

Translation of Boyvin's Theologia Quadripartita Scoti - De Deo Trino

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A Treatise on the Triune God

For the theologian who wants to consider God from every angle, it is necessary that after having contemplated God as one in essence, he immediately strive to know Him as triune in persons. Therefore, the order of teaching demands that we attach to the preceding treatise, in which we endeavored to explain the unity of the divine essence, the present one, which is about the Trinity of the divine persons. This treatise will consist of several chapters, the first of which will be about the knowability of this mystery.

Chapter 1: On the Knowability of the Mystery of the Trinity

In the doctrine of this great mystery, four things are to be presupposed, the first of which has already been proved in the preceding treatise, and the others will be proved in the following. First, that God is one, against the Manicheans, Gnostics, and pagans. Second, that there are three distinct persons in God: the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, against the Sabellians. Third, that these three persons are God, against the Arians who deny the divinity of the Son, and the Macedonians who attack the divinity of the Holy Spirit. Fourth and finally, that these three persons are only one God, against the Tritheists who say that the three persons are essentially distinct and thus are three Gods.

Question 1: Whether the proposition "God is triune" is self-evident.

The brevity to which we are committed prohibits us from repeating what has already been said and explained. Since, therefore, in question 4 of the preceding chapter we have said many things that are necessary to know about a self-evident proposition and its conditions, here we shall only assign the negative.

CONCLUSION

This proposition, "God is triune," or "The Trinity is in God," is not self-evident.

This is proved because that is self-evident whose knowledge comes from the apprehension of the terms alone, and whose predicate belongs to the subject *per se* and immediately. But to be triune does not belong to God immediately; indeed it belongs to Him by some *a priori* reason, namely, by the fecundity of the divine nature, from whose bosom the personalities spring forth. For the Father begets the Word because He has a fecund intellect, and the Father and the Son produce the Holy Spirit because they have a fecund will. Therefore, that God is triune is not a self-evident proposition.

But in order that these terms, "fecund intellect" and "fecund will," may be known, it must be noted that a fecund intellect is an intellect with the divine intelligible essence, insofar as it does not yet have the term of production; and by a fecund will is meant the will with the infinitely lovable divine essence, insofar as it is also understood not yet to have the term of production. The fecund intellect is in the Father alone, and the fecund will in the Father and the Son alone, because when the intellect is in the Son and the Holy Spirit, it is no longer fecund; hence the Son cannot produce another Son, nor can the Holy Spirit. But the will as it is in the Father and the Son is still fecund, because it does not yet have a produced term; but as it is in the Holy Spirit, it is no longer fecund, because it is exhausted by the production of the Holy Spirit. Therefore, the Holy Spirit cannot produce another Holy Spirit.

Objection 1: The Trinity of persons pertains to the quiddity of God; therefore, it is self-evident that God is triune. The antecedent is proved: Personal subsistence is the formal ratio of a person; for a person is defined as an incommunicable subsistence of an intellectual nature. But personal subsistence pertains to the quiddity of God. Therefore, since there is no greater reason why one person should pertain to the quiddity of God than another, consequently the three persons will pertain to the quiddity of God. The minor is proved: Personal subsistence is the ultimate complement of an intellectual nature, its term in the genus of substance, its highest perfection, and its most perfect existence. But the most perfect existence pertains to the quiddity of God. Therefore, personal subsistence pertains to the quiddity of God.

Response: The first antecedent is denied, for personal subsistence does not pertain to the quiddity of God. As to the proof of this—that it is the ultimate complement of God's nature and His highest perfection and perfect existence—it is denied. For that alone is the highest perfection of a thing which ultimately constitutes its quiddity, but not that which ultimately terminates it. But absolute subsistence ultimately constitutes the divine nature, and so we have said that it really pertains to God's essence. Personal subsistence, however, does not ultimately constitute, because God as God is adequately constituted without the persons; but it ultimately terminates or renders God incommunicable. Hence, in us also, created existence is indeed the ultimate term of a thing, but it is not its highest perfection; indeed, the difference of a thing is the highest perfection of its nature. In this, however, created existence

and the ratio of person in God differ, for created existence is a certain perfection without which a created nature would not be as perfect as it is with it; but personality is not a perfection that makes God more perfect; indeed, without the persons God is just as perfect as with them, because the persons do not imply perfection, as will be shown.

Objection 2: If the Trinity of persons pertains to the formal concept of God, this proposition will be self-evident: "God is triune." But the Trinity pertains to the formal concept of deity, which is proved: When some things are predicated of each other in the abstract, one pertains to the formal concept of the other. But it is said not only in the concrete, "God is triune," but also in the abstract, "deity is Trinity." Therefore, one pertains to the formal concept of the other.

Response: It is true that Trinity and deity are predicated of each other in the abstract. But when they say that what is predicated of each other in the abstract, one pertains to the essence of the other, I distinguish: if they are predicated formally, I concede, that is, if the formality of one is the formality of the other; if they are predicated only identically, I deny. But when it is said, "Deity is Trinity," this proposition is not formally true, because the formality of God as God is one thing, the formality of God as triune is another. They are predicated of each other identically, however, because deity, by reason of infinity, identifies the Trinity of persons with itself. Hence, although they are predicated identically of each other, one does not pertain to the formal concept of the other.

Objection 3: If the Trinity can be proved a priori of God, this happens through deity, which is the reason for the existence of the Trinity, that is, why God is triune. But this is false, because it would follow that wherever deity is, there would be the principle of the Trinity. But deity is in the Son and in the Holy Spirit, and so the Son would have the principle of the Trinity, and consequently of Himself and of the Father and of the Holy Spirit, which is absurd.

Response: Deity as such is not the principle of the Trinity; otherwise, where deity would be, there would be the principle of the three persons. But deity, insofar as it is prior in nature to paternity, is the root of paternity, because deity is determined immediately to the first person; but as it is in the Father, it is the root of filiation; and as it is in the Father and the Son, it is the root of the Holy Spirit. Therefore, deity in the Son is not the root of the Father, nor of the Son Himself, because when the Son has deity, the Father already exists, and the Son Himself is already produced. Nor as it is in the Holy Spirit can it be His principle, because He is already spirated. Hence, although the Word or the Holy Spirit have deity and intellect and will, nevertheless the Word cannot generate, because the intellect He has is exhausted; just as the Holy Spirit cannot spirate, because His will is exhausted, and each power has an adequate term.

Question 2: Whether it can be known a priori that there is a Trinity in God.

It is certain that the created intellect is inclined by the powers of nature to any intellection whatsoever, and consequently to the knowledge of the mystery of the Trinity. For every

perfectible power is naturally inclined to its perfective; but any cognition perfects the intellect. Therefore, it is no wonder if the intellect is naturally inclined to the knowledge of the Trinity. But whether such knowledge can be attained naturally, and whether any created intellect can know naturally a priori that the Trinity of persons can stand with the unity of essence, this we shall deny.

CONCLUSION

No created intellect, in whatever state it may exist, apart from revelation, can know this mystery a priori.

This conclusion is of faith: "Who shall declare his generation?" (Is. 53:8). "No one knows the Son except the Father, and no one knows the Father except the Son and anyone to whom the Son chooses to reveal him" (Matt. 11:27). Thus teach the Fathers: Hilary says, "Let not man think that he can attain by his own understanding the sacrament of generation" (De Trin. 1). Ambrose says, "The mind is silent, the voice fails," etc. (De fide 1.7). And Augustine, speaking of this mystery, says, "The feeble gaze of the human mind is not fixed on so excellent a light unless it be purified by the righteousness of faith" (De Trin. 1.2). The reason for the conclusion is this: A property most peculiar to a subject cannot be known of it a priori unless the quiddity of the subject is distinctly known, because the quiddity of the subject is the reason why such a property belongs to it. Therefore, the Trinity of persons, which is a property most peculiar to God (for no being besides God is triune in persons and one in essence), cannot be known unless the quiddity of God is distinctly known. But this cannot happen by natural powers, but only through revelation or the light of glory. And so the mystery of the Trinity cannot be known naturally by a created intellect.

Objection: The reason a priori why God is triune is because he has intellect and will, which are the productive principles of the divine persons. But one can know naturally that God has intellect and will, which can produce. Therefore, the mystery of the Trinity can be known naturally a priori. The minor is proved: It can be proved (1) that God exists. (2) It can be proved that God is of an intellectual nature, and therefore has intellect and will. (3) It can be proved that God's intellect is productive of a mental word, and that His will is productive of divine love; for we produce a mental word through the intellect, and love through the will. (4) It can be proved that this mental word is substantial, because there can be no accident in God; and consequently, that the love produced by the will is also substantial, not accidental. (5) It can be proved that this Word and this love are really distinct from the producing person, because there is a real distinction between the producer and the product. (6) Finally, it can be proved that this Word is one in essence with the producer, just as love is, because what is infinite is not communicated with its division. Therefore, from all these things, which can be proved naturally, it is clear that it can be known a priori that there is one God in deity, and three persons, of whom one is unproduced and is the Father; the other two are produced, one through the intellect, namely, the Word, the other through the will, namely, the Holy Spirit. And so the mystery of the Trinity is proved naturally a priori.

Response: It can indeed be proved (1) that God exists. It can also be proved (2) that God has intellect and will. For, as we have said, the noblest mode of acting is due to the noblest being, which is God. But the third cannot be known naturally, namely, that God's intellect is productive and His will is productive. For if our intellect is productive, this smacks of a certain imperfection. For we produce a notion of the object, or mental word, because our intellect does not have an unproduced notion by means of which it understands all objects. Therefore, in default of such an unproduced cognition, it must continually produce mental words. But God has an unproduced product by which He knows Himself and every truth. Hence, we have said elsewhere that God's intellect is operative, but not productive. We cannot, therefore, know naturally that the Father has an intellect productive of a begotten notion, because He has an unproduced notion. Indeed, this seems to argue imperfection. And so we must have recourse to faith, which teaches us that God as God has an operative intellect and an unproduced cognition, and that as Father He has a productive intellect and a produced notion, namely, the mental Word. Furthermore, if this were granted, a pagan philosopher would hesitate in many respects. For he would think that there is some accident in God, and so the Word would not be a person, just as love would not be substantial. Besides, he could not know clearly and distinctly how the Son produced cannot produce another Son, because he has an intellect and a knowable essence. He would also doubt about the Holy Spirit, because, since He is endowed with intellect and will, He would seem to be able to produce another Son through the intellect, and another Holy Spirit through the will.

Question 3: Whether the mystery of the Trinity can be known naturally a posteriori.

Many wise men and philosophers of old, altogether lacking revelation and supernatural light, acknowledged the distinction of persons in God, such as Plato, Trismegistus, Zoroaster, Plotinus, and others. From this some believe that they knew naturally, at least a posteriori, the existence of this mystery. But they rely on a false foundation, as Cyril of Alexandria, Justin, Augustine, and others say. For those Gentiles did not have such knowledge from created things, but from supernatural revelation, either made to them immediately, as Augustine thought of the Sibyls (De civ. Dei 18), who, as Jerome says, "on account of the virginity which they strictly preserved, had the gift of prophecy" (Adv. Iovin. 1), through a revelation made to them of the mysteries of the Christian religion; or made to Adam, and passed down to them by tradition, as Eugubinus indicates in his book De perenni philosophia. For it must be held with certainty that Adam, in his production, was filled with the knowledge of the mystery of the Trinity, which was transmitted from him to his posterity, and reached as far as Noah, from Noah to Abraham and the other wise Chaldeans, whose leader was Zoroaster. But from the Chaldeans that wisdom passed to the Egyptians, from the Egyptians to the Greeks, from the Greeks to the Latins, but always more impure and entangled with more errors, so that very many Gentiles hardly attained the knowledge of this mystery. Finally, it can be said that those Gentiles had such knowledge from the reading of the prophets. But it must not be inferred that they received it from creatures, as will be proved.

CONCLUSION

The created intellect cannot know the mystery of the Trinity naturally a posteriori.

The convincing and only reason is this: That cannot be known of the cause through the effect, which being circumscribed, there remains in the cause whatever is necessary for causing. But if the Trinity of persons were circumscribed (which is impossible), there would still be had in God whatever is necessary for causing the creature. Therefore, from the knowledge of the creature it cannot be known that God is triune, or that the first cause is triune in persons. The major is evident, because, although creatures lead us to the knowledge of the first cause, and prove the existence of God, nevertheless they do not prove that God is triune. The minor is evident, because God produces creatures through His will, which is an essential attribute. Therefore, if God were only one in person (which is impossible), He could produce creatures. And so from the knowledge of creatures, we cannot come to the knowledge of the Trinity.

You will object: When the image is known, the thing imaged is known naturally a posteriori. But we know the soul naturally, which is the image of the Trinity. Therefore, we can know the Trinity naturally a posteriori, of which the soul is the image.

Response: When the image is known, the thing imaged is known naturally a posteriori; I distinguish: if the image is known under the aspect of an image, I concede; if the image is known according to its absolute ratio, I deny. But we cannot know our soul under the aspect of an image of the divine Trinity unless we know the Trinity itself. And so, although we know the soul according to its absolute being, that is, insofar as it is a soul, nevertheless through such knowledge we cannot know the Trinity, unless it has first been revealed to us that the soul is the image of the Trinity. For example, when seeing a picture which is the image of the king, I cannot through such vision be led to the knowledge of the king, unless someone tells me that such a picture represents the king.

You will insist: From the response it is clear that we can indeed know the soul naturally, which is the image of the Trinity; but we cannot know the relation of image which is in our soul to the Trinity. On the contrary: that relation of image is something created; but a created being is the object of the intellect acting naturally. Therefore, we can know such a relation of image naturally.

Response: A created being is the natural object of the intellect; I distinguish: if the created being does not express a relation to an uncreated being, I concede; but if it respects an uncreated being, I deny. For a relation cannot be known unless its term is known. And so, although that relation of the soul to the Trinity is created, nevertheless it cannot be known naturally, because it has for its term the triune God, who cannot be known naturally.

Objection 2: Although a created intellect does not elicit the vision of the Trinity naturally, because it requires the light of glory, nevertheless it can reflect naturally upon its act, and

know that it sees the Trinity. Therefore, at least by a reflexive act it will know this mystery naturally.

Response: With Scotus, such a reflexive act is from the same light of glory as the direct act. For a reflexive act is not usually elicited by lesser powers than a direct act. And so, if it needs the light of glory for the act by which it tends directly to the Trinity, it needs the same light of glory to know that it knows this mystery. Nor should you say that one Blessed can see naturally the beatific act of another; therefore, he can also see the object with which that act is concerned, and consequently he can see the Trinity naturally. For this is false, because the beatific act of one Blessed is supernatural. Therefore, in order for another to see such an act, he needs a supernatural aid. If Scotus says that angels have natural species of this mystery, it cannot therefore be concluded that such a mystery can be known naturally *a posteriori*. For such species are only improperly natural, because they are infused in them from creation. But because they are not due to them, but depend on the will of God alone, they are not properly natural.

Chapter 2. On Persons Taken Generally

The holy Fathers argued fiercely over the meaning of these terms: nature, substance, suppositum, hypostasis, and person. However, according to the usage of the Church, in this matter nature, substance, and essence mean the same thing, just as suppositum, hypostasis and person signify the same thing.

The former terms signify something complete, perfect and singular, yet communicable. Thus divinity, as distinct from the persons, is a perfect, complete, and singular nature, essence and substance - it is "this" divinity. Yet it can be further communicated to the persons.

The latter terms signify something complete, perfect, and singular, but also incommunicable. For this is how a person is distinguished from a nature, at least in created things: a nature is communicable as "that by which" (*ut quo*) and as "that which" (*ut quod*), while a person is incommunicable in both ways.

To be communicated as "that which" is to be communicated as a superior to its inferiors. Thus human nature is communicable as "that which" to Peter and Paul, etc. For Peter is a man, Paul is a man, etc.

To be communicated as "that by which" is to be communicated as a singular nature to a suppositum, or as a form to a subject which it denominates. For example, the nature that is singular in Peter is communicable to him as "that by which", because it is truly communicated to the suppositum of Peter. Likewise, this whiteness which is in the wall is communicable as "that by which", because it is communicated as a form to a subject.

However, a person (and the same goes for a suppositum and hypostasis) is incommunicable in two ways - both as "that which" and as "that by which". It is incommunicable as "that which" because, since it is not a common nature, it cannot be communicated to multiple inferiors. It is also incommunicable as "that by which", because it cannot be communicated to another as a form to a subject, or as a nature to a suppositum. Thus, for example, Peter is incommunicable both as "that which" and as "that by which".

These things are worth knowing in order to grasp what we will say about the divine persons. With that established, we ask:

Question 1: Are there multiple Persons in the Divinity?

Many heresies arose concerning this mystery, which will be seen in what follows. Sabellius wanted there to be only one person in the Trinity, which had different names according to the different offices it performed. Thus it was called "Father" insofar as it gave being to the world through creation, "Son" insofar as it was incarnate, and "Holy Spirit" insofar as it descended upon the Apostles. And so, according to this heresiarch, the divine Persons were distinguished only by names and offices, but not in reality. Because of this, many who held this error were called "Patriconians". For they said that the divine Father suffered, since he was the same person as the Son. The Priscillianists and Jacobites were also in this error. To profess their heresy to the people, they used to make the sign of the cross with one finger, so that the oneness of the finger would indicate the oneness of the persons. Against all these will be:

CONCLUSION

There are multiple persons in the Divinity.

This conclusion is found in Sacred Scripture. Genesis 1: "Let us make man in our image and likeness." Theodoret, Basil and Augustine say that this is the conversation of the three divine Persons speaking among themselves. Deut. 6: "Hear O Israel: The Lord is our God, the Lord alone." Psalm 67: "May God, our God, bless us. May God bless us." Isaiah 6: "Holy, holy, holy is the Lord of hosts!" In these places "God" is stated three times and "Holy" three times to denote the Trinity of Persons.

It is also found in the New Testament. John 1: "The Son, who is in the bosom of the Father..." And Matt. 28: "Baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit."

Objection: There is no number in divine things. Therefore, there is no plurality of persons. For plurality cannot exist without number, since plurality enumerates so many or so many units.

Reply: In divine things there is no number implying an essential diversity of units, I concede, because the three Persons truly have the same essence numerically. But there is number implying only a real distinction of the Persons, I deny.

Question 2: Whether there are three Persons in the divine.

In the previous question we said there are multiple persons in the divine. Here we ask how many there are - whether there are fewer or more than three. For it could be said that, because the Father produces the Son through his intellect, so also the Son could produce another Son, since he has an intellect just as the Father does. And the same goes for the Holy Spirit.

CONCLUSION

There are three Persons, no more and no less.

Proof: There is one unproduced person and only two produced persons. Therefore there are three persons. The first part is proved: Every nature of itself demands to exist and be determined immediately to some person, which person is unproduced. For if it were produced by another, that other would be either produced or unproduced. If produced, there would be an infinite regress. Therefore, there must be some unproduced person, and this is the person of the Father, who, as Athanasius says, is made by none, neither created nor begotten.

The second part is proved, that there are only two produced persons, for there are only as many produced persons as there are productive principles. But there are only two productive principles, no more, namely the intellect and the will. Therefore there are only two produced persons. And so there are only three persons, of whom one is unproduced and two are produced.

Objection 1: A finite power enduring for an infinite time can produce infinite effects, as is clear with the sun, which if it endured infinitely could produce infinite effects. Therefore, all the more so an infinite power enduring for an infinite time could produce infinite effects. But the Father is infinite in productive power, namely in intellect. Therefore he can produce infinite intellects and infinite Sons. Likewise, through his will he can produce infinite Holy Spirits. And so there will be more persons.

Reply: An infinite power can produce infinite effects, I distinguish: if the first effect it produces is not adequate to the productive power, I concede, that is, if it is not as great as can be produced. If it is adequate, I deny. It is no wonder, then, if the sun enduring infinitely could produce infinite effects, because none of them is adequate to the sun's power. But it is not so with respect to the eternal Father, because when through his intellect he produces his Word,

such a Word is adequate to the Father's intellect. And so, once it is produced, the Father cannot produce another.

Furthermore, I say that while a finite power can have multiple effects, I distinguish: if the production of one passes into the past, I concede, for once it is produced, it can successively produce another. If the produced effect does not pass into the past, I deny, because since the power is formally occupied in producing this effect, it certainly cannot produce another. But in divine things, the generation of the Son does not pass into the past, because it is eternal. Hence the Father always produces his Son, and it is true to say that he actually begets him. And therefore, since the Father always remains producing his Word, and his intellect is always occupied in producing it, he cannot generate another.

Objection 2: There are as many relations of producers as there are of things produced. Therefore, there are as many producing persons as there are produced persons. But there are two produced persons. Therefore there are also two producing persons, and consequently there will be four persons. The antecedent is clear, because for the relations of producers there are active generation and active spiration, and for the relations of things produced there are filiation (or passive generation) and passive spiration. The consequent is evident, because relations constitute persons. And so there will be four persons, since there are four relations.

Reply: I concede the whole argument, except the last inference. For although there are two relations of producers and two of things produced, and although there are two producing persons and two produced persons, nevertheless there are not four persons, because one of them is both producing and produced, namely the Son. As for what is said, that relations constitute persons, I reply by distinguishing: when they do not accrue to a suppositum already constituted by a prior relation, I concede; when they accrue to a constituted suppositum, I deny. But in the Father and the Son, the relation of active spiration accrues when they are already constituted in personal being - the Father, namely, by active generation and the Son by filiation or passive generation. And so those relations do not constitute persons.

Objection 3: No divine person can be produced. Therefore it is wrong to say that there are three persons of whom one is unproduced and the others produced. The antecedent is proved: nothing produced is necessary of itself. But the divine Persons are necessary. Therefore they are not produced. The major is proved from Scotus: nothing is necessary from itself and necessary from another. But the Persons, because they are God, are necessary from themselves. Therefore they are not necessary from another, and so they are not produced. But if they are produced, they are produced contingently, which is repugnant to a person who is God.

Reply: I deny the antecedent. To the proof, I deny the major. To Scotus I say: nothing is necessary from itself and necessary from another in the same way, I concede; in different ways, I deny. But the Persons are necessary from themselves and necessary from another in different ways. They are formally necessary from themselves, because they are God. But they are originatively necessary from another, because the Son, for example, necessarily originates from the Father and the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son. If someone says, what is possible is not necessary, but what is produced was possible, otherwise it would

have been impossible for it to be produced, therefore the Persons are not necessary - I reply that the Persons are necessary. But when it is said that they are possible to be produced, I reply: they are possible with logical possibility, that is, it is not repugnant for them to be produced; but not with physical possibility, as if they could have not existed.

Question 3: Whether the three divine Persons are really distinct.

Sabellius denies this, saying the Persons are distinguished only by names. Faith affirms it, saying the person of the Father is one, the person of the Son another, the person of the Holy Spirit another. But before we conclude, the definition of person, which is had from Boethius, must be presented: An individual substance of a rational nature. But because this definition also befits the rational soul, which is an individual substance of a rational nature, yet is not a person, we take this one instead: A person is an incommunicable existence of an intellectual nature.

It is said, first, "of an intellectual nature". Hence person is distinguished from suppositum, for suppositum belongs to every substantial nature, whether rational or irrational, whether animate or inanimate. But person belongs only to an intellectual nature, as are God, angel and man.

Secondly, it is said "an incommunicable existence". And so things that exist communicably are not persons. Hence God as God is not a person, because although he is an individual substance, since he is "this" and most singular, nevertheless he is communicable to the Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Likewise, a soul is not a person, because it is communicable as a form to a subject. But a person cannot be communicated to anything, neither as "that which" nor as "that by which".

CONCLUSION

The three divine Persons are really distinct.

Sacred Scripture teaches this, where it is said: "The Word was with God" (John 1); that the Father is in the Son (John 14); "There are three that bear witness in heaven: the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit" (1 John 5). All these imply a real distinction, for properly speaking something is not in itself.

Furthermore, between producer and produced there is a real distinction, at least a personal one. But the Father produces the Son: "You are my Son; today I have begotten you" (Heb 5). The Holy Spirit is also sent by the Father and the Son: "When the Advocate comes, whom I will send to you from the Father" (John 15). But a person is not sent except by those from whom it proceeds. Therefore, the Holy Spirit is sent by both, and so is distinct from both. And

therefore there are three really distinct Persons. Hence Athanasius: "The person of the Father is one, the person of the Son another, the person of the Holy Spirit another."

Although it may be said "another person of the Father", nevertheless it should not be said "another one, person of the Father". For "another" signifies only a distinction in person, but "another one" involves a distinction in essence. And so there is no problem if we say "the Father is another, the Son is another, the Holy Spirit is another"- but not "another one".

Objection: The word "another" signifies another God. But it cannot be said that the Father is another God than the Son, for then there would be three Gods. Therefore it cannot be said "the Father is another, the Son another, the Holy Spirit another". The major is proved: for this proposition is true, "God begot God". Therefore, he either begot himself God or another God. But he did not beget himself God. Therefore another God. And so the word "another" signifies an otherness of deity.

Reply: I deny the major of the first argument and the confirmation of it. For it is not true to say that God begot himself God, nor another God, for then the deity would be multiplied. But it is true that God begets another who is God, that is, another person who is divine. Or it can be distinguished in this way: He begot himself God or another, where the otherness falls upon the person, I concede; where the otherness falls upon the essence, I deny. And so the multiplicity falls upon the persons, not upon the deity.

You will say, if they are three really distinct Persons, there will be four necessary, infinite and independent beings. For the divine essence is a necessary being, and the three Persons are necessary. I reply that there are not four, but at most only three, because those three personal beings are not really distinct from the essence - rather, they are identified with it. And so they should not be called four, because a quaternity or trinity expresses a real distinction.

Question 4: Whether the Word is God.

After treating the plurality of the persons and their real distinction, we must now turn to their divinity, asking whether each person is God. As for the divinity of the Father, no one has denied it, given the express texts of Scripture: "The Word was with God", namely the Father (John 1); "That they may know you, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent" (John 17). But the Arians denied the divinity of the Son, and the Macedonians denied the divinity of the Holy Spirit.

CONCLUSION

The Son, who is also called the Word, and who assumed our nature, is truly God.

Proof against the Arians: because Christ is called God in both Testaments. Isaiah 35: "God himself will come and save us." Romans 9: "From them, according to the flesh, is the Christ, who is God over all, blessed forever." The Fathers confirm this when they call him consubstantial with the Father and say that he is of the same substance as the Father, and not merely similar, as Arius wanted.

That the Son is consubstantial with the Father is clear from John 10: "I and the Father are one." Likewise the Council of Nicaea says he is consubstantial with the Father. Finally, the Word is the natural Son of God: "The only-begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, he has made him known" (John 1). But if he is the natural Son of God, he must be God. For generation occurs in identity of nature.

The Arians object from John 14: "The Father is greater than I." I reply: according to his humanity, I concede; according to his divinity, I deny. You will say, he who sends is greater than he who is sent. But the Father sent the Son into the world (John 5). Therefore, etc. I reply: when someone sends another by command, I concede; when someone sends one who is willing, I deny.

You will say, from John 5: "The Son can do nothing of himself but what he sees the Father doing." I reply, that is, the Son cannot operate by himself alone, but together with the Father. For in both there is one nature and one power. Hence it is said that the external works of the Trinity are undivided.

You will say, from John 7: "My doctrine is not my own but his who sent me." I reply, that is, my doctrine is not human but divine.

You will say, from Luke 18: "Why do you call me good? No one is good but God alone." From this it is clear that Christ did not want to be called God. I reply that this is understood in the opposite sense. For by this Christ wanted to prove that he is God, as if the sense were: God alone is good. Therefore, if you do not want me to be God, do not call me good. For no one is good except God alone.

You will say, from Romans 9: "The Lord has made his word brief upon the earth." If, therefore, Christ is abbreviated, he is less than the Father. I reply that Christ is called the abbreviated Word by reason of the law he wished to establish. For the new law instituted by Christ was, as it were, an abbreviation of the old law.

Objection 2: The Father and the Son are not consubstantial. For in the Council of Antioch, Paul of Samosata was condemned because he admitted this word homoousios (consubstantial). Therefore, the Son is not God as the Father is.

I reply that Paul of Samosata was condemned for this reason: because by this word he admitted that the Persons were one in a common specific substance, just as Porphyry admits that all men are one in human nature, which is false. For the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit do not have merely the same substance in species, but the same substance in number. For the same numerical nature, essence, and substance is in the three Persons. Hence they are said to be one in essence.

You will say that Scripture, speaking to the Father, says: "This is eternal life, that they may know you, the only true God" (John 17). Therefore, the Father alone is God, but not the Son. I reply that by that word "only", Scripture excludes false gods, but not the Son or the Holy Spirit.

Objection 3: Where being and duration are one and the same, if something is the principle of another's being, it is also the principle of its duration. But the Father is the principle of the Son. Therefore, he is the principle of the Son's duration. But if the Son has a principle of duration, he is not eternal. Therefore, he is not God.

I reply by distinguishing: the Father is the principle of the Son's duration, an originative principle, I concede, because the Son originates from the Father; an inchoative principle, I deny, because the Son never began to be, for he is eternal. Nevertheless, it should not be said that the Father is the principle of the Son's duration, because the principle of duration is taken for the beginning. But it is said that the Father is the originative principle of the Son's eternity. For because the Father communicates the divine essence to the Son, he consequently communicates to him all the divine perfections, and therefore eternity.

Objection 4: From John 1: "The Word was with God." Therefore, if he was with God, he was not God himself. I reply that by "God" is understood the Father, who truly is God. Then it is added, "and the Word was God." The Arians insist from the same chapter: "We have seen his glory, glory as of the only-begotten." Therefore, he is as it were the only-begotten, not properly begotten by the Father. Therefore, he is not in identity of nature with him, and so he is not God as the Father is.

I reply that this word "as" does not always signify likeness, but sometimes signifies truth and identity. Thus, in Luke 22, the sweat of Christ is said to be "as drops of blood", which nevertheless was true blood. But if the divine Word is said in Scripture to be created and made, this is improperly speaking, insofar as he is produced and begotten, just as parents are said to procreate children.

Objection 5: What is generated admits of change and succession, for it passes from non-being to being. But change and succession cannot befit God. Therefore, the Word which is generated is not God.

I reply that the antecedent is true in created things, where the begotten receives being after non-being - but not in divine things, where the begetter, the begotten, and the begetting are simultaneous and always. For there is no instant in which the Father exists without begetting the Son, and in which the Son is not begotten. And so the Word does not receive being after non-being.

You will say, as the corrupted is related to non-being, so the generated is related to being. But what is corrupted ceases to be. Therefore, what is generated begins to be. Therefore, it admits succession and change. I reply that the comparison holds only in physical generations, in which the subject is first subject to privation before the form - but not in this metaphysical generation, in which to be generated and to be begotten are the same, and in which the Word of God was never deprived of existence.

You will insist: The Father was able not to generate the Son. Therefore, the generation of the Son is changeable, and so the Son was able not to be. Therefore, he is not God, because God is a necessary being who was not able not to be. The antecedent is proved: The Father did not generate the Son under compulsion. Therefore, he generated him freely. Therefore, he was able not to generate.

I reply by denying the antecedent. To the proof I say he generated the Son freely, with a freedom opposed to compulsion, I concede, because he did not generate under compulsion - for he was well pleased in such a generation. With a freedom opposed to necessity, I deny. For he generated the Son necessarily and naturally, so that it was impossible for him not to beget.

Objection 6: If the Father generated the Son, either he generated him existing or he generated him not existing. If he generated him existing, he generated that which already existed before, which is absurd to say. If he generated him not existing, there was some instant in which the Son was not, and consequently he is not eternal, and therefore not God.

I reply that he generated the Son existing, yet not in such a way that the Son existed before the generation, but in such a way that the Son existed simultaneously with the generation. Since, therefore, that generation was eternal, because the Father generates the Son naturally, independently, and immutably, the Son is consequently eternal. For because the Father generates naturally, therefore, when the principle of generating was perfect in the Father and not impeded, then the generation had to occur. Because secondly he generates independently, his generation could not be impeded. And because he generates immutably, the begotten term does not have being after non-being. And so it remains that the generation of the Son is eternal.

Final Objection: Either the generation of the Son is completed today or not. If it is completed, then the Son is no longer being generated. Therefore, his generation has ceased. Therefore, it is not divine, for whatever is divine, just as it lacks a beginning, so also an end. But if it is not completed, then it is imperfect. Therefore, the Son who is produced through it is imperfect. Therefore, he is not God.

I reply that the generation of the Son is completed, not because it has ceased to be or will at some time cease, but because it always perseveres complete and is so at every moment, because it is eternal. And what is eternal never ceases. Hence at every moment the Father perfectly generates the Son, according to what is said in the Psalm: "Today I have begotten you." And so the Church sings in the responsory for the 9th reading of the 4th Sunday of Advent: "Whose generation has no end." This was determined in the 1st Lateran Council in the Confession of Faith, where it is defined that the Father is always generating from the beginning without any end, and the Son is being born, and the Holy Spirit is proceeding. The reason for this is that the generation of the Word is measured by eternity, which is a standing and permanent now, today as yesterday. But if they speak of the generation of the Word as past, this is because the past tense more clearly expresses a completed generation.

Question 5: Whether the Holy Spirit is God

We refuted in the previous question the Arians who deny the divinity of the Son. Now we must move on to refuting Macedonius, the Archbishop of Constantinople, who called into doubt the divinity of the Holy Spirit, believing the Holy Spirit to be a creature made through the Word. And he took the opportunity for his error from John 1: "All things were made through Him", therefore, he said, the Holy Spirit too. And because of this, he refused to acknowledge that the Holy Spirit is God. But the contrary is asserted by the

CONCLUSION

The Holy Spirit is truly God.

This conclusion is not only against Macedonius, but against Arius, who in denying the divinity of the Son, consequently denied the divinity of the Holy Spirit, whom he called the creature of the creature, produced by the Son who was a creature.

The first reason is because the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father (John 15): "I will send to you the Spirit of truth, who proceeds from the Father". Therefore, if He proceeds from the Father, He is of the same nature as the Father. Thus, because the Father is God, the Holy Spirit will also be God.

The second reason is taken from Acts 5, where blessed Peter rebukes Ananias and his wife Sapphira because they lied to the Holy Spirit. And he adds that they have lied not to men, but to God.

Third, the sacraments are conferred only in the name of God, because God alone is the author and giver of grace. But baptism is conferred in the name of the Holy Spirit just as Christ commands: "Go, preach, etc. baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit."

Fourth, the properties of God are attributed to the Holy Spirit, such as immensity: "The Spirit of the Lord has filled the world", and knowledge: "No one comprehends what pertains to God except the Spirit of God."

To all these are added the Councils: the First Council of Constantinople, which was celebrated against Macedonius to uphold this truth, the Council of Nicaea, etc.

OBJECTION 1. Macedonius cites what is found in John 1: "All things were made through Him, and without Him nothing was made". But the Holy Spirit is something and not nothing. Therefore He was made through the Word, and thus is not God. For whatever things were made or created have their being after non-being, and so are not eternal. I respond with Saint Gregory of Nazianzus (Oration 37) that not all things without qualification were made

through the Word, but only those things which were made without qualification. For this appears from the same text, where it is found not only "without Him nothing was made", but it is added, "what was made". And so the whole sentence ought to be pronounced: "All things were made through Him, and without Him nothing was made of what was made." Therefore, because the Holy Spirit was not made, He was not made through the Word. Thus Chrysostom (Homily 4 on that chapter) asserts that those are heretics who allow a period after the word "nothing", which nevertheless should be understood if it is done with a heretical mind and from the thinking of Macedonius.

OBJECTION 2. In Romans 8 it says, "The Holy Spirit intercedes for us with inexpressible groanings." But one who implores God is inferior to God. Therefore, the Holy Spirit is not God. I respond that the Holy Spirit intercedes for us efficiently and causally (I concede), because through His grace He makes us ask, but not formally and immediately (I deny), because it is not He Himself who prays. If it is found in Amos 4 that God "forms the mountains and creates the wind", "spirit" is understood to mean the winds, not the person of the Holy Spirit. You will say: From Matthew 11, "No one knows the Father except the Son." Therefore, the Holy Spirit does not know Him. Therefore, He is not God. I respond by denying the conclusion, because in the same Scripture it is found, "No one comprehends the secrets of God except the Spirit of God." This text does not impede the divinity of the Son, nor therefore the former text that of the Holy Spirit. Moreover, those particles exclude creatures.

OBJECTION 3. John 16: "The Paraclete will not speak on His own, but whatever He hears He will speak." Therefore, He is directed by another. Therefore, He is not God. I respond that He does not speak on His own because He truly receives His essence, His nature, and His knowledge from another, namely from the Father and the Son. Nevertheless, this does not impede His divinity, just as the divinity of the Son is not impeded, although He says, "The words that I speak to you I do not speak on my own."

If Gregory of Nazianzus (Oration 37) says that the wise of his time do not agree on the divinity of the Holy Spirit - by "the wise" he does not mean Catholic doctors, but either pagan philosophers or heretics dissenting from the Church in this matter, whom he calls wise ironically, because they boasted that they were wise when in reality they were not. If also Basil (Against Eunomius, book 3) is objected as saying that the Holy Spirit is second in dignity to the Son - this should be understood of the order of origin, according to which the Father is prior to the Son, because the Son is from Him, not conversely, and the Father and the Son are prior to the Holy Spirit, because He is from them, not the other way around. But it should not be understood of the dignity of perfection, as if there were some perfection in the Son which is not in the Holy Spirit.

Question 6: Whether the three persons are one God

It is clear from what has been said that the three persons are really distinct. It is also clear that each one is God. But whether those three persons are three gods or one God - this is

what we are inquiring. This question seems so difficult to the vain minds of the profane that those who acknowledged one God acknowledged only one person, and those who professed three persons really distinct dared also to profess three gods.

CONCLUSION

The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are only one God - against the Tritheists asserting that the three persons are three eternal spirits differing in essential number.

This conclusion is determined in the Councils of Nicaea, Constantinople, Florence, and others. It is confirmed by Saint Athanasius: "They are not three Gods, but there is one God", and Saint Bernard (On Consideration 5.8): "Let us say three," he says, "but not to the prejudice of unity." The same is found in Deuteronomy 6: "Hear, O Israel: The Lord our God is one Lord."

A REASON is not lacking to prove this truth, because the nature of God is communicable without division of itself. And so, when the Father through generation communicates His nature to the Son, and the Father and the Son communicate the same nature in number to the Holy Spirit - this differs from human generation where a father communicates the same nature in species to a son, but not the same in number, because human nature is finite and is communicated with division of itself.

OBJECTION 1. The true and one God is the Father of Christ. But the three persons are not the Father of Christ. Therefore, they are not one God. I respond by denying the conclusion, because there is a variation of supposition of the terms. For in the major "God" is taken for the person of the Father, who is indeed the Father of Christ. But in the conclusion it is taken for the essence, or for God considered in Himself. And so the conclusion is null.

You will say: No God is three persons, for the Father is not three persons, nor the Son, nor the Holy Spirit. Therefore, God is not three persons. Therefore, there is not one deity in three persons. I respond by conceding the antecedent but denying the consequence. For there is still a variation of the terms, because in the antecedent the name "God" is taken personally, as is clear from the attached sign "no one". But in the consequent it is taken essentially. And so the supposition of the terms is varied. For we do not say that any God, that is, any person, is three persons. But we say that God considered in Himself is three persons. And so that argument is not valid. Just as this one is not: No man is a species, therefore man is not a species. For the antecedent is taken particularly, and the consequent universally.

OBJECTION 2. Things which are the same as one third thing are the same as each other. Therefore, if the persons are one in essence and are not really distinguished from it, they will also be one among themselves. But the persons are really distinguished among themselves. Therefore they are not one in essence. And thus there will not be one God who is communicated to the three persons.

I respond that the persons are the same among themselves by that identity by which they are the same in essence (I deny). Therefore, just as they are essentially one in essence, so also they are essentially one among themselves. But that essential identity does not impede them from being really distinct personally.

You will say: The persons are really one in essence. Therefore, they are not really one among themselves. I respond by denying the consequence. But as to what is said, that whatever things are the same as one third thing are the same as each other - this is true when that third thing is not infinite. But in the case at hand, the divine essence, which is that third thing, is infinite. And so it identifies the persons with itself really. But the persons, which are not infinite, do not identify each other. And so, although the three persons are really distinct among themselves, they are nevertheless one in the divine essence, which is infinite.

OBJECTION 3. If the three persons had the same essence in number, it could be said that God was both begotten and unbegotten, which is contradictory. I respond that this can be said, because the Father, who is God, is unbegotten, and the Son, who is also God, is begotten. Nevertheless, it is not a contradiction, because the subject, namely God, is not taken in the same way - for He is taken now for the person of the Father, now for the person of the Son.

You will say: It would also follow that it could be said, "The Father is this God, the Son is this God; therefore, the Father is the Son." I respond by denying the consequence. For it is, says Scotus, a fallacy of figure of speech, because what is as it were common is changed into this particular thing, that is, what is singular or personal. For in the premises, "this God" is taken in common, for God considered in Himself. And in the consequent, "Father" and "Son" are taken personally.

Question 7: Whether there are three relative existences in God

Existence is the actuality of a being, by which any being is said to exist in act when it exists in fact in the nature of things. But it is asked in this question whether any person of God has an existence proper to Himself by which He exists in act. Such existences, if granted, ought to be called relative, insofar as they belong to persons constituted by relations.

CONCLUSION

There are three relative existences, each one of which belongs to each person.

The reason for this is that any person, as distinct from the divine essence, exists in act. But He cannot exist except through relative existence, because the existence by which God exists is one thing, and the existences by which the persons exist are another. Therefore

there will be three relative existences really distinct. Moreover, a relation in creatures has its proper existence formally distinct from the existence of its subject. Therefore, all the more in divine things any relation has an existence distinct from the existence of the essence. And this is what Augustine says (On the Trinity 7.4): "It is one thing to be God; it is another to be the Father."

OBJECTION 1. The Fathers say that there is only one being in God, and thus not three, and consequently not three existences. I respond that the Fathers should be understood to be speaking of the primary and fundamental being, namely the being of the essence. For since there is only one essence, there is only one fundamental being, which is the root of all things which are in God. Therefore, it should not be said that there are multiple beings simply speaking in God, but it should always be added: multiple relative and personal beings, lest there be a danger of error, and lest from this it be gathered that there are multiple essences in God.

OBJECTION 2. If there are three existences in God, there will be three durations. For duration is nothing other than permanence or continuation of existence. But if there are three durations, there will be three eternities. For interminable duration is eternity. And if there are three eternities, there will be three eternal ones - against Athanasius saying, "The Father is eternal, the Son is eternal, the Holy Spirit is eternal, etc. Nevertheless, they are not three eternals." I respond that there are not three durations, nor three eternities. For although any person endures or remains in existence, nevertheless the persons endure through eternity, which is absolute and the same, and consequently is not multiplied. And so they should not be said to be three eternals, although they can be said to be three eternal persons, just as the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are not said to be three Gods, although they can be said to be three divine persons.

OBJECTION 3. If there were three relative existences distinct from the existence of the essence, this would be because the relative existences are incommunicable, and the existence of the essence is absolute and communicable. But this reason is not sufficient, for diverse modes of existing do not constitute diverse existences, as is apparent from the human nature in the Word, which does not have another existence than it would have in its proper suppositum. Therefore, diverse modes of existing do not make diverse existences. I respond that they do not make diverse existences when those diverse modes are found in a single entity, as is apparent in human nature, which had the same existence in the Word that it would have had in its proper suppositum. But when diverse entities are found, their existences are diverse, as in the case at hand, where the entity of the essence is one thing, the entity of the persons another, since the persons involve a diverse formality from the formality of the essence. And so the existences of the persons and of the essence will be diverse.

OBJECTION 4. If there are three existences in God, there will be three essences in Him, because existence is nothing other than actual essence. I respond that there are not three essences taken in the strict sense, because by essence we understand the first absolute principle from which flow all things which are in divine things. Nevertheless, they can be said to be three relative quiddities. For the quiddity or formal nature of paternity is one thing, that of filiation another, that of passive spiration another. Therefore, when it is said that existence is actual essence - that is, it is an actual entity, whether it is properly called an essence or

not. You will say: If there were three relative existences, there would be four, because there is still one absolute existence. I respond by denying the consequence, because those three relative existences are really identified with the absolute existence. And so they do not make a quaternity, since for number a formal distinction does not suffice, but a real distinction is required.

Question 8: Whether there are three relative subsistences in God

As we said, existence is the actuality of a being by which a being exists in act. But subsistence is as it were a mode of existence by benefit of which something exists through itself. This mode belongs to substances, which are defined as beings subsisting through themselves. Therefore, existence is as it were something common to subsistence and inherence. For whatever is in act either exists through itself, that is, independently of a subject, and then it is said to have subsistence, which is a mode of existing of a substance, or it exists in another, and then it has inherence, which is a mode of existing of accidents. Furthermore, subsistence or existence through itself is taken in two ways: First, as it is opposed to inherence, and in this way every substance subsists through itself, whether it is incomplete, as a soul, or complete, as a man, or supposed, as Peter, or not supposed, as the humanity of Christ, which did not have its proper suppositum. Second, it is taken as it says the most perfect and independent existence from another as sustaining, in which way it belongs only either to a substantial suppositum or to some nature which most perfectly exists before it is in a suppositum. And this is the divine nature alone, which before it is understood to be in the divine persons, most perfectly exists and independently of them. But the human nature in Christ did not have this subsistence, because it depends on the suppositum of the Word as sustaining. For it is the Word which sustains it. Finally, subsistence, as also existence, is twofold: one absolute and communicable, by which, for example, the divine nature as prescinded from the persons most perfectly exists and subsists; the other incommunicable, which belongs to the persons, since they exist and subsist incommunicably.

CONCLUSION

There are three subsistences in God.

For the Second Council of Constantinople anathematizes those who do not confess that one essence of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit is to be adored in three subsistences. Thus also the Third Council of Constantinople determines that the Deity is known in three subsistences and three subsistences in the Deity. The reason for this is that relative subsistence, hypostasis, and person are one and the same thing. But there are three persons in God. Therefore, there are also three subsistences. Furthermore, the humanity of Christ was assumed by the subsistence of the Word, which terminated the human nature.

But the subsistence of the Father did not terminate it, although the subsistence of the Son did. Therefore, the subsistence of the Father is one thing, that of the Son another, etc.

You will object: If there are three relative subsistences, any person will have two subsistences, namely a relative one and an absolute one - an absolute one by reason of the divine nature, and a relative one by reason of the person. I respond that both are true. For the Father, for example, has an absolute subsistence insofar as He is God, and a relative subsistence insofar as He is the Father. But it is not repugnant for there to be two subsistences in the same thing diversely considered, especially when the subsistences are of diverse nature, as in the case at hand.

OBJECTION 2. Therefore, the same person has two terminations, just as it has two subsistences. I respond that there are indeed two terminations, but of a different genus. For any person through absolute subsistence terminates the divine essence according to its absolute and communicable being, and through relative subsistence terminates the same divine essence according to its incommunicable, personal, and relative being.

OBJECTION 3. To subsist bespeaks perfection. But a relation is not perfect. Therefore, it does not subsist. I distinguish the antecedent: absolute and communicable subsistence (I concede), relative subsistence (I deny). You will say: supposita through essence have being. Therefore, they also have subsistence. I distinguish: they have absolute being (I concede), incommunicable and relative being (I deny). You will say: the divine nature subsists by absolute subsistence. Therefore, it does not need relative subsistences. Therefore, they are not given. I respond: it does not need relative subsistences in order to be perfected by them (I concede), on account of the exigency of the nature (I deny). For any nature requires to be supposed and to exist in a person. And so it requires personal subsistence, although it is not perfected by it.

Question 9: Are there in God one absolute Existence and one absolute Subsistence?

We said that each person in themselves is formally different from being an actual being, for it is something and not nothing; and so each person has relative existence. Also each person is substantial; therefore they subsist per se; and so there are also three relative subsistences in the divine. But whether beyond those relative existences and subsistences there is given an absolute existence and absolute subsistence, is the question.

CONCLUSION

There are posited absolute existence and subsistence in God.

For God, as God, most perfectly exists and subsists; for in the first instant in which the divine essence is understood, it is a being per se, and of itself actually existing singularly, before it is in the divine supposita [persons]. Which does not belong to created nature; because no created nature has complete being before it exists in a supposit [person]. Therefore in that instant the divine nature pre-understood to the persons exists by absolute existence. In that prior sign it also subsists, because it exists per se, which is to subsist; and so there is in God absolute subsistence. But that absolute existence and subsistence belong to the three persons; since the existing and subsisting essence belongs to them.

Objection 1: God is not triune per se, but through relations; therefore he does not exist per se, but through relations. Response: by denying the consequence; because God as God, and without relations, does not have whence he would be triune; but he has whence he exists; because as such, he is most actual being. Therefore although he is not triune except through the persons, nevertheless he exists per se without the persons. You will say, subsistence is the same as hypostasis; but there is not given an absolute hypostasis; for it is the same as person. Therefore there is not given an absolute subsistence. Response: incommunicable subsistence is the same as hypostasis and person; but communicable subsistence differs greatly from person and hypostasis.

Objection 2: God exists in supposita [persons]; therefore he exists through the existences of the supposita; therefore no precisely absolute existence belongs to him. Response: by denying the consequence; since the entity of the essence is not the entity of the persons; the essence therefore does not exist through the existence of the supposita, but through its own existence, although the existence of the essence is in the supposita. You will say, therefore there are four existents in God, if there are four existences. Response: there are not four existences, nor four existents; because the three relative existences are really identified with the absolute existence; and the three relative existents, namely the three persons, are really identified with the absolute existent, namely with God. But number does not coalesce, except from really distinct things; and so there will not be four existences, nor four existents.

Objection 3: If beyond the relative existences and subsistences there were some absolute existent and subsistent, as God considered in himself; actions could belong to such an absolute existent and subsistent, which is false; because actions are of supposita [persons]. Therefore there is not given an absolute existent, nor an absolute existence. Response: actions in God are either essential or notional; essential ones belong to God, both ad intra and ad extra. But notional ones do not belong except to the persons, as for example, to generate and to spirare. I said that essential actions belong to God, as God is; for in that instant in which he is presupposed to the persons, God understands himself, and loves himself; and these are actions, which we sometimes called operative. Also actions ad extra can belong to God, as God is; for if God impossibly were without persons, he would no less produce creatures; because the production of creatures happens through an essential volition which is in God, as God is. But if actions are said to be of supposita; this is of supposita, or of singulars behaving as supposita; whence although God, as God is, is not a supposit; nevertheless because he is of himself most singular without the persons, therefore actions can belong to him.

Objection 4: The notional actions through which the persons are produced are presupposed to the actions ad extra; and so God precisely from the persons cannot act ad extra.

Response: the notional actions are indeed presupposed by reason of their necessity, and as if per accidens, insofar as he produces necessarily ad intra, and freely ad extra; whence he cannot produce ad extra, without having produced ad intra before. Nevertheless absolutely they are not presupposed; for if impossibly there were no production ad intra, God would no less produce ad extra. But if creatures are attributed to the three persons, this is, as if per accidens; insofar as creatures are produced through an essential volition, which is in the three persons.

Question 10: Whether in God there are three Substances.

It can be said that in God being and all transcendentals relatively taken are multiplied; and considered absolutely remain one; and so there are many beings in God, many things, many somewhats, many trues and goods relative; and there is one being, one thing, one somewhat, one true and good absolute. For each relation, as distinct from the essence, is a being, a thing, etc.; and so since there are many relations in God, there are many beings relatively taken. However, beware lest you say that in God there are many beings without qualification or many things, etc.; but always add relatively. There can also be said to be in the divine three hypostases, and in fact there must be said to be; just as there are three subsistences, and relative existences. Nevertheless do not say that there are three relative essences, or natures, or divinities. But whether there are three substances, it will be answered with explanation.

CONCLUSION.

If substance is taken for the essence or nature of a thing, as Aristotle used it when saying that univocal things are those whose substance (i.e. nature or essence) is the same, then there should not be said to be three substances in God. If secondly it is taken as the name substance comes from "standing under" accidents, then there are neither three nor one in God. If thirdly it is taken for that which subsists per se, then there can be said to be three substances in God.

The reason for the first is that there is only one nature in God, therefore only one substance, taking substance for essence. The reason for the second is that God does not stand under accidents, therefore there is no such substance in him. This is how Augustine should be understood when he says in *On the Trinity* 7.5 that God is called substance abusively. The reason for the third is that the three persons are three really distinct beings; but they are not three accidents, therefore they are three substances, since they are three beings, each of which subsists per se and has its own relative subsistence, as we said in the preceding conclusion. Hence Boethius defines person as an individual substance of an intellectual nature. Since therefore there are three persons, there are also three substances. In this

sense Augustine says in *On the Trinity* 7.6 that it can be admitted that there are three substances; and Hilary in his book *On the Synods* affirms that he attended a certain Synod where it was expressly admitted that there are three substances. However, do not simply say that there are three substances; but always add that there are three relative substances.

Question 9: Which beings are multiplied in God, and which are not.

Of the predicates which are in God, some are absolute and formally infinite, such as essence, intrinsic modes, and attributes; others are not formally infinite, but only identically, by reason of the subject in which they are, such as the divine relations, which precisely considered as such are neither finite nor infinite formally, although they are infinite insofar as they are in God.

CONCLUSION.

Absolute predicates which are formally infinite are not multiplied; but only relative predicates are.

The reason for the first part is that an infinite being communicates itself without multiplying itself; and so although divinity, infinity, and immensity are communicated to the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, nevertheless they are not multiplied. Hence there should not be said to be three Gods, or three infinites, or three eternals or immense beings; but one God, one immense, and eternal. The reason for the second part is that relative predicates are not formally infinite; therefore when they are communicated, they are multiplied; for they are communicated with their own division. And so there can be said to be three persons, three relations, three subsistences, etc.

OBJECTION: The three persons are eternal; therefore in them there are three eternities; therefore eternity, which is an absolute and infinite predicate, is multiplied.

Resp. The three persons are eternal; but by the same eternity which is numerically one in them; and so eternity is not multiplied. Just as, although the three persons are divine, nevertheless divinity is not multiplied; rather, it remains numerically the same and undivided. Moreover, although the three persons are called eternal adjectively, nevertheless they should not be called three eternal beings substantively, but one eternal; just as they are not three immense beings. This will be clear from the following two rules.

The first rule is that, for the multiplication of substantive names, a multiplication of forms is required; since therefore divinity, immensity, and eternity are not multiplied in the persons (indeed it is the same divinity, immensity, and eternity which is in the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit), there should not substantively be said to be three Gods, three eternals, or three immense beings.

The second rule is that, for the multiplication of adjective names, a multiplication of forms is not required; but a multiplication of supposita suffices. Therefore the three persons can be called divine adjectivally, because although divinity is not multiplied in them, nevertheless the supposita in which divinity itself is multiplied. From which it is clear that Athanasius rightly says: "The Father is eternal, the Son is eternal, the Holy Spirit is eternal; and yet they are not three eternals, but one eternal."

CHAPTER 3. On the Divine Productions.

Since we have said that in God there are three persons, one of whom is unproduced (namely, the Father) and the others produced (namely, the Word and the Holy Spirit), we therefore rightly add a chapter on the divine productions in general to the chapter on the divine persons in general.

Question 1: Whether there is production in God.

These names—production, procession, origin, and emanation—are taken for the same thing. For one and the same action, insofar as it is the act of a producing principle, is called production; but insofar as it is as it were the way to the term, it is called procession, origin, and emanation. So production is the action by which the producer produces the term; but procession is as it were the issuing of the same term from its principle.

Procession is twofold: transient, by which the term issues from the principle or cause to something outside, as heating, which is the procession of heat passing from fire into wood; and immanent, whose term remains within its principle, as the production of a mental word is an immanent procession, because the mental word produced resides in the producing intellect.

Immanent production is twofold: physical and metaphysical. Physical is that by which one thing proceeds from another through change, dependence, and diversity of nature; so our mental word issues from the intellect through physical production, because it proceeds with change, since it passes from non-being to being; with dependence, because it could be produced or not produced; finally, it proceeds with diversity of nature, because the intellect is a substance and the mental word an accident.

Metaphysical production is the production of a term, or the emanation of one thing from another, setting aside all change, dependence, and diversity of nature, and retaining only these two respects: from which another, and which [is] from another. For the producing intellect has this respect, from which another; for the Word is from it. But the Word has this respect, which [is] from another, because it is from the producing intellect.

CONCLUSION.

There is true production or procession in God—immanent and metaphysical.

The first part is proved from John 8, where the Son says, "I came forth from God"; and from John 14, where it is said of the Holy Spirit, "who proceeds from the Father." This is confirmed by the authority of the Fathers and the Council of Nicea and St. Athanasius. This conclusion cannot be proved by natural reason; otherwise the mystery of the Trinity would be knowable naturally, which is false. Nevertheless, Scotus, supposing faith, persuades it by this discourse: When something is of itself a productive principle, wherever that is, there is a productive principle; but the intellect having an actually intelligible object present to it is of itself a productive principle of a begotten knowledge. Therefore, wherever there is found an intellect having an actually intelligible object present to it, in it there will be a productive principle of a begotten knowledge. But in God there is an intellect having an actually intelligible object present to it, namely the divine essence. Therefore the intellect in God will be a productive principle of a begotten knowledge; and not of just any sort, but one adequate to itself, because every productive principle, when it is infinite, can produce a term adequate to itself. But no knowledge is adequate to the fecund memory of the producing divine person, unless it is infinite knowledge. Therefore the fecund memory of the producing person will be productive of infinite begotten knowledge; therefore it will be productive of a subsisting person, because nothing infinite can exist in another; therefore, finally, it will be productive of a divine person, because everything that is infinite is divine. And so it is concluded that there is procession through the intellect in God. The same can be said of the will, which, having the essence present to it actually and as supremely lovable, can produce an infinite subsisting love with respect to it.

Parts 2 and 3 are proved, that the production in God is immanent and metaphysical. First, it is immanent, because the divine processions are acts of the intellect and will, which are immanent powers whose acts remain within the power.

Second, it is proved that it is metaphysical. First, it is without change, because the Word did not pass from non-being to being, but rather is begotten from eternity, before the morning star. Second, it proceeds without dependence, because the Father could not fail to produce it. Hence the Father should not be called the maker or cause of the Word, but only the principle. Third, it proceeds without diversity of nature, for the Son says, "I and the Father are one."

OBJECTION: If it is clear from Scotus's discourse that the intellect is productive of a begotten knowledge, then, since the intellect is in the Son, the Son therefore has a productive principle and so can produce.

Response: This should be understood with the limitation that wherever the intellect is, there is the principle of begotten knowledge where the intellect does not already have an adequate term. But when the intellect is in the Son, it already has an adequate term, namely the Son

himself. And so the Son should not be said to have a productive principle of begotten knowledge.

OBJECTION 2: The intellect as it is in God, as God, already has its adequate term, namely essential knowledge. Therefore, since it is in the Father, it cannot have a term, and so in the Father there will not be production.

Response: The intellect as it is in God has an adequate term as operative, I concede; as productive, I deny. Therefore, although God as God has essential knowledge, which represents to him everything intelligible, nevertheless he can still have a notional term of his intellect, namely the Word, which is begotten knowledge. You may say, the intellect produces in order to be perfected; therefore the divine intellect does not produce. The antecedent is true when the intellect produces out of want; but the intellect of the Father produces out of fecundity.

OBJECTION: If there were production in God, there would be producer and produced; but if there were producer and produced, the producer would be the cause and the produced the effect; but effect implies dependence, therefore there should not be production in God.

Response: In God there are producer and produced, but not cause and effect; for the Father is the principle of the Son, not the cause. You may insist: a cause is what gives being to another; but a principle gives being to another, namely to what is principled; therefore a principle is a cause. Response: a principle and a cause give being to another, but in different ways; for a cause gives being to another distinct in nature, but a principle only gives being to another, whether that to which it gives being is other in nature or not. But in God the Son is not other in nature from the Father; therefore he is a principle, not a cause. For Aristotle defines cause as "that on which something else follows," where by "something else" a distinction in nature is denoted. You may say, production is action; but action is the causality of an efficient cause; therefore, if in God there is action and production, there will also be causality, and so the Father will be a cause. Response: physical action is the causality of an efficient cause; but metaphysical action is not the causality of an efficient cause. But in the case at hand, production is action, but only metaphysical, not physical, as we have said.

OBJECTION against the second part: The produced person does not remain in the producer, because it is really distinct from it; therefore the production by which it is produced is not immanent. Response: Deny the antecedent. For although the produced is really distinct from the producer, nevertheless one is in the other through circumcession and by reason of the divine nature which is numerically the same in the producer and in the produced, which does not prevent real distinction. For real distinction makes it so that one person is not another; it does not, however, prevent one from being in the other.

Question 2: How many productions there are in God.

After we have resolved that there is production in God, we must now move on to the number of productions. Here therefore we ask how many productions there are in God. This question is understood either of productions of the same genus, whether there are several

generations or several spirations; or of productions of diverse rationale, whether there are several productions in God of which one is generation and the other spiration. If we say that generation and spiration are of diverse rationale, we do not say however that they are of diverse generic or specific rationale, because it is wrong to assert genus or species in God; but they are said to be of diverse formal rationale. For generation and spiration differ more than individually, more than two generations; therefore they differ formally, because the formal rationale of generation is one thing, of spiration another.

FIRST CONCLUSION.

There are two productions in God, by the first of which the Word is produced, and by the second the Holy Spirit.

John speaks of the former in chapter 8: "I came forth from God"; of the latter the Nicene Creed, saying of the Holy Spirit, "who proceeds from the Father and the Son." The reason for the conclusion is that there are as many productions in God as there are productive principles; but there are two, namely the intellect and the will; therefore there are also two productions of diverse rationale, because the intellect produces naturally and the will freely. Nor can these two principles be reduced to some third, because there cannot be found any principle which is productive both in the mode of nature and in the mode of freedom; otherwise opposite modes of producing would belong to one and the same principle.

OBJECTION 1: What is the first principle cannot proceed from another; but the Son and the Holy Spirit are the first principle, because they are God; therefore they cannot proceed from another. Response: What is the first principle both *ad intra* and *ad extra* cannot be produced by another; but what is the first principle only *ad extra* and not *ad intra* can be produced. But the Word and the Holy Spirit are the first principle only *ad extra* and not *ad intra*; therefore they can proceed from another. You may say, one production suffices for producing everything producible in God, otherwise it would be imperfect and finite; therefore there are not two. Response: One does not suffice, because it is repugnant that the intellect produce the Holy Spirit; yet it is not for that reason imperfect, because it produces whatever it can produce in its own genus.

OBJECTION 2: Of one nature there is only one mode of producing; but in God there is only one nature; therefore also only one mode of producing. Response: The major is understood of created things, where production or generation is through nature, and so there is only one mode of producing; but not of uncreated things, where the productions occur through intellectual powers. Since therefore there are two intellectual powers in God, there will also be two modes of producing. You may say, there is only one term in God; therefore there is one production. The antecedent is proved, because the formal term of divine production is the divine essence. Response: The term in God is twofold, namely communicated and produced; the essence is indeed the formal communicated term, because it is communicated to the Son through generation and to the Holy Spirit through spiration, but there are two produced terms, namely the Son and the Holy Spirit.

SECOND CONCLUSION.

There are only two productions in God.

For if there were more than two, they would either be of diverse rationale or of the same. If they were of diverse rationale, beyond generation and spiration there would be given another production, which is not possible; for there are only two productive powers, namely the intellect which generates and the will which spirates. Therefore beyond generation and spiration there cannot be given another production of diverse rationale. But if there were several productions of the same rationale beyond two, there would be several generations and several spirations, which is false. For there cannot be found a twofold generation where the first has an adequate term exhausting the generative power; but the first generation by which the Father generates the Son is adequate to the Father himself, and the Son produced exhausts the whole power of generating of the Father, because the Son is infinite. Therefore beyond the first, a second cannot be given. Moreover, the Father remains in continuous producing and permanently produces the Son.

The same is to be said of spiration, which is necessarily only one in the Father and the Son, because the term produced through spiration, namely the Holy Spirit, exhausts the whole spirative power which is in the Father and the Son, and so beyond the Holy Spirit no other person can be spirated. And this is what Augustine says, speaking of the Son: "Generation would be immoderate if the begotten Son were to beget a grandson for the Father; because the grandson himself would be called imperfect unless he were to beget a great-grandson for his own grandfather."

OBJECTION 1: Nature as nature is a productive principle; therefore there are three productive principles in God, namely nature, intellect, and will; therefore there are three productions of diverse rationale. Response: Nature taken separately is not the principle of production *ad intra*, but with the intellect and will, so that the Father, knowing the essence through the intellect, produces the Son. And so the essence is a productive principle, but an inadequate one; for it concurs in the production of the Word as object. You may say, power and goodness are productive principles. *Ad extra*, I concede; *ad intra*, I deny. You may say, the same principle can have several terms of diverse rationale; therefore we conclude badly from the duality of principles to the duality of productions. The antecedent is proved, because the divine intellect has as its terms essential knowledge, which belongs to it as God, and begotten knowledge, which belongs to it as Father; but those terms are of diverse rationale. Response: The same principle can have several terms of which one is produced and the other unproduced, I concede; several produced terms, I deny. But essential knowledge is indeed a term of the divine intellect, but unproduced and founded in simple rootedness; but begotten knowledge is a produced term. You may say, our intellect can have several produced terms, e.g., several mental words; therefore also the divine intellect, whose intellect is no less fecund. Response: Deny the parity; for the term of our intellect is not adequate to the power, and so, one having been produced, it can produce another act. It is not so with God, who understands all things by one act and loves all things by one act; and so of one power there is only one term.

OBJECTION 2: The Son and the Holy Spirit can generate just as much as the Father, and spirate, because they have the formal productive principle, namely the intellect and the will; and so there will be several generations and spirations. Response: Deny the antecedent, because they have exhausted productive principles which already have their produced term. For the fecund intellect is in the Father alone, and the fecund will in the Father and the Son alone; but the intellect is exhausted in the Son, because it has an adequate term, just as the will in the Holy Spirit. You may say, although the soul of Christ has a vision of God adequate to itself, it nevertheless still has a vision of creatures; also, although God has a vision of the essence adequate to himself, he no less has a vision of creatures outside himself. Therefore the adequacy of the term does not prevent the power from producing another term. Response: The divine intellect has one adequate vision which is both of the essence and of creatures known in the essence, and so it does not have two visions. To the soul of Christ, I say that its vision is adequate in the genus of beatific vision, but not in the genus of vision simply, unless it sees the divine essence and creatures by the same vision.

OBJECTION 3: If the term of generation is adequate, especially because the Word is infinite, that is false, because the persons are neither finite nor infinite; therefore, the Word having been produced, the Father can produce another Word. Response: The divine persons are neither formally finite nor infinite, perfect nor imperfect; but they are both infinite and perfect by the nature in which they are. Hence since the divine nature in which they are is infinite, the persons are therefore infinite identically. That the relations of themselves are not perfect or imperfect is clear, because similarity, for example, is not perfect or imperfect except by reason of its foundation, so that if the similarity is in virtue it is perfect, if it is in vice it is imperfect. You may say, paternity is from the essence; therefore there are three processions. Response: It is from the essence by rootedness, as the intellect from God, I concede; by true production, I deny; otherwise there would be a real distinction between the essence and paternity. For the producer and the produced are really distinct.

Question 3: From what the divine processions are.

Durandus affirmed, though undeservedly, that the divine productions, namely generation and spiration, are immediately from the divine essence, so that it itself is their immediate principle, so much so that, formally prescinding the intellect and will and the divine essence alone remaining, we should understand the essence still to be the immediate principle of the divine Word and the Holy Spirit. Hence according to him it should be said that the Word is not produced through the intellect, nor the Holy Spirit through the will, but each is precisely through the divine essence.

CONCLUSION.

The divine processions are acts of the intellect and will.

This conclusion is common among all and is proved from Scripture, in which the Son is called the Word, and the Holy Spirit love and gift. But the Word is immediately produced through the intellect, and love or gift through the will; therefore their processions are acts of the intellect and will.

Besides, if the generation of the Son and the spiration of the Holy Spirit were immediately from the divine essence, there would be no distinction between generation and spiration, since each would be through nature as it is nature, and so there would be no reason why the production of the Son would be generation and the production of the Holy Spirit spiration; indeed there would be given no cause why the Son would be called Son and the Holy Spirit Holy Spirit, for they would be from the same principle, namely from the divine nature.

OBJECTION: The generation of the Son is called by Augustine a work of nature; therefore it is produced through nature. The antecedent is proved by the example of an animal, which is immediately produced by nature. **Response:** It is called a work of nature not because nature itself is its immediate principle, but because the principle from which it proceeds formally is a natural power, since in this the intellect and will are distinguished, that the intellect is a natural power and the will a free power. It can also be said that the generation of the Son is a work of nature radically, because the intellect by which it is immediately produced is rooted in nature; but not formally. To what is said about an animal, it must be responded that an animal is not produced immediately by nature, but by the power of generating, which since it is none in God besides the intellect, the generation of the Son is therefore attributed to the intellect formally.

You may say: The Word is not produced through intellection, because intellection is an essential act, and the Word is something notional; therefore it is not produced through the intellect. **Response:** It is not produced through intellection, for the reason given, but through diction, which is a notional act of the intellect, as will be clear in what follows.

Question 4: How the will becomes the principle of communicating nature.

There's no doubt that the intellect is the principle by which the Father communicates his nature to the Son. The intellect's role is to produce something similar to itself in nature. But since the will is not a natural faculty, but rather a free one whose job isn't to make something similar to itself in nature, there can be difficulty with God's will - how it is the principle by which the Father and Son communicate their nature to the Holy Spirit.

CONCLUSION

The will, as will, is not the principle of communicating nature or making what is produced similar to itself. That belongs to the intellect. But the will is the principle of communicating

nature insofar as it is formally infinite and its object is infinite. Because the will is infinite and its object infinite, together they constitute the productive principle of formally infinite love. If only one of them were infinite and the other finite, the love arising from them would be finite, since an effect follows the weaker part of its cause. So that conceptual love produced is formally infinite. And whatever is infinite is God himself. Therefore, whatever is produced through an infinite will and infinite object is God. So the will, by reason of its infinity, is the principle of communicating the divine nature.

We shouldn't say the same about God's intellect. It communicates nature not only by reason of its infinity but also by its proper mode of producing. For a mental word is similar to the intellect in this way: the receptive intellect only produces a mental word or expressed likeness by means of the impressed likeness by which it is informed. So the expressed likeness is similar to the intellect informed by the impressed likeness. And so the intellect, as intellect, produces something identical in nature, apart from any consideration of its infinity. The will only has this by reason of its infinity, as something divine.

This is confirmed because whatever is produced in God is God himself. But in God the will produces a conceptual act. Therefore that act is God, and so similar to the producer as identical in nature.

Question 5: Whether the intellect and will alone are the intrinsic principles of the divine productions.

Having said in the preceding that the divine productions are acts of intellect and will, it follows that intellect and will are the principles by which those productions occur. But here we ask whether the intellect alone is the intrinsic principle of the generation of the Word, and the will alone the intrinsic principle of the spiration of the Holy Spirit - especially since God's essence concurs in these productions.

CONCLUSION

The intellect considered just in itself is not the complete intrinsic principle of the generation of the Word, but rather the intellect along with the essence. Likewise the will as such is not the complete principle of the Holy Spirit, but together with God's essence.

So the intellect and essence, as two partial principles, constitute one immediate total intrinsic principle of the procession of the Son. Likewise the will and essence constitute one total intrinsic principle of the Holy Spirit.

For since the Word is begotten knowledge, that knowledge must be produced from a power and an object. So the intellect is required as the power, and the essence as the object, so

that from those inadequate principles one adequate principle is made. The same must be said about the Holy Spirit. For the Holy Spirit is produced love. But for the production of love, a loving power is required, namely the will, and a lovable object, namely the essence.

Objection: If God's essence were an intrinsic principle of the Son and Holy Spirit, the Son and Holy Spirit would be really distinct from the essence, because there is a real distinction between a principle and what it principally produces. Response: There are two kinds of principles - that which (quod) and that by which (quo). The principle quod is the producing person; the principle quo is that by which the principle quod produces. And so the principle quod of the Son is the Father, and the principle quo is God's intellect and essence. That said, I say that although the essence is the principle quo of the Son, it is not really distinct from him. So when it is said that a principle and what it principally produces are really distinct, I distinguish: the principle quod, I concede; the principle quo, I deny.

Question 6: Which actions are the processions of the divine persons.

You will say there are two actions of the divine intellect, namely understanding and speaking, and likewise two of the will, namely love and spiration.

The first act of the divine intellect is operational and belongs to God as such. For God as God, insofar as he abstracts from the persons, is understanding and willing. And so he has essential understanding and willing. The second act is productive and belongs to the Father as Father, who in speaking produces his Son. Those two acts are not really distinct, for in God there is only one act of intellect. But they are formally distinct. For the same act is not simultaneously operative and productive, otherwise it would be both productive of a term and non-productive. A productive act necessarily presupposes an operative one, which is why the Father is first understanding before he is speaking. For every essential perfection lacking relation to creatures is prior to a conceptual one.

The same must be said of the will's two acts. The first, called willing, is operative love belonging to God as God. And so it is essential. But the second, which is spiration, is a productive and conceptual act belonging to the Father and Son as Father and Son. Understanding and speaking are related as including and included. For speaking includes understanding and adds to it the relation of being produced, so that understanding regards the known object and speaking the produced term.

It is not this way with us. For our understanding and speaking are not two subordinate acts but are related as action and the term of the action. For our speaking is the action of our intellect productive of understanding or a mental word as its proper term.

Here we should note for understanding what we will say in the conclusion about the uncreated Word that, according to Scotus, a created word is an act of intelligence produced by a perfect memory, not existing without actual understanding, representing the divine Word.

It is called 1) an act of intelligence, that is, of the actually understanding intellect. 2) Produced by a perfect or fecund memory, that is, by the intellect as informed by an intelligible likeness. 3) Not existing without actual understanding, because when the act of intellect ceases, the word itself ceases. Hence, because our cognition is not everlasting, our word is consequently not everlasting. Finally, 4) representing the divine Word, for just as our memory, that is, our fecund intellect, represents the Father, and our love represents the Holy Spirit, so our word represents the divine Word.

Moreover, it can be added that a word is similar in its nature and by the force of its production to the producer. For when the intellect produces a word, it is informed by an impressed intelligible likeness, and by means of that produces an expressed intelligible likeness, which is entirely similar to the impressed intelligible likeness. And so that expressed likeness, which is a mental word, is produced similar to the intellect as informed by the impressed likeness.

FIRST CONCLUSION

God's Word is not produced through actual understanding, nor consequently is the Holy Spirit produced through willing. Because understanding and willing are essential acts common to the three persons, but conceptual actions are not common.

It is proved thus: If understanding and willing were not essential immanent acts, the Father would not be blessed before he generated the Son, nor would he communicate perfect blessedness to the Son. Both of those are false. For just as the Father is prior to the Son in origin, so he must first have every absolute perfection. For the Father's being in that prior instant is divine being. Therefore it brings with it every perfection, at least absolute perfection, and consequently blessedness.

But if willing were the act by which the Father produces the Holy Spirit, it would follow that in generating the Son he would not be blessed. For blessedness is through an act of will, and an act of will is only in the second instant in which he produces the Holy Spirit. Therefore in the first, in which he produces the Son, he would not be blessed.

It would also follow that he would not communicate perfect blessedness to the Son. For he only communicates to him what he has when he generates him. But in generating him, he would not have perfect blessedness, as we said. Therefore he would not communicate it to him.

So it is better if we say that in the first instant God is conceived as God, and as understanding and willing, and consequently perfectly blessed, since blessedness consists in the essential act of divine cognition and love. Afterwards this God with all his essential attributes is determined to be the Father. And so the Father is perfectly blessed in that

instant before he generates. And consequently when he generates the Son, he communicates to him perfect blessedness and every essential perfection.

SECOND CONCLUSION

God's Word is produced through speaking, formally distinct from understanding.

The first part is proved because since there are only two acts of intellect, namely to understand and to speak, God's Word is produced through the first or the second. But not through the first, namely through understanding, as we said in the preceding conclusion. Therefore what remains is that it is produced through speaking.

The second part is evident, namely that speaking is formally distinct from understanding. For what is prior is formally distinct from what is posterior, and vice versa. But understanding is prior to speaking, and speaking posterior to understanding. Therefore they are formally distinct.

The minor premise is clear, because understanding is essential, which is presupposed for everything conceptual. Therefore it is prior to speaking. Besides, understanding is only an operative act, not a productive one, and speaking is a productive act, not an operative one. Therefore they are formally distinct.

Objection 1: It cannot be conceived how understanding is distinct from speaking, since it cannot happen that God understands without producing understanding, as commonly happens with us. Response: Although we cannot understand without the production of understanding, which is the ultimate perfection of our intellect, the divine intellect has that unproduced understanding rooted in God's essence from itself and through itself, without any production. For it has every perfection, both in the manner of first act and in the manner of second act. So since it has understanding from itself, it must not produce it. Nor should we conceive it as a produced term, but as an unproduced act naturally flowing from the first act, namely from the intellect.

Objection 2: Speaking is a transient action according to Scotus. But the Son is produced through an immanent action. Therefore not through speaking. Response: It is a transient action with respect to the produced term, I concede, because the Word of God is produced through speaking. With respect to a subject matter, I deny, as for instance fire, whose term, namely heat, passes into a subject matter, for instance into a hand, wood, etc.

You will say: Our speaking is productive of a word and of understanding. Therefore also in God. Response: In God it is indeed productive of the Word, not of understanding. For when speaking is understood to be in God, understanding is already present as something essential. Speaking therefore cannot produce understanding, since speaking is posterior to understanding, and what is posterior cannot produce what is prior.

But if Anselm in the Monologion ch. 34 asserts that in God understanding and speaking are the same, I respond: Anselm and certain others did not distinguish these words as exactly as Augustine did. No wonder then if he confused the terms which Augustine distinguished, and as we are distinguishing them at present.

You will say: A power has only one act. Therefore to understand and to speak are only one act of intellect. Response: They are only one real act, but they are two formal acts. For to understand and to speak are not really distinct acts, but only formally distinct.

Moreover, from what we have said about understanding and speaking with respect to the Word, what must be said about willing and the spiration of the Holy Spirit is understood. So we assert that there are two acts of the divine will: one essential and unproduced, which is presupposed for all conceptual acts, namely willing; and the other conceptual and produced, namely spiration. The Holy Spirit is not produced through the first, because persons are not produced through essential attributes, but through the second, namely through spiration. The arguments, objections, and solutions are the same for this part as those we proposed for the production of the Word.

Question 7: What is the distinction between the production of the Son and the Holy Spirit?

This question is so difficult that when St. Augustine was speaking about it to Maximinus, an Arian bishop, he seemed to imply that the difference between the two is inexplicable.

Regarding the Father, he says, the Son is from the Father; the Holy Spirit is from the Father. But the former is begotten, the latter proceeding. Therefore, the former is the Son of the Father, from whom he is begotten, while the latter is the Spirit of both, since he proceeds from both. But who can explain what the difference is between being born and proceeding? You cannot distinguish between that generation and procession - it is beyond me. However, although this is true regarding a clear explanation of this mystery, this does not prevent us from being able to assign some difference between the two, which would be like a guide for conceiving the probability of this mystery. In order to see this distinction:

IT MUST BE NOTED firstly that generation, taken broadly, is understood as the action by which an agent in any way makes the product similar to itself. One kind is equivocal, the other univocal. The first is when the assimilation is only according to genus, or according to some transcendental degree; thus God is called the Father and begetter of all creatures, because creatures are made similar to him in the aspect of being. The second is when the assimilation happens according to the lowest species, as a man generating makes the begotten man similar to himself. Generation properly speaking is defined as the origin of a living being from a living principle, in the likeness of nature. First it is called origin, not action, because action implies change, but origin, as used here, only implies a communication of nature. Second, it is said to be of a living being, to exclude the production of inanimate things. Third, from a living principle, to reject the production of non-living things from living things, like frogs from the sun. Fourth, active is implied, and thus the production of Eve from

Adam is not the generation of Adam, because Adam was only passive. Lastly it is added, in the likeness of specific nature, both because the generation of corruptible things at least is instituted for the preservation of the species, and because since the one generating cannot generate in the likeness of individual nature, consequently it must generate in the likeness of specific nature. By likeness we mean identity, because generation tends toward identity of nature. But if there were some nature which was so perfect that it could generate without division of itself (as is the divine nature), then it would generate not only in identity of specific nature, but in identity of numerical nature. For the completeness of that definition, some, especially Scotists, add "by force of its own procession," so that generation would be the origin of a living being from a living active principle, in identity of nature, by force of its own procession. To understand this:

IT MUST BE NOTED secondly that to be produced similar by force of procession is when the procession by itself, formally, and not by some other extrinsic reason, tends toward that likeness; or it is when the procession happens through a power which from its formal nature is born to make the term similar to itself. But to be produced similar not by force of procession is when the power indeed produces a term similar to itself, but not from its formal nature, rather through some other adjoined and extrinsic reason. Thus an Ethiopian, by force of his own procession, has it that he is an animal, but not that he is black, although these follow each other mutually, because his generation tends per se toward the first likeness, and only accidentally toward the second. Thus when the will produces, it does not intend to produce something else like itself, but only intends to produce an affection by which it is united to another. However, the divine will, because it is divine, has it that it produces a term which is God, but it does not have this as will, but as divine will. And so although the term of the divine will is similar to itself, nevertheless it is not similar by force of its own procession. It is otherwise with the intellect, which in God not only produces a term similar to itself because it is divine, but also because it is intellect, whose property is to make the term similar to itself. For as we have said, the intellect informed by an impressed species produces an expressed species entirely similar to the intellect informed by the impressed species. But if it does not produce an expressed species entirely similar to the intellect, since the intellect is a substance and the expressed species an accident, this is because the intelligible impressed species by which it is informed is an accident, and so it must only produce an accident, for the effect follows the weaker part. But the divine intellect produces a Word substantially similar to itself, because all the things which concur in its production are substantial, namely the intellect which produces, and the essence which takes the place of the impressed species.

CONCLUSION.

The procession of the Son and of the Holy Spirit differ in this, that the former is a generation, the latter is not. And therefore the former is a generation, the latter is not, because through the first a term similar by force of its own procession is produced, but not through the second.

It is proven that the procession of the Son is a generation: Psalm 2, "You are my son, today I have begotten you"; Isaiah 53, "Who shall declare his generation?" It is also clear that the production of the Holy Spirit is not a generation, from St. Athanasius, who speaking of him, said that he was not made, nor created, nor begotten. Then in the Creed, Christ is called "only-begotten": "And in Jesus Christ, his only begotten Son." And John 3, "God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son." Therefore, if Christ, who is the Son of God, is only-begotten, then the Holy Spirit is not begotten. The reason for both parts is: because generation is production by way of nature; but the Son is produced by way of nature, because he is produced through the intellect, which is a natural power; therefore his procession is a generation. But the Holy Spirit is produced through the will, which from its nature has it that it produces freely - if not with a freedom of contrariety or contradiction, at least an essential freedom, which consists in this, that the producing principle determines itself to act by way of choice and delight.

IT IS CONFIRMED that the procession of the Son is a generation, but not that of the Holy Spirit, because the former produces a term similar to itself by force of its own procession, the latter does not. For an act of the intellect has the nature of an image and likeness representing its object, which is its principle. But an act of the will does not have the nature of an image and likeness. Therefore, the production which happens through the intellect is called a generation for this reason, that by force of its own procession it produces a term similar to itself; but the procession of the Holy Spirit does not.

OBJECTION: The Holy Spirit is just as similar to the Father in divinity as the Son is; therefore, the procession of the Holy Spirit is just as much a generation as the procession of the Son. The antecedent is proven: because the Holy Spirit is God just as the Father is; therefore, he is similar to the one producing. The consequence is proven: because the reason why the Son is begotten is that he is produced in the likeness of nature; therefore, the Holy Spirit is also begotten, because he is produced similar to the Father in divine nature. I respond by distinguishing the antecedent: the Holy Spirit is just as similar to the Father as the Son is - by reason of the infinity of the divine will, I concede; by force of his own procession, I deny. It is indeed clear that the Holy Spirit is similar to the Father in divinity, but he is not similar by force of his own procession, because he proceeds through the will, which as will is not born to produce a term similar to itself, but it has this from its divinity and infinity. For since the divine will which produces the Holy Spirit is infinite, it cannot fail to produce an infinite term; therefore it cannot fail to produce a term which is God. But because it does not do this as it is will, therefore it does not produce a term similar to itself by force of its own procession. It is otherwise with the intellect, because not only as it is divine and infinite, but as intellect, it is born to produce a term similar to the object and to itself, insofar as it is informed by an impressed species, as we have said. But although the divine intellect is not informed by an impressed species, nevertheless it is as if informed by the object, or the divine essence, which takes the place of the impressed species, and so it produces a term which is similar in nature to the producer by force of procession.

SECOND OBJECTION: To what we have said, that the Son is only-begotten. In Romans 8, Paul calls the Son of God "firstborn"; therefore, he is not only-begotten. I respond that he is called firstborn negatively, insofar as it is denied that he had preceding brothers, whether or not he had following ones. He is not called firstborn positively, for firstborn positively denies

earlier ones and affirms later ones. Then, it can be said that he had later brothers, but by adoption.

Chapter 4: On divine relations.

Question 1: Are there real relations in God?

Relations in God either concern certain persons or all persons. If they concern all persons, they are called common relations, such as identity, similarity, and equality. If they concern only certain persons, they are called proper relations or relations of origin, such as paternity, filiation, active spiration, and passive spiration. These are called proper relations because they belong only to some persons. And they are called relations of origin because they involve the origination of one person from another. Here we will discuss the proper relations, and later the common ones.

CONCLUSION.

The four relations of origin - Paternity, Filiation, active Spiration, and passive Spiration - are real.

This is proved first because the Father and Son are really distinct by paternity and filiation. Similarly, the Spirator and Holy Spirit are really distinct by active and passive spiration. Therefore, Paternity, Filiation, active Spiration and passive Spiration are real relations, for a real distinction is not made through beings of reason. Secondly, those relations are real whose extremes, foundations, and reasons for founding are real. But the extremes of these relations, namely the persons, are real and really distinct. The foundations are also real, namely the generative and spirative powers. Finally, the reasons for founding, namely generation and spiration, are real. Therefore those relations are real.

Someone may object: Real relations presuppose really distinct extremes. But paternity and filiation do not presuppose really distinct extremes; rather they distinguish the persons. Therefore they are not real.

I respond: The major premise is true of created relations, but not of divine ones. For created relations presuppose really distinct extremes, because they are accidents which presuppose subjects in which they inhere. But divine relations are not accidents but substances. Thus they do not presuppose subjects in which they inhere; rather, they cause those subjects to be really distinct from each other. If the Fathers say that the relation of the Holy Spirit to the

Father and Son is not reciprocal, but real in the Holy Spirit and only rational in the Father and Son, I respond that this is true if the Holy Spirit is referred to the Father and Son as Father and Son. For the Holy Spirit is not referred to them as such. But it is reciprocal and real if the Holy Spirit is referred to the Father and Son as they are one spirator.

Question 2: How are the divine relations distinguished from the essence?

There are many opinions on this question. Some say they are distinguished only by reason, not in reality or even virtually, such as Gregory and Vázquez. Others say only virtually, like most Thomists. Others say they are really actually distinct. Finally, others say they are formally actually distinct, and this is the view of our Doctor [Scotus], as we said when discussing the attributes. We explain this formal actual distinction by saying that God is indeed one most simple reality in which all perfections are contained in the most unified way. Yet in that reality itself, there are various formal aspects independent of the intellect, according to which that most singular reality is and is called now essence, now goodness, now paternity, now filiation, etc.

CONCLUSION.

Relations are not really distinguished from the essence, but they are formally distinguished.

The first part is an article of faith, defined by Lateran Council IV under Innocent III, chapter "We condemn," saying that the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are one and the same reality. The second part is proved from Augustine, *On the Trinity* 7.2: "It is not Word by which it is wisdom"; for Word is said notionally, wisdom essentially. And in 7.5: "It is not Word by which it is God, nor is it God by which it is Father." From this it is clear that paternity is formally distinguished from deity by the nature of the thing. The reason is that the divine essence in the Father is an entity communicable by its nature apart from the work of the intellect, while paternity in the same [Father] is an entity *per se* incommunicable. Therefore they are formally distinguished in reality. Moreover, paternity formally constitutes the Father and distinguishes him from the Son. But if paternity were formally the essence, the essence would formally constitute the Father and formally distinguish him from the Son, which is absurd.

Someone may object: If there were a formal distinction between the essence and the relations, God would not be one, nor simple, nor infinite. I respond by denying all of these. First, a formal distinction does not remove unity, which cannot be removed except by a multiplication of things, not of formalities, because a multiplicity of formalities is not sufficient for [real] number. Second, a formal distinction does not remove simplicity. For Augustine says (*The Trinity* 11.10), "God is simple because he does not have something in such a way

that he can lose it, or because there is not one thing having and another thing had, like a vessel and liquid." Therefore [God] is no less simple by the positing of formally distinct [aspects], because distinct formal aspects coalesce into one, not through union and composition opposed to simplicity, but through identity alone, since one is not the actuality and the other the potentiality. Third, such a formal distinction does not remove infinity, because although infinity is the reason for identifying, and although the infinite identifies other things to itself, this is true really but not formally. For the infinite does not confuse or destroy the formal aspects of things. See what we said when discussing the distinction of the attributes from the essence and from each other.

Question 3: How are the relations of origin distinguished from each other?

It is clear to everyone that there are four relations of origin in God: namely, Paternity, Filiation, active Spiration, and passive Spiration. That the first three are in God is clear, because they are constitutive of the three persons: paternity of the Father, filiation of the Son, passive spiration of the Holy Spirit. That there is also active spiration is not doubted, since there is passive spiration in the Holy Spirit, to which an active [spiration] in the Father and Son must correspond. Nevertheless there is no quaternity in God, even though there are four relations of origin, because quaternity expresses a plurality of four really distinct [items], just as trinity expresses a plurality of three really distinct [items]. But when we say there are four relations in God, we are not thereby affirming that they are all really distinct, because active spiration is distinguished only formally from the Father and Son. Of these relations of origin, some are opposed, such as paternity and filiation, active and passive spiration. Others are disparate, such as paternity and active spiration, filiation and active spiration. The former are incompossible in the same supposit, but not the latter.

FIRST CONCLUSION.

Opposed relations of origin are really distinguished, such as paternity and filiation, active and passive spiration.

First, because the persons are really distinguished, but they are not distinguished except by such relations. Therefore those relations are also really distinguished from each other. Second, because those relations are opposed to each other. Therefore, since they are real, they are really opposed. But real opposition presupposes a real distinction. Therefore they are really distinguished. Third, because three conditions are required for a real distinction, any one of which is sufficient: namely, that one can exist without the other, or that one is originating and the other originated, or finally that they are in diverse supposita. But those relations are in diverse supposita, for example, paternity in the Father, filiation in the Son, active spiration in both, and passive spiration in the Holy Spirit. Therefore those relations are really distinguished.

Someone may object: In God there is no real distinction except according to origin, that is, except between those of which one is originated by the other. But one relation is not originated by the other; for example, filiation is not originated by paternity. Therefore there is no real distinction between them.

I respond to the minor [premise] that one relation is originated by the other, not indeed in the abstract, but in the concrete. For example, filiation is not originated by paternity, but it is originated by the Father, who as Father gives being to the Son, and thus originates filiation.

Someone else may object: Whatever are the same as one third thing are the same as each other. But the relations of origin are really the same as the divine essence, because it is true to say, "Paternity is the essence" and "Filiation is the essence." Therefore they are really the same as each other.

I respond that this axiom is true when the third thing is not infinite, and false when it is infinite. But in the present case that third thing, namely the divine essence, is infinite. Therefore it is no wonder if the relations in the essence are really one, but really distinct from each other. For the relations considered without the essence are no longer infinite. Therefore they do not have that by which they are identified.

SECOND CONCLUSION.

Generation and active spiration, and likewise filiation, are only formally distinct in the concrete, but really [distinct] in the abstract.

Thus it is true to say in the concrete, "The Father is the Spirator," "The Son is the Spirator," but false to say in the abstract, "Active spiration is paternity," or "filiation." This is proved [as follows]. The whole reason why some things are identified in God is infinity. But generation and active spiration, like filiation in the abstract, have no infinity. Therefore they do not have that by which they are really identified in the abstract. But in the concrete they connote the divine essence, which is formally infinite (for each person is constituted from the essence and relation). Therefore by reason of the connoted essence, which is formally infinite, the aforementioned relations are identified in the concrete.

Question 4: Do the relations of origin express perfection simply speaking?

That is, are the relations considered according to themselves, or according to their proper relative entity, and as prescinded from the essence, infinite and perfect? For it is clear that they are identically infinite and perfect by reason of the divine essence with which they are identified. But in order that the question may be more easily understood, it should be known that the infinite is twofold: intensive and extensive. The extensive infinite is that which is

extended to more things infinitely, such as an infinite multitude, if it were given. The intensive infinite is that to which no perfection is lacking in the way in which it can be had in some being, that is, either formally, or really, or identically, or eminently, as we said in the chapter on infinity. And in this way infinity is described as the most simple possession of all entity and perfection. Moreover, it should be known that goodness and perfection are twofold: one is entitative, which belongs to a being as it is a being, for any being whatsoever is good and perfect in its genus. The other is gradual, which belongs to such a being as it is such a being. For example, a human having virtue is called good and perfect. Here we are not speaking about the first goodness and perfection, for since the divine relations are beings, they are for that very reason good and perfect entitatively. But [we are speaking] about the second, [asking] whether they have some goodness and perfection besides the perfection of being, which is proper to them.

CONCLUSION.

The relations of origin formally taken are neither perfect nor imperfect, neither finite nor infinite.

This conclusion is common to St. Thomas and Scotus, against Vázquez and others, who say that the divine relations of their very formality express perfection simply speaking, and indeed infinite [perfection], so that paternity is infinitely perfect in the aspect of paternity, and filiation in the aspect of filiation. The first part of the conclusion is proved [as follows]. If a divine relation precisely taken were to express perfection, it would be either finite or infinite. Not finite, because nothing finite can be in God. Not infinite either, because it would follow that there is more perfection in each person than in the essence. For besides the infinite perfection of the essence, the person would still have the infinite perfection of relation. And thus the Father, as Father, would be more perfect than as God. Moreover, it would follow that there is more perfection in all the persons taken together than in each one taken separately, against Augustine, who says, "The Father alone, or the Son alone, or the Holy Spirit alone, is as great as the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit [taken] together" (The Trinity 6.9). The second part [of the conclusion] is proved [as follows]. There cannot be several infinites really distinct. But the relations of origin are really distinct. Therefore they cannot be formally infinite. The major [premise] is proved [as follows]. The infinite really identifies the other to itself. But one relation does not identify to itself the perfection of the other relation, because they are really distinguished from each other. Therefore neither of them is infinite or perfect. Moreover, if there were several infinites really distinct, there would arise from them a greater good than any of them would be separately. Therefore none of them would be infinite, because to the infinite a greater cannot be given. Therefore there are not several infinites really distinct.

[The conclusion] is confirmed, because relations of themselves do not have perfection or imperfection, but take both from the foundation. For if the foundation is perfect, the relation founded in it will be perfect; if imperfect, [the relation will be] imperfect. Similarity, for example, is not formally perfect or imperfect. Indeed, if similarity is founded in vice, it will be imperfect; if in virtue, it will be perfect. Likewise, if the foundation is infinite, the relation will be infinite; if finite, it will be finite. Thus if that which is generated is good, the generation is

good; if evil, [the generation] is evil. If [that which is generated] is infinite, as in divine things, the relation will be infinite; if finite, as in human things, it will be finite. Therefore relations take their perfection or imperfection from the foundation in which they are, just as [they take] their finitude or infinitude. Therefore, if the divine relations are perfect or infinite, they do not have this of themselves, but by reason of the nature in which they are.

Finally, someone may object: The divine attributes are formally infinite. Therefore the relations are too. The consequence is proved [as follows]. The whole reason why the attributes are formally infinite is because they are one with the divine essence. But the relations are also one with the divine essence. Therefore, if they are formally infinite, the relations will also be formally infinite.

I respond by denying the consequence. To the proof, I say that although both the attributes and the relations are one with the divine essence, the relations will not for that reason be formally infinite, as the attributes are. For the attributes have the capacity to receive formal infinity, and the relations have only the capacity to receive identical perfection and infinity. For although the essence in itself is formally infinite, and is the root and origin by which the others which flow from it are infinite, this nevertheless happens in diverse ways, according to the diverse capacity of those [others]. Thus, because the attributes are capable of formal infinity, they have it from the essence. But because the relations are only capable of identical infinity, they will be only identically infinite. But if you ask why the attributes are capable of formal infinity but the relations are not, I respond: because they [attributes] are communicable and common to the three persons and not really distinct. Thus, from their infinity, there do not follow all the absurdities which we saw following in the proof of the conclusion from the formal infinity of relations, which are incommunicable and really distinct. Because of this they cannot have formal infinity.

Question 5: Whether the divine persons are constituted by relations.

There are MANY opinions of theologians on this, the first of which was that of Praepositivus, saying that it should not be asked by what the persons are constituted and distinguished, since they are constituted and distinguished by themselves, as they are primarily diverse and agree in nothing.

The second is that of Linconiensis, who asserts that the divine persons are constituted by absolute properties.

The third is that of St. Thomas, saying they are constituted by relations - not insofar as they are relations, but insofar as they are hypostatic or characteristic forms. For he wants a relation to say two things: namely, to be per se and in itself, and to be toward another. By the first, he says the persons are constituted, not by the second.

Praepositivus is easily refuted, because the divine persons are not primarily diverse, for they agree in something and are distinguished in another - they agree in essence and differ in the nature of personhood. Therefore, since they are not distinguished wholly, nor constituted, it is not pointlessly asked by what they are constituted or distinguished.

As for Linconiensis, he is also to be refuted, because the nature of each divine person is relative. For the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are something relative. Therefore they cannot be constituted in personal being by absolute properties.

For this reason we do not follow the opinion of St. Thomas, because he wants the hypostatic forms to be in themselves and through themselves. Therefore they are absolute, and so cannot constitute the Father, Son and Holy Spirit. For the Father is not in himself, but is toward the Son; the Son also is toward the Father; and the Holy Spirit toward both. But what our opinion is, the CONCLUSION will assert.

CONCLUSION

Each divine PERSON is constituted from the divine essence and a personal property which is relative. And this is to say the persons are constituted adequately through relations.

That each person is constituted from the divine essence and personal property is clear, because it is the condition of anything constituted, that it has one proper and formal constitutive by which it is ultimately constituted in its proper being. For example, man is constituted in common being through animal, in which he agrees with brute. But he is constituted in his proper being through rational, as through a peculiar constitutive, through which he is distinguished from brute and properly made man. So by parity, in the case at hand, each person has the divine essence as a common constitutive, through which it is constituted in divine being; and it has besides a personal relation, through which it is constituted in the being of such a person, and distinguished from another. For example, the first person is distinguished from the second through paternity, the second through filiation, the third through passive spiration.

The second part is PROVED, that the personal constitutive property of each person is relative, not absolute. First, because Scripture always expresses the persons in relative names, as in Matthew: "Baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit." But according to Dionysius, in chapter 1 of On the Divine Names, we must not dare say anything about the supersubstantial and hidden divinity beyond what is expressed in the sacred words.

Secondly, because the Council of Toledo holds in the confession of faith, that the persons indicate number only by this, that they are toward one another. Through which it is clear that they are only distinguished and constituted through relation alone.

Thirdly, because the Fathers subscribe to this view:

- Boethius: "Substance contains unity, but relation multiplies Trinity."
- St. Augustine: "The persons are in no way said in themselves." And so they are not constituted in personal being through something absolute, but through relation.
- St. Anselm in On the Incarnation chapter 3 says: "All things in God are the same, where opposition of relation does not prevent it." Therefore relations alone make the persons distinct, and consequently the persons are constituted through personal properties which are relative.

It is CONFIRMED, because whatever is absolute in God is some perfection simply. But no personal property is a perfection simply. Therefore the personal property constituting a person is not absolute but relative.

The minor is proved, if a personal property were a perfection simply, it would follow that there would be some perfection in the Father, namely paternity, which would not be in the Son. It would also follow that the Holy Spirit would not be as perfect as the Father and Son, because the Father would have two perfections, namely paternity and active spiration; and the Son filiation and the same spiration; whereas the Holy Spirit would have only passive spiration. Therefore, to remove this absurdity, it must be said that a personal property is not absolute, nor a perfection simply, but relative.

Besides, everything absolute in God is formally infinite. But no personal property is formally infinite. Therefore neither is it absolute.

The minor is proved, if a personal property were formally infinite, two absurdities would follow:

First, that each person would be deprived of something formally infinite, and so would not be infinite. For example, the Father would lack filiation, and the Son paternity, which would be formally infinite.

Second, that paternity in the abstract ought to identify really with itself filiation. For the infinite really identifies with itself another, and so paternity and filiation would not remain really distinct, nor the Father and Son.

Therefore a personal property is not formally infinite. Finally, the constitutive principle is the same as the distinctive, as is clear with man, who is distinguished from brute through rational, and through the same rational is constituted in the being of man. But the relative properties adequately distinguish the persons, for the Son is distinguished from the Holy Spirit through filiation. Therefore the persons are constituted in personal being through relations.

OBJECTION 1. The Fathers asserting that innascibility distinguishes the Father from the Son. Therefore it also constitutes, because as I said before, the constitutive principle is the same as the distinctive. But innascibility is an absolute property. Therefore the persons are constituted through absolute properties.

RESPONSE. It is not sufficiently clear whether innascibility is an absolute or relative property. But I say that innascibility is not a constitutive property, nor distinctive, because a constitutive must be positive, just as the thing constituted is positive. But if the Fathers say that innascibility distinguishes, this is true secondarily, not primarily, because positives always precede negatives. And so paternity, since it is something positive, distinguishes the Father from the Son prior to innascibility.

OBJECTION 2. Every relation presupposes an absolute which is related through it, as is clear with similarity, which presupposes two white walls before they are similar. Paternity also presupposes Socrates to be a man before it refers him to a son. Therefore relations in God presuppose the persons which are related through them. Therefore they do not constitute them.

RESPONSE. The major is true in created relations, which since they are accidents, presuppose an absolute subject in which they are and which they relate. But it is false in divine relations, where the relations, since they are subsistent, do not presuppose subjects in which they are, but themselves constitute them.

Nor should you say "A relation refers a supposit, therefore it does not constitute it." For this is false of divine relations, which constitute the persons and refer them, such that by constituting they refer, and by referring they constitute.

OBJECTION 3. Every real relation requires really distinct extremes. But the relations which are between the divine persons are real. Therefore they suppose the persons to be really distinct, and so do not distinguish, nor consequently constitute them.

The antecedent is proved, because a relation is a habitude of one to another. Therefore it presupposes one to be distinguished from the other.

RESPONSE. That a real relation supposes real extremes and really distinct ones, or makes them really distinct, such that a relation which does not have one of these conditions is not real. A created relation supposes really distinct extremes, because it is an accident, and an accident supposes a subject to which it inheres. But a divine relation is substantial, and so does not suppose really distinct extremes, but distinguishes them.

To the proof I say that for a relation to be a habitude of one to another, it suffices if the extremes are distinct either before the relation, as in created things, or through it, as in divine things.

OBJECTION 4. From Scotus, every relation is terminated at an absolute. But paternity is terminated at the Son, and filiation at the Father, and passive spiration at the Father and Son, just as active spiration is terminated at the Holy Spirit. Therefore the three persons are something absolute. Therefore they are constituted by absolute properties.

RESPONSE. Scotus is speaking of created relations, for when he says that no relative is referred primarily to a correlative, he later interprets himself saying this is understood of definable relations, which the divine relations are not.

But if it is also understood of divine relations, such that he says the divine relations are terminated at an absolute, I say this is true of the formal and inadequate and secondary term, namely the divine essence - not of the primary and adequate term which is a person. So the divine relations are terminated at an absolute as at the fundamental reason for terminating, though not as at the primary term. For example, divine paternity has two terms: one primary which is the Son, and this is relative; the other secondary, namely the essence of the Son, which is absolute.

OBJECTION 5. An originating person is prior to an originated one. But a relative is not prior to its correlative. Therefore the divine persons, one of whom is originating and the other originated, are not relatives.

RESPONSE. An originating one is prior to an originated one - in origin, I concede; in time or nature, I deny. To the minor, a relative is not prior to a correlative - in nature or time, I concede, and this is what the Philosopher says, that relatives are simultaneous in nature; in origin, I deny.

You will say, the term of generation is not a relation, but something absolute, to which a relation comes from the generation, as is clear from Aristotle saying that there is no motion, nor consequently generation, to a "toward something." Therefore the persons who are generated are not relatives, nor consequently constituted through relation.

RESPONSE. These things are true in created things, where relations are not substantial, as they are in God. Therefore, since there is motion and generation to substance, the divine persons can consequently be generated, even though they are relatives.

OBJECTION 6. Paternity and generation are the same. But the Father is not constituted through generation. Therefore neither through paternity.

The minor is proved - acting presupposes being. Therefore generation presupposes the Father, and so does not constitute him.

RESPONSE. I deny the minor. To the proof I say - acting presupposes being in created things, where action is an accident, I concede, because then it requires a subject; in divine things, I deny. As if heating, for example, constituted fire in the nature of fire, just as it constitutes it in the genus of heating; heating for that time would not suppose fire, but would constitute it.

If someone insists, saying that generation is the action of a supposit, and so requires a supposit, it must be responded that it is the action of a supposit because it constitutes the supposit, and is as if elicited by the supposit; nevertheless constituting the supposit itself.

OBJECTION 7. Acting presupposes being able to act. Therefore it supposes a person who is able to act. Therefore it does not constitute that person.

RESPONSE. That incommunicable acting and being able to act are the same in God. Whence generation does not presuppose being able to act incommunicably, since it constitutes that.

RESPONSE 2. That a person is indeed constituted in the nature of such a person through a relation, for example the Father through paternity, the Son through filiation, and the Holy Spirit through passive spiration. However, there are other natures in the persons which constitute them as distinct persons.

Whence it can be said, for example, that the Father is constituted in the being of first person through the first incommunicable subsistence, to which the divine nature is determined per se and immediately, just as human nature was determined per se to the person of Adam.

But because that first person in the second instant generates the Son, then he is constituted in the being of Father, and this through paternity. Therefore when it is said "generation presupposes being," it can be responded thus: it presupposes the being of a person, I concede, because in some instant, at least of nature, the Father is a person before he generates; it presupposes such a person, that is, the Father, I deny, because the Father is not the Father except through generation.

You will press - therefore we say badly that the relations constitute the persons.

RESPONSE. I deny it, because they constitute the persons in ultimate, formal and adequate being of such a person, though they do not constitute in the being of a person simply. For the Father is not a person through paternity, but through incommunicable existence. However, he is such a person, or the Father, through paternity.

You will say, if a person is relative, its production is not generation, because generation is to substance, not to relation.

RESPONSE. Generation is no less to substance, because the adequate term of generation is a divine supposit, which is substantial. But a relation is only an inadequate term.

Question 6: Whether the common relations are real in God.

St. Thomas denies it, Scotus affirms it. The reason for the first is because, he says, for a real relation the foundation must be multiplied in the extremes. For example, for there to be similarity between two walls, there must be two whitenesses - one in one wall, the other in the other. And therefore, because in God the essence is numerically one as the foundation of these relations, therefore, since it is not multiplied, he affirms that the relation of identity is not real, just as the others are not, but only of reason, because he says the same would be referred to itself.

But Scotus, who does not require such a multiplication of the foundation, holds that they are real.

CONCLUSION.

The aforesaid relations are real. So Scotus.

It is proved, because for a real relation only three things are required:

First, a real foundation and real term.

Second, really distinct extremes.

Third, that the relation follow from the nature of the foundation and terms without an operation of the intellect.

But all these are present in the common relations. Therefore they are real.

The minor is proved - for the foundation is real, namely the essence and attributes; the term is also real, namely a person. Next, the extremes are really distinguished, namely the persons. And finally, those relations issue from the nature of the thing. For when active generation is posited in the Father and passive in the Son, the relations of paternity and filiation immediately result. Therefore those relations are real.

It is proved secondly. If anything prevents those relations from being real, it is the unity of the foundation, as St. Thomas wants. But the unity of the foundation does not prevent the reality of such relations. Therefore, even though the foundation is numerically one, those relations are real.

The minor is proved by a threefold reason:

First, because the foundations themselves are not referred, but the extremes. For two whitenesses are not similar to each other, but two walls are similar by reason of whiteness. Therefore St. Thomas says in vain that the same is referred to itself, because it is not the foundation which is referred, although it is the reason for referring, but the extremes are referred, which are really distinct.

Second, because the more unity the foundation has, the more perfect the relation is. For there is greater identity where the nature is one in species than where it is one in genus. Therefore there will be greater identity where it is numerically one, as in God, than where it is one in species. Therefore the unity of the foundation does not take away the reality of the relation, but rather renders it more perfect.

Third, because if a multiplication of the foundation were necessary in the extremes for a real relation, the relations of origin in God would not be real, because their foundation is the intellect and will, which are not multiplied in the divine persons.

It is proved thirdly. The foundation of identity, similarity and equality is not the foundation insofar as it is multiplied. Therefore when it is not multiplied, it is equally the foundation of real relations.

The consequence is clear, and the antecedent is proved, because the aforesaid relations are founded on the unity of the foundation. For equality is of those whose quantity is one, and so on for the others. But it does not have unity insofar as it is multiplied, because one and many are opposites. Therefore the foundation is not the foundation insofar as it is multiplied.

Therefore, even though the essence, magnitude and attributes are not multiplied in God, the relations of identity, equality and similarity will nevertheless be real. For if, for example, God had placed the same numerical whiteness in two walls, those walls would be similar to each other and that similarity would be real, even though the foundation would not be multiplied in that supposition.

OBJECTION 1. If the foundation were not multiplied in the extremes, it would follow that the same would be referred to itself, for the foundation is the reason for referring.

RESPONSE. I deny the consequence, because since the foundation is the reason for referring, not that which is referred, even though the foundation is numerically one in the extremes, nevertheless the same is not referred to itself, since indeed it is the extremes which are referred to each other, and which are really distinct, as we said of the walls which would have the same numerical whiteness. In such a supposition, the same would not be referred to itself; rather, those which would be referred, namely those two walls, would be really distinct, and consequently the relation which would be between these extremes would always remain real, even though the foundation would not be multiplied.

You will say, the foundations are not only the reason for referring, but are sometimes themselves referred, as is clear, because not only are two white walls similar, but also two whitenesses are similar. Therefore if the foundation is not multiple, the relation will not be real, because for that time the same would be referred to itself.

RESPONSE. That indeed the foundations are sometimes referred, as in the example given, and then they must be multiplied; but sometimes they are not referred, but are only the reason for referring, and then the foundation need not be multiplied. But in the case at hand, we do not say that the foundations are referred; for we do not assert that the essence of the Father is similar, or the same as, or equal to the essence of the Son, for then the same would be referred to itself. But we say that the Father, who is one extreme, is similar to the Son, who is the other, even though the foundation of that similarity is numerically one in these extremes.

Nor should anyone say that the extremes of relations must be opposed, and are not opposed except through the multiplication of the foundation, for this is false, because the persons are indeed relatively opposed, even though the foundation is not multiplied.

OBJECTION. All theologians say there are only four real relations in God, which are paternity, filiation, active spiration, and passive spiration. Therefore identity, equality, and similarity, according to them, are not real.

RESPONSE. The theologians admit only four real relations when speaking of the proper relations and relations of origin. However, there are more when including both the common relations and the proper ones.

You will say, if these common relations are real, they constitute and distinguish the persons, just as the relations of origin do, which is against everyone.

RESPONSE. That they do not constitute nor distinguish the persons, because they presuppose that they are already constituted through the relations of origin.

You will say, if equality were a real relation, it would consequently be a real relation between the attributes, because they are equal, since they are infinite.

RESPONSE. I deny the consequence, because the divine attributes are not really distinct, and for a real relation it is required that the extremes be really distinguished.

You will say, from Scotus, equality is a perfection simply. But a real relation is not a perfection simply. Therefore equality is not a real relation.

RESPONSE. That equality is a perfection simply if taken fundamentally, for the essence, magnitude, and attributes. But if identity, equality, and similarity are taken formally, they are not perfections simply. For a relation formally taken is not perfect or imperfect.

Chapter 5: on the divine persons specifically, and first on the Father.

Question 1: Whether the name "Father" properly applies to the first person.

The name "Father" in divine matters is taken essentially in relation to what is external and notionally in relation to what is internal. If taken essentially, He is called the Father generally of all creatures, which He produces and conserves, and more specially of Angels and men, whom beyond conservation and creation He adopts as sons through grace, and constitutes as heirs through glory. And the name "Father" taken in this way applies to the three persons; for each person creates, conserves, justifies and glorifies. By reason of this paternity, we say daily, "Our Father who art in heaven." The name "Father" taken notionally in relation to what is internal applies to the first person who produces the Son from His own substance. The name "Father" in the first sense is taken broadly; for in order to properly be a Father, one must produce from one's own substance; whence God is not properly the Father of Angels or men, nor is the Holy Spirit the Father of Christ.

CONCLUSION.

The name "Father" taken notionally applies to the first person, and to Him alone.

This conclusion is an article of faith; and its reason is, because the first person generates and produces into an identity of nature by the force of procession; He alone also produces in such a way. Therefore the name "Father" applies to the first person, and to Him alone.

Whence although the Son produces the Holy Spirit with the Father, yet because He does not produce by generating, but by spirating, therefore He ought not to be called Father. Here it must be known, that although the name "Father" can be taken essentially and notionally; yet primarily and principally it has a personal signification. And so although it can be said of the Son, that He is essentially Father with respect to creatures; yet He ought not to be called Father without qualification, but Father of creatures; because an analogous term is always taken for the more worthy analogue. And the paternity which is internal, is more noble than the paternity which is external, since paternity taken essentially respects creatures alone; but taken notionally it respects the person produced, namely the Son, who is infinitely more excellent than any creature.

OBJECTION: Paternity in itself, as it is common to essential and personal paternity, is univocal; therefore it was falsely said to be analogous. I respond that it is rather equivocal than univocal; because personal paternity is a real and physical relation; but essential paternity is logical and rational; for it posits nothing real in God, as we said in q. 2 on immutability. But it is clear that real being and rational being do not have between themselves any but an equivocal communication.

Question 2: Whether the name "principle" applies to the first person.

What has been said about the name "Father" must also be said about the name "principle"; namely that it can be taken essentially and notionally. The name "principle" taken essentially expresses a respect to creatures, and accordingly belongs to the three persons indivisibly; for they themselves have produced all created things. Whence they can be called the principle of creatures; since external works are undivided. The name "principle" taken notionally, applies to God internally, not as He is God, but as He is person. Here we ask, whether the name "principle" so taken applies to the Father alone, or can also be attributed to the Son, who indeed is the principle of the Holy Spirit.

CONCLUSION.

The name "principle" applies to the first person; yet it is not so proper to Him, that it cannot be attributed to the Son, although it belongs more principally to the Father.

This conclusion has three parts, of which the first is proved: By principle is meant that from which something or someone is; but the Son or Holy Spirit are from the Father. Therefore the Father is the principle of the Son and Holy Spirit. Further: Whatever produces another, either is its principle or its cause; but the Father produces the Son, and is not His cause. Therefore He is His principle. The second part is proved by the same reason; because both the Father and the Son produce the Holy Spirit. Therefore the term "principle" is common to the Father and Son. The third part is proved, because the Father alone is the principle without principle; the Father alone is producing, and entirely unproduced; the Father alone finally is the principle of the whole divinity, as Augustine calls Him in bk. 4 On the Trinity ch. 20, Athanasius, Dionysius, the Councils of Toledo in the confession of faith, and Florence in the letters of union, last session. But the Son is the principle from a principle; the Son is not unproduced, the Son finally is not the fount and origin of the whole divinity, although He is the origin of the divinity communicated to the Holy Spirit. Therefore the name "principle" belongs more principally to the Father.

OBJECTION: against what we said, that the Father is the principle of the divinity. If the Father were the principle of the divinity, the divinity would be distinguished really from the Father, and moreover would be produced; but this is false, because the divinity is really the same as the Father, and it neither generates nor is generated. Therefore the Father is not the fount of the divinity. I respond firstly that the Father is not the principle of the produced divinity; for it neither produces nor is produced; nor generates nor is generated. Yet He is the principle of the communicated divinity; for the Father by generation communicates the divinity to the Son; and the Father and Son to the Holy Spirit. I respond secondly that when it is said, the Father is the principle of the divinity, here divinity is taken not in the abstract, but in the concrete; not for God in Himself, but for the persons who are God. So that this may be the sense: the Father is the principle of the persons, who are divine, or have divinity.

Question 3: Whether the name "cause" applies to the first person.

Because the Father gives being to the Son, from this some want to infer, that the Father is the cause of the Son, and the Son is the effect of the Father. But we say indeed, that the Father produces the Son, and on account of this is His principle; but we will deny Him to be His cause.

CONCLUSION.

Although the Father with the Son and Holy Spirit can be called the cause of creatures, yet with respect to the Son He cannot be called cause; but rightly principle.

The reason is, because principle is a more general name which denotes all that, from which something is produced, in whatever way it may be produced. But the name "cause" according to the common manner of speaking always includes some real distinction of nature, at least numerical. This is clear from Aristotle saying, a cause is that which influences being in another. But by the substantive name, "another," a diversity of nature is implied. But there is no essential distinction between the producing Father, and the produced Son. Therefore the name "cause" ought not to be attributed to the Father. Further, if the Father were the cause, He would be the efficient cause of the Son, and the Son would be the effect of the Father; but what is effected, passes from non-being to being, which cannot be said of the Son, who is eternal. Therefore the Father is not His cause.

OBJECTION: The Fathers say the Father is the cause of the Son. So Hilary in bk. 4 On the Trinity says, "The same is the cause, why He is God, and why He is wise"; and in bk. 9, "The Son takes His cause from the Father." So Jerome on Ephesians ch. 3 says, "God is the cause of His own substance." So also Augustine in q. 16 of his 83 Questions, "The eternal God is the eternal cause of wisdom."

I respond that here the name "cause" is taken broadly for principle, or for the reason why something is such; but it is not taken properly for cause as that which influences being in another essentially distinct. For in this way the Father is not the cause, nor the Son the effect, according to Athanasius: "Not made, nor created, but begotten."

YOU ASK, whether the Father can be called the author of the Son. I respond affirmatively with Augustine, Hilary and others, who nevertheless explain this manner of speaking, saying, especially Augustine: "If therefore you say the Father is the author of the Son; because the Son is begotten from the Father, and the Father begot the Son; and because the latter is from the former, and not the former from the latter; I avow, and I concede. But if by the name of author you wish to make the Son lesser, and the Father greater, and the Son not of the same substance of which the Father is, I will detest and reject it." Therefore nothing prohibits saying in this sense, that the Father is the author of the Son. But whether the Son can be called the author of the Holy Spirit, St. Thomas denies, saying the name "author" does not apply except to him who has the character of first principle, which does not apply to the Son. But Hilary better calls the Son the author of the Holy Spirit, and says the Holy Spirit is produced from the Father and Son as authors, taking this word adjectively, not substantively, because the spirative power is one and the same in number in the Father and Son. Whence because the form of spiration is not multiplied, the substantive name of author ought not to be multiplied. Nor let anyone say, an author must be superior to the other; for it suffices, that he be his principle.

Question 4: Whether "unbegotten" belongs to the Father.

This name "unbegotten" is taken in many ways: for that which is not created; in which way the Arians usurped it, saying, the Father alone is unbegotten, so that from thence they might make the Son begotten or created. And so it is not a property of the first person, but belongs to each. Secondly, unbegotten is taken for that which is not properly begotten; and so the Holy Spirit can be called unbegotten, because He is truly not begotten. And in such an acceptation, "unbegotten" is the same as "not-Son," if it is permitted to speak in this way. Thirdly, it is taken for that which by no production has being; and taken in this way, it belongs to the Father alone.

CONCLUSION. Unbegotten taken in the third way, for that which in no way is produced, belongs to the Father as His property.

So Augustine in bk. 15 On the Trinity ch. 26 saying, "The Father alone is not from another; therefore He alone is called unbegotten." It is also the teaching of all the doctors, calling the Father alone unbegotten and unoriginated, against the Sabellians asserting the Father to have been born from the Virgin Mary. The reason is clear; because the Son is produced through generation, and the Holy Spirit through spiration. Therefore the Father alone is unproduced, and so unbegotten. But if the doctors reject the name "unbegotten" from the person of the Father, as Athanasius who in his Epistle on the Decrees of the Nicene Synod near the end, writes: "the heretics took that term from the pagans, so that they might more easily hide their frauds": as also Basil who in bk. 1 Against Eunomius, says: "in the term 'unbegotten' there lies hidden some blasphemy": as also St. Ambrose On the Sacrament of the Incarnation: It must be responded, that the aforementioned doctors do not reject this term simply; for they cannot deny the Father to be unproduced; but they denied the application of the heretics, who sophistically used this term, so that they might gather that God the Father differs essentially from the Son. For thus they concluded: if the Father alone is unbegotten, that is uncreated; therefore the Son and Holy Spirit are created. Therefore they are not of the same substance as the Father; because the same substance cannot be created and uncreated. And accordingly they did not want the Son and Holy Spirit to be God. But such an application of the term "unbegotten" is heretical; and in this sense the cited Fathers rebuked this name, on account of the abuse of heretics. As otherwise the Fathers rejected the name "hypostasis" saying that it was not of good suspicion, although all commonly use it; asserting, that there are three hypostases in the divine. But the reason why they rejected it, was: because the name "hypostasis" among the Greeks signifies substance and person. Whence the Arians wanted to infer, that there were three substances in the divine, because there are three hypostases; and consequently they inferred, that the Son was not consubstantial with the Father. Therefore in these places the Fathers do not reject the names; but only the bad application of them.

OBJECTION 1: Augustine in bk. 5 On the Trinity ch. 6 saying: "unbegotten" is the same as "not begotten"; and "not begotten" is the same as "not Son"; but the Holy Spirit is "not Son". Therefore He is unbegotten, and so the name "unbegotten" does not belong to the Father alone. I respond that Augustine there takes "unbegotten" in the second way, and so it truly

belongs to the Holy Spirit. But we are speaking of "unbegotten" considered in the third way, insofar as it is the same as "unproduced"; and then it belongs to the Father alone.

OBJECTION 2: The divine essence is unbegotten in the third way; because it is not produced. Therefore "unbegotten" does not belong to the Father alone. I respond first that although it is not produced, yet it is communicated; which cannot be said of the Father who is not communicated. And so the essence is not properly unbegotten; for we take "unbegotten" for that which is not begotten, nor communicated, nor produced. I respond secondly that the essence is unbegotten negatively; because to be generated cannot belong to it. But it is not privatively unbegotten, as the Father, to whom to be generated can belong. You will say, The first person is not apt to be generated. Therefore "unbegotten" belongs to Him only negatively, as to the essence. I respond thirdly, He is not apt, as first person; I concede. As person simply, I deny. Further, although the divine essence were unbegotten, nonetheless the Father would no less be called alone unbegotten. For when we call Him unbegotten or unproduced, we are speaking of the Father through comparison to the other persons, who are not unbegotten; but not through comparison to the divine essence.

OBJECTION 3: against what we said that "unbegotten" is a property of the Father. A property expresses a dignity; but to be unbegotten is not a dignity, otherwise the Son and Holy Spirit would lack dignity. I respond with Scotus that the major is true of an absolute or attributive property; as to a relative property, it suffices, he says, that it not express an indignity. You will say, Unbegotten is not a personal property, because it is not relative, for relation is something positive. I respond that "unbegotten" is a negative relative property, as Augustine wants in bk. 3 On the Trinity ch. 7. For as "begotten" is not said with respect to oneself, but that which is from the begetter; so when it is said "unbegotten," not with respect to oneself, but that which is not from a begetter. And so to be unbegotten, is a negative relative property.

Question 5: Whether "unbegotten" is a constitutive property of the Father.

From what we have said, this question seems to be solved; for when we asserted the divine persons to be constituted through relations of origin, from this it is clear, that "unbegotten" is not a constitutive property of the Father; since paternity constitutes Him. However, for the sake of greater explanation, we again propose this little question, to which it will respond negatively.

CONCLUSION. Although "unbegotten" is a property of the Father, yet it is not constitutive; because "unbegotten" formally imports a negation, which cannot constitute a positive thing.

For such must be the constitutive principle, as is the thing constituted; but the thing constituted, namely the Father, is something positive. Therefore His constitutive cannot be

something negative. Further, the three persons would not hold themselves uniformly in the character of personality; for the others would be constituted through positive properties, as the Son through filiation, and the Holy Spirit through passive spiration, and the Father would be constituted through a negative property.

Question 6: Whether the Father generates the Son from His own substance.

In this matter the prepositions "from" and "out of" are taken indifferently, although "from" by the force of its signification imports the consubstantiality of the produced with the producer; in which way we say, the Son is from the Father. But "out of" does not of itself import consubstantiality, because it extends more widely, and expresses only the relation of producer to produced, and vice versa; whether it expresses consubstantiality, in which way it can be said, the Son is out of the Father; or whether it does not express consubstantiality, as when we say, the house is out of the architect, but not from the architect; because the house is not from the substance of the architect. Yet, because in divine matters the origins express the consubstantiality of the produced with the producer, therefore it is permitted to use without distinction the preposition "from" and the preposition "out of".

CONCLUSION.

The Father produces the Son from His own substance.

So Athanasius in the Creed, speaking of Christ, "God is from the substance of the Father, begotten before all ages." So also St. Augustine in his book On Faith to Peter ch. 2, "God the Father begotten from no God, once from His own nature begot His Son." So Damascene, "We affirm the Son God from the very substance of the Father." The reason for this is, because generation is an action by which something is produced from the substance of the one generating. So man generates man, but the sun does not generate a frog; because man produces a son from his own substance, but the sun does not a frog.

OBJECTION 1: There is only one and most simple substance in the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Therefore if the Father generates the Son from His own substance, the Son is generated from His own proper substance, and from the substance of the Holy Spirit. I respond that the Son can indeed be said to be from the substance which is in Himself, and in the Holy Spirit, because it is the same substance in number in the three persons. But it cannot be said, that He is from His own substance or from the substance of the Holy Spirit, because this would denote the Son producing Himself, or the Holy Spirit generating the Son; which is false. Therefore the Son is said to be from the substance of the Father, not from the substance of the Son; because He is from the substance which is in the Father in the first moment of origin, in which moment the Son or Holy Spirit do not yet exist. You will say, Therefore the Son is the Son of the substance of the Father. But if He is the Son of the substance of the Father, He is distinguished really from the substance, which is in the

Father. I respond that the Son is not called the Son of the substance of the Father; because the substance of the Father does not generate the Son. But He is said to be "from the substance"; because the substance is the inadequate principle, by which the Son is generated. But if Augustine calls Him the Son of the substance of the Father, that is, the Son produced from the substance of the Father.

OBJECTION 2: If the Son were from the substance of the Father, He would be from the divine substance. If He were from the divine substance, He would be from the divine essence, because essence and substance are the same. But if He were from the divine essence, the three persons would be from the same essence, which is against Augustine in bk. 7 On the Trinity ch. 6. Scotus responds, the Son can be said to be from the essence of the Father, but not from the divine essence, because to be "from" or "out of" expresses the origination of one from another. But the person of the Son is not originated from the divine essence, and so it must not be said, that the Son is from the essence of God. Yet because He is originated from the Father, He is rightly said to be from the essence and from the substance of the Father.

Question 7: Does the substance of the Father from which the Son is generated have the nature of matter or form? And what do the Arians say, wanting Him to be created?

The Son in divine things is not produced from nothing, because this is repugnant to His divinity, which we have proven. Therefore, He is produced from the substance of the Father. However, whether the substance or essence of the Father takes the place of matter or form is what we are asking. Henry, Durand, and many others teach that the substance is like matter.

CONCLUSION

The substance of the Father from which the Son is generated does not take the place of matter, but in a way of form.

For matter involves potency, and a person is an act. But where there is a union of two things, one of which is potency and the other act, there is composition. And thus each person would be composite. Therefore, the substance of the Father does not take the place of matter, but takes the place of a quasi-form, or rather takes the place of an essential act, which is incommunicably determined through a relation, which is a notional act. Hence, from essence and relation a composite is not made, because each holds itself as act. Theologians confirm this conclusion, asserting that essence is the formal term of generation which is communicated, not indeed that which is produced.

OBJECTION: That is matter which is the subject of generation. But the divine essence is the subject of generation. Therefore it is like matter. The minor premise is proven: what remains under each term is the subject of generation. For example, the matter of wood is the subject of generation, because it remains under the form of wood and under the form of fire. But the divine essence remains in the Father and the Son. Therefore it is the subject of generation.

RESPONSE: I deny the minor premise, because although the divine essence is the foundation of generation, nevertheless it is not the subject. To the proof I say that what remains under each term of generation is the subject of it - I make a distinction: if that generation is a change, I concede. For then the subject remains under privation and form. If generation is not a change, but only a production - I deny, as is the case in the matter at hand, where the divine essence was never under privation, although it remained and remains in the producer and the product. You will say, if essence does not hold itself as matter or potency, and person as act, from both one will come to be per accidens, because they are two acts together.

RESPONSE: This is false when one identifies the other to itself. For then one comes to be through identity, not per accidens. You will say it cannot be understood how essence does not distinguish, and relation distinguishes, unless because essence is like potency, and relation like act.

RESPONSE: It is well understood, because one is an essential act, which does not distinguish (for it is the same in all persons), and the other is a personal act, which distinguishes. You will say relation is a form with respect to a foundation, and a foundation is like matter with respect to relation.

RESPONSE: The name of subject and matter is not found, except when relations are inhering. But in divine things relations are subsisting. Therefore essence cannot be called a subject or matter, although it can be called the foundation of relations.

Question 8: How is the divine essence determined to the Father?

It is clear how the divine essence is determined to the Son and Holy Spirit. For this happens through the intellect and will, because the Father, through the intellect or diction, produces the Word, and communicates to Him the divine essence. The Father also and the Son, through the will or spiration, produce the Holy Spirit, and consequently communicate to Him the divine essence. Therefore the divine essence is communicated to the Son and Holy Spirit mediately. But how it is determined to the Father will be explained.

CONCLUSION.

The divine essence is determined immediately to the first person.

Thus Scotus says in question 4 of the Quodlibets. For just as any nature is determined immediately to one suppositum in which it may subsist (as is clear concerning human nature, which was determined immediately to the person of Adam, and through Adam to his posterity), so the divine nature and essence is determined immediately to the first person, and through the first to the second and third. Therefore the divine essence is not in the Father through production (except taken broadly, i.e., through communication), but demands to be immediately in Him through natural consequence.

OBJECTION 1: If the divine essence is determined to the first suppositum, it cannot be in others, because it is rendered incommunicable through the first person. For the notion of person is to render a nature incommunicable. Therefore, if the divine nature is immediately determined to the first person, it cannot be further communicated, because through the first person it is incommunicable. And what is incommunicable cannot be communicated.

RESPONSE: Through the first person the divine nature is rendered incommunicable immediately - I concede. Nevertheless this does not impede that through the intellect and will it can be communicated, and thus mediately - I deny. To that which they say, the incommunicable cannot be communicated - the same distinction applies: immediately - I concede; mediately - I deny. What is immediately incommunicable cannot be further communicated immediately; nevertheless it can be mediately.

OBJECTION 2: The reason why essence is determined to the first personality is because any intellectual essence of itself brings with it its connatural personality. Therefore, if it is capable of many personalities, as the divine essence is, it will have them immediately. Therefore in divine things no personality will be produced.

RESPONSE: I distinguish the minor premise - if it is immediately capable of them, it brings them with itself - I concede; if it is capable only mediately, it brings them - I deny. But the divine essence is capable only of one personality immediately. Therefore it brings with itself only one, although it can have others mediately, namely through diction and spiration.

YOU WILL ASK what is the difference between proximate and remote potency of generating.

RESPONSE: This is it, that the proximate potency is the intellect with the divine essence as it is determined in the first suppositum. For God as God does not have proximate potency of generating, because He must be in someone who is really distinguished from him who is generated. But only a suppositum in divine things can be really distinguished from another, and not God as God. Therefore God as God does not have proximate potency of generating. And hence that must be in a suppositum which is first, because generation is the first communication which happens in divine things. The remote potency of generating is only the intellect with the divine essence in whatever suppositum it may be found. And thus it can be said that in the Son and Holy Spirit there is remote potency of generating. For if, per impossibile, the Father had not produced the Son, and the Son existed, the Son could

produce Him. However, this remote potency of generating in the Son cannot be reduced to act. Nevertheless it should not be called imperfect, because if it does not produce, this does not proceed from its own imperfection, but arises from the fact that such potency of generating in the Son has its adequate term. And if it could produce, as it is in the Son, from this it would follow that the Son would not be adequate to the potency of generating, and hence not infinite. Therefore, if the Son cannot generate, this does not bespeak imperfection, but argues perfection, namely infinity.

Question 10: Whether the Father produces the Son necessarily and naturally.

IT SHOULD BE NOTED that there are four necessities. The first is of violence, which happens with nature resisting, as when a stone is thrown upwards. The second is the necessity of coaction, which happens with the will resisting, as when someone through the command and impulse of another wills to go into prison. The third is of immutability, by which it happens that the opposite cannot succeed, with determination supposed, although absolutely it could be. By such necessity God necessarily wills to the outside whatever He once willed. For when He willed something for some instant, He cannot will the contrary, otherwise He would be changed. Hence this necessity is called the necessity of immutability. The fourth finally is the necessity of complete inevitability, namely when something is so necessarily that it cannot not be. Thus God loves Himself necessarily, who loves Himself inevitably, as we have said.

IT SHOULD BE NOTED secondly, that this word 'naturally' can be used especially in three ways. First, as it is opposed to supernatural. And thus, one virtue is natural, which we acquire naturally; another supernatural, which is supernaturally infused. Secondly, as it is opposed to what is made by art. Thus elementary water is called natural, whereas rose water is called artificial. Thirdly, as it is opposed to free. Thus fire is said to heat naturally, because it does not heat freely. Some say there is a distinction between being produced naturally, and being produced in the mode of nature. For they say that is produced naturally, which bespeaks a necessary habitude to the producer. And thus the Holy Spirit is produced naturally, because He is produced necessarily by the Father and the Son. But they say that is produced in the mode of nature, which is produced through a natural potency. And thus only the Son, not the Holy Spirit, is produced in the mode of nature.

CONCLUSION

The Father does not generate the Son by necessity of violence, or coaction, or only immutability; but of complete inevitability or indefectibility.

Indeed, He produces Him naturally. The first two parts are clear from the fact that such modes of producing bespeak defect and sadness, which must be kept far from God. The third part is clear: for if the Father were to produce the Son by necessity only of immutability, the Divine Word would not be more necessary than the world, which is produced in this way. The fourth part is gathered from the fact that the Divine Word is an absolutely necessary and indefectible being. Therefore He is produced necessarily, by absolute necessity, because the Father could not not produce Him. Finally, the fifth part is evident, because the Father begot the Son through the intellect, which is a natural principle. Hence generation is called a work of nature. Therefore, since the Son has being through generation, He is produced naturally.

OBJECTION: A necessary agent is imperfect, because it does not have in its power dominion of its action. Therefore the Father does not generate the Son necessarily.

RESPONSE: The antecedent is true of a necessary agent by necessity of dependence, and opposed to freedom; not of an agent by necessity of indefectibility and opposed to contingency and defectibility. For the Son is not produced contingently, nor defectibly. If the Fathers say the Son is not produced by necessity, they are understood to mean necessity of coaction or violence. If they also say that is constrained, which is necessitated in action, they are understood to mean necessity which is sought from an extrinsic efficient or impelling cause. For he who is necessitated by an extrinsic cause is coerced. They are not understood to mean necessity which is sought from the nature of the potency. But when the Father generates the Son, He is not impelled by an extrinsic cause, so that He necessarily generates Him; but from the nature of the intellect, which since it is necessarily fecund, cannot not generate Him.

Question 11: Whether the Father begot the Son by will.

This question allows of a twofold sense: whether He produces by will, as by a principle quo; or whether He produces the Son willingly. If in the first sense, it can still be doubted whether He produces the Son by will concurring to Him, as to the production of creatures; or by will eliciting the production of the Son, as eliciting the production of the Holy Spirit; or finally, by will applying or copulating the parent with the offspring, i.e., the intellect of the Father to the generation of the Word. But if the question is understood in the second sense, three things can be inquired. First, whether in begetting the Son, He willed such begetting. Second, whether after He begot, He still willed it. Third, whether before He begot, He willed that begetting. For although all these things are together in duration, nevertheless certain ones are prior and posterior to others in origin, or by natural consequence.

FIRST CONCLUSION

The Father does not produce the Son by will, as by a productive principle; nor by will, in the way in which He produced creatures.

The first part is proven: The fecund memory, or intellect, is the productive principle of the Son. Therefore not the will. And thus the Son is not produced by will, as by a principle. For any principle of one production must be determined to a single production, and a single term. Therefore, since the Holy Spirit is the adequate term of the will, He alone is produced through the will, not the Son. Besides, if the intellect were to admit with itself the will for the principle of the Son, the intellect would not be a perfect principle. For it would require another potency for the production of its term. For the solution of objections the Fathers are accustomed to be alleged, saying the Father generates the Son by will. But they are speaking of will taken adverbially, i.e., willingly. However they are not understood to mean will taken for a principle quo.

The second part is proven, that He did not produce by will in the way in which [He produced] creatures; against the Arians, who say the Son is a creature, and hence is made in the manner of creatures. It is proven from St. Hilary, book 1 on the Synods, definition 24: "If anyone says the Son of God was made by the will of God, as some creature, let him be anathema." The reason is: because He so willed creatures, that He was able not to will them. But the Father was not able not to will to generate the Son, for He is supremely necessary and absolute; whereas creatures are only necessary by supposition of the divine determination. And consequently He did not beget the Son by will, in the way in which [He produced] creatures.

The Arians object, in Augustine: The Father either begot the Son willing or unwilling. If unwilling, He is miserable. If willing, the Son is not of nature but of will. And thus He is produced by will, as by a principle quo, or in the way in which creatures [are produced].

RESPONSE: The Father begot the Son as He is willing; indeed not by will as principle, nor by deliberative will, or of counsel, as He produced creatures, which He was able not to produce; but by will of complacency. For this natural necessity by which He produced the Son pleased the Father - not violently, nor contingently, but indefectibly and inevitably.

SECOND CONCLUSION

The Father did not beget the Son by will applying the parent with the offspring; but indeed by antecedent, concomitant, and subsequent will.

The first is clear, because the intellect is a natural potency, which from its nature is determined to understanding. Therefore He did not beget by will applying; otherwise the intellect would be at once determined of itself, and determined by another. And hence the will does not copulate the parent with the offspring, i.e., does not determine the intellect, so

that it may produce the Son; but produces Him naturally and determinately. For just as with respect to essential cognition the will does not determine God, as God is, to this - that He may understand; otherwise the operation of the will would precede the cognition of the intellect. Indeed, the essential intellect is determined naturally to understanding. So also the Father with respect to notional intellection is not determined by the will, indeed is determined of Himself, and from the nature of the potency. And thus the will does not apply the parent with the offspring.

The second part is proven, that the Father begot the Son by will both antecedent, and concomitant, and subsequent. For in that instant in which the first person is presupposed, before He generates, He does not have repugnance to generating the Son. Therefore He begot Him by antecedent will. Also when He begets the Son, He does not beget unwillingly, but willingly. Therefore He begot by concomitant will. Finally, after He begot, He does not have sadness from the generation of the Son. Indeed it pleases Him in such generation, according to that of Scripture: "This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased." Therefore He begot Him by subsequent will. Nevertheless attend, that when it is said the Father begot the Son by antecedent, consequent, subsequent will, this is understood of the essential will, which belongs to the Father, as God is. For since the Father is God, He has not only divinity, intellect and will; but He has essential intellection, and such volition. Therefore the Father as God, wills the generation of the Word before it happens, wills it when it happens, and when it has happened; priority and posteriority being taken according to the order of presupposition, but indeed not priority and posteriority of duration. For these are repugnant to God.

Objection to the first part, that although notional volition does not copulate the parent with the offspring, nevertheless essential volition determines the notional intellect of the Father, so that it may produce the Word. Because we have said that essential volition precedes the generation of the Word, since the Father generates the Word by antecedent will.

RESPONSE: Neither notional will, nor essential, conjoins the parent with the offspring. For notional will does not apply the Father, so that He may generate. Because notional will would will before the intellect would understand. From which it would follow that the production of the Holy Spirit would be prior to the generation of the Word. Since the Holy Spirit is produced through volition, and that volition would be before intellection. Nor also does the essential will determine the Father, so that He may produce. Because He produces through the intellect, and the intellect is determined by itself, and not by another.

OBJECTION 2: The intellect is not so determined of itself, that it is not sometimes determined by the will, as is clear concerning ours. For when I do not study, my will can apply the intellect to studying. Therefore also the essential will, which is in God, as God is, can apply the intellect of the Father, so that it may determine itself to the production of the Word, which is to apply the parent with the offspring.

RESPONSE: The antecedent is true in us, who are sometimes indifferent to understanding, or not understanding an object, especially when the object is absent. For then the will can command the intellect, that it may seek the object and understand it. And thus the will in us applies the parent with the offspring. However, not in God. Because the intellect of the Father is not indifferent that it may understand or not understand the divine essence. Nor

also is the essence absent; indeed it is intimately present, and supremely intelligible. Therefore naturally the intellect of the Father is determined to knowing it; and not by the will. Hence although we say the Father produces by antecedent will, nevertheless He does not produce by will copulating the parent with the offspring.

YOU WILL URGE: It cannot be understood why that essential volition precedes, unless that it may determine the Father to generating. Therefore if He begot by antecedent will, He begot also by will applying the parent with the offspring.

RESPONSE: I deny the antecedent. For if the essential volition precedes, this is not that that volition may copulate the parent with the offspring, but on account of the order of actions, where essential and operative precede notional and productive. For essentials precede notinals. Therefore through the essential volition the first person wills, and approves that natural necessity by which His intellect is naturally determined to the production of the Word; although that volition does not determine the intellect.

OBJECTION 3: Against the second part, where it is held that the Father begot the Son by antecedent essential will only. The Father as Father begot willing; otherwise He would have begotten unwilling. Therefore He begot the Son by antecedent notional will. For notional will belongs to the Father, as He is Father.

RESPONSE: The Father as Father did not beget willing, but the Father as God. For if He had begotten the Son willing by notional volition, the notional volition would have preceded intellection. But since notional volition is productive of the Holy Spirit, the Father would have produced the Holy Spirit before He begot the Son. To that which they say, therefore He begot unwillingly - I deny the consequence. Because if He had begotten unwillingly, He would have begotten either against the essential will, or against the notional. He did not beget against the first, because He begot by essential will. Nor also against the notional, because when He begot the Word, there is not yet an act of notional will. And hence He did not beget against notional volition, but beyond it. Because He begot for an instant, for which He had not yet produced notional volition. Hence it is clear that He did not beget unwillingly.

OBJECTION 4: Against the same part. If the Father wills the generation before He generates, from this it follows that the Father wills Himself by nature before He is. Also the Son and Holy Spirit will will themselves, before they are. Since that volition is essential, and common to the three.

RESPONSE: The Father wills Himself before He is, as the Son and Holy Spirit are God; they are not as persons. You will say, if the generation of the Son is willed before it is posited in being, therefore it will also be understood. But what has understood being, before it has real being, has diminished being, and future being. But the generation of the Son must not be future. Therefore neither pre-understood, nor pre-willed.

RESPONSE: Although the generation of the Word is pre-understood and pre-willed, nevertheless it must not be called future. Because that something may be called future, it must have some duration, in which it is not. But the generation of the Word always was. Therefore it must not be called future. But if it is said to be willed before it is, this does not bespeak some instant of duration, in which the Father wills the generation, before it is; but

bespeaks only the order of presupposition of one to the other. Nor let anyone say that if the Father wills the generation, before it is, therefore He has an act of desire about it, as Suarez wills. It is denied. For desire properly taken, is only about an absent thing. But the generation was never absent.

Question 12: Is the Father blessed before he begets?

The reason for doubting this is that the person of the Father is constituted in his own being through active generation, as we have said. From this, it seems that generation must exist in the Father before blessedness, for the constitutive principle is prior in the constituted thing to that which follows in the thing. But blessedness seems to presuppose the Father, for it is the action by which the Father understands and loves. And so it seems that he is blessed before he begets.

CONCLUSION

The Father by nature is blessed before he begets,

because essence and essential things precede notional things, not only when compared among themselves, but also as they are found in the persons. But blessedness is an essential predicate, for it consists in the vision and love of the essence. But generation is a notional predicate, since it is proper to one person. Therefore, blessedness precedes generation, not only as they are compared among themselves, but also as they are in the Father. Therefore, the Father has blessedness before he begets.

This is confirmed. It is rightly said that the Father is God before he begets, because he begets for this reason, that he has the divine intellect with the essence. But when he is God, he has all the essential predicates of divinity and hence blessedness. Therefore, he is blessed before he begets - he is, I say, blessed before by a priority of nature, but not of origin, because the priority of origin is among those things of which one originates from the other; here the Father is prior in origin to the Son. But generation does not originate from blessedness. Therefore, blessedness is not prior in origin to generation, and so the Father is not blessed before in origin than he begets, but he is blessed before by nature, because the priority of nature only says the presupposition of one to the other; but blessedness as something essential is presupposed to generation, as to something notional.

It is objected: in this proposition, "The Father is blessed before he begets," there the Father is supposed either for the Father as he is God, or for the Father as he is Father. If the first, it must not be said that the Father is blessed before he begets, but that God is blessed before generation. The second also must not be said, because the Father is not the Father except through generation. Therefore, the conclusion is false. I respond that there the Father is supposed for the Father not yet adequately constituted, but inadequately constituted through essential things, and further to be adequately constituted through active generation, just as

when it is said, "man is animal before he is rational," there man is taken for that nature constituted through animality, and further to be constituted through rationality. You will say, "Blessedness is an act, but an act presupposes an agent; therefore blessedness presupposes the Father." I respond that blessedness presupposes an agent constituted essentially and inadequately, I concede, namely the Father constituted by essential things; but it does not presuppose an agent adequately constituted.

Question 13: Whether the Father is wise by the begotten wisdom.

Once Augustine held the affirmative, in book 83, question 23. But in book 1 of the Retractions, chapter 23, he drew back from that opinion, saying of the Father and the Son, "At one time I said that he begot the wisdom by which he is called wise; but we better treated this question afterwards in the books on the Trinity." Hence other doctors before and after him rejected this opinion.

CONCLUSION

The Father is not wise by the begotten wisdom;

for wisdom in this proposition is either taken for the essential perfection, and so it is not begotten, and therefore the Father must not be said to be wise by the begotten wisdom, but by the unbegotten wisdom; or it is taken for the Son, who is sometimes called the wisdom of the Father, and so it is false, because the person of the Son is not the form or principle of the Father's being wise, which however is imported through the proposition.

It is objected: The Son from 1 Corinthians is called the wisdom of the Father, but the Son is begotten; therefore, the wisdom of the Father is begotten; therefore, the Father is wise by the begotten wisdom. I respond that the Son is not called the wisdom of the Father, as though wisdom should have the formal nature of the principle of being wise in the Father; but he is called the wisdom of the Father, because the Son has his wisdom, just as also the other essential predicates of divinity from the Father; therefore, since the wisdom which is in the Father is that which is in the Word, for this reason the Son is called the wisdom of the Father. You will say, "The Father understands by the Word; therefore, he is wise by the Word, because to be wise and to understand are the same thing." The antecedent is proven: To understand in the Word, through the Word, and by the Word, are the same thing; but Augustine and others teach that the Father understands in the Word and through the Word; therefore, he also understands by the Word. I respond by denying the antecedent. To the proof, I say that he understands through the Word and in the Word, insofar as the divine essence, which is called the Word appropriately, is the object representing to the Father those things which he understands and is wise about. Hence we have said elsewhere that all things are seen in the Word. Yet he does not understand by the Word, because the Word is not that by which the Father understands; indeed, the understanding or wisdom of the Father

immediately flows from his intellect, and so the Father is not wise nor does he understand by the Word. Therefore, neither is he wise by the begotten wisdom.

Chapter 6: on the second person

After all we said about the first person of the divine Trinity, it makes sense that we move on to the second one. Now, there are usually three things that get mentioned about this second person: that he's the Son, that he's the Word, and that he's the image. We will go through and explain each of these one by one.

Question 1: Whether the true name of the Son is a proper name of the second person.

Among the names that apply to the divine persons, some are proper and some are appropriated. Proper names are those that apply to one person in such a way that they cannot apply to another. Thus, the proper names of the first person are to be the Father and to be unbegotten, taking unbegotten to mean unproduced. The proper names of the second person are to be the Son, the Word, and the Image. The proper names of the third person are to be the Spirit and Love. Appropriated names are those that, although they apply to the three persons, are nevertheless especially appropriated to one of them, on account of its peculiar mode of being produced or proceeding. Thus, Power is appropriated to the Father, because he has will from himself and through himself, which is the productive principle *ad extra*. Thus, Wisdom is appropriated to the Son on account of his mode of proceeding, because he proceeds through the intellect, and wisdom in us is a habit of the intellect. Thus, finally, Goodness is appropriated to the Holy Spirit, because he is produced through the will, and goodness resides in the will. Here it is asked whether the name "Son" is a proper or an appropriated name.

CONCLUSION.

The name "Son" is proper to the second person.

Faith testifies by expressly calling him the Son. Psalm 2: "You are my Son; today I have begotten you." Matthew 28: "Baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit." Psalm 109: "From the womb, before the morning star, I begot you." Now, to be begotten and to be a son are convertible terms. The reason is that the second person proceeds from the first in the likeness of an intellectual nature. But because he proceeds in

the likeness of a nature, he has being through generation, and because he has being through generation he is a Son, especially among intellectual beings. For a brute animal is not the son of a brute animal.

Objection: The Son does not proceed as similar to the Father, but he is the same as the Father; for the nature of the Son is the same in number as the nature of the Father. Therefore he does not proceed through generation, which is an origin in the likeness of a nature. But if he is not begotten, he is not a son.

Reply: To be a son and to be begotten, although it is in the identity of a nature, for generation tends to the same nature being propagated with the greatest identity that can be given, such that if the nature is finite, generation tends only to a specific identity of nature, as in created things. But if the nature is infinite, generation occurs in a numerical identity of nature, because it is communicated without division of itself. Furthermore, the likeness and identity of nature are taken for the same thing in the definition of generation.

Question 2: Whether the name "Son" is univocal with respect to the divine Son and a human son.

The name "Son" is taken in two ways, broadly and properly. Properly, for a son by nature. A son by nature can again be taken in two ways: improperly and properly. Improperly, for any being produced by another; thus men and angels can be called sons of God, because they are procreated and produced by God. Properly, for what is produced by a living thing similar in nature, at least specifically; thus a man produced by a man is called his son. However, because it would follow from this definition that a horse produced by a horse would be its son, it must be added that most properly "son" is taken for what is produced in an intellectual nature. And so the offspring of brute animals will not be called a son. Therefore, because God is intellectual, just as man is, the person produced is called the Son of the producing person, both in divine things and in human things. But here it is asked whether this name "Son" is univocal.

CONCLUSION.

The name "Son" is truly univocal with respect to a human son and a divine son,

just as the name "Father" is. So Scotus thinks, against St. Thomas, who thinks that these names are only analogous. It is proved: The notion of Father and Son belongs to the uncreated Father as well as to the created father; for to be a Father is to produce a living thing from a living thing in the likeness of an intellectual nature, and to be a Son is to be produced as a living thing by a living thing in the likeness of an intellectual nature. But each definition belongs to uncreated and created Fathers and Sons; therefore each name is univocal.

Objection from St. Thomas: The notion of Father and Son belongs to the divine Father before it belongs to the human father; for Scripture says that all paternity is derived from God, and so also all filiation. But what belongs to one before another is not univocal. Therefore, etc. Reply: That to descend to inferiors prior and posterior does not take away univocation; but it is required only for it that the notion be the same in the inferiors, although it descends to one before another, as is seen in being, which is univocal with respect to God and creature, although being descends to God before creatures. Besides, if descending to one before another took away univocation, man would not be something univocal with respect to Adam and other men, for Adam was a man before Abel.

Question 3: Whether the name "Word" is proper to the second person.

The Alogians denied the existence of the Word in divine things, admitting it only through metaphor; whence they were called Alogians, that is, without the Word, from the fact that they said the Word was nothing other than an excellent creature, which on account of the excellent wisdom communicated to it was called the Word, just as John the Baptist was called a Voice. The Arians were of the same mind. But Durand, in 1, dist. 27, q. 3, teaches that the name "Word" is essential, but appropriated to the Son, like the name "Wisdom." His reason was that he believed the Son does not proceed from the Father through the intellect, but through the fecundity of the nature, and therefore is not called the Word (just as the Holy Spirit is not called the Word), except by appropriation, and through a certain likeness, which consists in this: that just as the procession of the word in us is before the procession of love, so the procession of the Son is before the procession of the Holy Spirit.

Before we explain whether "Word" is a proper name of the second person, it must be noted that there are two kinds of word, one internal and the other external. The internal word is the intellectual image of the object remaining in the intellect itself. The external word is twofold, vocal and written. The vocal word is that sensible voice which is uttered by the mouth, and which represents the mental word, or that which is in the mind. The written word is the written voice representing the concept of the mind, differing from the vocal word only materially, inasmuch as one is uttered by voice, and the other is expressed in writing.

The word is something relative; for it is placed in the genus of sign and representation. It includes two respects, a real one to the producer, and a rational one to the thing represented. The former is the respect of effect to cause, or of what is principled to what is principiating. The latter is the respect of sign to signified. Furthermore, the word of the mind is thus defined by Augustine: It is the image of the object naturally expressed by the fecund intellect, remaining in it as long as actual thought lasts.

To understand this, we must have recourse to what is said about the intellect in Physics, in the book on the Soul. Therefore, let us explain this definition only briefly. First, it is called "the image of the object"; for the expressed species, which is the word of the mind, represents

the object whose impressed species informs the possible intellect. Whence Augustine says that the word is most similar to the known thing from which it is begotten, and its image.

Second, it is called "expressed"; for the possible intellect has two offices, the first of which is to receive from the agent intellect the intelligible species of the objects by which it is informed; and because of this, the Philosopher says that the intellect, by understanding, becomes all things. Those intelligible species by which the possible intellect is informed are called impressed species. The second office is to produce from those impressed species a word of the mind entirely similar to the impressed species. But the word of the mind is called the expressed species.

Whence it is rightly called the word of the mind, the expressed image of the object. Third, it is said "by the fecund intellect"; that is, by the intellect having the species of the object, which species in the intellect is called by some habitual knowledge, and by others the seed of the object.

Finally, it is added, "remaining in it as long as actual thought lasts"; for when thought ceases, the word also ceases. Whence, if the word seems to remain in the intellectual memory after the intellection, it should be called an intellectual phantasm rather than a word.

In this definition the nature of the word is explained in itself, as it abstracts from the created word and the uncreated word; for the name "word" is univocal with respect to both, although in us it is an accident, and in God a substance; although also in the production of our word an inquiry or consultation of the object is made, which is not done in the production of the divine Word.

CONCLUSION.

The name "Word" is proper to the second person.

John 1: "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.... The Word was made flesh." Also 1 John 4: "There are three who give testimony in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit." Therefore, just as Scripture expresses the first and third persons by proper names, so also the second person.

The reason is that whatever is produced through a fecund memory, that is, through an intellect together with an intelligible species, or with an object having the nature of an intelligible species, is most properly a word. But the second person of the divinity has this. Therefore the name "Word" properly belongs to him.

Objection 1, with Durand: Anselm, who in Monologion, ch. 1, says that the Father is speaking, the Son is speaking, and the Holy Spirit is speaking, and that for the supreme Spirit to speak is nothing other than to gaze by thinking. Therefore, to speak is an essential action. Therefore, the Word, which is the terminus of speaking, is something essential, and so it is not proper to the second person.

Reply: Anselm takes "to speak" improperly; for he uses it for essential understanding. Whence, because the Word, the Father, and the Holy Spirit understand essentially, he asserts that the three persons speak. However, this use is improper.

You will say: In us, to understand and to speak are not two acts, one of which is essential and the other relative. Therefore, neither are they in God.

Reply: I deny the consequence. For since the divine nature as such is perfect on all sides, and receives nothing from the persons, it must have understanding and understanding that is unproduced and produced in the Father. It is not so with us, because since we are not perfectly adequate except through the actions we produce, we do not have two understandings, one of which is unproduced and the other produced. Whence in us the intellect is only productive; in God it is both operative and productive.

Objection 2: The Word, according to Augustine, is knowledge with love. But both love and knowledge are something essential. Therefore, the divine Word is also.

Reply: Augustine is speaking of our word; and if he is speaking of the divine Word, he must be distinguished: it is knowledge with love, begotten and notional knowledge, I concede; unproduced and essential knowledge, I deny.

You will say: The second person is properly called the Son, and filiation is its constitutive property. Therefore we should not attribute to it the name "Word" as proper to it.

Reply: The name "Word" and "Son" can belong to the same supposit, but with this distinction: for a person is called a Son inasmuch as it takes on the nature of a living thing produced by a living principle in the likeness of a nature, not judging through which power it is produced, whether it be through a corporeal or an intellectual power. But "Word" is attributed to the person produced as a living thing by a living principle, in the likeness of a nature through a purely intellectual power.

Therefore, the second person of the Trinity takes on the nature of a Son inasmuch as it is produced in the likeness of a nature; but it takes on the name "Word" inasmuch as it is begotten through a purely intellectual power. This response elucidates the question that is usually proposed in these terms: whether the names "Word" and "Son" are synonymous. To this question it must be replied that the name "Son" has a wider extension than the name "Word"; for the name "son" belongs to every begotten thing, at least intellectual, whether it be produced through a corporeal power or through an intellectual power; but the name "Word" belongs only to what is begotten through the intellect.

Here it is usually further asked whether, just as the second person is called the Word, so also it can be called the Utterance (Sermo), which word Calvin uses. For where in the Gospel of John we have, "In the beginning was the Word," Calvin translates, "In the beginning was the Utterance, and the Utterance was with God, and God was the Utterance." To this question it must be replied that the Fathers do not prohibit such a way of speaking; but because "Utterance" seems to indicate a complex of many words joined together, we use the name "Word" rather, on account of its simplicity and unity.

Furthermore, it can be asked whether the name "Wisdom" can be applied to the second person, just as the name "Word" can.

To this it is replied that it is not a proper name, because it signifies an absolute cognition, which belongs to the three persons. It is, however, a name appropriated to the second person, because he proceeds through the intellect, to which Wisdom belongs. Whence the Apostle calls Christ the power and Wisdom of God.

However, if to the name "Wisdom" is added "begotten," then the name "begotten Wisdom" is a proper name of the Son.

Objection 3: The divine Word is not like ours. But ours is properly called a word. Therefore in divine things the second person is not properly the Word.

Reply: There is indeed a difference and agreement between the divine Word and ours, which difference does not take away the nature of the word, as Athanasius says in his sermon against the Arians: "The Word of God is not to be sought as ours is; for God is not such as we are."

Therefore, the uncreated Word and the created word differ in something, and agree in something. First, they agree in that each is spiritual. Second, that each is permanent; that is, it lasts as long as the understanding lasts. Third, that each represents not at will, but naturally.

But they differ, because the created word is accidental; but the Divine Word is subsistent. And the nature of subsistent does not take away, but rather perfects the Word. Second, the created word is produced from the indigence of the one understanding; but the Divine Word is produced from the fecundity of the productive principle. Third, the word in us is the form constituting the intellect as understanding in second act, so that the intellect does not understand without the word; but the Divine Word is not so, because the Divine intellect is formally understanding through the essential understanding, before it produces the Word. Fourth, they differ in this, that in us the form of the producing intellect and of the produced word are not the same; for the form of the intellect is substantial, and the form of the word is accidental. But in God there is the same nature in the producer and in the produced.

Question 4: Whether the name "Image" belongs to the second person alone.

An image is defined as a total likeness, produced or expressed in imitation of the producer. First, it is called a "likeness," and this word is put in place of the genus, for according to Augustine every image is a likeness, and not every likeness is an image; for an egg is like an egg, but it is not an image. Second, "total" is added, to distinguish it from a vestige; for a vestige represents only a part, an image represents the whole thing. Third, it is said "produced"; whence the Divine Father is not the image of the Son, because he is not produced. Finally, "in imitation of the producer" is put; and so fire produced by another fire, or

a dog by another dog, is not an image, because it is not made in imitation. For fire and dog do not intend to produce something similar to themselves, since neither is an intentional agent.

Because there are three kinds of likeness, namely objective, exemplar, and natural, so there are three kinds of images. The first is called intentional, and it is the species drawn from the object, received in the sense or intellect, which represents the object. Whence the species are called images of things. The second is called artificial, and it is the likeness of something artificial, made in imitation of the exemplar, like the image of Caesar which is made to represent Caesar. The third, finally, is called natural, which is the likeness of the thing produced naturally to its producer, in an identity of nature, whether specific, as in human things, or numerical, as in divine things. And so the Son is the natural image of the Father.

CONCLUSION.

The name "Image" is proper to the second person.

For Holy Scripture attributes the name "Image" to the Son alone, as in Colossians 1: "The image of the invisible God," and in Hebrews 1: "The brightness of the Father, and the figure of his substance." Whence Ambrose says, "The Son alone is the full Image of God." Whence also Augustine has it, "The Word cannot be said of the Word, nor the image of the image, as God is said of God; because they are not both the image at the same time, but the Son alone."

The reason for the conclusion is that the Son alone is the expressed likeness in imitation of the producer, namely the Father. Therefore, the Son alone is the image of the Father. The antecedent is proved, because this befits neither the Father, since he is not produced, nor the Holy Spirit, for he is not produced in imitation of the Father and the Son, although he is produced by both and is similar to both. For in order to be produced in imitation of the producer, he must be produced through a power which by its nature tends to likeness, which does not belong to the will, which is the principle of the Holy Spirit.

Objection 1: If the nature of an image belonged to the Word, he would be similar to the Father, which is false; because if he were similar, he would be similar either in person or in essence. Not in person, because the persons are dissimilar; indeed, paternity is opposed to filiation. Nor in essence, because the Father and the Son are the same in essence, and one and the same thing is not similar to itself.

Reply: The likeness stands not on the part of the person, but on the part of the essence. For likeness it is not required that the nature of the likeness be distinct in the things which are similar, as we said in the chapter on relations. For if there were one and the same whiteness in two walls, the walls would be no less similar. Whence the likeness is in the deity, so that the Word is the image of the Father under the nature of divinity, but with the paternity coming as a necessary condition, because between the image and the thing imaged there must be a real distinction.

Objection 2: The Fathers call the Holy Spirit the Image of the Father. Therefore the name "Image" is not proper to the second person.

Reply: By the name "Image" the Fathers understood a perfect likeness in nature, and this is an image improperly taken. But because for the nature of a proper image it is required that the likeness be had from the force of the procession, thus the Son alone is the image of the Father. If man is called the image of God, this is improperly, inasmuch as man is made to the exemplar of the divinity.

You will say: If the names "Word," "Son," and "Image" are proper to the second person, there will be many constituents.

Reply: By the name "Image" a peculiar property is not imported which is not imported by the name "Word" and "Son," because "Word" and "Son" say the same thing as "image," with this exception, that "Word" and "Son" say first a natural procession, and second they import a likeness. But "Image" says first a likeness, and secondarily a natural procession.

Question 5: From what cognition does the Divine Word proceed?

In divine things there is one cognition of the essence, another of the attributes; for in the chapter on invisibility we said that the essence is the primary object, the attributes and persons the secondary object. Here it must be known that it is one thing to ask whether the knowledge of the essence and attributes precedes the production of the Word, but another whether the Word is produced from such knowledge of the essence and attributes. The first is certain, because essentials precede notinals. The second is the question.

Where Scotus assigns two instants of nature, in the first of which all things that are ad intra are completed, and in the second all things that are ad extra are completed. The first still has two other instants: in the first all essentials are completed, for example, understanding and willing; and in the second all notinals are completed, namely the generation of the Word and the spiration of the Holy Spirit.

Here it is asked whether the Word is produced from the cognition of the essence alone, or of the essence with the persons and attributes, or also from the cognition of creatures.

CONCLUSION.

The Word proceeds from no actual knowledge of anything, but from a quasi-virtual and habitual knowledge of the essence alone, not of the persons, attributes, and creatures.

The first part is proved, because the Word is rather the begotten and actual understanding and knowledge, than produced through that actual knowledge. And this is what the theologians say, that the Father produces not through cognition, but through fecund memory. For just as in us actual understanding, which is our word, is begotten immediately by the intellect informed by the species, not as understood but as intelligible, so the Divine Word is immediately begotten by the Divine intellect and the Divine essence fecundating it, not as understood but as intelligible.

Nor let anyone say that the Father knows his essence before the Word is understood to be produced, and so the Word is produced from the cognition of the essence. For it is replied that although such operative cognition precedes, nevertheless the Word is not produced from that cognition; indeed, if per impossible the Father did not first understand and love the essence before he spoke the Word, he would nonetheless speak and spirate no less. Whence the cognition of the essence does not concur per se to the production of the Word.

The other parts are proved. First, that it proceeds from a quasi-virtual knowledge, because the Word proceeds through the intellect which is made fecund by the object; but the intellect with the object is called habitual or virtual knowledge.

Second, that the Word proceeds from the knowledge of the essence alone is certain, because the essence is the primary object, which alone is formally known by God, where the attributes are known only concomitantly, by reason of the essence, which has the power to make them present and actually represents them. Since, therefore, the essence is a formally infinite and perfect being, it suffices for the production of the Word. And so if the attributes are not formally known, therefore the Word does not proceed from the formal cognition of them. However, it can be said that it proceeds from the formal cognition of the essence, insofar as the essence itself represents the attributes, and therefore from the material cognition of them, but not from the formal cognition.

Third, the same must be said of the persons, that the Word proceeds from the material cognition of them, insofar as the Divine Essence represents them, and cannot be known without the persons being known as represented; but it does not proceed from the formal cognition of them, because they are not formally and per se intelligible, as we said in dealing with invisibility.

Fourth, it is clear that the Word is not produced from the cognition of creatures, because before creatures are understood, the divine productions are completed. For this is the order, that first those things which are essential ad intra are completed, then those which are notional, and finally those which are ad extra, that is, which respect creatures. For God is God before he is Father, and in divine things the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are first before creatures are decreed; for they were produced by the three persons indivisibly.

The last part of the conclusion is confirmed. When the motive object is apt to move the power to a finite or infinite term, it first moves to the infinite rather than to the finite; because the infinite does not presuppose the finite, but the finite does presuppose the infinite. But the essence is the object moving the Divine intellect both to the production of the Word and to the understanding of creatures. Therefore the intellect is first moved to the production of the Word than to the cognition of creatures.

Add that creatures as intelligible, and the Divine essence, are not a more perfect object than the Divine essence alone, since it alone is infinite. Therefore it alone suffices for the production of the Divine Word. Therefore the Word is not produced from the cognition of creatures, for that would be superfluous.

The same must be said of the Holy Spirit as of the Word. For just as the Word is not produced from knowledge, but is itself the knowledge produced by the Divine intellect and the Divine essence fecundating it, so neither is the Holy Spirit produced from actual love; indeed, he himself is the love produced from the Divine will and essence, not as loved, but as lovable.

Objection: The Divine Word represents not only the Divine essence, but also the attributes, persons, and creatures. Therefore it is produced from the habitual knowledge of all these.

Reply: The Word does not represent all these primarily and formally, but only the essence, although secondarily and concomitantly it represents all those things. But the Word is born only from the object which it represents primarily and principally.

You will say: According to Augustine, De Trin. 11, ch. 14, the Word is produced from all things which are in the knowledge of the Father. But the attributes, persons, and creatures are in the knowledge of the Father before the production of the Word. Therefore the Word is born from the knowledge of all of them.

Reply: The Word is from those things which are in the knowledge of the Father, first and per se intelligible. But the attributes are not first intelligible, nor are the persons. As for creatures, they are not in God before the generation of the Word, actually and according to their formal being, but only virtually; and for that time they are nothing other than the Divine essence. Therefore the Word does not arise from the habitual cognition of creatures.

You will say: The Word is produced from the habitual cognition of those things which it declares and expresses. But the Word is declarative of creatures. Therefore, etc.

Reply: It is produced from the cognition of those things which it expresses primarily. But the Word primarily expresses only, and declares, the Divine essence, and secondarily creatures, just as it expresses persons and attributes.

Chapter 8: On the Third Person of the Trinity

The third person of the Trinity is called the Holy Spirit - not from spirituality, because the Father is spirit and is holy, as is the Son, but from passive spiration. So by Holy Spirit we understand the holy one who is spirated.

Therefore, after treating the Father who generates the Son, and the Son who together with the Father produces the Holy Spirit, the order now demands that we discuss some things about the Holy Spirit.

Question 1: Whether the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son

There was an old controversy between the Greeks and Latins about the procession of the Holy Spirit. The Greeks held that he is from the Father in such a way that he is in no way from the Son. Many made Theodore of Mopsuestia the author of this opinion, but when he saw its authors were condemned by the Council of Ephesus, he immediately returned to the Church's view.

Many years later, in the time of Pepin, King of the Franks, the schism revived around the year of our Lord 767. A provincial synod was held at Gentilly near Paris, which some call the Synod of Paris. At that time this heresy began to spread through Greece, so that not even Theophylact, who lived at that time, was free from it.

Later Michael Cerularius, Patriarch of Constantinople, reached the height of impudence in publicly asserting that the Roman Pontiff was excommunicated because he added "and the Son" to the Nicene Creed. The Patriarch even ordered all Latin churches in his jurisdiction closed, as is done in times of interdict.

Against the Greeks stands the Latin Church, with which will be our

CONCLUSION

The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son.

Although this is not found expressly in Scripture, it is found equivalently. For in John 17, the Son says "All that the Father has is mine." On which Augustine says, "Whatever the Father has, the Son has, except Paternity." But the Father has the power of spiration, therefore so does the Son.

Also in John 15 and 16, the Holy Spirit is said to be sent by the Son: "When the Paraclete comes, whom I will send to you from the Father", and "If I go, I will send him to you." But every sending implies procession, according to Augustine, who in On the Trinity book 4, chapter 20, teaches that for the Son to be sent is nothing other than to be born, and for the Holy Spirit to be sent is nothing other than to proceed.

Our opponents should not say this does not prove it, otherwise Christ would proceed from the Holy Spirit, since the Holy Spirit sent him, as in Isaiah 61: "The Spirit of the Lord has sent

me." For we say Christ was sent by the Holy Spirit not according to his divinity but according to his humanity.

Also in John 16, the Son says of the Holy Spirit, "He will glorify me, for he will take what is mine." But a divine person receives nothing except from the one from whom he proceeds.

Finally, in Romans 5 and Galatians 4, the Holy Spirit is called the "Spirit of the Son": "God has sent the Spirit of his Son." Therefore, he proceeds from him.

It is proven secondly from the Latin councils of Lateran and Florence, which the Greeks attended. After long disputations they admitted the phrase "and the Son".

This was added at the Second Council of Nicaea. It was also defined at the Council of Lyon under Gregory X, which the Greeks also attended. With everyone's consent, the Creed was chanted with the addition of "and the Son", repeated thrice in Greek and Latin.

The reason the schism persists among the Greeks after their agreement is to be ascribed to their fickleness. Having been defeated so often in disputations, they always returned to their errors. Antoninus reports that the union made at the Council of Florence between Greeks and Latins in the presence of the Greek Emperor Palaeologus was dissolved, both because the Greeks who were not present at that Council remained in their error, and because after John Palaeologus died, they elected a new Emperor with whom they made a new separation from the Latins.

It is proven thirdly from the Seventh Council of the Greeks themselves, the Second Council of Nicaea under Pope Adrian. The Creed made at the First Council of Nicaea was read there with the addition of "and the Son". The reason this addition was not made in previous councils is because it was not controversial in the Church at that time.

To understand this more distinctly, note that the first seven councils were celebrated among the Greeks:

1. The First Council of Nicaea, against Arius on the divinity of Christ. In its Creed nothing more is read about the Holy Spirit than "I believe in the Holy Spirit", because at that time no question had arisen about his divinity or procession.
2. The First Council of Constantinople, against Macedonius on the divinity of the Holy Spirit. To the Creed was added, "the Lord and giver of life, who proceeds from the Father", to denote his consubstantiality with the Father and thus his divinity. The reason no mention was made of whether he proceeds from the Son is because the Macedonians granted that the Holy Spirit is a creature produced by the Son alone.
3. The Council of Ephesus, against Nestorius who asserted two persons in Christ. It approved the letter of Cyril to Nestorius in which are the words, "The Holy Spirit, though he is called the Spirit of truth, and Christ is the truth, still proceeds from him as from the Father."
4. The Council of Chalcedon, against Eutyches and Dioscorus who asserted only one nature in Christ. It also approved the letter of Cyril, as did the two following councils of Constantinople.

5 & 6. The Second and Third Councils of Constantinople.

7. Finally, the Second Council of Nicaea, in which the phrase "and the Son" was added to the Creed.

So from these it seems that in the third through seventh councils, even those held in Greece, the Holy Spirit is proceeding from the Father and the Son.

Fourthly, it is proven by this argument of Scotus: A person having a perfect productive principle of some term, before that term is understood as produced, can use that principle and produce that term. But the Son of God has the divine will, which is the perfect productive principle of the Holy Spirit, before the Holy Spirit is understood as produced. Therefore, by that will he can produce the Holy Spirit. Therefore he does produce, because in divine things to be able is the same as to be.

The major premise is proven because the Son and Holy Spirit have the will which is the productive principle of creatures *ad extra*, before creatures are understood as produced. Therefore they produce them with the Father. So if the Son has the fecund will before the Holy Spirit is understood as produced by the Father, consequently he produces with him.

The minor premise is proven: Between the productive actions of intellect and will there is such an order that the Father first speaks the Word before the will breathes forth. Therefore the Father first produces the Word through his fecund intellect before he breathes forth the Holy Spirit through his will. But the Father, in producing the Word, communicates to him all the divine perfections, including the fecund will. Therefore, since in the instant the Word has the fecund will the Holy Spirit is not yet produced, consequently when the Father breathes him forth, so does the Son.

Objection 1: In this mystery we should not dare to say anything except what is known from Scripture, as Dionysius says in *On the Divine Names*, chapter 1. But it is not had from Scripture that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son.

I respond: Nothing should be said except what is had from Scripture, either in express words or equivalently. And in this latter way, in the first proof for the conclusion, we have from Scripture that the Holy Spirit is from both. You may say passive spiration is proper to one person, therefore so is active spiration. I concede the antecedent, for one person is produced by a single production, otherwise the production would be inadequate. But I deny the consequence, because two persons can produce one if they have the same principle - not because of the inadequacy of the principle, but because the principle is in both.

If Dionysius says only the Father is the fount of divinity, this means he is the first principle of communicated divinity to the Son, who is the principle from a principle. If Gregory Nazianzen says "What the Father has, the Son has, except causality" - by causality he means the power of generation, which he did not communicate to the Son, not the power of spiration.

If John Damascene says in his book *On the Orthodox Faith*, "We say the Holy Spirit is from the Father, we do not say he is from the Son" - St. Thomas responds that he was in the error

of the Greeks, but was not a heretic because the opposite had not yet been defined by the Church. Others however say Damascene was not in such error, because in chapter 11 of the same book he teaches the Holy Spirit is from the Father through the Son. He cannot be through the Son except insofar as the Son flows into his production.

So Damascene is to be understood thus: "We say the Holy Spirit is from the Father" as from the first principle, "and we do not say he is from the Son" as from the first principle, but as from the second. In this way are to be understood the holy Fathers who say the Holy Spirit is principally from the Father as from the first principle, and from the Son as from the second principle. For there are not two principles quo but two principles quod.

Objection 2: In the Council of Nicaea it was only put "I believe in the Holy Spirit." In the Council of Constantinople was added "who proceeds from the Father." But in the Councils of Ephesus and Chalcedon it was prohibited to add anything to the Nicene and Constantinopolitan Creeds. Therefore that phrase "and the Son" should not have been added, nor consequently believed.

I respond: It was prohibited to add anything - I distinguish - contrary to the doctrine of the other councils, I concede; something more expressive of their doctrine and agreeing with them, I deny. Just as it is agreed the Council of Constantinople added to the Nicene Creed without scruple "who proceeds from the Father", so it was lawful for later councils to add the phrase "and the Son" as occasion of the times and heresies required, wherein the Church further explained what was to be believed.

If the Greeks object, saying Pope Leo III, after that addition was made, ordered the Creed to be inscribed on a silver plate without that addition of "and the Son" and placed behind the altar of St. Paul in Rome - I respond he did this not because he rejected that phrase but to leave to posterity the memory of the Constantinopolitan Creed with what was established by that council without gloss. For it is expedient the Church have sure testimonies of antiquity, so it may be agreed what was established at each time.

Objection 3: From Athanasius in his Anonymous Questions, chapter 15, where he compares the Father to Adam, the Son to Seth, Adam's son, and the Holy Spirit to Eve. But Eve was not taken from Seth but from Adam alone. Therefore neither is the Holy Spirit from the Son.

I respond: Some hold these Questions are not by Athanasius. Further, every comparison limps and so does this one, which only holds in that, just as Seth is truly begotten from Adam, so the Word from the Father; and just as Eve is not truly begotten, so neither is the Holy Spirit. For it is not likely Athanasius erred in this, since he says in the Creed, "The Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son, not made nor created nor begotten, but proceeding."

If in the Council of Ephesus the conciliar fathers did not reprove Nestorius who affirmed the Holy Spirit is from the Father alone, by their silence they did not approve this doctrine. For the procession of the Holy Spirit was not being treated then, but the name "Mother of God" and the single person of Christ in two natures. Further, the fathers sufficiently proved their mind by approving the letter of Cyril in which was contained that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son.

Final objection: The Holy Spirit is one. Therefore he has one principle, not two. Therefore he proceeds by one procession. Therefore he is not from two persons.

The Greeks use this objection, to which I respond by denying the final consequence. For it does not follow: The world is one. Therefore it has one principle. Therefore it does not proceed from three persons. Although the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are three persons, they are still one principle of the world and create by one action. They have a single omnipotence. So in our case it can be said there are two spirating, because they have a single spirative power in both, namely the fecund will.

You may say: The Father is a sufficient principle of the Holy Spirit. Therefore he does not require the help of the Son.

I respond it does not follow, because the Father is a sufficient principle of the world, yet all the persons create. For they create through omnipotence which is common. So the Father breathes forth with the Son, not because he needs him, but because both have the same spirative power.

Question 2: Whether if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, it would still be really distinct from Him.

We indeed say that, as things stand, the Holy Spirit is really distinct from the Son because it is produced by Him; but the further question arises whether, if it were impossible for the Holy Spirit not to proceed from the Son, it would still be really distinct from Him.

This question is not absurdly proposed, whatever Godfrey may say, even though it is based on an impossible supposition; for it is impossible that a man not be an animal, yet it can still be asked whether, if man were not an animal (which is impossible), he would still be distinct from a brute. The answer to this question is affirmative because man and brute are not distinguished by their animality, but by the fact that one is rational and the other irrational.

Moreover, this supposition is no more absurd than that of St. Augustine, who says: if it were impossible for the Father not to be unbegotten, nothing would prevent Him from begetting the Son. Godfrey admits this supposition and similar ones, so he should not reject ours as absurd.

Furthermore, the reason why the subtle doctor raises such a question was on the occasion of the preceding question, in which St. Thomas proves that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, because if it did not proceed from Him, it would not be really distinct from the Son. Scotus holds that this reasoning is invalid because, according to him, even if it were impossible for the Holy Spirit not to proceed from the Son, it would still be really distinct from Him.

CONCLUSION.

Even if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, it would still be really distinct from Him.

This is proven by the authority of St. Augustine in *De Trinitate*, Book 4, Chapter 14, where he teaches that the Son is really distinct from the Holy Spirit because the former proceeds as begotten, while the latter as given; that is, the former by way of nature, the latter by way of will. But if, by impossible supposition, the Holy Spirit were not from the Son, the Son would still be begotten, and the Holy Spirit given; the former would still be by nature, and the latter by will. Therefore, the Holy Spirit would be no less really distinct from the Son, even if it were not produced by Him. Anselm says the same in his *Letter Against the Greeks*, especially in Chapter 4: if the Son and the Holy Spirit were not plural through something else, they would still be diverse through this, because one exists by being born, the other by proceeding. From this, it is clear that the Holy Spirit is distinct from the Son, not precisely because the Holy Spirit is from the Son, but because the emanation of the Holy Spirit is of a different nature from the emanation of the Son. And given our impossible supposition, the production of the Son and the Holy Spirit would still be of different natures: therefore, even if one were not from the other, they would be no less really distinct.

IT IS PROVEN by reason: If the essential and intrinsic distinguishing factor of one thing from another remains, regardless of any other circumstance, the real distinction between them remains. But even if we remove the fact that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, the essential distinguishing factor of the Son from the Holy Spirit remains. Therefore, they are really distinct. The minor premise is proven: the formal distinguishing factor of the Son from the Holy Spirit is filiation; but filiation would not be lost even if the Holy Spirit were not from the Son. Therefore, given our hypothesis, the essential distinguishing factor of both would always remain. The major premise is proven, that filiation is the formal principle distinguishing the Son from the Holy Spirit: That by which something is formally constituted is that by which it is distinguished; because that by which something is formally constituted in its being, by that it is formally such an entity; and by which something is formally such an entity, by that it is one; and by which it is one, by that it is undistinguished in itself and distinguished from everything else: therefore, the principle of constitution and distinction is the same.

IT IS CONFIRMED: Supposing that the Holy Spirit were not from the Son, the Father would still generate and spirate; but that which would be generated would be distinct from that which would be spirated; because generation and spiration, even if they were from the Father alone, would still be adequate productions; and thus each would have its own term; and those terms would not be one thing; otherwise one and the same thing, or person, would be produced through intellect and through will: therefore, there would be two persons; one of which would be produced through intellect, and the other through will.

SCOTUS objects to himself that the Son is distinguished only from the Father by filiation, but not from the Holy Spirit, just as, for example, man is distinguished from beast by rationality, but not from stone, from which he is only distinguished by the fact that man is an animated

body, and stone inanimate. He answers himself by denying the antecedent; and saying that whatever is distinguished from another as such, must be distinguished by something that is of the intrinsic nature of itself as such; but the Son is personally distinguished from the Holy Spirit as Son: therefore, it must be distinguished by something that is of its nature as Son: But active spiration is not of the intrinsic and essential nature of the Son. Neither as He is the Son, nor as He is a person; because such spiration comes to the Son already constituted in personal being: therefore through active spiration He is not personally distinguished from the Holy Spirit, but precisely through filiation. The example of man and stone does not compel; because even if it is granted that man is distinguished from stone only because he is an animated body; he would always be distinguished by something intrinsic to him, for body is of the essence of man, whereas active spiration is only of the extrinsic nature of the son. Then, through the rational, man is not only distinguished from brute, but also from stone; because if he were not distinguished from stone by rationality, man and stone would not be of different most specific species, since man is constituted in his most specific species only by rationality.

OBJECTION 2. The Fathers say that persons are distinguished by origins; or even by origins alone: therefore if the Holy Spirit did not originate from the Son, He would not be personally distinguished from Him. Response: origins are of two kinds; some are opposed, like active generation and passive generation, active spiration and passive spiration; others are disparate, like passive generation and passive spiration. This being established, I distinguish the authority; persons are distinguished by origins alone, either opposed or disparate, I concede; opposed only, I deny: because therefore if the Holy Spirit were not from the Son, His origination would be different from the origin of the Son; thus they would always be distinguished among themselves by disparate origins, and not opposed. In the same way should be solved those who say that persons are distinguished by relations alone; that is, either opposed or disparate; in our supposition there would always be a disparate relation between the Son and the Holy Spirit, because one would always be produced through intellect, the other through will; one would have the relation of generated, the other of spirated; which relations are disparate and incompatible in the same person.

OBJECTION 3. The First Council of Toledo, where near the end it is said; The Holy Spirit is neither the Father nor the Son, because He proceeds from both. Response: it is rightly concluded that the Holy Spirit is neither the Father nor the Son, because He proceeds from both; for the procession of one from another is a sufficient distinguishing medium of both; but that distinguishing principle is only extrinsic, therefore it does not follow from this that if He did not proceed from the Son, He would not be distinguished from Him; for then He would be distinguished by an intrinsic and essential medium; namely by this, that the Son is Son, and the Holy Spirit is spirated: just as e.g. although man is distinguished from horse by risibility; if however, per impossible, man were not risible, he would nonetheless be distinguished from horse by an intrinsic medium; namely by this, that man is rational. If some say that persons insinuate number by this that they are mutual: this is to say that relation makes number; not indeed relation alone opposed, e.g. that one person is producing, and another produced; but also disparate, that one is through intellect, another through will: supposing however that the Holy Spirit were not from the Son, those disparate relations would remain in both and thus the number would persist; or distinction between both.

OBJECTION 4. from the Council of Florence. If the son did not spirate, He would not be Son in the divine; but if He were not Son, the Son and Holy Spirit would not be distinguished, because distinction supposes the existence of the distinguished: therefore if the Son did not produce the Holy Spirit, they would not be distinguished. Response: that truly He would not be Son, nor Holy Spirit, if the latter did not proceed from the former, but our supposition is of the impossible: Hence we ask, if per impossible there were Son and Holy Spirit and the Son did not produce the Holy Spirit, whether they would be distinguished between themselves. You will say, from Anselm's Letter against the Greeks, in the divine all things are the same, where the opposition of relation does not obviate; but relative opposition is only between producer and produced: therefore if the Holy Spirit were not from the Son, He would not be distinguished from Him. Response: Anselm stands with us, as we saw in the proof; hence I distinguish him; all things are the same, where the opposition of relation does not obviate; that is, where the repugnance of relations does not obviate, whether such repugnance is relatively opposed, as between producer and produced; or disparate, as between begotten and spirated: but spiration and generation are disparate relations, which disparity consists in this, that one is not the other, indeed one is incompatible with the other; hence one person cannot simultaneously be produced through generation or through intellect, and spirated through spiration, or through will. You will insist. If disparate repugnance between relations were sufficient for multiplying persons, the Father would be two persons; because He has two disparate relations, namely paternity and active spiration, which is absurd. Response: disparate relations are compatible in the same supposit, if it is producing; incompatible however, if the supposita are produced; because not so much distinction is required in the principiant, as in the principiated; as is evident from the action of generating and creating in the Father, which are really identified in the same supposit; where however created and generated things are distinguished not only by supposita, but also by nature: It must be said therefore, that generation and active spiration are compatible in the same producing supposit; it cannot however happen, that one and the same person is produced through intellect and will simultaneously; and thus filiation and passive spiration cannot belong to the same supposit; and therefore, for the Son and Holy Spirit to be personally distinguished, it suffices to say that the Son is Son, or begotten; and the Holy Spirit is spirit, or spirated.

Question 3: Whether the production of the Holy Spirit is both necessary and free.

There are multiple types of freedom, as we said in the first treatise, namely of contrariety, of contradiction, and essential; likewise there are multiple types of necessity, namely of coercion or violence, of immutability, and simple or complete inevitability. It is certain that the Holy Spirit is not produced freely with freedom of contrariety or contradiction; because the Father and Son could not determine themselves not to will or to refuse to produce the Holy Spirit, but the common opinion is that He is produced freely with essential freedom. It is also certain that the Holy Spirit is not produced necessarily by necessity of coercion, because the Father and Son are not coerced into such production: Nor by necessity of immutability alone, as if the Father and Son could not have not produced, supposing a decree to produce Him; for He would not be produced more necessarily than creatures: but He is produced by simple or absolute necessity, by which it is impossible for the Holy Spirit not to exist.

CONCLUSION

The procession of the Holy Spirit is not natural, but is necessary; yet free.

The first part of the conclusion is clear; because just as the mode of acting naturally belongs to the intellect, it therefore cannot belong to the will. The second part is evident; because the Holy Spirit is God: therefore He is a necessary being, and consequently is produced by necessary production; for a necessary being cannot exist by contingent production. The third part is proved because the mode of acting freely is essential to the will: therefore the Holy Spirit is produced freely, since He is produced through the will; with essential freedom, I say, which consists in this, that the Father and Son determined themselves with pleasure and delight to the production of the Holy Spirit. That freedom and necessity can belong to the same thing is clear from Augustine, who says in chapter 105 of the Enchiridion, "Man will afterwards be such that he cannot will evil, nor will he therefore lack free will; for free will will be much freer, which will not be able to serve sin at all."

Furthermore, freedom of contrariety and contradiction are opposed to necessity, but not essential freedom; which is opposed only to coercion; as if that which is done by coercion is not done freely with essential freedom.

OBJECTION: If the Holy Spirit proceeded freely, He would proceed contingently; but if He proceeded contingently, He could be produced or not produced; but what can not be produced is not a necessary being: therefore the Holy Spirit does not proceed freely.

RESPONSE: I distinguish the first consequence; if He proceeded freely with freedom of contrariety or contradiction, I concede; if He proceeded freely with essential freedom, I deny.

You might say: Therefore at least we should not use this term, because "free" is used by the wise for "contingent". I respond that this is false, for "free" extends more broadly than "contingent"; and "free" can be divided into necessarily free and contingently free; thus e.g. God loves Himself freely necessarily, and loves creatures freely contingently: thus St. Thomas and Scotus say that God loves Himself freely and necessarily; but not contingently: Therefore we should not be afraid to use the manner of speaking of such doctors.

If moral theologians say that man does not merit in those things which he does necessarily; but does merit in those which he does freely: therefore the necessary cannot be free; I respond that there are two types of freedom, moral and essential: moral freedom, which is required for merit, excludes necessity; but essential freedom excludes only coercion.

Question 4: Whether the Father and Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit

We have already said there is generally a twofold principle of a produced person, and consequently also of the Holy Spirit - namely the principle quo and the principle quod. The principle quo is the spirative power, or the will with the lovable essence. The principle quod is the person having the spirative power.

There is no doubt there are two spirative principles, since the Father and Son spirate. But it is doubted whether they should be called simply one principle, because the spirative power is one in the Father and in the Son.

CONCLUSION

The Father and Son should be called one principle of the Holy Spirit, but should not be called two spirators, although they can be called two spirating.

The reason they should be called one principle and one spirator is because the names "spirator" and "principle" are substantive names. But substantive names should not be multiplied unless the form is multiplied. However, the spirative power, which is the form of the spirator, is the same in the Father and in the Son. Therefore the Father and Son can be called one principle and one spirator.

For example: The Father, Son and Holy Spirit created the world. But because the creative power, which is the will, is one in those persons, they are not called three creators but one creator. However, they can be called three creating, because the name "creating" is an adjective which is multiplied with the multiplication of supposita.

Therefore, because there are two spirating persons, they can be called two spirating. Scotus says this when he asserts the numerical term "two", when added to the verbal substantive "spirator", falls upon its formal meaning, namely upon the spirative power, which since it is one, they should not be called two spirators. But added to the adjective participle "spirating", it falls upon the material meaning or the persons.

This is confirmed by the Second Council of Lyon under Gregory X: "With the Catholic faith we confess the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, not as from two principles but as from one principle, not by two spirations but by one single spiration."

You may object: Although the Father and Son can be said to have the same principle, they still should not be said to be one principle, since they are two principiating persons.

I respond they should be said not only to have one principle but also to be one principle, just as it is said not only that the three persons have one principle of the world but also that they

are one principle of it. Therefore, although there are two principiating persons, there are not substantively two principles, because the personal properties of the Father and Son do not per se divide the ratio of spiration but the ratio of person.

Durandus objects: Either the name "spirator" supposes for the spirative power or for the spirating persons. If it supposes for the spirative power, it should rather be said the Father and Son have one principle of the Holy Spirit, because they have the same spirative power, than that they are one principle. But if it supposes for the spirating persons, then they are rather two spirating than one spirator.

Scotus responds the principle supposes for the spirative power, not simply, but as it connotes the supposit of the Father and Son. And then it is not rightly said the principle of spiration is in the Father, otherwise a person would be in a person. Therefore, the Holy Spirit does not say a relation to the Father and Son under the aspect of Father and Son, but under the aspect of spirator. But spiration does not per se involve a twofold supposit, which will be explained in the following conclusion.

Question 5: Whether a plurality of persons is per se required in the production of the Holy Spirit

It is agreed a plurality of persons is required to produce the Holy Spirit. For he must proceed from those persons who have his productive principle, and the Father and Son have the productive principle of the Holy Spirit, namely the fecund will. Accordingly, multiple persons must spirare.

But whether this plurality of persons is so required per se that he could in no way be produced except by two persons - this is what we are asking.

CONCLUSION

The Holy Spirit necessarily proceeds from the Father and Son because of the order between intellect and will. Nevertheless, this duality is not so required per se that if, per impossibile, he proceeded only from one person, he would not be of the same personal character as he is now.

This conclusion is against St. Thomas who says in that case the Holy Spirit would be of another characteristic property.

The first part is proven from what we said - the order of powers requires the Word to be produced before the Holy Spirit. Therefore, when the Word is produced, the Father communicates to him all he has and in the way he has it. He communicates to him,

therefore, his exhausted intellect and fecund will, because the Holy Spirit is not yet understood as produced.

So when in the second instant the Father produces the Holy Spirit, the Word cannot not also produce him, because then the Word has the same will, numerically, as the Father. And so the Father cannot produce through the will without the Son also producing. Therefore, a duality of persons is required for the production of the Holy Spirit because of the order of powers.

The second part is proven because if a plurality of persons were required *per se*, it would be required either as a complement to the spirative power or as an intrinsic condition of the spirating principle. But the first is false, because the spirative power is just as perfect in one person as in two. The second also cannot be, since one person is just as perfect in the aspect of spirating as two. For if the Father, in producing the Son, did not communicate to him the fecund will, he would be no less able to produce the Holy Spirit than with the Son, nor would the Holy Spirit be of another character and property than he is now.

Augustine confirms these parts by comparing the spirating power to the creating power: The Father, Son and Holy Spirit create the world, because it is the same power, numerically, in the three persons. And so one cannot create without the others also creating.

Yet this plurality of creating persons is required only as it were extrinsically, not *per se* and essentially. For if, *per impossibile*, the Father alone existed, he would be no less able to create, nor in that case would the created world be of another character than it is now.

So by parity of reasoning, the Word is necessarily required with the Father for the production of the Holy Spirit, but this is because of the order of powers insofar as the will is in the Son as in the Father. But this is not *per se*, as if the Holy Spirit essentially required two spirating persons. For if the Father alone existed, *per impossibile*, he alone would most perfectly produce the Holy Spirit.

Objection 1: A duality of persons is not required as a complement to the spirative power but as a condition of the spirating power. For the Father cannot spirare unless the Son spirates. Therefore, etc.

I respond it is indeed a condition, but an extrinsic one which is required from the order of powers, not an intrinsic one which is required *per se*. For as we said, if *per impossibile* the Word did not exist, the Father would be equally able to produce.

For example: If there were only one soul in two men, one would not be able to produce an intellection without the other also producing. And so in such a supposition, a plurality of understanders would be required, so that one could not understand without the other. Yet no one would say this plurality is required *per se* but only from the supposition made that the intellect is in two. So if the Father requires the Son, this is not *per se*, nor is it an absolute condition, but only an extrinsic condition.

St. Thomas objects the Holy Spirit would be of another characteristic property if he proceeded only from one person. Therefore, a duality of persons is required per se for his production.

The antecedent is proven: The Holy Spirit is the bond of the Father and Son, since these two persons are as it were united in active spiration. But if the Holy Spirit were only from the Father, he would not be the bond of the Father and Son. Therefore, he would not have the same characteristic property he now has.

I respond he would not be a bond, yet he would be no less the Holy Spirit. For the aspect of bond does not intrinsically pertain to the personal property of the Holy Spirit. For only this is required for the intrinsic and primarily constitutive ratio of the Holy Spirit - that he be the infinite love of the infinite object, produced by the fecund will. But the ratio of bond is not included in this ratio. Therefore, such a ratio of bond is only extrinsic.

For just as he is produced by two from a necessity holding by an extrinsic place, or because of the order of powers, so he is only a bond from a necessity holding by an extrinsic place - namely because he is produced by two.

Someone may say the Holy Spirit is produced through mutual love. Therefore, he requires two persons.

The following question will solve this objection.

Question 6: Is the Holy Spirit produced by a mutual and concordant will?

The difficulty here is about the principle by which the Holy Spirit is produced. Is he produced by the will as it is one? Or is he produced by the will insofar as it has the character of mutual and concordant? Taken in this way, it cannot properly be called one, because mutuality and concordance argue duality. For they speak of a relation which requires two distinct extremes. But such a distinction would be absurdly admitted in divine things. However, since some assert this, the conclusion will be against them.

CONCLUSION

The Holy Spirit is not produced by the will as it is mutual and concordant.

This is the Doctor's [Duns Scotus] opinion in Book 1, Distinction 12, Question 1, Article 2. Because the Holy Spirit is produced by the will as it is one. But as mutual and concordant, it is not one. Indeed, mutuality argues relation, and relation argues distinction of the related.

Besides, if he were produced from the will as mutual, it would follow that the Father would not have from himself the perfect principle by which the Holy Spirit is produced. For the Father does not have that mutuality from himself, which necessarily involves duality of supposita [persons].

Objection from Augustine, *On the Trinity*, Book 6, Chapter 5: The Holy Spirit is the common union of the Father and the Son. Hence theologians say he is the bond and unitive love of both. Therefore he is produced by mutual love. Response: Granted he is a bond by an extrinsic relation, as we said, and unitive love. Nevertheless he is not produced by mutual love. And so the consequence is denied. For he is called unitive love not because he unites the will of the Father with the will of the Son (for then there would be two wills, which is against the faith), but he is called bond and unitive love because the Father and Son are united in the production of the Holy Spirit.

However, it can be said that the Father and Son mutually and concordantly spirate, but not that they spirate by a mutual and concordant will. The reason for the first is that the mutuality is considered on the part of the spirating persons, who concordantly and mutually (that is, simultaneously) spirate by one will. The reason for the second is given, because in such a way of speaking, the mutuality is considered on the part of the spirative power and the action of spirating, in which there is no mutuality, because it is unity.

Thus the Fathers are to be understood who say the Holy Spirit is produced by mutual love: this is by a mutuality holding on the part of the persons, not a mutuality holding on the part of the spirative power. If Richard [of St. Victor] says the will cannot have perfect fecundity unless it is in a twofold person, he says this, Scotus notes, because the divine will is not in potency to producing the Holy Spirit unless the Word has already been produced.

Question 7: Do the Father and Son uniformly spirate the Holy Spirit?

It is agreed that the Father and Son spirate the Holy Spirit. But it must be explained whether they spirate uniformly. This question is raised because of the Fathers' way of speaking, some of whom say the Holy Spirit arises from the Father principally, others properly, others that he arises from the Father through the Son, and finally others that he arises immediately from the Father and immediately from the Son. And so there seems to be a disuniformity in the mode of spirating.

But before the solution, it should be known, with Scotus, that the act of spirating can be considered in four ways:

- 1) In itself and absolutely
- 2) In relation to the term, namely the Holy Spirit
- 3) In relation to the spirative power which is in the Father and Son
- 4) Finally, in relation to the spirating supposita [persons]

CONCLUSION

If the act of spirating is taken in the first three ways, the Father and Son uniformly spirate. If it is considered in the fourth way, they do not spirate altogether uniformly.

The first part is proved: If the act of spirating is taken in itself and absolutely, they uniformly spirate, because it is the same act in number in the Father and in the Son. In relation to the term, they uniformly spirate, because each one attains the Holy Spirit by the same act. Therefore uniformly. Also in relation to the spirative power, the spiration is uniform, because the spirative power is altogether one.

As to the second part, it is clear, namely that the Father and Son do not uniformly spirate if the act of spirating is referred to the spirating persons. Because the Father spirates from himself, and the Son from the Father, since the Father has the spirative power from himself, and the Son has it from the Father. Therefore they do not spirate uniformly.

However, those expressions should not be admitted by which it is said that the Father spirates principally, properly, and mediately. For they seem to construct a greater disuniformity in the act of spirating than that which is found only in relation to the spirating supposita.

Objection from Augustine, who says the Father spirates principally. Response: That is, from himself. You will say, Jerome asserts the Holy Spirit properly proceeds from the Father. Response: Still, that is, because, as our Doctor [Scotus] says, he is called the proprietor of something who possesses it from himself, but the usurper who has it from another. Hence, because the Father has the spirative power from himself, he is therefore said to spirate properly.

But if the Council of Florence, Hilary, and Richard say the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son, or immediately from the Son and mediately from the Father, they should not be so understood as if they want the Holy Spirit to arise from the Father through the Son as a grandson is generated from a grandfather through a son. But they should be so understood that they want the Son to mediate between the Holy Spirit and the Father.

Nor should anyone say: if the Father spirates from himself, and the Son from the Father, the Father will spirate prior in origin to the Son. Therefore in that prior sign of origin the Holy Spirit will be spirated. Therefore in the posterior the Son will spirate nothing. Response: Although the Father spirates from himself, and the Son from the Father, they nevertheless spirate in the same instant.

Final Question: Do the names Gift and Love belong to the Holy Spirit?

Some names are proper, others appropriated, as we have said. Proper are those which belong to one of the divine persons, such as being Father, Son, etc. Appropriated are those which belong to the three persons, but are attributed to one of them on account of the special mode of proceeding. Thus Power is an appropriated name of the Father, Wisdom of the Son, and Goodness of the Holy Spirit.

Before the solution of the question it should be known that the name Gift primarily and for its *per se* signified bespeaks a respect of giving to creatures, and connotes secondarily procession by way of liberty.

FIRST CONCLUSION

If there is talk of the name Gift most broadly taken, it can be said to belong to the Trinity. If there is talk of the name Gift improperly considered, it belongs to the Son. If finally it is taken properly, it is a name proper to the Holy Spirit.

The reason for the first is that for the notion of Gift most broadly taken, it suffices that it be given. But the whole Trinity is given to creatures, John 14: "We will come to him and make our dwelling with him." Nor is a distinction necessary between giver and given, for then the Trinity could not be given, because it is not distinguished from itself. For a man can give and sell himself.

The reason for the second is that not only is the Son given in the Incarnation, but besides he is distinguished from the giver, namely from the Father. And this is to take the name Gift more properly. But that the Son is given is clear from John 3: "God so loved the world that he gave his only Son."

The reason for the third is that for the notion of Gift properly taken two things are required, namely giving to creatures, and procession by way of liberty. But although giving to creatures can belong to the whole Trinity, and to the Word taken separately, nevertheless the Holy Spirit alone proceeds by way of liberty. And so the name Gift is proper to him. Augustine proves the Holy Spirit is Gift from these places of Scripture, John 4: "Woman, if you knew the gift of God." Acts 2: "Be baptized every one of you, and you will receive the gift of the Holy Spirit."

Therefore, because the Father and Son are the spirator of the Holy Spirit, they are also the giver. However, they cannot be called two givers, but two giving. The name gift, as we have said, bespeaks a twofold respect: one of giving to the creatures to whom it is given; the other real to the Father and Son from whom it is given. But because those creatures to whom it is given are not from eternity, therefore the Holy Spirit is not called gift or given actually from eternity, but only in aptitude.

Furthermore, it should be known that passive spiration and gift are not two properties of the Holy Spirit, but one, although they are distinguished by reason. For he is called Spirit because he proceeds from the will, and gift because he is love produced liberally, insofar as it connotes creatures to whom it is communicated.

SECOND CONCLUSION

If the name Love is taken absolutely and without an adjective, it is not a proper name of the Holy Spirit. But if it is taken with this adjective, produced Love, spirated Love, then it is a true proper name of the third person.

The reason for the first is that love considered absolutely is an essential name belonging to the three persons, and therefore not proper to the Holy Spirit. However, it can be called an appropriated name, because the Holy Spirit proceeds through the will, to which love belongs.

The reason for the second is that if to the name Love is added "produced", the name produced love belongs to the Holy Spirit alone, and consequently is proper to him. Therefore, the same should be said about the name Love with respect to the Holy Spirit as we said about the name Wisdom with respect to the Word. For if Wisdom is considered absolutely, it is a common name to the three persons, but appropriated to the Son, because he proceeds through the intellect, to which wisdom pertains. But if "begotten" is added, then the name begotten wisdom is proper to the Word alone. So the name Love is common to the three persons, but the name spirated Love is proper to the Holy Spirit.

And this is what the scholastic Doctors say: if the name Love is taken for the act by which God formally loves all things, then it is not a proper name. But if it is taken for the term produced by the fecund will, it is a proper name.

Last chapter : On the Notions, Circumincection, Order and Mission of the Divine Persons.

Now that we've covered each divine person specifically, we need to move on to some considerations that follow the persons in a special way - namely, explaining the Notions, Circumincection, Order and Mission of the persons. Since these topics don't require great length, we'll try to contain what we have to say about them in a single chapter.

Question 1: How many Notions are there in God?

The term "Notion" can be taken in two ways: First, it means the actual understanding of something. In this sense, a learned man is said to have many notions. Second, it is the basis for knowing, identifying and distinguishing something, in a way so particular to it that upon hearing it, we immediately come to know it. For example, when we hear of paternity and filiation, we come to know the Father and Son.

A Divine Notion is defined as: the basis for knowing a divine person, pertaining to origin, according to its own proper and special aspect, either positively or negatively. "Negatively" is added on account of innascibility, which is a negative notion.

CONCLUSION

Five divine Notions are assigned, namely: innascibility, paternity, filiation, active spiration, and passive spiration.

The reasoning is that there are as many notions as there are forms or marks by which we know one person is distinct from another with respect to origin. But there are five such forms, therefore five notions.

First, innascibility is a negative form signifying the Father does not originate from another, and is the first notion. Second, paternity is the form signifying the Father is the generative principle of another, and so is the second notion. Third, filiation is the form by which we know the Son is from another, as from one generating, and is the third notion. Fourth, active spiration is the form signifying the Father and Son are the spirative principle of the Holy Spirit, and so is the fourth notion. Fifth, passive spiration is the form signifying the Holy Spirit is spirated by the others, and so is the fifth notion.

Of these notions, two are proper to the Father (innascibility and paternity), one is proper to the Son (filiation), another to the Holy Spirit (passive spiration), and one is common to the Father and Son (active spiration).

Furthermore, of the same notions, some are constitutive properties, like paternity, filiation and passive spiration. Some are only relations, like active spiration, which is a relation referring the Father and Son to the Holy Spirit, though it does not constitute either. Finally, some are only notions, like innascibility, which is not a constitutive property nor a relation, since it does not express something positive. It is only a notion by which the Father is distinguished from the Son and Holy Spirit.

Therefore, property, relation and notion are related as more and less common. For every constitutive property is a relation and notion, but not every notion is a relation (as is clear with innascibility), nor is every relation a constitutive property (as is evident with active spiration, which comes to persons already constituted in their being).

OBJECTION: The notion is required so that one person is distinguished from another. But the three persons are sufficiently distinguished by paternity, filiation and passive spiration. Therefore innascibility and active spiration should not be admitted. Response: A notion is admitted so the persons are distinguished in every way they can be distinguished. But the Father and Son are distinguished from the Holy Spirit by active spiration, such that even if the Father were not the Father, nor the Son the Son, they would still be distinguished from him by active spiration. Innascibility also distinguishes the Father from the Son and Holy Spirit, because if per impossibile the Father were not the Father, he would still be distinguished from both insofar as the Father is innascible, that is, unproducible, while the other persons are producible. And so active spiration and innascibility distinguish one person from another in their own way. Therefore they are notions.

Question 2: Whether inspirability can be assigned as a sixth notion.

As the Father is innascible, so also is he inspirable, just like the Son. For the Father and Son cannot have being through spiration. Therefore it is asked whether inspirability can be assigned as a notion common to the Father and Son, just as innascibility is a proper notion of the Father. Scotus answers affirmatively.

CONCLUSION

Nothing prevents saying inspirability is a notion of the Father and Son.

So says Scotus, because this is not against the faith, and the Councils have not determined there are only five. Hence, just as innascibility was added as a notion of the Father to the four notions that were known at the time of St. Ambrose, so now nothing prevents adding a sixth, namely inspirability, since this is held by the most serious Doctors.

The Conclusion is proven: Innascibility is a notion of the Father. Therefore inspirability will be a notion of the Father and Son. The similarity is proven: just as being unbegotten belongs to the Father alone, so being inspirable belongs only to the Father and Son. Next, a notion is a basis making known to us some divine person, pertaining to origin either positively or negatively. But inspirability is a basis for us knowing the Father and Son. Therefore it will be a notion.

The minor is proven for the Father: because if per impossibile the Father were not the Father, nor unbegotten, he would still be known as distinct from the Holy Spirit by inspirability. For then the Holy Spirit would be spirable and spirated, and the Father inspirable. It is also proven for the Son: because just as the person of the Father is made known more by a positive and negative property together than by a positive one alone, so the person of the Son will be made known more by a positive and negative property

together, namely by being begotten and uninspired together, than by being begotten alone. Therefore inspirability will be a notion of the Father and Son.

YOU WILL OBJECT: Therefore besides these notions, a seventh notion should be assigned, namely infiliation or ungenerability, which will be a notion of the Holy Spirit. Response: Denying the consequence, because it belongs to the Father, who since he is unproducible, because he is the first person, is also ungenerable - unless you want to say it is a notion common to the Father and Holy Spirit, but this has not yet been in use.

Question 3: Whether one person is in another by Circumincection.

CIRCUMINCESSION is nothing other than the mutual and intimate presence of a subsistent in a really distinct subsistent, in numerically the same nature. First it says "of a subsistent in a subsistent," where it is understood incommunicably. And so the essence and attributes are not in the persons by circumincection, because neither the essence nor the attributes subsist incommunicably. Second, it says "really distinct." This is another reason why the essence is not in the persons, nor the persons in the essence, by circumincection - because they are not really distinct from each other. Third, it adds "mutual and intimate presence." Hence God is not in creatures by circumincection, because although God is intimately present to creatures and is in them, creatures are not properly in God, and so that in-existence or presence is not mutual. Also, although the soul is in the body, the body is not in the soul. Fourth, it adds "in numerically the same nature." And so numerical identity of nature is required for circumincection. For this reason two bodies mutually penetrating each other are not in each other by circumincection, on account of their distinct natures.

CONCLUSION

The persons are in each other by circumincection according to their wholes, not according to parts - that is, not only by reason of nature, but by reason of person.

The first part is proven by John 14: "Whoever has seen me has seen the Father also... Do you not believe that I am in the Father and the Father is in me?" And again, "The Father who dwells in me does his works." Hence Fulgentius in his book *On the Faith to Peter*, ch. 1, says: "By this natural unity, the whole Father is in the Son and in the Holy Spirit, the whole Son is in the Father and in the Holy Spirit, and the whole Holy Spirit is in the Father and the Son."

The second part is proven because that circumincection is the in-existence of one subsisting incommunicably in another subsisting incommunicably. But to subsist incommunicably belongs to a person as person. Therefore by circumincection one person is in another

according to its whole. It also escapes no one that one is in the other also by nature, because it is numerically the same nature in the three persons. This second part of the conclusion is against Henry, who says the Father is in the Son, but according to a part, so that the essence of the Father is in the Son and the essence of the Son in the Father, but not the paternity in the Son nor the filiation in the Father.

HENRY OBJECTS: If the Father according to his whole is in the Son, he will be in the Son according to essence and paternity. And so paternity will be in the Son. Therefore, just as the Son is called God because he has deity, so also he will be called Father because he has paternity. **Response:** Paternity is indeed in the Son, and vice versa - yet the Son is not the Father by the paternity, as he is God by the deity. For paternity is not in him as if informing, like the deity, but only by circumcession or mutual presence. It is exemplified: if by divine power a learned man were in an unlearned man, the unlearned man would not be called learned, because the learning would not be in the unlearned as if informing, but only by intimate presence. You will say: From such in-existence of one person in another would arise a confusion of the persons, contra St. Athanasius: "neither confounding the persons nor dividing the substance." **Response:** Denying such a consequence. For with that circumcession stands the real distinction of the persons, since it is put in the definition of circumcession: "of a subsistent in a really distinct subsistent." But if John says the Son goes out from the Father, the response is that he no less remains in him. For to go out is either to be begotten by the Father or to be sent by him. Whichever it is, he always remains in the Father.

Question 4: Whence proceeds the circumcession of the persons.

THAT IS, what is the basis of that in-existence by which one person is in another. Some say the origin of one from the other is the basis of such mutual presence. Others say it is the essence alone. But we say the basis of circumcession is the essence together with the relation. St. Thomas wants the origin to be the precise basis for why the Father is in the Son. For he argues thus: The divine persons are produced through immanent acts. But the term of an immanent action must necessarily remain within the agent - otherwise it would not be an immanent but a transient action. Therefore it is necessary that the Son be in the Father, and likewise the Holy Spirit in the Father and the Son. Against him and others will be:

CONCLUSION

The basis of circumcession is not origin alone, nor essence alone, nor relation alone - but essence with relation.

The first is clear, because although origin or immanent production expresses the produced term remaining within the producer, yet it does not imply that the producer is in the produced. Therefore, although by reason of origin the Son is in the Father, and the Holy Spirit in the

Father and the Son, nevertheless on this account the Father who is the producer is not in the Son, nor the Son in the Holy Spirit - just as although a mental word is in the intellect, yet the intellect is not in the word. Scotus uses this reasoning to weaken the opinion of St. Thomas. The second is clear, because circumincession is the mutual presence of one really distinct subsistent in another really distinct subsistent. But the persons do not have it from the essence that they are distinguished, nor that they subsist incommunicably. Therefore the basis of the circumincession of one in the other is not the essence alone. The third is proven because for circumincession it is required that the mutual in-existence of many occur in the same nature. But the nature is not the same by the relation - rather, if it could be distinguished and divided, it would be divided by the relation. For by this, that the Father is generating and the Son begotten, the divine nature would be divided if it were not indivisible of itself. The fourth part is proven because for circumincession two things are required especially: the real distinction of the persons mutually existing in each other, and that such mutual in-existence occur in the same nature. The relation does the first, namely that the persons mutually existing in each other are distinguished. The essence does the other, namely that such mutual presence occur in the same nature. Therefore circumincession is taken both from the relation and from the essence.

Question 5: Whether there is some order among the persons.

IT IS AGREED indeed that there is not an order of duration among them, for the three persons are co-eternal, and in them there is no before and after. Therefore the question is about the order of nature and origin, which is admitted by Scotus and other most serious doctors to remove the confusion of the notional and essential acts.

Where it should be NOTED that there is a twofold order in God: namely of nature, and of origin. By the order of nature we understand the natural presupposition of one to another with which it is identified, without any imperfection. So the essence is prior to the attributes, and is presupposed to them, just as the essence and attributes to the relations and persons. That order is not made only through the intellect, because without the operation of the intellect the divine essence as the radical entity is still presupposed to the relations emanating from it; the formal aspect of the former is required for the formal aspect of the latter. The order of origin is the natural presupposition of one to another, with the added origination of one from the other. And so the order of origin adds something to the natural order, namely origination. Therefore such an order is found only between the originating and the originated, so that the Father is prior in nature and origin to the Son. But if Aristotle says relatives are simultaneous by nature, this is true formally, for the Father as Father is in the same instant of nature as the Son as Son. Yet it is false fundamentally, for the person who is the producer is presupposed to the produced person. But if Scotus says the notional originate from the essential, and there is an order of origin between them - there he takes origination for emanation, inasmuch as the notional flow from the essence, not through production (because the essence neither produces nor is produced), but through emanation, inasmuch as the relations are rooted in the essence, like properties in a subject.

NOTE 2: The instants of nature can be considered in two ways: namely simply, and comparatively - that is, in comparison to the instants in which he produces creatures. If taken

in the first way, then there are two instants of nature in God: in the first, all the essential are completed, and in the second, all the notional. If taken in the second way, in comparison to those things which are *ad extra*, then the Doctor says in the things which are *ad intra*, there is only one instant comparatively, in which are completed all the things which are *ad intra* - which instant indeed taken comparatively encompasses two instants simply. The signs of origin are also taken in two ways: first simply, second in a certain respect. The signs of origin simply are those which are found in the production of the persons - so in the first sign of origin the Father is able to generate and spirate; in the second the Father generates, and communicates to the Son all the essential, and consequently the proximate power of spirating; in the third the Father and the Son produce the Holy Spirit. The signs of origin in a certain respect are those which follow the divine persons, as they are to spirate from himself, and to spirate from another. And so it can be said that in one instant of origin taken in a certain respect, the Father spirates, and in another the Son - because the Father spirates from himself, and the Son from the Father. All these must be distinguished, so that Scotus may be understood, because sometimes he puts only one instant of nature in God, sometimes two; now he says the Father and the Son spirate in the same instant of origin, now in two. Moreover, one instant of nature sometimes involves many instants of origin. So the second instant of nature, in which all the notional are completed, encompasses three instants of origin. Also in one sign of origin are many instants of nature, as in the first sign of origin, where is the Father with the essence and the essential - the essence is supposed to the intellect, and the intellect to the intellection, and the intellection to the volition, even as all these are in the Father, which presuppositions are signs of nature.

CONCLUSION

In God there is order, or priority and posteriority of origin and nature, such that it is true to say there is priority and posteriority among the divine persons, excluding the operation of the intellect.

The first is clear from what we have said: that the Father in the first instant has the generative and spirative power; in the second, the Father generates the Son; in the third, spirates with the Son the Holy Spirit. But that that priority is on the part of the thing is clear from St. Basil, book 1 against Eunomius, teaching that in God there is a before and after - not by our position, but by a certain natural consecution. And afterwards explaining this passage of John, "the Father is greater than I," he says he is called greater because he is prior in origin. Our opinion is confirmed by the common usage of the Church, which calls the Father the first person, the Son the second, and the Holy Spirit the third - so that it is not in our power to call the Holy Spirit the first person, nor the Father the third. This is a sign that the order among the persons does not depend on our intellect. Therefore there is priority and posteriority among them on the part of the thing - not which is duration, but which is only a certain peculiar aspect by which one person produces another, or is produced by another. And since that aspect of proceeding or producing is on the part of the thing, such order is on the part of the thing.

YOU WILL OBJECT: From Augustine, between the begetter and the begotten there is an order of nature - not that one is prior to the other, but from the other. Therefore on account of the order of origin, priority is not to be admitted in God. Response: Priority of duration is not admitted, which alone is priority properly so called. Priority of origin is indeed admitted, which is a diminished priority and in a certain respect. But if Basil in book 10 against Eunomius admits priority and posteriority only by cognition, by this he denies only priority of duration. For he says the persons are not to be separated by interval. But he does not deny the priority of origin and nature, which nevertheless he says is from the intellect, insofar as it is apprehended in the manner of duration. You will say: Those signs or instants of origin by which we say the Father is prior to the Son, are either something fictitious or something real. The second is not the case, because they would be either a person, or the essence, or some duration. But if they are some duration, the Father is prior to the Son in duration. Response: They are something real, yet they are neither the essence, nor a person, nor a duration of the persons. For because the Father is from himself, and the Son is from the Father, therefore the Father is in the first sign, and the Son in the second. Also because the Holy Spirit is from the Father and the Son, therefore he is in the third. They are not durations, but certain aspects of being and proceeding.

Question 6: What is the sending of divine persons?

Sending can happen in five ways. First, by command, like a master sending a servant. This does not apply to divine persons because they are completely equal. Second, by way of advice or persuasion, like when advisors send a king to war. This also cannot apply to divine persons, as none are ignorant and in need of advice. Third, by praying and begging, like when someone sends another somewhere by request. This is not what we're talking about either, as the one who asks is inferior to the one being asked. Fourth, by local motion, like sending an arrow, letter, legate or friend to some place. This doesn't work for divine persons either, as each is God and therefore everywhere. Fifth, it refers to the manifestation of a produced person in some new external effect, visible or invisible. This is what the question is about.

CONCLUSION

Sending is the manifestation of a produced person in some new external effect, produced visibly or invisibly, or signified as previously produced.

First, it's called a manifestation to denote a relation of reason to the one to whom the sending happens. Sending implies two relations: a real one to the sender, which is a relation of origin (to be sent by a person is to be produced by that person), and one of reason to the creature. If it's asked to whom the sending happens, the common response is that it's to a rational nature, angelic or human, not an irrational one. Because according to Augustine, a

divine person is sent to be known as proceeding from the Father. But a divine person cannot be known by an irrational nature, so sending does not happen to it.

Second, it's called a produced person, so sending only applies to an emanating person. Two things are found in sending: external manifestation and internal procession. Third, it's said to happen in some newly produced effect, because a person is sent in time so a rational creature receives something. The Word was sent to humanity to terminate it, the Holy Spirit was sent to the Apostles to newly give them grace. Fourth, or signified as previously produced - when the Holy Spirit was sent to Christ at the Jordan in the form of a dove, this sending did not signify Christ actually receiving grace from the Holy Spirit, but denoted that Christ had previously received the grace of the Holy Spirit at his conception. So this descent was a sign of grace not actually being conferred, but previously given, as Christ was full of grace from the moment of conception. Lastly, visibly or invisibly is added to denote the way the Holy Spirit is sent, truly both visibly and invisibly, as we will discuss.

OBJECTION: Against the second part of the definition. The Word is sent by the Holy Spirit to become incarnate, for Christ says in Isaiah 61: "The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, he has sent me to preach good news." But the Word does not proceed from the Holy Spirit. So it's false to say sending happens from producer to produced. **RESPONSE:** The Hebrews understand this to be about Isaiah himself, sent by the Holy Spirit. Or King Cyrus, according to Cyril. But since Ambrose and Augustine understand it to be about Christ sent by the Holy Spirit, a second response is needed. It should be understood as referring to the incarnate Christ made man, whom the Holy Spirit sends, not to the Christ about to become incarnate. For the same text says the Holy Spirit is upon the Son - not as God, but rather in him. So the Spirit does not send him as God but as man.

OBJECTION: Against the same part. If only a produced person sent and not the three persons, one person would effect something another did not, because to send is to produce some effect. **RESPONSE:** Two things are found in sending: First, the passive manifestation of the sent person. This is proper only to the produced person and is a relation of reason. Second, the production of grace, which belongs to the whole Trinity as an external work. So just as in the incarnation the three persons produce the humanity but only the second terminates it, so in the sending of the Holy Spirit the three persons produce the grace which is the effect of the sending, but only the productive person is properly manifested and said to be sent.

Question 7: How many kinds of sending are there?

Having assigned the ways sending can be used, seen in what way we attribute it to divine persons, and given its definition, now we will divide sending.

CONCLUSION

There are two kinds of sending: passive and active.

Passive sending, which is especially the question here, is again twofold: visible and invisible. Invisible is when a person is sent without any sensible sign to produce some insensible effect, like when a divine person is sent to sanctify souls inwardly through gifts of grace, without any sensible sign of such coming. As it says in Romans 5: "The love of God has been poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us."

Sensible sending is twofold: in being and in representing. The first is ordered more to being than representing, like the sending of the Word in the Incarnation, which is ordered more to the being of the hypostatic union than to representing something. It's called sensible because through it a divine person is rendered sensible in some way, if not in himself then by reason of the term or man to whom he is united. Hence it is said, "The Word became flesh."

Sensible sending in representing is when a person is sent under a sensible sign representing an insensible effect. So the Holy Spirit was sent in the form of wind and a dove. Furthermore, sensible sending is twofold: One representing an effect actually produced, like when the Holy Spirit was sent to the Apostles on the day of Pentecost. This sending represented the grace actually given to them. The other represents an effect not actually produced but previously produced, as when the Holy Spirit was sent upon Christ in the Jordan. This sending signified grace not actually conferred upon him then but previously at his conception.

Lastly, visible and invisible sending are related as what includes and what is included. Because when the Holy Spirit was sent visibly upon the Apostles, he was also sent invisibly through grace.

Question 8: To whom does sending belong?

From what we have said it seems clear enough to which persons sending belongs, since we asserted sending is the manifestation of a produced person. It's clear enough that passive sending can only belong to produced persons and active only to producing ones. But lest anything remain unexplained, we propose this question.

CONCLUSION

Passive sending belongs to a produced person and active to a producing one.

The first is clear, because as we said, passive sending includes two things: a relation of origin or procession from the sender, and external manifestation. But only a produced person implies a relation of origin to the sender or originator. So only a produced person is sent and thus only the Father is not sent, because he alone does not proceed.

The other is also evident, because just as passive sending implies a relation of origin to the producer by whom it is sent, so also active sending implies a relation to the produced person whom it sends. And so the Holy Spirit does not send, but the Son both sends and is sent.

OBJECTION: The Father is also sent. John 13: "My Father will love him, and we will come to him." Hence Augustine says any person gives and is given, and therefore sends and is sent. Also, the Father can appear in some sensible sign, as perhaps he appeared in the Old Testament in the form of the Ancient of Days. But that appearance is a passive sending, so the Father was sent.

RESPONSE: The Father is not properly sent, for the reason given - that sending involves production from the sender. But it can be said the Father comes, is given and appears. For these names are essential to what is outside, not notional. Hence all the persons could communicate themselves and come, but they cannot be sent. So Augustine says the Father, when he is known by anyone in time, is not said to be sent, for he does not have anyone from whom he is or proceeds. And so although he can be called given, he is not called sent except improperly and broadly.

To the objection that the Father appeared - granted, but it still cannot be inferred that the Father was sent. For sending involves two things: manifestation and procession. Since he did not have the second, he cannot be called sent, even if he had the first.

Question 9: Is sending eternal or temporal?

This question is raised because two things are found in sending: procession, which is eternal, and manifestation, which is temporal. Hence it seems partly eternal, partly temporal - eternal in its principle, temporal in its term; eternal in procession, temporal in manifestation. However:

CONCLUSION

Sending is temporal.

This is clear from Paul in Galatians 4: "When the fullness of time had come, God sent his Son." The reason is that although sending connotes eternal procession, formally it implies manifestation. For the formal meaning of sending is manifestation and what is connoted is procession. So it is simply temporal.

OBJECTION 1: Just as sending is called temporal because of a temporal term, so also it can be called eternal because of eternal procession. RESPONSE: The inference is denied, because sending does not exist except when its complete nature exists, which happens when a temporal term is added to the eternal procession. Hence, because it is completed and perfected through a temporal term, it should truly and properly be called temporal.

OBJECTION 2: Christ includes human nature, which is temporal, and the divine Word, which is eternal. But by reason of the Word we say Christ is from eternity. So by equal reason, since sending signifies one temporal thing and one eternal thing, by reason of the eternal it can be called eternal. RESPONSE: The reasoning is not parallel. For Christ supposits for the person of the Word, to whom eternity belongs. But sending does not supposit for the eternal procession but for the manifestation, which connotes procession. And so it should be called temporal.

QUESTION: Under what signs did the Holy Spirit appear when he was sent visibly, and what do those signs denote? RESPONSE: He was sent visibly four times:

First, in the form of a dove when Christ was baptized, which denotes the fecundity of Christ's works and ours through spiritual regeneration, for the dove is a most fertile animal.

Second, in the form of a bright cloud at Christ's Transfiguration, to show his majesty. For in many places Scripture is accustomed to show God's majesty through a cloud.

Third, under the form of a breath, which signifies the expulsion of sins through penance.

Fourth, under the form of fiery tongues, which denotes the power of fervent preaching granted to the Apostles when the Holy Spirit was sent to them.

Final question: On the way of speaking about this mystery

Since many theological propositions generate diverse and sometimes contrary meanings because of the obscure signification of terms, it must be declared what propositions and terms should be used. Hence:

I SAY 1: This proposition is true: "The Son is other than the Father." This is false: "The Son is another thing." For "another" taken substantively denotes diversity of essence, but "other" taken adjectively imports only diversity of supposit. Therefore it can be said "other and other" but not "another thing and another thing," unless adjectively, connoting a supposit, so that the meaning is "the supposit of the Father is one thing, the supposit of the Son another." If some say substantively "it is one thing and another," here "another" should be taken inadequately for a formality, because the formality of the Father is something other than the formality of the Son. For if Augustine says "it is one thing to be God, another to be Father," because of the distinction of formalities, a fortiori it can be said "the Father is one thing, the Son another." But because "another" taken substantively commonly denotes a distinction of essence, it should not be said "another and another" except with the explanation alleged.

I SAY 2: This is true: "God is the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit." Scotus's reason is this: That proposition is true where the predicate is adequate to the subject. But in this one the predicate, namely the three divine supposita, are adequate to this subject "God." For the predicate does not extend more broadly than the subject. So it is true - not formally, because a formal predication, which the logicians call proper, is when the predicate is superior or as it were superior to the subject, as if it were said "Peter and Paul are man," and in divine things, "The Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are God." But here the opposite happens, for the subject is as it were superior. And so it is not formal but identical. And an identical proposition is one in which, because of infinity, the predicate is the same as the subject, as in the case at hand. Nor let anyone say that no God is the Father or the Son or the Holy Spirit, as is clear by induction. Therefore neither is God in himself the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. The inference is denied, because in the antecedent "God" is taken distributively for the supposita, and in the consequent not distributively but collectively for the individual of divinity.

I SAY 3: These propositions are false: "The essence generates or spirates or produces" or "is generated or spirated or produced." Because as we said, between the generator and the generated there is a real distinction. But the essence is not really distinct from the essence, otherwise there would be two of which one would be generating and the other generated. And this would fall into the error of those who said there are three essences in God of which one is from another, and who falsely asserted the Father to be the essentiaator, the Son and Holy Spirit to be essentiated. Nor is it really distinct from the persons, otherwise there would be a quaternity in God, because there would be four really distinct things. Therefore the essence does not generate or is generated, but is indeed communicated.

For the essence as it is in the Father is communicated to the Son through generation; as it is in the Father and Son, it is communicated to the Holy Spirit through active spiration.

I SAY 4: This proposition is true: "God generates." And this is false: "God does not generate." For by the former it is simply understood that within the divine nature there is some generating supposit, and this is true. And by the second it is understood that among the persons none generates, and this is false.

You will say: In the prior proposition, when it is said "God generates," here "God" supposits for the Father who truly generates, and so it is true. But in the second, "God" supposits for the Son who truly does not generate, and so both will be true. RESPONSE: In neither is "God" taken for a supposit, but it supposits for the concrete of divinity insofar as it connotes some supposit that generates. Therefore, since in the concrete of divinity, connoting the supposita, there is some supposit that generates, it would be true to say "God generates." And it is false to say "God does not generate," because for this to be true - that God does not generate - it would be required that within the concrete of divinity there be no generating supposit. For there is this difference between an affirming and a denying proposition: for the truth of an affirmative it is enough that the predicate belongs to the subject under some aspect; but for the truth of a negative it is required that under no aspect does the predicate belong to the subject. For example, for this proposition to be true - "Peter disputed yesterday" - it is enough that he disputed either in the morning or in the evening. And for the truth of this one - "Peter did not dispute yesterday" - he must not have disputed at any hour. To our point: "God generates" is an affirmative proposition, for the truth of which it is

sufficient that generation belong to God in some way, that is, by reason of some supposit. Since therefore some supposit truly generates, it is true to say "God generates."

But when it is said "God does not generate," it is a negative proposition, for the truth of which generation must be removed with respect to any supposit whatever. Since this cannot be done, because some supposit truly generates, therefore it is false to say "God does not generate." For a negation destroys the whole.

Table of contents

Chapter 1: On the Knowability of the Mystery of the Trinity	1
Question 1: Whether the proposition "God is triune" is self-evident.	1
CONCLUSION	2
This proposition, "God is triune," or "The Trinity is in God," is not self-evident.	2
Question 2: Whether it can be known a priori that there is a Trinity in God.	3
CONCLUSION	4
No created intellect, in whatever state it may exist, apart from revelation, can know this mystery a priori.	4
Question 3: Whether the mystery of the Trinity can be known naturally a posteriori.	5
CONCLUSION	6
The created intellect cannot know the mystery of the Trinity naturally a posteriori.	6
Chapter 2. On Persons Taken Generally	7
Question 1: Are there multiple Persons in the Divinity?	8
CONCLUSION	8
There are multiple persons in the Divinity.	8
Question 2: Whether there are three Persons in the divine.	9
CONCLUSION	9
There are three Persons, no more and no less.	9
Question 3: Whether the three divine Persons are really distinct.	11
CONCLUSION	11
The three divine Persons are really distinct.	11
Question 4: Whether the Word is God.	12
CONCLUSION	12
The Son, who is also called the Word, and who assumed our nature, is truly God.	12
Question 5: Whether the Holy Spirit is God	16
CONCLUSION	16
The Holy Spirit is truly God.	16
Question 6: Whether the three persons are one God	17
CONCLUSION	18
The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are only one God - against the Tritheists asserting that the three persons are three eternal spirits differing in essential number.	

Question 7: Whether there are three relative existences in God	19
CONCLUSION	19
There are three relative existences, each one of which belongs to each person.	19
Question 8: Whether there are three relative subsistences in God	21
CONCLUSION	21
There are three subsistences in God.	21
Question 9: Are there in God one absolute Existence and one absolute Subsistence?	22
CONCLUSION	22
There are posited absolute existence and subsistence in God.	22
Question 10: Whether in God there are three Substances.	24
CONCLUSION.	24
If substance is taken for the essence or nature of a thing, as Aristotle used it when saying that univocal things are those whose substance (i.e. nature or essence) is the same, then there should not be said to be three substances in God. If secondly it is taken as the name substance comes from "standing under" accidents, then there are neither three nor one in God. If thirdly it is taken for that which subsists per se, then there can be said to be three substances in God.	24
Question 9: Which beings are multiplied in God, and which are not.	25
CONCLUSION.	25
Absolute predicates which are formally infinite are not multiplied; but only relative predicates are.	25
CHAPTER 3. On the Divine Productions.	26
Question 1: Whether there is production in God.	26
CONCLUSION.	27
There is true production or procession in God—immanent and metaphysical.	27
Question 2: How many productions there are in God.	28
FIRST CONCLUSION.	29
There are two productions in God, by the first of which the Word is produced, and by the second the Holy Spirit.	29
SECOND CONCLUSION.	30
There are only two productions in God.	30
Question 3: From what the divine processions are.	31
CONCLUSION.	31
The divine processions are acts of the intellect and will.	31
Question 4: How the will becomes the principle of communicating nature.	32
CONCLUSION	32
Question 5: Whether the intellect and will alone are the intrinsic principles of the divine productions.	33
CONCLUSION	33
The intellect considered just in itself is not the complete intrinsic principle of the generation of the Word, but rather the intellect along with the essence. Likewise the will as such is not the complete principle of the Holy Spirit, but together with God's essence.	33
Question 6: Which actions are the processions of the divine persons.	34
FIRST CONCLUSION	35

God's Word is not produced through actual understanding, nor consequently is the Holy Spirit produced through willing. Because understanding and willing are essential acts common to the three persons, but conceptual actions are not common.	35
SECOND CONCLUSION	36
God's Word is produced through speaking, formally distinct from understanding.	36
Question 7: What is the distinction between the production of the Son and the Holy Spirit?	37
CONCLUSION.	38
The procession of the Son and of the Holy Spirit differ in this, that the former is a generation, the latter is not. And therefore the former is a generation, the latter is not, because through the first a term similar by force of its own procession is produced, but not through the second.	38
Chapter 4: On divine relations.	40
Question 1: Are there real relations in God?	40
CONCLUSION.	40
The four relations of origin - Paternity, Filiation, active Spiration, and passive Spiration - are real.	40
Question 2: How are the divine relations distinguished from the essence?	41
CONCLUSION.	41
Relations are not really distinguished from the essence, but they are formally distinguished.	41
Question 3: How are the relations of origin distinguished from each other?	42
FIRST CONCLUSION.	42
Opposed relations of origin are really distinguished, such as paternity and filiation, active and passive spiration.	42
SECOND CONCLUSION.	43
Generation and active spiration, and likewise filiation, are only formally distinct in the concrete, but really [distinct] in the abstract.	43
Question 4: Do the relations of origin express perfection simply speaking?	43
CONCLUSION.	44
The relations of origin formally taken are neither perfect nor imperfect, neither finite nor infinite.	44
Question 5: Whether the divine persons are constituted by relations.	45
CONCLUSION	46
Each divine PERSON is constituted from the divine essence and a personal property which is relative. And this is to say the persons are constituted adequately through relations.	46
Question 6: Whether the common relations are real in God.	50
CONCLUSION.	51
The aforesaid relations are real. So Scotus.	51
Chapter 5: on the divine persons specifically, and first on the Father.	53
Question1: Whether the name "Father" properly applies to the first person.	53
CONCLUSION.	54
The name "Father" taken notionally applies to the first person, and to Him alone.	54
Question 2: Whether the name "principle" applies to the first person.	54
CONCLUSION.	55
The name "principle" applies to the first person; yet it is not so proper to Him, that it	

cannot be attributed to the Son, although it belongs more principally to the Father.	55
Question 3: Whether the name "cause" applies to the first person.	55
CONCLUSION.	56
Although the Father with the Son and Holy Spirit can be called the cause of creatures, yet with respect to the Son He cannot be called cause; but rightly principle.	56
Question 4: Whether "unbegotten" belongs to the Father.	57
CONCLUSION. Unbegotten taken in the third way, for that which in no way is produced, belongs to the Father as His property.	57
Question 5: Whether "unbegotten" is a constitutive property of the Father.	58
CONCLUSION. Although "unbegotten" is a property of the Father, yet it is not constitutive; because "unbegotten" formally imports a negation, which cannot constitute a positive thing.	58
Question 6: Whether the Father generates the Son from His own substance.	59
CONCLUSION.	59
The Father produces the Son from His own substance.	59
Question 7: Does the substance of the Father from which the Son is generated have the nature of matter or form? And what do the Arians say, wanting Him to be created?	60
CONCLUSION	60
The substance of the Father from which the Son is generated does not take the place of matter, but in a way of form.	60
Question 8: How is the divine essence determined to the Father?	61
CONCLUSION.	62
The divine essence is determined immediately to the first person.	62
Question 10: Whether the Father produces the Son necessarily and naturally.	63
CONCLUSION	63
The Father does not generate the Son by necessity of violence, or coaction, or only immutability; but of complete inevitability or indefectibility.	63
Question 11: Whether the Father begot the Son by will.	64
FIRST CONCLUSION	65
The Father does not produce the Son by will, as by a productive principle; nor by will, in the way in which He produced creatures.	65
SECOND CONCLUSION	65
The Father did not beget the Son by will applying the parent with the offspring; but indeed by antecedent, concomitant, and subsequent will.	65
Question 12: Is the Father blessed before he begets?	68
CONCLUSION	68
The Father by nature is blessed before he begets,	68
Question 13: Whether the Father is wise by the begotten wisdom.	69
CONCLUSION	69
The Father is not wise by the begotten wisdom;	69
Chapter 6: on the second person	70
Question 1: Whether the true name of the Son is a proper name of the second person.	70
CONCLUSION.	70
The name "Son" is proper to the second person.	70
Question 2: Whether the name "Son" is univocal with respect to the divine Son and a	

human son.	71
CONCLUSION.	71
The name "Son" is truly univocal with respect to a human son and a divine son,	71
Question 3: Whether the name "Word" is proper to the second person.	72
CONCLUSION.	73
The name "Word" is proper to the second person.	73
Question 4: Whether the name "Image" belongs to the second person alone.	75
CONCLUSION.	76
The name "Image" is proper to the second person.	76
Question 5: From what cognition does the Divine Word proceed?	77
CONCLUSION.	77
The Word proceeds from no actual knowledge of anything, but from a quasi-virtual and habitual knowledge of the essence alone, not of the persons, attributes, and creatures.	77
Chapter 8: On the Third Person of the Trinity	79
Question 1: Whether the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son	80
CONCLUSION	80
The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son.	80
Question 2: Whether if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, it would still be really distinct from Him.	84
CONCLUSION.	85
Even if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, it would still be really distinct from Him.	85
Question 3: Whether the production of the Holy Spirit is both necessary and free.	87
CONCLUSION	88
The procession of the Holy Spirit is not natural, but is necessary; yet free.	88
Question 4: Whether the Father and Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit	89
CONCLUSION	89
The Father and Son should be called one principle of the Holy Spirit, but should not be called two spirators, although they can be called two spirating.	89
Question 5: Whether a plurality of persons is <i>per se</i> required in the production of the Holy Spirit	90
CONCLUSION	90
The Holy Spirit necessarily proceeds from the Father and Son because of the order between intellect and will. Nevertheless, this duality is not so required <i>per se</i> that if, <i>per impossibile</i> , he proceeded only from one person, he would not be of the same personal character as he is now.	90
Question 6: Is the Holy Spirit produced by a mutual and concordant will?	92
CONCLUSION	92
The Holy Spirit is not produced by the will as it is mutual and concordant.	92
Question 7: Do the Father and Son uniformly spirate the Holy Spirit?	93
CONCLUSION	94
If the act of spirating is taken in the first three ways, the Father and Son uniformly spirate. If it is considered in the fourth way, they do not spirate altogether uniformly.	94
Final Question: Do the names Gift and Love belong to the Holy Spirit?	94
FIRST CONCLUSION	95

If there is talk of the name Gift most broadly taken, it can be said to belong to the Trinity. If there is talk of the name Gift improperly considered, it belongs to the Son. If finally it is taken properly, it is a name proper to the Holy Spirit.	95
SECOND CONCLUSION	96
If the name Love is taken absolutely and without an adjective, it is not a proper name of the Holy Spirit. But if it is taken with this adjective, produced Love, spirated Love, then it is a true proper name of the third person.	96
Last chapter : On the Notions, Circumincection, Order and Mission of the Divine Persons.	96
Question 1: How many Notions are there in God?	97
CONCLUSION	97
Five divine Notions are assigned, namely: innascibility, paternity, filiation, active spiration, and passive spiration.	97
Question 2: Whether inspirability can be assigned as a sixth notion.	98
CONCLUSION	98
Nothing prevents saying inspirability is a notion of the Father and Son.	98
Question 3: Whether one person is in another by Circumincection.	99
CONCLUSION	99
The persons are in each other by circumincection according to their wholes, not according to parts - that is, not only by reason of nature, but by reason of person.	99
Question 4: Whence proceeds the circumincection of the persons.	100
CONCLUSION	100
The basis of circumincection is not origin alone, nor essence alone, nor relation alone - but essence with relation.	100
Question 5: Whether there is some order among the persons.	101
CONCLUSION	102
In God there is order, or priority and posteriority of origin and nature, such that it is true to say there is priority and posteriority among the divine persons, excluding the operation of the intellect.	102
Question 6: What is the sending of divine persons?	103
CONCLUSION	103
Sending is the manifestation of a produced person in some new external effect, produced visibly or invisibly, or signified as previously produced.	103
Question 7: How many kinds of sending are there?	104
CONCLUSION	105
There are two kinds of sending: passive and active.	105
Question 8: To whom does sending belong?	105
CONCLUSION	105
Passive sending belongs to a produced person and active to a producing one.	105
Question 9: Is sending eternal or temporal?	106
CONCLUSION	106
Sending is temporal.	106
Final question: On the way of speaking about this mystery	107
Table of contents	109