

Theological Theses
In which are explained
Various distinctions and acceptances of Grace, which are in use among
Doctors of the Roman School.

Thesis I

To understand and elucidate many questions that are debated with great fervor concerning grace and free will, it is highly beneficial to know the various distinctions and acceptances of grace that are commonly used in Christian schools. Therefore, it significantly contributes to our goal, which is to shed some light on those controversies that exercise and divide Christian schools if we briefly and clearly explain these acceptances and distinctions as much as possible.

II. To begin with the Roman School, their theologians, such as Bellarmine and William Estius, observe that the term "grace" is generally understood in two ways. First, it denotes God's love and benevolence through which He wishes and does good for people; secondly, it refers to any gratuitous benefit from God and all that is graciously granted to us by God. This twofold notion of grace is recognized to be customary both in divine scripture and among ecclesiastical and scholastic writers. They call the former eternal and uncreated grace, while the latter is referred to as temporal and created grace. The same applies to what others, with Estius, say: grace can be understood either from God's side or from our side.

III. Furthermore, since not only things that surpass nature are gratuitously granted to us by God, but also the very goods of nature, which we possess without any of our own merits, from God's gratuitous benevolence, grace taken in its broadest sense, as those same doctors observe, does not oppose nature but includes nature itself, which is sometimes designated by the name of grace because it is a gratuitous benefit from God, freely bestowed upon us by God. However, this acceptance of grace is indeed frequent in common usage, in which we are accustomed to ascribe the gifts and advantages of nature to divine grace, but in scriptures and schools, it is very rare and little used. For the most part, grace is restricted there to those benefits of God that exceed the order of nature and do not flow from nature or are necessary to establish and preserve it, but are superadded to it by God's gratuitous benevolence.

IV. In this sense, grace is opposed to nature. Because those gifts that are bestowed upon us by God beyond nature are uniquely gratuitous, since they not only fall outside the merit of the person but are also not owed to nature. Although God absolutely owes nothing to anyone and is obligated to nothing, nevertheless, hypothetically, if He wishes the creature to exist and operate, He must somehow provide those things without which it can neither exist nor operate.

V. Furthermore, the grace opposed to nature is diligently distinguished by some doctors of the Roman School into that which was bestowed upon man before the Fall and that which is conferred upon fallen man through the merit of Christ. They call the former grace the grace of Adam, and the latter the grace of Christ. The former is called the grace of health, while the latter

is called medicinal grace. The former was granted to an undeserving man, while the latter is also given to the unworthy.

VI. This distinction is frequently emphasized and insisted upon by Jansen, Bishop of Ypres, in his book titled "Augustinus," where he extensively gathers and explains the difference between these two types of grace from Augustine. He establishes that the grace given to man before the Fall was an assistance without which the first man could not will the good, but it did not make him actually will the good. However, the grace that Christ bestows upon fallen man causes man to actually will, and it is an aid not merely without which but by which the very willing of the good is produced in man.

VII. For he observes that the aids to the will are of two kinds. One aid is such that without it the will cannot will, yet the willing or not willing, using or not using the aid, is left to its free choice. The other aid is such that it determinately causes the will to will. And he contends that the grace of an upright man was an aid of the first kind, but the grace by which Christ heals corrupted man is an aid of the second kind. In this way, the difference between the grace of health and the medicinal grace lies in this: the aid of the former integrity assisted the will so that it operated together with it if it wanted to; now, however, the aid itself causes the will to will. This means that the aid before the Fall was such that the influence of the aid and the will in action depended on the free will's nod, so that the flexibility of freedom to choose either direction remained intact. But after the Fall, the aid is such that it makes the will assent and influence, and will.

VIII. In accordance with these principles, the entire work teaches that the main difference between the grace of the first Adam and the second Adam is that the former enabled one to do good if he wanted to; the latter additionally makes one want to. The former was subject to the will's nod and its own dominion; the latter subjects the will to its own nod and dominion. The former followed the will's lead with obedient submission; the latter draws the will as if with authoritative command. The former accompanied the preceding will in a conquerable and avoidable manner; the latter leads and drives the following will in an unconquerable and unavoidable manner.

IX. However, although Jansen has many followers in this part, those who particularly call themselves disciples of Augustine, his doctrine is nonetheless rejected by the majority of the Roman School, and it is openly opposed by both those who follow the Jesuit Molina's method and doctrine, and those who are called recent Thomists. For the former want the grace of Christ to be in the power of the will no less than the grace bestowed upon the first man before the Fall, so that by innate freedom, it can either use or not use it, and indeed often does not use it, and thus depends on free will, so that the grace of Christ is effective or not effective, and achieves its effect in man's conversion, or does not achieve it.

X. On the other hand, the recent Thomists believe that the grace that predetermines and effectively applies the will to the good was not alien to the state of innocence. And if Adam did any good before sin, as he certainly did, he did it by the power of some grace that physically predetermined his will, not only granting him the capacity for good but also effectively moving

him to good; without which effective divine pre-motion, according to their principles, the human will in no state can be inclined to good.

XI. Furthermore, the grace that is conferred upon fallen man through Christ is commonly distinguished in the Roman School into grace called freely given and grace that makes one acceptable. This division, according to the mind of the doctors of that school, is not to be understood as if there were any grace not freely given; for they acknowledge that the grace that makes one acceptable is also gratuitously given: but, as often happens elsewhere, they leave the name of the genus to one species that lacks its own proper name, as Bellarmine notes in the place cited above.

XII. Therefore, according to them, freely given grace is a supernatural gift bestowed without any debt, primarily for the spiritual salvation of others. But grace that makes one acceptable is a supernatural gift given without any debt, primarily for the spiritual salvation of each individual. Although it is common to both freely given grace and grace that makes one acceptable that they contribute to both one's own and others' salvation, yet the difference is that grace that makes one acceptable is given primarily for the personal salvation of the recipient; secondarily for the salvation of others: that is, so that we ourselves may first become holy and righteous, and then others may see our good works and glorify our Father in heaven. On the other hand, freely given grace primarily concerns the salvation of others. It consists of those gifts that directly and in themselves do not contribute to the salvation of the one who possesses them but greatly help in leading others to repentance and faith.

XIII. Therefore, freely given grace includes the word of knowledge, the word of wisdom, the gift of prophecy, the discernment of spirits, various kinds of tongues, the working of miracles, the grace of healings, and many other such gifts enumerated by the Apostle in the twelfth chapter of the first letter to the Corinthians, among which some gifts result in physical benefits, such as good health from the grace of healings; but since the primary and ultimate end of all freely given grace is the eternal salvation of the soul, therefore it is said in the above definition that all such grace is conferred for the spiritual salvation of others.

XIV. Under grace that makes one pleasing (*gratum facientem*) are comprehended all those things in which some part or the beginning of salvation and justice consists; and which make a person either pleasing and amiable to God or dispose them to reconciliation and friendship with God and are directed to this end. In this category are faith, hope, good will, indeed any beginning of faith and good will, repentance, forgiveness of sins, charity, justice, good works, virtues and their increases, perseverance, and finally eternal life, to which, as to consummated grace, those previous benefits of God are destined. And about which the Apostle says in Romans 6: Grace of God is eternal life. As can be seen in Estius in 2 Sentent. Dist. 26, paragraph 1.

XV. Furthermore, they call that grace *gratum facientem* because it places something in a person that pleases God and is approved by Him, and makes the person, to some extent at least and in some respect, pleasing and acceptable to God. However, it is not their intention to suggest that the grace which they place in a person and call *gratum facientem* precedes every act of divine love toward us and is properly the cause of the love by which God pursues a person. For

they teach that this grace is simultaneously the effect and object of divine love. It proceeds from that love by which God wishes well to a person, since it is the greatest good that God can confer on a person, and to that extent it is posterior to divine love. But at the same time, it is something most pleasing to God, and in respect to which a person cannot fail to be pleasing to God; and to that extent it precedes divine love and divine affection towards us in some way.

XVI. Moreover, the Roman School divides *gratum facientem* grace into actual grace and habitual grace, or, which comes to nearly the same thing, into permanent grace and special assistance grace, as Bellarmine prefers to speak in Book 1 of *Grace and Free Will*, Chapter 2. And indeed some distinction can be noted between actual grace and that grace of special assistance. For by the grace that is called special assistance, not our good actions themselves but rather a certain principle of them is signified: our good works, however, are a certain actual grace and are comprehended under it.

XVII. However, this division, although commonly accepted, has nevertheless been disapproved by some. For it has never been doubted among the theologians of the Roman Church that there is some actual grace of God in a person. But it is otherwise concerning habitual grace. For scholastic doctors acknowledge that in the Roman Church this matter was not so certain before and seems only to have been defined at the Council of Vienne under Clement V and in the Council of Trent in the last century: before then, it was somewhat doubtful and problematic whether there was any habitual grace.

XVIII. Indeed, Albertus Pighius, a doctor not undistinguished, a little before the time of the Council of Trent, dared to oppose the common opinion of the Roman School on this point. For, as reported by Bellarmine, these are his words in the fifth book on *Free Will*: We will seek various acceptance of grace not from the schools but from divine scriptures: Since in those they almost imagine some uncreated quality of our soul from God; either the same with the habit of charity or distinct from it. All of which I consider fictitious, nor does it have any authority from scriptures.

XIX. And although today no one after the Council of Trent follows Pighius; and his opinion is generally condemned as very rash: nevertheless, Roman School theologians still dispute among themselves whether it is of faith to grant habitual grace, and whether those councils intended to define that matter as of faith. After the Council of Trent, Dominic Soto, a distinguished doctor who was present at the council, denied it. Although others commonly think it is more probable that this doctrine is of faith.

XX. Now, under habitual grace, they comprehend all infused habits of virtues, and especially that grace in which they wish justice to consist formally before God by which we are justified: which they call justifying grace, and generally grace simply and without addition: and to which in common use, the name of *gratum facientis* grace is usually restricted.

XXI. For it must be known that among the writers of the Roman Church, *gratum facientem* grace is ordinarily taken in a much stricter sense than in the division just mentioned. According to which it is opposed to freely given grace and comprehends under itself every internal gift which per se helps and directs the salvation of the recipient. For by *gratum*

facientem grace they understand a habit and certain quality by which a person is properly and formally constituted just, and thus simply pleasing and amiable to God. About which grace many questions are debated among themselves, the principal of which is whether this grace is a habit distinct from charity or whether it is entirely the same with charity.

XXII. And indeed Thomas, the prince of the Roman School, and many others teach that justifying and gratum facientem grace is a quality really distinct from charity and all other habits of virtues. For they want the subject of grace to be the very substance of the soul, in which it has its immediate seat: whereas the subject of charity and other virtues is the powers of the soul, namely the mind and will. They consider that grace stands in relation to infused virtues as the soul does to its powers. And just as the soul gives natural being to the body, from it the powers flow, which are the instruments of the soul: so too grace, about which the question is now, gives the soul a certain supernatural being: from it, in a way, flow the habits of infused virtues, which are the proximate principles of supernatural operation.

XXIII. Some, on the contrary, like Durandus, wish there to be no difference at all between grace and charity: and they affirm that they are distinguished only by name, not in reality or reason. They consider charity and grace no more distinct than being dear and pleasing. For grace is called such because by it a person becomes pleasing to God: charity, however, because by it a person is made dear to God.

XXIV. But others in great number take a somewhat middle way. They say that grace and charity are neither entirely indistinct, nor really distinct, but only distinguished by reason. Namely, this is their opinion, that one and the same habit, inasmuch as it regards the subject and adorns the person in whom it resides, making them pleasing and amiable to God, is called grace: inasmuch as it regards the work and makes the will prompt to love God above all things, it is properly called charity. This is the opinion of Bellarmine in Book 1 of Grace and Free Will, Chapter 6.

XXV. As regards actual grace, or as Bellarmine calls it, the grace of special assistance, in order to understand what is meant by that name, it should be noted first that the aids by which God helps a person in acting are usually distinguished in schools into internal and external. External aids are occasions and opportunities for acting, examples, counsels, precepts, exhortations, and many things which it would take long to enumerate: internal aids consist in certain motions of the soul. External aids do not pertain to that grace about which the question is now, but it is restricted to internal aids.

XXVI. Again, the Roman School distinguishes that internal aid by which people need assistance in acting into general and special. They call general aid that by which God cooperates with all creatures and assists them in acting, whether they act well or even badly: whether the things they do are within the powers and manner of nature or somewhat surpass nature. For according to the common sense of the Roman School, what is positive in bad acts is good and can only be done with God's cooperation. Special aid, however, is that which is given by God only for good acts and those which exceed the powers of nature. And so the grace of special

assistance is defined by Bellarmine as the motion of God by which a person is helped to perform actions that in some way surpass their nature.

XXVII. He observes, moreover, that some operations can surpass the powers of nature in three ways. First, simply and absolutely. As if an operation by its very nature is of a higher order than natural things. Such are the acts of the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity, which are not acquired by repeated and frequent acts but are divinely infused into the soul. Secondly, not simply, but by reason of the state of sin; because a person weakened by sin cannot easily perform many things without such aid. Thirdly, by reason of mode, place, time, or any other circumstance: because it can happen that what neither by its nature nor by reason of the state surpasses the powers of nature, nevertheless surpasses them by reason of the circumstance. Thus, he says, a just person can easily fulfill some commandment of the Decalogue if no diabolical temptation intervenes. But if such a temptation intervenes, they cannot do it without special aid.

XXVIII. Therefore, according to the doctors of the Roman School, all good and salutary movements that God excites in our souls pertain to actual grace. These movements are both of God, because they proceed from Him, and ours too, because they are vital actions elicited by our faculties, with God moving them in a special way.

XXIX. Those good movements pertain either to the intellect, such as internal illuminations and pious thoughts inspired by God, and in a word, all illustrations and inspirations by which the mind is led to the knowledge of saving truth; or to the will, such as pious desires and salutary movements and affections, which immediately affect the will.

XXX. Furthermore, Gregorius de Valentia, for the sake of clearer doctrine, distinguishes the movements that are reduced to actual grace into two kinds. One, he says, consists of those movements by which God excites, calls, and invites our minds to turn to Him through acts of faith, hope, charity, repentance, and similar actions. The other consists of those movements or actions by which we respond to God's excitation, calling, and invitation, and open the door of our mind when we turn to Him. Tom. 2. Disput. 8. Question 3. Point 2.

XXXI. The movements of the first kind, according to him, are indeliberate and are elicited by our faculties only physically, not freely; while those of the latter kind are free and deliberated. The first kind includes pious thoughts and desires immediately inspired by God without our consent; the latter includes all acts of Christian virtues, which we elicit with the help of God's grace.

XXXII. Additionally, the grace of special assistance, or as it is otherwise called, actual grace, is usually divided into exciting grace and assisting grace; or, as Bellarmine speaks, into exciting aid and assisting aid. This distinction is not explained in the same way by theologians of the Roman School. Bellarmine, and all the Jesuits and many others with him, say that exciting grace, also called calling grace, pertains to divine illuminations and inspirations by which God knocks at our heart to wake us from the sleep of sin or negligence in good works. Assisting grace, or assisting aid, pertains to divine cooperation, direction, and protection, by which we are helped both to choose and to do what God has previously inspired. According to Revelation 3:

"Behold, I stand at the door and knock; if anyone hears my voice and opens the door, I will come into him," etc. These are the words of Bellarmine in Book 1 of Free Will, Chapter 2.

XXXIII. And the same interpretation is given by Gregorius de Valentia. For theologians, he says, call exciting or calling grace certain divine inspirations or movements divinely excited in the mind of a person, by which God allures and invites a person to Himself and moves them to pious and salutary actions, so that they may turn to acts of faith, hope, charity, and repentance. Assisting grace, however, they call the gifts and benefits of God by which He helps the person consenting to divine calling and excitation, both in that very act of consenting and converting, and in other pious actions by which one strives towards beatitude. Therefore, to this assisting grace primarily pertains the special cooperation of God with a person in conversion, that is, to believe, hope, love, repent, etc. Also, that God by particular care and providence guards, protects from evil, directs, and assists a person in various inspirations to overcome temptations and to keep the commandments. Tom. 2. Disput. 8. Question 3. Point 3.

XXXIV. Therefore, according to these doctors, exciting grace consists in a certain illumination of the mind and some pious thoughts, affections, and desires, immediately excited by God in the souls of people without waiting for their consent. To these, therefore, the mind and will of a person physically concur since they are vital acts flowing from those faculties, but not freely since they are indeliberate acts that precede the consultation of the mind and the choice of the will.

XXXV. Assisting grace, according to the same doctors, chiefly consists in a certain gift and assistance of a supernatural order by which the will is elevated and helped to elicit acts that surpass its natural powers. This assistance moves the will physically and effectively, but it does not concur in the supernatural work prior to the nature of free will, nor does it properly act as a total cause in respect of the supernatural act, but only as a partial cause.

XXXVI. Those who more distinctly enumerate what constitutes that exciting grace refer to it first as a certain internal hearing and preconception of the truths of faith that precedes assent. Secondly, as certain divine flashes by which our mind is suddenly struck so that we experience a new and unusual light in understanding and contemplating the greatness and dignity of divine things, or even the foulness of sins and the insignificance of human things, and other similar matters, which, when attentively considered, strongly move a person to fully turn to God.

XXXVII. In this category, they also place a certain inner delight in the will, usually following such illuminations. Furthermore, various movements are divinely excited in the appetite, such as love, fear, hope, sorrow, and confusion, and similar affections, by which the higher reason is sometimes drawn and inclined to follow virtue and avoid vices.

XXXVIII. Indeed, although that special assistance, divided into exciting and assisting, properly consists in the internal movements of the soul as mentioned, many, however, also refer to exciting grace some external matters: such as occasions and opportunities, which divine providence provides to a person, so that such movements are excited in them both in the intellect and in the appetite. Such are sickness, dangers, good companions, adversities, and various other events, as can be seen in Gregorius de Valentia in the place just cited. Similarly, Alvarés notes

that exciting grace comprehends excitation both external, which is through creatures and sensible signs; and internal, which is immediately from God when He inspires pious thoughts and proposes those things that can induce free will to the act of faith and charity and other supernatural operations. *De auxiliis divina gratia*, Book 8, Dispute 75.

XXXIX. However, other theologians of the Roman School explain and understand the distinction of grace into exciting and assisting in quite a different way. For it is clear from the aforementioned that, according to the former, exciting grace is that by which a person is excited and urged to good, even if they do not yet will it; assisting grace is that by which a person is helped to will and then do it. They refer to Revelation, "Behold, I stand at the door and knock; if anyone hears my voice and opens the door, I will come into him," etc. But these later theologians of whom we now speak consider that passage should not be explained of exciting grace. For they say that knocking and exciting are not the same. For many are knocked upon through the external ministry of preaching, exhortation, and reproof, and through internal illuminations and inspirations, who are not yet awakened from the sleep of sin or negligence but remain slumbering, and therefore cannot yet be said to have exciting grace. Just as it happens with those who are held in bodily sleep, that although they are knocked upon, they do not immediately wake up.

XL. Therefore, by exciting grace, they understand that by which a thought, desire, and will for good work is so infused into a sinful person or one ceasing from good work and as if oppressed by a certain slumber, that they can now truly be said to be awakened from the sleep of sin or negligence of good works. Assisting grace, however, they call that by which the one who is already awakened is helped to will more perfectly what they have begun to will and to accomplish what they have willed. For grace excites, they say, that we may will; it assists that we may do. The grace of exciting is to will; the grace of assisting is to do and accomplish. This interpretation is that of William Estius in Book 2 of *Sentences*, Distinction 26, Paragraph 11.

XLI. Jansen, Bishop of Ypres, explains this partition of grace into exciting and assisting in the same way in the fourth book, Chapter 16, of his work *On the Grace of Christ the Savior*. As, he says, that grace is properly called exciting, which excites the good movement of the will in the potential of the will, where there was nothing but bad, or which excites the dead and asleep potential of the will to God, so that, receiving the good movement of willing well, it begins to live and wake; so that grace is properly called assisting, which, having already excited and received the good movement of the will, helps the person now willing and striving to either accomplish what they have willed or to will more strongly what they have begun to will and overcome the carnal desire most persistently resisting the received will. To make this clearer, he teaches in the preceding sections that in this division, the excitation of grace is not so much any provocation or incitement to act as the first awakening, excitation, or emission of the slumbering, dead, and extinguished good will.

XLII. In the Roman Schools, there is also a well-known and famous division of grace into operating and cooperating. This is taken from the words of Augustine in the book *On Grace and Free Will*, Chapter 17. He, says, works that we may will, beginning; who cooperates with

those willing, perfecting. And shortly after, he says, He works that we may will without us. But when we will, and so will that we may do, He cooperates with us. Thus, according to a common and confused notion, operating grace is called that which works alone without us. Cooperating grace, however, is that which does not work without us but with which we cooperate.

XLIII. However, theologians of the Roman Church do not agree on what that grace is which works without us: and also on what that grace is which cooperates with us, and how, and to what extent, we cooperate with it. The older Scholastics, according to Bellarmine, call operative grace the very habit of grace, as it formally makes us just and pleasing to God. That indeed God does in us, without us. They want cooperating grace to be the same habit, as it is the principle of meritorious work. For when we do good works, it is not only grace that works in us, but we ourselves truly cooperate.

XLIV. However, most modern theologians of the Roman Church understand operative grace as that by which those movements of the soul are produced in us that are indeliberate and do not depend on the free consent of our will. Such are pious thoughts, and illuminations of the mind, and also certain pious desires, by which we are moved and solicited by God to faith and conversion.

XLV. And they note that this grace is rightly said to work in us, without us, not because our mind and will are merely passive in regard to those movements which it produces in us. For since they are vital movements, they must proceed efficiently from a vital power. But because through it God works in us without our moral, that is, free, concurrence; although not without our physical action. For they say that those actions are not usually attributed to us which are done without freedom, and which are called human actions, but only those to which we freely determine ourselves and which are properly called human actions.

XLVI. Consequently, by cooperating grace they understand that which produces in us the free consent of the will by which we obey the divine calling and subsequently the other acts of our will, by which we proceed in good and are more and more converted to God. They call it cooperating, not operative, because we freely concur with it; nor do those acts which are attributed to it proceed solely from grace, but also from our free will.

XLVII. Therefore, what Augustine says that grace works in us without us so that we will, they understand of the indeliberate act of the will and of a certain imperfect desire. But what he adds, When we will, He cooperates with us, they understand of the consummated act of the will and of perfect and deliberated choice. And thus the Jesuits and many theologians of the Roman Church, who side with them against the Dominicans and more recent Thomists, commonly explain operative and cooperating grace. As can be seen in Becanus's booklet on the Aids of Grace according to Catholics, which is among his works. And Peter of Saint Joseph in the *Idea of Speculative Theology*, Book 4, Chapter 6, Resolution 4.

XLVIII. Gabriel Vasquez teaches in a similar manner that operative grace is the holy thought that comes before consent, and in the same way the sudden movement of the will, arising from that pious thought without our freedom, by which we are deterred from evil and provoked to good: but that cooperating grace is in free consent, in which some merit is already found,

whether deserving of eternal life or obtaining some gift. For God works in us without us the holy thought and the first indeliberate movement of the will, which are the beginning of our good operation and salvation; but He works the consent itself, which we give to this calling, with us. In 1. Thom, Tom. 1, Dispute 88, Chapter 6, Number 20.

XLIX. However, Andreas Vega, among those doctors who were present at the Council of Trent and were not insignificant, refers to the same things as the aforementioned doctors to operative grace, namely, the holy thought and the first movement of the will, by which a person is suddenly moved to good. But he thinks that for another reason God is said to work these in us without us. Namely, because for the production of that movement and holy thought, God alone works physically, while a person is entirely passive. For in that, a person not only does not act freely but also does not elicit any physical action. What led that doctor to think so was that he, with those Scholastics who are called Nominalists, thought that in a person a certain intellection and volition could be produced by God alone, while the intellect and will are entirely passive, not acting in any way, even if a person is said to understand and will by that quality: because although those are grammatically expressed as actions of a person, in that case, they are not really actions and productions of the mind and will, but only qualities that formally make a person intelligent and willing. On this matter, see Vasquez in the cited Dispute, Chapter 3.

L. But there are others who think that by operative grace is meant that which causes in a person the first act of the deliberated will, such as conversion, whether from infidelity to faith or from other sins to repentance. But by cooperating grace they understand that which causes subsequent acts of the will: such as the will to pray, the will to do good works, and other similar acts. So that operative grace is nothing else but special effective assistance in respect to the first act of the will; and cooperating grace is special effective assistance also in respect to subsequent acts.

LI. This is the opinion of Bellarmine, who contends that it can rightly be said that God works in us without us the first deliberated will, by which we are converted to God, although it is elicited not only physically but also freely by our will. For, he says, if we consider the efficient cause of that act, it is not only God through special assistance; but also the will through free will; and in this way, God works it not without us. But if we consider the moral cause of the same act, that is, the cause by persuading, exhorting, and advising, it is only God. For the will does not persuade and exhort itself to will what it does not will; but God through His inspirations speaking within the soul persuades and convinces it to will. Therefore, according to him, operative grace is that which precedes our effort and industry, and works that we may will what we previously did not will, without us working that we may will; but not without us freely consenting when we will.

LII. The grace, however, that is required for the remaining acts of the will after the first, according to his opinion, is called cooperating, because after we begin to be converted to God, we ourselves not only produce the remaining acts by free will, with God's help, but we also incite and urge ourselves, with God cooperating, to those acts. Thus, he says, operative grace is that by which God makes us will to believe; because that happens in us without us seeking, much less

striving and exerting; and cooperating grace is that which makes us will to pray, fast, and give alms; because that does not happen without our effort and industry cooperating. Hence, he concludes that God does not work our will without us; but only works that we may will without us: because we cooperate with God by willing, that is, by freely producing the act of willing; but we do not cooperate by making ourselves will. Because we do not move and incite ourselves to will; but He alone by His internal inspiration moves and incites us.

LIII. The same is taught by Estius, who commonly says that operative grace is said to work in us without us because the first act of conversion, or the first good movement of the will, which is the effect of that grace, is from the will as an active and free principle; but nevertheless, God works it by His grace without any prior movement of our will by which we strive, aspire, or command ourselves to that first movement. For a good affection of the will is sometimes inspired in a person, even strongly resisting, as happened with Paul. His conversion, as far as it pertains to that change from evil to good made by operative grace, is the form and example of the conversion of all sinners. Because through God's grace, they are converted from being averse and made willing from unwilling. However, the remaining acts of the will, which follow that first one and by which we continue to adhere to God, are indeed also worked in us by God's grace; but our will, already converted to God, not only freely produces them but also commands them to itself by previous acts. And thus in a singular way, it cooperates with divine grace, which is therefore called cooperating in this respect. In 2. Sentences, Dist. 26, Sect. 11.

LIV. Jansen, Bishop of Ypres, explains operative and cooperative grace in a similar manner. He says that operative grace is that which, without any preceding study, prayer, or merit of the person, works the will, or willing, by which the will is made good from bad, and just from unjust. Cooperative grace, however, cooperates with a person already willing and striving, by increasing and strengthening that will so that it may accomplish and perfect what it has willed and attempted. In the same place, he teaches from Augustine that operative grace is that by which, when we did not will, it is made that we will; cooperative grace is that by which, when we already will in act, it is made that we will more strongly, so that by overcoming any obstacles, we may indeed accomplish. The former works that we may have a good will, or willing of good in some way; the latter works that the good will may be increased and strengthened. Hence, he concludes that cooperative grace is never said in respect of the first good will, when the potential of the will bursts into it, because that first good will, or good volition, is the effect of operative grace alone, but only in respect of the good will after a person has already begun to will, so that the will may persevere, be increased, and be enriched with good works as with fruits.

LV. Therefore, he carefully observes that operative grace alone produces the first good will in a person, not because a person does not simultaneously influence that will, that is, the movement and consent of the will, but because that movement is worked by grace, without us contributing anything to it by seeking, desiring, studying, meditating, and thus asserting no merit at all in respect of that will. For it is impossible that the first good will, to which one is converted from a bad will, can be achieved without grace. Conversely, cooperating grace is so called

because it works something in us not alone, but with us simultaneously cooperating; not only by a simultaneous influence, in which we also cooperate with operative grace, but previously to the effect of that grace, by willing, believing, desiring, seeking, knocking, striving, and thus also by meriting; so that the effect of that cooperating grace is the entire increase of that first good will, up to the pinnacle of human perfection. In *The Grace of Christ the Savior*, Book 4, Chapter 15.

LVI. The opinion of Didacus Alvares differs from all of these. He believes that for any pious operation, whether it be internal or external, whether it be the first act by which we are converted to God, or any other following it, operative grace and cooperative grace always concur. And indeed, he believes that operative grace is that by which God physically predetermines our will to consent to any good work; but cooperative grace is that by which God works any pious action with us. He believes both are necessary, that God predetermines our free will physically and effectively to any supernatural act, and that He concurs with the same free will, which being previously moved by God, moves itself to the good work. Operative grace is said to act in order to the first effect, in respect to which our will behaves only as moved; cooperative grace, however, in order to the second, in which the will moves itself being moved. For our will, in respect to the previous motion by which it is moved by God to supernatural acts, behaves passively, since such motion is not actively produced by our free will, but only by God, from whom comes that help of operative grace. And again, the will moved by God actively and freely produces supernatural operations, with God's grace concurring. Hence, God's grace works without us in the first respect; in the latter, we cooperate with it. In *De Auxiliis divina gratia*, Book 9, Dispute 81.

LVII. Here, however, Roman Church doctors ask how operative grace is distinguished from exciting grace, and cooperative grace from assisting grace. But from what has already been said, it can easily be gathered how to answer this question according to each person's preference. For those who, with Vasquez, Molina, and most Jesuits, understand exciting grace only as knocking and soliciting grace, and indeed often in vain; but assisting grace as that by which God concurs with special help with free will, when it consents to grace and obeys it. And in turn, they understand operative grace as that which produces pious thoughts and indeliberate movements in us, to which we indeed physically but not freely concur; and cooperating grace as that which produces in us free acts of the will, by which we respond to God's calling and invitation. These believe that operative grace is the same as exciting grace, and assisting grace is the same as cooperating grace. According to them, the same grace is called exciting, inasmuch as it solicits and excites us to good through holy thoughts and pious desires inspired in us; and operative, inasmuch as it works these in us without our free concurrence and consent. And similarly, the same grace is called assisting, inasmuch as it helps us when we consent to the inviting grace; and cooperating, inasmuch as it does not work without our freely giving our consent.

LVIII. In the same way, exciting grace is the same as operative grace, and assisting grace the same as cooperating grace, for all those who, with Jansen and Estius, understand exciting grace as that which truly awakens the sinner from the sleep of sin, and assisting grace as that by which a person is helped to perfect the good which they have already begun to will; and

operative grace as that which produces in us the first act of conversion, and cooperating grace as that which produces the subsequent acts, to which we not only cooperate with a certain free influence of the will but also with some previous study and effort on our part.

LIX. But those who, with Jansen and Estius, indeed want operative grace to be called that by which the first conversion is worked in us; and cooperating grace, that which moves us to the good works that follow: but contend with the Jesuits that exciting grace is that by which we are knocked upon so that we may wake up from the sleep of sins, even if by our fault we often remain asleep; but assisting grace is that which strengthens and helps us while we shake off that sleep. These, like Bellarmine, distinguish exciting grace from operative grace, and consequently assisting grace from cooperating grace: for exciting grace, according to them, extends more widely than operative grace. Therefore, they divide exciting grace into sufficient and effective; and again, effective into operative and cooperating, as can be seen in the same Bellarmine's book 1, often cited on Grace.

LX. Similarly, Alvares distinguishes exciting grace from operative grace: because to him, exciting grace is a grace that morally only attracts and allures the will to good. Operative grace, however, is grace that not only morally but also physically moves and predetermines the will to good. Hence, according to him, exciting grace is the same as sufficient grace. Operative and cooperating grace pertain to effective grace.

LXI. But among the theologians of the Roman School, the main controversy here is about the manner in which God's grace cooperates with our will. For the Jesuits and many other theologians of the Roman School deny that assisting or cooperating grace concurs naturally prior to the supernatural work with free will; and they do not admit that grace predetermines free will. Therefore, in their judgment, the liberty of the will would perish; since according to that hypothesis, divine grace would impose some necessity of acting, which could not consist with liberty. Thus, among others, thinks and reasons Peter of Saint Joseph, in the Idea of Speculative Theology, Book 4, Chapter 6, where his third Resolution begins: Assisting grace does not concur naturally prior to the supernatural work with free will.

LXII. On the other hand, others contend that assisting and cooperating grace, in the order of causality, precedes free will and acts before it; and although grace and free will simultaneously influence the pious operation in time, the influx of grace is somehow naturally prior and not simultaneous in the order of causality with the influx of free will. This is the opinion of Didacus Alvares in the Epitome of the Aids of Divine Grace, Book 3, Chapter 19, which has this lemma: That cooperating grace, as cooperating, is prevenient or pre-moving free will to consent, and not only influences the pious operation simultaneously with it. The same chapter begins with these words: From the above, it is clear that cooperating grace, as distinguished from exciting grace, is prevenient to the free cooperation of created will, not indeed by priority of time, but by that of reason and causality.

LXIII. They do not think, however, that this prejudices the liberty of the human will; for God's grace thus moves and determines free will to act that it does not remove the power to act

otherwise: so that, given the grace, it acts infallibly, but always remains able in a divided sense not to act or to act otherwise.

LXIV. Furthermore, those who follow Molina's Jesuit method and doctrine teach that assisting or cooperating grace does not properly act as the total cause of the supernatural act but only as a partial cause. And this because, according to their opinion, assisting grace does not produce the supernatural act except dependently on free will.

XV. They indeed admit that the entire supernatural act depends on grace; however, they add that it does not depend on it entirely, but only partially: because grace, namely, cannot produce it except dependently on the concurrence of the will. Therefore, grace can indeed be called the total cause of a good act in terms of the effect's totality, but not in terms of the totality of the cause, which is being discussed here: because the whole effect depends on grace, yet as on a cause that does not produce it without another concurrent cause, and acts together with it. Hence, they compare grace and free will to two horses pulling the same carriage together, neither acting before the other, nor moving the other to act, and which are partial causes of that pulling: although the entire pulling can be said to depend on each horse individually because each contributes something to the entire pulling.

LXVI. Therefore, in their view, assisting grace, considered in itself and precisely, does not move a person to act, but helps them in actual operation. Exciting grace, however, although it moves a person to act, does not impose a necessity of acting; but leaves it to the person to determine themselves to the pious work, since otherwise they can abstain from it if they wish and determine themselves otherwise. Hence, it should not be called the total, or adequate cause of good operation, as can be seen in the same Peter of St. Joseph in the previously cited place.

LXVII. On the other hand, Estius and the more recent Thomists teach that God's grace is the total cause of the good work in such a way that everything good in the work is entirely done by it, and the entire work is ascribed to divine grace as the total cause, not just as a partial cause.

LXVIII. But although they absolutely and properly assert that the entire good work is from God's grace, they nevertheless teach that the same good work is also entirely from free will. Because nothing prevents something from being entirely from two causes, one of which is subordinate to the other: just as the lower cause receives all its operating power and movement from the higher cause. And they teach that this is always the case with the first cause and the second cause; whatever the second cause may be, whether it acts freely or naturally, because it is necessary that whatever is done by the second cause is referred to the first cause. In these cases, no partition of works can be admitted: that something in any part of it is done by the second cause, which is not also entirely and in every part done by the first cause applying the second cause to all its operation.

LXIX. They say, therefore, that the entire good work is done by grace and free will together and in one indivisible operation: nor is there a distinction between what is from free will and what is from grace; because there is no distinction between what is from the first cause and what is from the second cause. But they teach this difference between the two agents, that free will, as it has its being from God, so it has this entire good operation from God's grace working

in it and through it: but not the other way around, either entirely or partially, that God, in what He works, depends on the free will of man. For God makes man do, but man does not make God do. The same reasoning applies in every work or action done by any second cause. Hence, according to these doctors, divine grace and free will do not cooperate as partial causes that depend on each other in acting, but as total and subordinate causes, of which the lower depends and is moved by the higher, not the other way around. As can be seen more extensively in the same Estius in 2 Sentent., Dist. 26, Paragraph 29.

LXX. Furthermore, some other divisions of grace coincide with the ones already mentioned, which differ little or not at all from them. As when grace is divided into prevenient grace and subsequent grace, and into leading and accompanying grace. For by leading and prevenient grace, theologians understand the same as what they call exciting and operative grace: and by accompanying or subsequent grace, what is otherwise called assisting or cooperating grace. For the grace that excites us to good and thus works in us without us is the same that also precedes us: but the grace that assists us in actual operation and cooperates with us is the same that accompanies our wills in doing good and follows the former grace. Some, however, seek certain subtle distinctions between these divisions of grace, but mentioning and recounting them does not contribute much to our purpose. What remains to be considered here is the famous division of grace into sufficient and efficacious grace: but because a thorough exposition of it is a matter of longer discussion, it seems best to defer it to the next dispute.

THEOLOGICAL THESES

In which are explained

Various distinctions and acceptances of Grace, which are customary in Reformed Schools.

Thesis I

According to the common sense of the Doctors of the Reformed School, Grace generally designates God's love and favor with which He pursues us undeserving, but sometimes also refers to certain of His gifts and created effects. Thus, Tilenus in his theses on the various names of the divine will in the first disputation, thesis 20, teaches that the grace of God is taken actively and passively. The former, he says, signifies the benign and propense will of God, liberally and freely bestowing everything, not from our merit or His obligation. The latter declares some gift freely given.

II. Similarly, Peter Martyr in his commonplaces says, The name grace in sacred scripture is taken in two ways. First and chiefly, it signifies God's goodwill and gratuitous favor towards men, with which He pursues the Elect. Secondly, because God endows His Elect with excellent gifts, grace sometimes also signifies those gifts which are freely given to us by God. Class 3, place 2, paragraph 7.

III. Likewise, Aretius in his commonplaces, place twenty-five, teaches that when the sacred writings speak of grace, they first mean by this term the gratuitous mercy of God which

manifests itself in the reconciliation and justification of man. Secondly, by grace they also mean the gifts of the Holy Spirit; these gifts, he acknowledges, can rightly be called infused grace. And the same is found in the distinction of Polanus. The grace of God, he says, as it is spoken of in two ways, is either inherent in God or given by God. In the *Syntagma of Christian Theology*, part 1, book 2, chapter 21.

IV. Although Reformed theologians acknowledge that by God's grace in sacred scripture, the gifts and effects of divine favor and love towards us are sometimes designated, they believe that grace in this sense is to be taken in only a few places. For they contend that all those passages where we are said to be elected, called, justified, and saved by God's grace, should not be explained as some gift inherent in us, but only as the gratuitous love and favor of God. As is especially seen in Polanus. Grace, he says, that makes us pleasing and acceptable to God, and thus saving grace by which we are elected in Christ to eternal salvation, effectively called, justified, regenerated, and by which we are finally saved, is not a quality infused in us, not something created and inherent in us, not the charity by which we love God, nor any other virtue in us. *Syntagma Theologica*, book 2, chapter 21, as cited.

V. Furthermore, when grace is taken for the gifts and effects of divine favor, Tilenus notes that in a general sense it encompasses nature itself, its qualities, and endowments. Yet, it is properly restricted to certain supernatural gifts bestowed upon men by God. These gifts, he further categorizes into two kinds. Some properly and directly pertain to the salvation of the recipient, as effects of that active grace by which God justifies us: such as faith, charity, and hope. Others, however, do not so much pertain to the peculiar salvation of those to whom they are given but to the common use and edification of the whole Church: such as the gift of prophecy, tongues, miracles, and similar things.

VI. This aligns with what Zanchius teaches in book four of *On the Nature of God*, chapter 2, question 1. That is, the gifts of God which are sometimes signified by the name grace either pertain to eternal life, such as faith, hope, and charity, and the virtues connected with them; or they do not pertain to eternal life, such as the gift of tongues, miracles, and others mentioned by Paul in 1 Corinthians 12. Similar views can be read in Polanus in the previously cited place.

VII. Nor does the distinction of Cameron differ much, in volume one of his lectures, digression on grace, where he says that some gifts of grace are such that they only fall to those who are saved: others, however, also fall to those who are not saved. Additionally, God's gifts are divided into those which benefit others only, not ourselves, such as all God's gifts bestowed on the impious: and those gifts which often benefit others, sometimes do not benefit them, but always benefit those to whom they are given, such as faith, hope, and charity.

VIII. These divisions of the gifts of grace received among the Reformed differ little or not at all from the solemn division of grace among the Scholastics into grace freely given and grace making one acceptable. As Tilenus acknowledges in the previously cited first disputation on the various names of the divine will, thesis 22. Nevertheless, most Reformed theologians criticize and censure this distinction of the Roman School. First of all, they dislike the fact that some gifts of God are specifically called grace freely given: because there is no grace that is not

freely given. The gifts of hope, faith, and charity are no less gratuitous than the gift of prophecy, healing, and the like.

IX. Secondly, they do not approve that anything created and inherent in us should be called grace making one acceptable and pleasing to God, as seen in Polanus, Aretius, and Peter Martyr in the places cited above. Not that they deny that God's gifts, which the Doctors of the Roman School designate by the term grace making one acceptable, are something pleasing to God, in which He delights, and which is acceptable to Him: But because these gifts do not first reconcile God's favor to men; since they are the effects of divine favor and love and proceed from God who favors us and loves us even before we receive them: according to John's saying, Not that we loved God, but that He first loved us.

X. This is evident from their words. For Peter Martyr in his commonplaces, Class three, place two, number eight, speaking of the Scholastics' infused grace, says, It is no small error that they want us to be made pleasing to God by this habit or creature. For it is necessary that when He has endowed us with such a gift, He has first loved us. For God's love precedes all His gifts. And in number thirteen, he says, No less are those who babble in the schools, saying that there is one grace freely given, another making one acceptable. For all grace must be freely given. Otherwise, as Paul says, it would not be grace. And since they understand by grace making one acceptable a habit, as we have taught above, they wrongly state that men are made acceptable to God by such gifts. For we are received into God's favor by His mercy alone, and because of Christ.

XI. Similarly, Cameron in the above-mentioned digression on grace says, It must be noted that God's gifts are never called grace in this sense, as if God's favor is reconciled by them, and those gifts make us acceptable and pleasing to God. But if God's gifts are sometimes called grace in this sense, it is considering the human perspective, by which men are led into love by those gifts, not God's perspective. To understand this, it must be understood that human love, which is reconciled by those gifts, does not make those gifts but finds them. Divine love finds and makes those gifts: just as a painter who delights in his work, rejoices in the beauty of his work, and is the author of that beauty. Therefore, it should not be called grace making one acceptable properly speaking, but rather it should be called the grace of the One making one acceptable.

XII. Hence it is clear that Reformed Doctors do not deny that faith, hope, charity, and similar gifts of the Holy Spirit are things pleasing to God, and by which a person in whom they are found is pleasing and acceptable to God: but only that these gifts do not precede God's favor and goodwill towards us, but are its effects and gifts.

XIII. Furthermore, Tilenus seems to criticize the Scholastics in this respect only for confusing those gifts which they call grace making one acceptable with justifying and saving grace, which according to the Reformed theologians is not something inherent in us, but only the active and external grace of God. Speaking of hope, faith, and charity, he says, This grace, called by the Scholastics grace making one acceptable, they perilously confuse with the same. Thesis 22 of the often-cited disputation on the various names of the divine will.

XIV. Some Doctors of the Reformed School also accept the distinction of grace into *gratis data* (freely given) and *gratum faciens* (making one acceptable), but in a different sense than that received among Scholastic Doctors. For Testardus, in the *Irenicon*, understands by *gratis data* grace that by which God invites a person to salvation, and by *gratum faciens*, he means that grace by which God effectively changes, converts, and sanctifies a person. Or *gratis data* grace to him is a kind of genus; *gratum faciens* grace is a species of that genus, through which faith is engendered, sins are forgiven, and holiness is infused. As seen in thesis three hundred, he says, "The distinction of grace into *gratis data* and *gratum faciens* can be accepted in this way, that *gratis data* is said to be that which only prevents, inviting on the part of God, such as general grace: *gratum faciens*, which is also freely given, but effectively changing a person, making them from abhorrent to pleasing and acceptable to God. Or that *gratis data* grace is the most general kind of grace and signifies all grace; *gratum faciens* grace is the species of *gratis data* grace, which engenders faith, forgives sins, sanctifies, and in one word, prepares the subject."

XV. Rivera, however, in his *summa* of controversies, treatise four, question two, understands by *gratis data* grace all the gifts of grace; by *gratum faciens* grace, which he also calls *gratis dantem* (freely giving), he wants to be understood as God's favor itself, from which those gifts proceed. In this sense, Paulus Ferrius in his *Specimen of Scholastic Orthodox*, chapter thirty, uses the same distinction. For by *gratum faciens* grace he signifies grace immanent to God, which does not place anything around the one receiving grace, but is the love of God itself: under *gratis data* grace, he includes all the benefits of vocation, justification, etc., flowing into us from *gratis dantem* grace, as from the most abundant source.

XVI. Furthermore, among most Reformed Doctors, there is no explicit distinction between actual and habitual grace. Indeed, some of the older Reformers seem to reject this. For Peter Martyr, in the above-cited place, explicitly refutes the Scholastic opinion that grace is a habit infused into the soul. But more recent Doctors of the Reformed School, and also most of the older ones, acknowledge that there is a certain habitual grace. For they speak of the theological virtues as habits divinely infused. And Robert Baronius Scotus, a professor of Theology at the University of Aberdeen, testifies to the unanimous consent of Modern Theologians, as he calls them, in this regard. William Ames also extensively defends this opinion on habitual grace against Grevinchovius in his response to Grevinchovius's reply, chapter ten.

XVII. Indeed, I believe that those older Reformers who seem to dissent actually do not. For when they contend against the Scholastics that grace is not a habit infused into the soul, they clearly speak of justifying grace. Therefore, their intention is not to deny that any habits of virtues are infused by God through the Holy Spirit into the souls of the faithful, or that such habits are not designated by the name of grace anywhere: but only that the grace by which we are said to be saved and justified in the scriptures does not consist in those holy habits in any way: but by that grace, God's mercy and goodwill alone are signified. The proof of this is that they sometimes deny that the grace by which we are saved, justified, and even regenerated is a habit and an infused quality, or anything created and inherent in us, as we reported about Polanus

above. And yet the same Polanus in the same chapter acknowledges that there is an inherent grace, which he says is both faith and the grace of conversion and regeneration, which they call the grace of Christ the Redeemer, and also Christian grace. Therefore, when he denies that regenerating grace is anything created and inherent in us, he speaks only of the efficient and impelling cause of our regeneration, not of the formal cause as the Scholastics call it.

XVIII. Whether besides the habits of virtues, there is some habitual grace immediately penetrating and affecting the very essence of the soul, as many Scholastics think, is a matter on which most Reformed School doctors do not explicitly discuss, but from which they do not seem far removed, acknowledging that new and supernatural habitual renovation of all faculties, which they recognize is bestowed upon man in regeneration. However, Paulus Ferrius, a pastor of the Church of Metz recently deceased in the Lord, explicitly admits such a grace. He believes that before the very act of conversion, God infuses a certain habitual grace into the very substance of the soul, which penetrates the whole soul like a certain spiritual light and insinuates itself from the substance of the soul into all its faculties: and thus prepares them to follow the guidance of effective grace and to obey it easily and willingly, as seen in the homily he publicly published on Hebrews 12:28. But I know that this opinion is not pleasing to many.

XIX. The distinction of grace into exciting and assisting is not as frequent in the Reformed School as in the Roman School. However, the learned Ferrius mentions it and seems to approve of it in the previously cited homily. The British theologians also use it in the Synod of Dort.

XX. However, the Doctors of the Reformed School do not disapprove of the Scholastic distinction of grace into operative and cooperative. But like the more recent Thomists, they want operative grace to be understood as that by which someone is first converted to God, and cooperative grace as that by which someone already converted to God is moved to act well. Thus, Aretius, in the above-cited place, says, "Grace is sometimes operative, sometimes cooperative. The former is said to heal and improve our will. The latter confirms the changed will and makes it act rightly."

XXI. Similarly, Peter Martyr in the often-cited place says that operative grace is that which initially heals and changes our will: cooperative grace is that which makes the changed and healed will act rightly. He adds that operative and cooperative grace is one grace, not two. He explains the reason for this varied denomination, that when the will is first healed, it concurs passively with grace: for, he says, it is said to be changed, and we are said to be regenerated. But later, it behaves actively and passively. For being impelled by God, it also wills and chooses.

XXII. Nevertheless, neither he nor other Reformed theologians deny that the first act of conversion is a vital act and an action elicited by that faculty which we call the will in us: indeed, they do not deny it is a free action, and one of those actions which are called human in the schools. They only mean this; when God converts a person, the first thing that grace works in us is something that wholly precedes the free movement of a person to good. Therefore, the Reformed in this part do not seem to differ from the sounder Scholastics, although they express their minds in different words.

XXIII. The Doctors of the Reformed School also admit the distinction of grace into prevenient and subsequent, but not all in the same sense. Aretius wants prevenient grace to be the same as operative grace; and subsequent grace to be the same as cooperative, which is also the opinion of many Scholastics. For, he says, prevenient grace is so called because it precedes the will, so that the beginning of conversion is not from us, but from God having mercy: subsequent, because new movements and good works follow conversion, all of which we cannot accomplish without grace.

XXIV. Martyr, however, wants grace to be called sometimes prevenient, sometimes subsequent, because there are many and diverse gifts with which the mercy of God adorns us in a certain order. So that all grace which is prior can be called prevenient in respect to what follows. For, he says, the will is first healed; once healed, it begins to will well: from willing well, it begins to execute: then it perseveres in doing well: finally, it is crowned. Grace prevents our will by healing it, the same follows by making those things that are right pleasing. It prevents so that we may will, it follows by impelling us to accomplish what we have willed. It prevents by moving us to good works, it follows by granting perseverance. It prevents by bestowing perseverance, it follows by crowning it.

XXV. But besides those solemn divisions of grace commonly used in the Roman School, many have been devised by Reformed Doctors. Thus, Tilenus distinguishes the grace of God into decreeing and executing. The former, he says, denotes the eternal purpose of God to elect us before the foundation of the world was laid: the latter encompasses the entire economy of this wonderful mystery, according to the variety of times and stages. From the names of the divine will, disputation 1, thesis 24.

XXVI. Moreover, many Reformed School theologians usually distinguish grace into universal and particular grace, but not all in the same sense. Polanus, in book 2, chapter 21 of his *Syntagma*, after initially distinguishing grace into that which resides in God and that which is given by God, says at the end, "The grace given to men by God is either universal, such as natural grace given to all and every human being, and supernatural grace before the fall; or particular, such as supernatural grace after the fall, which is given only to a part of the human race."

XXVII. For earlier, he distinguished grace into natural and supernatural. By natural grace, he means nature itself and all the gifts of both integral nature and those that remain in corrupted nature. By supernatural grace, he means whatever gifts are beyond nature given to humans by God. Therefore, he again distinguishes supernatural grace into supernatural grace before the fall of man, by which he designates the gifts beyond nature given to man in his integrity: and into supernatural grace after the fall of man, under which name he includes all gifts beyond nature given to sinful man.

XXVIII. Thus, by universal grace, he signifies the gifts both natural and supernatural given to the first parents before sin, because they pertained to the whole human race, which consisted of them alone and were to be propagated to all their posterity if they had persisted in obedience to God. Moreover, after the corruption of the human race, he also wishes the benefits

and gifts of nature which remain after sin and are common to all men to be designated by the name of universal grace. But after sin, he does not want any supernatural gift or benefit to be universal. And therefore, after the fall, he says all supernatural grace is particular. And for this reason, he distinguishes the grace he calls particular into that which is common to both the elect and the reprobate, given by God for the salvation of others, such as charismata which the Scholastics call *gratis datae* graces: and into that which is peculiar to the elect and destined for the salvation of those to whom it is given, such as faith, regeneration, repentance, charity, hope of eternal life, the gift of perseverance, which the Scholastics refer to as *gratum faciens* grace.

XXIX. However, Paulus Testardus, a few years ago the pastor of the Church of Blésois, in the synopsis of his doctrine on nature and grace, thesis 300, uses the distinction of grace into Particular and Universal in a very different sense. For he says, "Grace towards sinners is twofold, General and Particular. General is that which is given to the whole world, the offering and opportunity of salvation. Particular is that of the Elect only, the application of salvation. Its immediate foundation is free election: the means are effectual calling, justification, preservation, and glorification." And immediately he says that particular grace is either prevenient, such as Election and Calling: or mercifully rewarding, such as justification, preservation, and glorification.

XXX. Therefore, in his mind, universal or general grace is that benefit of God by which salvation is offered to all men, and made possible for each and every one of them, so that they can be saved if they are willing, and it depends only on themselves whether they obtain salvation or not. For he believes that God has prepared Christ the Redeemer for all, and that by His death the sins of all men were so expiated that nothing more on God's part hinders anyone who turns from sin and comes to God from being saved and delivered from perdition: since the vindictive justice of God for the sins of all men has been abundantly satisfied by Christ's death. Not only that, but God calls all men to participate in the salvation in Christ; some indeed by the explicit word of the Gospel, others by the voice of creation and various testimonies of divine goodness and patience, which shine forth in the works of nature and providence, inviting men to repentance, and consequently to salvation.

XXXI. By particular grace, however, he understands that by which God makes certain men truly partakers of salvation, not simply offering them the benefit of Christ, but effectively and actually applying it to them. He calls this particular grace, because it does not extend to all as the former does, but is peculiar to a few, namely the elect, as it consists in the election itself and the benefits flowing from it: such as internal and effectual calling, justification, the gift of perseverance, and glorification.

XXXII. In the same way, this division of grace into particular and universal is used and explained by the distinguished Moses Amyraut in those two treatises he entitled, *On Universal and Particular Grace*. He is also agreed with and supported by all those in France who follow Cameron's Method and doctrine, and by many in Germany and Poland who seek and pursue peace and concord with the Lutherans. However, most of the Reformed in Belgium, and many in

France and England, disapprove and oppose this distinction and do not admit any universal grace of Christ.

XXXIII. From what has been said, it is clear enough that these theologians by the name of universal grace do not understand any grace inherent in men, but only some external benefit of God, by which He gave His Son to death, so that divine justice would be satisfied for the sins of all men, and by which His justice being thus pacified, He externally calls men to the fellowship of salvation, which Christ has obtained for them by His death. And conversely, by particular grace, they chiefly designate the gifts and helps of God, by which He acts inwardly in men, working conversion and faith in them, and finally making them actually partakers of eternal salvation.

XXXIV. Hence arises another distinction of grace, namely into Objective and Subjective, which the distinguished Moses Amyraut sets forth at the beginning of his dissertation on Particular Grace. For he teaches there that two kinds of grace are necessary to engender faith in the minds of men. One which acts as an object, the mercy of God offering satisfaction in Christ extrinsically: the other which affects and illuminates the mind intrinsically, so that the object is received. The former he calls objective, because it is external and places nothing in man; but is only proposed to him as an object, which he must embrace by faith. The latter he calls subjective, because it changes the man inwardly and is received in him as in a subject. And he contends that the former objective grace is universal and pertains to all men absolutely: but he teaches that subjective grace is particular and specially destined for the elect.

XXXV. Furthermore, those who are called Remonstrants or Arminians in Belgium, philosophize about grace almost in the same way as those Doctors of the Roman School who are today called Molinists. For they use distinctions of grace into exciting and assisting, prevenient and subsequent, operative and cooperative in the same sense as those, as can be seen in the declaration of the Remonstrant's opinion on the third and fourth articles, which is contained in their Synod.

XXXVI. For there they say that by exciting grace they mean the gracious and unmerited operation of God and the Holy Spirit, which first imbues and enlightens the mind with the knowledge of saving things, and thus makes it assent to divine truth, and secondly acts on the will itself through the same illumination and the senses comprehended by the word.

XXXVII. However, they add that they do not deny that the Holy Spirit acts immediately on the will, by infusing into it supernatural power to believe, by which power the will is not necessitated and irresistibly determined. And they note that this grace is called exciting because it draws, entices, invites, and incites the will to free assent, and, with man not placing an obstacle, makes him actually willing. And the same grace is also called prevenient because it precedes our will: and finally operative because it is also the cause of the volition itself.

XXXVIII. They point out that the necessity of this grace arises from the fact that supernatural acts, such as those involved in human conversion, far exceed the innate and inherent power of the will, and therefore require supernatural powers and special grace preceding the very

act of the will to elicit it; whereas for other natural acts proportionate to the power of the will, there is no such need.

XXXIX. For them, assisting grace is that which aids the will and effectively concurs with it to produce the act; and this not merely morally, but also physically, or rather more than morally: because the term 'physically' seems very inconvenient to them in this matter, due to the supernatural nature of the acts in question: nor does any other proper term occur to them by which they can positively express this. And they observe that this grace is also called cooperating, because it operates with the will; and subsequent with respect to prevenient and exciting grace.

XL. As for the distinction of grace into actual and habitual, it is rejected by them as a scholastic fiction without foundation in Scripture. However, it is understood by habitual grace that such an infusion of faith, hope, and charity into the will occurs without any intervening act of the will, and they concede that by frequent acts of faith, hope, and charity arising from special divine grace, faith, charity, and habitual hope are ultimately produced in us: just as habits of justice and liberality are produced in us by repeated acts of justice and liberality. They believe that it is the opinion of those who wish that all these habits, which they consider too laborious to acquire by frequent acts, should be immediately infused by God without any proper human operation.

XLI. However, if by habitual grace they mean a certain supernatural power granted to the will so that it can believe and do good, they willingly admit it. Hence, it is evident that although they deny habitual grace, they still recognize a certain permanent quality and supernatural power infused by grace. This almost comes down to the same thing and differs little or not at all from the opinion of those who speak differently.

XLII. Moreover, from what we have so far expounded about the various divisions and conceptions of grace, both in the Roman and Reformed Schools, it is clear that the theologians of the Roman Church readily teach and concede that grace in sacred Scripture is not always taken to mean certain inherent gifts and aids from God, but that grace sometimes means the very favor of God, from which these gifts and aids proceed. Conversely, Reformed doctors do not deny that the name of grace in Scripture is often attributed to the gifts and effects of divine favor. Therefore, it is in vain that some Reformed criticize the Doctors of the Roman School, as if they never wanted grace to mean anything other than some supernatural gift infused in us. And conversely, the Roman School's Doctors unjustly attack and complain about the Reformed, as if they did not recognize any grace inherent in us.

XLIII. Furthermore, it is evident from what has been said regarding the distinction of grace into *gratis data* and *gratum faciens*, that it is only a contention about words. For what the Reformed contend that there is no grace that is not given freely, and that all grace is therefore called grace because it is given freely, is admitted by the Doctors of the Roman School, who point out that a certain species of grace is singularly called *gratis data*: not because another species of grace is not also given freely; but because it seemed convenient to the School to call that species by the name of the genus, as it lacks a proper name.

XLIV. The same Doctors do not call the other species of grace *gratum faciens* because it precedes every act of divine love towards us and is the cause by which God is first moved to favor us; which the Reformed rightly judge to be false and absurd: since God loves us first before we love Him.

XLV. Nor does the Reformed School deny that what the Roman School means by the name *gratum faciens* grace, namely faith, hope, and charity, is something by which man is in a particular way acceptable and pleasing to God, to which Paul refers in Hebrews, saying, "Without faith, it is impossible to please God." This is what the theologians of the Roman Church refer to when they call it *gratum faciens* grace.

XLVI. Thus, both sides will easily agree that there is a certain act of divine love that precedes those gifts and virtues, which the Scholastics designate by the name of *gratum faciens* grace: because, namely, God favors us before we have those things: and at the same time, there is a certain act of the same love which those gifts precede, namely, because without them we cannot please or be approved by God. Such gifts and virtues formally constitute a man adorned with them as acceptable and pleasing to God. As Peter said in Acts 10, "In truth, I perceive that God shows no partiality, but in every nation, whoever fears Him and works righteousness is accepted by Him."

XLVII. Furthermore, it is clear from what has been previously explained that the Doctors of the Reformed School admit certain divinely infused virtues and certain gifts of saving grace that are in the soul as habits and permanent qualities: and thus, it is unjustly imputed to them by Roman communion theologians that they deny any habitual grace or quality inherent in the soul; since this is denied by few, if any, Doctors of the Reformed Church.

XLVIII. The only question is whether in those places in Scripture where we are said to be saved and justified by the grace of God, grace signifies the external favor and benevolence of God: or rather some grace inherent in us, whether actual or habitual. The former is affirmed by the Reformed School, the latter by the Roman.

XLIX. Therefore, the simple question is not whether there is any saving grace inherent in us in the form of either acts or habits: but only this, whether those places in Scripture where our salvation and justification are attributed to the grace of God are to be understood as referring to such grace, which is affirmed by the Doctors of the Roman Church, and denied by the Reformed. How important this question is, has been discussed by us elsewhere at greater length.

THEOLOGICAL THESES

In which is expounded

The Doctrine of the Roman School concerning the division of Grace into sufficient and efficacious, and the harmony of human liberty with the efficacy of Grace.

Thesis I

Jansen, Bishop of Ypres, and those who follow his doctrine, call that grace sufficient alone, beyond which nothing else is necessary on God's part as a principle for a man to will and act. Efficacious grace, however, is only that which not only gives the created nature the ability to will but also operates the very will within it, bending and determining the will to will by itself. Accordingly, according to their principles, no grace is truly sufficient unless it is also efficacious, unless it gives the creature the ability to will in such a way that no further divine assistance is required for willing; and yet it is so subject to the creature's liberty that it remains within its free will to use or not use that grace. Conversely, only that grace is truly efficacious, not which in any manner is followed by an act of will, but which subjects the will of the creature to itself, and effectively moves it to will, producing the act of willing infallibly by its power.

II. They assert that the grace, which in the aforementioned sense is sufficient, was granted to angels and men in their creation. To both, according to their sense, God gave the necessary aids for doing good, but left it in their free will to use or not use those aids. In that first state of integral creation, efficacious grace had no place, as it was not necessary for either men or angels before the fall. Therefore, although the perseverance in good followed the grace accepted by the blessed angels, they should not be said to have had efficacious grace, but only sufficient grace. Conversely, neither the apostate angels nor the first humans lacked any necessary assistance from God's grace to persevere in good.

III. After man fell into sin, according to these doctors, it is impossible for him to turn to God or, having turned, to move towards any good work without some prior assistance of grace, which not only simply invites and solicits him to good or assists him in good work but bends and determines his will towards good and effectively produces a good act of will in it. This, they say, is demanded by the weakness of the will, which, due to the inordinate concupiscence inherent in man after sin, is continuously inclined towards earthly things and therefore needs actual and efficacious assistance from God to be elevated upwards at every impulse of heavenly love.

IV. Hence it follows that for all who are not actually converted and doing good, some divine assistance necessary and requisite for acting is lacking; and thus they should not be said to have sufficient grace to convert themselves and do good, since only that which comprises all necessary things should be called sufficient. Whoever has all necessary and prior aids for any good work is infallibly and certainly going to act well; and thus every grace that can be truly called sufficient is also efficacious: and hence it is futile to distinguish in the schools the salvific grace of Christ the Redeemer, which is necessary for fallen man, into efficacious and sufficient.

V. Therefore, according to their view, all true and specifically so-called grace of Christ, provided for healing the sick man and necessary for each impulse and movement of pious will, is per se efficacious grace and such that it is never rejected by any hard heart; for it always gives the will and removes the hardness of the heart, according to the measure of the divine gift. And although man can resist it if he wills, it always ensures that man does not will to resist it.

VI. Nevertheless, they do not mean that this particular grace of Christ always actually and really converts a man and produces true and serious repentance in him. This is because a man moved by this grace does not always will or act efficaciously and perfectly as he ought to will

and act; and it often happens that a sinner remains stuck in ineffective desires formed by grace and does not bring them to the effect of action due to his own weakness and fault; he even rejects these desires and, with concupiscence resisting and prevailing, does not repent of sin, does not perform repentance as he ought and as much as is necessary to rise from sin and obtain forgiveness from God.

VII. Nevertheless, they believe that even this grace of Christ is efficacious in such a man, achieving the effect for which it was precisely and proximally given, and which was intended by God, which is none other than the movement of a good and incipient desire. That this desire lacked the ultimate and perfect effect of the action to which it impelled and excited is solely the man's fault, not God's, and the cause is in man, not in God. But if God wished to bestow as much grace as is sufficient and necessary for this man to repent properly, rise from his sin, and attain justifying grace from God, the man would certainly repent, rise from sin, and attain God's justifying grace. But God shows mercy as He wills, as much as He wills, and to whom He wills. This is evident in the true and Catholic exposition of the five propositions on grace, which is included in the book titled, *Journal de Saint Amour*.

VIII. And Jansen also explains his view on this matter in the book *On the Grace of Christ the Savior*, Book 2, Chapter 27. After teaching extensively that no grace of Christ lacks effect and thus no grace is sufficient yet not efficacious, he addresses this concern at the beginning of that chapter in these words. Let no one be disturbed that it is known that many are enlightened by divine grace in their minds and even moved by divine grace in their wills, who yet dissent from its internal persuasion and inclination, so that they might think it false that grace always works its intended effect in the one to whom it is given. It should be considered that there are many effects of divine grace, just as there are many effects of the will. There is a perfect will, which Augustine calls power; and there is an imperfect will, which they commonly call will. This will itself has various degrees until it reaches the very first and most tenuous complacency in good. Thus the first effect of heavenly dew, which God pours out, achieves, as the least, a certain faint pleasure in the will, moderately adapted to the contemplation of the offered good, and swiftly and almost secretly leads it after itself. Therefore, although this grace is by no means sufficient for man to keep God's commandments, love God above all, hope, pray, and believe, yet it does accomplish something, as it excites certain free inclinations towards those heavenly things, which no human power can achieve without divine infusion. For not every grace suffices to produce every effect, as some imagine, but the power of operations must be tempered to the difficulty.

IX. From these considerations, it is clear that the proposition falsely attributed to Jansen, 'Interior grace in the state of fallen nature is never resisted,' is false. This is the second of the five infamous propositions, condemned as heretical by the Roman Pontiffs Innocent X and Alexander VII in their constitutions on the matter. For besides the fact that the words of this proposition are found nowhere in the works of that man, he explicitly teaches the contrary in the place just cited, where he distinctly affirms that many are enlightened by divine grace in their minds and even moved by divine grace in their wills, who yet dissent from its internal persuasion and inclination.

X. Furthermore, when these theologians teach that no good work can be done by man after the fall without such efficacious divine assistance that bends and determines the will to good, they understand this of proximate and complete power: nor do they mean anything else by this than that a man is not proximate and completely capable of doing any good work as long as efficacious grace, necessary due to the infirmity and illness of his will, is absent. For since this grace, being per se efficacious, simultaneously gives the will and proximate and complete power, whoever lacks this grace lacks the proximate will and power which it bestows.

XI. However, they freely acknowledge and admit that it is true that humans, even in the absence of efficacious grace of Christ, can in many ways be said to be able to keep God's commandments and do good works. This is extensively discussed by Jansen, Bishop of Ypres, in the book *On the Grace of Christ the Savior*, Book 3, Chapter 15. He observes that in matters pertaining to good life or piety, a man can be said to be able to do something in many ways. First, in the remotest sense, through the mere flexible faculty of free will towards good and evil. This power is established in the naked nature of free will as long as it has not yet hardened to do evil through the punishment of eternal damnation. Therefore, only demons and the damned should be said not to be able to believe, love, and do good in this sense; because they are not in a state to be inclined to good by God's grace. Conversely, all men while they live this mortal life on earth can rightly be said to be able to believe and love God because they are flexible to those things by God's grace.

XII. Secondly, according to the same doctor, we are said to be able to live well, resist all temptations, and avoid sins through faith, even though we lack the love of God, actual assistance from God, and internal strength of will. For although this faith itself can by no means do all things, since it is, however, the seed of prayer, through which we usually obtain love and assisting grace and the strength of will, therefore we are said to be able to do those things through faith.

XIII. Thirdly, according to the same Doctor's opinion, we are said to be much more fully and closely able to do what pertains to true piety through charity, by which a man is justified. This is because that charity or love is nothing else than good will or volition, which, as long as it is lacking, it is impossible to live well; but when it is present, we are said to be able. However, charity, through which the power to do good is given, has various degrees and increments; according to these, that power is either greater or smaller: and initially being weak and insufficient for all good works, it gradually grows until it reaches such maturity of strength that it can overcome all enticements, threats, and sufferings.

XIV. He also notes that what is said about the ability given through faith and charity must be understood mainly about those habitual gifts: because through these, the just are said to be able to pray, love, live well, and overcome temptations, even when they do none of those things. Since these are virtues that remain in the soul, they themselves make the soul robust for certain works, although, if they are still imperfect, they are not sufficient for higher-order works.

XV. However, he contends that we should not be said to be completely able to do good and perform duties of piety unless the will is so prepared by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit that

it not only can but also wills. Accordingly, according to his doctrine, this complete ability is never possessed unless it is also being acted upon, and it is the proper effect not of faith or charity, or habitual good will, but of that actual grace which Christ brought to humans through His cross. By this grace, not only the ability but also the actual doing is assisted: as it gives not only the ability if you will but also the will to do what you can. And therefore, no matter how much faith and charity, or habitual good will someone has, even if very robust, unless in a temptation, however slight, they are fortified by such an inspiration of the spirit or actual grace, they will undoubtedly succumb: because without it, the habitual will or charity after the fall of the first man cannot come into action. This is because the flame of innate concupiscence always presses the languishing soul downward; and always provokes it with visible objects offered from within and without, unless the movements arising from the gift of the Holy Spirit either prevent them from arising or suppress them when they have arisen.

XVI. From these, as from what has been previously stated, it is manifestly clear in what sense Jansen asserted this proposition. "Some of God's commandments are impossible for just men who are willing and trying, given the current powers they have, also lacking the grace by which they would be possible." This is the first of the five propositions, which the Roman Pontiffs condemned a few years ago, attributing them to Jansen, and indeed, as they say, in the sense in which Jansen asserted them; although they do not explain or determine that sense which they intend to condemn.

XVII. However, whatever they might think about that sense, it is certain from what has been expounded that Jansen meant by those words nothing other than that it sometimes happens, by God's hidden but just judgment, that some faithful and just people do not receive grace by itself efficacious for praying, overcoming temptation, and observing some commandment: and then, although they have some will to fulfill the commandment, but a small, weak, and imperfect one, insufficient for fully and properly observing that commandment, they are not, according to the present powers they have at that moment, proximally and completely able to pray as they should, overcome temptation, and observe the commandment as they should. And thus, this inability is nothing other than that which arises from the weakness of the will and the lack of efficacious assistance, which simultaneously gives the nearest and most complete ability and the will.

XVIII. Moreover, that Doctor, and those who agree with him, assert that this inability to do good, found in all those who are deprived of Christ's grace necessary for these or those good works, does not remove the obligation by which they are bound to do them, nor excuse them from fulfilling their duty in this part. To show this, they note that the inability to fulfill a command is twofold. One, they say, arises from the lack of something that cannot be supplied by any amount of will, that is, no matter how strongly one wills. Such is the inability of someone who lacks the means to give alms or the knowledge to teach someone perishing from lack of instruction, and similar countless other things. Concerning such inability, it is absolutely true that God does not command impossibilities. For the very reason that such impossibility arises, the commandment either ceases, or certainly the person to whom it is commanded is no longer

obligated to fulfill it. In such impossibilities, the will is considered as the act. For it is not the fault of the will that it is not done, but pure lack of ability.

XIX. The other inability arises from the lack of will or volition itself, which if it were present, as it should be, the command would be easily fulfilled. For it is only fulfilled by willing strongly; hence, if he wills strongly, it is already fulfilled, and it cannot be unfulfilled. Such a will, just as it brings full willingness, so it brings the power to do what it wills. This inability to act in no way excuses the one who does not fulfill what is commanded. For he could fulfill it if he willed. But if he is unwilling, and therefore unable, who would not blame him for the very perverse and obstinate will?

XX. To apply this to the present matter, they say that the inability to fulfill divine commandments found in sinners is such that they do not cease to be able to fulfill them if they will. For if they will, and fully will, as soon as they will, they will be fulfilled: but if they are unwilling, and therefore unable, who does not blame them for the hardness of their unjust will and the consequent lack of ability? For indeed, such a lack of ability is nothing other than the hardness of an evil will, which having been assumed, cannot be receded from; it is nothing other than a tenacious unwillingness. Thus, Jansen, the Bishop of Ypres, philosophizes about this matter in the book *On the Grace of Christ the Savior*, Book 3, Chapter 15.

XXI. He adds that the grace denied to them is justly denied by God, because by their own fault they have made themselves unworthy of it, whence it follows that their lack of it cannot excuse their inability to do good. It would be otherwise if God deprived a sinless creature of the necessary aids to do good: for then, there would be no fault in the creature, as it would follow God's institution and could not be said to have departed from it.

XXII. He does not think it more difficult to reconcile that inability which arises from the absence of grace with the freedom of human will. For that inability, according to him, is nothing other than the obstinacy of the will in evil and its inflexibility to good, originating from a free first choice. Thus, just as voluntary firmness does not take away God's freedom when it cannot recede from a once-assumed volition; so, the immobility of sinful humans or angels, by which they cannot receive a good will, in no way infringes upon their liberty. Nor is there any necessity here that contradicts liberty and absolves the guilt of a deviating will. For whatever necessity is found in it arises entirely from the hardness and obstinacy of willing, which neither takes away nor diminishes the guilt of the stubbornly willing, but rather increases and accumulates it because through it the will adheres more firmly to evil.

XXIII. However, towards the end of the previous century, and many years before Jansen wrote, the Doctors of Louvain also acknowledged no grace sufficient for the conversion of man except that which actually and effectively converts him. For they affirm that the assistance sometimes administered to those who neither believe nor convert to the Lord is not sufficient for faith and conversion, because the grace sufficient for conversion itself converts; that which does not convert is not sufficient. This is discussed in the justification of the censure against the Jesuits of Louvain, Chapter 16.

XXIV. But except for those who adhere to Jansen and call themselves disciples of Augustine, the entire Roman school today admits this division of the grace of Jesus Christ into sufficient and efficacious: and for it, both those who are called recent Thomists and those who follow Molina's method and principles contend. However, they do not all explain and understand it in the same sense.

XXV. For those who are called recent Thomists call that grace sufficient which gives the ability to act, even if a new assistance on God's part is required for the actual good operation to follow: but efficacious grace is that which not simply gives the ability to act but effectively moves man to do good, and thus gives the ability with effect. Accordingly, according to them, efficacious grace is really distinct in essence from sufficient grace; because, namely, efficacious grace adds to sufficient grace a certain divine assistance that is prior and necessary for good action.

XXVI. Although the grace they distinguish from efficacious grace does not include that final prerequisite for doing good, they nevertheless insist that it should rightly be called sufficient. Because, even though it does not suffice for someone to act, it does give the strength to do good, and this suffices for someone to be able to do good. Indeed, through such sufficient grace, they say not only the power to do good is simply given, but such a power that deserves to be called proximate and complete; although they admit that new divine assistance must necessarily precede the good action. Just as a healthy person whose eyes are well-constituted, even if they are in darkness, has, according to their sense, the proximate and complete power to see, although, for vision to occur, it is necessarily required that there be light to illuminate the present objects.

XXVII. They contend that grace sufficient in this manner for doing good is given to those who indeed fail in good works. For God gives them aids through which they can do good, and which provide them with the proximate and complete power to do good, that is, as the schools say, in the first act: even if they lack another assistance which is required for the actual good work and which, when given, infallibly moves them to such work, and is kindly also granted to all those who actually do good. Therefore, they are said to have grace for doing good, not only sufficient but also efficacious.

XXVIII. On the other hand, the grace given to others is rightly, according to them, called sufficient because, although it does not suffice to give the ability with effect, it truly suffices to give the ability simply. For no other assistance is necessary for those who have received it to be truly said to be able to do the works for which it is called sufficient: although new assistance is necessary for the action to follow. That new assistance does not add some new virtue to the power, which gives it the ability in the first act, as stated: but its function is to move and apply the power, which is already suitable for action, to the act.

XXIX. Indeed, as Alvarez notes, there is a twofold assistance sufficient for some operation. One is completely sufficient, namely, beyond which no other assistance is absolutely necessary for that operation to be produced in actuality. The other is not completely sufficient, but nevertheless truly sufficient, which, namely, gives the ability concerning that operation: so

that no other assistance is absolutely necessary for a man to be truly said to be able to produce that operation: just as to say a man is able to see, nothing else is required than that he has the visual power: although beyond the visual power, many other things are required for someone to actually see. And in this sense, he asserts that by the aids of grace, which he calls sufficient, a man is truly able to perform that act concerning which it is called sufficient: even if he will never perform it unless God, through efficacious assistance, brings it into actual operation. And thus, sufficient assistance to believe is that by which a man can believe: and sufficient assistance to persevere is that by which a man can persevere if he wills: although efficacious assistance is required for him to will. Epitome of the Aids of Divine Grace, Book 3, Chapter 17.

XXX. Indeed, according to these doctors' hypotheses, this division of divine grace into sufficient and efficacious should have a place even in an integral nature. For according to their doctrine, for any creature to act, it is not enough that it has the power to act given by the creator, but it is also necessary that the first cause applies and pre-moves it to act. Accordingly, for an integral creature to actually do good, it not only needed assistance giving it the power to do good; but also another assistance whereby God would effectively move and pre-determine its faculties to do good. Hence it follows that the apostate angels had indeed sufficient assistance to persevere, but lacked the efficacious assistance necessary to actually persevere: while the good angels were given assistance to persevere, not only sufficient but also efficacious by itself.

XXXI. Furthermore, they acknowledge that grace, which in one respect is only sufficient, is in another respect efficacious. Namely, the grace that is sufficient in relation to some perfect act, to which it disposes and ordains a person, is efficacious in respect to the imperfect acts through which a person is usually disposed to that perfect act. Indeed, according to their view, all sufficient grace, which is inefficacious for the full work for which it is said to be sufficient, is nevertheless fully and abundantly efficacious for the proximate and immediate act for which it is given and destined by God.

XXXII. Diego Alvarez explicitly teaches this among others in the third chapter of the previously cited book. He says, "Every sufficient assistance, in comparison to one act, is always efficacious in respect to another, to which it is destined by the absolute decree of the divine will. For example, sufficient assistance for an act of faith effectively produces pious thoughts and knowledge of things to be believed, or pious desires to have faith, and other such imperfect acts which regularly precede the assent of faith. Similarly, sufficient assistance for an act of contrition effectively produces in a person consideration of the punishments of hell, or attrition, or other such imperfect acts which regularly precede perfect contrition."

XXXIII. Moreover, since the grace called sufficient is so named relative to various works for which it disposes a person and in respect to which it gives them the ability, as various works are considered, that grace must be established in various ways. For the same grace does not make a person sufficient for all things. Thus, in a just man, sufficient grace for the works of true piety and those worthy of eternal life consists both in the habitual grace itself and the gifts of the Holy Spirit with which he is already endowed, and in the various illuminations and enlightenment by which he is invited and solicited to these and those works. In a faithful person not yet justified,

faith together with such movements of the Holy Spirit is sufficient assistance to pray and ask for and obtain from God justifying grace and the gift of the Holy Spirit. And in someone who is not yet faithful, sufficient grace for an act of faith includes, as Alvarez already said, the knowledge of things to be believed, pious thoughts, and pious desires to have faith, and such things.

XXXIV. But whatever it may be, that Doctor wants no grace to be sufficient for any good work and pious operation except that which not only illuminates the intellect within but also in some way moves and affects the will. He says, "Exciting grace, by which only the intellect is illuminated or moved, is not the same as sufficient grace, speaking simply; but only in a certain respect; because not only the intellect but also the will needs divine motion and prevenient grace to be able to exercise works of piety, since the will is more corrupted by sin than the intellect."

XXXV. He proves this from the fact that, "For salvation, it is necessary not only that the intellect knows what is to be done and what is to be avoided; but also that the will should will to embrace good and avoid evil, and love God above all things: but by exciting grace received only in the intellect, the will cannot will anything that leads to salvation, nor love God above all things: Because grace existing in the intellect is external to the will and consequently does not provide it with a sufficient principle by which it can exercise works of piety. Hence he concludes that grace received only in the intellect is not sufficient grace for salvation." Epitome of the Aids of Divine Grace, Book 3, Chapter 16.

XXXVI. However, the proper assistance of efficacious grace, those recent Thomists constitute in the gratuitous and benign operation of God, which properly operates the conversion itself or any other act of true piety in a person's free will. Namely, by effectively touching the movement of the will itself, that is, by applying and determining the will itself to will and choose. This operation is called physical, that is, properly said. Which operation is indeed recognized in God towards any other effects proceeding from Him. And since it cannot happen that God determines the will and the will is not determined and acts towards what it is applied to by God as a secondary cause; it follows that this grace cannot fail to have its effect. Hence, according to this view, divine grace is said to be efficacious by a physical and properly said efficacy, not a moral one. These are the words of Estius in the 2nd Book of Sentences, Distinction 28, Paragraph 2.

XXXVII. Therefore, they say that this grace is efficacious by itself, that is, such that by its own power it moves and determines the free will: and this, as they say, infallibly, irresistibly, unavoidably: because it cannot happen that the human will frustrates its effect and opposes so as not to produce that for which it is properly given by God; because this divine grace overcomes all human resistance, and its power lies in making a willing person out of an unwilling one.

XXXVIII. For this reason, they also say that the efficacy of this grace is absolute concerning good action and does not depend on the consent of free will: because to follow the good action, it does not wait for the consent of free will but powerfully causes it; as it subjects free will to itself and is by no means subject to its power.

XXXIX. Nevertheless, they do not think that the efficacy of this grace in any way removes or diminishes human free will; and thus, human actions that depend on this grace as

their cause are no less free. This is because God, through His grace, not only makes us perform good works and conform to His will, but also makes us perform them in a manner suitable to human nature, and thus freely. Indeed, that efficacious divine grace moves us so that, based on the practical judgment of the intellect, we freely choose the good and, moreover, could choose the opposite based on the different judgment of the same intellect, which is sufficient for the full notion of freedom. For although grace certainly and infallibly ensures that we direct our will towards this or that good based on the prior judgment of the practical mind, it does not prevent the intellect from retaining the power to judge otherwise, and the will from having the power to choose otherwise, in which the essence of freedom lies. Simply put, one is entirely free who, while acting, retains the power not to act or to act differently.

XL. Even though grace effectively works so that free will consents to the moving grace and follows its guidance, it does not take away the power to dissent. The efficacious aid of Christ indeed ensures that the human will always and certainly embraces the good it is moved toward; but it does not prevent the will from having the power to not do that good, and even to do the opposite evil. According to these doctors, the actual created will's dissent cannot coexist with the actual motion of efficacious grace; but the power to dissent can coexist perfectly with the same motion. This is what Alvarez means when he says that free will, moved by God with efficacious assistance, cannot dissent from it in a composed sense but can in a divided sense.

XLI. Moreover, Jansen and his followers teach the same as the recent Thomists regarding the manner in which the medicinal and efficacious grace of Christ operates in human wills and moves them to act. Like the Thomists, they assert that the efficacy of this grace is absolute and does not depend on the consent of free will, nor does it wait for it to achieve its effect. They claim it is the conqueror of the human heart and such that no one can resist it. It inseparably carries with it the effect for which it is given by God: and is never rejected by any heart, no matter how hardened, because it is given precisely to remove the hardness of the heart. It does not leave the will in equilibrium but most powerfully takes it with it: and thus it inseparably and irresistibly dominates the human will. Similar things can be read in the aforementioned Jansen's eight books on the grace of Christ the Savior, especially in the third book.

XLII. Indeed, the same author asserts, along with the Thomists, that this help of Christ truly involves the function of physically pre-determining the will. For it is such that it leads the will to act, not if it wills, but by most effectively making it will. For it does not wait for the will to cooperate with it but makes the will cooperate, applying it to willing and doing whatever God has determined it to will and do through it. For as earthly desires determine the will not to will, or even to resist, it removes this depression and determination towards the contrary and reflects it towards good, not only as it seems to free will and wants but by making it seem so and want by its ineffable light and sweetness. Thus, according to him, God makes those who are unwilling and resistant to be willing and consenting; by inclining, applying, determining, and, since it precedes the very determination of the will, also pre-determining the will; not only morally but by true, real, and physical determination. For moral pre-determination is called that which only relates to the object and in the manner of enticing, flattering, asking, advising, etc., whether

externally or internally; but this operates in the very power of the will, which it applies to willing by the greatness of its own sweetness, and by applying it, determines it, as it causes in it the very act of determining itself, and therefore pre-determines.

XLIII. Likewise, with the Thomists, this bishop and those who adhere to his doctrine teach that the efficacy of Christ's grace, as described, can be reconciled with human free will in this state. Namely, because that grace of Christ, which determines the will to act, does not take away from it the power to act otherwise, even if it infallibly makes it act. That agent should be considered free which acts in such a way that it retains the power not to act or to act otherwise. Nor is it necessary for freedom that, with all the requirements for action being present, the will should be simultaneously able not to act; but only that it can refrain from acting. Therefore, according to their hypotheses, given the motion of divine grace, the mind must indeed follow it in a composite sense, and the will cannot resist the moving God or dissent from what God wants to accomplish through it; thus the power of divine grace in this respect is rightly called unavoidable and irresistible: but in a divided sense, it is true that the will, even when moved by grace, can resist God, dissent from grace, and turn elsewhere than where God leads it: because while it consents to grace, it does not lose the power to dissent, and while it follows God's guidance, it retains the power to resist and follow where concupiscence draws. This can be seen in Jansen's work on the grace of Christ the Savior, book 8, chapter 4. "Therefore," he says, "in a composite sense, such phrases are true, by which the will, moved by divine grace, is said to be unable to resist God, unable to dissent from what God wants to work through it, unable to decline, unable to overcome: yet, on the contrary, in a divided sense, it is true to say that it can decline, can dissent, can overcome."

XLIV. He repeats and emphasizes similar things in the twentieth chapter of the same book. "We say," he says, "that free will, however much it is prevented and determined by the efficacious delight of grace to do good, can still not only refrain from doing good but also do evil. This is true not in a composite sense as it is commonly said, but in a divided sense. Namely, because at the same time, the free will, placed under the delight of grace effectively moving it, or even doing the good deed itself, has within itself the power not to do it, and even to sin; not that the cessation of the act which it then elicits, or the actual sin, can coexist with the influx of the delightful grace, which the composite sense would require) but because the power to cease and sin can simultaneously coexist with the same grace in the same will. For although two opposite acts cannot coexist, and in the same will at the same time, the powers for opposites are not opposed to each other, nor to the opposite acts, and coexist in the same subject, whether acting or at rest. Thus, the will, however much it is captivated by the sweetness of grace, can refrain from doing what it is drawn to, because it retains the true power of not doing, even while being drawn by grace." He summarizes this in fewer words in the following chapter: "For," he says, "the power of dissenting does not conflict with the actual motion and consent of grace; although it cannot happen that actual dissent is joined with the actual motion of God."

XLV. Although Jansen and those who share his view acknowledge that divine grace's efficacy is reconciled with indifference, or the power to choose between good and evil, to act or

not to act, which they do not deny exists in all those living in this mortal body, and in which many seem to place the very essence of liberty: nevertheless, they contend that this does not provide the true and genuine harmony of divine grace with free will. Because Augustine and his first disciples establish this harmony differently. Specifically, they say that grace does not destroy free will because it makes free will not idle like a stone and do nothing, nor be forced unwillingly to do good, but also to will and act itself. They defined free as what is within our power, and this was said to be within our power when we will, or what someone does if they will, and does not do if they do not will. Given these points, it follows that every rational will or volition is free: because just as it is impossible for something to not happen when we will, and to happen when we do not will, so consequently it is impossible for it not to be in our power, and thus not free. Therefore, since grace only provides that we elicit a good volition from the right judgment of reason, it thereby makes us act freely and does not destroy but rather establishes our freedom. Jansen considers this the best and most genuine way of reconciling human liberty with the infallible efficacy of divine grace in his book on the Grace of Christ the Savior, book 8, chapter 19. This is because, according to him, the essence of liberty in general does not consist in indifference, whereby someone can will or not will, this or the contrary: but rather in being moved to will and act not by any external force or brute necessity but by one's own judgment of reason, and to that extent being the master of one's own act.

XLVI. However, although Jansen and the recent Thomists agree that the grace of Christ, by which men are converted and do good, is an intrinsically efficacious grace that subdues free will to itself and does not depend on free will; and that to produce its effect, it does not await the human will's consent but infallibly and powerfully brings about that consent; they nonetheless disagree among themselves about the nature and substance of this grace and do not explain in the same way what it consists of and where it is situated. While the mode of operation of this grace is the same for both, its essence is different.

XLVII. It is indeed agreed among both parties that this grace, without which no one turns to God and does good, and by which all who receive it are certainly and infallibly converted and do good, is some kind of aid that moves and directly affects the will itself, and not merely the intellect; nor should it be constituted in any permanent habit. But what this grace actually is, is not entirely agreed upon among them, not even among the Thomists themselves.

XLVIII. For although all these Thomists denote this efficacious aid by the term physical predetermination and say it is a gratuitous and prior motion of God that moves and applies the created will to do good; there are some who say that this divine pre-motion, by which human wills are moved to do good, acts in the manner of a non-permanent, transient quality, accompanying the operation of the will itself. Others say that the actual motion by which God moves and applies the will to act is actually the will's own operation, as it proceeds from God, who effectively applies and pre-moves the will to act. Finally, others maintain that this prior motion is neither a quality received in the will nor identical with the will's operation itself but is something that has an incomplete existence, in the manner in which colors are in the air and the power of art is in the artist's tool, which can be properly and fittingly called a virtuous motion.

This last opinion is defended as true and his own by Didacus Alvarez in his book *De Auxiliis Divinae Gratiae*, disputation 19.

XLIX. From this, Alvarez infers that this divine aid, which precedes and is necessary for the action of the created will, is produced in it effectively by God alone and in no way depends efficiently on the influence of the will itself; and thus the will, in relation to this prior aid of God, is passive: although the same will is active and free in relation to the free act to which it is moved by that prior aid. This is explained in the cited disputation, number six.

L. Furthermore, these doctors acknowledge that this divine motion, which precedes and is necessary for every good work, is not within the power of man; because it is given and withheld according to divine good pleasure. Nevertheless, they affirm that it is within the power of our will to prevent itself from receiving this motion. Hence, they conclude that if someone fails to perform the commanded act, it will be imputed to them as a fault because their own fault prevented them from receiving the efficacious aid necessary to actually perform the virtuous act commanded. Just as if God were to impose a command to fly on a person and, as far as lies in Him, offered wings and the necessary aid to fly, but the person by their own free will responded, "Lord, I neither wish to receive wings nor to fly": they would rightly be considered guilty and a transgressor of the command, even if they could not fly without wings, because it was their own fault that prevented the wings from being given to them by God. These are the words of Alvarez in the same book, disputation 18, number 20, where he confirms his doctrine with the saying of Augustine: "That men are not aided by the grace of God is due to themselves, not to God."

LI. Moreover, the necessity of this aid, which effectively moves and pre-determines the will for every pious operation, is not simply derived from the corruption and weakness of the human will; but generally from the dependence of every secondary cause on the First Cause, without whose impulse and prior motion no cause can act at all, according to their hypotheses. Additionally, from the indifference of free will, which is not apt to act unless determined by a higher agent.

LII. Although they constitute this efficacious aid in a certain motion that physically pre-determines the will, they nonetheless acknowledge that it presupposes a moral motion, which occurs through the proposition of a suitable object, by which that object appears desirable and fitting to the will. For they maintain that the will can desire nothing unless it is first proposed to it by the intellect as fitting. Therefore, no one can be physically determined to pursue good by the aid of grace unless their mind is illuminated with the knowledge of that good, and their will is invited and morally inclined by the internal persuasions and suggestions of the Holy Spirit. Yet, according to their doctrine, this never results in the consent of the will unless that other aid is added, which effectively and physically moves the will to that consent.

LIII. Jansen, however, maintains that the grace of Christ, which effectively and certainly determines a person who is already enlightened with the knowledge of good and in various ways urged, attracted, and solicited to embrace good, to actually pursue it, is nothing other than a certain heavenly and ineffable sweetness, or spiritual delight, by which the will is anticipated and bent to will and do whatever God has determined it to will and do. He asserts that there is no

kind of good action or will, nor any effect of efficacious grace, that should not be attributed to this heavenly delight as the true grace of Christ and the true cause. It is by this that we begin to desire the good that is preached to us; by this that we accept and embrace the good thought with pious will. Without this divinely infused delight, no prayer pleasing to God can be made, nor can God be purely and chastely loved, nor can the temptations of our desires be resisted, nor any good work be done. This is extensively argued by Jansen with references to Augustine. (*De Gratia Christi Salvatoris*, book 4, chapter 1 and following).

LIV. To explain what this heavenly sweetness and delight is, which he considers to be the true grace of Christ according to his and Augustine's views, Jansen distinguishes three acts concerning good in the appetite and will. The first is simple love, or complacency, which is like a certain adaptation of the appetite to the good as fitting to itself. The second is a consequent motion, called desire, by which the appetite tends towards the good as fitting and suitable to itself. The third is rest in the good that someone has already attained. This act is properly called joy and delight, through which the soul rests with a certain satisfaction and enjoyment in the present good.

LV. Although delight properly consists in that third act, he nevertheless observes that there is a certain delight in the previous acts of simple love and desire; for since every love tends towards delight as its rest and center through desire, it cannot happen that the very motion itself does not participate in that sweetness. For as soon as the motion begins, it participates in rest to some extent, as even the first moment of motion has its partial end.

LVI. This holds much more in the love and desire of spiritual things, such as wisdom, truth, holiness, justice, and charity. For whoever loves earthly things does not, by the very fact of loving them, also possess them, nor does he rest in them as if attained, nor delight in them as if enjoying them. But whoever loves justice, truth, wisdom, charity, by that very act of love attains, has, and possesses those goods; and thus also enjoys them with delight and delights in them with enjoyment. Therefore, whoever loves God, who is eternal wisdom, truth, charity, and justice itself, enjoys and delights in God by the very act of love, as having his object. Hence, even the acts of love and desire, especially when they concern God as divine things, are rightly attributed the name of delight and sweetness, as Augustine often does.

LVII. Furthermore, it should be noted that the acts of love and desire that affect the will can be either deliberate and free, which are elicited after prior deliberation from a certain judgment of reason; or non-deliberate and thus not free, which arise suddenly in the will at the proposition of some object, before the mind can consult and deliberate.

LVIII. Having noted these things, Jansen observes that the heavenly delight, in which he places the efficacious aid of Christ necessary for every pious operation and good act of will, is not that properly called delight, through which the will rests in the present good and enjoys it, which is the terminus of desire by which the will tends towards the good; nor is it any free and deliberate motion of the will: but rather a certain indeliberate act divinely infused into the will, by which either the proposed good simply pleases the will or even moves it to desire the good.

This divinely infused act, although the will does not freely elicit it, nevertheless proceeds actively from it and is a certain vital motion of it.

LIX. According to the principles of that doctor, it is clear that this delight does not consist in any love or free desire. Since to desire and love God, and any true and spiritual good, by a free movement of the will is necessary: because such acts of desire and love are good acts, which cannot proceed from the will without the grace of delight. Jansen treats this at length in the fourth book of "The Grace of Christ the Savior," chapter eleven, titled "That Heavenly Delight, according to Augustine's view, is a vital and indeliberate act of the soul: indeed preceding the consent of love and desire, and that delight which is called the rest of the soul and joy."

LX. This divine infused delight, according to the author's view, is necessary for any good act of the will because, according to Augustine's explicit statement, the will cannot be moved in any way unless something occurs that delights and invites the mind. For the will embraces nothing unless it is first affected by some sense of delight towards it. This applies not only to good things but also to evil things. For the will is not inclined to evil unless it is prepared and driven by a preceding delight, which flatters it under the false appearance of good.

LXI. Since it often happens that a man's mind is affected simultaneously by some sense of delight about opposites; and especially in believers, as long as they carry this mortal body, there is a struggle of two delights, one earthly, the other heavenly, one harmful, the other beneficial, whichever one prevails, draws the mind prone and consenting to itself. And it can never happen otherwise, than that the greater delight will carry the will into that which delights more. And wherever the mind, situated between justice and sin, is drawn in different directions, it must necessarily act according to what delights it more.

LXII. Jansen illustrates his view with these words of Augustine, taken from his commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians, where Augustine, discussing the fruits of the Spirit, which are joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, faith, gentleness, self-control, says: "These spiritual fruits reign in a person in whom sins do not reign. These goods reign if they so delight that they hold the mind in temptations so that it does not rush into the consent of sin. For whatever delights us more, we must necessarily act according to it. For example, a beautiful woman's form appears and moves towards the delight of fornication: but if the inner beauty and sincere form of chastity delight more, through the grace which is in the faith of Christ, we live according to this, we act according to this; so that sin not reigning in us, to obey its desires, but justice reigning through charity, we do with great delight whatever we know pleases God. And what I said about chastity and fornication, I want to be understood about other things."

LXIII. Therefore, he does not place the effective aid of divine grace in any delight about good but in such delight which, in the person to whom it is given, is greater than and surpasses any opposed delight; and which, therefore, he calls with Augustine, "Victorious Delight." For if the delight of the flesh is greater, then the delight infused by the Spirit will never obtain the consent of the will. For the lesser delight cannot overcome the greater: but the mind follows that which, by affecting it more with sweetness, holds it. "On the Grace of Christ the Savior," book 4, chapter 6.

LXIV. Although that victorious delight, in which the medicinal and effective grace of Christ consists, infallibly drives the will towards good and certainly makes it consent to the good which is thus pleasant: nevertheless, what is victorious in one person, because a lesser delight of the flesh opposes it, and therefore induces the will to consent, will be conquered in another by a greater and stronger delight of the flesh, and the will will not be moved by it but will be taken captive by a more powerful and stronger earthly delight.

LXV. Furthermore, he derives the necessity of this victorious delight, which must be infused from heaven to overcome temptations and accomplish works of justice, from the weakness of the will, which makes it incapable of embracing any good unless it delights. Because the will by itself, and by its mere freedom to will, cannot overcome internal obstacles of pleasure or pain. Nor is man sufficient by himself, as the Pelagians thought, to give laws to his inherent motions. Since earthly delights, arising from the innate concupiscence in man, so depress the will and call it away from true good, that it cannot lift itself up and burst forth into actions worthy of heaven, unless God sends down a certain heavenly delight and sweetness, greater and more powerful than those earthly ones, by which it is freed from the snare of carnal desires and brought into freedom from that captivity. Without which the will cannot so strongly and intensely desire the good as to overcome the opposing temptation. Nor is it in its power to delight freely in heavenly things, according to Augustine's saying to Simplicianus: "Who has the power to so bind his mind with such a vision that his will is moved to faith? But who embraces something with his mind that does not delight him? Or who has the power that either something that can delight him occurs or that it delights him when it occurs? Therefore, when we are delighted by things by which we progress to God, this is inspired and given by the grace of God, not by our own will and industry, nor is it obtained by merits of work."

LXVI. From these and many other similar points, Jansen derives this conclusion: "Thus, this weakness of the will, which arises from the delights of earthly things depressing the will downwards to love created and carnal things, is the true cause why the delight of justice or of the good work commanded is necessary, by which the soul is lifted up to be able either to strongly will what it now weakly wills or even to will what it does not will. Without the sweetness of this delight, God never will be able to make the will fulfill the justice of the commandment, either by doing or willing: but if it seems to exercise any acts concerning the commandment, they will end only in the fruits of earthly concupiscences and delights or of one's own pride. For this heavenly sweetness smooths the way so that the will can emerge from the snare of carnal things and fix itself on loving justice. Consequently, if it is lacking, the will, as if torpid and dead, cannot embrace any good at all; just as conversely, it cannot pursue anything in carnal things except what has delighted it. "On the Grace of Christ the Savior," book 4, chapter 7.

LXVII. However, he carefully notes that this necessity of heavenly delight for willing and acting, and our will's weakness, which makes it impossible for it to be moved to good unless something delights it, nor to choose between two delights anything other than what has delighted it more, comes not from the essence and nature of the will but from its punishment. For he does not think that this is the nature of the human will considered absolutely, that it cannot freely

pursue a good object unless it first delights; much less does he consider it necessary that, upon seeing a good object, the will must be touched by some delight.

LXVIII. Therefore, he attributes the entire matter to a certain weakness contracted by the will through sin, and which must be numbered among the punishments of sin. For before sin, according to his hypotheses, no delight dominated the will or bent and determined it to either side, effectively eliciting its consent. Before man had fallen from his original integrity through sin, no delight in earthly things solicited and elicited his will to evil; and this because all such delight arises from concupiscence, which is the fruit of sin. Therefore, the first sin of the first man was committed without preceding delight. For the first delight followed the perverse will, not the will delight. For every repugnance of good will is a punishment for evil; which God does not inflict on rational creatures without merit.

LXIX. As for good actions, indeed the first man was endowed with grace to be able to perform them and to carry them out duly and perfectly: but that grace was not such as to make him will and act; because it was subject to his free will, and it was in his power to use or not to use that grace. Therefore, in him, there was no place for that victorious delight which subjects free will to itself and effectively and infallibly moves the will to good. Whence it clearly follows that the necessity of that victorious delight, now prevailing for doing good, does not arise from the nature of the will itself. For otherwise, it would have had to be perpetual in man: whereas in the integral man it had no place and was not necessary for him.

LXX. Therefore, according to this doctor, what makes that heavenly delight necessary for good actions is nothing other than the corruption and depravity of the human will. Because, through the sin of the first man, the will was plunged into the dominion of lusts. As a result, in all actions before grace, it is provoked by some preceding and titillating libidinous delight, to which it sins by consenting, and if left to itself, it cannot but consent. To cure this evil, God sends the delight of good or justice, as the only medicine for the ailing will, by which, as it is directly opposed to the disease by which it is afflicted, its consent to the good, which God demands from it, is extorted; and thus the will is bent upwards, fixed and as if suspended from God by the delightful and attractive Spirit, no longer to be dragged back into the old servitude of lust. Jansen explains this in more detail in chapter 9 of the frequently cited book.

LXXI. From all this, it is easy to see how Jansen's opinion aligns with and differs from the Thomists' regarding sufficient grace and efficacious grace. Jansen agrees with them that those who do not convert and do not perform good works receive multiple graces from God; not only is their intellect enlightened, but their will is also moved by various graces. He does not deny that, with such aids of grace, a person can be said to be able to convert and perform good works. Conversely, Thomists admit that those who do not convert and do not perform good works lack some necessary aid to actually convert and perform good works.

LXXII. However, the distinction lies in that the Thomists say that grace, which is not followed by a good action, is still sufficient and provides the proximate and complete power to perform good works. Jansen and his followers deny this. In this matter, it appears to be a mere logomachy and a question of terminology. Jansen denies that such grace is sufficient and

provides the proximate power to perform good works for no other reason than that it lacks some aid necessary for the good action, which the Thomists concede.

LXXIII. Regarding efficacious grace, Thomists and Jansen agree that there is no grace of Christ that is not efficacious in some respect, that is, which does not certainly and infallibly produce some effect for which it was precisely given by God and destined by God's absolute decree. Jansen, like them, acknowledges that the grace of Christ not only morally but also physically determines the will. Both agree and assert with equal conviction that divine grace is efficacious in itself and by itself: its efficacy does not depend on the consent of free will but is absolute: and that grace dominates free will, not the other way around.

LXXIV. However, they differ greatly concerning the nature of efficacious grace, as Jansen extensively notes and reports in the first chapter of the eighth book of "The Grace of Christ the Savior." According to the more recent Thomists, the grace that physically predetermines the will, as explained above, is a kind of virtuous motion, which has an incomplete effect: and in the will, it exists in the manner that colors are in the air and impetus in the object being pushed. But to Jansen, that grace is a real and true affection of the will, consisting in a love and desire for some heavenly and spiritual good, by which the human mind is sweetly and with great delight lifted upwards. Thus, to the Thomists, that efficacious aid is received passively in the will, but to Jansen, it is something that proceeds actively from it and is a vital motion of it.

LXXV. Then, according to the Thomist view, the physically pre-determining aid is such that, in whatever circumstances the will is placed, it always makes it act and produces its effect, overcoming all resistance. Namely, if the same aid that moves and determines this or that person to act well were given to everyone else, it would similarly move all, even those agitated by the same impulses of concupiscence. But according to Jansen's sense, the effective aid of Christ operates differently. For the victorious delight, in which he places that aid, is relative. It is victorious when it is greater than the opposing delight. If it happens that the other is more intense, the mind will stick only in ineffective desires and will never effectively will what should be willed. Therefore, what is victorious in one person, due to weaker concupiscence movements, will be overcome and ineffective in another due to stronger movements of the same concupiscence. And what suffices in one person to overcome a present temptation will not suffice at another time if a stronger and harsher temptation urges.

LXXVI. Moreover, the recent Thomists think that a physical predetermination to act well is necessary for the human will because, like all other secondary causes, it needs to be pre-moved by God, the primary cause, to act. They also derive this necessity from the indifference of the will, which must be determined to act by a superior cause. But Jansen thinks that the effective aid of divine grace is necessary for the human will only because of the wound inflicted by sin and the weakness contracted from concupiscence adhering to fallen man.

LXXVII. Therefore, according to the Thomist hypotheses, physically pre-determining aid was necessary even for the integral man, apart from any consideration of sin. But according to Jansen, effective aid, by which a person wills and acts, had no place in the state of innocence;

only aid without which a person could not act well, and with which it was easy to act well, but also easy not to act well, as it was subject to free will and did not subject the free will to itself.

LXXVIII. However, the doctrine of the famous Jesuit Louis Molina and several others who follow him differs significantly from the views of Jansen of Ypres and even the recent Thomists. To make this clearer, the summary of his opinion concerning efficacious and sufficient grace must be briefly repeated from his writings. He does not want any aid of grace to be called sufficient except that which, once given, requires nothing more from God for the action to actually follow. And he teaches that sufficient aid of grace is granted by God to both those who do not act well and do not convert to God and to those who convert and act well.

LXXIX. Thus, he divides sufficient aid into efficacious and inefficacious aid. Efficacious aid is what follows with the effect, that is, the good work to which it moves a person. Inefficacious aid is what lacks the effect and through which a person does not actually convert nor act well.

LXXX. According to him, for the aid to be efficacious, it does not depend on a particular motion of God, which, once given, the free will always consents to and cooperates with, and once removed, never consents or cooperates. Indeed, he thinks those who believe this are in error regarding faith. After referring to the opinion of those who say that it is the divine aid itself or God moving effectively or ineffectively through it that determines whether free will consents or not, he adds, "Certainly, I would not hesitate to call this opinion, explained in this way, an error in faith." His reason is that in this way, the liberty of free will seems to be destroyed because, namely, a person's conversion and perseverance would not depend on their innate and proper liberty but on the quality of the divine aid and motion. For if, he says, our free will derives from the efficacy of divine aid that it consents or does not consent to God's call, and cooperates or does not cooperate for salvation, and perseveres or does not persevere in grace, certainly it does not depend on its innate and proper liberty but on the quality of the aid and divine motion; and thus there is no reason for it to be credited for praise and merit, but rather the liberty of free will is wholly destroyed. "On the Concord of Free Will with the Gifts of Grace," question 23, article 4 & 5, disputation 1, member 6.

LXXXI. Therefore, according to his view, the division of sufficient aid into efficacious and inefficacious is taken from the effect, which depends on the liberty of free will. Hence, it is up to human free will and in its power whether the aid of grace, which is sufficient in itself, becomes efficacious or remains inefficacious. And that sufficient aid is called efficacious when free will, according to its liberty, converts with it, although, nothing hindering from the aid itself, it could have not converted, and that in the composite sense, not only in the divided sense; and it is called inefficacious when free will, according to the same liberty, does not convert with it, although it could have converted and could actually and in fact elicit the act of conversion without any other aid of God's grace. He states, "We assert that the aids of prevenient and assisting grace, which are granted to travelers by ordinary law, whether they are efficacious or inefficacious for conversion or justification, depend on the free consent and cooperation of our free will with them, and thus it is in our free power to render them efficacious by consenting and

cooperating with them for the acts by which we are disposed to justification, or to render them inefficacious by withholding our consent and cooperation or even by eliciting a contrary dissent." "On the Concord of Free Will with the Gifts of Grace," question 14, article 13, disputation 40.

LXXXII. Therefore, according to his hypotheses, efficacious aid and inefficacious aid are named from the outcome: and efficacious aid has nothing more in itself than inefficacious aid. Thus, it can and often does happen that, out of two people equally prevented by the grace of God, one converts and the other does not. Indeed, it sometimes happens that the one who received greater aids of grace remains unrepentant or neglects to act well: while the one to whom God granted fewer and lesser aids performs true repentance and strives for good works; because the former did not wish to use the greater grace granted to him by God, while the latter, using the lesser grace well by his own liberty, benefited from it. It also sometimes happens that, out of two people in whom grace is efficacious, the one who is helped by lesser grace works more fervently and zealously; while the one who received greater grace works more languidly and remissly.

LXXXIII. This is the explicit doctrine of Molina in question 14, article 13, disputation 12. He states, "It can happen that out of two people, equally called inwardly by God with the same aid, one converts by his own free will, and the other remains in unbelief: It often also happens that with the same aid by which one does not convert, another does convert. Indeed, it can happen that someone prevented and called by much greater aid does not convert by his own free will, while another converts with much lesser aid. For God often calls, and sinners resist and despise all the counsel of God."

LXXXIV. Hence it is clear that Molina does not need to reconcile the efficacy of divine grace with the liberty of human free will. Since he subjects God's grace to human free will, he does not want any aid of His to be so efficacious as to determine free will to act by itself; but supposes that whatever aid from God precedes a good action, the dissent of the human will can always stand with it, and it remains in the power of a person to use it or not use it as they please.

LXXXV. Nevertheless, he maintains that the act of free will by which it consents to divine grace is not merely natural but supernatural; and it should be attributed to God's grace; not only insofar as it is called prevenient and entices and invites a person to good, and in a way provides new strengths: but also insofar as through the same grace, God influences the act of human free will, in which respect it is called cooperating grace. Namely, according to him, that grace of God by which He prevents a person helps the will in acting and cooperates with it, in the same way that an inherent habit of power, together with it, concurs in its act. And therefore, the cooperation of that grace depends on free will and should not be conceived as moving the will and preceding its action: just as the influx of a habit into an act depends on the power, and does not move the power to act, but influences the act of the power at the same time as the power moves itself to act.

LXXXVI. Thus, Molina philosophizes about this matter in various places. Especially in disputation 40, article 13, question 14, he asserts, "We maintain, thirdly, that the prevenient grace, by which the will of an adult is prevented, excited, enticed, and invited to the

aforementioned acts of believing, hoping, loving, and repenting, is an instrument of the Holy Spirit, by which He further effectively concurs and influences the will itself to produce those acts, when the will itself consents to that prevenient grace, and with it influences and cooperates in those acts. Therefore, such acts are effectively from the will itself by its influence on them, and from God, who with a new influx or action influences those same acts through prevenient grace, as through an instrument. Just as habits, both natural and supernatural virtues, because they incline powers to acts and thereby make them suitable for them, effectively concur with them in the acts, influencing them by their partial and proper influx: so when prevenient grace entices, invites, and inclines the powers to elicit those supernatural acts, when the powers consent to the exciting grace and influence the acts to which grace entices and invites, that grace itself also influences and cooperates with the powers in those acts. Moreover, just as the existence of the influx of habits into the acts of virtues, which the powers elicit, depends on the influx of the powers themselves into those acts; because a habit is not a sufficient cause without the concurrence of the powers to produce such acts: so the existence of the new influx of prevenient grace into the acts of believing, hoping, loving, and repenting depends on the cooperation and influx of our free will into those same acts through the intellect and will; because similarly, prevenient grace is not a sufficient cause of the same acts without the cooperation and influx of our free will into them."

LXXXVII. Hence he argues that the consent of free will to God exciting and calling by prevenient grace is nothing in reality that is not supernatural, and which does not simultaneously come from God, not only as enticing, exciting, and inviting the will to it, but also as cooperating through the aid of grace. Therefore, according to him, anathema should be considered for anyone who affirms that the consent of our free will to God exciting and calling by the aid of prevenient grace is a natural act or can be elicited without the aid and cooperation of the same prevenient grace. Although he also pronounces anathema for anyone who says that the same consent is not in the power of our free will as explained by him: namely, so that it is up to free will to render such prevenient grace of the Holy Spirit either void or not void: as are his words in the same disputation.

LXXXVIII. However, he explains more distinctly what are the parts of grace and free will concerning those good acts, in which a person's conversion consists, in disputation 37 on the same article. Where, after supposing that three things concur for any good act; first, the general concurrence of God as the first agent; second, the particular influx of divine grace; and finally, human free will: he teaches that any good act, for example, an act of believing, hoping, repenting, has from the general concurrence of God that it is any act at all, but not that it is this particular act rather than another: from free will, it has that it is this specific act rather than another; and finally, from grace, that it is a supernatural act. For, he says, "From God's influence through general concurrence alone, it emanates as a universal cause, which does not determine that it should be the assent of faith, or sorrow for sins, rather than any other act of the same power. From the influence of free will, together with the necessary knowledge and other conditions, it has, as from a particular cause, that it is specifically an act of faith or sorrow for

sins rather than some other different act. From prevenient grace, or from God influencing through it as His instrument together with free will in the same act, it has that it is a supernatural act, specifically different from a purely natural act of believing or sorrowing for sins, which free will would elicit by its own strength alone, if prevenient grace did not also influence it."

LXXXIX. Therefore, according to him, God's grace and human free will are two parts of one integral cause of the act of believing, hoping, or repenting, as necessary for salvation; and each such act depends on the influx of both free will and divine grace: and from free will, they have that, as to their substance, they are acts of believing, hoping, repenting; from the influx of grace, they are supernatural and necessary for salvation. Thus, every one of those acts is wholly from free will and wholly from grace: but from neither is it as from a total and integral cause, but as from a part of an integral cause. As that author explains his view at the beginning of the already frequently cited disputation.

XC. Moreover, when this doctor says that if two people are given equal aids from God, it can happen that one converts by his liberty, and the other does not, he clarifies that he means prevenient aids of grace, as prevenient. For if it concerns the aids of the same grace as cooperating, that is, as God influences through it in the act which a person freely elicits, it is no longer true that, given equal aid, one converts, and the other does not. For it is impossible for someone not to convert, and yet for God to effectively produce the act of conversion in him with his free will. But since prevenient and cooperating grace are actually one and the same, and the cooperation of grace depends on the cooperation of our free will, just as the influx and influence of any habit depend on the operation of the power in which it resides: he thinks it should simply and absolutely be said that one converts and is saved with equal or even lesser aids, while another does not convert and is not saved. Although, if we speak with the utmost rigor, it should not be said that one converts with equal aids of grace, while the other does not convert: because in the one who converts, there is a certain influx of grace which is not in the other; namely, that which depends on the consent of our free will.

XCI. Similarly, according to this doctor, it should not be affirmed that, with equal prevenient aids of grace existing in two adults, the one who converts does so by his liberty alone. For although that conversion depends on liberty and is done by the will according to its liberty, it is not done solely by its liberty but with the cooperating aid of prevenient grace through an influx by which it takes on the nature of cooperating grace: although when this aid is present, prevenient grace follows from the cooperation of the will, requiring only the free cooperation of our will. This is discussed in Disputation 40, Article 13, Question 14, paragraph "to the second."

XCII. From this, it follows, according to his hypotheses, that with any given prevenient aids of grace, as prevenient, a person can fail to convert, both in the composite sense and in the divided sense. But given the aid of the same grace, as cooperating, a person indeed can fail to convert in the divided sense; however, this is false in the composite sense, because it cannot be that the influx of cooperating grace, as it cooperates in conversion, is present without the sinner converting by his own will; which does not, however, hinder the liberty of the will, because the

influx of cooperating grace depends, as often said, on the consent of the human will. This is also evident in the same disputation, paragraph "hence it is clear."

XCIII. Molina extensively explains the nature of that divine grace, which is both prevenient and cooperating, and which human free will renders efficacious or inefficacious, in Disputation 45, Article 13, Question 14. First, he generally describes this grace as consisting in some illumination of the mind and certain movements of the will.

XCIV. That illumination of the mind, for him, is nothing other than certain knowledges acquired from an external preacher or elsewhere and assisted by God's particular and supernatural influx so that they are somewhat adapted to salvation. He observes that God, in the ordinary way, does not infuse new species and ideas by which those knowledges are formed, through which their minds are illuminated; but those knowledges are made through species acquired in a human manner, and excited by preachers or some other way, in which God inserts Himself through His influx, so that those knowledges are more or less adapted to salvation, according to the degree of greater or lesser influx. Therefore, according to his opinion, God's illumination is nothing other than assisting those knowledges by His influx so that the will is excited by them.

XCV. The movements of the will, in which prevenient grace consists, according to his opinion, are certain affections by which, with prior knowledge, the will is raised and invited, both to elicit hope and to love God or to grieve for sins, before the act of hope or love or sorrow is elicited from the love of God. For such movements and affections, the will does not cooperate as free will but only as will and as a certain nature. For, whether it wants to or not, with the presence of knowledge, they naturally arise in it. However, they do not have the nature of grace unless God simultaneously influences them in a special way so that they become supernatural and, in some way, adapted to salvation.

XCVI. To understand this more fully, he observes that from the contemplation of something very lovable and greatly desirable, a certain movement naturally arises in the will, by which the will is affected toward that thing: this movement is not volition but an affection of the will toward that thing, touched as it were by its goodness and invited to will it. And this movement, according to him, usually precedes volition, not only in humans but also in angels; and this in both the state of integral nature and the state of corrupt nature. For it was earlier in time or nature for Lucifer to be affected by the will toward what he wanted to obtain through pride, than to freely will it. Just as it was also earlier for Eve to be affected by the forbidden fruit, than to will to eat it against God's law.

XCVII. Moreover, after such a movement in the will has arisen from the contemplation of a thing, it is in the power of the will to will or not to will the thing simply. But this movement, by which it is affected toward the thing, arises not freely but merely naturally in the will, given the contemplation of the thing. However, the will can indirectly impede such a movement in itself, namely by keeping away from the thought and turning to other things, and by seeking to have the mind present other things to the will which usually entice it to entirely contrary things.

XCVIII. If, however, with the affection for something which the mind perceives as desirable and offers to the will, the mind encounters a way and means by which it is believed to be obtainable, a certain movement of elevation toward hope naturally arises in the will, which in time or nature precedes the free act of hope. Therefore, that movement is produced by the knowledge of the goodness of the object and the knowledge of the way by which it is believed to be obtainable, cooperating with the will not as free but as a certain nature; and it naturally arises in the will, the greater as the knowledge of the goodness of the object and the way by which it can be obtained is greater and more probable, just as it happens with that affection of the will toward the object known simply as good.

XCIX. But that doctor does not attribute anything else to grace than to perfect nature and to assist it in its movements, so that each one, by supernatural aid and grace, is such as is necessary for salvation. Therefore, to recognize and explain the movements of grace, he wants attention to be given to the progress and order that nature itself, the knowing and appetitive powers, would observe if they produced those same acts, attributed to grace, by their own strength alone as to the substance of the act, which he thinks is possible. Thus, it may be understood in what way God, through the aids and gifts of grace, inserts Himself and cooperates with nature and assists it, so that it produces those acts above its own powers which are necessary for salvation.

C. Thus, he considers those movements, in which prevenient grace consists, to be vital operations proceeding actively from our faculties but not freely elicited by them, nor should they be called acts of free will, strictly speaking, although they depend much on free will. This is because free will can in various ways aid or hinder those acts, and desire and seek them from God, and somehow fit and dispose itself so that, according to the common course and order of divine providence, they may be more easily granted to it by God.

CI. For example, those knowledges of things to be believed, which begin to illuminate our minds for salvation with a certain supernatural influx, can be acquired freely by giving ear to preachers and reading pious books, or in some similar way: and one can freely turn away from them and thus put an obstacle to divine illumination. Although that knowledge holds the nature of prevenient grace only from the supernatural influx of God, not from human free will. Similarly, those pious affections, which naturally and necessarily result in the will from God's illumination and hold the nature of prevenient grace from the part of the will if a certain special divine influx is added to them, can be hindered by human free will if one freely ceases from pious thought or brings and seeks reasons that entice the will to the opposite; and conversely, they can be aided if one keeps the mind willingly in that pious thought.

CII. But to make Molina's opinion clearer, it will not be out of place to explain in his own words the order and nature of the movements of prevenient grace by which we are called to faith, hope, love, and contrition, in which a person's conversion consists. Thus, in the aforementioned disputation, he philosophizes about it as follows. "When a person, not yet supernaturally called inwardly to faith, thinks and considers the things to be believed, through knowledges acquired by the ministry of a preacher or elsewhere, God influences those same knowledges with a certain

particular and supernatural influx, which assists that knowledge, both so that the matters are better and more clearly considered and penetrated, and also so that that knowledge now reaches the limits of supernatural knowledge and, in its order and degree, is adapted to a supernatural end. From the consideration and penetration of those things which pertain to faith, namely when it is considered how worthy they are to be believed, and how advantageous it is to do so, a natural movement of affection toward those things so known arises in the will, by which it is enticed and as it were invited to command the intellect to assent to them. With this movement, therefore, God also inserts Himself, influencing it through a particular aid and, as it were, sharpening it so that it urges and entices more, making it supernatural, so that in its order and degree it is also adapted to salvation."

CIII. Furthermore, free will, aided and excited by these two movements of prevenient grace, still has the free power to command or not to command the assent of faith. If the will wishes to embrace faith and commands the intellect to believe, influenced simultaneously by the movement of prevenient grace it has, it elicits in itself a supernatural act by which it wishes to embrace faith and commands the intellect to assent: and simultaneously, the intellect, moved by that supernatural command of the will and aided by divine illumination, elicits the supernatural act of assenting to the revealed truths, and by these two supernatural acts of the intellect and will, the person rightly disposed receives the supernatural habit of faith, infused solely by God, by which he can subsequently produce similar supernatural acts whenever he wills.

CIV. As for the movement of grace by which we are excited to the act of hope, he explains his view as follows. When the intellect, now illuminated by the light of supernatural faith, thinks about the eternal happiness prepared by God for man, the goodness and excellence of it, along with many other and remarkable works of God and benefits bestowed upon man, including the incarnation and passion of Christ, and considers the other means abundantly provided for attaining eternal life, a natural affection for happiness arises in the will, by which it is enticed and invited to desire it with a love of concupiscence. Additionally, a movement of elevation arises by which it is attracted and invited to hope for it from God. Although this movement depends on free will if it ceases from the thought from which the movement arises, nonetheless, with obstacles removed, it naturally arises, and God, as it were, inserts Himself by a special influence, sharpening and making it supernatural, so that in its order and degree it is necessary for salvation; through it, He supernaturally elevates and, as it were, invites the will to elicit the supernatural act of hoping for eternal happiness and the means necessary to obtain it. Therefore, by such grace, our free will, prevented and excited by God, elicits, if it wills, the first free act of supernatural hope, by which rightly disposed it receives from God the habit of supernatural hope, through which it can subsequently elicit other similar supernatural acts whenever it wills.

CV. He also discusses in a similar manner the grace necessary for the act of loving God and for contrition for sins. He continues, "When the intellect, illuminated by the light of faith and with a preexisting act of supernatural hope in the will, considers the goodness of God, both in itself and towards us, and the many and great benefits with which He has so kindly prevented us,

a natural motion of the love of friendship towards God is excited in the will, by which that power is enticed and invited to love God. To this movement, too, God inserts Himself, sharpening and kindling it with His supernatural influence, and also making it supernatural and necessary for salvation in its order and degree."

CVI. If, at the same time, the knowledge of the greatness, multitude, and ingratitude of the sins by which we have offended God is present, free will, prevented by the same grace, can elicit an act of the supernatural love of God, and similarly can elicit an act of true sorrow for sins, for God's sake, from the affection of supernatural love, which is true contrition and the ultimate disposition for sanctifying grace, which follows contrition in the same instant, though later in nature.

CVII. Furthermore, this author distinguishes between the aid of prevenient grace and prevenient grace itself. By prevenient grace, he understands those cognitions of the mind and affections of the will, which God sharpens and assists with a certain particular influence, so that they become supernatural and necessary for salvation in their order and degree. By the aid of prevenient grace, he understands that supernatural influx by which God sharpens, assists, and kindles those cognitions, mostly acquired by human reason, and affections naturally arising in the will after such cognition, as previously described, so that they become supernatural and suitable for man's eternal salvation.

CVIII. Moreover, from what has been said, it is easy to gather that the doctrine of the recent Thomists, as expounded by Didacus Alvarez, is diametrically opposed to the doctrine of Molina regarding that grace which is called efficacious and to which man's conversion is attributed. They are completely opposed to each other, whether considering the manner in which grace moves a person to the acts by which they convert to God, or the nature and essence of grace, and what it consists of.

CIX. As for the manner in which grace operates, the recent Thomists, like Didacus Alvarez, hold that the grace by which a person is converted is efficacious in itself and not made so by the consent of free will, but rather it powerfully and infallibly determines free will to consent, as previously explained. On the contrary, Molina and his followers maintain that the grace which converts a person is so subject to free will that its efficacy depends on the consent of free will and it is in a person's free power to make it efficacious or inefficacious, both of which frequently happen in fact.

CX. Regarding the essence of grace by which the will is moved to acts of conversion and which actually effects conversion, the recent Thomists place it, as stated above, in a certain virtuous motion which has an incomplete being and is in the will in the manner that colors are in the air and impetus in an object that is pushed. Molina, however, places the grace that effectively moves a person to conversion, with the consent of free will, in certain affections of the will arising from prior illumination of the mind, by which God, through His influence, entices the will to will and grants the power to will, and also concurs with the will if it wills.

CXI. In this respect, Jansen is closer to Molina than to the recent Thomists. Although Jansen agrees entirely with them regarding the manner in which efficacious grace operates,

contending that the efficacy of saving grace in Christ in no way depends on the consent of human free will but produces that consent by itself, infallibly and irresistibly; nonetheless, regarding the nature and substance of the grace called efficacious, his view is closer to Molina's than to the Thomists'. For, as is evident from the above, he considers that efficacious grace, to which, according to him, man's conversion and all the good works of the faithful are entirely attributed, consists in certain affections of love and desire which proceed actively from the will of a person, not freely but actively, and are vital acts of it, by which the will is carried and induced to embrace the good freely. He understands such affections by the name of heavenly sweetness and delight, in which he places efficacious grace.

CXII. However, he differs from Molina in that such affections, according to Molina's doctrine, arise naturally in the will, given the illumination of the mind: and God does nothing else but insert Himself by a particular influence into those affections and make them supernatural. According to Jansen, however, given any illumination of the mind, such affections do not arise naturally in the will of a corrupt person, but it is necessary that they be entirely infused from heaven, not merely sharpened and intensified by a certain divine motion to make them supernatural.

CXXIII. However, although they agree with Molina on the matters of efficacious grace, they do not explain in the same way what its efficacy consists of. As was extensively explained above, Molina considers grace to be called efficacious because it results in human cooperation; thus, according to his hypothesis, the efficacy of grace simply depends on human free will, which has the power to make grace, which is in itself only sufficient, either efficacious or inefficacious. Consequently, according to Molina's principles, the efficacy of grace consists in the assent and cooperation of human will. This, however, is explicitly denied by the Doctors whose opinion we are expounding. They argue that the grace which is called efficacious is efficacious in itself before the consent of the will; it is not properly said to be efficacious because the will consents, but rather the will consents because the grace is efficacious.

CXXIV. This is the explicit doctrine of Bellarmine in the first book on Grace and Free Will, chapter 12, where, after recounting the opinion of those who place the efficacy of grace in human assent and cooperation, so that grace is called efficacious from the outcome because human will cooperates, and who think that it is in man's power to make grace efficacious, which otherwise would only be sufficient, he adds, "This opinion is entirely alien to the sentiment of Blessed Augustine and, as I believe, to the sentiment of the divine scriptures." Similarly, Peter of St. Joseph states this assertion, "The efficacy of grace does not consist in the cooperation of the will." In "On Divine Grace," disputation 7, section 9, number 61. He proves that the efficacy of grace does not consist in that cooperation of the will because grace is not efficacious because the will works; rather, the will works because grace is efficacious. Therefore, the efficacy of grace cannot formally come from the cooperation of the will, since it is the cause of it and precedes it. In "Idea Theologiae Speculativae," book 4, chapter 7, to the 7th resolution.

CXXV. Thus, according to them, the efficacy of grace consists in a certain congruence and fittingness of the divine calling with free will, which, being present, according to God's

foreknowledge, the effect follows infallibly. These are the words of Peter of St. Joseph in book four, chapter seven of *"Idea Theologiae Speculativae,"* resolution 7. In *"On Divine Grace,"* he observes that this congruence should not be taken simply from place or time, as if grace is efficacious because it is given at a suitable place and time. Although it is certain that congruent and efficacious grace is only given at a suitable time, its congruence and efficacy should not primarily be taken from the time, but rather something in the calling itself must be assigned for which it will have its effect at such a time and place. For another calling, even if sufficient, would have no effect at the same time. Therefore, according to his view, that congruence of grace is nothing other than a certain portion and accommodation between grace itself and the will so affected that the operation follows infallibly. Disputation 7, section 9, number 66.

CXXVI. He explains this further in the next paragraph. "God," he says, "through His infinite knowledge, certainly knows what each person will do, given this or that state of affairs: whether he will give consent or not; and what mode of calling is suitable, not only to persuade a person but also to make him convinced: for an ambitious person is moved differently from a greedy one, and so on. For an ambitious person, it is useful to propose the instability of human affairs, where many have been suddenly cast down from the height of honors. For a greedy person, it is useful to consider the brevity of life and the uncertainty of the hour of death, and so on. And since among the ambitious there are different temperaments, likewise among the greedy, examples must be proposed to one, philosophical or theological arguments to another, and analogies drawn from more familiar things to yet another; thus, one person is led to repentance in this way, another in that. Indeed, even the same person at different days, hours, and moments is different from himself. Now he is affected by anger, now by joy, now by sorrow, hence he needs to be moved and excited differently today than yesterday: and the reasons that would effectively persuade him at one hour might be useless at another; it is indeed true that everything is received according to the mode of the receiver, and not everything always appears the same to us, but as each person is affected, so does he see his goal. Therefore, sometimes, due to the circumstances of place or time, and the various passions by which he is agitated, a person is so disposed that such a thought or illumination of the intellect and such an affection or movement of the will are duly suited and tempered for his conversion: thus, in such a fitting of the aid and the will so disposed, the efficacious grace must be placed.

CXXVII. Therefore, the authors of this opinion suppose that God, from eternity, foresees through what the Schools call middle or conditional knowledge what each person will do if he is called in this or that manner, and if such illuminations and inspirations, and other similar means, both external and internal, are applied to convert him. For example, if Peter is called in this manner, he will follow, but not if called in another manner. Although whether he is called in this or that manner, he can follow if he wills, or not follow.

CXXVIII. Then, based on this, they say that God decreed to call and excite certain people, such as the Tyrians and Sidonians, to conversion, by means and in a manner which indeed gave them the power to convert if they wished, but which He certainly foresaw would have no effect on them; not by the means which He foresaw would convert them if applied. On

the contrary, He willed to call the Ephesians, for instance, not in a manner that they would reject, but in a manner which He certainly foresaw would lead them to faith. Hence, it follows that God decreed to give some people the grace by which they could convert if they willed; but to others, the grace by which they would actually convert.

CXXIX. The former grace is called sufficient; the latter is called efficacious. Those who are called by the former manner are said to be called in a non-congruent manner; those by the latter, in a congruent manner. The latter calling originates from the decree by which the conversion of those who are called is predestined; the former does not. And yet the grace conferred by the former calling, which is called sufficient, according to these Doctors' understanding, is not really distinguished, either in physical entity or acting power, from efficacious grace; but only morally or in the order of the subsequent operation. For although someone does not have efficacious aid by which he actually converts, he can actually convert with what is called sufficient aid if he wills, without any new aid, which he has as the principle of good work.

CXXX. However, although those theologians consider that the aid called efficacious does not differ physically and in real entity or acting power but only morally and in the order of the subsequent operation from what is called merely sufficient; nevertheless, they think that the person who receives efficacious aid receives much greater grace from God than the one to whom merely sufficient grace is granted. And this because the excellence and magnitude of some gift or grace must be measured primarily by the intention of the giver and also by the utility and fruit which returns to the recipient. Now, efficacious aid is given by God with a certain purpose of converting a person: sufficient aid, however, cannot be referred to such a purpose. Moreover, the conversion worked by efficacious aid is the greatest good that returns to the one to whom God grants such aid. Sufficient aid, however great in itself, remains entirely useless to the one who receives it, assuming it is not suited and congruent to the disposition of the one who receives it; indeed, it even incidentally increases his condemnation.

CXXXI. Therefore, those Doctors, unlike Molina, do not say that it is possible for one of two people equally prevented by grace to convert while the other does not. For the one who converts has always received greater grace from God than the one who does not convert. But assuming entirely equal grace in many respects, either all will convert, or none will convert. According to their opinion, it is indeed possible that in the one who converts, there is not, from the part of divine aid by which he is prevented, greater illumination of the mind and stronger movement of the will than in the one who does not convert. Indeed, they admit it is possible that in the one who remains rebellious, the mind is more clearly illuminated by the divine spirit and the will more strongly and vividly moved than in the one who is actually led to conversion and faith by efficacious grace. But in the one who converts, any divine motion, whether greater or lesser, always has the reason of greater grace, according to them, because it is suited and tempered to the disposition of the one who receives it; therefore, it proceeds from a more remarkable benevolence of God towards him and results in his greater utility.

CXXXII. Thus Bellarmine teaches, comparing his opinion with that of Molina and Lessius, though without naming them. The first opinion, he says, holds that the efficacy of grace depends on human will, while ours holds that it depends on the will of God. And if the question is posed whether, if two men have exactly the same exciting and aiding grace in the first act, and hear the same preacher and see the same signs, it is possible for one to believe and the other not to believe, the first opinion will answer that it is possible because free will remains, and can follow or resist grace as it chooses. But our opinion will answer that it is indeed possible for two men, receiving the same internal motion, to hear the same preacher and see the same signs, and for one to believe and the other not to believe; however, it is not possible that if two men receive exactly the same exciting grace, one believes and the other does not. For grace not only includes internal motion or excitation but also the circumstances of place, time, person, etc. If, receiving the same motion, one believes and the other does not, without a doubt, one received the motion in a manner, place, and time that God foresaw would suit his disposition, while the other did not receive it in such a manner. Therefore, the one who believes received much greater grace from God than the one who does not believe. The one who did not believe had the grace to believe if he willed, while the one who believed had the grace to believe and to will. For God works in us to will when He calls in such a way that He foresees we will follow. Thus, a believer cannot truly boast against an unbeliever or be arrogant because what principally distinguishes him from the unbeliever is not his own free will but God's efficacious grace, which He gave to him and not to the other. (*De gratia et libero arbitrio*, book 1, chapter 13, towards the end).

CXXXIII. Peter of St. Joseph, in the conclusion of the seventh disputation of his treatise on Divine Grace, teaches similar things. He states, "Divine aid can be considered in two ways: either in the category of being or in the category of benefit. If considered in the former way, it is possible that one person, with equal or even greater aid, does not convert, while another with lesser aid does convert. The reason is that since grace does not determine the will, if equal aid is given to two people in terms of being, each remains indifferent to consenting or not consenting. Therefore, one of them can freely consent even if the other does not. But if the aid is considered as a gift or benefit, it is not possible for one to convert and the other not with equal aid because aids are called equal in the category of benefit when they are equally effective. Thus, if one aid is effective in achieving its effect while the other is not, they are not equal in the category of benefit."

CXXXIV. However, although the authors of this opinion believe the efficacy of grace to be something in divine aid that precedes the operation of the will, and therefore not dependent on its consent and cooperation in such a way that it is within man's power to make grace efficacious or inefficacious as Molina and his followers hold, they do not deny that the efficacy of grace in some way depends on free will. According to them, the efficacy of grace can be considered in two ways: either in the first act or in the second act. When considered in the first act, it is nothing other than the power to effect, which is not distinct from the aid itself; and in this way, the efficacy of grace does not depend on free will but on God. When considered in the second act, the efficacy of grace is taken as the actual efficiency or actual influence of grace in the

supernatural work. And in this way too, the efficacy of grace depends on God. For just as the influence of an instrument in a work depends on the principal agent that uses such an instrument, so the influence of grace in a supernatural work depends on God as the primary agent who works through grace as His instrument. However, because this actual efficiency of grace depends not only on God but also on free will as a partial cause, without whose operation grace would not work, they say that in this respect, that is, in the second act, the efficacy of grace also depends on free will. As Peter of St. Joseph explains in his treatise on Divine Grace, disputation 7, number 62.

CXXXV. Nevertheless, they consider that the efficacy of grace is such that, being present in the first act, the effect infallibly follows, that is, the consent and cooperation of free will. For efficacious aid is said to be that which efficaciously and infallibly moves the will to elicit consent and makes it act. As Peter of St. Joseph says in the cited disputation, number 61. Therefore, supposing the efficacy of that divine aid, which it has from God alone and antecedent to the consent of the will, it can never happen that man does not do what he is moved to do by such aid. On the other hand, removing such efficacy, however sufficient the grace may be supposed, it is entirely impossible for the good operation, to which it is said to be sufficient, to follow. In this matter too, they differ from Molina, according to whose hypotheses, whatever grace of God is supposed antecedent to the actual consent of the will, it can happen that the effect, to which grace is ordained, either follows or does not follow: and in either direction, the event is not infallible.

CXXXVI. They do not think it difficult to reconcile this infallibility of the event, depending on the presence or removal of the aid called efficacious, with the freedom of human will. Although it never happens that the will denies its consent to the motions in which efficacious grace consists, that is, those which according to God's foreknowledge are so congruent and tempered to the will that they will bend it, nevertheless the will, being prevented and excited by those motions, is not predetermined by them; rather, it determines itself to act in such a way that it can refrain from acting and suspend its consent, or even determine itself to dissent if the nature of those motions is considered in itself.

CXXXVII. Although they admit that it is in some sense necessary for the one who receives efficacious grace to consent to it and perform what the grace moves him to, since it is repugnant for some grace to be efficacious and yet for the effect not to follow; they think that necessity does not harm liberty, because according to their doctrine, the necessity is consequent, not antecedent. For to them, grace is efficacious when it consists of aids that are so suited to the will in place and time that God foresaw from eternity that the will would freely allow itself to be moved by them if they are presented to it, although it could also resist. Therefore, in the congruence by which grace is called efficacious, the future free consent of the will, foreseen by God through conditional knowledge from eternity, is included. Hence, it in no way harms human freedom to say that it is necessary to consent to efficacious grace since that grace is called efficacious only because it is supposed that the will would freely consent if God applies it to a

person: thus, that necessity is not antecedent but follows the foreseen conditional consent of the will.

CXXXVIII. They add that the efficacy of grace, in producing its effect, is infallible not absolutely and metaphysically but rather morally because, being most suited and proportionate to the disposition of the will, it infallibly moves the will in a very gentle manner, and in a way that fits the disposition of the will. Just as a man suffering from extreme poverty and need, although he could physically refuse a hundred gold coins offered to him, yet morally speaking, given the circumstances as they are, considering his state, condition, and calamity, will infallibly accept them because they are very suitable for relieving his misery.

CXXXIX. Finally, those who hold this opinion boast that their explanation of the efficacy of grace not only fits well with the liberty of human will but also with the certainty of divine predestination. For according to their view, predestination achieves its effect through aids that are indeed rejectable in themselves, yet so suited to the disposition of the will that according to God's foreknowledge, they will infallibly have their effect.

CXL. Thus we have briefly explained as clearly as possible the four opinions, most solemn and accepted in the Roman School, regarding the sufficiency and efficacy of divine grace. Besides these, other opinions could also be mentioned, but since they seem highly improbable, have less clear authors, and fewer followers, and since it would be too lengthy and tedious to note the finer distinctions by which individual doctors somewhat differ from one another, we can be content with these. It does not seem worth the effort to inquire more scrupulously into those minutiae.

CXLI. However, lest some pages remain empty here, we will briefly add, as an example, the opinion of the quite notable Jesuit Gregory of Valencia, which many learned men report and refute. He thus considers efficacious grace to consist in some gift that a man, already prevented by calling and exciting grace, can acquire with God's help through the pious use of his free will. This gift, he believes, in one kind of cause, namely efficient, is naturally prior to the very conversion of free will; and in another, namely in the kind of material and dispositive cause, is posterior.

CXLII. This gift, he asserts, consists in the infusion of the habits of grace and virtues, inasmuch as through these habits the mind of man is strengthened to elicit the act of conversion. Therefore, according to his opinion, efficacious grace is either habitual grace when it is infused or the infusion itself: inasmuch as by that infused grace, free will elicits its own conversion, with God simultaneously cooperating in it.

CXLIII. For someone to be considered to have sufficient grace for a pious action, according to his view, it is necessary either to have all the gifts and aids required for the action as its principles or beginnings, or to have some of these gifts or aids such that, being already prevented and excited by them, he can, with some use of his free faculty and with God's help, acquire all the remaining such gifts or aids. As can be seen in the already mentioned Gregory, volume 2, disputation 8, question 3, point 4.

CXLIV. Hence, it is clear that this Doctor does not wish to make the real entity of sufficient grace the same as that of efficacious grace; rather, he believes that efficacious grace adds a new aid to the sufficient one, which prevents the conversion of man: in this matter, he aligns with more recent Thomists and disagrees with Molina and the proponents of congruent grace. Yet, he does not want the efficacy of divine grace to be absolute, but to depend on the use of our free will, in which matter he departs from the Thomists and aligns with these later theologians.

CXLV. However, a particular inconvenience arises in his opinion: what he says about efficacious grace might apply only to the conversion of a sinner to God, not to the good works of a person already converted, for which no new infusion of habitual grace is required, and to which efficacious grace nevertheless extends. Moreover, it is not clear to me how the infusion of habitual grace could be prior to a person's conversion in the kind of efficient cause and yet simultaneously posterior in the kind of dispositive cause.

THEOLOGICAL THESES

In which the Doctrine of Protestants is explained regarding the distinction between sufficient and efficacious Grace, and the harmony of human freedom with the efficacy of divine grace.

Thesis I

The theologians of the Augsburg Confession, who are called Lutherans, do not accept the common division of grace into sufficient and efficacious. This is because the same grace of God operates in believers and is rejected by unbelievers. Therefore, according to them, the same grace that is spurned and trampled upon by unbelievers and the unrepentant is in itself efficacious and should not merely be called sufficient in contrast to some efficacious grace.

II. Indeed, they teach that God, as much as it is within Him, wants to convert all those to whom the word is preached, and offers the same grace to all and each individually. However, many resist the divine grace and the Holy Spirit who initiates the work of conversion, and thus the grace does not achieve its effect in them. Others, however, accept divine grace and do not put up an impediment to it, which is why grace is effective in them and actually brings about their conversion. But since, on God's part, it is the same grace that converts Simon Peter and does not convert Simon Magus, because the latter resisted it while the former did not, they do not think it should be distinguished from one another.

III. This can be seen in the writings of Johann Gerhard, a theologian of Jena, in the second volume of his treatise on free will, chapter six, section one. He states, "We concede that many resist the Holy Spirit, who initiates the work of conversion, despise God's counsel against themselves, judge themselves unworthy of eternal life, and thus by their own fault repel the grace of conversion from themselves. But we deny that the grace itself should be divided into insufficient and efficacious, since it is the same grace of God that works in believers and is repelled by unbelievers."

IV. However, to explain whence the efficacy of divine grace is derived, he notes that first two extremes must be avoided. Neither should the efficacy of grace for conversion be attributed to the cooperation of human will, nor should it be attributed to the absolute decree of God choosing certain individuals. Rather, one should take a middle path: that many are converted and saved should be attributed solely to divine grace, and that many do not convert and perish should be recognized as solely the fault of the perishing. And in this pious simplicity, the Christian mind can safely rest, even if it cannot extricate itself from all difficulties.

V. He then tries to show how these ideas are consistent: that the efficacy of divine grace should not be attributed to the cooperation of human will, and yet that the efficacy of the same grace should not be attributed to a certain physical action of God by which He determines the will to will and choose the good inspired by grace. Thus, he explains his position on this matter: "In the work of conversion, the Holy Spirit finds a subject that has no strength to cooperate, since the mind of unregenerate man is blind, and his will is turned away and hostile to God. Therefore, divine grace does everything to make him who is to be converted, willing from being unwilling, obedient from being an enemy. But this is not done as if converting a man without his thought or knowledge, or even against his will, by applying force. Rather, the Holy Spirit gives new strengths by which he can assent to the call; yet, at the same time, He does not immediately take away the old freedom, or rather the miserable bondage, by which he can reject the offered grace."

VI. The same doctrine is also distinctly explained by George Calixtus, formerly a professor of theology at the University of Helmstedt, in his *Epitome Theologiae* based on his dictations. In his treatise on the ministry of the word, page 241, he teaches that when the minister of the word proposes the legal and evangelical doctrine to men, God, through this medium and instrument, is effective and excites in human hearts contrition for sins committed, trust in Christ's merit, hatred of sin, and the pursuit of a new life, unless men themselves, through their stubbornness and obstinacy, love darkness more than light.

VII. According to his view, there is no doubt that a man can spurn, reject the offered grace, and resist the Holy Spirit who works faith. For God does not draw and convert men by His absolute power, but does so according to the order and manner He has established. On the contrary, it is certain that a man can be concerned for his own salvation, can take care of the means to it, according to the saying, "Many will seek to enter and will not be able." For a man can hear the word of God, indeed, receive and study it with all eagerness, and strive to learn and understand the truth.

VIII. According to this Doctor's view, those who do this are given greater helps by God, so that they understand the word, recognize their sins, and have faith in the promises of the Gospel. Not that such works are of such great dignity or merit, but because God wants His word to be honored, this order to be observed, and this to be done by man before He provides greater and more special, and in their kind, supernatural helps.

IX. He distinguishes between actions that are by their nature supernatural, that is, that by their nature surpass human strengths and are not within human control, and therefore are

attributed to the Holy Spirit, such as believing, fearing, and loving God, and similar ones, which constitute true conversion to God; and between certain acts that are within human power, which God wants man to perform before progressing to supernatural helps and gifts, at least in the ordinary way. Such acts include hearing the word of God, examining it, paying attention to it, and taking some care about the means to salvation.

X. He says, "Believing is an action of its kind supernatural, or by its nature above human strengths, therefore we attribute it to the Holy Spirit, for He excites the human mind to believe, and makes man believe, love, fear God, indeed to want to believe, fear, and love. And thus we attribute to God the supernatural acts that constitute true conversion and deny that they are within human control: yet we do not deny that there are certain acts within human power that God wants man to perform before progressing to supernatural helps and gifts, at least in the ordinary way."

XI. He states similarly elsewhere: "It must be observed that, assuming that God has revealed the Gospel and makes it generally preached among men through men, it is not above human strengths for someone to hear the Gospel, understand, consider, and compare it with what others, such as Jews or Muslims, present as divinely revealed. In the judgment on theological controversies debated between Lutherans and the Reformed, no. 33.

XII. According to him, whoever hears the word and does not spurn the counsel of God in themselves, and does not choke the word of God with cares, riches, or pleasures of this life, will experience God's help and operation, and will be led to faith and life by His free benevolence. Those who do otherwise must attribute their lack of faith to their own negligence and stubbornness.

XIII. Although the word of God is the instrument God usually employs in the conversion of men, he does not believe that those to whom the word is not preached are deprived of all means necessary for salvation. Rather, he asserts that God behaves in such a way towards them that if they perish, it is their own fault and not due to a lack of necessary assistance. For, if they use the faculties and strengths left in their corrupt nature correctly, God is ready to provide them with means by which they may be led to a fuller knowledge, and ultimately to true and saving faith.

XIV. Having posed the question of how those who neither live among Christians nor have ever received anything from Christians (from whom alone the word can be heard) might come to faith, he responds that all men possess certain intellectual and volitional strengths and natural insights. If they use these correctly, care about their salvation, and work towards it as much as they can, God will provide them with the means to lead them to fuller and more perfect knowledge, and eventually to a knowledge based on divine revelation. He believes we have examples of this in Cornelius the Centurion and the Eunuch of Queen Candace.

XV. However, if others, unlike these, neglect the means and assistance available to them, extinguish the innate sparks, and hold the truth in unrighteousness, as Paul says, they are certainly kept from greater light not by some fate or divine decree, but by their own fault. This is stated in the cited Epitome of Theology, page 244.

XVI. From the above, it is clear that the theologians of the Augsburg Confession do not accept the distinction between sufficient and efficacious grace as commonly used in the Roman School. However, they do affirm what many doctors of that school signify by sufficient grace: that those who are not converted by the preaching of the Gospel lack no assistance on God's part that is necessary for their conversion and without which they could not be converted. Therefore, even the unbelievers who reject the word of God are offered grace that is abundantly sufficient to lead them to repentance and faith if they do not refuse to use it.

XVII. It is also evident that these theologians, according to the principles they have established, do not labor much to reconcile the efficacy of grace with human free will. Since they assert that the will is not physically predetermined to good by grace, nor is any necessity to act rightly imposed by grace upon the will, they maintain that man can freely either accept the efficacy of divine grace by performing those things which divine wisdom requires of him for grace to exert its efficacy in him, or place obstacles and impediments to that grace by neglecting those things through which grace usually operates in man, such as hearing, studying, and meditating on the word of God.

XVIII. This is the doctrine of George Calixtus in the cited judgment on controversies debated between Lutherans and the Reformed, number 32. After establishing that the Gospel is a divine instrument destined to impart faith and salvation to men, along with which, when heard, divine supernatural grace is also infused, enabling a person who previously could not assent and have faith to now be able to do so, he adds, "Thus, man acquires the ability to believe, which he lacked before, yet is under no necessity to do so, for if he gives rein to his own nature and depravity, he can resist and oppose the Holy Spirit and reject the word of God. Therefore, that a man hearing and considering the Gospel believes, indeed can believe, is to be attributed not to natural strengths, but to the grace connected with and supplied through the Gospel. But that this grace can be resisted is to be attributed to the inherent depravity and nature. For although God is effective and operates by His grace, He does not do so by absolute power but admits conditions and order, thus His grace can be frustrated in success and outcome."

XIX. This does not contradict what the same theologians say, that man's conversion is solely the work of the Holy Spirit, and that the will of man is purely passive in conversion. They do not mean to deny that the acts of faith, hope, fear, and love, in which true conversion to God consists, are vital acts freely elicited by the human will, but rather that for eliciting these acts and similar ones, the natural powers of the will are utterly insufficient, and that the will, by its natural strengths, cannot cooperate with the divine grace that converts a man, nor contribute anything from itself when the Holy Spirit, through the heard word, undertakes to change and renew it and supply it with new strengths.

XX. This is also the content of what is found in the Book of Concord, in the epitome of the articles about which controversies have arisen among the theologians of the Augsburg Confession, at the end of the chapter on free will: "What Luther wrote, that man's will in conversion behaves purely passively, is to be understood correctly and dexterously, namely, with respect to divine grace in arousing new motions. This means it is to be understood when the

Spirit of God through the heard word or the use of the sacraments addresses man's will and works conversion and regeneration in man. After the Holy Spirit has worked and achieved this, and has changed and renewed man's will solely by His divine power and operation, then indeed the new will of man is the instrument and organ of the Holy Spirit, so that it not only apprehends grace but also cooperates with the Holy Spirit in the subsequent works. Therefore, before man's conversion, there are only two effective causes of conversion: namely, the Holy Spirit and the word of God, which is the instrument of the Holy Spirit by which He works man's conversion. Man certainly must hear this word, but that he actually embraces it with true faith, he can achieve only by the grace and operation of the Holy Spirit."

XXI. The Remonstrants, or Arminians, in the Netherlands, highly approve of and strictly adhere to the distinction between sufficient and efficacious grace, believing it to be supported by many scriptural passages and necessary to defend divine justice. Thus, they deny that sufficient grace is anything other than what is efficacious, meaning what actually converts a man. Although, they say, the sufficiency of grace for working conversion in a man is very powerful and effective, it does not always have an effect due to the fault and guilt of man, so that the love and desires of conversion are not always achieved. This is stated in their Synod in the declaration of the Remonstrants' position on the third and fourth articles, page 15.

XXII. They further explain the nature of this sufficient grace in the beginning of the aforementioned declaration, thesis six: "Although, by God's most free will, there is a great disparity in divine grace, the Holy Spirit confers or is ready to confer sufficient grace to all and each one to whom the word is preached, sufficient to promote the conversion of men in its stages. Therefore, sufficient grace for faith and conversion is not only given to those whom God is said to will to save according to His absolute decree of election, but also to those who do not actually convert."

XXIII. However, they do not want the efficacy of grace to be based on some omnipotent power of acting and an inevitable determination of the will to good, or even on the congruence of the calling, as some Scholastics do. Rather, they see it as such an operation of grace that certainly achieves its effect when man does not oppose it with new stubbornness and rebellion, which he could have opposed from himself. These are their words on the same page 15 of the cited declaration.

XXIV. On the next page, to explain the acts of divine grace individually, they observe that in corrupted man three aspects need correction and regeneration: the mind, the will, and the affections. They then match the triple act of divine grace to this triple subject. First, as they express their view, "God enlightens the mind with His word and the illumination of the Holy Spirit, making it certain of His saving will, and enables it to assent to the truth of the word. Although man can, either through negligence or malice of will, reject, despise, and not deeply admit this illumination and revelation when it is first externally or even internally presented to the mind, resulting in affected ignorance, it is not possible that if the truth is clearly and perspicuously presented by the Holy Spirit to the mind, the intellect does not assent, or suspend

judgment, but is determined to assent by the object thus presented and insinuated by the Spirit, and the intellect cannot resist this illumination when determined by its object."

XXV. God also inclines the will to His obedience and to acts of faith and obedience through His Holy Spirit using the word, so that the will, by that operation, not only can obey but also does obey whenever it does; not from itself, or by itself, or from itself.

XXVI. They also add to further emphasize grace in every way, that even a supernatural power is conferred upon the will, and thus God acts immediately upon the will, provided that action does not necessitate the will antecedently and does not take away its freedom and ability to will.

XXVII. They further add that with the mind illuminated and supernatural power granted to the will, partly through illumination and partly through the immediate infusion of strengths, God also corrects our affections and the sensitive part, affecting it with good desires, whose objects are shown by the intellect and commanded by the will. As these affections are increasingly corrected, disciplined, and brought into order, the will is subsequently made more prompt and easier, and less impeded, to perform acts of piety, not so much as before with the affections resisting and the law in the members warring against it.

XXVIII. Moreover, to explain the roles of both the word of God and the Holy Spirit using the word in this efficacy and operation of grace, they say that the word persuades, but the spirit using the word persuades more effectively. Furthermore, it is always safer to assert that the action of the Spirit, when it acts upon the will, has subordinated to it the action of the word, rather than to say that the action of the Spirit is collateral to the action of the word in the will and operates according to the word, not through the word, lest we seem to grant to Enthusiasts the principles of their doctrine and some secret motions, impulses, and attractions which anyone might easily imagine for themselves.

XXIX. However, to further clarify their view on the power and efficacy of divine grace, they raise many questions to which they respond briefly and distinctly. "If asked," they say, "whether the action of God in converting is only moral, by persuading, proposing, and inviting, we answer that it is more than moral. If we consider exciting grace, we say that supernatural power is also infused into the will itself, distinct from illumination. If we consider cooperating grace, we say that it can be called physical and has a real and proper efficiency."

XXX. "If asked whether there is no immediate action of the Spirit upon the will, we do not deny that there is. If asked whether the mode of operation concerning the efficacy of grace is the same in the vivification of the intellect, the affections, and the will, we respond that it is not, but the mode of acting on the will is resistible." They do not seem to simply deny that some movements might be produced irresistibly in the will by grace, but according to their hypotheses, this seems to be restricted to that efficacy by which the will is simply made good from evil.

XXXI. "If asked whether grace, besides the illumination of the mind, the excitation of the affections, and the invitation of the will, does anything by way of principle or antecedent to conversion, we respond that it does." What grace further does, according to their view, seems to be the infusion of those new strengths of which they spoke earlier.

XXXII. "If asked whether, with all the operations by which God works to effect conversion in men being set in place, conversion often or never follows, we respond that it often does not follow with antecedent and prevenient grace, but never does not follow with cooperating grace."

XXXIII. "If asked whether conversion is contingent and uncertain, or whether it follows infallibly with the necessity of cause or event in the one who is converted, we respond that conversion is contingent because it is free; yet it is not uncertain to God, for it is foreknown. It does not follow with the necessity of the cause or consequent, because man could resist, but it follows with the necessity of the consequent, that is, with infallible certainty in the one whom God has foreseen will be converted."

XXXIV. "If asked why one person is converted and another is not, we respond that the one is converted because God converts him who does not oppose new stubbornness; the other is not converted because he opposes new stubbornness. If asked why this person opposes new stubbornness and the other does not, we respond that this person opposes because he wants to oppose; the other does not oppose because he is moved by grace not to want to oppose. If asked whether the one who does not oppose new stubbornness, and consequently is converted, has greater grace than the one who opposes and consequently is not converted, we respond that antecedent and prevenient grace can be equal, but the first has cooperating grace, the latter does not."

XXXV. From this, it is clear that the Remonstrants, according to their own principles, can easily reconcile the liberty of the will with the efficacy of grace. They assume that grace which moves the will to conversion acts in a resistible manner, meaning in such a way that the will can yield to grace and accept its operation, and also can place obstacles to grace and hinder its operation. This they explain in these words on page seventeen of the often-cited declaration: "To this conversion to which man is moved by grace, he can, from his inherent depravity and affection for worldly things, place a free obstacle and often does place it, whether the will neglects and disregards the external preaching of the Gospel when it is available to him, or whether, having heard the word, he treats it perfunctorily, being more attentive to worldly matters, or whether he otherwise prevents the truth, necessity, and utility of the doctrine of the Gospel from being persuaded to him by the Holy Spirit. Either he assents to the word and its truth but is unwilling to conform his will according to the prescription of that word and obey it, or, giving rein to the flesh, he extinguishes the Spirit, resists the Spirit, and voluntarily suppresses and exterminates the good desires and thoughts often infused and presented to him. Therefore, we say that the human will is not necessitated to will good but that man can resist of himself, that is, not will, and often does not will and resists the operations of sufficient grace."

XXXVI. Besides the Remonstrants, some Reformed theologians who subscribe to the Synod of Dordrecht also distinguish between sufficient and efficacious grace, but in a somewhat different sense. Paul Testard, when he lived as pastor of the Church of Blois, used this distinction in his *Irenicum*, thesis 300, and in his book on Nature and Grace in various places. But by

sufficient grace, he understands what he calls universal grace, and by efficacious grace, he means particular grace.

XXXVII. Therefore, according to his view, this sufficient grace is not some subjective grace which inwardly disposes a man to faith and repentance, but only an objective grace, consisting in making salvation possible for man, both through the satisfaction of Christ, which removed the obstacle that divine justice placed against men obtaining forgiveness of sins, and through the external calling and invitation of God to faith and repentance, either by the preaching of the word or by the works of nature and providence.

XXXVIII. He calls this grace sufficient because it gives man the possibility to be saved if he wills, so that if a man does not become a partaker of salvation, it is solely due to his own wickedness and malignity, and he cannot complain against God as if He had denied him anything without which he absolutely could not be saved. Since he has the object presented to him in sufficient light, and the mind and will which can and ought to embrace and accept it, the only thing that prevents this from happening is his own perversity, for which he himself is responsible, and for which he has no reason to complain against God.

XXXIX. He acknowledges, however, that it never happens that anyone is saved by this sufficient grace alone unless something else is added, due to the inherent depravity and wickedness of man, which prevents him from rightly using those means proposed by God, which are otherwise sufficient for salvation. Thus, faith and repentance, to which man is sufficiently equipped by his physical faculties, are made morally impossible for him. Hence arises the necessity for some particular grace that corrects man's depravity and inwardly disposes and affects the mind and will, so that, casting off bad habits, he embraces the salvation offered externally, and flees to divine mercy through faith and repentance. This particular grace he therefore calls efficacious.

XL. However, other Reformed theologians generally reject the distinction between sufficient and efficacious grace. They believe that no grace can be truly sufficient and can be called so unless it is also efficacious. This is because, for a man to be truly converted, such divine assistance is required that not only simply moves and attracts him to good, but also bends and determines his will to will and adhere to good, without which the will would never be so inclined, due to the inherent depravity of man.

XLI. Indeed, it is the common opinion of all Reformed theologians who follow the Synod of Dordrecht that the grace of God, to which the conversion of man and all subsequent good works are attributed, is efficacious in itself, and its efficacy in no way depends on the cooperation or consent of the human will, as it is the infallible cause of this consent or cooperation. This is consistent with the decrees of that Synod. In the rejection of errors concerning the third and fourth articles, Canon 8 condemns those who teach that in man's regeneration God does not use those powers of His omnipotence by which He might powerfully and infallibly bend man's will to faith and conversion, but that man can indeed often resist and actually does often resist the regeneration intended by God and the Holy Spirit, and thus it remains within man's power to be regenerated or not. Canon 9 also condemns those who teach

that grace and free will are partial causes concurring together for the initiation of conversion, and that grace does not precede the efficiency of the human will in order of causality. That is, God does not first efficaciously aid man's will to conversion before the will itself moves and determines itself.

XLII. However, as to how God works true conversion in the elect, the same Synod explains it thus: Not only, it says, does He ensure that the gospel is externally preached to them, and their minds powerfully illuminated by the Holy Spirit so that they rightly understand and discern the things of the Spirit of God, but also the same Spirit, by the efficacy of regeneration, penetrates the innermost parts of man, opens the closed heart, softens the hard one, circumcises the uncircumcised one, infuses new qualities into the will, making it from dead alive, from evil good, from unwilling willing, from rebellious compliant, and acts upon and strengthens it so that it, like a good tree, can produce the fruits of good works. This is in the chapter on the doctrine of man's corruption and conversion, in its eleventh article.

XLIII. In the following article, it adds that this operation of God is wholly supernatural, most powerful and most gentle at the same time, wonderful, mysterious, and ineffable, in its virtue neither inferior to nor lesser than creation or the resurrection of the dead. Thus, all those in whose hearts God operates in this admirable way are certainly, infallibly, and effectively regenerated and come to believe.

XLIV. Therefore, since this operation of God does not manifest itself in those who do not truly believe and repent, the theologians who subscribe to this Synod deny that sufficient grace is given to them, however much they may be invited to repentance and faith by the external preaching of the word, and even though they may be struck by some internal movements of the Holy Spirit.

XLV. It is to be noted that the Reformed who deny that all those who are not converted have sufficient grace for conversion do not deny that in many who harden themselves in sin and do not approach God through faith and repentance, some grace of God operates. For there are, in their view, certain things that precede conversion or regeneration, which are common to both the elect and the reprobate, and which are aroused by the power of the word and the Holy Spirit in both groups. Such things are the knowledge of God's will, a sense of sin, fear of punishment, thoughts of deliverance, some hope of pardon, and other similar motions.

XLVI. They acknowledge that many whom God calls to faith and conversion in this way do not wish to follow the calling God gives and resist the Holy Spirit who suggests what is necessary for their salvation. Eventually, they utterly extinguish those motions aroused in them by the word and the Holy Spirit and thus perish eternally by their own fault.

XLVII. This is the doctrine of the British theologians, included in the acts of the Synod of Dordrecht. In explaining their view on the third and fourth articles, and discussing the prerequisites for conversion, they state in their second thesis and the following ones: There are certain internal effects that precede conversion or regeneration, which are aroused in the hearts of the unjustified by the power of the word and the Spirit. These include knowledge of the divine will, a sense of sin, fear of punishment, thoughts of deliverance, and some hope of pardon. Those

whom God thus affects, He truly and seriously calls and invites to faith and conversion. Those thus affected by God are not abandoned or ceased from being promoted towards true conversion until they abandon it through voluntary neglect or rejection of this initial grace.

XLVIII. These preceding effects, produced in the minds of people by the power of the word and the Spirit, can be suffocated and utterly extinguished by the rebellious will and often are, to the extent that some people in whose minds there was a slight knowledge of divine truth, some sorrow for their sins, some desire and concern for deliverance, completely turn to the opposite. They reject and hate the truth, abandon themselves to their lusts, become hardened in their sins, and rot in them without any desire or concern for deliverance.

XLIX. They add that even the elect themselves never conduct themselves in these preceding acts of regeneration in such a way that, because of their negligence and resistance, they could justly be abandoned and forsaken by God. But God's special mercy towards them ensures that even though they may repel or suffocate this awakening and illuminating grace for a while, God repeatedly urges them and does not cease to promote them until He has completely subdued them to His grace and placed them in the state of regenerated children.

L. Moreover, although the doctors of the Reformed School agree that grace exerts its efficacy not only on the mind of man but also on the will, powerfully and infallibly inclining and determining it to the good, they nevertheless differ somewhat on the manner in which grace moves our will so that it is inclined towards God and consents to the good.

LI. For Paul Testard, Moses Amyrald, and others who follow Cameron's method and doctrine in the matter of grace, teach that the efficacy of divine grace, which converts man to God, engenders faith in Christ, and inflames his heart with the love of God, consists in this: that the saving truth proposed in the Gospel is presented to the mind in such a way, and the mind is internally disposed by the secret power of the Spirit, so that man forms the firmest and most efficacious persuasion of that truth. He concludes that there is nothing better or more conducive to obtaining true happiness than adhering to Christ and obeying His Gospel. Consequently, the will, which according to their hypothesis necessarily follows the direction and judgment of the practical intellect, embraces the saving good offered by the Gospel and indicated by the intellect, and eagerly accepts it. It thus turns entirely to God, being averted from vain and earthly things, in which its renewal and sanctification consist.

LII. Therefore, they assert that the efficacy of divine grace is primarily and immediately exerted on the mind alone and only secondarily and consequentially on the affections and the will. Thus, the renewal of the will and affections does not occur except through the renewal of the intellect, as the fruits and outcomes of the renewed mind extend to those faculties subject to the intellect's guidance. This can be seen in Paul Testard's "Irenico" thesis 224 and following.

LIII. From the aforementioned, it is clear that their view significantly differs from that of those who believe that the entire efficacy of grace lies in a certain moral persuasion, which leaves the will in indifference and can be rejected or accepted by it. For in those who are converted by God's grace, they not only acknowledge a certain persuasion by the Spirit of God through the word but also a very strong and forceful persuasion, which seizes the will and most

efficaciously moves it, gently yet certainly and infallibly determining it to the good and extracting consent from it, not merely expecting it as from a doubtful and indifferent source.

LIV. However, other theologians of the Reformed School assert that the immediate operation of grace affects not only the mind by illuminating it and flooding it with new light but also the will itself, in which it physically and really works the consent it gives to divine admonitions.

LV. This view is taught and explained by Amesius in "Bellarminus Enervatus" book three, chapter three on Grace. He says, "We assert that with moral persuasion is also joined a real efficiency of God, whereby a new principle of spiritual life is effectively implanted in the heart of man called by grace, and man is simultaneously stirred to elicit the acts of this life."

LVI. He also fully supports and recognizes as his own the view of Didacus Alvarus, which is that God, through the help of efficacious grace, physically, or in the manner of a physical cause, predetermines the created will so that it infallibly consents and cooperates with God calling and stirring it. Using Alvarus's words, he says that to physically predetermine means nothing other than to truly, effectively, or really cause the will to infallibly cooperate with God. And that the help of grace, effective in itself, as it comes from God before the free cooperation of the will, and physical predetermining aid signify the same thing.

LVII. However much these and other doctors of the Reformed School may extol the efficacy of divine grace, they do not wish it to prejudice human will's liberty in any way. They hold that all good works done by man through God's grace are done freely, and thus the very first act of conversion is no less free than those that follow it, being not only a vital operation of our will but freely elicited by it.

LVIII. However, how these things agree among themselves, not all attempt to show in the same way. Indeed, the previously cited Amesius, following Didacus Alvarus, tries to reconcile the immediate and efficacious operation and determination of divine grace on the will with the liberty of the will itself in acting and obeying grace. He says that a person who acts freely retains the power not to act. Now grace, though it moves and determines the will to act, does not remove the power not to act. For the power not to act exists in the same subject along with the grace and aid required to act and makes someone act, even though grace and aid to act in a particular operation and the absence of such an act are never and cannot be together in the same subject. Others say that grace determines the act but does not remove all indifference and indetermination from the faculty.

LIX. However, those earlier followers of Cameron, based on their hypothesis, do not find it difficult to show how the certain and infallible operation of grace, not dependent on the consent of our will, fits well with human liberty. According to their doctrine, that operation is certain and infallible because a rightly disposed mind, behaving in accordance with nature, cannot fail to embrace and judge as good the truth presented and recognized as such. When there is a fitting approach and application of the object to the faculty, which is in a proper state, a nature-conforming operation necessarily follows. Similarly, the will cannot help but will and follow what the intellect, after considering everything, judges should be willed and followed.

LX. However, this does not detract from liberty, whether on the part of the intellect or the will. Not on the part of the intellect, because this grace bestows only these two things: first, that the evangelical truth is presented to it in a suitable light; and second, that it is restored to a fitting state or even somewhat elevated above its natural condition. Although the intellect cannot fail to give assent to the recognized truth, no force is applied to it by the truth presented, and it acts most congruently with its nature when it assents to the truth. Hence, if any species of liberty is attributed to it, it is not harmed in this matter. And much less can the internal operation of grace, which either restores lost powers to the intellect or even supplies new ones, prejudice the liberty of the intellect if it is considered to have any.

LXI. On the part of the will, although the operation of grace described necessarily elicits its consent, it does not in any way take away its liberty. For grace does not move and determine the will except through the judgment of the practical intellect. But according to the opinion of those learned men, the necessity and determination of the acts of the will arising from the judgment of the practical intellect do not prevent them from proceeding freely from the will. Since the liberty of the will is not opposed to every kind of necessity but only to that which arises from external force, from matter, or from sense. This is more extensively discussed by Moses Amyraut in his treatise on free will, especially in Section Four, and similarly in the posthumous book by Joshua Placeus on the same subject.

LXII. However, the older theologians of the Reformed School more simply respond that grace does not take away liberty from the will, although it imposes some necessity on it, because not all necessity is opposed to liberty, but only that which arises from external force or natural determination. Grace, however, does not compel the will, nor does it apply any force to it, but gently bends it and does so in a manner consistent with its nature.

LXIII. Furthermore, the Reformed School theologians admit that the man who is converted by God's grace freely elicits the very first act of conversion, which at first glance does not seem to agree with what they commonly teach, and with the theologians of the Augsburg Confession, namely, that man in the work of his regeneration and conversion is purely passive. How can the human will freely elicit the act of conversion and yet be purely passive in its own conversion? Does the will that is supposed to operate freely behave purely passively?

LXIV. This difficulty is resolved by the British theologians in their explanation of their view on the third and fourth articles, included in the acts of the Synod of Dordrecht. They observe that conversion can be understood in two senses. First, it denotes the immediate work of God regenerating a man. Second, it denotes the action of a man converting himself to God through faith and repentance. In the work of conversion or regeneration taken in the first sense, man is passive and it is not within the power of the human will to prevent God from thus immediately converting and regenerating. However, in conversion taken in the second sense, the will, having been acted upon by God, acts and elicits the acts which constitute our conversion to God.

LXV. Moreover, they say that conversion, as it designates the immediate work of God, involves God regenerating the souls of His elect, who have been previously aroused and

prepared by various acts of His grace, with a certain intimate and marvelous operation, and as if creating them anew. This is done by infusing a vivifying spirit and endowing all the faculties of the soul with new qualities. According to their view, this conversion is followed, not in time but in nature, by our actual conversion, whereby God causes the very act of believing and converting to arise from the changed will. Thus acted upon by God, the will itself acts by converting to God and believing, that is, by eliciting its own vital act. They add that this divine action does not harm the liberty of the will but rather strengthens it; it does not eradicate the deeply rooted potential for resistance but effectively and gently gives man a firm will to obey.

LXVI. The same is taught by the Hessian theologians in their exposition of their view on the third and fourth articles, also included in the acts of the same synod. Their sixth thesis on man in a state of grace reads as follows: Therefore, the will of man in receiving supernatural qualities, faculties, and powers, as well as new inclinations, behaves purely passively. Thus, the action of the Holy Spirit infusing those supernatural powers into the will and effectively and powerfully bending and inclining it to conversion and faith does not depend on human will, nor on its cooperation or consent. However, the acts of faith, charity, hope, and other virtues, as well as good movements, are not purely passive but both passive and active. With the grace of God preceding and moving, and with subsequent assistance, the will also acts and produces the acts of faith, charity, hope, and other virtues. Hence, we are said to believe, hope, and love not only by God in us or through us but by ourselves through the grace of God.

LXVII. From what has been set forth so far, it is easy to infer that the Remonstrants and the theologians of the Augsburg Confession differ somewhat in method and terminology regarding the doctrine of sufficient and efficacious grace, but they agree on the substance of the matter. Namely, the theologians of the Augsburg Confession deny that grace should rightly be divided into efficacious and sufficient, while the Remonstrants affirm this distinction and highly approve of it. However, the intent of the theologians of the Augsburg Confession is not to imply that those who hear the Word of God and do not convert lack any aid from God necessary for their conversion, or that the grace given and offered to them is not sufficient to produce faith and repentance in them. On the contrary, they assert that the grace offered to unbelievers and impenitent people merits not only the name of sufficient but also efficacious because it is efficacious in itself to lead them to repentance and faith unless they themselves persist in placing obstacles in its way.

LXVIII. On the other hand, the Remonstrants do not distinguish grace into sufficient and efficacious because they think that the grace received by those who remain unbelieving and persist in their sins lacks the necessary and requisite power and efficacy to bring about conversion in them and thus deserves only the name of sufficient and not also efficacious. They acknowledge that those who reject the Gospel preached to them lack no necessary aid for conceiving faith. But they deny the name of efficacious to the grace they participate in only because it does not produce the intended effect in them due to the obstacles those people place, not because the grace itself lacks the necessary efficacy.

LXIX. Both parties thus agree and teach that the grace given to those who refuse to obey the Gospel has sufficient power to convert them and that it fails to achieve its effect in them solely because they resist its movements and voluntarily place obstacles in its way. Conversely, they also agree that the faithful and those who seriously convert to God could, if they wished, place an obstacle to the grace that is efficacious in them and hinder its effect by their contumacy, and that no necessity was imposed on them by that grace to believe and convert to God.

LXX. Therefore, the Remonstrants are no worse off in this respect than those called Lutherans. Consequently, since the Reformed do not avoid their communion but instead invite them to brotherly peace and concord, the Remonstrants should not repel them from their communion for this doctrinal point if they do not err more gravely but should consider their view tolerable and not pernicious to piety.

LXXI. If anyone compares what we have previously recounted in the theses about Molina with the doctrine of the Remonstrants set forth in these theses, it will clearly appear that the Remonstrants, regarding the efficacy and sufficiency of grace, indeed hold the same view as many doctors of the Roman School who follow Molina today. Both parties agree that out of two people prevented by equal grace, one can convert while the other does not because one freely places an obstacle to grace while the other does not. They also agree that those who do not convert receive from God aids of grace abundantly sufficient for their conversion so that nothing more is required on God's part for their actual conversion to follow.

LXXII. Nor have we less clearly demonstrated that those who subscribe to the Synod of Dordrecht, together with the more recent Thomists and also those who adhere to Jansenism, essentially hold and teach the same doctrine concerning efficacious and sufficient grace. And if they seem to differ in some respects, the contention is either verbal or not very significant.

LXXIII. Indeed, the Reformed who approve of that Synod, together with those doctors of the Roman School, agree and acknowledge that those who are converted by God's grace freely elicit the acts of conversion and that divine grace infallibly ensures that they believe and repent, yet in a manner that is consistent with a rational and free nature, and so that it does not simply take away the power to act otherwise and to omit those pious acts.

LXXIV. They also readily concede that those who hear the Gospel and do not convert or renounce sin, besides the external grace of preaching, receive many internal aids of grace and that God in various ways knocks at their heart and enlightens their mind to turn away from sin and give the proper faith to the Gospel. Thus, they perish only by their own fault, and it stands solely because of their perversity and contumacy that they do not become partakers of salvation.

LXXV. In turn, both those who are called Jansenists and the more recent Thomists acknowledge that the efficacy of grace is such that it not only invites and solicits the will to good but also powerfully bends and determines it; nor is its efficacy to be suspended on the consent of free will, since it infallibly and irresistibly brings about that consent in those whom it converts.

LXXVI. They also openly admit that all those who refuse to believe or are hardened in their sins lack some necessary and prerequisite aid from God in order to actually conceive faith and truly repent of their sins.

LXXVII. Therefore, the assertion of the more recent Thomists that those in whom grace is not efficacious for conversion nevertheless have sufficient grace for conversion, which the Reformed and Jansenists deny, is a mere verbal dispute. For the Thomists do not intend to assert by this that those who do not convert lack any antecedent aid from God necessary for their conversion, which is the only thing the Jansenists and the Reformed deny when they say those do not have sufficient grace. The Thomists would easily concede that the grace given to such persons could be called sufficient in a certain respect and in its own kind.

LXXVIII. This is particularly evident in the judgment of the theologians of Nassau-Wetteravia regarding the third and fourth articles, which is found in the acts of the Synod of Dordrecht. There, explaining their thesis on the intention of God in man's calling, they say that the grace of preaching and illumination, which is common to both hypocrites and the pious, is sufficient for conversion in a certain respect, that is, in the order of secondary causes or means, as no other means of conversion, whether external preaching or internal illumination, are required besides these. But it is not sufficient for conversion simply, that is, without the grace of internal drawing; without which Scripture declares that it is impossible for anyone to convert and come to Christ.

LXXIX. The difference between the Thomists and Jansenists and the Reformed School doctors in explaining the nature of efficacious grace and defining in what it consists—when the Thomists place it in a certain virtuous motion in the will, as an impetus in the thing impelled, Jansenists in the affections of love and desire for celestial and spiritual good, by which the human soul is gently drawn upward, the disciples of Cameron in the most powerful illumination and persuasion of the mind which carries the will and affections with it, and others in the omnipotent and most efficacious operation of God, whereby a new principle of spiritual life is introduced into the heart of the called person, and he is simultaneously excited to elicit the acts of this life—is a matter that pertains merely to scholastic dispute. Learned men may speak and think about it in various ways, and the statements made by most learned men appear to be reconcilable rather than opposed.

LXXX. Nevertheless, the great variety of opinions and doctrines concerning the nature and essence of efficacious grace and the manner and way in which it operates in the minds of men, which have occupied Christian schools for so many centuries, indicate that the matter is complex, obscure, and fraught with many difficulties on all sides. There is no hope of ending the disputes unless a limit is set on curiosity and arduous and unnecessary questions are abandoned. Indeed, it would be far wiser and more conducive to Christian peace and piety to abstain altogether from such questions than to endlessly quarrel over matters that overwhelm the human mind with their difficulty and in which hardly anyone can satisfy himself.

LXXXI. Especially since such questions are proposed to the Christian populace in sermons and homilies, not only without benefit but often with great harm, as various scruples are instilled in the minds of the simple which the skill and eloquence of the disputants cannot afterwards satisfactorily resolve. Therefore, it would be safest and most suitable to Christian prudence and sobriety, especially when speaking to the people about these matters, to stick to

what Christian teachers agree upon and what is sufficient for instructing piety and faith. Such as, all the good that is in us and that we do is owed to divine grace. It is God who works every good thing in us. Without Christ and the help of His Spirit, we can do nothing that promotes our eternal salvation. There is nothing we have that we did not receive from God for free and about which we can boast over another. Therefore, in all things, we are bound to implore God's grace and, if we have done anything good and right, to give thanks to Him.

LXXXII. Nevertheless, God, who is the author and creator of our nature and knows best how the human mind should be moved by reason, works in us through His grace in such a way that nothing is taken away from our liberty, and He moves us to do good not as if we were blocks of wood or stones but as befits rational creatures. Hence, the necessity and efficacy of divine grace do not in any way nullify our care and diligence in doing good works, nor do they exempt us from laboring and watching, just because we need God's help in everything. However great the necessity of grace may be, the impious who act wickedly and refuse to obey God's word have no reason to complain against God. For God invites them to repentance and provides them with the means of salvation in such a way that they fall into perdition solely by their own fault, and it is to be attributed solely to their contumacy and rebellion that they do not attain eternal salvation.

LXXXIII. These things, which no one doubts, should suffice for all Christians, in my opinion, without further and more curious investigation into both the inner nature of human liberty and the manner in which grace operates in us and how its efficacy is to be reconciled with our free will, about which there are no explicit, clear, and express oracles in Scripture. If anyone, however, insists on philosophizing further and more accurately about these matters in the schools, it should at least be hoped that it is done with the utmost moderation of mind and a sincere acknowledgment of our own darkness and ignorance in such difficult matters, which would remove all bitterness from disputes about such a grave and difficult subject and mold minds towards mutual Christian and fraternal tolerance, which God, through His same grace, may grant to those who preside over Christian schools.

LXXXIV. By way of appendix, it seems fitting to briefly state what the present-day Socinians attribute to the aids of divine grace in the conversion of man and in the business of piety. They suppose that the will of man is not so bound by nature to sin that he cannot will or not will to do something in matters pertaining to religion and eternal salvation and further, when he has received the doctrine of the Gospel in his ears, can actually believe and obey God's precepts. For they say that God willed that our will, from which the piety of life proceeds and is judged, should be placed in our choice and power, although He customarily promotes, hinders, or permits its external act according to His will. Hence they conclude that the good will that is in us is ours, not God's.

LXXXV. If anyone objects that if this is the case, much will be detracted from God's governance, which is seen in ruling the world, they respond that the internal act of our will, which God has placed ordinarily in our power alone, has no impact on the governance of the world, but its external effect, which is so placed in God's power that nothing can happen without His decree, aid, or permission. However, free will extends its force so that with God's aid or His

mere permission, man can not only entertain the thought of accomplishing something but also complete it in execution.

LXXXVI. Specifically regarding good actions commanded by the will, which God wants us to perform, they acknowledge that they can very often not be done without God's help. However, they do not think this prevents them from being in our power in their own way. This is because God denies His help to no one who sincerely comes to Him. Therefore, if anyone, lacking divine aid, does not obey His commands, he should attribute the blame to himself and has no excuse for his sin because he did not sincerely implore God's help or did not want to embrace the aids that God supplied for cultivating piety. This evil flows solely from the person's own wickedness, for it happens that he does not adapt his will to those things which are approved by God. If he did so, there would be no doubt that he would try every way and means to accomplish them and, as a result, would always resort to divine aid and thus, being surrounded by it, would easily attain knowledge of divine matters and focus his whole mind on the study of God.

LXXXVII. They say, moreover, that God assists human endeavors in a twofold manner: one is external, consisting either in threatening or promising, although promises have greater power to inflame men with zeal for God; the other is internal help, which God affords when He imprints more deeply in our souls the promises made and confirmed by external testimonies through divine power, or instructs us with a fuller knowledge of His will.

LXXXVIII. If anyone says that our willing, no less than our external work, in matters of saving good is attributed to God in Scripture, as in Paul's words to the Philippians, "For it is God who works in us both to will and to work for His good pleasure," they respond that these words and similar ones, which attribute human conversion to God, do not mean that God absolutely and necessarily brings about in humans what the words imply. Rather, God omits nothing that pertains to achieving this, while preserving the liberty of our will. Specifically, because God allures and invites us to will good by the magnitude of His benefits and the certainty and supreme excellence and amplitude of His promises, He makes it so that we not only can will, which is naturally within us, but actually do will. However, He accomplishes this in such a way that it is always within our power to resist the efficacy of this divine grace. This is more extensively discussed by the Socinian Volkelius in the fifth book, eighteenth chapter of "De Vera Religione."

THEOLOGICAL THESES

In which it is explained

Whether and to what extent a person can fulfill the LAW through the grace of CHRIST and keep God's commandments.

Thesis I

Man was created by God in such a state that he could provide complete and perfect obedience to the law given by God without any flaw or fault. Indeed, it would not have been fair for God to demand from His innocent creature something for which He had not given sufficient power or means to accomplish. Scripture confirms this by teaching that God made man upright. A person who could not conform to God's law, which is the standard of uprightness, could not be considered upright.

II. However, man, having voluntarily transgressed God's law, lost the gifts and aids by which he could keep God's law. Thus, having become a slave to sin, he could not, of himself, satisfy the law in any part, nor offer obedience pleasing and acceptable to God. Far from being able to fully keep the law, it is necessary for anyone who seeks to attain life through the law to do so. Sacred Scripture clearly teaches this, affirming that humans, apart from the grace of Christ, are dead in sins, and that without Him, they can do nothing. They are not sufficient to think anything of themselves, as if from themselves; the wisdom of the flesh is enmity against God, is not subject to God's law, nor indeed can it be.

III. But God, having mercy on humanity lost by its own fault, sent His Son Christ into the world, who not only freed people from the penalties justly deserved for their sins but also delivered them from the bondage of sin. He conferred grace through which they could again serve God in true righteousness and holiness and begin new obedience to His commandments.

IV. This grace, pertaining to the new covenant in Christ, was frequently promised by God through the prophets. Thus, God speaks through Ezekiel (chapter 11): "I will give them one heart, and put a new spirit within them; and I will remove the heart of stone from their flesh and give them a heart of flesh, that they may walk in My statutes and keep My ordinances and do them. Then they will be My people, and I shall be their God." And again in chapter 36: "I will sprinkle clean water on you, and you will be clean; I will cleanse you from all your impurities and from all your idols. I will give you a new heart and put a new spirit within you; I will remove from you your heart of stone and give you a heart of flesh. And I will put My Spirit within you and cause you to walk in My statutes, and you will be careful to observe My ordinances."

V. Similar words are found in Jeremiah (chapter 31): "Behold, the days are coming," declares the Lord, "when I will make a new covenant with the house of Israel and with the house of Judah, not like the covenant which I made with their fathers in the day I took them by the hand to bring them out of the land of Egypt, My covenant which they broke, although I was a husband to them," declares the Lord. "But this is the covenant which I will make with the house of Israel after those days," declares the Lord, "I will put My law within them and on their heart I will write it; and I will be their God, and they shall be My people." And in the following chapter: "I will give them one heart and one way, that they may fear Me always, for their own good and for the good of their children after them. I will make an everlasting covenant with them: I will never stop doing good to them, and I will inspire them to fear Me, so that they will never turn away from Me."

VI. Moses had also foretold similar things, saying in Deuteronomy (chapter 30): "The Lord your God will circumcise your heart and the heart of your descendants, to love the Lord

your God with all your heart and with all your soul, so that you may live." And shortly after: "You shall again obey the Lord, and observe all His commandments which I command you today. Then the Lord your God will prosper you abundantly in all the work of your hand."

VII. Indeed, unless God granted such grace to people by which they could offer true and sincere obedience to His commandments, none of them could be saved. None could rightly trust that God would show them the beneficence and mercy He offers and grants in Christ. For God promises to deal mercifully and kindly only with those who keep His covenant and do His commandments, as seen in Psalm 103: "But the mercy of the Lord is from everlasting to everlasting upon them that fear Him, and His righteousness unto children's children; to such as keep His covenant, and to those that remember His commandments to do them." This is consistent with what is read in Ezekiel (chapter 18): "But if a wicked person turns away from all his sins which he has committed and keeps all My statutes and does what is lawful and right, he shall surely live; he shall not die. None of the transgressions which he has committed shall be remembered against him; because of his righteousness that he has done, he shall live."

VIII. This also aligns with what Christ declares in Revelation, pronouncing blessed those who keep God's commandments and excluding from the city of God all who indulge in vices, love, and practice falsehood: "Blessed are those who do His commandments, that they may have the right to the tree of life, and may enter through the gates into the city. But outside are dogs and sorcerers and sexually immoral and murderers and idolaters, and whoever loves and practices a lie," (Revelation 22).

IX. No one can be considered truly in communion with Christ or to truly know and love Him who does not keep God's commandments. As John says: "By this, we know that we have come to know Him if we keep His commandments. The one who says, 'I have come to know Him,' and does not keep His commandments, is a liar, and the truth is not in him," (1 John 2). Similarly, "The one who keeps His commandments abides in Him, and He in him," (1 John 3). And in chapter 5: "For this is the love of God, that we keep His commandments." Hence, Paul teaches that the only thing of any importance in Christ is the keeping of God's commandments: "Circumcision is nothing, and uncircumcision is nothing, but what matters is the keeping of the commandments of God," (1 Corinthians 7).

X. However, the fact that the faithful can keep God's commandments through divine grace is most evidently proven by experience itself. For, according to Scripture, many holy and pious people have indeed kept God's commandments. David does not hesitate to affirm this about himself in Psalm 119: "I hastened and did not delay to keep Your commandments." Also, "My soul has kept Your testimonies, and I love them exceedingly. I have kept Your commandments and Your testimonies, for all my ways are before You." Luke the Evangelist gives the same testimony about Zacharias and his wife Elizabeth: "They were both righteous before God, walking blamelessly in all the commandments and ordinances of the Lord." Indeed, all the pious and faithful are frequently described in Scripture as those who keep God's commandments, as David says in the cited Psalm: "I am a companion of all who fear You and of those who keep Your precepts."

XI. Thus, with good reason, John in his first epistle, chapter 5, affirms that God's commandments are not burdensome. For not only do they demand nothing from us that is not very agreeable to nature and reason, and most beneficial to us, but God also provides the strength by which His commandments can be performed, and through His grace enables the pious and faithful to observe them.

XII. Furthermore, since the faithful, in whom divine grace operates, are said in Scripture to keep God's commandments, there is no doubt that in some sense they can also be said to fulfill God's law. For God's commandments are the same as God's law. To keep God's commandments and to fulfill the same law signify one and the same thing. Indeed, it cannot be denied that true and sincere charity, that is, the love of God and neighbor, is found in those who are regenerated by the Spirit of God. For those who believe in Christ and are born again by His Spirit have passed from death to life. As the Apostle John testifies, "He who does not love remains in death" (1 John 3:14). Therefore, anyone who lives a spiritual life necessarily loves God and their neighbor. Moreover, "love is the fulfillment of the law," and "he who loves has fulfilled the law," as Paul explicitly teaches in Romans 13.

XIII. Additionally, the fulfillment of the righteousness of the law in us and our fulfillment of the law and its righteousness seem to be the same thing. The Apostle teaches that Christ came into the world so that the righteousness of the law might be fulfilled in us, who do not walk according to the flesh, but according to the Spirit. For, he says, "what the law could not do, in that it was weak through the flesh, God did by sending His own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, and for sin condemned sin in the flesh, that the righteous requirement of the law might be fulfilled in us who do not walk according to the flesh but according to the Spirit" (Romans 8:3-4).

XIV. Although the faithful, who are led by the Spirit of God, can, in a true and proper sense, be said to fulfill God's law and keep His commandments according to the style and custom of Scripture, they are far from being able to perfectly fulfill the law and offer exact and absolutely complete obedience to God's precepts.

XV. To perfectly fulfill the law means to satisfy it in every part, according to its entire rigor, without failing in any of the things that the law precisely demands from a person, so that one might attain life by the law, according to the clause "Do this and live," and claim the happiness promised by the law as a right, without any fear of the penalties that the law threatens against transgressors. However, no one fulfills the law in this sense and respect, except one who is entirely free from sin and has never transgressed the law. For all who have sinned even once are judged and condemned by the law, strictly interpreted, and are subject to its curse, according to this terrible clause: "Cursed is everyone who does not continue in all things which are written in the book of the law, to do them." The law justifies and absolves no one freely, but only from a debt, according to Paul's doctrine in Romans 4. Every sinner, whoever he may be, needs God's grace and mercy, and cannot be justified except freely.

XVI. Now, there is no one among humans who has not at some time transgressed the law. For all are born in sin, and by nature are slaves to sin, indeed dead in sins, and would remain

perpetually in that death and slavery unless they were raised and freed from it by the grace of Christ. As we briefly showed above, and as Scripture inculcates so often and so clearly that it seems superfluous to heap up testimonies about it here. Paul especially urges and insists on this doctrine in his epistles, particularly in the first four chapters of Romans, where he convincingly argues that all have sinned and are under sin, both Jews and Greeks, according to these Scriptures: "There is none righteous, no, not one; there is none who understands; there is none who seeks after God. They have all turned aside; they have together become unprofitable; there is none who does good, no, not one." Hence he concludes that no one will be justified in God's sight by the works of the law, but all are justified freely by God's grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus. From this, it follows that no one perfectly fulfills God's law in every respect, for if anyone fulfilled the law in that way, he would undoubtedly be justified by the works of the law, and that from a debt, not from grace.

XVII. However, not only are humans naturally immersed in sin and convicted by the law of sin, but even after they are reborn through grace, they are far from rendering perfect obedience to the law. Even the most holy among them daily fall into many sins, according to James' statement, "We all stumble in many ways" (James 3:2). And John, in his first epistle, chapter 1, says, "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us." This aligns with the wise statement in Ecclesiastes, chapter 7, "There is no one on earth who is righteous, no one who does what is right and never sins."

XVIII. Moreover, not only are those regenerated by Christ's grace subject to minor and small sins, but hardly any of them avoid falling into serious sins at times, by which they incur anew the guilt of eternal death and lose their present fitness for the heavenly kingdom until they are raised up by God's special grace through singular repentance. This is clearly demonstrated by the frequent lapses of saints mentioned in Scripture, such as David, who fell into adultery and murder, and Peter, who denied Christ three times with an oath. This is also confirmed too often by the daily experience of the faithful.

XIX. Indeed, even the obedience that the faithful render to the law is not without its defects and blemishes. Even in those works they perform in conformity to the law, they do not fully achieve the highest standard of the law, always leaving room for progress and something to strive for. This is evident from Paul's example. For it will hardly be found that anyone was granted as much measure of grace as Christ did to him. Yet, he confesses that he is not yet perfect and that he continually strives for further progress. He says in Philippians 3, "Not that I have already obtained all this, or have already been made perfect, but I press on to take hold of that for which Christ Jesus took hold of me. Brothers and sisters, I do not consider myself yet to have taken hold of it. But one thing I do: Forgetting what is behind and straining toward what is ahead, I press on toward the goal to win the prize for which God has called me heavenward in Christ Jesus."

XX. But, you might say, the Apostle himself implies that some are perfect, and includes himself among them. For he adds, "All of us, then, who are mature should take such a view of things" (Philippians 3:15). And in 1 Corinthians 2, he says, "We do, however, speak a message

of wisdom among the mature." Many holy men in Scripture are also testified to be perfect. Thus, it is said of Noah, "Noah was a righteous man, blameless among the people of his time, and he walked faithfully with God" (Genesis 6:9). And God Himself, speaking to Satan about Job, says, "Have you considered my servant Job? There is no one on earth like him; he is blameless and upright, a man who fears God and shuns evil" (Job 1:8). Indeed, David in Psalm 18 does not hesitate to attribute such perfection to himself. He says, "I have been blameless before him and have kept myself from sin. The LORD has rewarded me according to my righteousness, according to the cleanness of my hands in his sight."

XXI. To solve this difficulty, it is necessary to observe a twofold distinction of perfection. There is an absolute perfection, and there is a relative and comparative perfection. Absolute perfection is that in which nothing is lacking in its own kind. Relatively perfect things, however, are those which, although they fall short of the highest perfection, surpass many others of the same kind with which they are compared. When we say that no one in this life is perfect, or can render perfect obedience to the divine will, we mean absolute perfection, which reaches the highest level and to which nothing can be added. In this sense, Paul acknowledges that he is not yet perfect because he has not yet reached that level of love and obedience to God which the blessed spirits reigning with Christ have attained. Their knowledge and obedience can no longer increase since they are wholly devoted to God with all their strength and will. However, this does not prevent the faithful, who excel in virtue and who have made greater progress in the knowledge of divine truth and in the pursuit of piety and justice, from being called perfect, not absolutely, but in relation to those who fall far short of them. These are, as Paul says, infants in Christ and somewhat carnal compared to those who are uniquely spiritual, as seen in 1 Corinthians 3. These are the more mature Christians, if I may say so, of greater age and stature, whom Paul calls perfect in the aforementioned passages, "We speak a message of wisdom among the mature," and "All of us, then, who are mature should take such a view of things."

XXII. A related distinction is often made between the perfection of parts and the perfection of degrees. Perfect obedience in terms of degrees is that which has reached the highest degree of perfection and by which one so perfectly conforms to and obeys the law that nothing is lacking in it, and it cannot be improved. In this respect, we contend, and it is evident in itself, that no one perfectly fulfills the law in this life. However, obedience that falls far short of the highest degree of perfection can still be and is called perfect according to parts; because, with respect to its essential and integral parts, it lacks none of the necessary elements to be true and acceptable obedience to God. In this sense, the obedience of the pious in this life is perfect. In this respect, the faithful, who are renewed by Christ's grace and led by His Spirit, can perfectly fulfill God's law, that is, render true and sincere obedience acceptable to God according to His commandments. For such essential perfection is nothing else but the truth and sincerity of the thing itself.

XXIII. To make this clearer, it must be observed that three main things are required for our obedience to be true and sincere. First, it must be rendered not only in body and outward action but also with the inward affection of the heart. For it is of no benefit to do what the law

commands unless it is done out of love for God and with the intent of fulfilling His will and promoting His glory. Moreover, it is not enough to have a certain affection to obey God if His commandments are not also fulfilled in action when required. Secondly, true obedience is not achieved by keeping some of God's commandments while neglecting others; rather, we must seriously subject ourselves to all the precepts of divine law and strive to fulfill them whenever the opportunity presents itself. Lastly, our obedience must be constant and persevering. It is not sufficient to obey God temporarily, but we must persevere in His service to the end, through both adversity and prosperity.

XXIV. In all these respects, there is nothing lacking in the obedience of those who are truly pious and regenerated by the Spirit of God. They do not serve God merely with their bodies, but they also subject their minds and affections to His will. They not only perform outward actions prescribed by the law, but they do so with the intent of glorifying God and out of love for Him. They strive not only to obey some of His commands while neglecting others, but they endeavor to conform themselves to the entire law of God and all its precepts. This obedience is not temporary or only when things go well but continues even when faced with temptations and persecutions, holding God's commandments before their eyes until their last breath and aligning their actions to His norms.

XXV. Therefore, their obedience rightly deserves to be attributed with the perfection that is often called "perfection of parts" in scholarly terms. They strive to observe the whole law and all its precepts, with both the acts of the body and the affections of the mind, consistently and perseveringly. Certainly, if this were not so, Scripture would not attribute true righteousness and holiness to the faithful, as it does when it says that they are clothed with the new self, created to be like God in true righteousness and holiness (Ephesians 4:24). True righteousness cannot be considered such if it lacks essential parts. This is the perfection attributed to Job and Noah, and which David does not hesitate to claim for himself. For in these instances, perfection merely signifies the integrity and sincerity of these holy men. The Hebrew word "Tham" or "thamin," which is translated as "perfect," properly means "complete" and "sincere."

XXVI. Thus, we deny that the faithful can perfectly fulfill God's law if we speak of absolute perfection and degrees. This is because, first, like all other men, they are naturally sinners; second, even after receiving grace, they continue to offend in many ways and remain susceptible to serious lapses; and finally, even in their good works, they do not reach the highest standard of perfection that the law in its rigor demands. Yet, in agreement with Scripture, we assert and teach that the faithful keep God's commandments through Christ's grace and in some way fulfill the law, providing true and God-approved obedience to the divine law according to all its precepts. This obedience, although far from the highest perfection, can still be called perfect in the scriptural sense because it is true and sincere, lacking nothing that is necessarily required for true and acceptable obedience to God.

XXVII. This explanation of the orthodox view must be carefully noted, especially in light of the teachings of Roman Church doctors who, in this question as in many others, either do not understand or deliberately misrepresent the doctrine of the Reformed Schools. They attribute to

Protestant theologians the claim that Christ's faithful cannot keep God's commandments and fulfill the law in such a way that some of their works can be called just. Indeed, they argue that the law is utterly impossible for a person justified by Christ's grace to keep, so that no good works can be done, nor any actual righteousness exists in them. This is evident in the writings of Bellarmine (*De Justificatione*, lib. 4, cap. 10) and Becanus in his *Summa Theologiae Scholasticae* (tom. 2, tract. 4, cap. 4), titled "*De merito bonorum operum ex sententia Calvinistarum*."

XXVIII. Based on this false hypothesis, they pose a state of controversy between us and themselves that does not actually exist, namely, whether justified men, aided by the grace of the Lord, can so fulfill the divine law that their works are not only not to be called sins but also truly and properly deserve to be called just. These are the words of Bellarmine in the cited chapter 10. Similar statements are found in Gabriel Vasquez (tom. 2 in 1-2, disp. 212) under the title, "*An justi homines possint ita adimplere legem, ut opera ipsorum, non modo non sint peccata, sed etiam justa dicenda sint*."

XXIX. But it was never the intention of Protestants to deny any of these points. They do not teach that the law of God is utterly impossible for the justified. They do not deny that the faithful render true obedience to God's commandments and that the law of God is so fulfilled by the pious through Christ's grace that they perform good works. Nor do they claim that the works of those striving to conform to the law under the guidance of the divine Spirit are to be called sins or are inherently sinful. Instead, they acknowledge that such works can and should be called holy and just. The only thing they consistently deny is that the faithful can perfectly fulfill the law because their obedience, while true and sincere, always falls far short of the highest perfection.

XXX. To prevent any misrepresentation, we will provide some testimonies from Protestant theologians, though reviewing every single one would be excessive and unnecessary. Moreover, the matter is sufficiently clear to any attentive observer. Therefore, Paraeus writes in his commentary on Bellarmine (lib. 4, de Justif., cap. 10): "The question is whether the justified can fulfill the divine law. The adversary absolutely affirms this, but we grant imperfect and initiated fulfillment and deny perfect fulfillment." He later explains what it means to fulfill the law: "To fulfill the law of God absolutely means to render perfect obedience to the divine law without any defect, which we admit the justified cannot do." He adds that it is impossible for a justified man to perfectly fulfill the law in every aspect, though they can initiate new obedience to the law according to all its precepts.

XXXI. Similarly, William Ames writes in *Bellarminus Enervatus* (tom. 4, lib. 6, c. 7), "We do not teach that the law is utterly impossible for man to keep, for instance, for Adam before the fall, later for Christ, and also for those perfectly sanctified in Christ. But for others who have only initiated sanctification through ordinary grace in this life, we say it is not possible to perfectly and exactly observe the divine law." He further concedes that the saints praised in Scripture observed the commandments with purpose and effort, though not completely, with

respect to essence but not to completion, to the quality of sincerity but not to the quantity of intensity or extension.

XXXII. John Davenant also addresses this in his discourse on actual righteousness (c. 47). Critiquing the Tridentine Canon, he observes the Papist art in fabricating the canon. He notes that Protestants do not deny the diligent observation of divine precepts by the regenerate but deny the perfect and complete observation which fully satisfies the law. The Canon falsely anathematizes Protestants, who do not claim that the regenerate cannot observe God's commandments but assert that it is impossible to meet the full righteousness of the law, which would escape all transgression.

XXXIII. Lastly, Robert Baron of the University of Aberdeen authored a brief treatise on the possibility of fulfilling God's law according to the evangelical measure. He distinguishes between the obedience required by the law in its strict sense and the obedience required by the gospel or the covenant of grace for salvation. Although the gospel offers hope of salvation to the greatest sinners and transgressors condemned and excluded by the law, it does not permit anyone to hope for eternal life without sincere obedience to divine law. Declaring that without holiness, no one will see the Lord, he maintains that while the obedience demanded by the covenant of works is impossible for any, even the regenerate, the obedience required by the gospel for salvation is possible through ordinary grace.

XXXIV. It is unnecessary to enumerate private testimonies since the confessions and declarations of our churches clearly state the Reformed position. The Reformed confession in the Kingdom of Poland, presented at the Thorne Colloquy, states: "We are falsely accused of teaching that Christ's precepts cannot be kept by the faithful. We teach that they can be kept by the grace of the Holy Spirit, not only can but must be kept by all, not merely in intention or ineffective purpose but also in true, sincere, and lifelong diligent effort." The same doctrine is expressed differently in the Anglican confession of 1645, which states that the Spirit of Christ so tames and bends the will of man that he does with joy what the will of God requires in His law.

XXXV. From these examples, it is evident that Reformed Church doctors do not deny that the faithful, by Christ's grace, can in some way and sense fulfill the law and keep God's commandments by rendering true obedience. When they occasionally state that it is impossible for the faithful to fulfill God's law and observe His commandments, they mean it is impossible in terms of perfect and absolute fulfillment. This is carefully noted when they explain the nature of the question. They observe, with Chemnitz, in his Examination of the Sixth Session of the Council of Trent, that the question is not simply whether the law can be fulfilled by the grace of God but whether it can be perfectly fulfilled. Protestant theologians freely concede the initiated and imperfect fulfillment of the law by the regenerate.

XXXVI. From what has been presented, it is clear that when Protestants affirm that the divine law's commands are observed by the faithful in an initiated and imperfect manner, rather than absolutely and consummately, they do not intend to deny that the obedience they render to the law is complete and sincere. They also do not deny that through this obedience they submit themselves to the whole divine law and its individual precepts, and that this constitutes a

righteousness that pleases and is approved by God, who will graciously reward it in the future. This is contrary to what Roman Church doctors often attribute to them. Therefore, Protestants do not deny the obedience of the regenerate the perfection we have called the perfection of parts, but only the perfection of degrees. This distinction is often used by them, as can be seen in John Davenant's treatise on actual righteousness, chapter 51. "We have never denied," he says, "that the regenerate, imbued with the spirit of charity, can love even their enemies and perform other acts commanded in the Decalogue. But in performing these works, they achieve only what theologians call the perfection of parts, not the perfection of degrees."

XXXVII. This is consistent with what is found in Paraeus in Bellarmine, book 4, on Justification, chapter 11, page 1077. "In the places cited," he says, "where perfection is attributed to some or required of all, perfection is understood not in degrees, which the law in its rigor requires, but in parts, or integrity opposed to hypocrisy. That is, a true and not feigned affection and effort to obey God, resisting desires, and the initiation of obedience according to all God's commands." In this, Paraeus is followed by Wendelin in his Christian Theology, book 1, chapter 26, in the explanation of thesis 10, section 3. "The perfection attributed to the saints," he says, "is not in degrees but in parts, not absolute but limited, which we call sincerity." Indeed, it might seem superfluous to cite testimonies from the Reformers on this matter, since this distinction between perfection is so frequently used by them that it can hardly be found lacking in their works.

XXXVIII. Thus, in this question, Protestants only intend to deny that the faithful, renewed by the Spirit of Christ, can fulfill the law according to the entire perfection required by the law when rigidly taken. The law is rigidly taken when considered in its original institution and viewed as it was given to the first man, containing the initial covenant made with man, by the observation of which he could expect perpetual and blessed life from the goodness and justice of God. The law, thus considered, required from man perpetual obedience, uninterrupted by any sins, unblemished by any defects or flaws, and through which man would submit himself with utmost alacrity, without any struggle or resistance of internal affections, in all things whatsoever, without exception, to the divine will. Such obedience, indeed, could be rendered by our first parents in the state of innocence and was required of them to remain in that blessed state and ultimately enjoy eternal happiness with God.

XXXIX. However, such obedience can no longer be rendered by Christ's faithful, even those endowed with the abundant gifts of His Spirit. For in all of them, the flesh struggles against the spirit, constantly stirring up many impulses rebellious to right reason and therefore contrary to the divine law. Consequently, they experience a great inclination to do evil and not a small difficulty in doing good. Hence, they offend daily in many ways, as James says, and among them, few or none are found who do not sometimes fall into grave sins.

XL. The reality of this situation and the inability of the faithful in this state of natural corruption and weakness to reach the described perfection is so evident from the very experience, common sense of the faithful, and internal testimony of conscience that even the doctors of the Roman Church cannot deny it and are forced to admit the truth in this matter. This

can be abundantly evidenced by Stapleton alone, a man of considerable authority among his peers and a fierce opponent of Protestants, as well as a staunch defender of Papal doctrine, who wrote twelve whole books on justification and related questions, dedicating the entire sixth book to this very question of fulfilling the law. To make this clearer, it seems appropriate here to briefly summarize what this doctor has extensively discussed in the mentioned book.

XLI. Therefore, in chapter 2, after stating that according to Catholic doctrine, it is certain that justified men, through good works done in God, fully satisfy the divine law as far as this life's state allows, he explains this doctrine in many propositions. The first of these, which he endeavors to prove in that chapter, is this: "The renewed and justified in Christ receive the grace of the Holy Spirit by which they fulfill the law." In the third chapter, his second proposition is: "However, this fulfillment of the law does not necessarily and precisely mean in all the commandments of the law, throughout the entire course of human justice; but he is considered to fulfill the law, satisfy the law, and be regarded as just in the sight of God who, having the will and affection to fulfill all the commandments of the law, fulfills it as far as human frailty, assisted by the grace of Christ, can and usually does in this life." He then concludes from Scripture, which asserts that no one in this life is without sin, and yet testifies that many just men have walked in all God's commandments, that there is some way of doing all the commandments or fulfilling the whole law, even if it is not universal and complete. At the end of the chapter, he observes that it is very different to require for righteousness that the whole law be perpetually fulfilled by a just man throughout his entire life, or at least after his first conversion, which he condemns as Pelagian, than to say that a justified person in Christ can do some good works which so fulfill the law or satisfy the law that these works are truly good, praiseworthy, and just in the sight and judgment of God, and the person doing them is considered just because of them, which he asserts to be the orthodox view.

XLII. In chapter 4, his third proposition is this: "He who observes the commandments of the law, even if he offends in many things, can still be just in the sight of God if he has more virtues than vices." He notes that no one is just who does not have more venial sins than virtuous works, but here compares the works of virtues with grave sins, to which many small sins are not equivalent. Thus, the sense is that one is considered just who, after the first conversion, in the whole course of their justice, in the entire conflict of the present life, has more notable virtues than grave and deadly sins, or who more frequently and diligently engages in works of piety and charity than falls into serious sin, and finally, who more often overcomes than is overcome.

XLIII. In chapter 5, he teaches that the fulfillment of the commandments in this life is not such that it is completely without sin, but it is such and so great that it can and should be completely free from those grave and deadly sins. Just men indeed sometimes sin mortally, but they are not just while in such sin, nor do they fulfill the law; nor can true justice consist with such sin unless it is removed by repentance, although true justice in this life consists with other lighter sins committed daily.

XLIV. In chapter 6, his fifth proposition is: "Although the justice of this life is not entirely free from sin and therefore not perfect in that regard, it is still perfect in its own way

because it always strives to be free from sin, progressing day by day." He later explains in what sense he calls it perfect in its own way, namely, because it is true justice and true obedience. Here, he considers perfect and full as synonymous. He understands perfect and full to mean that nothing is lacking for the true nature and essence of justice and obedience, as he indicates in the paragraph "In this therefore" and chapter 7, paragraph 1, where he says, "Perfect charity and justice are said to be true," just as perfect hatred is said to be true.

XLV. This thesis summarizes the seventh chapter: Although the righteousness of this life does not fulfill all commandments completely, often offending, and being more in progress than in perfection—that is, perfect operation or possession of virtues—yet, in the observance or fulfillment of the commandments which the righteous perform, they do not sin, even if the commandment itself is not fulfilled in the most perfect way, in terms of the manner or degree of fulfillment. Furthermore, it should be diligently noted that the Catholic Church does not teach that the most perfect obedience to the commandments is necessary for righteousness and salvation, but rather true obedience, and such as the divine law requires us to have in this life. For it is one thing to truly and fully satisfy the mandate of the law, so that you are not its transgressor, and to keep it truly and fully, so that neither the law itself nor God, because of the law, can justly condemn anything in your work; and another thing to satisfy the divine law most fully and perfectly, so that neither the law nor God because of the law desires anything more in your work. For the former is true in every just work. The latter is thirsted and hungered for in this life, but not comprehended, not possessed.

XLVI. In the eighth chapter, the seventh proposition is undertaken to be proven and illustrated. The righteousness of good works in faith is true righteousness before God, even if mixed with sins and imperfect, both in terms of fulfilling all the commandments and in the manner of fulfillment, and it truly and plainly satisfies God's law: not only because it closely approaches full and perfect righteousness or because it at least lacks more serious crimes, or even because it progresses daily towards completely avoiding all sin and fully satisfying, but further because whatever it lacks for full and perfect fulfillment of the commandments by omission and frequently venial sinning, or because of imperfection in the manner and reason of fulfillment, Christ's mercy and grace indulges and forgives; and by indulging, it makes us just before God, as if we had fulfilled all the commandments to the utmost and most perfectly.

XLVII. Finally, in chapter 15, it is explained in what sense the reborn fulfill the law and satisfy it, according to the teaching of the Roman Church. For whenever the Catholic Church teaches that the law is fulfilled by the reborn or that the reborn fully satisfy the divine law, it means the mode of fulfillment that is opposed to transgression of the law, which is aversion from the whole breadth of the law, either by commission or omission. It understands true observance and execution of the commandments. But by the term fulfillment or fully satisfying, it does not understand the full measure or the most complete manner by which the entire law can be fulfilled, so that, namely, the entire law in its full breadth is always and most perfectly observed. For this belongs to the full and perfect righteousness of another life. That pertains to the legitimate contest of the present life, the right course. Consequently, in the same chapter, it is

explained how the righteousness of the faithful in this life is perfect in a certain respect and not perfect. It is necessary, he says, to recall that our righteousness in this life is imperfect in some sense and that there is a certain newness begun in us; but it is imperfect because it is not perfect in every way and in every part; likewise, it is begun because it is not full, such as it will be in another life, where it will be so great that nothing can be added to it; yet it is true righteousness in name, according to the capacity of this life, according to the reason of the present righteousness, which consists in conflict, not in victory, where death and the law of sin are absorbed, in the stadium and course, not in the reward and prize, finally on the way, not in the homeland.

XLVIII. Similar things are found in Andradius, a renowned Roman theologian of considerable repute among those who attended the Council of Trent. For in the defense of the faith of Trent, book 5, folio 330, he acknowledges that the celestial law prescribes a certain angelic integrity and righteousness, most free and secret from all taint of crimes, from which Paul himself confessed to be far distant. And afterward, he adds, using the words of Augustine, that the admirable law of God so institutes the life of men and so moderates their affections, not only prescribing duties which cannot be neglected without crime but also those which should be sought with all effort, although they cannot be perfectly performed by mortals burdened with the weight of the flesh. For who, he says, would be so insane as to think that he could fulfill all the numbers of love which God the Almighty has encompassed in that prayer, "You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, with all your soul, and with all your strength," when he understands that even the happy minds, free from all care, enjoying the blessed vision of the divine presence eternally, do not by any means exceed these limits of love? But since God wished to present to the eyes of mortals the most perfect image of love and righteousness, He did not prescribe only those things which could be performed by them, but also those which should be pursued with love and desire. To this also pertain all those precepts that utterly forbid nefarious desires: for although mortals cannot completely avoid them, in whom the sparks of vices have not yet settled, they are nevertheless so prohibited from obeying desires by those precepts, as to plainly show to what all the studies and cognitions of the pious should be referred.

XLIX. The same thing concerning the imperfection of the faithful in this life regarding the fulfillment of the law is also taught by Ruardus Tapperus, a professor at Louvain, in the defense of the second article, page 76. There he affirms, after that holy Doctor, that indeed here is health, newness, and righteousness, but not full or perfect, except in a certain manner: just as here love is not full. And the law, whose fullness is love, will only then be fully fulfilled so that nothing is lacking when the love of God is perfect. But the love of God will not be perfect until we see God.

L. Finally, since Protestants consider the obedience that the faithful render to the law through the grace of Christ to be especially imperfect because it is constantly obscured by daily incursions of sins, which the Catholics call venial, and is also frequently interrupted by more serious ones, which they call mortal, both of these are acknowledged and supposed by the very Councils of the Roman Church, and notably by the Council of Trent. For in session six, chapter

eleven, it affirms that all in this mortal life, however holy and just they may be, sometimes fall into light and daily sins, which are called venial. And in the same session, canon 23, it anathematizes those who teach that a person once justified can avoid all sins, even venial, in their entire life, except by a special privilege of God. And in session 14, chapter 5, it proves and confirms the constitution of the Lateran Council, by which all the faithful are commanded, after reaching the age of discretion, to confess their sins to a priest at least once a year: although the same council, in the same chapter, teaches that it is not necessary to confess venial sins, but only mortal ones. Hence it is manifest that this council supposes that all the faithful do not go through a whole year without committing some grave sin, which can only be expiated by solemn penance.

LI. From all these things, it is easy to conclude that in the obedience which the reborn render to the law through the grace of Christ, Protestants readily acknowledge that essential perfection, which consists in its truth and sincerity, for which the Doctors of the Roman Church contend. And in turn, the Doctors of the Roman Church, when they say that the faithful can perfectly fulfill the law, do not mean to attribute to their obedience the perfection called of degrees, which the Protestants remove from it, and which consists in the most exact and absolute conformity with the law, considered according to that rigor by which it could and should have been observed by man when he was first created by God. Therefore, the Doctors of the Roman Church unjustly malign the doctrine of our churches in this part, as if it nullified the efficacy of the grace of Christ and greatly diminished the zeal of piety in the faithful, when in truth the Protestants here teach nothing that the very Doctors of the Roman Church, according to their own tenets, are not compelled to admit.

Theological Theses on the Truth of Good Works Done by the Regenerate through the Grace of Christ

Thesis I

Christ declares in more than one place that a bad tree cannot produce good fruit. Furthermore, all men by nature are bad trees, for they are born and conceived in sin, and the inclination of the human heart is prone to evil from youth, as God Himself testifies in Genesis 6. Consequently, from humans, if left to themselves, no truly good and God-pleasing work, nor one that has any significance for salvation, can proceed. But whatever men think or do without God's grace and by the strength of nature alone, however outwardly splendid it may appear, always has something rotten inside, rendering it simply defective.

II. However, those who by nature are rotten and bad trees, Christ by the efficacy of His grace makes into good trees. He purifies and sanctifies men through His Spirit from the corruption of sin, making them put off the old man and put on the new man, becoming new creatures who no longer serve sin but righteousness.

III. That those who are thus renewed by the Spirit of Christ and made good trees, and, as scripture sometimes speaks, trees of righteousness, can do good, holy, and just works and indeed

produce such good fruits that are pleasing and acceptable to God, is so certain and evident that no one can doubt it without rejecting the common sense of Christians and denying all authority to the word of God.

IV. For Christ Himself, who denies that a bad tree can produce good fruit, conversely affirms that a good tree produces good fruit. The Apostle teaches that we are God's workmanship, created in Christ Jesus for good works, which God prepared beforehand that we should walk in them. And that Christ gave Himself for us to redeem us from all iniquity and purify for Himself a peculiar people, zealous for good works. These certainly would be said without any reason if the faithful, redeemed by Christ and newly created in Him, could do no truly good works.

V. Moreover, how could the faithful be said to walk according to the Spirit and not according to the flesh, and to sow to the Spirit and not to the flesh, and to have put on the new man who is created according to God in true righteousness and holiness, and to be servants of righteousness who offer their members as instruments of righteousness to God, if no truly holy and just works proceed from them? Or what else but works of righteousness and holiness can we understand by the fruit about which the Lord says, "He who abides in Me, and I in him, bears much fruit"? (John 15).

VI. There can be no doubt that what is truly good and just is what is rightly done and judged so by God, and what God Himself imputes to righteousness. The faithful, whom God's grace has renewed, do what is right in God's judgment, and what they do under the impulse of the divine Spirit is imputed to them as righteousness by God. Thus in 1 Kings 15, David is said to have done what was right in the eyes of the Lord. And God Himself, in the same book, chapter 14, rebuking King Jeroboam through a prophet, says to him, "You have not been like My servant David, who kept My commandments and followed Me with all his heart, doing only what was right in My eyes." And in Psalm 106, it is said that Phinehas, in his zeal to appease God's wrath, was counted to him as righteousness. "Phinehas stood up and executed judgment, and it was accounted to him for righteousness to all generations forever."

VII. Indeed, who would dare to deny that to seek and love God with all one's heart and soul is a truly good, holy, and God-pleasing work? But God's grace enables His people to love Him in that manner, as Moses says in Deuteronomy 30, "The Lord your God will circumcise your heart and the heart of your descendants, to love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul, that you may live." And God exercised this power of His grace in David, who acknowledging and celebrating this benefit of God, testifies of himself in Psalm 119, "With my whole heart I have sought You." Similarly, in 2 Kings 23, it is written of Josiah, "There was no king like him before him, who turned to the Lord with all his heart, with all his soul, and with all his might."

VIII. Indeed, those who contend that no truly good, just, and holy works are found in the faithful would thereby exclude them from salvation and consign them to the eternal fires of hell. For without holiness no one will see the Lord. And Christ says, "Unless your righteousness exceeds that of the scribes and Pharisees, you will never enter the kingdom of heaven."

Moreover, the Lord declares that every tree that does not bear good fruit is cut down and thrown into the fire (Matthew 7). Similarly, every branch that does not bear fruit in Him is taken away, gathered, and thrown into the fire, and burned (John 15).

IX. Therefore, the works that are done by the faithful through God's grace, being truly good and just, are neither in reality nor should be called sins. Who would dare to count among sins Abraham's obedience in offering his son, Joseph's chastity, Elijah's zeal and fervor, and Paul's constancy and eagerness in executing the task entrusted to him by Christ amidst so many adversities and dangers, and other excellent deeds of holy men, which the Holy Spirit praises in Scripture and sets forth as examples for others?

X. So far from numbering these and similar pious works, which are performed by God's grace and help, among sins, we willingly acknowledge that they differ entirely in kind from sins. For sins are forbidden by divine law; but the works that the faithful do by God's grace are commanded by the law. Sins displease God and are hateful and abominable to Him; but God loves and delights in the works of the pious. He severely punishes sins, but He rewards these according to His goodness. Sins obstruct a person's salvation; but these works have a place among the means of salvation and are a path to salvation prepared by God. Sins have God as their author, but these works are ascribed to God and are done under His moving Spirit. Finally, through sins, God's name is profaned and blasphemed; but through these works, it is sanctified and glorified.

XI. Not only do the good works of the faithful differ from manifest sins, that is, actions that are evil in themselves and forbidden by law, but they also differ from the excellent deeds of unbelievers, which have the appearance of virtue and are civically good and laudable. For in such actions of unbelievers, wherein they seem to exercise some virtue, such as kindness, justice, and temperance, the substance of the action is indeed good, yet the action is simply evil because it does not proceed from the principle from which all truly good and holy actions should flow, namely, the love of God, nor does it tend toward the end to which the same actions should be directed, that is, the glory of God. But the works of the faithful done by God's grace tend to the glory of God and proceed from charity. Therefore, these actions of unbelievers, though they may seem specious in human judgment, are not pleasing or acceptable to God and do not profit their authors for eternal salvation. But the works of the faithful are pleasing and acceptable to God and receive the reward of eternal salvation from Him.

XII. But however good the works of the faithful are, they are by no means perfect. Here it must be observed that there is a difference between a truly good and holy work and a work that is perfectly and entirely good. We affirm that the works of the faithful done by God's grace are indeed truly good. However, we deny that they are perfectly good and so complete that they lack nothing at all.

XIII. There is a double imperfection in them. First, lighter sins frequently cling to good works, which somewhat taint them with their contamination, like dust sprinkled on them, obscuring their brilliance. Thus, while praying, the mind is often distracted. In hearing the word of God, foreign thoughts frequently intrude. In giving alms, feelings of doubt arise, and some

tickling of vain glory. Similarly, when it comes to suffering for Christ, the zeal for divine glory mingles with some desire for human approval. These are like certain blemishes attached to such good works, which detract from and diminish their worth.

XIV. Besides, the good acts themselves, considered in themselves, even in men who are in the highest state of mortal and frail life, fall far short of the highest perfection. We do not merely mean that pious men in doing good do not attain that perfection to which blessed souls in heaven arrive, but that they also fall far below the degree of perfection that the law strictly taken requires of a man, and to which a man was obliged according to the original law of creation.

XV. For that law demanded of the first man that he obey God with all alacrity and readiness, without any sluggishness or resistance, and indeed the first man, as long as he remained intact, could exhibit such obedience to God: nor could he have departed the slightest bit from that perfection without vice and fault, for which he would have held himself guilty in God's judgment. How far those who are regenerated by the grace of Christ are now from that perfection is attested by the sense and conscience of each one of them. For when they obey the divine law and do good works, they do not do so without great difficulty. The evil desire that remains in them after receiving God's grace injects much languor and sluggishness when they have to attend to divine worship and other acts commanded by the law: and when they have to avoid evil, it excites a propensity and inclination towards it. Hence it is that in good things they follow the guidance of the Holy Spirit with difficulty, and in evil things, they are reluctantly drawn away from the allurements of sins. Therefore, they neither flee from evil nor pursue good with such ardor and pure zeal for God's glory as a man, remaining intact, could have performed according to the law's demand. And so their good works indeed conform to the law, but not according to that exact measure which the law, in its original institution, estimated and required, and according to which a man, not yet corrupted by sin, could and ought to conform his works to the law.

XVI. But, someone might say, the works of the regenerated, since they fall short of due perfection, should simply be called bad, not good. For an action cannot be good and be called simply such unless it contains everything required for the moral goodness of the action. As it is commonly stated in the schools, "Good is from the whole cause; evil is from any defect." To solve this difficulty, theologians observe that in works, otherwise good in their kind and substance, two kinds of defects can be noted and occur. The first is when something required for the moral goodness of the action is entirely lacking, or in no degree present. For example, when a work does not proceed from the proper principle, namely from faith and love of God, or is not referred to the proper end, namely to the glory of God. The second is when everything required for moral goodness is present in the action according to its kind and in some degree, but not in that degree, nor according to that perfection which the law strictly considered requires. For example, when the action proceeds from the proper principle, but less perfectly, that is, when it proceeds indeed from faith and charity, but from faith somewhat weak, and from charity lacking the fervor that the law demands. And when it is indeed referred to the proper end, but not with such purity of intention as the law in its rigorous justice requires.

XVII. A defect of the first kind is specific and essential and deprives the action of some essential perfection. But a defect of the latter kind is gradual and accidental and only removes accidental and individual perfection from the action. Therefore, an act that lacks something in the first way is so bad that it cannot be simply called good: but if it lacks something only in the latter way, it does not cease to be truly and properly good, although it only has imperfect goodness.

XVIII. To the first kind belong the acts of unbelievers that seem honest and proceed from virtue. For they do not arise from faith and love of God, nor are they directed to the glory of God, as we have said above, and therefore they cannot be numbered among good and holy works, and simply called such. But the actions of the faithful, done with the help of the Holy Spirit and through the grace of Christ, must be referred to the latter kind: for they are not only good in respect to their object and substance, but also in respect to their principle and end, since they are done from charity and tend to the glory of God. Therefore, such works of the faithful are approved and accepted by God as truly and properly good and should be simply and absolutely called such, although they fall far short of supreme perfection.

XIX. Although this defect, by which the works of pious and holy men labor, does not entirely vitiate the good action and make it simply bad, it is nonetheless of itself blameworthy and defective. As Augustine openly teaches in epistle 29, which is to Jerome, where he affirms that what is lacking in our charity, as long as we live in this body, is due to vice. "Perfect charity," he says, "which can no longer be increased, while one lives in this mortal life, is in no one. As long as it can be increased, surely that which is less is from vice. From which vice there is no just man on earth who does good and does not sin. From which vice no living person will be justified in the sight of God. For this reason, however much we have advanced, it is necessary for us to say, 'Forgive us our debts.'" This is akin to what the same Doctor writes in the book on the perfection of righteousness. "It is a sin when there is either no charity where there ought to be or when it is less than it ought to be."

XX. And certainly, who can deny that it is culpable and defective to depart from the perfection prescribed by the law? But what is lacking in the present state to the charity of the faithful causes it not to equal that love which the law originally given to man at creation required of him, and with which he indeed embraced his Creator before he voluntarily fell away from Him. Therefore, our charity and the good works that proceed from it contract some blemish from this, for which they are not entirely pure in the eyes of God, nor can they bear the strict judgment of God if He wishes to deal with us completely severely and not relax anything of the original rigor of the law. This is the doctrine of Gregory the First, Bishop of Rome, drawn and collected from the words of Job. For in book nine of *Moralia on Job*, he says, "The holy man, seeing that all the merit of our virtue is vitiated if judged strictly by internal judgment, rightly adds, 'If he wishes to contend with him, he cannot answer him one in a thousand.'" And in the same book, chapter 14, explaining these words, "If I have any righteousness, I will not answer, but I will plead with my judge," he says, "All human righteousness is convicted of injustice if judged strictly. Therefore, after righteousness, prayer is needed so that what could fall under judgment may prevail by the judge's mercy alone." This is similar to what is read in the last chapter of the

same book, "If we are judged strictly by God, where is the place of salvation, since our evils are pure evils, and the good that we believe we have are by no means pure goods."

XXI. Indeed, God does not impute this defect to the faithful once they have been received into grace. Nor, because they do not conform to the law as perfectly and precisely as a pure and whole man could while doing good, are they therefore involved in a new guilt of death, which would require a new and special remission, as when the faithful, overcome by temptation, commit acts that are inherently evil and which the Apostle calls the works of the flesh. Nor, as we have said, does what is lacking in their good works hinder them from being pleasing and acceptable to God, and from being praised and approved in His future judgment, so as to receive the reward of eternal life and glory from Him. But this is to be attributed to God's kindness, who, looking upon us in His Son, deals with us paternally and mercifully: He does not call us to strict judgment, wherein He would use rigid and severe justice against us, but to a judgment tempered with much mercy: in which He does not weigh our works solely by their own worth, nor does He scrutinize them rigidly, but considers them as voluntary obedience from children, and as works sprinkled and tinged with the blood of Christ. Hence, they are so greatly pleasing to Him and are so magnificently crowned by Him.

XXII. Scripture sufficiently indicates this when it teaches that our spiritual sacrifices are acceptable to God through Jesus Christ. Peter says, "You are a holy priesthood to offer spiritual sacrifices acceptable to God through Jesus Christ" (1 Peter 2:5). For by those spiritual sacrifices are meant the good works of the faithful, which are said to be acceptable through Jesus Christ because they could not be so pleasing to God and accepted by Him for eternal life if God considered them simply in themselves and estimated them solely by their own value, setting aside the merit and intercession of Christ, who, as our Priest and Advocate, offers and commends them to the Father. This commendation of Christ, and the merit and intercession added from Him, is signified by the incense that the angel offers with the prayers of the saints to God in the golden censer (Revelation 8).

XXIII. Having explained these things, it remains to repel various accusations with which the Doctors of the Roman Church attempt to create hostility against Protestant doctrine in this matter. For they very odiously accuse them as if they assert that the faithful cannot perform any works that are truly good and just, and that the actions of the faithful, even those that seem most holy and excellent, are by their nature sins, and indeed mortal sins, which induce new guilt of eternal death in the faithful. This can be seen in Bellarmine, Book 4 of *De Justificatione*, chapter 10, where he speaks of Protestants, whom he calls heretics. "They teach," he says, "that the divine law is utterly impossible for man, even for the just, and they infer from this that there is no true actual righteousness in us, but that all the works of the just are by their nature mortal sins." Similarly, Becanus in the summary of Scholastic Theology, volume 2, tract 4, chapter 4, whose title is *On the Merit of Good Works according to the Calvinists*, attributes to the Calvinists that they teach that the just cannot do any good works, but that all the works of the just are damnable or mortal sins.

XXIV. But it is easy to show from the writings of the Protestants that they by no means deny that the regenerate by the grace of Christ can perform works that are truly good and just and are considered such by God, and that we have thus far faithfully explained their opinion. Among others, John Davenant, Bishop of Salisbury, who attended the Synod of Dort and whose writings are highly esteemed among the Reformed, can be a reliable witness of this. For that Doctor, in his book on Habitual and Actual Righteousness, chapter 33, whose title is On the Truth of Good Works, and in some subsequent chapters, explains the doctrine we have delivered above more copiously and accurately than others. And this is his first thesis in that chapter: "The good works of the regenerate have in themselves a supernatural goodness, pleasing and acceptable to God in the supernatural order, and ordained by His promise to receive gracious rewards." And he notes that the good works of the regenerate are distinguished by this threefold difference from the works of civil justice, which are sometimes performed by impious, unbelieving, and unregenerate men. For, he says, however those works may seem to shine, they are not truly good in this theological sense: for they neither proceed from the supernatural goodness of the agent, nor are they truly pleasing to God, nor are they rightly ordained to rewards by the promise of God. After proving and explaining these three points in more detail, he summarizes them at the end of the chapter: First, that the good works of the faithful have in themselves a truly supernatural goodness; since they are done under the impulse of the Holy Spirit, by supernatural grace, and in order to a supernatural end. Secondly, that such works are pleasing and truly acceptable to God; because they always flow from a person reconciled through the Mediator; because they proceed from a heart purified by faith and conformed to the image of divine holiness; and finally, because in the practice of good works, the regenerate act according to the strength and measure of the grace received. Lastly, that these works have an ordination to divine rewards, because of God's preceding promise, because of the condition or state of the worker, and finally because of the quality of the works themselves.

XXV. Robert Baron, a few years ago a professor of theology at the University of Aberdeen in Scotland, teaches consistent things in his appendix on the possibility of fulfilling God's law, which is attached to the disputation on mortal and venial sin. In that appendix, section 2, number 3, he affirms, "All the good works of the regenerate have everything that is essentially required for the moral goodness of an action. For," he says, "they are good first as to the object, because they deal with lawful things and are prescribed by divine law. Secondly, as to the principle, because they are done from faith and true love of God. Thirdly, as to the end, because they are referred to the glory of God. And fourthly, as to the circumstances, because the due circumstances are observed in doing them." Even Luther, whom the Doctors of the Roman Church particularly attack here, expressly teaches that the faithful, through the spirit obtained by faith, perform works that are truly good. "Faith alone," he says, "justifies, and alone fulfills the law. For faith, through the merit of Christ, obtains the Holy Spirit. This Spirit renews, cheers, excites, and inflames the heart to freely do what the law requires. And then at last, from faith thus effectively acting and living in the heart, truly good works spontaneously flow. This is what the Apostle means in the third chapter. For when he utterly condemns the works of the law, and

it might seem that he would destroy the law through the doctrine of faith, he anticipates this objection, saying, 'We do not destroy the law, but establish it.' That is, we teach how the law is truly fulfilled by believing, through faith." Preface to the Epistle to the Romans, found in volume 5 of the Wittenberg edition, page 97. The same doctrine is also delivered in the Augsburg Confession, article 20: "Because," it says, "through faith the Holy Spirit is received, now hearts are renewed and put on new affections so that they can produce good works."

XXVI. Protestants also expressly deny that the works of the faithful, done through the grace of Christ, are by their nature sins, especially mortal sins. For they complain that this is falsely imputed to them by the Doctors of the Roman Church. Thus Paraeus, writing against Bellarmine in *De Justificatione*, Book 4, chapter 10, says, "It is a gross calumny to say that we teach all the works of the just to be mortal sins by their nature." Rivetus also, in his *Summa of Controversies*, tract 4, question 17, says, "We have often declared in its proper place that our opinion of the imperfection of works is not such as they falsely attribute to us, who say that we do not call good works sins; for that would be a ridiculous contradiction in terms; but that sins are mingled with them and that they are not purely or perfectly good." Similarly, Ames in Bellarmine *Enervatus*, volume 4, Book 6, chapter 8, says, "Bellarmin proposes this question as if the good works (according to our opinion) were by their nature mortal sins, which is most false; but he himself shows sufficiently in the conclusion of his first argument that he was not ignorant of what we teach on this matter: namely, that the good works of the just, while they are still in a state of imperfection, are imperfect and stained with some sin." Similar things are written by John Davenant in his book on *Habitual and Actual Righteousness*, chapter 35, where he argues against the Doctors of the Roman Church, who vociferate that we abolish good works and place no distinction between them and the mortal sins called peccata. "Because our theologians assert that every work of the regenerate suffers from some defect and is tainted with some stain of sin, this thesis is established: 'The works of the regenerate, though imperfect and tainted with the stain of indwelling sin, are not to be considered as mortal sins, nor are they so considered by Protestants.'"

XXVII. Therefore, Protestants indeed teach that the good works of the regenerate are in some measure infected and stained by sin, because they always have some defective element adhering to them, which, if measured by the strictness of the law, ought to be considered and counted as sin; yet they do not concede that it follows from this that those good works are simply and absolutely to be called sins. If they sometimes call them sins, the expression is, in their mind, improper and abusive, by which they do not deny that such works are in themselves and truly good and holy, and entirely different from sins; but they only mean that some sin is mixed in and adheres to them. For, according to their opinion, the works of the regenerate, done from faith and charity, are in themselves, simply, and absolutely good, but only incidentally, in some respect, and relatively, they are evil and defective: and therefore, if we are to speak properly, it should not be said that they are sins, but only that they are sprinkled with and tainted by sin, as is rightly and accurately explained by Robert Baron in the cited appendix on the possibility of fulfilling God's law, section 2. The good works of the regenerate, according to the opinion of our

theologians, are not, he says, simply and absolutely speaking, sins, but only in some respect and relatively. The reason is: because they have all things, although not perfectly and in the highest degree, that are essentially required for the moral goodness of an action. They are said to be evil and tainted by sin in some respect and relatively, because some of these requirements are not present in them in the degree of perfection in which, according to the strictness of the law, they ought to be present. For example, although they are done from faith and charity, they are not done from faith simply and absolutely firm, nor from charity with the fervor that the law requires.

XXVIII. Furthermore, it should be carefully noted that the Reformed School's doctors teach indeed that in the good works of the faithful there is a certain defective element that can be considered a sin and may bring guilt in God's judgment, if God chooses to act without mercy and severely and to use the full rigor of the law given to the first man against them: because their works are not up to the highest and strictest measure of the law, nor do they equal the entire perfection that God demanded of a whole man and according to which a whole man could indeed obey God. But they also acknowledge that God does not deal so strictly with the faithful, nor demand from them precisely and under the penalty of eternal damnation that they keep His law in the exact and most perfect manner in which a man before the fall could and should have kept it in order to become a partaker of eternal happiness: because we are freed from that rigor of the law through Christ: and now God does not necessarily and precisely require from us another kind of obedience for us to enter into eternal life than true and sincere, such as we can perform in the infirmity of this life, according to the measure of grace granted. Hence it happens that God accepts our good works, however imperfect they are, for eternal life, and does not impute to us what is lacking in them. Therefore, because of the defects that occur in them, we are not bound by a new guilt of death, as when we fall into those sins about which it is said, "Those who do such things will not inherit the kingdom of God." The reason is that all these defects pertain somewhat to original sin, and are necessary and inevitable as long as we live here, as its consequences. Therefore, once original sin is forgiven to the pious, such defects are considered to be pardoned and forgiven along with it, and cannot be imputed to the faithful anymore, nor make them guilty before God, and consequently, they need no new remission. However, the remission of graver sins, which the Apostle calls the works of the flesh, is not included in the remission of original sin in the same way, so that the faithful who fall into them incur a new guilt of death, from which they cannot be freed unless those sins are forgiven them by new and special grace from God.

XXIX. This is carefully noted by the aforementioned Davenant in his book on Habitual and Actual Righteousness, chapter 35. He says, "The sin that adheres to the good works of the regenerate, although according to the strictness of the law it could condemn a man outside of Christ; yet it does not condemn the regenerate and engrafted into Christ, nor does it involve them in any new guilt. For since each of the regenerate has within himself, as it were, two men, the new and the old Adam; whatever the old Adam may struggle and resist the law, it is not imputed to the regenerate man and the new, following the norm of the law, and resisting and curbing the

rebellion of concupiscence as much as he can. This is what Augustine noted in epistle 200 to Asellicus: 'Although there are desires of sin within us as long as we are in the body of this death; if we do not give assent to them, there would be no reason to say, forgive us our debts.'

Augustine does not mean that indwelling concupiscence is not sin by its nature, nor does he deny that its motions or desires, which impede and stain our good actions, are sins according to the strict judgment of the law: but he means that the regenerate man is so freed from the guilt of original sin through Christ, that he cannot be made guilty because of the disordered motions of it, as long as they are repressed and subdued by the spiritual man. Hence he concludes that we are far from considering such defective elements, with which innate concupiscence stains the good works of the faithful, as mortal sins, since mortal sins in a specific sense are called those that induce a new deadly guilt, and do not allow the sinner to have a part in the kingdom of God until he repents and withdraws from them. This does not apply to these defects, whatever they may be. Therefore," he says, "although indwelling concupiscence breathes its poison into the good actions of the regenerate; yet such actions are not reckoned as mortal sins, because this stain that arises from the old Adam is not imputable to him who is engrafted into the new, provided that he does not allow his will to be diverted from doing good or impelled to commit evil by it."

XXX. Similar things are taught by Robert Baron, often cited already, in the said appendix on the possibility of fulfilling God's law, section 2, where this is his first assertion. "Although the good works of the regenerate, simply and absolutely, according to the opinion of our theologians, would be sins, yet it would not follow from this, what the adversaries infer from our doctrine, namely that all the good works of the regenerate are mortal sins. And the reason is," he says, "because although our theologians teach that all sins, by themselves and by their nature, are mortal, they do not teach that all sins, according to the administration of divine providence in punishing them under the grace of the covenant, are mortal; but on the contrary, they affirm that the lighter offenses of the regenerate are sins that, by the grace and mercy of God, are venial."

XXXI. It has indeed been said by Luther and some others among the Protestants, "Every work of the just is damnable, and a mortal sin if judged by God's judgment. And all the works of men, however praiseworthy, are sins deserving death. Also, every good work, if considered with exact strictness, is rather worthy of eternal damnation than the reward of life." But, to answer in the words of Davenant, "They meant nothing else by this than to signify that the regenerate in their best works do not fulfill the perfection of the law, but mix in some defect, which has the nature of sin, and consequently would induce the guilt of death before a strict judge, if the acting person were excluded from the benefit of the Mediator and mercy. Therefore, although their expression in this matter has something harsh and inconvenient, they nonetheless meant nothing contrary to the things previously explained by us. But they intended only to teach that the merit of any, even the slightest sin, is death and damnation according to God's strict judgment, and what would be instituted according to the utmost rigor of the law: and at the same time that the best actions of the regenerate are not free from some curvature of sin, if examined by that rigor. By no means did they intend by this to confuse the defects found in good works with graver sins, which are specifically called mortal in the schools, because they hold the regenerate themselves,

whenever they fall into those, and persist in them for a while, bound by a new guilt of eternal death until they renounce them through a new and special act of repentance."

XXXII. However, whatever the Protestants may say, their entire doctrine on this question can be summarized in these points. First, there is no sin, however slight it may seem, for which God could not justly exclude a person from the heavenly kingdom and punish them with eternal torment if He chose to act strictly, without any grace and mercy. Second, all the works of the regenerate suffer from some imperfection; both because some lighter faults frequently adhere to their good works, which somewhat vitiate and obscure them: and because, while doing good, they do not achieve that perfection which the law demanded from an integral man, according to which the divine law could be obeyed, should be obeyed, and indeed could be obeyed. Third, that this defect, which adheres to the good works of the regenerate, could be imputed to the person as guilt if God chose to use His full right against the person and did not judge them according to the covenant of grace and deal kindly with them for Christ's sake. Now the Protestants, in these points, have the support of famous men and leading doctors even within the Roman Church itself.

XXXIII. Firstly, some theologians of the Roman School, and indeed not of the lowest rank, teach that all sins, in themselves and by their nature, deserve eternal death in God's just judgment: that certain sins are only punished with temporal penalties and do not bring the guilt of eternal death upon the sinner, and are therefore distinguished from mortal sins, must be attributed to God's indulgence and clemency, who does not wish to use His full right against humans in this matter. This is the opinion of John Gerson, who was the Chancellor of the University of Paris about 250 years ago, and one of the most celebrated theologians of the Sorbonne, which he elaborates and defends at length in his treatise *On Spiritual Life*, first lecture. Where, discussing the nature and quantification of sins, as he speaks, he concludes: "Every sin, as it is an offense to God and against His eternal law, is in its condition and worthiness mortiferous, according to the rigor of justice, and separates from the life of glory." From which he later deduces, among many other things, this corollary: "No offense to God is venial in itself, except only in respect to divine mercy, which does not wish to actually impute any offense to death, although it could most justly do so."

XXXIV. John Fisher, Bishop of Rochester in England, who was a martyr for the Pope and wrote against Luther, teaches similar things in his *Refutation of the Lutheran Assertion* on article 32. After citing Luther, saying that venial sin is such only by God's mercy, he adds, "That venial sin is venial solely by God's mercy, in this I agree with you. But since we also believe that even mortal sin can, by God's mercy, become venial, I would like you to explain to us more clearly what you think the difference should be between mortal and venial sin."

XXXV. Moreover, although the common doctrine of the Roman School is that lighter sins are venial by themselves and by their nature, not mortal, because they do not bring death to the soul and do not extinguish spiritual life, whose principle is grace and charity infused by the Holy Spirit, as graver sins do, which are therefore called mortal: nonetheless, Scholastic theologians generally teach that those very sins, which they call venial, unless forgiven by God's

grace, exclude a person forever from the heavenly kingdom and are punished with eternal penalties. And so, all those who die outside of Christ are punished with eternal torments in hell even for venial sins. In this, they follow Thomas Aquinas, who in 1.2, question 8, article 5, in the 3rd argument, says, "Venial sin deserves eternal punishment if found in someone damned with mortal sin, because there can be no remission in the damned." When the Protestants say that all sin is by its nature mortal, they mean nothing other than this: any sin, even the slightest, if God does not pardon it and does not show some clemency and mercy to the sinner, can be justly punished by God with eternal penalties and perpetual exclusion from His kingdom.

XXXVI. Furthermore, the Doctors of the Roman Church admit and recognize that in any good works of the faithful there is some defect and imperfection, not only because they arise from charity, which needs to grow daily and has not yet reached that perfection with which blessed souls love God clearly seen, and are carried towards Him with their whole heart and fullest affection: but also because the faithful are far from doing God's will with the promptitude, alacrity, and cheerfulness with which an integral man, not yet corrupted by sin, obeyed God. This is due to the innate and perpetually inherent concupiscence in them, which retards them in doing good and, with its evil motions, which impel and solicit them to evil while they engage in good works, greatly impedes and disturbs them.

XXXVII. This doctrine, contradicted by none in the Roman Church, is elaborately taught by Thomas Stapleton, especially in Book 6, chapters 10 and 11, of his work on Justification. Among other things, he observes that our corrupt nature cannot be restored to its original perfection, which it had before the sin of the first parent, in this mortality until death is swallowed up in victory, and all evil concupiscence is utterly extinguished. For, as Augustine teaches, the righteousness of the first man was to obey God and not have the law of concupiscence, and also his love was undisturbed in God. That is, he was wholly carried towards God without any distraction or perturbation. He adds that this original righteousness of man had to be commanded by the law because the law was given to restore almost extinct natural law in men. However, the law was commanded to teach us from what we have fallen and to what we must progress in this life and arrive at in the next; but not to obligate us to that original perfection in such a broken and weakened state under the penalty of transgression and sin. Indeed, human nature is exempt from such an obligation due to the corruption that is certainly in it, but which is no longer imputed to the regenerate through Christ. Hence, according to the very doctrine of the Roman School, the good works of the regenerate do not have that perfection which the original law of nature commanded and to which man before the fall was bound by the very law of creation.

XXXVIII. The theologians of the Roman School also concede that lighter sins are often mixed with the good works of the just, which in some way vitiate and taint them. This is clear from the writings of the Jesuit Costerus in the *Enchiridion of Controversies*, chapter 6. "We must admit," he says, "that some works of the just do not shine with such purity that they do not contract at least slight stains or are sprinkled with the dust of venial sins. For we are distracted in prayers, vain glory creeps into the act of giving alms, and many things are performed negligently

and carelessly." Similar things are read in Estius, in the second book of Sentences, distinction 41, paragraph 4. Referring to the opinion of some of his own, he says, "It is one thing for a man to sin in some work, another thing for the work itself to be a sin. For even the just often sin in those works that are undoubtedly good, while they admit some defect of concupiscence, negligence, or some lighter circumstance required for the integrity of the good work; as happens in prolonged prayer to God, in preaching to the people, in the study of sacred literature, and the like." Gregory seems to have referred to this when he says at the end of his *Moralia*, "The good that we believe we have can by no means be pure good." Nor do the strictest among the Papists, like Bellarmine and Suarez, deny this. For Bellarmine, in Book 4 of *De Justificatione*, chapter 10, towards the end, explaining Gregory's words just cited, says, "It cannot be that there is not sometimes something that vitiates some good works." Suarez, in Volume 3, Disputation 74, says, "In the judgment of heretics, all our works, however good, are in some way tainted and unclean, which, although not universally true, is often the case."

XXXIX. Finally, although according to the understanding of the doctors of the Roman Church, that defect which is present in the good works of the regenerate is not imputed to the faithful and pious as guilt, nor do they contract any guilt from it, they do not deny that, if God wished to deal strictly and rigorously with the pious, He could attribute such a defect to them as guilt and thus make them guilty before Him, although He does not do this out of a certain kindness. This is evident from what Andreas Vega teaches in Book 11 of his commentary on the Council of Trent, chapter 40. He says, "Many works which are now good, just, and meritorious, if elevated to the holiness and purity with which we ought to serve God and which God could strictly demand from us, both because of His goodness and because of His extraordinary benefits to us, would truly be vices, evil works, and unrighteousness. For it is true not only that the life of any just person is continually soiled and defiled by many venial sins, but even the works of the most perfect fall far short of the goodness with which we should serve, praise, and honor God. They are joined with many imperfections as long as we live here; nor are they as pure, holy, and fervent as the greatness of divine goodness and beneficence towards us would require. And although God, out of His extraordinary sweetness and kindness towards us, does not even impute those defects and imperfections to us as venial guilt, He could still attribute them to us as guilt if He wished to act strictly and beyond His kindness and benevolence towards us." And further on, he says, "Therefore, Gregory affirms that all the merit of our virtue is a vice because none of our works are done so purely, so holily, so fervently, and so perfectly in every respect as would be fitting, considering the magnitude of God's goodness and benefits towards us, and as God could demand from us if He wished to judge strictly. Finally, in the last words of that chapter, he concludes that many works which are now good and without any stain of sin would be, if God wished to deal strictly with us, unrighteousness and evil and would not be approved as good." This is what Robert Baron reports in the said appendix on the possibility of fulfilling God's law, section 3, number 9. For I do not have Vega's books at hand. Moreover, the doctors of the Roman Church admit that the good works of the faithful are imperfect not only in the manner of fulfilling the law, because they do not satisfy the divine law fully and perfectly, but always in

them the law and God, because of the law, desire something, as Stapleton says in *De Justificatione*, book 1, chapter 6, chapter 7. They also admit that what is lacking in the good works of the just to the highest perfection, in which nothing would be lacking according to the rigor of the law, is, I say, forgiven and pardoned to them by the grace and mercy of Christ. This clearly supposes that this imperfection has something defective and culpable by its nature and that it could be imputed to us as guilt if God did not deal with us kindly. For otherwise, such imperfection would not need God's indulgence and grace through Christ. This can be seen in the same Stapleton in *De Justificatione*, book 6, chapter 8, where his seventh proposition is: "The righteousness of good works in faith is true righteousness before God, although mixed with sins and imperfect, both as to fulfilling all the commandments and as to the manner of fulfilling them, and truly and fully satisfies God's law: not only because it approaches as closely as possible to full and perfect righteousness, or because it at least avoids more grievous crimes, or because it works by progressing day by day to be entirely free from all sin and fully satisfy, but also because whatever is lacking in it to full and perfect fulfillment, by omitting commandments and frequently sinning venially, whether because of imperfection in the manner and reason of fulfilling them, all this is pardoned and forgiven by the mercy and grace of Christ; and by pardoning, He makes us just before God, as if we had fulfilled all the commandments most perfectly and to the utmost." By these words, that doctor clearly acknowledges that God's grace and mercy pardon and forgive us not only for what is lacking in the righteousness of our good works because of the more serious omitted commandments and venial sins which we frequently incur, but also for what is lacking in perfect fulfillment of the law because of imperfection in the manner and reason of fulfilling it: and thus it is due to that divine indulgence that we are just before God as if we had perfectly fulfilled all the commandments to the utmost, although in reality, we have performed neither. Hence, it is inferred that, according to the mind of the doctors of the Roman Church, God's mercy and indulgence are exercised towards us in two ways. First, by not imputing to us as guilt those things which, if God wished, He could justly impute, so that we are held by no guilt for those things which could otherwise make us guilty before Him. Second, by removing and erasing those sins for which we have indeed become guilty in God's judgment and liable to punishment. The former kind of indulgence is that by which God does not impute to us the defects of good works: the latter is that by which He forgives sins committed against the law.

XL. This is also related to what is read in John Gerson, in his book *On the Spiritual Life of the Soul*, lecture 1, corollary 3, where he dares to say, "Perhaps all our righteousness could be imputed to us for eternal punishment because, as they are in themselves, they are like a polluted garment. We are obligated," he says, "to gratitude and thanksgiving to God because He does not impute our venial sins to death, just as we are for the remission of mortal sins, since in both cases, God's mercy not imputing them concurs, except for temporal punishment, which by its worthiness is imputable to death, one by possibility, the other by established law. Indeed, perhaps it could be said of all our righteousness, that, as they are in themselves, they are like a polluted garment, especially after sin, or without grace."

XLI. And perhaps this is why the ancient Scholastics, and many of the more recent ones, thought that the righteousness, whether actual or habitual, which is in the faithful, does not in itself have the true nature of righteousness and holiness, which by its nature necessarily pleases God and makes us pleasing and acceptable to Him for eternal life: but that this is added by a certain special favor, through which it is completed in the nature of righteousness, which can justify us, that is, truly make us just and holy before God. Gabriel Vasquez explains this in 1.2, volume 2, Disputation 204, chapters 1 and 2, where he tries to refute this doctrine and contends that inherent righteousness makes us truly just and holy without any new favor and acceptance from God.

XLII. From all these things, it is easy to infer that the doctors of the Roman School do not correctly understand the Protestants' opinion on this question, as in many other matters. For when Protestants say that the defect which is present in all the good works of the regenerate is by its nature defective and culpable, and has some nature of sin, they do not mean to suggest, as their adversaries suppose and think, that this defect is actually and really imputed to the faithful by God as guilt, and therefore the faithful, whenever they do good, contract a new guilt of eternal death, which needs a new and special remission, which we heard above that Davenant expressly and clearly denied in the name of the Protestants: but they only mean that the faithful, while engaged in good works, do not do so perfectly, but somewhat deviate from the original law of nature, and thus God, if He wished to act strictly and remit nothing of His right, could impute this to them as guilt and make them guilty before Him for this reason, although He does not do this, kindly looking upon the faithful in Christ. This, certainly, the doctors of the Roman Church dare not deny but are forced to admit, as is evident from the testimonies cited.

**Theological Theses,
In Which It Is Explained Whether and To What Extent the Faithful Are Obligated to
Keep God's Law and Perform Good Works.**

Thesis I

The doctors of the Roman Church are accustomed to accuse Protestants of teaching that the faithful are not obliged to observe the divine law, and thus it is not necessary for them to perform good works: for Christ has freed them from the subjection to the law and divine commandments; and that Christian liberty consists in the faithful being subject to no law before God and in conscience.

II. Bellarmine attributes this to them in his work *De Justificatione*, book 4, chapter 1, paragraph "Fourthly, we prove." He says, "They place Christian liberty in this, that a justified person is free from the debt of fulfilling the law before God, and by this, all works are now indifferent to him, that is, neither commanded nor forbidden." From this, he concludes in the same chapter, "Protestants, as it seems to him, entirely consider that a person can be saved even if he does no good works nor keeps the divine commandments." And in the fifth chapter of the same book: "The adversaries," he says, "place Christian liberty in this, that they are subject to no

law in conscience and before God, and having Christ as a Redeemer, not as a lawgiver, Moses with his Decalogue does not pertain to them."

III. Similarly, the Jesuit Becan imputes to the Reformers, whom he calls Calvinists, in his *Summa Theologiae Scholasticae*, volume 2, tract 3, chapter 5, question 2. He asserts that the Calvinists teach that the moral precepts or the Decalogue cannot be kept by us, and therefore Christ has freed us from their observation, and that Christian or Evangelical liberty consists in this, that we are free from observing the Law. And in the same volume, tract 4, chapter 4, question 2, he raises this question, as if it were a controversy between the Calvinists and the Roman Church, "Whether the just are bound to do any good works and keep the law." And number 2, he says, "Calvinists teach that works are not necessary for salvation, or that the faithful are not bound to observe the law."

IV. To refute such an atrocious slander, we propose to briefly explain whether and to what extent the faithful are bound to observe the law and strive for good works, according to the common doctrine of the Reformed Church. To better understand this, we must first establish as a foundation that the law, which we call moral, was given and imposed on a whole and newly created man in such a way that he was bound to render perpetual and exact obedience to it in every respect, under the peril and penalty of death and damnation, nor could he otherwise obtain eternal life and happiness than by diligently and assiduously avoiding all transgressions of the law and persevering constantly in obedience to it without any lapse or defect. This is what we call the legal covenant or covenant of works, by which life and happiness are proposed to be obtained through entirely perfect and complete obedience; while death and a curse are severely threatened to any transgression, with no hope of remission made to transgressors by that covenant.

V. This law, which was gradually fading from the minds of men and greatly obscured by the darkness brought by sin, God had once again promulgated through Moses, and specifically repeated to the people of Israel, and handed down in writing, adding many positive precepts concerning the external rites of divine worship and the form of judgments and the administration of the Republic among the said people. All of which He sanctioned with two solemn clauses, one being, "Do this and live." The other, "Cursed is everyone who does not continue in all things that are written in the book of the law, to do them."

VI. Since the law, considered in this way, demands entirely perfect obedience from man if he wants to be a partaker of blessedness, and does not offer any hope of mercy and pardon to those who sin against it but simply threatens them with a curse and wrath, it is impossible for a man once guilty of sin to attain salvation and life through it: nor does the law have any other function for him but to convict him of sin and subject him to condemnation and death. In this respect, the law is said by Paul to work wrath, and it is called the letter that kills, and the ministry of the law, the ministry of death and condemnation, 2 Cor. 3. And this is what the same apostle says in Romans 3, "Therefore by the deeds of the law no flesh will be justified in His sight; for by the law is the knowledge of sin."

VII. Therefore, since all men fell into sin through the fault of the first parent, all were destined to perish if God had wished to deal with them strictly according to the law first given. But God, having mercy on the human race, substituted the covenant of grace for the legal covenant, through which sinners can be saved and delivered from the death and perdition into which they had fallen, and made partakers of blessed and immortal life. Indeed, through this covenant, God offers forgiveness of sins to any transgressors of the law, provided they repent and embrace Christ the Redeemer with a living faith; and He promises them eternal and glorious life in heaven, provided they henceforth render true and sincere obedience to the law and earnestly strive to conform to His commandments; even if their works are not exacted to the utmost rigor of the law, nor equal to the entire perfection which the former covenant strictly required from an integral man. Moreover, this latter covenant also has an added efficacy of the spirit, by which it inclines the hearts of men to believe in God speaking and to conceive His love in their hearts, and thus voluntarily lead themselves in obedience to Him. According to what God says through the prophet, "This is the covenant that I will make with the house of Israel after those days," declares the Lord. "I will put my law in their minds and write it on their hearts." Hence, this covenant, in opposition to the old law, is called the law of the Spirit of life, and its ministry is the ministry of righteousness and the ministry of the Spirit, 2 Cor. 3.

VIII. Moreover, as soon as man fell into sin, certain rudiments of this covenant were proposed to him in the promises of grace: and by it, all who have attained salvation from the foundation of the world were saved: but it was finally clearly explained and solemnly promulgated through the Son of God manifested in the flesh.

IX. However, in the meantime, the legal covenant was once again repeated and promulgated through Moses for the purpose of serving this covenant of grace and leading people to Christ through faith in His name to be justified. For the law, convicting people of sin and their own inability to keep God's commandments, while simultaneously threatening and denouncing wrath and a curse upon them, drove them to seek divine mercy, from which they might obtain forgiveness of past sins and the grace of the Holy Spirit, through which they could be liberated from the bondage of sin and begin to offer and exhibit new obedience to the law. Moreover, in its shadows and figures, it showed them Christ the Redeemer, in whom and through whom God's grace and mercy were to be exercised towards men. Hence, the law is called a pedagogue to bring us to Christ, that we might be justified by faith, Gal. 3. Christ, however, is called by Paul the end of the law for righteousness to everyone who believes, Rom. 10.

X. Furthermore, it is certain and evident from sacred scripture that this new covenant founded in Christ and entered into through Christ requires a new obedience to be rendered to the divine law by those who are to be saved, as a necessary duty and condition without which they cannot attain eternal life and avoid perdition. For this is the voice of Christ speaking in the Gospel, "If you want to enter into life, keep the commandments." And in Revelation 22, only those who keep God's commandments are pronounced blessed by the same Christ. "Blessed are those who do His commandments, that they may have the right to the tree of life, and may enter

through the gates into the city. But outside are dogs and sorcerers and sexually immoral and murderers and idolaters, and whoever loves and practices a lie."

XI. This does not pertain to the legal covenant, which does not promise the forgiveness of sins to the repentant, which scripture proposes as a peculiar benefit of the new covenant, Jer. 31, but to the covenant of grace, which is read in Ezekiel 18, "But if a wicked person turns away from all his sins that he has committed and keeps all my statutes and does what is just and right, he shall surely live; he shall not die. None of the transgressions that he has committed shall be remembered against him; for the righteousness that he has done he shall live. Have I any pleasure in the death of the wicked, declares the Lord God, and not rather that he should turn from his way and live? But when a righteous person turns away from his righteousness and does injustice and does the same abominations that the wicked person does, shall he live? None of the righteous deeds that he has done shall be remembered; for the treachery of which he is guilty and the sin he has committed, for them he shall die." Where God explicitly and clearly requires from all those who wish to avoid the death due to their sins and obtain life to repent of all their sins and henceforth keep His commandments.

XII. And for this reason, Paul declares that without this, everything else in Christ is nothing and contributes nothing to salvation. In 1 Corinthians 7, he says, "Circumcision is nothing, and uncircumcision is nothing, but the keeping of the commandments of God." Finally, how necessary it is, even under the Gospel and the covenant of grace, to keep the divine commandments is clearly taught by the New Testament scripture, which declares that those who do not keep God's commandments neither love nor know God. John says, "By this we know that we know Him, if we keep His commandments. He who says, 'I know Him,' and does not keep His commandments, is a liar, and the truth is not in him," 1 John 2. And in chapter 5, "For this is the love of God, that we keep His commandments."

XIII. It is no less evident from the same sacred scripture that the same covenant of grace does not precisely require from the faithful, once they have been received into grace, perfect obedience under the penalty and peril of eternal damnation, nor obedience that is exacted to the utmost rigor of the law, such as that which an unfallen man was required and able to render according to the law's prescription. For if that were the case, none of the faithful could attain life and be saved by the covenant of grace: since what scripture says applies even to the most holy men, "We all stumble in many things," James 3. And "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us," 1 John 1. Nor is there any of the faithful who ought not to say with Paul, "Not that I have already attained, or am already perfected," Philippians 3. For in all, there are remnants of native corruption, which even oppose the faithful while they are doing good and prevent them from rendering such prompt and fervent obedience to God as the rigor and breadth of the law require: and cause them to stumble and fall frequently.

XIV. Therefore, God, dealing with the faithful through the gracious covenant, indeed requires from them that they strive to conform themselves to the divine precepts contained in the law if they wish to be crowned with eternal glory, nor does He admit to the possession of eternal life those who indulge in sins and serve the desires of the flesh contrary to the divine law's

commandments, but still, He does not scrutinize their obedience to the utmost rigor of the law. And although they fall short of the highest perfection in many things, as long as their obedience is true and sincere and such as is brought forth by the measure of grace granted to them, He accepts it as deserving of the rewards of heavenly life and glory. For God treats the faithful with that clemency and mercy which the pious King Hezekiah hoped for from God: "The Lord is good and will pardon everyone who sets his heart on seeking God, the Lord, the God of their fathers, even if they are not clean according to the rules of the sanctuary," 2 Chronicles 30. And this is related to the promise by which God comforts those who fear Him and think upon His name in the Prophet Malachi chapter 3, "They shall be mine, says the Lord of hosts, in that day when I make up my jewels; and I will spare them as a man spares his own son who serves him."

XV. Although God no longer requires from the faithful, under the penalty of eternal damnation, perfectly complete obedience in every respect, such as the integral man was bound to render according to the legal covenant to live and obtain eternal happiness, yet the law, insofar as it commands such perfection, should not be considered abrogated by Christ. For Christ did not change anything in the moral law but rather renewed and confirmed it and vindicated it from various corruptions of men. Christ Himself teaches this in Matthew, "Do not think that I came to destroy the Law or the Prophets. I did not come to destroy but to fulfill." And Paul concurs in Romans, "Do we then make void the law through faith? Certainly not! On the contrary, we establish the law."

XVI. Indeed, if the law, insofar as it absolutely demands perfect obedience from man, had been entirely nullified and no longer had any binding force, there would no longer be any defect in the faithful, nor any imperfection because they do not attain such perfection, nor would they need to flee to divine mercy and humbly implore God's strict judgment. Just as now the faithful in no way need divine clemency, nor are they less perfect, because they do not observe various rituals and ceremonies of the law, which Christ has removed and abrogated. Yet the common sense of Christians acknowledges that those various infirmities with which the faithful struggle and which prevent them from entirely and perfectly obeying the law are a perpetual matter of humiliation before God for them, and for that reason, they are compelled to say with David, "Do not enter into judgment with Your servant, for in Your sight no one living is righteous."

XVII. Therefore, even today, the law commands entirely perfect obedience from the faithful. For it proposes to us the entire perfection of righteousness both to strive for and to attain as far as we are able; it commands us to strive for it with all our might: although it does not precisely demand it from us under the penalty of eternal death. Under that penalty, it obliges us to a certain measure of obedience, namely, that which is possible through ordinary grace, requiring that we actually and truly possess it if we desire to be saved. To a further measure, which we cannot attain with the strength of ordinary grace, it obliges us less strictly, requiring that we at least desire and strive to have it. For God strictly and precisely requires from us, even under the covenant of grace, that we strive to keep all the commandments of the law with heart and deed, in which consists that essential perfection of our obedience, which is the same as its

truth and sincerity and is called the perfection of parts in the schools. For unless we render such obedience to God, we cannot attain eternal life. But that absolute perfection, which excludes all defect and is called the perfection of degrees, He does not so precisely and strictly demand but only requires that we strive and endeavor to attain it with the strength of grace granted to us.

XVIII. Thus the faithful are exempted from the curse, guilt, and rigor of the law through Christ; for those who flee to Christ with faith and repentance no longer need to fear the curse of the law for past sins or even for those lapses and defects to which they remain subject while in communion with Christ. This is what Paul refers to in the Epistle to the Galatians, "Christ has redeemed us from the curse of the law, having become a curse for us," Gal. 3:13.

XIX. Nevertheless, those who are partakers of the grace of Christ remain always debtors to the law, that is, they are obliged to render true and sincere obedience to the law, without which they can neither escape eternal death nor attain heavenly life and glory.

XX. Indeed, the faithful are not simply and entirely released from the obligation to render perfect and exact obedience to the divine law as the strictness of the law requires. For as we have already said, they are bound to strive for it as much as lies within them, and if they fall short of it, to acknowledge and lament their imperfection in this respect, and therefore continually implore divine clemency and mercy.

XXI. Nor should anyone object that the faithful are no longer subject to the law, but entirely freed from it, because, as Paul teaches, they are no longer under the law. "For sin shall not have dominion over you, for you are not under law but under grace," Rom. 6:14. For the faithful are said to be no longer under the law because they are freed from the curse and rigor of the law, as has already been explained: and further because Christ has entirely freed them from that yoke of ceremonies which was imposed on the Jewish people by the Mosaic law. For since all those ceremonies were only shadows and figures of future good things, after Christ brought the body and the truth, they were no longer of any use and therefore were entirely abolished by Christ. But this does not prevent the faithful from being obliged to keep the moral law, which Christ did not abrogate but rather renewed and illustrated.

XXII. Similarly, when Paul writes to Timothy that the law is not made for a righteous person but for the lawless and insubordinate, for the ungodly and for sinners, for the unholy and profane, for those who kill their fathers or mothers, for murderers, fornicators, and similar criminals, he does not mean by this that the faithful are no longer subject to any law. Rather, he simply means that the person who is justified in Christ and seriously strives for holiness and righteousness, even if he stumbles in many things due to weakness, no longer needs to fear the threats and curse of the law, which will only fall upon those who, despising the grace of Christ, indulge in wickedness and, as scripture says, practice iniquity. And Paul refers to the same thing in the Epistle to the Galatians, where after enumerating the various fruits that the Holy Spirit produces in the regenerate, he adds, "Against such there is no law." This means that the law no longer has the power to condemn and make guilty those who bear such fruits of the Spirit, whether for the sins they previously indulged in or the defects to which they are always subject

in this life; or for neglecting the Mosaic rituals, from the observance of which Christ has released his followers.

XXIII. Moreover, the doctrine I have expounded thus far, concerning the subjection of the faithful to the law and their obligation to render true obedience, is commonly accepted among Protestants. This is known to all who have even lightly touched upon their writings. This can be attested particularly by the Book of Concord, published with the common consent of the theologians of the Augsburg Confession in Germany. It states in the Solid Declaration of certain articles of the Augsburg Confession, concerning which there had been some disputes among the theologians adhering to the same confession, in Article VI, which deals with the third use of the law: "The law of God is like a clear mirror in which the will of God and what pleases Him are set before our eyes. Therefore, it must always be urged diligently and continually upon believers. Although the law is not made for a righteous person, as the Apostle testifies, but for the unrighteous, this should not be understood in such a way as if it were permissible for the righteous to live without the law. For the divine law is written in their hearts. Thus, the true and genuine meaning of Paul's words is that the law cannot condemn those who are reconciled to God through Christ and that it cannot be oppressive to the regenerate since they delight in the law of God according to the inner man." And towards the end of the same article, it states that the faithful are not without the law and, although they are not under the law, they are still in the law.

XXIV. This is consistent with the doctrine of the Anglican Confession of 1645, chapter 19, number 5: "The moral law binds all men to obedience, both those who are justified and others; neither only with regard to the matter contained in it but also with regard to the authority of God the Creator who gave it. Nor does Christ in the Gospel in any way diminish this obligation but rather confirms it."

XXV. The same doctrine is also subscribed to by the theologians of Leyden in the Synopsis of Purer Theology, published with their common consent. In Disputation 35, Thesis 14, after teaching in the preceding thesis that we are freed by Christ from the yoke of that most severe exaction by which the law severely demanded the most exact observance of its commandments under the penalty of a curse, with no hope of salvation proposed to the sinner, they add these words: "We do not therefore teach that the law is superfluous but rather that its doctrine is immutable and its obedience necessary for all. And we recognize that true liberty is only when we serve God according to His law." In Thesis 16, they say, "Therefore, we reject the madness of the Antinomians who think that the moral law should be expelled and eliminated from the Church. We justly complain about the atrocious slander of Bellarmine, who falsely claims that we place Christian liberty in the idea that a man justified by faith is not subject to any law in conscience, is free from the obligation of keeping the law, and considers all things as indifferent, neither commanded nor prohibited."

XXVI. Furthermore, since the whole divine law is concerned with commanding good works and prohibiting evil deeds, it is clear from this that the faithful are obligated to strive for good works and avoid sins, or evil deeds, simply because they are bound to obey the law and

keep its commandments. This is what scripture calls living according to the Spirit and not according to the flesh. This is what Paul teaches in the Epistle to the Romans: "Therefore, brethren, we are debtors—not to the flesh, to live according to the flesh" (implying but to the Spirit, to live according to the Spirit), Romans 8:12.

XXVII. Moreover, since we have previously proven that God demands true obedience to His law from the faithful under the penalty of eternal damnation and exclusion from the kingdom of heaven, it follows that they are bound under the same penalty to avoid vices and pursue good works, and that those who indulge in vices and neglect good works can by no means attain eternal life. For as the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews states, "Without holiness, no one will see the Lord," Hebrews 12:14. And Christ Himself pronounces, "Every tree that does not bear good fruit is cut down and thrown into the fire," Matthew 7:19. This aligns with Paul's statement in the Epistle to the Romans, "If you live according to the flesh, you will die; but if by the Spirit you put to death the deeds of the body, you will live," Romans 8:13. And in the Epistle to the Galatians 6:7, "Do not be deceived: God is not mocked, for whatever a man sows, that he will also reap. For he who sows to his flesh will of the flesh reap corruption, but he who sows to the Spirit will of the Spirit reap everlasting life." Furthermore, in the same epistle, after listing various sins which he calls works of the flesh, he repeats that "those who practice such things will not inherit the kingdom of God." Similar to this is what he writes to the Corinthians: "Do not be deceived: Neither fornicators, nor idolaters, nor adulterers, nor homosexuals, nor sodomites, nor thieves, nor covetous, nor drunkards, nor revilers, nor extortioners will inherit the kingdom of God," 1 Corinthians 6:9-10.

XXVIII. An infinite number of other passages could be gathered from scripture to confirm this doctrine, but it is unnecessary to dwell on this matter here, as it is so certain and evident that it is not disputed by anyone who even bears the name of Christian. Especially since it is far from the belief of Protestants that good works are not necessary for the faithful and that they can obtain eternal life even if they persist in sins until the end and are overtaken by death without engaging in good works. Their public and private writings attest to this, and they repeatedly emphasize that the faith to which justification and salvation are ascribed is a living faith, one that works through love. They teach everywhere that without good works, faith is dead and useless for salvation, and true faith cannot coexist with reigning sin and contempt for good works.

XXIX. But to repel this calumny more strongly, it seems appropriate to quote some passages from the public writings of those who are most suspect to their adversaries on this matter. Thus, the already cited Book of Concord, to which most of the theologians of the Augsburg Confession in Germany have subscribed, states in the Solid Declaration of certain articles concerning which there had been some controversies among the same theologians, in Article IV, which is on good works, page 702: "As for the necessity or freedom of good works, it cannot be denied that these words are often used and repeated in the Augsburg Confession and its Apology: Good works are necessary, and it is necessary to do good works, because faith and reconciliation with God must necessarily follow, and the works which God has commanded must

necessarily be done by us. Sacred scripture uses the words necessity, necessary, duty, we must, ought, etc., whenever it speaks of matters we are bound to perform by reason of divine command, ordination, and will. Therefore, the propositions 'Good works are necessary' and 'It is necessary to do good works' are rightly retained and insisted upon to refute and reject the Epicurean opinion of security, by which many take a dead faith, or some vain persuasion without repentance and good works, for true faith, as if true faith and the evil intention of persisting and progressing in sins could exist simultaneously in the same heart, which is utterly impossible; or as if someone could have and retain true faith, righteousness, and salvation even if he remains a rotten and unfruitful tree, and brings forth no good fruit, indeed, even if he persists in sins against his conscience, or relapses into former crimes with deliberate malice. These things are false and impious. However, this distinction must also be observed, that the word necessity should be understood as the necessity of order, command, and will of Christ, and our duty, not as the necessity of coercion."

XXX. Similar statements are found in the Saxon Confession, Article 6, where it affirms that if anyone rushes against his conscience, he forfeits the good things received from God. In support of this, it cites Paul's statement in Galatians 5, "Those who do such things will not inherit the kingdom of God." From this, it concludes that care must be taken to avoid such lapses. It further states, "This clear necessity, proposed with the utmost penalty, namely, the loss of eternal life, if it does not move some to good works, they are already among those of whom it is said, 'He who commits sin is of the devil.'" There are several reasons for this necessity: obligation, that is, the immutable order for creatures to obey God; also, the avoidance of present punishments, etc.

XXXI. Although all Protestants agree that good works are necessary for those justified and to be saved, and that no one can be saved who neglects good works and does not care to avoid sins, some of them do not approve of saying that good works are necessary for salvation and that it is impossible to be saved without good works. This is not because they simply deny that these phrases can be explained in any proper sense, but because they consider them dangerous and prone to lead to the conclusion that our salvation is not entirely gratuitous and that our works have some merit and efficiency in obtaining salvation. This is the opinion of those who composed the often-cited Book of Concord and subscribed to it, for it states in the Epitome of the articles about which controversies have arisen among the theologians of the Augsburg Confession, in Title IV, which deals with Good Works. In the Negative Part, number 1, page 590, it says: "We reject and condemn the following phrases when it is taught: Good works are necessary for salvation; no one is ever saved without good works; it is impossible to be saved without good works." And in the Solid Declaration of the same fourth article, which we just cited, it states, "Nevertheless, it must be diligently observed in this matter that good works are not mixed into the article of justification and our salvation. Therefore, these propositions are rightly rejected: Good works are necessary for salvation in such a way that it is impossible to be saved without good works." And later, they add, "It must be firmly, certainly, and definitively established that such phrases or propositions about the necessity of good works for salvation are

not to be taught, defended, or presented, but rather should be excluded and rejected from the Church as false and insincere."

XXXII. But we plainly believe that these propositions, that good works are necessary for salvation and that it is impossible to be saved without good works, should not only be taught and retained in the Church but should be constantly urged and inculcated among the faithful. For they contain the very doctrine of Christ and the Apostles, clearly and expressly delivered in the places already cited. For what else does it mean that "without holiness no one will see the Lord," but that no one will be saved without good works? For what is holiness without good works, and what is salvation without seeing the Lord? Similarly, when Christ says to His disciples, "Unless your righteousness exceeds that of the scribes and Pharisees, you will by no means enter the kingdom of heaven," what else does He mean but that no one can be admitted into the heavenly kingdom without striving for works of piety and righteousness, which the Gospel commends?

XXXIII. Moreover, since those very people with whom we contend continually urge that without good works faith is dead and useless for salvation and that a living faith that works through love and is effective through good works is absolutely necessary for salvation, it is evident, according to their own doctrine, that good works are something without which no one can have true faith and consequently, no one can attain salvation and righteousness. Why then are they reluctant to say that good works are necessary for salvation when everything necessary for salvation must be present without which salvation cannot be secured, nor can one be a partaker of it?

XXXIV. Similarly, since they willingly teach, as we have previously reported, that no one can have or retain righteousness and salvation who is and remains an unfruitful tree, bearing no good fruit, why do they not want to say that it is impossible to be saved without good works? For when someone lacks that which is essential for salvation, is it not impossible to be saved without it?

XXXV. Furthermore, should it not be said that it is impossible to be saved without that to which we are bound and obligated by divine command and precept, and indeed under the penalty of losing eternal life? But those with whom we now contend acknowledge that the faithful are bound under such a penalty to abstain from works of the flesh and to live according to the Spirit, which is evident from scripture, as is clear from the words of the Saxon Confession cited above, and from the very often cited Book of Concord, in that fourth article on Good Works, in the Solid Declaration, page 706. After condemning, as false and Epicurean, the opinion that faith, the grace of God, righteousness, and salvation can be had and retained even if a person indulges in their evil desires, resists the Holy Spirit, and plans atrocious crimes against their conscience, they add the following words: "Against this most pestilential persuasion, the divine threats, punishments, and admonitions, immovably true, must be diligently and frequently repeated and inculcated to Christians justified by faith: 'Do not be deceived: Neither fornicators, nor adulterers, nor covetous... will inherit the kingdom of God.' And elsewhere, 'Those who do such things will not inherit the kingdom of God.' And to the Romans, 'If you live according to the

flesh, you will die.' And 'Because of such things, the wrath of God comes upon the sons of disobedience.'"

XXXVI. Nor should anyone object that many infants attain eternal life and are admitted to the kingdom of heaven; and yet all infants are devoid of good works. The answer is clear in itself, namely, when it is said that good works are necessary for salvation and that no one is saved without good works, this is understood concerning those who, by age, are capable of good or evil works, to which infants do not belong; who, just as they lack good works, are also not guilty of evil works; and who, just as they are tainted with no actual sin, can also, by God's grace, be purified and cleansed from the sin in which they were born and conceived without any of their own works.

XXXVII. But you may say, are not many adults converted in the very act of dying, when life is failing and there is no time left to do good works, who nevertheless are also delivered from eternal death and admitted to the enjoyment of heavenly blessedness and glory? Just as the other thief who was hanging on the cross with Christ heard that kind voice, "Today you will be with Me in Paradise." I answer that those who seriously and wholeheartedly turn to God in the very act of dying are undoubtedly not excluded from salvation; but neither are they entirely without good works: for necessarily found in them are a serious confession and detestation of their sins before God, a vehement desire for His grace, heartfelt prayers to God, hope and trust in His forgiveness, sincere love for God, and a firm resolution to obey His commandments in the future and abstain from the sins they have indulged in, if life were to be prolonged for them by God.

XXXVIII. Scripture indeed everywhere proclaims that we are saved by grace and not by works; but by this, it means to signify that our salvation is entirely gratuitous and not to be attributed to the merits of our good works but to the goodness and mercy of God, which prevents us when we are lying in sins, awakens and quickens us so that, having obtained the remission of our sins through Christ, we may henceforth walk in newness of life and finally attain eternal life. From this, it follows that good works are not the price by which salvation is purchased for us, and our trust for salvation is not to be placed in them. However, it cannot be concluded from this that good works are not something without which our salvation is not completed and the way prepared by God by which, and not by another, we must reach eternal life, which is what we intend to affirm when we say that good works are necessary for salvation and that it is impossible to be saved without good works.

XXXIX. Therefore, these formulas contain nothing that could detract from the doctrine of gratuitous salvation or that is not entirely consistent with the form of sound words. Consequently, they have been approved by the unanimous consent of Christians and used without scruple up to these recent times. They cannot be condemned and rejected without causing great offense to pious souls and giving occasion for people, who are already more than prone to evil and negligent in doing good, to flatter themselves in their sins and to diminish their zeal for good works. For who among the people, hearing it preached that good works are not necessary for salvation and that it is not impossible to be saved without good works, will not conclude from this that they can safely indulge in vices and still be partakers of salvation even if

they do not care about works of piety? I know that the theologians with whom we contend have a different intention, and this debate, like many others, ultimately reduces to a mere logomachy. For although they do not want to say that good works are necessary for salvation and that it is impossible to be saved without good works, they nonetheless teach and assert that no one can be saved who remains in sins and neglects good works. But these statements seem to contradict each other: after one has asserted that good works are not necessary for salvation and that it is not impossible to be saved without good works, what is subsequently stated cannot remove the scandal of such a dangerous expression, which is so abhorrent to the common sense of Christians and which by itself, and as the words sound, opens such a wide window to a licentious life.

XL. Therefore, other Protestants, especially those who are called Reformed, whose opinion we defend and expound here, believe that the praise of our salvation should indeed be entirely attributed to divine grace and the merit of Christ. Nevertheless, they also believe that the Christian people should be diligently taught that good works are necessary for salvation, not indeed as meritorious or efficient causes of salvation, but as the way that alone leads to salvation and as the means ordained by God through which the possession of eternal life is to be obtained and without which one cannot hope to be a partaker of it. It would be a great injustice to attribute the opposite view to us, as they so frequently complain in their sermons and writings, and it would be too lengthy and superfluous to gather their testimonies on this matter.

XLI. Therefore, omitting private testimonies, it will suffice to refer here to what is read in the public confession presented in the name of the Reformed Churches at the Colloquium of Thorn in 1645. They state, "We are falsely accused as if by this doctrine we abolish the study of good works and deny their necessity; yet it is manifest from what has already been said that neither justifying faith nor justification itself can exist in adults without sanctification and the study of good works. In this sense, we acknowledge that they are absolutely necessary for salvation, although not as meritorious causes of justification or salvation," Chapter 4 on Grace, Section 2, Number 9.

**Theological Theses,
ON
THE RELATION
OF GOOD WORKS
TO
Eternal Life.**

PART ONE.

In which the Doctrine of the Reformed Church is Expounded.

Thesis I

The Doctors of the Roman Schools are accustomed to attribute to the Doctors of the Reformed Church that they teach that the good works of the faithful have no relation to salvation

and eternal life, as if they are not only not merits or causes of it, but also not conditions or something similar. This can be seen in Bellarmine's book on Justification, book 4, chapter 7. The adversaries, he says, agree that good works are not necessary for salvation, except by necessity of presence. The meaning of this proposition is that good works ought to be done because otherwise, faith would not be alive or true unless it produces good fruits, just as fire is not fire unless it gives heat; yet good works have no relation to salvation as if they are merits, causes, conditions, etc. In which they say faith is distinguished from works because faith has a relation to salvation because it apprehends it, and therefore is said to be necessary for salvation; but works have no relation at all, and therefore are indeed necessary but not for salvation.

II. However, those who wrote against Bellarmine, such as Paræus in the cited book, complain that Bellarmine either did not understand or did not faithfully report the doctrine of the Protestants in this part. It is false, he says, that we say works are necessary only by necessity of presence. And that good works have no relation at all to salvation, not even as conditions, this, I say, is false. Even if they do not have a causal relation, they have or can have a relation of order, such as the means to the end, the antecedent to the consequent, a condition without which the effect cannot happen, the presence of which indeed does not produce but the absence of which can impede salvation. For example, a battle is necessary for victory: victory for the crown: yet the battle itself does not necessarily produce victory (since both sides fight) nor victory the crown (since it is given freely, according to the promise), but the absence of the battle can impede victory and the crown.

III. Similarly, Amesius in Bellarmine Enervatus, book 6, chapter 6, says the same words of Bellarmine: We do not deny that good works have any relation to salvation: for they have the relation of an adjunct, consequent, and effect to salvation, as they say, achieved; and of an antecedent and disposing adjunct to be achieved salvation; and also of an argument confirming confidence and hope of salvation: but we deny that our works can be the meritorious cause of justification and salvation.

IV. But to make it clearer what the doctrine of the Reformed School is in this part, and, if possible, to cut off all occasion for future calumny, we thought it worthwhile to explain a little more distinctly and broadly what the Reformed think about the relation of good works to salvation according to the doctrine of Scripture. V. First of all, it is certain that good works are a condition without which celestial glory cannot be obtained and eternal destruction cannot be avoided. For without holiness, no one will see the Lord. And unless, says Christ, your righteousness exceeds that of the scribes and Pharisees, you will not enter the kingdom of heaven. Also, every tree that does not produce good fruit is cut down and thrown into the fire.

VI. Good works are not simply a condition assumed in those who are to obtain eternal life; but they are the way that leads to it, and the means ordained by God through which one certainly and effectively arrives at eternal happiness. For, as the Apostle says in Romans 2, there will be tribulation and distress for every human being who does evil, but glory, honor, and peace for everyone who does good. And to those who by patience in well-doing seek glory and honor and immortality, he will give eternal life; but for those who are self-seeking and do not obey the

truth but obey unrighteousness, there will be wrath and fury. This relates to what the same Apostle says in Romans 8, If you live according to the flesh, you will die; but if by the Spirit you put to death the deeds of the body, you will live. Hence it is said that by good works our calling and election are made sure, and an entrance into the kingdom of our Lord Jesus Christ is provided for us. Strive, says Peter, to make your calling and election sure by good works. For if you do these things, you will never fall. Thus, an abundant entrance will be provided for you into the eternal kingdom of our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ, 2 Peter 1. And it also pertains to what James says in his epistle, chapter 1. Whoever looks into the perfect law of liberty and continues in it, not being a forgetful hearer but a doer of the work, this one will be blessed in what he does.

VII. And this is why the faithful, being diligent in good works, are said to work out their own salvation, Philippians 2. Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling, says Paul. Wherefore, writing to the Corinthians about the afflictions they patiently endure for Christ, he attributes to them that they work for us an eternal weight of glory. For this slight momentary affliction is preparing for us an eternal weight of glory beyond all comparison, as we look not to the things that are seen but to the things that are unseen, 2 Corinthians 4.

VIII. For although the good works of the faithful do not by themselves and properly produce their eternal salvation and glory, they are rightly said to work it because they are means tending and leading to it, and which by God's ordination and promise are infallibly and necessarily followed by eternal life and glory. And so, although the Reformed Theologians rightly deny that good works are properly called causes of salvation, because they do not immediately and by themselves attain the effect of salvation, they can yet in a broader and improper sense be called efficient causes of salvation, namely, inasmuch as an efficient cause is called anything that in any way works and concurs to some effect, as the opinion of the Protestants is explained by John Davenant in his work on habitual and actual justice, chapter 32. Bellarmine, he says, in his declaration of his opinion affirms that good works are necessary for salvation by reason of efficiency, it is true if he takes efficiency broadly, for anything that in any way works and concurs to the effect of salvation; false if he understands efficiency as meritorious, which alone is in the justice of Christ, or apprehensive, which alone pertains to the virtue of faith, or properly efficient, that is, which reaches the effect of salvation itself; in which sense only God is the efficient cause of our salvation. And later, We do not deny all efficiency to good works in relation to salvation, but meritorious efficiency; or efficiency properly taken; namely, which reaches or produces the effect of salvation itself. Efficiency broadly taken, which works something preceding the effect of salvation, we gladly concede to good works.

IX. But to better understand what the relation is between good works and eternal life, it is necessary to consider the various similitudes by which sacred Scripture explains it. First of all, it compares good works to seed, and eternal life to the harvest or fruit gathered from it. For whatever a man sows, that he will also reap. For he who sows to his own flesh will from the flesh reap corruption, but he who sows to the Spirit will from the Spirit reap eternal life, Galatians 6. It is similar to what is read in Psalm 126. Those who sow in tears shall reap with shouts of joy. And Psalm 58. Truly there is a reward for the righteous. For just as he who commits seeds to the earth

gathers a suitable fruit in the time appointed by God and nature, so those who pursue piety and justice do not labor in vain, but after patiently waiting for the fulfillment of the divine promise, a very abundant harvest of happiness and glory finally springs up for them in the future life.

X. Moreover, eternal life is often compared to a prize and a crown, and good works to the race and contest. So when Paul writes to Timothy, he says, I have fought the good fight, I have finished the race, I have kept the faith. Henceforth there is laid up for me the crown of righteousness, which the Lord, the righteous judge, will award to me on that day. And in the first epistle to the Corinthians, Do you not know that in a race all the runners run, but only one receives the prize? So run that you may obtain it. Every athlete exercises self-control in all things. They do it to receive a perishable wreath, but we an imperishable. For just as he who competes in a contest is not crowned unless he competes according to the rules, so also no one ought to promise himself a blessed and immortal life from God unless he strives against his own desires and brings his flesh into the service of God. Moreover, just as those who surpassed others in the stadium or in the wrestling school had certain rewards appointed by those who instituted the games, so also eternal life and glory is a reward that according to God's law and promise certainly remains for all those who seriously and sincerely exercise themselves in good works.

XI. Especially, however, Scripture speaks of good works as a task and labor imposed on us by God: and of life and eternal glory as a reward promised by God, and repaid by God for that labor. Thus Christ, addressing those who suffer persecution for righteousness' sake, says, "Rejoice and be glad, for your reward is great in heaven," Matthew 5. And the Psalmist refers to this reward when he says there is great reward in keeping God's judgments, Psalm 19. And Solomon also in Proverbs says, "The one who sows righteousness gets a sure reward." Therefore, Paul, writing to the Corinthians, says, "Each will receive his own reward according to his own labor," 1 Corinthians 3.

XII. Furthermore, when sacred Scripture calls eternal life the reward of good works, it takes the term "reward" not strictly and properly, but in a broader and somewhat improper sense, as it signifies anything that, according to any agreement, is repaid to some labor and work. For the understanding of this matter, it should be noted that for a reward properly so-called, two things are altogether required. First, that there be a proportion between the labor and the reward, not just any proportion, but a certain proportion of equality. Secondly, that the reward is due to the labor strictly by right and from proper justice. Neither of these applies here.

XIII. For as to the first, eternal life and glory is such a great reward that it far exceeds the price and value of our good works if they are estimated by themselves. For it is a good entirely perfect. However, our good works suffer from many defects and are not exact to the rigor and perfection of the divine law. Even if we take those good works of the faithful which are the most eminent and seem the most excellent, none will be found which can be preferred to the sufferings patiently endured for Christ out of love for God. And yet, speaking of these, the Apostle says in Romans 8, "I consider that the sufferings of this present time are not worth comparing with the glory that is to be revealed to us." This is similar to what we just cited from the same Apostle,

"For this slight momentary affliction is preparing for us an eternal weight of glory beyond all comparison," 2 Corinthians 4.

XIV. Certainly, that God attributes to our works, which are done out of love for Him, a reward much more abundant and richer than they could by themselves demand, is sufficiently indicated by Christ in Luke 6, where He says that God measures back to us not only a good measure, but a measure pressed down, shaken together, and running over. "Give," He says, "and it will be given to you. Good measure, pressed down, shaken together, running over, will be put into your lap." By these words, He exaggerates the amplitude of divine reward beyond what we can perform.

XV. Although there is no proportion of equivalence, that is, equality of price and value, between the good works of the faithful and the heavenly and immortal life which God rewards them with, nevertheless, as is evident from what has been said, there is a multiple relationship and a certain proportion, so to speak, of congruence between them. Such congruence can be noted between the seed and the harvest, between the seed and the fruit that arises from it, between the contest and the crown appointed for the winner, which are the similes used by Scripture in this matter. Likewise, between the means and the end, between the way and the terminus to which that way leads, between moral good, that is, virtue and holiness, and the physical good corresponding to it, that is, happiness and blessedness, between the beginning of a thing and its consummation, or between an initiated thing and the same thing completed. Finally, between things of the same order, which proceed from the same principle, and have some connection by nature. For good works pertain to grace, which is glory begun, while glory is grace consummated. Then, good works have the nature of moral good, while eternal life has the nature of physical good. Moreover, both are of the supernatural order and have the same Holy Spirit as their author.

XVI. Hence Scripture says that God will repay each, both good and evil, according to their works, that is, as is fitting and appropriate to their works. For it is fitting, and altogether in accordance with divine wisdom, that it should be well with the good and ill with the wicked. And that those who have conducted themselves well and laudably in this world, and indeed beyond the common measure of nature, should be well and happily in the other world beyond the common measure of nature.

XVII. Therefore, also those who live piously and justly in this world and suffer for Christ, are in sacred Scripture declared worthy of heavenly life and glory. As in Revelation 3:4, "They will walk with me in white, for they are worthy." And 2 Thessalonians 1, where the Apostle teaches that the faith and patience of the pious are proven through many persecutions and tribulations, so that they may be considered worthy of the kingdom of God, for which they also suffer. Although the sufferings of this present time are not worthy to be compared with the future glory that will be revealed in us, as we cited above from the same Apostle, because, namely, the light and momentary affliction bears no proportion of equality to the eternal weight of glory; nevertheless, those who constantly bear adversities for Christ's name and fight against their own desires, following the motions of the divine spirit, are worthy of the kingdom of God

and the crown of glory, because it is fitting for God to grant to those who have legitimately contended at His command, the prizes which befit His goodness and munificence, and to bestow those rewards which correspond not to the meagerness of the duty performed, but to the majesty and greatness of the rewarder.

XVIII. Moreover, such a congruence and appropriateness of nature between eternal life and the good works of the pious is acknowledged by the Reformed Doctors, as can be evidenced by the renowned men, John Davenant and Moses Amyraldus. For the former, explaining how the good works of the regenerate relate to and are ordered towards the reward of eternal life, not only observes that they are ordered towards the reward because God freely, according to the good pleasure of His will, promises rewards of this life and the future to the good works of the faithful and regenerate; but also affirms that those good works have a certain ordination, or at least aptitude, to be ordered towards divine rewards for three reasons, as if from three causes. First, from the condition of the worker himself. Second, from the condition of the works themselves. Third, from the difficulty of performing good works. First, I say, from the condition of the worker himself. For, he says, since the worker is supposed to be faithful and justified, he is also presumed to be admitted into divine grace and friendship. The law of friendship requires that whatever services a friend offers to his great friend be valued not according to the meagerness of the service performed, but according to the dignity and munificence of the one to whom it is offered. Since, therefore, the regenerate are counted among the friends of God, according to Christ's saying, "You are my friends if you do what I command you," when they endeavor this with pious will, they can expect from a benevolent and friendly God those rewards with which He is accustomed to honor His friends. Secondly, from the condition of the works themselves. For, he says, these works which are called good must always spring from the love of God and aim at the honor of God. Such a work, although it does not have the condignity for a heavenly reward, nevertheless has, so to speak, an ordainability. For doing something out of charity for God provokes God's love towards the doer, which, though situated in affection, not in effect, must bring with it some conferment of good. Thus referring our works to the honor of God, as it were, excites Him to honor us and bestow divine rewards upon us, as the sacred Scriptures teach, "Those who honor me I will honor." "Whoever gives you a cup of water in my name because you belong to Christ will by no means lose his reward." As if to say, there is no work so small that if it is done out of love and in my honor, it does not acquire a splendid reward for the doer. Finally, he says that the very difficulty of doing good works, which arises from the Devil and the opposing world, and the flesh resisting and urging to the contrary, gives them a certain congruence to divine rewards. For, he says, it is always decided that some reward should be conferred on those who contend legitimately at the judge's command. Since, therefore, good works are not done without adversaries and struggle (for the flesh lusts against the spirit, to say nothing of the Devil and the world, which as it were declare war on those who do well), they have from this difficulty a certain ordination to rewards. Therefore, whoever has sweat and fought in the arena of good works can say with the Apostle, "I have fought the good fight, I have

finished the race, I have kept the faith. Henceforth there is laid up for me the crown of righteousness, which the Lord will award to me," 2 Timothy 4:7-8.

XIX. Similarly, the notable scholar M. Amyraldus elaborates and meticulously explains the congruence between good works and eternal life in his French treatise "On the Merit of Works" against Theoph. Brachetium Milletterium, page 50. Where, giving reasons why God is said to render to the just according to their works, he notes that the particle "*κατά*," that is, "according to," generally signifies any relation or congruence between two things, and that there are very clear and explicit congruences between the good works of the just and eternal life. First, good works are a kind of moral good, while life and glory are a physical good, as they say: the former consisting in virtue, the latter in joy and gladness: and thus these two agree in that both are a kind of good, though not of the same kind. Secondly, good works reflect the image of God as He is good and holy; life and glory reflect the image of God as He is happy and blessed: and thus these two agree in that the image of God shines forth in both in a special way. Thirdly, God delights in holiness and good works because they partake in something of His excellent nature, just as, on the contrary, God hates sin because it is contrary to the purity of His nature. Fourthly, this is why God has promised happiness to holiness and good works, just as, conversely, He has threatened punishment to sin.

XX. And then on page 60 and following, explaining how the faithful who are diligent in good works are worthy of the kingdom of God, he first teaches that they are pronounced worthy of the heavenly kingdom on account of the holiness that is in them, not absolutely if God were to examine them strictly; but comparatively to the impious, who are immersed in the filth of sin. Then, he notes that there are two kinds of dignity. One which consists in a certain relation of justice. In this sense, the worker is said to be worthy of his wage. The other which consists only in a certain natural congruence: as when it is said, "Produce fruits worthy of repentance," that is, fruits that are congruent and consistent with repentance. And in this latter sense, he affirms that the pious are worthy of eternal glory and happiness, because just as happiness and the state of sin are naturally opposed and cannot be compared, so there is a certain natural congruence between happiness and holiness produced by true repentance. Moreover, since the promise of reward made to the good works of the pious has been established, they are worthy of the reward because they are in the state required by the promise and have the disposition that the promise demands.

XXI. Furthermore, although there is a certain congruence between the good works of the faithful and the eternal life and glory that God rewards them with, for which the faithful are said to be worthy of eternal life in Scripture, it should not be thought that eternal life is due to their good works in themselves and by strict right. For, as we have shown from Scripture, for a reward to be due to work and labor by strict right, it is not enough that there is a simple congruence between the work and the reward; but it is required that the work be equivalent in price and value to the reward, and that there be that proportion of equality between the two, which is not found here.

XXII. Indeed, if eternal life were strictly due to the good works of the just, there would be no reason for them to fear and deprecate the strict and severe judgment of God. For what

could they fear from God if they could demand eternal life and glory from Him as their right? And yet we see even the most holy men, who were most illustrious for their good works, deprecate such severe judgment. Witness David, a man after God's own heart, whose voice is this, Psalm 143: "Do not enter into judgment with your servant, for no one living is righteous before you." And Job, a man blameless and upright, who feared God and shunned evil, who speaks thus to his friends in chapter 9: "Truly I know that it is so, but how can a man be in the right before God? If one wished to contend with Him, one could not answer Him once in a thousand times."

XXIII. Moreover, whatever we are and can do, we have from God; He can take nothing from us, nor does He need our good works. As it is often repeated in Scripture, "Who has given to Him, that He should repay him?" By a double right, namely, of creation and redemption, He is our Lord and Master; we, on the other hand, are His servants and slaves who owe Him all our service entirely. Therefore, whatever good we accomplish, since it is owed to Him on so many accounts and is yet completely useless to Him, cannot by itself oblige Him to reward, let alone such a great and magnificent one. This is what Christ teaches in the parable in Luke 17. "Will any one of you who has a servant plowing or keeping sheep say to him when he has come in from the field, 'Come at once and recline at table'? Will he not rather say to him, 'Prepare supper for me, and dress properly, and serve me while I eat and drink, and afterward you will eat and drink'? Does he thank the servant because he did what was commanded? So you also, when you have done all that you were commanded, say, 'We are unworthy servants; we have only done what was our duty.'"

XXIV. Therefore, if we have any right to eternal life through our good works, it is founded on the gratuitous promise of God, who in His immense goodness has declared in His word that He wills to reward our services, however weak and meager, with eternal life and glory: even though without any injustice He could neither give nor promise such a great and magnificent reward to our works.

XXV. And therefore, sacred Scripture calls eternal life a reward in such a way that it also signifies it as a free gift that befalls us by the mercy of God. To this pertains what Peter commands in the first chapter of his first epistle, urging the faithful to "set your hope fully on the grace that will be brought to you at the revelation of Jesus Christ." For by the revelation of Jesus Christ is understood the final appearance of Christ, in which the grace to be offered to us is nothing other than eternal life and glory of body and soul, which by the gratuitous promise for Christ's sake, all the faithful will then be endowed with by God. Hence also Paul, wishing eternal happiness and salvation for Onesiphorus, whose love had refreshed him, prays to the Lord to "grant him to find mercy from the Lord on that day," 2 Timothy 1:18. Clearly indicating that God, when He crowns the works of the pious with glory on the last day, will use mercy towards them. And moreover, theologians often cite in this regard what is read in Psalm 103: "Who crowns you with steadfast love and mercy." And what is read in Paul, Romans 6: "The wages of sin is death, but the gift of God is eternal life in Christ Jesus our Lord."

XXVI. And certainly, with the greatest right, eternal life should be called grace; not only because God has promised it out of sheer generosity, without being bound by any right, and led by no necessity, to the good works of the faithful: but also because the good works of the faithful themselves proceed from God's grace and are the free gift of the Holy Spirit. Add to this that our services, for which God has promised such ample remuneration, suffer from many defects and are interrupted by frequent lapses: and therefore require much forgiveness and great clemency and kindness to be accepted by God for eternal life.

XXVII. Furthermore, since the strictness of justice excludes mercy and grace, it is certain that eternal life, which must be attributed to divine grace and mercy, is not rendered to our works from strict justice. For that is strictly and properly called justice which gives each one his due without grace and favor, and by which someone maintains, as required by law, equality of thing with thing, and compensates the accepted debt with an equal reward; otherwise, he would be unjust and unfair, and would defraud another of what is due to him against justice and right. This kind of justice can have no place in God in relation to men, since God has given all things to everyone, and owes absolutely nothing to anyone.

XXVIII. However, it must not be denied that God so rewards the good works of the regenerate out of grace and mercy, that He also maintains some measure of justice in this and can thus be called just in a broader sense. Firstly, to keep and fulfill promises pertains in some way to justice, and one who refuses to keep promises sins against justice to some extent. God, when He rewards eternal life and glory to the good works of the pious, confirms His promise and keeps what He has promised gratuitously. This pertains to what the Apostle says in the Epistle to the Hebrews, "For God is not unjust so as to overlook your work and the love that you have shown for His name in serving the saints, as you still do" (Hebrews 6:10). For he says that if God were to forget the charity of the faithful, He would be unjust because He would then deny them the rewards He has promised, which would be contrary to His justice, that is, His faithfulness.

XXIX. Moreover, when God crowns with happiness and glory those who are devoted to piety and charity, He exercises justice in some way because He does what is fitting to His goodness and equity, which seem to demand that He should benefit the good and that He should reward true holiness and justice, which He, being just, cannot but love, with the highest remuneration according to His greatness. Sacred Scripture often calls justice in God the propriety of His goodness, as the Scholastics speak; and calls God just when He does things that are congruent with His wisdom, equity, and kindness. This can be referred to what the Apostle says in 2 Thessalonians 1:6-7, "For it is just with God to repay with affliction those who afflict you, and to grant relief to you who are afflicted as well as to us when the Lord Jesus is revealed from heaven." He says that it is just with God to give relief to those who are unjustly afflicted for Christ, because this is altogether congruent with divine wisdom and equity.

XXX. Add that He exercises a kind of justice when, in distributing rewards, He accepts no person's status but gives each one what is rationally congruent and what the law established by Him demands. God, in distributing heavenly rewards no less than in inflicting the punishments of hell, will avoid all respect of persons; and therefore, without any regard to the

nation, condition, or dignity of men, He will grant to the good and holy works of each one the rewards established in the Gospel, and will give each one his own reward according to his own labor; those who have labored more in the work of God, and have bravely endured greater and harsher struggles for His glory, will also receive more praise and glory from Him in the final judgment. To this, the Apostle refers when he expects the crown of glory from God as a just judge, 2 Timothy 4:7-8: "I have fought the good fight, I have finished the race, I have kept the faith. Henceforth there is laid up for me the crown of righteousness, which the Lord, the righteous judge, will award to me on that day; and not only to me but also to all who have loved His appearing."

XXXI. And this is the opinion and doctrine of the Reformed Church, as evidenced also by the two notable theologians cited earlier. For Davenant, in his treatise on Actual Justice, chapter 60, explaining the passage from the Epistle to the Hebrews, teaches that God would act unjustly if He did not reward good works because He would act against the reason of His wisdom, which is like a law to Him: not because He would take away something due to us according to the reason of strictly called justice, which consists in the equality of giving and receiving. Likewise, God is said to act justly when He gives the reward of eternal life to good works; not because He observes equality between the dignity of the works and the rewards, but because He keeps His faith in the exhibition of His promises. And in chapter 66, he affirms that the whole right which we are said to have to eternal life lies in the fact that God is, as it were, a debtor to Himself, to act conformably both to the propriety of His goodness and the faithfulness of His promise.

XXXII. How it befits divine goodness to reward the good works of the pious with eternal life, he explains in chapter 57 of the same book, in response to the third argument. Where he acknowledges that it is congruent to divine goodness and munificence to reward eternal life to those who have not yet equated any merits with lesser benefits. Because eternal life does not surpass the dignity and excellence of the works of pious men more than God Himself surpasses men, and therefore it is fitting that when men render services to God according to their strength, God should reward them with rewards according to His majesty. For there can be conceived a certain geometric proportion between infinite God and miserable man, and between the infinite reward of God and the short service of man.

XXXIII. Finally, at the end of chapter 60, he teaches that God, in rewarding the faithful, acts as a just judge and exercises a kind of distributive justice, and is no respecter of persons: because in that retribution, although the reward greatly exceeds the work of each one, yet He gives to each one according to the quality of the good works, rewarding good works with a good reward; and moreover according to a certain proportion of the works, because He grants greater and clearer rewards to greater and holier works. Neither does He give the spiritual rewards, which are proposed by divine ordination to the faithful and those living piously, to the noble, the wealthy, or any others, without regard to their faith and holiness, which would incur a kind of unjust respect of persons. When, he says, the supreme ruler of heaven and earth gives eternal and blessed life to each Christian soldier who fights bravely, He also gives a different and

outstanding measure of glory in this life to those who have exercised the diverse measure of grace more excellently, thus preserving the proportion between different works and rewards. This does not, however, mean that the virtue of any excellent soldier corresponds equally to the reward of a blessed life or the degree he holds in a blessed life if equality of thing to thing is considered.

XXXIV. The notable scholar M. Amyraldus, in his French treatise on Justification against Milletterium, page 200, teaches similar things. Where he says that God, as He crowns the good works of the faithful, can be called just in three respects or for three reasons: Firstly, because the purity of the divine nature, which is also called justice, is the true cause of the love with which God pursues whatever in creatures reflects and imitates it: according to Psalm 11, "The Lord is righteous; He loves righteous deeds." Secondly, because if one compares pious men with the impious, and the different rewards of the former and latter, which in themselves and absolutely speaking are pure mercy, it seems in some way to be justice. To this, he applies the saying of Paul, "It is just with God to repay with affliction those who afflict you, and to grant relief to you who are afflicted as well as to us when the Lord Jesus is revealed from heaven." Thirdly, because when God mercifully rewards us, He does so according to His promises. Now, faith in promises is also usually called justice according to Cicero's saying, "The foundation of justice is faith."

XXXV. Thus far we have shown clearly, according to the truth of the matter and the common doctrine of the Reformed School, that there is indeed a great congruence and relationship between eternal life and the good works of the regenerate: but still, there is not found that proportion of equality in which strictly called justice is founded: and therefore, eternal life is not due to good works in themselves and by strict right, nor is it rendered from strictly called justice. Hence follows what we undertook to prove, namely, that eternal life, with respect to good works, does not have the nature of a properly and strictly called reward.

XXXVI. Since reward and merit are related terms, with one implying the other; if one is removed, the other is also removed; by this very fact that eternal life, with respect to good works, does not have the properly called nature of reward, it is also clear that good works, with respect to eternal life, do not have the proper nature of merit.

XXXVII. Indeed, although theologians vary in assigning the reason for properly said merit, and some require more, others fewer conditions for it, all Protestants agree that two things are absolutely necessary for merit properly taken: one, that the work be equal and proportional to the reward; the other, that it can demand the reward as strictly due by justice properly so called. Since all Protestants agree that these two things are absent in our works in this matter, they therefore unanimously deny that our good works are meritorious of eternal life and glory.

XXXVIII. However, just as sacred Scripture calls eternal life the reward of good works in a more common and broader sense, so also the ancient Church Doctors attribute the term "merit" to good works in a broader sense. They call merit every work that is imputable to praise or reward; that is, any work by which we achieve and obtain something, and which is ordained to some reward. Therefore, when they affirm that the faithful merit eternal life and glory by their

good and holy works, they mean nothing else but that good works are the means ordained by God through which we attain eternal life and glory; and the conditions by which it is gratuitously promised by God.

XXXIX. We do not deny that such an improper sense of merit is found in the good works of the faithful; nor do we think that the term "merit" taken in this sense should be simply condemned and rejected. We acknowledge that the good works of the faithful are imputed to them for eternal glory and are ordained to the reward of heavenly life, as is abundantly clear from what has been explained before.

XL. David Pareus teaches and observes the same thing in the preface to Book 5 of Bellarmine on Justification, where, after reporting that Gabriel Biel defines merit as a work imputable to praise, he adds, "If the adversaries were content with this sense, there would be no question. For it is not doubtful that good works are worthy of praise before God and men." He also adds, "It can also be said that merit is a work imputable to reward, that is, worthy of a reward. Nor will we simply deny this, provided the distinction between grace and law is maintained."

XLI. Similar things are read in John Davenant's "On Actual Justice," chapter 53. For he says, "Among the Fathers, 'to merit' denotes nothing else than to obtain or achieve some benefit from God by means of a good work; and merit signifies nothing else to them than a good work ordained by God for reward. Therefore, to merit eternal life is to do those works which, according to God's ordinance, are means of attaining it. If anyone calls the good works of the regenerate 'merits' in this sense, that is, because they are ordained by God for reward, and teaches that the regenerate merit eternal life because, walking in the way of God's commandments, they finally obtain the crown of eternal glory from God as a reward, he agrees with the Fathers in his way of speaking, and with us in the thing itself." And similarly in chapter 54, he says, "We do not oppose the mere name of merit used by the Fathers in an innocuous sense; but we oppose the proud and false opinion of condign merit recently introduced into the Church by the Papists. For what the Fathers understood by the name of merit, namely, the work of a faithful and regenerated man endowed with supernatural goodness, pleasing and acceptable to God in the supernatural order, and ordained by the promise of the most munificent God to gracious rewards both in this life and in the future life, all of this our people have always conceded."

XLII. Indeed, some Protestant confessions also use the term "merit" in this sense. For the Württemberg Confession, in the section on Good Works, begins with these words: "We teach that good works divinely commanded must necessarily be done and merit certain rewards by the gratuitous mercy of God, whether corporal or spiritual." And the Augsburg Confession, Article 6, states: "Therefore it must always be believed that we obtain remission of sins and are pronounced righteous, that is, accepted gratis for Christ's sake through faith. Afterward, our obedience to the law is also pleasing and is accounted as a kind of righteousness and merits rewards." And later, in Article 20, in the section on good works: "Although this new obedience is far from the perfection of the law, it is still righteousness and merits rewards because they are reconciled persons." Thus, it should be judged about works: they should indeed be adorned with

the highest praises because they are necessary, the worship of God, and spiritual sacrifices, and they merit rewards.

XLIII. The Apology of the same confession contains many similar statements. For example, in Article 6, it says: "We teach that good works are meritorious not of remission of sins, gratis, or of justification, but of other rewards, corporal and spiritual, in this life and after this life; for Paul says, 'Each one will receive his own reward according to his labor.' Therefore, there will be different rewards for different labors." Similarly, in Article 20, it says: "Afterward, because works please God, they merit other corporal and spiritual rewards. For there are degrees of glory among the saints."

XLIV. But although Protestants recognize that the term "merit" was used by the ancient Church Doctors in that improper and innocuous sense, and even in some recent confessions, nevertheless today they abstain from this term; nor do they allow any merit to be attributed to the good works of the faithful with respect to eternal life and glory, or that these works should be called meritorious of life or glory: because that term has been twisted into a perverse sense in the Papal Schools. That is, to signify a certain condignity in good works with respect to eternal life; on account of which they are considered equivalent to the price of it, and for which it is due to them by justice properly so called. It is much better and safer, says Davenant, to abstain from this word. "On Actual Justice," chapter 53. And in the following chapter, he says, "Although our theologians now abstain from the term 'merit,' frequently used by the Fathers, they do so not because they disagree with the Fathers, but lest they agree with the Papists, who have twisted that term into a pernicious and heretical sense." Similar things are read in Vossius's theses, Disputation 4, "On the Merits of Good Works." He says, "We do not entirely dare to condemn the term 'meriting,' which was used by many of the ancients and by the Reformed in their confessions, namely, the Augsburg and the Württemberg Confessions; nevertheless, we think it better to speak with the Scriptures, especially since the term 'merit' is ambiguous and particularly in our age, when pride is to be avoided by name.

**THEOLOGICAL THESES;
ON THE RELATION OF GOOD WORKS TO ETERNAL LIFE.
PART TWO.**

**In which the opinion of the Doctors of the Roman Church is reported,
and the controversy of the state is summarized and examined.**

Thesis I

In the previous theses, as much as was within our power, we have accurately expounded what Reformed theologians think about the relationship of good works to eternal life. It follows that we should also briefly explain the opinion of the Roman Church on this matter.

II. Indeed, it is well known and manifest to all that, according to the common consensus of the Doctors of the Roman school, the good works of the regenerate are condign for eternal life

and glory, are owed to them by right, and are to be rewarded out of justice. Therefore, good works are meritorious of eternal life in a condign sense. But it is necessary to explain this more distinctly so that their meaning may be clearly perceived. For unless one has read their writings, one might easily conceive something different from their meaning from these forms of speaking. Furthermore, although they all speak in this way, not all think and understand the same.

III. First, although they generally teach that the good works of the just have a certain condignity and proportion to eternal life, some attribute more and others less to good works in this part. For some seem to attribute entirely equal value to the good works done by grace of Christ and to eternal life. Among these, we can count Gabriel Vasquez. For in volume 2, 1, 2, Disputation 214, chapter 11, he says that eternal life and the good works of the just are indeed unequal in what they formally have: since, for example, the joy of eternal beatitude greatly exceeds the tribulation of this present life which the just suffer for Christ: but this does not prevent there being equality between those good works and eternal life in terms of dignity and merit: just as sins and punishment are also not equal in what is formally in each: since there is more torment and pain in the punishment inflicted for sins than there is pleasure in the sin itself. And yet no one will deny that there is an equality of condignity between sin and punishment, and that the punishment is equal to the sin in this respect, not greater than the sin deserves and is worthy of. Hence afterward, in Disputation 215, chapter 2, he concludes that it was rightly said by the Jesuits of Cologne that heaven is offered to us for sale, and that it should be obtained by condign merits as an equal price. Augustine Monk agrees with these, having taught theology some years ago in the Academy of Toulouse. For in 1, 2, q. 114, art. 1, doubt 7, he says that between our merit and the reward of eternal life there is found the most perfect equality and condignity. He repeats the same in doubt 8, concerning the third and fourth conclusion.

IV. Others speak less harshly on this part. Thus Thomas Stapleton, in his work "On Justification," book 10, chapter 2, says that works of grace have a certain condignity and equality to eternal life, such as merit should have to reward: because the seed of eternal life is grace itself, which is therefore equal to that glory in power, though not in act; just as a seed is equal to a tree. But he afterward adds that the reason for merit does not require strict equality of justice, because it is not a servile or mercenary work; but it is a work of virtue and therefore of charity, which posits friendship; so that thus we merit from God as from a Father. In such works of justice, the reward is not compensated by the equality of the thing, but by the dignity of the person or acceptance.

V. Similarly, Bellarmine, in "On Justification," book 5, chapter 17, says that a good work of the just is equal to the reward of eternal life: but he later explains this about proportional equality, in chapter 18, where he says that for merit by condignity, absolute equality between merit and reward is not required; but proportional equality is sufficient, like that between a source and the stream that arises from the source: between a seed and the thing of which it is the seed, to which the seed is equal, not in size, but in power; and finally between the way and the terminus to which that way leads, with such similarities explaining his meaning, chapter 17. "It cannot be denied," he says, "that beatitude far excels the meritorious action, since in it there is

perfect knowledge and charity; in the latter, there is imperfect knowledge and charity. But absolute equality between merit and reward is not required, according to distributive justice, to say that the reward is owed to merit by condignity, even on the part of the work; but it is sufficient that there is a certain proportion according to which he who merits can be said to be worthy of that reward. For here on earth, one who is endowed with learning and good morals, and has labored for the Church for some time, is judged worthy of the episcopate, although absolutely the dignity of the episcopate is very great and incomparable. Similarly, in natural things, the disposition to form is much more imperfect than the form itself, and yet from a natural justice, the properly disposed subject is owed the form. Thus, therefore, he who loves God with all his heart, and is thereby pure in heart, peaceful, humble, merciful, is worthy to be admitted to that beatitude which is promised to those who love God, are pure in heart, peaceful, and merciful, as those who are properly disposed." And a little later, he says, "Therefore we say that the vision is due by condignity to faith formed by charity, because it is worthy that the thing begun and disposed by God should finally be perfected and completed."

VI. Whatever may be the condignity of good works concerning eternal life, the Doctors of the Roman Church do not wish to attribute it to good works as they are esteemed in their own nature and according to the goodness inherent in them; but they teach that this dignity arises, at least in great part, from the principle from which they proceed and from the dignity of the person performing them. Namely, the good works of the just are condign for eternal life and glory because they are done by those whom God has already seen fit to adopt as sons, who have been elevated to a certain supernatural state, and have the indwelling Holy Spirit, who is the principle of such works. So that, if a man created and left by God in a pure natural state, without any supernatural grace and favor, were to do good works and conform to the law, such works would not be deemed worthy of eternal life. Just as in human affairs, a father of a family values the same services much more highly in his sons than in his servants.

VII. This is what Thomas Stapleton means, in "On Justification," book 10, chapter 2. "The proper foundation of merit," he says, "is primarily and especially that the works of the just are the works of the sons of God, which proceed from the grace of the indwelling Holy Spirit in us." And shortly after, he adds, "Therefore, inheritance is given, not only because we are sons, but because we are good sons suffering with Christ: nor again because we are good only, but because we are good sons. For neither goodness nor justice of works has any right to the inheritance of the heavenly kingdom except in the sons of God: nor does mere adoption without the justice of good works attain that right by way of merit." The former is against the novel opinion of some theologians today, who teach that from the natural constitution of man, a good work and obedience to the law, from the integrity of the work, merit eternal life, not from any dignity of the worker. The latter is against today's heretics, who dogmatize that beatitude is given by reason of adoption only, because we are sons of God through faith. And at the end of the next chapter, with Augustine, he teaches that the just have merits, not because their works considered in themselves are truly merits, but because they are the works of the just sons of God, which otherwise would not be merits.

VIII. And this, as Vasquez testifies in 1, 2, volume 2, disputation 216, is the common and accepted opinion of the Scholastics, who agree that for works to be meritorious of eternal life, the adoption of the sons of God is necessary in those who are to merit. The contrary opinion of Michael Baius, Professor of Louvain, was condemned by Popes Pius V and Gregory XIII in a bull in which they censured various opinions of this doctor. For among the many propositions noted for error in that bull, these two occur: "It is a Pelagian opinion that a good work done without the grace of adoption is not meritorious of the heavenly kingdom." Also, "Good works done through the spirit of adoption do not acquire the nature of merit because they are done through the spirit of adoption dwelling in the hearts of the sons of God, but rather because they are in conformity with the law." As Bellarmine reports in "On Justification," book 5, chapter 13, where he teaches that even if someone perfectly fulfilled the law, he would still not merit eternal life unless he were elevated to a supernatural state, and condemns as erroneous the opinion of those who say that eternal life is owed to good works because they are true obedience to the law, not because they are done by a person elevated by grace to the state of the sons of God.

IX. Moreover, the Doctors of the Roman Church teach that for our works to be considered condign of eternal life and heavenly glory before God, it is necessary that they be stained and sprinkled with the blood of Christ, that is, that some value and price should accrue to them from the merit and obedience of Christ, which they would not have even if they were done by the grace of God: so that Christ not only merited for us that we should do good and just works; but also that our works, once done, should merit and receive the power of meriting from Him.

X. This is the doctrine of Thomas Stapleton in "On Justification," book 10, chapter 4. He says, "Our righteousness and merits depend on the righteousness and merits of Christ, not only because, as the universal principle of reforming the human race, He imparts grace by which we both work justly and merit by working; but also because, being made one with Christ, we have obtained that our merits, as the merits of Christ our head, merit before God through Him and for His sake. For He merited this for us, that our good works, when we are incorporated with Him, should be valid before God for the merit of eternal life. Thus, by His passion being consummated, He became the cause of salvation for all who obey Him, that is, He makes our obedience to His commandments effective for obtaining salvation, that is, meritorious of eternal life."

XI. Similar things are taught by Francisco Suarez in the third part of Thomas, volume 1, disputation 41, section 3, where he shows with many testimonies of the Scholastics that the common opinion of the School is that through Christ, not only is help given to us to perform meritorious works, but also value is given to the work itself, for which it is accepted as condign merit of such grace or glory. And the merit of Christ has such an influence on our merits and on every effect of them, that whatever we merit is given to us not only because of our merit, but also because of the merit of Christ: and our works have the nature of merit that they now have, not only from their goodness and quality, and from the proximate grace from which they proceed;

but also from their conjunction with the merit of Christ, on which they depend, and from which they derive power and efficacy.

XII. The Jesuit Costero, in the "Enchiridion of Controversies," in the chapter on merits, illustrates this matter with this simile: "Just as," he says, "if a rustic were forming characters moved by the hand of the King in writing, the writing which is partly produced by the rustic is of no weight; but because the King guided the hand of the scribe in writing and delineating, it has great dignity: so our works, because of Christ, who uses us as members and the indwelling Holy Spirit, and who works through us, are worthy of heavenly reward."

XIII. And Vasquez attributes this same doctrine to Alfonso Virvesio, Bishop of the Canaries, Hosius the Cardinal, Tapper, Lindanus, and many other writers of the previous century, whom he testifies teach that the works of the just done with the help of grace receive much greater dignity from the merit and grace of Christ. Indeed, the works of the just have very little dignity from themselves, but the greatest as far as they depend on the grace and merits of Christ, and are in some way His merits. He adds that Cajetan affirms that the works of the just have the nature of merit from the dignity of the works, because they proceed from the grace of the Holy Spirit, but thinks that the nature of merit in the works of the just is more clearly derived from the fact that the action of the just is not so much the action of themselves as the action of Christ Himself. For Christ, as the head, flows into the members and works and merits; so that each just person can say, "I merit, yet not I, but Christ merits in me." In the first part of the second, volume 2, disputation 214, chapter 2. And this sentiment is openly favored by the words of the Council of Trent, session 6, chapter 16, where it is said that without the virtue of Christ, which continually flows into the justified, their good works could by no means be pleasing and meritorious before God.

XIV. However, Vasquez himself takes a different opinion, contending that the works of the just derive no increase in dignity from the merits or person of Christ, which they would not otherwise have if they were done by the same grace liberally bestowed by God alone. In chapter 7 of the aforementioned disputation, titled "That our works do not have greater dignity from the merits or grace of Christ than they would otherwise have from the grace of God," he observes that he does not deny that some glory is given to us in consideration of the merits of Christ, beyond what our works condignly merit. But he denies that our works are thereby made more worthy than they would otherwise be if done apart from Christ by the same or similar grace liberally given by God. For it is one thing for a work to have greater or lesser dignity, and another to assign a greater or lesser reward to the worker.

XV. Many Doctors of the Roman Church also believe that the condignity, which they attribute to good works concerning eternal life, depends on the gratuitous promise of God, who has promised eternal life to them; for good works, apart from the gratuitous promise of God, cannot be deemed worthy of heavenly glory: but by that promise, they are made condign for eternal life and in some way equivalent to it. This is the opinion of Gregory of Valencia, a Jesuit, in the "Summa Theologiae," volume 2, disputation 8, question 6, point 4. He observes that the work of the just can be considered in two ways. First, absolutely and in itself, according to the

goodness it has, both from its object, its circumstances, and its principle, that is, from grace, and in this way, he acknowledges that there is no equality between the work of the just considered in this way and eternal life: because the dignity of eternal life far surpasses the excellence of such a work. Secondly, the work of the just can be considered in relation to the divine promise, because of which eternal life is to be rewarded. And in this respect, he contends that it is condign to the reward of eternal life and equal to it. For in this way, the work considered, namely, as it is related to that promise, and is, as it were, supported by it, is wholly valid for eternal life, since through it the just person, unless they oppose an obstacle of sin, is certain to obtain eternal life. Thus, by the divine promise, the work of the just, which in itself is not equal to eternal life, is made equal to it. He then illustrates this with an example: "For," he says, "if money by the command of a prince is made of some base material, which considered in itself is not worth as much as the things that can be exchanged for it, then indeed, if this money is considered absolutely, without regard to the prince's decree, it is certain that according to commutative justice it is not equal to the things that can be obtained for it; but if it is considered as subject to the prince's decree and law, by which it is ordained that whoever presents such money shall obtain necessary things according to the established value of the money, then in this way, the money is valued at as much as the things themselves that can be obtained by it. Thus it is in this proposition. For if the work of the just is considered precisely in itself, it is not equal to glory. But if it is considered as subject to the divine promise, by which through it glory can certainly be obtained, then it can be valued at as much as that glory, and in this way, it is equal to glory."

XVI. Similar things are taught by Alphonsus à Castro in "Against Heresies," book 10, under the word "Merit." He says, "If Luther, when he says that there is no merit of man for glory, takes merit to mean such a work that by its own nature and from itself is equal to the reward; certainly his opinion is not to be noted as an error, because there is no such work of ours that can be equated with eternal glory. But merit is not taken to imply such equality but another kind of equality, which does not arise from the nature of things, but from a certain pact, by which the work becomes equal, which was not previously said to be equal."

XVII. Especially in this opinion are the Canons of Cologne, in the "Enchiridion," under the title "On Justification." They say, "Nor does Scripture fear to call eternal life the reward of good works, not that we should think our good deeds are worthy of eternal life or that eternal life is owed to them because of the worth of the works themselves. For who is so foolish as to think so? But rather that God has promised eternal life to our faith, which is exercised through such works." As Gabriel Vasquez reports in 1. 2. volume 2, disputation 214, chapter 1, where he attributes the same doctrine to many ancient Scholastics, whom he testifies teach that the good works of the just, proceeding from grace, if considered in themselves and without God's pact and acceptance, are not condign for eternal life, nor have the condignity and nature of merit for eternal life; but that all the dignity and the entire nature of merit which is in them is sought from God's pact and promise.

XVIII. However, Vasquez himself thinks that the good works of the regenerate are condign for eternal life, even without God's promise, and have equal value and dignity for it in

themselves, without God's pact. As can be seen in the aforementioned disputation, chapter 4 and following, where he attempts to prove that there is an equality of dignity between works and eternal life before God's pact and promise are added to them. Puteanus joins this opinion in 1.2, question 114, article 1, doubt 5, where he expressly says that operations done by grace are equal or condign to the reward of eternal life, even without the divine promise. Likewise, Peter a Sancto Josepho in "The Idea of Speculative Theology," book 4, chapter 11, Resolution 4, where he affirms that the works of a just man have a certain condignity with the reward of eternal life in themselves, and proves this from the fact that they are supernatural and proceed from an adopted son of God, and therefore have a certain proportion with the supernatural reward of eternal glory, which is the inheritance of the sons of God. Similar things are read in Martin Becanus in the "Summa of Scholastic Theology," volume 2, treatise 4, chapter 5, number 11. He says, "The works of a just man and one existing in a state of grace are in themselves worthy and proportionate to eternal life, because they proceed from grace which is the seed of glory." And he later adds that such works, without the promise, are worthy of eternal life, not indeed by the dignity of justice, but by the proportion of the means to the end.

XIX. Although many Doctors of the Roman Church insist that the good works of the just are condign for eternal life and glory even without God's promise and apart from regard to it, they all unanimously agree that it is only God's promise that obligates God to render eternal life for the good works of the regenerate, and that if this promise were set aside, God could, without any injustice or injury, deny eternal life to any good works whatsoever; for by themselves, without God's pact, they acquire no right to eternal life.

XX. This is the doctrine of Gabriel Vasquez, who in this question seems to be the most rigid of all. For although, as we have said, he contends that there is an equality of dignity between works and eternal life before God's pact and promise are added to them, he nevertheless admits that unless God had promised the reward, we could not demand it from Him or require it by any right: for the debt of the reward of eternal life and glory arises not from the works, however worthy, but from the munificence of God, who promised, since He could not promise. As can be seen in the aforementioned volume, disputation 213, chapter 8. Similar things are read in the same volume, disputation 204, chapter 2, towards the end. "God could, if He wished, without any injustice or ingratitude, deny eternal life to one who has justice and sanctity." For although a just man, by inherent justice, is pleasing and beloved by God, and thereby worthy of eternal glory, either as a son by the inheritance of the Father through habitual grace or by merits and good works, as a worker by reward and payment, and in this way could be said to be acceptable to eternal glory, that is, beloved as worthy of it; nevertheless, since God is the author of all things, He could freely never confer beatitude on him.

XXI. Similar things are taught by Becanus in the previously cited place, where he says, "The works of a just man and one existing in a state of grace are in themselves worthy and proportionate to eternal life, because they proceed from grace which is the seed of glory; nevertheless, God is not bound by justice to recompense them, apart from the pact and promise." Also, the often-cited Puteanus in "Summa Theologiae," question 114, article 1, doubt 5, where

he indeed affirms that operations done by grace are in themselves condign and equal to the reward of eternal life, but at the same time admits that eternal life is not owed to them before the divine promise.

XXII. The contrary opinion, which states that good works merit eternal life in themselves, before the gratuitous promise of God, was expressly condemned by the Roman Pontiffs in a bull first issued by Pope Pius V, and later renewed by Gregory XIII, as reported by Bellarmine in "On Justification," book 5, chapter 14. Where he testifies that among the many propositions noted in that bull, this is the eleventh: "That those who have lived piously and justly in this mortal life until the end obtain eternal life, this is not to be attributed properly to the grace of God, but to the natural ordinance established at the beginning of creation by God's just judgment: nor is this reward of the good to be attributed to the merit of Christ, but only to the original institution of the human race, according to which it is ordained in the natural law that eternal life is rendered to the obedience of the commandments by God's just judgment."

XXIII. However, given the gratuitous promise of God, the common doctrine of the Roman School is that eternal life is owed to good works by justice. But what kind of justice that is, by which eternal life is to be rewarded to good works, is not entirely agreed upon among the Doctors of the Roman Church. For most of them admit that strict and proper justice cannot apply here, nor is eternal life owed to the good works of the faithful out of the rigor of justice. This is repeated and emphasized by Vasquez in many places, especially in 1. 2. volume 2, disputation 213, chapter 4, where he often affirms that in God with respect to us there is no justice properly so called, but only according to a certain common reason and meaning. And he also attributes the same opinion to Scotus, Gabriel, and many other ancient Scholastics, who he says teach that eternal life is rendered and owed to the works of the just according to the equity of justice, but nevertheless, in God with respect to men, there is no justice according to propriety, but only in a certain common sense. For what is called justice in God, they said, is only a certain decency of His goodness. And justice is not to be granted to God as it signifies a debt of necessity; but as it signifies a certain decency of propriety, as can be seen in the same Vasquez in the first part of Thomas, disputation 86, chapter 2. Thus Vasquez himself explains his own opinion. "We," he says, "who said that between God and us there can be no proper justice, but only in a certain common reason, do not attribute to God an obligation to give glory in remuneration for good works from accepted justice, as if He must compensate out of justice for the good works He has received from us: but we say that He owes to give eternal life in remuneration solely from the word of promise, and therefore from His fidelity alone, as we will prove from Augustine below. Therefore, if He did not give it, which cannot happen, He would indeed be unfaithful because He would not keep the truth of His promise; but not unjust properly, because He would not act against proper justice. Nevertheless, He would be called unjust, in that fidelity is a certain kind of justice, namely, a part of potential justice, and thus this infidelity could be called injustice in a common sense. And in this sense, Paul said to the Hebrews, 'God is not unjust to forget your work.'"

XXIV. Becanus agrees with this in "Summa Theologiae Scholasticae," volume 2, treatise 4, chapter 5, question 8. Regarding the first point, he says, "The merit of a just man before God is not from strict justice. So says Saint Thomas in the third part, question 1, article 2, and elsewhere. The reason is that the rigor of justice requires such a contract that there is no grace and liberality between the contracting parties, in which merit is founded. But this is not the case between God and man, because all human merit is founded on the grace and liberality of God, especially on justifying grace which is given freely, and on the liberal promise of God by which He willed to reward our merits, which were not useful to Him, and were owed to Him for many other reasons. In this sense, the Council of Trent said in session 6, chapter 16, that it is the goodness of God that He willed our merits, which are His gifts, to be merits."

XXV. Similar things are read in Costero the Jesuit in "Enchiridion," chapter on Merits, where this is his third proposition: "Between God and men, there cannot be exact justice as it is between men. For God cannot be obligated to us in such a way that, excluding His merciful grace, He remains bound to us by anything." 1. Because we are His creation, who made and possesses us entirely, and to whom all our things belong. 2. Because He has bound us to Himself with countless benefits, and He has bought us with the price of His blood and life. Hence, if a father owes nothing to a son for the benefit of birth, and a master owes nothing to a servant whom he bought with money, much less can God, our Creator and Redeemer, become a debtor or be obligated to man by any gift. 3. Because the merit we gain from Him is the grace of God, in which the entire reason for our merit before God consists. This is also the opinion of Baillie the Jesuit as reported by Rivetus in "Summa Controversiarum," treatise 4, question 17. He says, "Merit primarily signifies an action for which compensation is owed by the rigor of justice. But we are not so rash as to claim this privilege for ourselves, which we attribute only to the Son of God incarnate, who merited salvation for us by His justice." Finally, Bellarmine himself, in "On Justification," book 5, chapter 18, agrees with this. For in responding to a certain testimony of Bernard, he acknowledges that life is not owed to the pious by the rigor of justice, which presupposes no grace, and that God would not be doing any injustice if He deprived the just of the reward of justice; although hypothetically, God would be doing an injustice if He did not give eternal life to good works as promised by covenant.

XXVI. Therefore, according to these Doctors, no matter what the works of man are, God, absolutely speaking, and if you set aside His gratuitous and merciful promise, owes man nothing and is not bound by any justice to give him anything; and in this respect, the rigor of justice does not apply between God and man. And yet, given God's promise, justice requires that what is promised be rendered to the one who works well. Furthermore, when God rewards the good works of the just with eternal life and heavenly glory, He exercises a certain kind of justice called distributive justice, because He shows no partiality but renders to each according to his works, and He maintains such a proportion between works and rewards that to him whose works are more excellent and abundant, more glory and praise are given. In this matter, He also satisfies commutative justice and maintains its mode, because He rewards no one with less, but rather with more and more ample rewards than their works deserve.

XXVII. This is the doctrine of Bellarmine in "On Justification," book 5, chapter 14. He affirms that the substance of divine judgment, when God rewards the works of the just, will be according to commutative justice. Indeed, the substance of that judgment will be according to distributive justice, since God as the supreme judge will distribute rewards according to merits: and in this, He will not show partiality, which is contrary to distributive justice. The mode of the same judgment, however, will be according to commutative justice, because God will not only establish a proportional equality between merits and rewards, so that he who has more merit will have more reward, which is proper to distributive justice; but also will establish an absolute equality between works and rewards, so that each person receives no less reward than they justly deserve, which is commutative justice.

XXVIII. Moreover, when Bellarmine says that God will establish an absolute equality and, as he later repeats, a perfect equality between works and rewards, he does not mean that the reward will be so equal to the merit that it is neither above nor below merit, and thus each person receives neither more nor less from God than they have merited: but simply, as he himself explains, that the reward will not be less than the merit, and God will attribute to each no less than their works justly deserve. For he does not deny, indeed he expressly teaches in the same book, chapter 16, that God rewards good works above condignity, and that the good works of the just will receive on the day of final judgment a greater reward than they justly deserve to receive from God's judgment. Therefore, Bellarmine's aim is only to say that in that distribution, God will so preserve distributive justice that He will not fail in commutative justice, unlike what often happens in human affairs. For example, when princes distribute stipends to soldiers, considering the office and dignity of each, they maintain distributive justice, but give much less to each than they are owed by contract, and in this respect do not preserve commutative justice; they would not violate it if they gave each more than they owed by right.

XXIX. However, among the Doctors of the Roman Church, some are found who teach that eternal life is owed to the good works of the just by the rigor of justice, and is repaid from strict justice. For they think that in this matter that very justice called commutative justice applies, which maintains, as the schools say, the equality of thing to thing, and renders equal to what was received. They believe that two things are required and sufficient for this: one, that a work be presented that is in itself equal to the reward; the other, that a certain pact intervene by which the reward is promised to the work. They contend that both apply here. For they believe that not only has eternal life been promised by God to the good works of the just, but also that those works have an equal dignity to eternal life in themselves, and are its equivalent price. Vasquez attributes this opinion to certain recent theologians, whom he claims teach that in the good works of the just there is found the nature of merit concerning heavenly glory even according to the rigor of justice. This is because the just offer God good works by which they not only give Him honor but which are equally worthy of the reward of eternal life and glory, and to which God has also promised such a reward. Hence, according to them, God is a debtor of eternal life and glory to them from strict commutative justice. Vasquez explains this at length in the first part of Thomas, disputation 85, chapter 1 and following.

XXX. John Davenant attributes the same doctrine to Francisco Suarez in "On Actual Justice," chapter 66, where he affirms that, according to this Doctor and others of the same opinion, after the promise of God has been made, all the conditions of commutative justice are found in the reward of works: and therefore, given the promise, God rewards according to commutative justice. They prove this by examining the individual conditions of commutative justice, which they claim apply here. The first is the equality of thing to thing. They believe this is found between human merit and the reward of eternal life: for although works of grace, according to their entity, are not entirely equal to the reward of glory, nevertheless, according to moral value, they are equivalent to it. The second property of commutative justice is that there be such a mutual exchange that places mutual giving and receiving on both sides. They say that such an exchange exists between man and God: for God accepts our works and gives us His rewards for them, and we, in turn, accept divine rewards and give God our works. Finally, the third condition of the same justice is that from the acceptance arises a debt, and an obligation of justice in the retributor, by the force of the right acquired by the other through the work presented and given. They claim that such a debt and obligation of justice to reward arises in God from the work itself, as it is founded on the promise or pact of God made beforehand.

XXXI. Peter of St. Joseph also teaches that God rewards the works of the pious from strict justice in "The Idea of Speculative Theology," book 1, chapter 17. There he presents his fourth resolution: "In God, there is justice properly and strictly taken, as it is a special virtue distinct from others." He proves this from the fact that Scripture, as he says, judges that God gives eternal glory from true justice, for the merits of good works; and in the bestowal of beatitude, true justice is exercised on the part of God. This was also the opinion of Cajetan, as is clear from what John Davenant reports from him in "On Actual Justice," chapter 57, where he brings forth one who affirms that a good work of the just, according to strict justice, merits eternal life and glory.

XXXII. Moreover, it is clear from what we have said that even those Doctors who say that eternal life is owed to the good works of the just by the rigor of justice do not believe that eternal life is owed to good works by justice without the gratuitous promise of God. Since they do not base that strict debt of justice on the dignity of the work alone, but also on the free promise of God, without which no such debt could exist. For just as he who works in another's vineyard, even if his labor is worthy of such a price, does not make the owner of the vineyard a debtor for his payment unless the owner has promised the payment: so also, according to their view, God would not owe us the recompense of good works by justice unless He had bound Himself by His word, as Vasquez observes in 1. th. Disputation 85, chapter 1.

XXXIII. Nor do the same Doctors deny what others commonly teach, that God rewards the good works of the just above condignity. For what we attributed to Bellarmine above is the common and accepted opinion of the Roman School, namely that God not only rewards good works with the recompense that is condignly due to them, but also adds something undeserved. According to the Gospel, "A good measure, pressed down, shaken together, and running over, will be poured into your lap." Moreover, the Roman Pontiffs themselves, namely Pius V and

Gregory XIII, have expressly defined this in their constitutions, as can be seen in their often-cited bull. For there, among many condemned opinions, the fourteenth is expressed in these words, "The good works of the just will not receive on the day of the last judgment a greater reward than they justly deserve by the judgment of God," as Bellarmine testifies in "On Justification," book 5, chapter 19, whose title is, "That God rewards good works above condignity."

XXXIV. To reconcile these points, namely that the good works of the just are condign for eternal life and glory, and even that eternal life and glory are owed to them by the rigor of justice, and yet that God rewards such works beyond what they condignly deserve, they say that beyond the glory which good works are worthy of and which is justly due to them, God adds some degree of glory: thus something is rendered to the dignity of the merits of eternal glory, and something is added beyond the dignity of the merits. "I willingly concede," says Vasquez, "that God rewards our merits with the reward of eternal life more abundantly than they condignly deserve: not because they are not condign for eternal life and its increase, but because God, out of an abundance of gratitude, adds more glory than the merits of the saints condignly demand," volume 2, in 1, 2, disputation 215, chapter 4. And later, clarifying the mind of the Scholastics, he says, according to their view, which he approves, "something is given to the dignity of the merits of eternal glory, and something is added beyond their dignity." Similar things are read in Cajetan. "From the fact," he says, "that God rewards above condignity, the condignity of the good work for eternal life is not overthrown, because when God rewards a good work deserving glory with double glory, He does not take away from the work the fact that it, according to strict justice, merited glory," in 1, 2, question 114, article 3.

XXXV. Moreover, although the Doctors of the Roman Church with common consent teach that the good works of the regenerate are owed eternal life and glory by justice, whether that justice is said only according to a common and broader meaning, as many think; or in a strict and proper sense, as others believe, none of them deny that eternal life, with respect to the faithful, has the nature not only of a deserved reward but also of grace and a gratuitous gift. This is because the matter is defined in the Council of Trent. For in session 6, chapter 16, the Council speaks thus: "To those who work well to the end and trust in God, eternal life is to be proposed as both a grace mercifully promised through Jesus Christ to the sons of God, and as a reward to be faithfully rendered to their good works and merits."

XXXVI. Furthermore, they believe that eternal life, with respect to the faithful, has the nature of grace for many reasons. First, because eternal life is mercifully promised by God for our good works, whereas otherwise God could, without any injustice or injury to the creature, not promise eternal life for good works, nor deem them worthy of such a reward. Secondly, because our good works are the gifts and effects of grace, which God works in us entirely freely. Gregory of Valencia touches on both of these reasons, volume 2, disputation 8, question 6, point 4. He says, "Merit for eternal life is thus a merit of condignity, yet it relies on divine liberality and mercy: namely, that God mercifully promised to reward the good works of the just with eternal

life. Similarly, for this reason, the merit of the just relies on liberality and mercy, because it is not such unless it proceeds from grace and charity, which are freely given to us by God."

XXXVII. Moreover, according to the mind of the Doctors of the Roman Church, the faithful have from the grace of Christ not only the ability to do good works, but also that their works are condign for eternal life, which they would not be unless they were done by those whom God has adopted as sons through Christ, as is clear from what was explained above. Furthermore, the same Doctors do not want eternal life to be simply rendered to the faithful as a reward due to their labors and merits, but also to be given as a paternal inheritance, which Christ merited for them immediately by His death, along with their adoption as sons of God.

XXXVIII. This is seen in Bellarmine in "On Justification," book 5, chapter 14, where he refutes a certain doctor from Louvain, condemned by the Roman Pontiffs, who taught that good works by their nature are meritorious of eternal life, so that no pact or gratuitous promise is required for eternal life to be owed by justice to good works. Bellarmine, on the contrary, asserts that eternal life is not owed to human works except by the gratuitous and merciful promise of God; and furthermore, that Christ merited immediately for us not only the grace of doing good works but eternal life itself, to be given to us as sons.

XXXIX. First, he proves that the reward of eternal life is not owed to good works without God's promise, which is entirely gratuitous, with three reasons. The first reason, he says, is taken from the works themselves, which, if considered by their own nature, apart from the promise, and the dignity of the acting principle, have no proportion to that supernatural beatitude; therefore, the reward of eternal life is not owed to them by justice if considered by their own nature alone. The second reason is taken from God, who needs nothing and to whom all things belong by the right of creation. Hence it follows that God is not bound to accept works for a reward to be justly given unless He has first bound Himself by His liberal promise. The third reason is taken from men, who merit. Since we are all in the condition of servants and possessions of God, there could be no justice between us and God unless He, by a liberal agreement, willed to establish a reward for our works, which were otherwise due, even if no reward was to be given for them.

XL. That Christ merited for us immediately, not only the grace of doing good works, but also eternal life itself, he proves with this reason based on Scripture. For, he says, by the very fact that we begin to be sons of God, we begin to have a right to the inheritance of eternal happiness. For if sons, then heirs, says the Apostle to the Romans 8 and to the Galatians 4. If a son, then an heir through God. But we begin to be sons of God before we begin to do good works, for (as we have proven above from Augustine) men do not live rightly unless they first become sons of God. Therefore, we have a right to the eternal inheritance by the grace of regeneration before we begin to do good works: indeed, even baptized infants are saved by this grace alone before any good works. Therefore, Christ merited for us the inheritance itself when He merited the grace of regeneration and adoption for us. That He willed that we should also merit the same by good works is an argument of His greater grace and kindness, who (as we

have demonstrated above) not only wanted us to have eternal life by the right of inheritance, but also by the right of merits, which He Himself also gave us.

XLI. Similar teachings of Bellarmine are also found in Francisco Suarez in 3. Tho. Volume I, Disputation 41, Section 3. Where he teaches that not only are our merits the gifts of Christ, who merited for us the grace of doing good works; but also that the promise of eternal life to our works is due to the merits of Christ. "The promise," he says, "made to our works is to be referred to the merits of Christ." And he later explains at length that Christ merited for us both the initial glory and the increase of glory. Therefore, glory, no less than grace itself, is given to us for the sake of Christ and in view of His merits: and thus the same reward is given to us by a double title, being both repaid for Christ's merits and for our own. "An adult who is justified," he says, "by an act of contrition merits condignly the initial glory, and nevertheless that same initial glory is given for the merits of Christ just as grace is, as the Council of Trent expressly said. Otherwise, Christ would not have merited glory for all men, but only the grace by which they themselves would merit glory, which is false. But He merited both for us: although we can also add our own merit with respect to glory. The same must be said of the increase of grace and glory: so that Christ is the most perfect cause of all salvation and eternal life for the just, and all the blessedness of the saints is the reward of the works of Christ."

XLII. However much the Doctors of the Roman School attribute to divine grace, they nevertheless all unanimously state that the good works of the regenerate truly merit eternal life and glory before God, and can rightly be called meritorious. This was expressly defined by the Council of Trent in session 6, chapter 16, where these words are read: "To those who work well to the end and trust in God, eternal life is to be proposed both as a grace mercifully promised to the sons of God through Jesus Christ, and as a reward faithfully rendered to their good works and merits by the promise of God Himself. For this is the crown of justice which the Apostle said was laid up for him, to be rendered to him by the just judge after his struggle and course; and not only to him but also to all who love His coming. For the same Christ Jesus, as the head into the members and as the vine into the branches, continually infuses virtue into those who are justified, which virtue always precedes, accompanies, and follows their good works, and without which they could not in any way be pleasing and meritorious before God. Nothing further is believed to be lacking for the justified, by which they may not be fully deemed to have satisfied the divine law in this life, according to their state, by the works done in God, and truly merit eternal life in its due time, if they die in grace." In the same session, Canon 32 is conceived in these words: "If anyone says that the good works of a justified man are so the gifts of God that they are not also the merits of the justified man himself, or that the justified man, by the good works performed by him through the grace of God and the merit of Jesus Christ, whose living member he is, does not truly merit the increase of grace, eternal life, and the attainment of eternal life itself, if he dies in grace, and also an increase in glory, let him be anathema."

XLIII. Although the Doctors of the Roman Church hold as an article of their faith that the good works of the just truly merit eternal life, there is no agreement among them on what

generally constitutes the notion of merit and what the merit of good works of the just consists of and how much it is worth.

XLIV. To understand this, it should be noted that in the Roman School, a distinction is made between merit of condignity and merit of congruity. Moreover, merit of condignity to them is not the same as merit taken strictly and rigidly. Not everyone who teaches that good works merit condignly thereby attributes strict and rigid merit to good works. John Bunderius, a notable writer of the previous century, can serve as an example. He says, "Merit of condignity is found in two ways. One, taken strictly and properly, is a voluntary action for which a reward is owed by the rigor of justice: in such a way that he who does not give this reward is considered unjust. Such merit is not of man before God. For if God rendered no reward for our works, He would not be unjust. For whatever is our duty, we owe to Him. And we render to Him what is His. The other is called merit which is not by its own nature or simply worthy of reward, but from the supposition of the one rewarding. Such as the merit of a prize in a contest, in a dance, in theaters. Such is the merit of man before God, who by His own liberality, has determined to accept our works as worthy of eternal happiness; according to the saying of the Apostle, 'He has made us worthy to share in the inheritance of the saints.' This merit is said to rely on justice, because it is just that He who made the law should observe it. And He who promised should make good His promise. But if God did not keep the law of His promise and did not make His pledge effective, He would do no injustice to others, but would wrong Himself."

XLV. Bailie the Jesuit also observes this in Andrew Rivet's "Summa Controversiarum," treatise 4, question 17. He says, "Merit first signifies an action for which compensation is owed by the rigor of justice. But we are not so rash as to claim this privilege for ourselves, which we attribute only to the Son of God incarnate, who merited salvation for us by His justice. But we recognize a certain mode of merit by analogy, which our theologians call merit of condignity, which depends on the liberal promise that God has given to men, that He wills to compensate their labors undertaken for His honor and glory. Since God has freely bound Himself to compensate us, out of infinite mercy, He is bound to keep His promise. He has promised us His glory on this condition, if we keep His commandments. If we consider our works as they proceed from us, they can merit nothing; but if we contemplate them animated and, as it were, vivified by divine grace, they merit. For God has solemnly bound Himself by promise to render a reward for them." And we have cited many other places of the theologians of the Roman Church above, who deny that good works merit before God by the rigor of justice, and yet defend the merit of condignity.

XLVI. Therefore, they call merit of condignity any work that, according to some mode of equality or justice, ought to be compensated by some reward from another. And so, according to them, for merit of condignity to exist, the reward must be owed to the work by justice. It is sufficient that it be owed by some form of justice, namely, either by commutative justice, which considers the equality of thing to thing, or by distributive justice, which considers the proportional equality of merit to reward. Nor does it pertain to the essence and nature of merit from where that justice originates, what foundation it has, and whether the justice is strictly so-

called, or only according to some common meaning. Therefore, in their view, however much a work may seem worthy of a reward by itself, if a reward is not owed to it by some obligation of justice, it is not to be considered meritorious of reward by condignity. Conversely, even if a work, by itself and by its nature, is not worthy of a reward, either equal to or corresponding to the reward; if, however, by some pact and agreement, the reward is owed to it, and because of the agreement can be justly demanded, such a work is truly considered meritorious by condignity. Thus, for example, a soldier in war, fulfilling duties assigned by the Emperor, merits the promised pay by condignity. But however bravely he may act, and therefore be worthy of being promoted to a higher rank by the Emperor, he is not said to merit that rank by condignity; because the Emperor is not bound by any law to confer that honor on the soldier. If, however, the prince had promised to compensate the not-so-great services of his servants with a great reward when they performed those services, those services would be truly meritorious by condignity for the servants; although the obligation by which the prince ought to compensate them does not arise solely from the goodness of those services, but primarily from the prince's promise.

XLVII. Merit of congruity, however, is a work that, although it should not be compensated by some reward according to some form of justice, it is still fitting and proper that it be compensated, according to a certain honesty. Thus, a son, when he shows due obedience to his parent, can be said to merit some reward from the parent in this way. Therefore, merit of condignity and merit of congruity differ in that in merit of condignity there is some obligation of justice to compensate it. In merit of congruity, no such obligation is found, but only a certain propriety inviting compensation.

XLVIII. Gregory of Valencia in Volume 2, Disputation 8, Question 6, Point 1 and 2, and Becanus in "Summa" Volume 2, Treatise 4, Chapter 5, Question 1, philosophize about merit in general in this way. Bellarmine also agrees in several places in "De Justificatione," especially in Chapter 17, where he teaches that even if the work is far inferior to the promised reward, as if the master of the vineyard hired laborers and promised not a denarius per day, but a hundred gold coins as a reward, there would still be merit of condignity, not by reason of the work, but by reason of the pact. And this is the common opinion of the Roman School.

XLIX. However, some philosophers have a completely different view of merit. For they think that for merit, even condign merit, it is not at all required that the reward be owed by justice, but only by gratitude. Indeed, whenever an action acquires a right of justice to compensation, in their opinion, there is no true merit strictly so-called. Therefore, contrary to the previously cited philosophers, they would say that a soldier's service, for which a stipend has been promised by the king, does not have the nature of merit strictly so-called with respect to the stipend: but the outstanding deeds of the same soldier would truly and condignly merit an honorable reward from the same king, to which the king is not bound by justice, but by gratitude. They believe that the true nature of merit consists in it being a work worthy of praise and glory. And they do not want the reward that corresponds to true merit to be something that can be estimated by price; but something that pertains to praise and glory. They describe merit in general as an action that can acquire some such reward from gratitude. If that reward has equal

dignity and value, it will be merit of condignity; if, however, it receives a more abundant reward from liberality, beyond its proper value, it will be merit of congruity.

L. This is the doctrine of Gabriel Vasquez in 1, 2, Volume 2, Disputation 213, Chapter 5. He teaches that the nature of merit in general is the dignity of praise and honor, either before God or before men: which dignity of praise follows the goodness of the human action. He considers eternal blessedness itself to be the true nature of praise before God. Then he notes that not only is it not required for the nature of merit simply, or merit of condignity, which he considers the same, to be owed by justice, whether commutative or distributive: but also whenever an action acquires a right of justice to compensation, that action does not have the true nature of merit, except in an improper and broad sense: just as we also use the term merit for value in irrational matters. Hence, he concludes that the nature and obligation of justice have nothing to do with the nature of merit. For, he says, just as the nature of merit is not value that must be estimated by price; but only in the moral goodness, which is rewarded with praise or something similar: so also the nature of merit is not considered in the matter of justice, which requires payment by justice. This is because the matter of justice in giving and receiving, or in any other way, is money, or what is valued as a price: but the nature of merit is not something that can be estimated by price nor having the value of money or price; but of praise or similar remuneration.

LI. Finally, after concluding from many things that the nature of merit is the property of a diligent human action, that is, which is according to virtue, to which only praise, or glory, or something pertaining to it is due from a grateful mind, he distinguishes merit of condignity from congruity. However, he says, since gratitude usually rewards not only great services, but also small ones abundantly, we must still distinguish in the aforesaid matter of gratitude a double nature of merit. We can call one congruous, or impetratory, and the other condign. In the former way, merit is any diligent action done in the service of someone, which can be rewarded from gratitude beyond the dignity of the work itself. And this merit is called congruous because it is a suitable matter for which it is fitting to return something from gratitude that even exceeds its dignity. It is also called impetratory because it obtains what is given in view of it. For it is the same from the part of the work to obtain, as from the part of the rewarder to grant in view of the work. In the latter way, merit is, in comparison to some reward; service that by its nature requires such a reward, as a fitting grace to be returned to it, by the law of a grateful mind, and to which that reward responds as an equal remuneration and legitimate compensation, according to the correct estimation of service and reward. And this is what the Scholastics call worthy, or condign.

LII. With these things considered, it is questioned among the Doctors of the Roman Church what kind of merit that is which they consider to be attributed to the good works of the just, with respect to eternal life and glory. And from the older Scholastics, some have thought that this merit is not properly merit of condignity, but should rather be reduced to merit of congruity. Vasquez attributes this opinion in the previously cited disputation, Chapter 3, to Paul of Burgos, Bishop, who is said to have written that no one, according to common law, merits

eternal life by condign merit: and also to Durandus, who is said to have taught that our merits before God are not condign with the reward of glory; but are only called merits because God, by His law and ordinance, requires our works, so that He may grant the glory itself: and that there is no equality of condignity between the meritorious works of the just and eternal life, still in the likeness of that which is between the seed and its fruit, and thus the merits of the just, in comparison to eternal life, are only congruous merits. Bellarmine adds that Durandus seems altogether to hold that our merits proceeding from grace, and placed in promise, are still not such that the reward is owed to them by justice, but by the sole liberality of God. Although that Doctor concedes that the merit that the just have for eternal life is intermediate between the congruous merit of one in sin, and the simply condign merit, which is from justice: and thus it can partly be called congruous merit, partly condign merit. Bellarmine also testifies that Gregory of Rimini agrees with him.

LIII. However, the vast majority of the Roman School has long adopted a different view. Indeed, its Doctors, by almost unanimous consensus, maintain that the good works of the just merit eternal life and glory by condign merit. Nevertheless, they greatly differ among themselves, and they do not explain in the same way on what this condign merit of the good works in the just depends and in what it consists. According to them, there are three types of condign merit. One is based solely on a pact; another is based solely on the work; and the third is based on both the pact and the work. A work is said to be meritorious solely by reason of a pact when the reward is indeed owed by promise, but the work itself is much inferior to the reward and has no parity or equality with it in itself, as if the master of the vineyard hired laborers and promised not a denarius per day but a hundred gold coins as a reward. Someone is said to merit solely by reason of the work when the entire basis of the merit is not in any pact but in the value and dignity of the work. Finally, someone merits by reason of both the pact and the work when the work itself is not only equal and proportionate to the reward but also has the reward promised by an agreement.

LIV. In all these ways, some in the Roman School attribute condign merit with respect to eternal life to the good works of the just. Firstly, many among the older Scholastics believe that the good works of the just are meritorious solely by pact. This is because, according to them, those good works proceeding from grace, if considered in themselves and without God's pact and acceptance, are not worthy of eternal life and do not have the nature of the merit of eternal life: whence they conclude that the entire dignity and nature of merit in them is derived from God's pact and promise. Vasquez attributes this opinion to Scotus, Gabriel, Ockham, and William of Paris. He also says that, among the more recent, Andriam de Vega and Alphonsus à Castro agree with them. Likewise, the Canons of Cologne and John Bunderius, whose testimonies we have already mentioned above. In 1, 2. Tom. 2, disp. 214. cap. I.

LV. Others, however, hold the opposite view, believing that the good works of the just are condignly meritorious of eternal life in themselves and without regard to the divine promise. And previously, there were some in the Roman Church who taught that good works by their very nature and in themselves were meritorious of eternal life, such that no gratuitous pact was

required for the reward of eternal life to be owed to them by justice: and thus a good work is by its very nature meritorious of eternal life, just as an evil work is by its nature meritorious of eternal death. But this opinion was condemned by the Bull of the Roman Pontiffs already frequently cited, in which the proposition is noted as erroneous: "Just as an evil work by its nature is meritorious of eternal death, so a good work by its nature is meritorious of eternal life." And furthermore, that which asserted that "those who live piously and justly in this mortal life until the end, obtain eternal life, not to be attributed properly to the grace of God, but to the natural order established at the very beginning of creation by the just judgment of God," as Bellarmine testifies in "De Justificatione" lib. 5. cap. 14.

LVI. Whether some Doctors of the Roman Church persist in the same opinion after this Pontifical Bull, I do not know. It is certain, however, that there have been those who taught that the good works of the just merit eternal life condignly, not by reason of a pact but solely by reason of the work. But this does not prevent them from admitting that only God's promise obliges Him to grant eternal life to the good works of the regenerate; and without this promise, God could, without any injustice, deny eternal life to any good works, because by them, without God's pact, no right to eternal life is acquired. Indeed, they believe it is not essential to the nature of merit that the reward is owed by justice and must be given by justice: but it suffices that it is a work worthy of the reward and equal to it, which it demands from a grateful mind. The good works of the just that proceed from grace, in their view, before God's promise and without regard to it, are worthy of the reward of eternal life and have in themselves an equal value and dignity to it.

LVII. This is the doctrine of Gabriel Vasquez in 1, 2. Tom. 2. Disp. 214. cap. 4. & following, where he contends to prove by various arguments that good works of the just by themselves, without any pact or favor of acceptance, condignly merit eternal life: and although the divine promise has been added to the just works, it in no way pertains to the nature of merit itself: for there is an equality of dignity between the works and eternal life before the pact and promise of God is added. Nevertheless, as we said above, he concedes that if God had not promised the reward, we could not demand it from Him nor rightfully claim it: and the debt of the reward of eternal life does not arise from the works, however worthy, but from the munificence of God, who promised, since He could choose not to promise, as can be seen in the cited Tom. Disp. 213. cap. 8. For in his view, merit does not include a debt of justice.

LVIII. But the more common opinion of the Roman School is somewhat in between these two extremes. It maintains, namely, that the good works of the just, done by the grace of Christ, merit eternal life condignly, not solely by God's pact, nor solely by the dignity of the work; but by both the pact and the work together. Not that, according to them, without the pact or acceptance of God, the good work does not have a proportion to eternal life: but because God is not bound to accept the good work for that reward, even if it is equal and proportionate to the reward unless an agreement intervenes. Therefore, those in this opinion differ from the authors of the first opinion in that, contrary to them, they believe good works, before the promise, and without regard to it, are condignly worthy of eternal life and have a certain proportion and

equality to it. They differ from Vasquez, the advocate of the third opinion, in that they think this is not sufficient for the nature of merit; but additionally, it is required that the reward be owed to the work by justice. Since this debt is founded on the divine promise, not on the very nature of the works, they thus agree with the authors of the first opinion that good works, before the promise, are not condignly meritorious of eternal life. This is the opinion of Bellarmine in "De Justificatione" lib. 5. cap. 17. Peter of Saint Joseph in "Idea Theologiae Speculativae" lib. 4. cap. 11. Resolution 4. Becanus in "Summa Theologiae" Tom. 2. tract. 4. cap. 5. num. 11. and many others, whose names and testimonies it would be superfluous to list in detail.

LIX. Now, to sum up the whole matter briefly, from what has been presented so far, it is clear that the Doctors of the Roman Church unanimously agree on the following points: 1. The good works of the regenerate are not condignly worthy of eternal life if they are considered solely by their intrinsic goodness, without considering the persons from whom they proceed and that they are the services of those whom God has graciously adopted as sons. 2. Whatever dignity may be thought to be in the good works of men, God, speaking absolutely, that is, excluding any pact and divine promise, owes nothing to them; nor is He bound by any right to crown them with eternal life and heavenly glory. 3. That God has promised eternal life and glory to the good works of the just is wholly and entirely attributable to His liberality and kindness, not to any obligation. 4. Eternal life, with respect to the faithful, has the nature not only of a due reward but also of a gratuitous gift. 5. Christ, by His blood, has immediately merited for us eternal life to be given to us as children of God, not only mediately, in that He merited for us the grace by which we do good works and by which we obtain eternal life and glory. 6. The faithful have a right to eternal life as a paternal inheritance, as adopted sons of God through Christ, before they obtain it as a reward liberally promised by God for their works. 7. From all these points, it follows that the good works of the just are not by their nature meritorious of eternal life, just as evil works are meritorious of eternal death. 8. The good works of the faithful will receive a greater reward on the last day than they justly deserve to receive.

LX. Moreover, we have also shown that many Doctors of the Roman Church admit that the good works of the just, before God's promise and without regard to it, are not condignly worthy of eternal life, nor do they have a value and equality to it, because the dignity of eternal life far surpasses the excellence of such works, even if considered according to all the goodness they possess, not only from their object and circumstances but also from their principle, namely, the grace of Christ. 2. Many of those who maintain that good works, even before God's promise, are condignly worthy of eternal life, do not thereby place an absolute and strict equality between good works and eternal life, but only a relative and proportional one, like the relation of a way to its end, means to their goal, seeds to their fruit, and such as can be found between things of the same kind and which originate from the same principle, which are related to each other like the beginning and the end. 3. The good works of the faithful are not accepted by God for the reward of eternal life except as they are sprinkled with and purified by the blood of Christ, that is, because of the value that accrues to them from Christ's merit, either from a special favor and benevolence of God, which Christ has merited for us by His blood. 4. Even with God's promise,

eternal life is not owed to good works done by the grace of Christ by strict right, that is, by the rigor of justice, but only by a justice that presupposes mercy and accompanies it: Thus, good works, with respect to eternal life, do not have the nature of strictly taken merit; nor do they merit it according to the rigor of justice. 5. The justice that God exercises when He rewards good works with eternal life is called justice only in a general sense, namely, it is nothing other than God's faithfulness or the appropriateness of His goodness, or the rectitude of His divine will conforming to the law or dictate of divine wisdom.

LXI. Finally, despite these points, we have shown that, according to the common opinion of the Roman School, the good works of the just should not only be said to truly merit eternal life but also to be condignly meritorious of it. Indeed, some Doctors of the Roman Church attribute perfect equivalence and parity with eternal life to the good works of the just, without any regard to the divine promise. And some even go so far as to assert that, at least with the divine promise, the good works of the just merit eternal life and glory according to the strict rigor of justice and that eternal life is to be retributed to them properly and strictly speaking, from that justice which is called commutative, which maintains equality in given and received things.

LXII. From what has been more fully explained in the earlier part of these theses, it is clear that the Doctors of the Reformed Church do not deny that there is a manifold relationship or connection between the good works of the faithful and eternal life. They freely admit and teach: 1. That the works of the regenerate, done by the grace of Christ, please and are approved by God, and that eternal life and glory have been promised by God to them. 2. That such good works have a certain natural congruence and aptitude for such a great reward, and are therefore ordered to it: not only because they are the works of the sons and friends of God but also because they proceed from the love of God and are directed to His honor and are good and holy by a certain supernatural goodness: and therefore it is fitting and appropriate to divine goodness and munificence to propose to them supernatural glory and happiness. 3. That the good works of the pious can therefore be said to be worthy of eternal life; not indeed by the dignity that consists in the relation of justice, but by that which consists in a certain natural congruence. 4. That the good and holy works of the faithful have a relation and proportion to heavenly glory similar to that which a way has to its end, means to their goal, seeds to their fruit, and the sowing to the harvest; a contest to the crown generously proposed and labor to the reward gratuitously promised; finally, the beginning of a thing to its completion. 5. That therefore eternal life is granted to the faithful and the saints by a double title, both as an inheritance belonging to them by the right of adoption and as a reward gratuitously promised by God to their pious labors and services. 6. That eternal life is retributed to the good works of the regenerate not only out of mercy but also in some way out of justice: as far as justice signifies in God faithfulness in keeping His promises and that equity by which God, without respect of persons, renders to each according to his works, which is fitting and suitable both to His goodness and to His wisdom.

LXIII. We have also shown that the Reformed Theologians indeed deny that the good works of the faithful are properly speaking meritorious of eternal life, because they do not have in themselves an equal value to it, nor can they demand it by strict and rigorous right; which they

think is required for true and properly said merit. And yet they acknowledge that the good works of the regenerate can be said to merit eternal life and glory in a certain broader and improper sense, customary among the ancient Doctors of the Church and received in some public writings and confessions of Protestants; according to which merit signifies any work ordered to a reward in any way whatsoever. From this way of speaking, however, they now judge they must abstain, lest they seem to favor those who assert that good works are meritorious of eternal life *de condigno* and according to the rigor of justice.

LXIV. Furthermore, from all these points we gather that the fundamental issue in this controversy is that good works are not owed eternal life by themselves; nor is God bound to crown them with such a great reward except by a gratuitous pact and His liberal promise; and that God will reward good works with a greater reward than they justly deserve to receive, which has such evident truth that it is commonly received in the Roman School, and the Roman Pontiffs themselves have condemned the contrary opinion. Moreover, there remains no real and significant question for us here except with those who, like Francisco Suarez, say that the good works of the just merit eternal life according to the strict rigor of justice and that eternal life is to be given to them out of proper and strict justice; and that commutative justice, which maintains equality in given and received things. Or at least those who, like Vasquez, assert that good works, without any regard to the divine promise, are equivalent to the price of eternal life and glory, and that they have equal value and dignity with it, and by reason of which heaven can be said to be sold for good works. But all those who say that good works merit eternal life *de condigno* and yet teach that the entire dignity and merit of good works depend on a gratuitous pact of God; or at least, if before God's promise they are to be called worthy of eternal life, they do not yet have strict justice equality with it; but only some congruence and suitability, and that eternal life is not to be retributed to them out of proper and strict justice; but out of God's faithfulness and the appropriateness of His goodness, which is broadly called justice: therefore, good works do not have the nature of strictly taken merit with respect to eternal life and do not merit it according to the entire rigor of justice: all these doctors, I say, agree with us in the substance of the matter, although they follow a mode of speaking which we rightly disapprove of.

LXV. They define *meritum de condigno* very differently from us. Whenever there is no agreement on the definition of what is denied here and affirmed there, the contention must be about the name, not the thing signified by the name. For, according to our view, two things are absolutely required for merit. One is that the work called meritorious, in itself and by its nature, is equal in value and price to the reward it is said to merit. The other is that the reward, because of this equality, is owed to the work by the rigor of justice, that is, by justice properly and strictly said. Therefore, when we deny that the good works of the faithful merit eternal life and glory *de condigno*, we mean to deny that those works are equal in value and price to eternal life in themselves, and therefore that eternal life and glory are owed to them by the rigor of justice, which is also denied by those we are now discussing. But they maintain that this is not at all necessary for our works to be considered to merit eternal life *de condigno*. For, in their view,

meritum de condigno can be found even where exact justice, properly and strictly said, does not apply, and where the work is not equal to the reward, nor has strict and absolute equality with it. But to establish true meritum de condigno, any promise made under any condition of work suffices, however much that work by itself is inferior in value and dignity to the reward, nor is the reward owed to it by any other justice than that which requires that, the condition being fulfilled, what was liberally promised under such a condition is given. Therefore, when they say that the good works of the regenerate merit eternal life de condigno, they do not mean to signify that there is an exact commensuration between good works and eternal life; but only a certain suitable proportionality, as the fruit is rightly said to be commensurate to the seed, as Bonaventure speaks. Nor is eternal life owed to those good works by a justice called common and improper, as it is just that God should fulfill His promise to give eternal life to good works; and it is fitting to the goodness and wisdom of God to generously reward the pious and holy works of His children, whom He has adopted in Christ, with such a magnificent reward. These two points the Reformed Theologians readily concede.

XXVI. Therefore, when the more moderate theologians of the Roman School assert that the good works of the regenerate truly and de condigno merit eternal life, they do not intend to affirm what Protestants so vehemently abhor, namely, that there is an equality of value between the good works of the faithful and eternal life, such as must exist between the price and the purchased item, and consequently, that eternal life is owed to them by the rigor of justice properly and strictly said: but only what the Reformed admit, namely, that there is a certain suitability and proportion between eternal life and the good works of the just, like that found between the seed and the fruit, between means and ends, between something begun and completed, and between the contest and the reward generously promised for it: and furthermore, with God's promise given, His faithfulness and truthfulness, and the appropriateness of His goodness, require that the reward of eternal life be rendered for the good works of the pious. And thus it seems that there is a mere verbal dispute between the two sides. Indeed, since they agree on the relation and connection that exists between eternal life and the good works of the pious, the question is whether that relation and connection can rightly and appropriately be called meritum de condigno? The Doctors of the Roman Church affirm this, while the Reformed deny it, thinking this mode of speaking to be abusive, dangerous, and very much alien to reason.

LXVII. However, as we have already said, many Doctors of the Roman Church, although they speak poorly and inappropriately on this point, nonetheless in reality acknowledge the truth of our doctrine, and therefore we have a real dispute only with some of the more rigid Doctors of the Roman School, as repeatedly testified by Davenant in "De Justitia Actuali" chapter 53. Where, after showing that Thomas Aquinas himself, by meritum, even de condigno, denotes nothing other than a work that, by God's ordinance, is fitting for a reward, without equality of value to the reward and without a debt of justice in God to retribute the reward. And Durandus explicitly denies that strict meritum de condigno can exist between man and God: and that the Doctor by a meritorious act understands nothing other than an act that can be ordered to a reward. He adds that Scotus, Gregory, Gabriel, Ockham, Alphonsus, and many others of better

repute among the Papists have professedly taught that the good works of the just done with the help of grace do not have intrinsic condignity to eternal life: but with respect to this remuneration, it entirely depends on God's gracious acceptance and promise, adding, "Therefore, with the Fathers, nor with these more recent Papists, will we have any dispute about the bare term of merit. (Although it is much better and safer to abstain from this term) but we will fight against the recent Papists, who defend merit in such a way that they affirm that because of these works which they call merits, God Himself is a debtor to men out of justice, and they establish a condignity or equality between these human merits and the reward of eternal life. The refutation of which error, as well as of others that can be noted in the Doctors of the Roman Church, we reserve for another dispute, as this one has already grown too long.

**THEOLOGICAL THESES
ON
THE RELATION OF GOOD WORKS
TO
ETERNAL LIFE
In which are noted**

**PART THREE
and refuted the errors of the Doctors
of the Roman Church.**

Thesis I

In the subsequent part of these theses, to the best of our ability, we have clearly explained the doctrine of the Roman School concerning the merit and value of good works with respect to eternal life and glory. We have briefly reviewed the various opinions of the Scholastics on this matter and inferred what remains controversial between the Roman and Reformed Schools. It remains for us to refute, in brief, the various errors that can be noted in the Doctors of the Roman School regarding this issue, whether concerning the matter itself or the manner of speaking.

II. The first and most serious error of those who teach that eternal life is owed to the good works of the just out of justice, even without any gratuitous covenant or liberal promise from God, is that they claim good works by their very nature merit eternal life, just as evil works by their very nature merit eternal death. This can be shown to be against all reason with various arguments.

III. First, whatever good a person can do is owed entirely to God in many ways, and no matter how perfectly one performs their duty, with respect to God, it only fulfills what is owed. No one, by giving another what is fully owed, can thereby obligate that person to provide a reward or recompense.

IV. Moreover, the dependence of humans on God is far greater than that of servants on their master or children on their father. Now, a servant, no matter what he does, has no right to demand a reward from his master because whatever the servant is or has belongs entirely to the master, and whatever he acquires, he acquires for the master. Similarly, a child, no matter what he does for his parent, in whose power he resides, cannot make the parent indebted to him, because no one can return an equivalent to a parent for the benefits received. How much less, then, can a human make God a debtor to them, given that God has far more right and power over us than a master over a servant and a father over a child, and we are obligated in many more ways than a child to a father and a servant to a master.

V. Even among equals, no one is obliged by law to remunerate another's labor and effort unless they have voluntarily obligated themselves by some agreement or are at least bound by some superior law. What then can obligate God to grant eternal life to humans before His free promise when He has no superior, nor can any law be imposed on Him by another?

VI. Additionally, according to the covenant made by God in the law with humans, eternal life and glory are not due to the good works of the faithful. For even those works, as acknowledged by the Doctors of the Roman Church themselves, do not achieve the full perfection that the law given to the first man demanded, which he could and should have truly performed in the state of original integrity to become a partaker of eternal life. Therefore, for God to be considered in any way to owe eternal life to the good works of the faithful, it is necessary that He has newly obligated Himself to this by a gracious and liberal promise.

VII. Furthermore, our good works proceed from the grace of God and are His free gifts. Therefore, can God be obliged to give another grace by already giving one grace? And who can conceive that by receiving a benefit from another, one thereby acquires a right to demand a new benefit from the same?

VIII. But we linger too long in refuting such a gross error, which we could have entirely omitted, given that it is commonly rejected in the Roman School today and has been explicitly condemned by the very Bulls of the Roman Pontiffs, where the following proposition is marked as erroneous: "Just as an evil work by its nature merits eternal death, so a good work by its nature merits eternal life." Also, this: "That those who live piously and justly in this mortal life until the end obtain eternal life, is not properly attributed to the grace of God but to the natural order established from the beginning of creation by the just judgment of God." As we have previously shown from Bellarmine.

IX. Nevertheless, errors very similar to this and scarcely less serious and contrary to piety and right reason still prevail in the Roman School. Although it is now generally acknowledged, as far as I know, that before God's covenant and promise, eternal life is not owed out of justice to the good works of the just, some of their Doctors, including Gabriel Vasquez the Jesuit, still insist that eternal life is due to good works, if not out of justice, then at least out of gratitude, as we have discussed in the previous disputation.

X. But in this, we first miss Vasquez's consistency. Although he affirms that the good works of the just before God's promise and without reference to it are meritorious of eternal life

out of condign merit and defines merit as a work to which a reward is owed out of gratitude, he nevertheless elsewhere admits, compelled by truth, that God could, if He wished, deny eternal life to one possessing justice and sanctity without any injustice or ingratitude since God is the author of all things and therefore is obligated to no one. How can these two statements coexist, namely that eternal life is owed to the good works of the faithful at least out of gratitude, and yet God can, without injustice or ingratitude, not grant eternal life to those good works?

XI. However, although Vasquez might wish to deny the latter, the truth of it is plainly evident from the Gospel. For in Luke 17, Christ teaches that the faithful are like servants to whom, even if they have diligently and faithfully performed their duty, the master not only owes no reward but is not even obliged to give thanks or hold them in gratitude. He says, "Which of you, having a servant plowing or tending sheep, will say to him when he has come in from the field, 'Come at once and sit down to eat'? But will he not rather say to him, 'Prepare something for my supper, and gird yourself and serve me till I have eaten and drunk, and afterward you will eat and drink'? Does he thank that servant because he did the things that were commanded him? I think not. So likewise you, when you have done all those things which you are commanded, say, 'We are unprofitable servants. We have done what was our duty to do.'" How far then should the faithful be from thinking that God owes them such a great reward as eternal life and glory out of gratitude for the works they have done according to His commandments? For can the eternal and infinite God owe more to wretched humans whom He created and redeemed than a master owes to a purchased servant, who is of the same nature as the master and not inferior in any respect before God?

XII. Moreover, nothing is owed out of gratitude except to those from whom some benefit has been received. But God receives nothing from His creature. Nor does anything we do confer any advantage on Him. Eliphaz says in Job 22, "Can a man be of benefit to God? Can even a wise man benefit Him? What pleasure would it give the Almighty if you were righteous? What would He gain if your ways were blameless?" Therefore, nothing can proceed from us that can make God a debtor to us out of gratitude, let alone a debtor of such great recompense.

XIII. Indeed, far from our works being considered a benefit to God, they should rather be counted among the greatest benefits received from God, for which we are highly indebted to Him and obligated to give thanks. For as many good works as we perform, so many are God's gifts and the effects of His pure grace. Therefore, can the same thing that must be acknowledged and celebrated as the greatest benefit from God also be our benefit to God, for which He is bound to thank and repay us?

XIV. The third error is of those who admit that nothing is owed to good works without the divine promise, but contend that once God's promise has been made, eternal life and glory are owed to them out of strict justice, as Suarez does. However, it is acknowledged by many of the most learned and renowned theologians of the Roman School and is not difficult to show from the very conditions required for such justice by those with whom we contend that strict justice, especially commutative justice, cannot apply between God and humans.

XV. Indeed, to omit other points, in order for any reward to be given out of the justice we are discussing, it is necessary, as they themselves admit, for a mutual exchange to occur, involving a reciprocal giving and receiving from both parties. However, God does not properly receive anything from us. For the good works we perform are more so given by God to us than we to Him. In all good actions, it is God who works in us both to will and to do. We indeed say that we offer our good works to God, but not as a price equal to the rewards expected from Him in the manner of an exchange; rather, they are offered as sacrifices of praise and as testimonies of a grateful heart. Moreover, not every act of giving and receiving constitutes an act of commutative justice between two persons; only those acts do, in which there is mutual damage and mutual benefit, or those through which something is added to the recipient and conversely something is subtracted from the giver. But it is evident that these conditions can in no way apply to God. For when He gives, He does not relinquish ownership of the given thing; when He receives, He does not gain any benefit from our possessions. Therefore, when God dispenses rewards, He does not exercise an act of commutative justice, since neither can He alienate anything from Himself by giving, nor can He acquire anything from us by receiving that was not already His or from which He could gain any benefit.

XVI. Furthermore, for a promised reward to be due to the work out of the strictness of law and to be repaid out of commutative justice, it is necessary that the work by its own nature be due to the promiser and such that the promiser cannot justly demand it without providing the reward. For one who renders what they already owe to another gives nothing to them but only returns what is theirs, and therefore cannot acquire any right over them through this act. Nor does a gratuitous promise made for an already owed work make the work any less owed, thus one who performs it should be considered to give something to the promiser rather than if they had performed the same work without the promise. Thus, one who promises something liberally for works already owed to them, as when a father promises something to his children or a master to his servants for their services, is indeed bound to fulfill what he has promised; but not out of strict justice, rather out of fidelity. And although a father who does not fulfill what he promised to his son, or a master to his servant, may be accused of unfaithfulness or inconsistency, the servant or son cannot justly demand it from the master or father as if they were withholding what was justly earned by the other's labor.

XVII. Moreover, the strictness of law and strict justice exclude all grace, as is well known; therefore, it is contradictory for eternal life to be owed to the faithful and the pious out of the strictness of law and at the same time be given out of grace and to have any nature of a gratuitous gift. But it is evident from Holy Scripture that eternal life is proposed to the faithful as a gratuitous gift and as grace to be expected from a merciful and kind God, where we are commanded to expect the mercy of our Lord Jesus Christ unto eternal life. The Apostle Jude says, "Keep yourselves in the love of God, looking for the mercy of our Lord Jesus Christ unto eternal life." This truth is also acknowledged and proclaimed by the Council of Trent itself, teaching that eternal life should be proposed to those who do good works unto the end, not only as a reward faithfully rendered for their good works but also as grace mercifully promised to the

children of God through Jesus Christ; and that the just should hope for eternal retribution from God through His mercy and the merit of Jesus Christ. These are the words of that Council: "To those who do well to the end and trust in God, eternal life is to be proposed, both as a grace mercifully promised to the children of God through Jesus Christ and as a reward to be faithfully rendered according to the promise of God for their good works and merits." And in Canon 26: "If anyone says that the just should not expect and hope for eternal retribution from God for the good works done in God if they persevere to the end, let him be anathema." Here it is highly noteworthy, according to the words of the Council of Trent, that not only should it be attributed to God's mercy that sinners are made just, but also that eternal life is to be retributed to the just according to God's promise at the final judgment. Now who can grasp that eternal life is a retribution that the just should expect from God through His mercy and the merit of Jesus Christ, and such a reward that is also graciously promised; and yet that it is owed to the just out of strict justice and is repaid according to strictly and properly defined justice? And if God retributes eternal life to the just out of mercy, how can it also be out of strict justice, which is opposed to mercy and grace?

XVIII. It is also contradictory for someone to merit admission into the kingdom of heaven out of the strictness of law, and yet be excluded from the same kingdom out of the strictness of law. It is certain, however, from the very confession of the Doctors of the Roman Church, that humans, no matter how just, do not live in this mortal body without some light and daily sins, which, unless forgiven by divine mercy, exclude a person from the kingdom of heaven, into which nothing impure can enter. Hence, even the most holy need to say with the Prophet David, "Enter not into judgment with your servant, for no one living is righteous before you," and to pray daily as Christ commanded, "Forgive us our debts." How then can the same people demand eternal life from God as something owed to them by strict right if it is necessary for God to forgive even the pious and just their debts for them to be admitted into the heavenly kingdom? How can God be considered to owe them that kingdom out of strict justice?

XIX. However, even those Doctors of the Roman Church who admit that strict right has no place here, and that even with the divine promise, eternal life is not owed to the pious out of properly defined justice, are not free from all error in this part. Many of them nevertheless contend that even without the divine promise, the good works of the just are so worthy of eternal life that they are equal to it in value and have a value equivalent to it, not indeed by themselves and by their own nature and simply as actions conforming to God's law, but considering the principle by which they are performed, namely, because they are done through the indwelling Spirit and the grace of Jesus Christ, and by those whom God has adopted as children.

XX. But certainly, far from the services rendered to God by the faithful and the love with which they love God accruing value and worth before God from the fact that God has adopted them as children and made them heirs of His kingdom and by the continual help of His Spirit incites, moves, and impels them to these pious acts, if we suppose the same love and services to be offered by those whom God has not yet honored so highly and to whom He does not confer equal help, they would seem to have more worth and be more deserving of greater praise and

reward. For certainly, one who is provoked by lesser benefits yet still loves and serves as much merits more gratitude; and more praise is due to one who, aided by lesser helps, nevertheless performs no lesser works. Therefore, if good works are valued only by their intrinsic goodness and their conformity to God's will and law, they cannot gain value from the grace by which they are performed, nor from the dignity of the person by whom they are performed.

XXI. Nor can such worth be added to the good works of the just from the blood and merit of Christ, as the theologians of the Roman School imagine. For the blood of Christ has the power to cause the good works of the faithful, stained with it, to be accepted by God for eternal life; but this is not by adding some new value to these works and increasing their worth in themselves, but by ensuring that their deficiencies are forgiven by God and not rigorously examined in His judgment, and by moving and compelling God to promise and at the appropriate time bestow eternal glory and happiness, which far exceeds their worth, without thereby changing their internal worth and value.

XXII. Indeed, whatever the Doctors of the Roman Church may concoct here, they must admit that the good works of the faithful, even if done by the grace of Christ and the indwelling Spirit, do not yet achieve, due to the concupiscence still adhering to the faithful, the perfection required by the supreme law and which the law demanded from the first man and which, while he remained whole, was truly found in his works. How then can these works equate in worth to the utterly perfect and entirely supreme glory and happiness that God has graciously promised them and greater than which no integral man could hope for, when certainly God, being the best and most generous, would have rewarded his obedience above what was deserved and would not have proposed a reward less than his works deserved? Certainly, if the good works of the faithful are said to be of equal value to eternal life and glory, it must be that the works of an integral man, being undoubtedly more perfect, far exceeded that glory in worth and value, and therefore God promised him in His law a reward less than he deserved, for certainly nothing greater than celestial and immortal life was promised for the obedience of an integral man.

XXIII. Regarding those Doctors of the Roman School who teach that the good works of the just, even with the divine promise, do not merit eternal life out of strict justice; nor do those works, before God's promise and covenant, in any way, regardless of how they are considered, deserve celestial glory and be equal in value to it; hence, the good works of the faithful are indeed meritorious of eternal life and glory from condign merit, but only by reason of the covenant, not by the nature of the works themselves; as far as these Doctors are concerned, it is clear from our previous discussion that they agree in essence with the theologians of the Reformed Church, differing only in words and manner of speaking.

XXIV. Nevertheless, we rightly complain about those Doctors who, although agreeing in essence with the doctrine, grossly misuse words, calling that condign merit which in no way deserves that name if we wish to follow the proper and ordinary use of vocabulary. For how can a work that by itself is not worthy of such a reward, but to which the reward has been liberally promised beyond its own worth, be said to merit eternal life condignly? Certainly, the promise can oblige the promiser to grant what was promised under any condition of the work; but the

work thereby does not become worthy of the reward or merit, which far surpasses its value. Just as the daily labor of a vineyard worker, which is sufficiently compensated by a single denarius, does not acquire new value and worth even if one hundred gold coins are liberally promised; nor therefore is it equal to such a reward, and if we wish to speak correctly, it is not condign.

XXV. Moreover, such language is not only abusive but also very dangerous: it sounds inherently proud, flatters human presumption, and provides an occasion for gravely erring in reality by attributing too much to our works and in some measure diminishing the glory of divine mercy. Those with whom we are in contention cannot deny that this has occurred in the Roman School, as they also condemn the excess of those from their own ranks who explain condign merit in such a way that they teach that people merit eternal life out of strict justice and pay an equivalent price for it.

XXVI. If a subsequent divine promise could make a work that by itself is not worthy of the promised reward, nor equal in value and dignity to it, be said to merit it condignly, then acts of faith and repentance, to which justifying grace and the remission of sins are often promised in the Word of God, could be said to merit these things condignly. Yet the Council of Trent itself declares that we are said to be justified freely in Scripture because nothing that precedes justification, whether faith or works, merits the grace of justification. And it is a constant teaching of the Roman School that the remission of sins is a completely gratuitous gift and does not fall under condign merit. (Session 6, Chapter 8).

XXVII. The adversaries respond that the promise of grace made to a sinner, on the condition that he believes and repents, is not properly called a promise or covenant but only an assertion of a certain future event so that the person may be assured of obtaining the benefit if he performs the required work. But I reply, with Davenant, that this is to play with words and not to satisfy the argument. For no divine promise is other than an assertion about some benefit to be conferred upon a person, either absolutely or with the condition of some work to be performed by the person. Therefore, from the standpoint of the promise, no distinction is found when God promises the remission of sins to the penitent and when He promises the kingdom of heaven to those who live piously. In both cases, God declares and sets forth His definite will and stable ordinance regarding the rewarding of such work with the bestowal of such a benefit. Therefore, since the divine promise, as admitted by those with whom we contend, does not make the act of repentance condignly meritorious for the remission of sins, neither can the divine promise make the act of living piously condignly meritorious for glorification, assuming, as they acknowledge, that by itself it is not worthy of it.

XXVIII. Moreover, the same Council of Trent proves that nothing which precedes justification merits the grace of justification by the fact that it is contradictory for something to be grace, or a free gift, and yet be from works, that is, from the merit of works. "Nothing that precedes justification, whether faith or works, merits the grace of justification; for if it is grace, it is no longer from works; otherwise, as the Apostle says, grace is no longer grace." From this, it follows that the faithful cannot properly and condignly merit eternal life, since it is also grace, as taught by Sacred Scripture and acknowledged by all. Thus, it is surprising how the same Council

could define in Chapter 16 of the same Session 6 that the faithful truly merit eternal life by those works done in God, while also teaching that eternal life should be proposed to those who do good works to the end and hope in God as a grace mercifully promised to the children of God through Jesus Christ. And in Canon 26, it states that the just should hope for eternal retribution from God for the good works done in God, through His mercy and the merit of Jesus Christ. For if it follows from the fact that the remission of sins is grace and is called such in Scripture that it is freely given to us and without our own merits, because it is contradictory, according to the Apostle, for something to be grace and yet from the merit of works, why does it not also follow, by the same reasoning, that since eternal life is the gift and grace of God, it too does not fall under merit but is freely conferred by God?