

DISPUTATION.

Q. Whether the Faculties or Natural Powers of the Soul (namely, the Active Vital, the Intellective, and the Volitive) are the very Essential form of the Soul itself? Affirmative.

This controversy has been so long agitated in the Schools by the most subtle intellects, that scarcely anything new is to be expected from me here. By most, the state of the question is thus put forth: Whether the Faculties are distinguished in reality from the very substance of the soul? Scotus and his Followers deny it; and Ockham, with Gregory of Rimini and the cohort of Nominalists. Thomas Aquinas affirms it, with his followers; who hold that the faculties are nothing else than accidental qualities by which the Soul performs its operations.

The opinion of the Thomists is supported by these arguments recited by Zabarella (in his book On Natural Things, page 687):

1. Natural Power, or the aptitude for operating, is placed by Aristotle in the second species of quality: But the Powers of the Soul are Natural aptitudes for operating: Therefore they are essentially in the second species of quality.

2. If the Soul were the same as its Powers, the Powers themselves would also be the same among themselves: Because things which are the same with any third thing, are also the same among themselves: Therefore, the Visual Power will be the same as the Motive Power, the Olfactory Power, etc. But multiple Powers are not a single one.

(See Augustine cited by Lombard in section 1, distinction 3, chapter 8. And Bernard on the Canticles, sermon 11. And Isidore in his Etymologies, chapter 1, book 11. And Hugh of St. Victor on Spirit and Soul. And William Chalmers the Scot in Selected Disputations, Part 2, question 28, page 289, etc. Philip Faber in Natural Philosophy, Theorem 74. Rada in Controversies, Volume 2, Controversy 13, article 2. Piccolomini on Matter, book 1, chapter 10. But most clearly of all (as in all things) Rada.)

3. The Soul is a Virtuous Substance: Therefore (says Zabarella) it is not the Virtues themselves: because neither can the Concrete be predicated of its abstract, nor the abstract of the Concrete: If the soul is the Virtues themselves, it is not rightly called Potent.

4. The power of operating regards the act, that is, the operation itself; but the act is always more noble and perfect than the Power regarding it: Therefore, if the Power were essentially and according to its internal nature the Soul itself, the operation, which is an accident, would be more perfect than the Soul, which is a Substance.

5. As power is related to being, so is Potency to Essence: But in the Soul, Power differs from Being: Therefore, Potency also differs from Essence: For the Soul, according to its being, regards the whole Body formed by it--- but according to its power, it regards operations, and the distinct parts of that Body as instruments which it uses.--- Someone having eyes is blind: therefore, in such an eye, the soul is present according to its being, because the eye is animated and has the substance of the Soul in itself: but the Soul is not there according to its power, because it cannot see--- Zabarella dismisses the other Arguments of the Thomists as weaker. But although he defends the real distinction, nevertheless he denies that the faculties are intermediary agents between the Soul and the operation, and asserts that they are only certain conditions and aptitudes of the Soul for operating.

However, Zabarella seemed to himself to have explained the matter sufficiently as follows:

1. The power of operating is something positive, but it denotes the privation of act.
2. This power presupposes another prior nature in the same thing, which it follows. Because every operation proceeds from an act: Therefore, the power of operating presupposes another actual nature from which it comes--
3. Such Powers do not depend on the prior Cause in any other way than as on an Efficient Cause; but this is not an efficient cause properly speaking through transmutation, but through mere emanation; for emanation is said to occur when, without any resistance of the patient and without any effort of the efficient, the effect follows it of its own accord, as it were, like a shadow follows a Body.
4. A Natural Power, although in a certain way Intermediate between the Cause which it follows and the operation, is not however an intermediate Cause, but that prior Cause is the immediate Cause of the operation: As if someone runs, the power of running is not the proximate Cause of running, but the Soul is the remote one; rather, the Soul is the proximate and immediate Cause. For the Power is not the Cause of the operation, but the aptitude of the Cause for operating. For the operation proceeds from the Act, not from the Power. The response must be adapted to these points before the Truth is established.

To the first I say, the Authority of Aristotle, who numbers natural Powers among accidents, namely Qualities, is held by us as nothing; inasmuch as his doctrine on Qualities seems to us very obscure and erroneous.

To the second; Powers or Virtues are both multiple and single; viz. Single Really in Essence as the Form of the Soul, and Multiple either formally or at least Relatively to multiple acts; and through extrinsic denomination to multiple objects. The Relations of multiple effects to a single Cause provide an occasion for denominating that Cause as multiple and various. And just as a Universal concept is of multiple singulars confusedly and in similarity known, and not of one real thing; so a virtual, fundamental, rational distinction arises from a partial or imperfect concept (because the Intellect does not apprehend the whole object at once) and from the diversity of

effects, or of certain connotations. And the first departure from unity to multiplicity indeed contains this difficulty that has been raised: but it must necessarily be solved by you no less than by us. The Form of any Active substance is a certain Image of the Most Holy Trinity. But it is most certain that God is Single in Essence, in three Persons, and in three active Principles, Life, Intellect, and Will. And although there is no Matter and Form in God, nevertheless we cannot conceive of Him except inadequately, and as He is made known to the incorporeal Soul as if in a mirror, through His image in the human Soul, which has a substance that must be conceived under the notion of Metaphysical Spiritual Matter and virtuous form. But are not the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit one God? Are they not three Persons? Are not Potency-Act, Intellect, and Will the single Divine Essence? Are they not nevertheless distinguished from each other in some way? By at least a virtual and Relative distinction, through extrinsic denomination, if not by the formal distinction of the Scotists. The multitude of creatures takes its origin from the Divine unity, through His Power, Intellect and Will. The effects are truly multiple: The Cause must be said to be either Single or Trinal: If Single, it does not imply a contradiction for a Single Cause to produce multiple effects: If Trinal, it does not imply a contradiction for Trinal principles of operating to be a Single and same Essence.

I confess it surpasses human understanding how diversity can occur in effects without any, even the slightest, diversity in causation (taken actively), for it seems that nothing diverse can be possible in the effects which does not flow from a diverse mode of causing: Because it is necessary for diversity itself to have a Cause: But it seems likely that the same thing operating in the same way and in the same circumstances will produce, not diverse and dissimilar things, but the same thing, or things of one kind. But at the same time it must be admitted that the Essence or Nature of Action and Causation itself almost escapes human understanding. We have some, albeit tenuous and slippery, concept of the Substance, forms, Powers of the causing thing; and effects are better known to us than their causes: Whence Logicians say that Action is in the Patient; (as if it were nothing at all as of the Agent, but only as Received and in the effect:) But without doubt, not only the Agent and the Work are something, and Action as Received; but also Action as of the Agent, or from the Agent is something: Not only the Cause and the Caused and Passion are something, but also Causation: just as an immanent Act is a mode of the Agent in itself, by which it differs from a non-agent; so a transient Action is a Mode of the Agent operating through its power in another; by which it differs from a non-operating thing. Which becomes known to us better through sense and experience than through definitions. But to say with Hervaeus, Javellus, and others, that transient Action is nothing other than the effect, from which the acting thing is said to be so only by extrinsic denomination, just as a wall is said to be seen by the act of the eye, is in my judgment, almost to rave.

I am not unaware that our Bradwardine, with many Thomists, asserts that the simple and single Volition of God causes all creatures and their diversity and all changes; and as Capreolus and others say, the Divine Essence through this Volition is not referred to the creature (by a relation of reason), but only the creature to God: But (besides that by the same argument by which they assert that Will without operative Power suffices, they could also establish that intellect without Will would be sufficient) that Volition which is Single as the Divine Essence, is in some way multiple in the production of multiple things. That it should be called multiple from the effects

(e.g., the Volition of the incarnation of Christ, the Volition of the salvation of Peter, the Volition of the damnation of Judas, and the Volition of the Divine Glory, are to be called diverse Volitions) is denied by almost no one; But whether, just as created effects are diverse, so there is some antecedent diversity in the efflux or Causing Action? Whether Heaven and Earth and Hell, salvation and damnation, are effected by a single Volition, entirely the same antecedently to the effect, and operating in the same way? Whether in cognized being, Heaven and Earth, Peter and Judas, salvation and damnation, were one thing in the Divine Mind, or the Idea of all was a single Idea, without the least diversity, before the things themselves existed as produced? And so whether from eternity, while as yet nothing created existed, to Will an Angel, to Will the incarnation of Christ, to Will the salvation of Peter, and the damnation of Judas were a single Will without any, even the slightest, difference? These things are disputed among the Scholastic Theologians. If you say that these diverse Volitions are denominated extrinsically from eternity, from Relation to the diverse things Willed. I respond: The things Willed in themselves were not Things from eternity; therefore they were not Related to the Divine Volition: For of a non-existent there is no Accident. Nor in themselves as existing, when they had not yet existed, were they the Terms of the Divine Volition. If you say, creatures were diverse from eternity in cognized being first, and thence in willed being. I respond: When as yet nothing knowable beside God existed, cognized being and willed being were nothing other than the Divine Essence itself, imperfect by no diversity: But where there is absolutely no diversity, either in thing, or in mode, or action, how can there be any Relation? Can the same thing in the same respect be both the Related and the Correlative, the foundation and the Term? And where there is no Relation, whence can there be given extrinsic Denomination? which is always founded in Relation (at least of Reason)? And (as has now been said) the Thomists hold that the relation of reason is only of the Creature to God, but not of God to the creature. But if the diversity of Persons in God most certainly consists with His Simplicity and Unity, why not also the diversity of active principles, or Essential Virtues, and the diversity of acts, namely Intellections and Volitions?

And when certain Scholastics say that God's Self-Knowing is the Son, and Self-Loving is the Holy Spirit, how do they prove the diversity of persons here, if there is absolutely no difference between God's Knowing and Willing? But if any difference whatsoever between God's Power, Intellect and Will is granted, as in no way contrary to his unity; why is it not also permitted to say the same about some diversity of Intellections, Volitions, and Creating Actions?

These things have been said at greater length, so that it may be better understood how diverse Faculties or Virtues, as well as Acts, consist with the Unity of the human Soul. Notwithstanding these things, it must be said that from the most simple and immutable God arises all diversity in (created) things; and that there is no Real multiplicity in Him, taking Reality strictly: All multiplicity is from Unity: Without doubt the Divine Essence is Single, which is apprehended by us through inadequate concepts, both of Substance or Being, and of Form. But there are three Persons, and a Threefold Essential Primality (as it is called by Campanella), or a sort of Faculty or Virtue, viz. Potency-Act, Intellect and Will. So also in the Divine Image in the human Soul, there is a Threefold Virtue or Faculty in a Single Substance; It is Single as Substance (and Metaphysical Matter and Form:) The Virtue itself or Power or Faculty is to be called Single inwardly as Essence: But looking outward it is to be called threefold; To be called threefold, I

say, without doubt by relative denomination, because the Power or Virtue is to a threefold Act and Effect; but whether also in the Virtue itself, besides the Unity of Essence, there is also some ineffable Formal threefoldness of the very operative Principle, I leave undecided.

(See Rada where cited above concerning the Image of God in the Soul, where however he badly puts Memory in place of the Active Vital Power, from Augustine.)

I indeed venerate the footsteps of the Divine Trinity in Created Souls; and although when I read the books of the Scotists on formalities, I perceive the thread to be very subtle and tenuous, nevertheless I do not dare to deny their doctrine: I discern that the difficulty of this Controversy does not lie in the argumentation of this or that person, but in the depth and spirituality of the matter: And although each side in the dispute is accustomed to hurl these difficulties at the other to defend its own Cause; nevertheless it is incumbent on all almost equally to explain how plurality proceeds from Unity, and how every Active Form is Single as Form, and yet contains in itself Virtually a certain beginning of Diversity, and as a Virtue inclined to communication, is threefold.

Scaliger says in Exercise 307, n. 15. "We say (that Intellect and Will) are not Accidents, neither absolute nor relative; nor do they differ really, as they say, from each other, nor either of them from the Essence of the Soul: For it is fitting for the Soul, on account of its dignity, to perform its offices and exercise its powers without the assistance or aid of any accident or inherent thing; but without any intermediary, immediately through its own Essence---But Intellect and Will, although one thing, are distinguished by reason; for they are proper affections of the Soul, not accidental, but one thing with it, just as One, Good, True are affections of Being itself, surely one Thing, and the same with Being itself; but they are distinguished both from it and among themselves by definition in this way: Because in the first Nature Being itself is established: Which Nature in a certain way brings itself forth and effects that it be one, good, true; which is another Formality, from that first formality --- Thus Soul, Intellect, Will are one thing.] See the rest.

But Zabarella objects, with others, [Those aptitudes of the powers to various operations either are something or nothing: if nothing, there is no difference of powers: if something, they are either substances or accidents: if substances, they would be diverse substantial forms: but if accidents, in what Category, etc.]

I respond:

1. Truly, Aristotle's or Porphyry's ten Categories are not adapted neatly enough to the nature of things, either as to their genera, or order, or number: And they are as suitable for the deception of the intellect as for its information. Therefore it matters little to us to what Category the natural Powers are said to belong.

2. While the nature of Spirits, being placed outside sense and imagination, is not known to us clearly enough, it is least to be hoped that the Accidents of Spirits are better known. And unless

I am mistaken, Aristotle adapted his categories to corporeal things and to Physics, rather than to the nature of Spirits: And although he thought the same Soul as the form of man incorporated, with all its Powers and Acts, pertains to Physics, and yet as in itself and separated, with the same powers and acts, only to Metaphysics; nevertheless the Soul in the body and separated from the body is one and the same, both in substance and Essential Virtues and acts (although not in actions to the outside). And the order of things should not be confused and disturbed according to Aristotle's opinions.

3. How will you yourself resolve your objection about the Divine Persons and Properties? Namely, that by which the Persons and Properties differ among themselves is either something or nothing: if nothing, there is no difference: if something, it is either substance or accident, etc. Respond so that you may have a response.

4. The name of accident is so ambiguous (not the genus of nine species of accidents, but a general name signifying several genera of things, and that scarcely univocally) that until it is explained by something better known, it is inept for expressing the state of the controversy.

5. The Virtue itself or Power is the form of the substance, and therefore substance: This Form of the Soul is Single, it is Really a Single Virtue, Force, Inclination, but threefold to a threefold object. That by which one Inclination or Virtue differs from another is the proper Relation at least, if not the Formality, of that Virtue. The name should not be disputed too much. If you prefer to say Property rather than Formality, you may do so as far as I am concerned. It should not be thought at all alien to Divine Power to create an active Vital Form in its Image, single at the root, but proceeding into a trinity, without division of Essence. And although the Soul, inasmuch as it is not corporeal, does not have parts outside parts, nor is it discernible; nevertheless it has its own Metaphysical or Spiritual extension, as well as Matter; and so is Metaphysically divided into Spiritual parts, that is, diverse faculties: We do not say, however, that each faculty has its own form, but rather that it is a form or formality; while the single form verges into a trinity: Nor are they to be called the forms of that single Form; but a formal Virtue as if pregnant or multiplying itself. The similitude would be too crass, inasmuch as it is from the material divisible, if I should say, just as my hand is single in the palm, but immediately divided into several fingers, etc. In even the smallest seed there lies hidden a manifold Virtue, which nevertheless is the single form of the seed. In the Sun or Fire (whatever opponents may say about its qualities) there is a single form, which contains essentially the Power or Virtue, Motive, Illuminative, and Calefactive, formally distinct among themselves, that is, as diverse formalities, although not as diverse substances: Nor are sense and the sensitive appetite accidental Qualities of the sensitive Soul, but essential faculties: But say through what Sight primarily differs from taste? and from smell? etc. and through what the apprehensive part differs from the appetitive part or faculty? Not only through organs, media, and objects; but first and intrinsically in the proper Nature or Virtue and Inclination of each one. But what should that peculiar Virtue or Inclination be called by which one sensitive faculty differs from another?

But if this formal distinction does not please, accept the prior response of the Occamists, that the faculties are not really multiple, but only respectively and by extrinsic denomination.

Obj. But when the soul is not thinking do we have distinct powers of seeing, moving, etc.?

I respond. But (say the Nominalists) they are distinct only in knowable being, supposing diverse objects, organs and media, as connotated also in intelligible being.

2. Zabarella objects [There is no more intimate or essential consideration than that which is signified through this reduplication [insofar as.] Therefore there is no more interior reason of the visual power than that which is signified by saying [The visual power insofar as it is the visual power:] It follows therefore that the visual power insofar as it is visual is olfactory; Which is absurd.

I respond. Indeed no Reason better expresses the distinction of a power than that which names the essential property of that power as differing from others. But in the very nature of the thing another more common and profound and interior and prior reason is, viz. The sensitive power, insofar as it is sensitive is prior in the order of Reason to the same power insofar as it is visual. And the visual power, insofar as it is sensitive is the same as the power which is called secondarily olfactory. When you say [The visual power insofar as it is visual] you include a relation to the connoted object; But the reason for diversity consists in this connotation: Therefore it should not be said, The power insofar as it is visual, but Which is visual is really the same as the olfactory: Which is true. The single faculty of sensing senses in diverse ways through the diversity of organs, objects and concauses: Those who lack this or that particular sense nevertheless retain the same animal faculty of sensing.

To Arg. 3. I respond. We conceive the soul inadequately under the distinct notions of Thing or Metaphysical Matter, and Formal Difference; Although in reality it is not composite. And when we speak of the Soul under the inadequate concept of Metaphysical Matter (which I am accustomed to call substance or $\delta\sigma\eta$) then we often call it Virtuous; for thus the form itself is most usually predicated of the Matter in the concrete: And so we say that God Himself is Good, Wise, Powerful. But where we strive to signify the Form itself primarily, we use rather abstracting language: And we properly say, the Soul is Substance-Virtue, or Power, Intellect and Will.

To [Arg] 4. I respond 1. Act is more noble than Potency in a certain respect, when it is a Means to some effect as an end: And Potency in Act when it is necessary to act is more noble than Potency then not acting. But in Constitutive being, and Physically, Potency or Faculty, as such, is always more noble than Act, as such, abstracted by Reason from the excellence of the Potency.

2. Active Potency is not to be confused with Passive Potency: Indeed the act of an Active potency is more noble than a Passive Potency: But it should be well noted that the name Potency in our controversy is defective: Because that of which we speak is something greater than Potency: The names, namely, of Potency, Virtue, or Force, and Inclination all taken together signify this single form of the Soul: Nor is there at hand any single name sufficient to aptly and fully signify its nature.

To 5. I respond. If by Being is understood the Being of the Soul itself, and by Power is understood not the Power to Be, but the Power to Act, with Force and Inclination as has now been said, then Power is only a partial or inadequate concept of the same Soul which is said to Be. Essence qua Essence, and Essence qua potent, etc. are diverse inadequate concepts, even objective: But they are not either diverse Essences or things; nor do they differ as substance and Accident; but as Genus and Difference, or the Nature of Spirits, qua Spirits, and qua formally Virtuous. To the illustrating reason I say, the Respect of the Powers of the Soul in operating to diverse parts of the body as instruments does not prove their real diversity among themselves. For the Powers of the Soul are the same in the separated state, when they use no corporeal instrument. In the blind eye the Soul is present not only according to being, but also according to Power: For the cause of the blinded eye not seeing is not the Impotency of the Soul, but the defect of the organ inasmuch as it is not duly disposed. That is, the whole Soul can see, the whole can taste, the whole can hear, but not wholly.

As to Zabarella's conclusions I say; 1. The first is granted. 2. If by Nature nothing else is signified than the Metaphysical Matter of the Soul or the Soul qua Essence, or this something, as an inadequate objective concept, I grant that the Soul, qua Thing comes to our mind prior to the Soul as Potent or Virtuous. But it is not one nature and another thing. Indeed every operation is from an entitative Act, that is, nothing does not operate: whatever operates, is: Indeed every operation is from an Active Potency. But the potency of operating is not operation: Nor should this Potency be said to come from the Essence of the Soul or from a prior nature, but to be the very Essence of the Soul qua Potency; just as in simple physical things, the form is not rightly said to come from the matter.

To 3. I deny that the Soul effects its Powers; as through transmutation or through emanation. But here it should be most noted how closely Zabarella approaches the truth: And how little remains to decide the dispute: For he concedes that the Powers so come from the Soul through emanation, as natural, constant and necessary effects, namely without any resistance of the patient, and without any effort of the efficient. But if he had noted that here there is no patient, and had conceded indeed an effort but a natural one, and had spoken only of the Act through the Potency, and not of the Potency itself, he would have erred minimally from the truth. Just as we say that Light indeed emanates from the Sun (and if you wish Brightness), but not the Potency of Shining; which is present in the Sun as its formal virtue, and does not emanate or come from it.

4. To the 4th. The Potency is indeed perversely denied to be the Cause of the operation; since we speak of the active Powers of the Soul, which are also Virtues and Inclinations. Indeed the Soul should not be called the remote Cause, and the Power the proximate Cause, as if they were diverse things and Causes. But the Soul qua Potent and inclined by Virtue is the total and proximate Cause: And this potency can indeed be called an Aptitude to act, but an Essential formal Aptitude, and more than an Aptitude.

II. But that the Faculties of the Soul are its very Essence or Form is proved thus:

I. From the common nature of Actives. Every Active nature (as it is distinguished from a Passive nature) is Essentially Active (just as a Passive nature is essentially passive). The Soul is an Active Nature: Therefore the Soul is essentially active.

A Passive Nature (namely Earth, Water and Air) does not act naturally (except to Unity and to Rest): And therefore it is doubted whether its act is through essence or through accidents. But an Active Nature (such as is of Spirits and Fire) does not act to rest, but as it were rests in acting, and to act is its most natural state. It does not act, therefore, through accidents only but through essence.

Nature is the Principle of Motion: Form is the Nature of Actives: Therefore the Form of Actives is the Principle of Motion.

II. The most perfect State of an Active Nature is rather from the Nature itself than from an accident. To Act is the most perfect state of an Active Nature: Therefore it is rather from the Nature itself (or form) than from an accident. But without doubt we Act from Potency: Therefore Potency should be called Nature or Form rather than Accident.

III. A more excellent mode of acting is to be imputed to a more excellent Nature: The Soul is a more excellent Nature, and to act through an essential form or virtue is a more excellent Mode of acting than to act through an accident: Therefore to act through form is rather to be ascribed to the Soul than to act through an accident.

IV. A simpler mode of acting is to be ascribed to a simpler Nature: But the Soul is a simpler Nature, and to act through a formal Virtue is a simpler Mode of acting than to act through Essence and through accidents together: Therefore to act through a formal Virtue is rather to be ascribed to the Soul than to act through Essence and through Accidents. For it is done in vain through more, what can equally be done through fewer.

V. Rationality is the Form of the Soul: Rationality is the Potency or Virtue of Reasoning or Understanding: Therefore the Potency of Reasoning is the form of the Soul. The Major is proved from the common definition of Man: Man is a Rational Animal: Rational is the specifying difference of Man: The specifying difference is not an Accident, but the very form: And it is said to be Predicated in what essential Quality. And if the adversaries were speaking of such a Quality, which is not an Accident, but the very quiddity or substantial form, we would not dispute about the name.

Or the Best Definition of the Soul is through its operative Virtues or faculties: But the best Definition of the Soul is not through Accidents, but through the form or specific difference: Therefore the operative Powers are the Form. The Major is proved, because no clearer or better Definition of the Soul is given than that it is [a Spirit, endowed or informed with the faculty or Virtue of Vitally Acting, Understanding and Willing:] or, as Aristotle prefers, the Entelechy or act of an Organic Physical Body, by which we live, sense and understand. Therefore the Essence is

best defined through the Potency or Virtue to these acts: But it is not best defined through accidents.

The Soul is not at all known except through Acts: But according to the adversaries, not the Soul, but only its accidental qualities are known through these acts: Therefore according to them the Soul is not known at all.

VI. If the form of the Soul is the principal Cause of Vital-Action, Intellection and Volition, then something principally is in the form itself, whence it would be called such a Cause: And this will be either Potency-Virtue-Inclination, or something else. But something else cannot be given. Nor are the Accidents of the Soul more Active than the form of the Soul itself: Otherwise they would be more noble. But even the adversaries say that the form of the Soul is the principal Cause of these acts: namely as the Thomists say, the Remote Cause, but as Zebarella, the Proximate Cause: But if the Soul as Essence or form is no Potency, no Force or Virtue, no Inclination to these acts, how is it their principal Cause?

VII. If the faculties which they say are Accidents are effects of the Form, then nothing is in them except what is either formally or eminently in the Form: Because nothing gives what it does not have, either formally or eminently. But according to the adversaries, these faculties are effects of the form.

VIII. When the Form or Essence of the Soul is said to effect its accidental Potencies, either it does what it can do, or what it cannot: But the latter no one says: But if the former,

1. Either it can do this through some Potency prior to the effected Potency, or through the effected Potency: The latter will be said by no one: But if the former, either this prior Potency is the formal Virtue of the Soul itself, or an Accident. If the latter, the question will again recur concerning its causation, and so to infinity. But if the former, the point in question is had.

2. Also the Potency of the Soul of effecting this fictitious Accidental Potency is either single or threefold: And if the dissenters could explain to themselves how the Potency of effecting diverse Potencies is either single, or threefold, or both single and threefold in diverse respects, they could also respond to their own objections against us.

IX. These said accidental faculties are either separable from the Essence of the Soul (and from each other) or inseparable: The former is said by none of those who think otherwise. For if they were separated, either the Soul still remains Potent to these acts, (of Understanding, Willing, etc.) or to others, or to none. Not to none: for then the Soul would not be a Soul; but either passive Matter, or nothing. Not to others: For others are not given, or cannot be named by anyone. But if to these, the point in question is granted.

But if they are said to be inseparable, then those saying [that the Essence or form of the Soul by a necessary and perpetual emanation effects in itself inseparable faculties, Vitally Active,

Intellective, and Volitive] (unless they want the Soul to effect in itself another Soul,) say nearly the same thing which they seem to contradict.

X. In a matter so difficult we should not flee from the more known to the unknown; but should adhere to what is open, certain and simple, rather than to carry the whole matter into darkness. But these things are most certain; That the Soul is an essentially Active Nature; and is known to itself through its Acts; and that these Acts are no others (besides those of vegetation and sensation) than Vital, Intellective and Volitive: It is also certain that no other definition is given of the Soul than that which is respectively taken from these acts: And therefore the form of the Soul must be designated by us either as such a Virtue, or not at all. But those who cannot designate any, confirm the Brutists who think that there is no soul different from that of brutes: Although its operations, from which it can be defined, are clearly known to almost all. But when we come to the doctrine of the Accidents of Souls, what difficulties assail us? For who knows what are the real Accidents of Spirits? Whether the Essences themselves, just as they are multiplied through generation, (and the number of simple Essences is nothing really different from the Essences numbered:) so they can become greater, and receive an increase of the Essence itself? And whether a degree of Essence added to a degree should be called an Accident? While it is also doubted concerning material things, whether the extension or quantity of a Body is something real besides the thing quantified or extended: What wonder, if how greatly the Degrees, and Modes, and also the Acts, and Habits of Spirits differ from the Essence, the wisest of mortals can scarcely or not at all either demonstrate or clearly understand? Therefore we should not flee from certainties to these doubtful accidents.

I will now put forth the Arguments of Scotus and Ariminensis, with Zabarella's responses, and to them I will give brief Replies.

Scotus' 1st Arg. is: Of what the Definition is said, of the same is also said the name of the defined: But the definition of Active Potency is predicated of the Form: Therefore also the name. The Minor is proved from Aristotle's Def. 9. Met. ["Active Potency is the principle of transmuting another insofar as it is other:" But form is a principle of this kind: Therefore form is Active Potency.]

Zabar. responds that Aristotle there defines neither form alone, nor potency alone, but the whole conjunction: Or by [Principle] is signified only the Reason of acting.

Reply. Let whoever has leisure dispute about Aristotle's meaning and authority: But to speak of the thing itself, an Active Potency is rightly defined to be the Principle of an Action by which another is transmuted: And the same is the definition of form qua efficient Cause (not qua form). And who, speaking accurately, would call the aptitude of a Cause (which according to Zabar. is not the Cause itself) the Principle of transmuting another? An Affection or Mode of an Active Principle is not the Principle. At least it is easily proved that this Potency is truly a Cause.

Scotus' 2nd Arg. As Passive Potency is related to the patient, namely to prime Matter, so also Active Potency to the agent; namely to the form: But the passive Potency of Matter is Matter

itself: Therefore also Active Potency is the form itself. The Minor is proved. If the Potency of Matter were something diverse from the Nature of Matter, it would be an accident: Therefore some accident would be received in matter before the substantial form, which is absurd.

Zabar. responds that it is not absurd for Matter to have an indeterminate Accident, even if not a terminated one.

Reply. But every Accident is an Accident of a substance. And although for a second form, either a prior form or some disposition of the matter is necessary; it has not yet been proved that for the first form some accident of the Matter is required. And Aquinas indeed concedes that passive potency is the very substance of matter. An indeterminate accident is nothing.

3rd Arg. As a merely natural form is related to its operations, so also is the Soul to its own: But a merely natural form is the immediate principle of its operations without any Mediate potency: Therefore also the Soul. The Soul should not be of less perfection than an inanimate form: A substantial form is a Nature: Nature is the principle of motion: Heat (an accidental form) is the immediate Cause of heating, etc.

Zabar. responds by conceding that substantial and accidental forms are the immediate Causes of their operations; But neither acts without Potency as the Reason of acting or Aptitude: And he rejects Thomas who posits an intermediate cause of acting in substantial forms; but not in accidental ones, because they themselves are intermediate causes.

Reply. But Active-Potency which contains Force or Virtue and Inclination to act, sounds greater than Reason or Aptitude of acting: Namely, some, indeed proximate Cause of acting. From the very Force, Virtue, or active Potency Action comes to be: And the Potency Virtue itself has its own Aptitude or Reason of acting: Which, namely, if firm and strong, is apt; If infirm, inept. But an aptitude of an aptitude is not given: And while Zabarella asserts that the form of the soul is the immediate cause of operations, he truly concedes that it is the very Virtue of acting, while he seems to deny the same in terms.

4th Arg. Nature does nothing in vain: But the form itself suffices for acts: Therefore, etc.

Zabar. responds by Denying the minor, 1. Because the soul needs Corporeal instruments, without which it cannot operate. 2. Because it needs active Potency.

Reply. 1. The Soul separated from the Body can operate without corporeal instruments; otherwise it would be either dead matter or nothing. 2. The Soul in the Body does not use instruments properly so called, namely, efficient ones, in the work of Intellection and Volition, but only instruments presenting the object in a due manner: Which it needs, not insofar as it is an Intellectual Spirit, but insofar as it is a Soul united to a Body. 3. We confess that the Soul, to act rightly, needs rectitude or aptitude; but while you concede that it does not need some intermediate Cause, we conclude therefore that it does not need an intermediate Potency Virtue, which is a Cause.

5th Arg. An agent never acts on an extreme, without first acting on a medium, if it has a medium: And so if the Soul effects operations through mediate potencies, it is necessary that it act on the potencies themselves, which is absurd.

Zabar. responds that the Antecedent is true of Mediate Causes, but not of the aptitude of Causes: And that the soul indeed produces both potencies and operations, but does not act on them.

Reply. Indeed it is not aptly said that the Soul acts on its operations; but if its Potencies were Mediate Causes as the Thomists Want, why would it not be said to act first on the Mediate Cause, and through that on the remote object? And so it would act on the potency either without a potency, or through another potency? But your aptitude which is not a Cause leaves the point in question conceded to us, namely, that Every Virtue, faculty and Causal or Effective Potency is the very form or essence of the Soul: We do not contend about a potency or faculty not causing (which we hardly know). He who says a Knife cuts through sharpness, does not say it cuts through an Accident or accidental Quality; For sharpness is the form of the Knife: Yet one sharpness can be sharper than another; and so one form more excellent than another: And the same sharpness can become sharper: Yet it does not become more the form of the Knife, but a greater or rather better form; namely by the addition not of some heterogeneous accident, but of a more excellent degree of its Essence. But if you prefer to call this Degree an Essence or an Accident, while the matter is agreed, I do not much dispute about the name.

6th Arg. If potencies are diverse from the Essence of the soul, and emanate from it, then they depend on it as on a Cause: but not as matter, not as end, not as form, therefore as on an efficient: Therefore the soul immediately produces something, namely Potencies: And if through other potencies, we proceed to infinity.

Zabar. responds that through Emanation some effect can come from an agent immediately; and so potencies from the essence of the soul.

Reply. But the soul which effects those faculties does not effect that which it cannot effect; nor that for effecting which it has no Virtue. The emanation of Light from Solar Fire comes from the Potency and Virtue of shining. Nothing does through emanation that which it is not potent and apt to effect: Therefore, whether you want it or not, it must be conceded that some Potency and Virtue is the form of the soul itself, and not an accident.

(Natural things operate according to their essential form from their nature: artificial things, etc. Polanus Syntag. 1, 5. c. 15. p. 288.)

7th Arg. The Potency itself can produce an operation without another mediate potency: Therefore some agent can produce an act without a mediate potency.

Zab. responds by Conceding that the argument holds against those who say that the faculties are mediate Causes, which there is no need to reply to again.

8th Arg. The Soul does not require potencies distinct from itself, either on account of its perfection or its imperfection: Therefore not at all: Not on account of imperfection; because accidental forms which are more imperfect do not require potencies of this kind, e.g. Heat: Not on account of perfection, because substances separated from matter, and God, do not require them at all.

Zabar. responds that Potencies are necessary on account of the imperfection of souls: For forms separated from matter act through their Essence: Therefore in them both the potency and the operation itself are the same as the Essence: but material forms on account of their imperfection act through potencies distinct from the Essence, since they cannot act through the Essence: Therefore when they say, Therefore more ignoble forms act through mediate potencies, we concede all these things.

Reply. Here Zabarella seems to me to desert his whole Cause, unless he has denied the immortality of the soul. For who in their right mind can believe him, that the separated soul operates through its Essence, and its Potencies and operations are its very Essence; and yet in the same soul incorporated, the matter is entirely otherwise? Indeed the Soul in the body operates on the body, and in the state of conjunction, from the cooperation of the senses and spirits, Intellection, Volition and Execution sound as actions in a certain way composite, connoting namely the actions of the cooperants. But that it differs so much from itself in the separated state is entirely incredible. Nor is any reason given for such Imperfection; That now also it cannot act through its Essence: And that the potencies and operations of the soul itself are mere accidents in the state of incorporation, and yet the Essence itself in the separated state: This most clearly fictitious alteration will need proof. Indeed, whether a Soul operating with so great a difference of acting should be called truly the Same Soul? And whether it is not thus inferred that its Essence itself is changed, let the reader see. And while Zabarella here concedes that accidental potencies, e.g. Heat, require mediate potencies to act, he casts his Cause into great absurdities: For he cannot make known that Potency through which Heat heats, besides Heat itself, and besides the Active Potency, which in Fire is not subordinated to Heat but coordinated: Nor does Heat heat more through Active Potency than Active Potency acts through Heat. And I ask whether also this subordinate Potency through which Heat is imagined to heat operates through itself, or through yet another intermediate potency? And so to infinity. Therefore we must stop at some potency operating without a mediate potency.

Moreover, concerning these things it should be noted that through these two propositions Rada opens up the mind of Scotus:

1. "That Unitive containment is not of those things which are entirely one: Those which are the Same in all ways are not said to be United. The Same is not United to itself: Nor is it of those which remain distinct by the same distinction by which they were distinguished before: But of those which perhaps were really distinct, but united, are Really the same, but formally distinct. Of these, some are of the Nature and Essence of the continent itself; as Whiteness, Color, quality in Whiteness. Others are contained in something unitively as if posterior; because they

are as if passions of the continent itself, yet not other things: Thus One, True, Good are distinguished from Being, and from each other quidditatively and formally." Thus He wants the Soul to contain its powers: "Because those which are contained in something Unitively are not contained without Any distinction; nor those which are simply really distinct." He concludes therefore that this word 'Unitively' includes some distinction of the contents, which suffices for a Union which is repugnant to all composition and aggregation of distinct things.

2. He distinguishes "Potency as a Principle of operating (either Active or Passive) from Potency as it is distinguished from Act, (that is, to be in Potency is to be Possible, and to be in Act is to Exist.) This is called objective Potency."

But in truth the Animal Virtue is One Essentially, namely the Form or specifying Difference of the Soul; and when it is called Threefold formally, the sense is that a Threefold inadequate objective Concept is given of it, or the foundation in the object of a threefold inadequate formal concept. From the narrowness and imperfection of the Intellect, we cannot comprehend in one concept all that which in the object is one: Nevertheless, sometimes some Reason for the diversity of our subjective concept is supplied by the object: And so the distinction of certain Reasoned Reasons seems to William Chalmers the Scot, in Philosophical Disputations, to be the same with the Formal distinction of Scotus: for besides the Formal distinction he denies that any distinction of Reasoned Reason is given. And while the foundation of diverse concepts is acknowledged in the thing, they are scarcely distinguished from each other except in name, the Distinction of Reasoned Reason, and the Formal of Scotus, and the Virtual of the Nominalists.

And the whole difficulty arises from the abstruse nature of things (especially invisible things, and spirits) and Actions, and almost imperceptible to human intelligence, e.g. We clearly perceive that there is a threefold Influx of the Fiery (Solar) Nature; And therefore that it has a threefold Potency, namely Motive, Illuminative, Calefactive. We also clearly perceive from the effects that Motion, Light and Heat are not the same; And therefore that the Motive, Illuminative and Calefactive Force or Potency are not the same. But to perceive clearly what motive force is, what illuminative force, what calefactive force, and how the Force or Virtue of the agent passes into the effect, far surpasses the understanding of mortals (whatever is presumed by intellects ignorant of themselves). What is it that emanates or proceeds from the Virtue of the Agent to the patient? And to Motion, and Illumination, and Calefaction? Whether Substance or Accident? if Substance, whether Corporeal or Incorporeal? if Accident, namely Quality, What Real thing is signified by the name of Quality? For whoever will not acquiesce in mere names will obtain no rest of the Intellect through the name of Quality, inasmuch as it is of most uncertain signification. And just as it is plainly to be despaired of, concerning a satisfactory apprehension about the Quiddity of that Influx which passes from the Agent to the effect in the patient, so also concerning its subject in transit, if it is called a Quality or another Accident: For how a Substance (even spiritual) would operate on a distant thing through the Influx or attingency of Virtue, without the attingency of the Substance itself in which the Virtue immediately Efficient is, is almost impossible for the intellect: If that Virtue is an emanating substance, then the Efflux of Virtue is the Efflux of Substance: but if it is an Accident, separated from the subject, it perishes: But if it generates another univocal operative Accident, (e.g. in projecting a Stone) either in a

contiguous Body (namely either the Stone or the Air, or both), it generates that, or in a distant one. How it happens in a distant Body without the reception or causation of the medium, whatever William Chalmers the Scot and other Scotists say, still seems unintelligible to me: Unless we say that the Effect happens through Causation, which is nothing. But if it is first received in the Medium, and the influx of the first Cause operates through the Medium, then the Nature of the first agent seems to be communicated to the Medium; and the Medium effects only immediately through the received Force. But Rada (Vol. 1, Controversy 28, Article 2, p. 450, 451) and others say, That the Virtue is not communicated by the Agent to the Patient or Medium, or is there, but only there is terminated to the effect. But how is that terminated there, which is not there? They explain the matter through the Act of Willing; imagining that God effects merely by Willing: But 1. This does nothing to open up the Nature of Motion, Illumination and Calefaction; 2. To Will, without Acting for execution, is an Immanent act as to the Effect, and they do not prove that something effects that alone.

And just as the matter stands concerning the Nature of Solar or Fiery Virtue and Influx, so also in Souls concerning the Active, Intellective, and Volitive Virtue: That there is a Threefold Act, and therefore a Threefold Virtue we certainly understand: But what that Virtue is, and how it Acts, indeed what the Act itself is, we can scarcely or not at all describe: By a certain internal sense, or immediate perception, or (as some want, Intuitively) we perceive what it is to Understand, to Will, to Act almost as we perceive what it is to Taste, to Hear, to See, etc. But just as sensations, so also the Acts of the Soul, when they are perceived immediately by sensing in their own way, nevertheless not under second intellectual notions; nor can we define, or know through words, that which is known by experience and incomplexly.