarmine, in Book 4 on Christ, which is about Christ's soul, Chapter 7, claims this to be the opinion of Brentius and Calvin: that to descend into hell is to be utterly destroyed and extinguished. To this end he cites certain passages from their works, but this is entirely slanderous. For none of the Protestants or Reformed ever thought this, and the calumny can be refuted from the very passages Bellarmine cites.

II. Among those Protestants called Lutherans, there were many debates in Germany over this article. But the Book of Concord, which attempts to settle disputes arising among Lutherans, and in which most Lutherans agreed, wants this article to be believed simply as containing doctrine distinct from the article on Christ's burial. However, it says the manner in which Christ our Lord descended into hell should not be investigated and defined, but distinct knowledge of this matter should be reserved for the next age. For that book states thus in the epitome of articles about which controversies arose among theologians of the Augsburg Confession, Article 9: "It should be enough for us to know that Christ descended into hell, destroyed hell for all believers, and delivered us through himself from the power of death and Satan, from eternal damnation, and even from the jaws of hell. But we do not curiously inquire in what way these things were accomplished, but reserve knowledge of this matter for another age, where not only this mystery, but also many other things simply believed by us in this life will be revealed which exceed the grasp of our blind reason."

III. From our theologians also, Zanchius, in that passage we cited in the previous chapter, after presenting several explanations of this article, does not dare to define anything for certain, but leaves the matter undecided and wants each person to be free to choose whatever opinion he wishes.

IV. But other theologians from our side have quite varied opinions on this article and do not explain it in the same way. To a few, a certain opinion far differing from others seems probable. William Bucanus reports it and does not entirely reject it in his Institutes of the Christian Religion, Section 25, Section 6. Where after he said the ancients contend that at the very moment of the earthquake and resurrection, Christ showed himself alive to those in hell and declared, not so much in words as in reality, that he was the victor over death and the Prince of darkness, and that Satan no longer has any power over the elect, and that the name was given to him, so that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow in heaven, on earth and under the earth, he adds: "I do not dare to condemn this opinion, since it does not conflict with Sacred Scripture and contains nothing absurd. Indeed, this opinion seems able to be probably inferred from the words of the Apostle, Ephesians 4:9: 'Now that he ascended, what is it but that he also descended first into the lower parts of the earth?' For there is a clear antithesis between 'above all heavens' and 'the lower parts of the earth'. And since the former is taken literally, the latter also seems it should be understood literally. But no part of the earth is lower than hell, which is the place of the damned." This opinion holds that Christ descended into hell in body and soul, and not during the three days of death, but in the very resurrection in which Christ stood and showed himself alive to the

devils and damned in hell by his real presence. But I do not think any of our theologians today approve this opinion.

V. The opinion of the Zurich theologians is also unique. Their Catechism explains this article thus: "I believe that Christ after his bodily death not only went with his soul to the souls of the departed, but also that by his death he was salutary to all the holy Fathers who died from the beginning of the world; indeed that Christ by his death has broken eternal death and hell for all of us who believe in him, and has freed us from all the horror of Tartarus."

VI. Moreover, some understand Christ's descent into hell as nothing other than his burial, and consider this article to be merely a repetition of the preceding article in other words and another formula, just as in Sacred Scripture one and the same thing is often expressed by two formulas. This is because the Hebrew word which the Greeks translate as "Hades", and which corresponds to the word "inferorum" in the Latin Vulgate edition, is often taken to mean "grave" in Scripture. Rufinus seems to have held this opinion formerly, who, discussing this article, says, "The force of the word seems to be the same in that he is said to be buried." And indeed some of our theologians have followed Rufinus, but today there is scarcely any theologian who does not reject this opinion.

VII. However, another opinion which is very close to this one is widely held among our theologians. Since Sacred Scripture very often designates by "Hades" and "Infernum" in general the condition and state of the dead and those who have been removed from sight by death, and as it were cut off from the earth, hence it happens that according to the style of Sacred Scripture, to descend into hell simply means to undergo the condition of those whom death has taken from the company of the living, and to be pressed and held by the power of death. And according to this sense, many of our theologians want it to be said in the Creed that Christ our Lord descended into hell, because not only did he die and was buried, but he lay in the grave for three days, and there was held as if captive by death, so that for some time he seemed to have completely perished and to have been utterly cut off from the land of the living like all others whom death takes away forever from the sight of men living on earth. And so Christ's descent into hell signifies the last and lowest degree of humiliation by which Christ remained for a time under the power and dominion of death, with enemies insulting and triumphing as if over one completely oppressed and cut off.

VIII. Nevertheless, an opinion far different from this appealed to most of our theologians formerly, and is still held by many today. They believe that by Christ's descent into hell is signified those most grievous pains and anguishes which Christ endured in soul for our sake, and which the Evangelists mention when they record that Christ, before he was crucified, was in agony and also in great distress, and that his soul was sorrowful, completely sorrowful even unto death, so much so that due to anguish of mind and most grievous torment, a bloody sweat flowed from Christ, and on the cross he was forced to cry out due to the bitterness of pain, "My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?"

IX. So that this whole matter may be understood more distinctly, it should be known that our theologians teach by common consent that Christ's passion, by whose power and merit we have been redeemed, is not to be restricted to the bodily death alone which he endured

hanging on the cross, and to which he was condemned by the mouth of an earthly judge, with divine providence directing. For just as we were endowed with body and soul, and unless God's supreme goodness had come to our aid, we would have been punished one day in hell with the highest torments in both, so it was necessary that Christ our surety and sponsor, who had taken upon himself the guilt of our sins, should bear the punishments due to us, both in body and in soul, so that we might be freed from them.

On Whether Christ Merited for Himself

I. Both our theologians and those of the Roman Church unanimously teach that Christ merited grace and glory for us. However, the Scholastic Doctors also inquire whether Christ merited anything for himself. First of all, since they teach that Christ's soul from the moment of conception saw God and was blessed, and besides, received all the fullness of grace, so that there was no room for increase afterward, it follows that they also teach that these things were not acquired by his merits since he received them before any merit. This is also the common opinion of the Scholastics, with perhaps a few exceptions.

II. However, although according to their understanding, Christ never lacked supreme beatitude in his soul, as long as he lived on earth, by a singular dispensation, he had a soul subject to many sorrowful passions, and besides, a mortal and infirm body, and he struggled with the gravest pains, sufferings, and utmost ignominy up to and including a shameful death. Therefore, many things were lacking to him, both bodily and spiritual goods: namely, the impassibility of the soul, the immortality of the body, and other qualities of a glorified body, as well as the glory and exaltation of his name, and everything else he received through the resurrection, ascension into heaven, and sitting at the right hand of the Almighty Father. They believe that Christ merited all these things for himself and received them from the Father as a reward for his obedience, although these things could and should also flow from the personal union of the human nature with the divine nature.

III. This is the doctrine of the Roman School, with no known dissent. As for our theologians, Calvin in his Institutes (Book 2, Chapter 17) judges that it is curious and foolish to inquire whether Christ merited anything for himself and presumptuous to affirm it. He also attempts to prove with several arguments that Christ did not acquire anything for himself through his merits.

IV. However, Jerome Zanchius was of the opposite opinion, and in this question followed the doctrine of the Scholastics. When he included these words in Chapter 11, aphorism 15 of his published confession of faith: "We believe that Christ by his perfect obedience merited not only eternal life for himself but also for us," he was advised by some theologians following Calvin to remove those words, "not only for himself." But he refused to comply with their admonition. To defend his position, in the preface to later editions of his confession, he brought forth many testimonies from the Fathers, attempting to show that the doctrine of the ancient Church agreed entirely with his own in this matter.

V. Although some of our theologians lean more towards Zanchius' view and others towards Calvin's, they all agree that this question is not necessary, and that theologians may hold either view with the goodwill of their brothers, without disturbing the peace of the Church or creating discord among souls.