Here, then, is the great law of his philosophy as to the Will: no volition has any moral value except as it is determined by a preceding moral principle or disposition—a moral spontaneity; and of course it is applicable to bad as well as good acts of choice. Let us then read the foregoing utterance in relation to bad acts of choice: This is the general notion, not that principles derive their badness from actions, but that actions derive their badness from the principles whence they proceed; and so that the act of choosing that which is bad is no further sinful than it proceeds from a bad principle, or sinful disposition of mind; which supposes that, therefore, it is not necessary that there should first be thought, reflection, and choice, before there can be any sinful disposition. If the choice be first, before the existence of a bad disposition of heart, what signifies that choice? Now, Edwards was maintaining against Taylor that Adam was created in righteousness, "with holy principles and dispositions." Whence, then, the sinful principle or disposition which determined the first sinful act of choice? And if there was none, what signified that choice? We answer: there was no preceding sinful disposition which determined it; but, alas, that unnecessary and avoidable act of choice, originated and determined by Adam's will, had a significance which is marked upon the everlasting ages!

CHAPTER III.

THE articles which we have published on the subject of the Freedom of the Will in its Theological Relations,¹ have encountered some criticism. Part of it is of so grave a character that we are under the necessity of replying. It is alleged that we are inculcating a "new theology," and that we are out of harmony with Calvin and the Calvinistic standards. We are sorry to be considered by any of our brethren as innovators in theology, for we profess to be genuine Calvinists and sincere adherents to the doctrines of the Westminster Confession; but we cannot say that we altogether regret the charge against us to the contrary, since it gives us the opportunity of still more fully vindicating the proposition with which we started—that the theory of Philosophical Necessity, as claimed by Edwards and the Determinist School to be one of universal and invariable application to all cases of moral agency, is out of accord with the Calvinistic system. We propose, in these remarks, in connection with notices of the special difficulties which have been urged against our views, to show that we have taught the old theology—that we have maintained precisely the doctrines held by Calvin, and made symbolic in the Confessions of the Calvinistic bodies. The assertion has been made by one of our respected critics that "the great theologian of the Reformation was as rigorous an advocate of De-

terminism as Edwards himself." We hope to be able to evince the great misapprehension of Calvin's views disclosed in this remark. We shall offer no apology for the fulness of our citations from his writings, since the specific nature of the allegation we are meeting demands that method of proof. To show that we are not departing from the tenets of the Reformer and the Reformed Churches, we must largely adduce their own testimony to the points under discussion.

1. It has been intimated that in affirming the power of otherwise determining, or liberty of contrary choice as to the alternatives of holiness and sin, for man in innocence, we have assigned it to him in his natural, fallen condition. There are two ways in which the attempt might be made to prove this allegation: either by showing that in what we have written we have consciously and intentionally asserted the possession of the liberty of contrary choice as to sin and holiness by the unregenerate sinner; or that such a position is, notwithstanding what we have designedly said to the contrary, logically deducible from our premises.

We may safely appeal to our former discussion for proof that we expressly and repeatedly denied that such a power is possessed by man in his unregenerate condition, in relation to spiritual and supernatural things. It did not belong to the scope of that discussion to treat the subject of the Will with professed reference to man's natural, fallen estate. Its very end was to show that the inability of the unregenerate sinner to choose holiness, and the moral necessity upon him to choose sin, being assumed, such could not have been his original condition, but must have been visited upon him as a penal infliction, in consequence of a decision for sin, which was unnecessitated and avoidable while yet he stood in innocence. And it was contended that, upon the supposition of such a decision by a will capable of determining itself in utramque partem, the complete bondage of the will under sin is a judicial result which was required by justice; but that any theory, which does not proceed upon that pre-supposition, furnishes an inadequate account of the freedom of the will, of the genesis of man's present sinful and miserable condition, and of the righteousness of his punishment. In short, without such a supposition, it cannot be shown how man determined himself to that fixed spontaneity, which now with inevitable certainty he expresses.

We take occasion now to indicate more explicitly our views as to the state of the Will in man's fallen and unregenerate condition.

We accept without qualification the teaching of Scripture, that the natural man is dead in trespasses and sins, and that before he can discharge a single spiritual function, he must be the subject of a miraculous and supernatural act, immediately performed by the Holy Ghost, by which he is made a spiritually living man. Believing, as Robert Hall says, that there are no degrees in death, we hold that the spiritually dead sinner is totally unable to do a spiritual act, or feel a spiritual emotion, or think a spiritual thought. This spiritual death extends to the whole man— to the understanding, the emotions, the conscience, and the will. There is no spiritual life in any of these faculties. The vases are still there,
though cracked; but the precious liquor has all leaked out—the wine of existence is gone. Now we hold this to have been the instantaneous and necessary effect of the first sin, provided that sin was not the result of a concreated necessity of nature, but of an unnecessitated and avoidable decision of the will. In the case of a probationer, such as Adam was, the first deliberate decision of the will in favor of the good, apart from express covenant stipulation to that effect, would not confirm the soul in holiness. The intrinsic consequence of that first determination in favor of righteousness would be to develop and strengthen the spiritual principle, but not to terminate the probation in an indefectible life. The habit of virtue would be to a certain extent consolidated, the character be advanced on the path of formation, but the contingency of fall would continue to throw its shadow before, and to warn the probationer against a failure to watch and pray. God did not tell Adam that on the first day he refrained from eating of the fruit of the tree of knowledge, he should surely be justified. It was for his gracious Maker to decide when the application of the test of character should issue in confirmation.

On the other hand, the first deliberate decision of the will in favor of evil would have the effect of at once confirming the soul in sin. This it would accomplish in two ways. In the first place, as life to the creature is the result of union and fellowship with God, and the very first sin would necessarily interrupt that communion, death must be the consequence. The soul cannot enjoy spiritual life which has broken its vital relation to him who is the only source from which it is derived. The connection is destroyed be-

between the stream and the fountain of its supply. In the second place, the first instance of transgression would bring down upon the soul the sentence of the broken law, that judicial curse of God which withdraws original righteousness, renders the acceptance of personal obedience hopeless, and shuts up the sinner, without the intervention of grace, to perpetual continuance in sin and the doom of eternal death. As "every sin deserveth God's wrath and curse," and all mankind, descending from Adam by ordinary generation, are, in consequence of their federal oneness with him as their representative, legally guilty of his first sin, they are born into the world with the same judicial consequences inflicted upon them for that sin as were entailed upon him. From birth, then, all men, without the interposition of recovering mercy, are under the moral necessity of sinning. In their federal head and representative they determined the complexion of their moral dispositions, and the necessity of expressing them by the spontaneous acts of the will. We have no hesitation in using the language of Edwards in relation to the fixed connection between a sinful nature and the acts of the will. We see no reason for softening the term necessity, which expresses the connection, into the term certainty. What is the relation of a spiritually dead soul to voluntary acts of sin but a necessary one, so far as its own intrinsic energies are concerned? Augustin and Calvin ordinarily use this expression, as the following examples, among others, will show:

"Hence in the view of our corrupt nature, Augustin hesitates not to call those sins natural, which necessarily reign in the flesh wherever the grace of God is wanting." 1

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1 Institutes, B. ii., c. i., 8 2.
“Therefore if the free will of God in doing good is not impeded because he necessarily must do good; if the Devil, who can do nothing but evil, nevertheless sins voluntarily; can it be said that man sins less voluntarily because he is under a necessity of sinning? This necessity is uniformly proclaimed by Augustin, who, even when pressed by the invidious cavil of Celestius, hesitated not to assert it in the following terms: ‘Man through liberty became a sinner, but corruption ensuing as the penalty has converted liberty into necessity.’ . . . The thing not obscurely expressed is, that he is under a necessity of sinning.’

We are even prepared to go further than some apologists of the doctrine of Determinism, and to assert that besides the inherent inability of the sinner, without regenerating grace, to perform spiritual acts, there is an external force, that is, an externally originated force, though internally applied, operating upon him which disables him spiritually. Principal Cunningham, after conceding some validity to the distinction between natural and moral ability, says:

“In accordance with these definitions and descriptions, it is contended that man may be said to have a natural ability, or to have no natural inability, to do what is spiritually good and acceptable to God, because there is no physical law, no superior controlling power, no external violence operating irrespectively of his own volition, that prevents him from doing it, or is the cause of his inability to do it,” etc.

Now, the illustrious author forgot that the judicial curse of God is a superior controlling power, an external force, which is a cause of the unregenerate sinner’s inability to do what is spiritually good, a force which deprives him of the ornament of original righteousness, and drinks up the fountains of spiritual life. The shadow of God’s frown strikes a death-chill into the seat of life, and incapacitates the surviving natural faculties for the accomplishment of spiritual ends; and this blighting and disabling influence is justly exerted upon the sinner, because when he had spiritual ability he recklessly and wilfully threw it away. He is a spiritual corpse because he committed spiritual suicide. Being dead, he can do nothing in the spiritual sphere to recover himself. He depends on the almighty power of Christ to infuse new life into his soul, and on the almighty voice of Christ to call him from the grave. He must be born again, or lie an abortion in the womb of death. He must be created anew in Christ Jesus, or remain forever in the category of spiritual nonentity.

It follows from what has been said as to the reign of spiritual death in every faculty of the unrenewed sinner’s soul, that he has no power of contrary choice as to the alternatives of sin and holiness. His will is spiritually dead, and can therefore exert no act of spiritual choice. The liberty of spontaneity remains—the sinner pleases to sin. But the liberty of deliberate election between the spiritually right and the spiritually wrong is clean gone. The Will is the willing slave of sin. It is under a bondage to sin which is all the more inviolable because it is the spontaneous choice of the soul. No slave is so bound as he who wills not to be free. As to this matter we tread exactly in the tracks of Luther, Calvin, and the whole body of the Reformed Church. We utterly deny to man in his natural, fallen condition the power of contrary choice as to spiritual things, the freedom to go in the way of holiness or the way of sin, which we ascribe to man in innocence. That

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1 Ibid., B. ii., c. iii., § 5.
2 Hist. Theology, Vol. i., p. 600.
sort of freedom was lost by the Fall, and it is the only sort of freedom which was so lost.

It has, however, been said that although we may not have consciously intended to affirm the possession of the power of contrary choice by man in his fallen and unregenerate condition, that position would logically result from the theory we maintained. In the absence of proof, we are at a loss to conceive how this can be established. We can perceive how upon the principles of the Determinist, the law which is applied to one case must be applied to all; we can see that, his philosophic hypothesis requiring the denial to man of the liberty of a self-determining will, or of contrary choice, on the ground of its impossibility, that liberty must be denied to man universally, in all circumstances and relations, whether naturally or spiritually considered, whether contemplated as unfallen or as fallen. But we attempted to establish no philosophical theory of universal and invariable applicability to men. If we had, as we explicitly contended that man in innocence had the power of contrary choice as to spiritual things, we must have acknowledged that the unregenerate sinner also possesses it. With Augustin, Calvin, and the Reformed Confessions, we ascribed the power of contrary choice to Adam in spiritual things, not in the sense of an essential and inalienable attribute of humanity, but as an accidental, separable, contingent quality. It was necessary, not to his make, but to his peculiar relation to God’s moral government as a non-elect probationer, who was under covenant arrangements which supposed his ability to stand and liability to fall. His possession of such a power we endeavored
to prove by the fundamental principles of our nature, by the testimony of Scripture, and by the common agreement of the Church in all ages. We have been charged with making the case of Adam peculiar and exceptional, so far as this matter is concerned, whereas what is true of Adam as to the will, it is contended on the other hand, must be true of the race. This is extraordinary. Surely there were some features in Adam’s case which were totally unlike those of his descendants. Was each one of them a federal head? Was each required to perform personal obedience as the condition of confirmation in holiness? Had Adam been justified, would not all his seed have been personally justified upon precisely the opposite principle to his? Would they not have been justified by a vicarious righteousness imputed to them? Was Adam elected to stand in holiness as were the elect angels, and as are some of his descendants through the mercy of God? And are we to blame for regarding him as also an exception in being endowed with the liberty of contrary choice in relation to sin and holiness? Holiness, to the extent in which it existed in him, was not an essential, it was an accidental and contingent, quality of Adam’s soul. That is proved by the fact that it was actually lost after being possessed, and that it may, through grace, be recovered. If so, Adam’s will must have been separably related to holiness. What is that but saying that he may have chosen to retain it or not? And what is that but saying that he had the power of contrary choice as to holiness and sin? The peculiarity of his position was that he was not confirmed while he was in innocence. His case was not like that of the non-
elect unregenerate sinner, nor that of the saint in Christ Jesus. If, therefore, his case was exceptional, it could not, to the extent of its having been so, be reduced to a general law of equal application to all human cases. Our principles, then, we claim, do not necessitate the logical inference that if Adam possessed the power of contrary choice in relation to spiritual things, it must, as to those things, be an essential property of the race.

Having thus concisely but explicitly shown the revolutionary change which the Fall occasioned in man’s spiritual condition, a change in which the power or liberty of deliberate election between the contrary alternatives of sin and holiness was completely lost, so that the Will by its own fatal choice is now under a bondage to evil from which only the Son of God by his grace can make it free, we deem it proper, in order to meet misconceptions and misrepresentations of our position, to repeat what we formerly said by way of caution with reference to the meaning of the terms power, or liberty, of contrary choice. We do not employ them as equivalent either to the terms liberty of indifference, or liberty of equilibrium, with which they ought not to be, but often are, confounded. For an exposition of the difference between them, we refer to Müller’s work on the Christian Doctrine of Sin.¹ What we mean is the power of choosing between contrary alternatives—the power of otherwise determining. It is the power or liberty of the will to incline to one or the other of two opposite directions, to elect one or the other of two opposite courses. This is the power of contrary choice which we ascribed to Adam in innocence, and which we utterly deny to his descendants, in relation to spiritual things, while in their unregenerate condition. There is a difference, which cannot be overlooked, between the liberty of spontaneity and the liberty of deliberate election between opposing alternatives. The former, we contend, was possessed by Adam not as a contingent quality attaching to him as an individual, but as a permanent attribute of the race. It consequently survived the storm of the Fall, which wrecked the accidental holy qualities of Adam, and remained an imperishable, because an essential, property of human nature. If the spontaneity of the will were lost, the will itself would cease to be. When, therefore, the unregenerate sinner commits sin, he acts spontaneously. No compulsory force is exerted upon his will which drives it against its spontaneity. It acts from the necessity of that spontaneity, but not from the necessity of compulsion. Spontaneous action and necessary action coincide in this case, precisely because the power of contrary choice—the liberty of deliberate election between the contrary alternatives of holiness and sin—is gone. The man goes only one way spontaneously, but he goes that way necessarily. He pleases to go that way, but he cannot please to go the opposite way. The liberty of spontaneity, then, existed in Adam in innocence, and it exists in man now. That sort of liberty was not lost.

But the liberty of deliberate election between sin and holiness is that liberty which Adam lost for himself and his posterity. No unregenerate sinner pos-

sesses it now in regard to spiritual things. It has vanished. We cannot here refrain from advertting to a consideration which, from a theological point of view, appears to us to be fatal to the theory of Determinism. The Church, following the plain teachings of Scripture, has always held that there was a *liberum arbitrium*, a certain free-will, which Adam possessed and which he lost when he lost himself. *Perdidit se et ipsum*. Now it is obvious that the liberty of spontaneity was not lost. It remains that the liberty of contrary choice was that which was originally enjoyed, and which was lost by the Fall. Principal Cunningham confessed his leanings to the doctrine of Philosophical Necessity, but in an elaborate discussion designed to prove the neutrality of the Calvinistic Formularies in relation to the controversy between Necessitarians and their opponents, strangely makes this strong statement:

"The practice of distinguishing, in the exposition of this subject, between the freedom of man's will in his unfallen and in his fallen condition, and indeed of viewing it distinctively with reference to the different stages or periods of his fourfold state—as unfallen, fallen, regenerate, or glorified—has prevailed in the Church in almost all ages. These views were fully brought out and applied by Augustin. They had a place in the speculations of the Schoolmen, as may be seen in Peter Lombard's Four Books of Sentences, and in the Commentaries upon it. They were embraced and promulgated by the whole body of the Reformers, both Lutheran and Calvinistic. They have a prominent place in the writings of the great systematic divines of the seventeenth century. They have a prominent place in the Westminster Confession—the ninth chapter, entitled 'Of Free Will,' being entirely devoted to the statement of them. And what is in some respects peculiarly interesting, the doctrine of the loss of man's free-will by the Fall, and of the servitude of the will of fallen man to sin because of depravity, was held by Bains, Jansenius, and Quesnel, and their followers—the best men and the best theologians the Church of Rome has ever produced."

This is true and well said, however inconsistent with Dr. Cunningham's leanings to Philosophical Necessity. Now we ask, What free will did man lose by the Fall? Edwards and the Determinist school maintain that the sort of free will, if any, which man now possesses he always possessed—possessed before the Fall; and that the sort of free will which he now has not, he never did have—did not have before the Fall. He has lost no free will which he once had. That is clearly their doctrine, as might be evinced by an appeal to their writings, did our space permit. Spontaneity is the only species of liberty they allow, and that, according to their own teaching, is not lost. What freedom of the will, then, was lost? None, according to the Determinist theory. But the Scriptures and the Church alike teach that there was a free will which was lost by the Fall. There is only one other kind—the liberty of deliberate election between opposite alternatives, or of otherwise determining. That, therefore, was the liberty which was lost; and, consequently, it was originally possessed. We call attention to this point as at once establishing our position, that Adam possessed the power of contrary choice, and proving the inconsistency of the Determinist doctrine with the teachings of Scripture and the consent of the Church.

Our statement would not be complete did we not add, that although the power of contrary choice in relation to spiritual things has been entirely lost, so

that the unregenerate man is altogether destitute of it, it still remains in regard to things natural and civil, and, in a certain degree, to things merely moral. The power to stand or not to stand, to walk or not to walk, and the like; the power to yield or not to yield obedience to civil requirements and the power, to some extent, to indulge or not to indulge certain immoral tendencies, to cultivate or not to cultivate certain merely moral habits: this power, in the natural and civil and merely moral sphere, cannot, we believe, be denied to man. Now this power, in the sphere designated, the Determinist denies to man. The sweep of his theory includes every possible case and relation of human agency. It excludes the possibility of the liberty of otherwise determining. It denominates it an absurdity and a contradiction. Intrinsically, it is an impossibility.

When a man stands, he cannot do otherwise; when he walks, he must walk; when he yields obedience to civil government, he cannot decline to obey; when he swears, or drinks intemperately, he cannot, even in the early stages of the habit, refrain; when, like Socrates, he cultivates patience, or, like Scipio, continence, or, like Cato, truth, he acts necessarily, he could not do otherwise. He acts spontaneously in all these respects, but at the same time he acts necessarily—he could not otherwise determine. He has no power of contrary choice. The theory denies this power to man in every condition—to man as man; to man unfallen, fallen and unregenerate, regenerate, and glorified. We deny it to man as unregenerate, and with the further limitation—in relation to spiritual things. We also deny it to glorified saints, since they are de-

terminated by grace to holiness without any admixture of sin. In a word, the Determinist makes man as to his essence incapable of it as involving an impossibility; we represent it as a contingent power which may exist in some instances of human agency and not in others.

It is not our purpose to discuss these questions upon their merits, but, having stated our doctrine, to vindicate it against the allegation that it is out of harmony with the teachings of Calvin and of the Calvinistic standards. We design to show that the contrary is true, and that the position of the Determinist school, and not ours, is subject to the charge of being uncalvinistic. We do not concur with those who hold that the doctrines of Calvinism are not exclusive of the theory of philosophical necessity, as one of invariable and universal applicability to man; but shall endeavor to prove that both Calvin and the great Calvinistic symbols definitely take a side in this controversy, and that the side implicitly, if not explicitly, opposed to Determinism. We have given the writings of Calvin a patient investigation in regard to this question, holding ourselves free to be impressed by the evidence we should encounter, whatever it might be, and we have risen from the search with the clear conviction that he held the views which we have expressed. We shall attempt, by quotations from his works, *usque ad nauseam*, to prove that he maintained the following positions: that the present necessity of sinning, which holds the will in utter bondage to spiritual evil, is grounded not in nature, not in man's original constitution as imperfect and defective, but in the corruption of nature flowing from the un-
necessitated and unavoidable decision of the will of Adam as the representative of the race in his first sin; that Adam possessed the liberty of contrary choice, or of otherwise determining, as to sin and holiness; that the present servitude of the will, if it could not thus be accounted for, could not be adjusted to our fundamental conceptions of the justice of God; that it is the penal result of a sin which man originally had the ability to avoid; and that men now possess the power of contrary choice in the sphere of things external and civil. If we can succeed in this endeavor, we shall have refuted the assertion that "the great theologian of the Reformation was as rigorous a Determinist as Edwards," and evinced the contrariety of his doctrines to that of Philosophical Necessity. We proceed to cite the words of Calvin:

"Many persons are surprised that Moses simply, and as if abruptly, relates that men have fallen by the impulse of Satan into eternal destruction, and yet never by a single word explains how the tempter himself had revolted from God. And hence it has arisen, that fanatical men have dreamed that Satan was created evil and wicked as he is here described. But the revolt of Satan is proved by other passages of Scripture; and it is an impious madness to ascribe to God the creation of any evil and corrupt nature; for when he had completed the world, he himself gave this testimony to all his works, that they were 'very good.' Therefore, without controversy, we must conclude that the principle of evil with which Satan was endowed was not from nature, but from defection; because he had departed from God, the fountain of justice and of all rectitude. But Moses here passes over Satan's fall, because his object is briefly to narrate the corruption of human nature; to teach us that Adam was not created to those multiplied miseries under which all his posterity suffer; but that he fell into them by his own fault. In reflecting on the number and nature of those evils to which they are obnoxious, men will often be unable to restrain themselves from raging and murmuring against God, whom they rashly censure for the just punishment of their

sin. These are their well known complaints, that God has acted more mercifully to swine and dogs than to them. Whence is this, but that they do not refer the miserable and ruined state, under which we languish, to the sin of Adam, as they ought? But what is far worse, they fling back upon God the charge of being the cause of all the inward vices of the mind, ... as if the whole perverseness of our disposition had not been adventitious (accidentalis)."}

1 "I therefore readily subscribe to the exclamation of Augustin, 'O wretched free-will, which, while yet entire, had so little stability.'" 2

"Fanatics torture this word evil, as if God were the author of evil, that is, of sin; but it is obvious how ridiculously they abuse this passage of the Prophet ... We ought not to reject the ordinary distinction, that God is the author of the evil of punishment, but not of the evil of guilt." 3

"But the only good ground which the Manichees have, viz., that it were impious to ascribe the creation of anything bad to a good God, militates in no degree against the orthodox faith, since it is not admitted that there is anything naturally bad throughout the universe; the depravity and wickedness, whether of man or of the Devil, and the sins thence resulting, being not from nature, but from the corruption of nature; nor at first did anything whatever exist that did not exhibit some manifestation of the divine wisdom and justice." 4

"At present, however, we confine ourselves to a consideration of our nature in its original integrity. And, certainly, before we descend to the miserable condition into which man has fallen, it is of importance to consider what he was at first. For there is need of caution, lest we attend only to the natural ills of man, and thereby seem to ascribe them to the Author of nature; impiety deeming it a sufficient defence if it can pretend that everything vicious in it proceeded in some sense from God, and not hesitating, when accused, to plead against God, and throw the blame of its guilt upon him. Those who would be thought to speak more reverently of the Deity catch at an excuse for their depravity from nature, not considering that they also, though more obscurely, bring a charge against God, on whom the dishonor would fall if anything vicious

1 Com. on Genesis, ch. III., Calv. Soc. Trans. 2 Ibid., ch. III., v. 6. 3 Com. on Isaiah, ch. XLV., 7. 4 Institutes, I. I., c. XIV., 3

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were proved to exist in nature. Seeing therefore that the flesh is continually on the alert for subterfuges, by which it imagines it can remove the blame of its own wickedness from itself to some other quarter, we must diligently guard against this depraved procedure, and accordingly treat of the calamity of the human race in such a way as may cut off every evasion, and vindicate the justice of God against all who would impugn it."

"Paul never could have said that all are 'by nature the children of wrath,' if they had not been cursed from the womb. And it is obvious, that the nature there referred to is not nature such as God created, but as vitiated in Adam; for it would have been most incongruous to make God the author of death. Adam therefore, when he corrupted himself, transmitted the contagion to all his posterity."

"The blame of our ruin rests with our carnality, not with God, its only cause being our degeneracy from our original condition. And let no one here clamor that God might have provided better for our safety by preventing Adam's fall. This objection, which from the daring presumption implied in it is odious to every pious mind, relates to the mystery of predestination, which will afterwards be considered in its own place. Meanwhile let us remember that our ruin is attributable to our own depravity, that we may not insinuate a charge against God himself, the author of nature. It is true that nature has received a mortal wound; but there is a great difference between a wound inflicted from without, and one inherent in our first condition. It is plain that this wound was inflicted by sin; and therefore we have no ground of complaint except against ourselves. This is carefully taught in Scripture. For the Preacher says, 'Lo, this only have I found, that God made man upright; but they have sought out many inventions.' Since man by the kindness of God was made upright, but by his own infatuation fell away into vanity, his destruction is obviously attributable only to himself.

"We say then that man is corrupted by a natural viciousness, but not by one which proceeded from nature."

"If any one will dispute with God, and endeavor to evade his judgment, by pretending that he [the sinner] could not have done otherwise, the answer already given is sufficient, that it is owing not to creation, but the corruption of nature, that man has become the slave of sin, and can will nothing but evil. For whence that impotence of which the wicked so readily avail themselves as an excuse, but just because Adam voluntarily subjected himself to the tyranny of the Devil? Hence the corruption, by which we are held bound as with chains, originated in the first man's revolt from his Maker."

"But if the inquiry be as to the first man, he, when he was created in integrity, fell of his own accord; and thence it came to pass that by his own proper fault he brought destruction upon himself and his seed. Now although Adam fell and ruined himself and his posterity not without the knowledge, and so not without the ordination of God, nevertheless that by no means either lightens his fault, or implicates God in his crime. For this is always to be considered, that of his own accord he stripped himself of the rectitude which he had received from God, of his own accord devoted himself to the bondage of sin and Satan, of his own accord rushed headlong to destruction. It is pleaded as an excuse for him, that his fall was decreed by God, and was therefore unavoidable by him. But voluntary transgression is sufficient and more than sufficient to ground guilt. Nor indeed is the secret purpose of God a proper and genuine cause of sin, but the free will of man. . . . When man discovers that the cause of his sin is within himself, what boots it for him to fetch a circuit and seek for it in heaven? The blame is obviously his own, inasmuch as he willed to sin. . . . The reason why God knowingly and willingly permitted man to fall by his own agency may be hidden from us, but it cannot have originated in injustice. This indeed must be held without controversy, that sin has always been hateful to him . . . Although I say that he ordained it [the Fall], I cannot concede that he was in a proper sense the author of it."

"Piggin thus proceeds: 'If the apostasy of man is the work of God, the deliverance of Scripture is false, that all things which God made are good.' But I can righteousl testify and frankly profess, that such a figment never entered into my mind. I everywhere assert that the nature of man was at first created in rectitude, so that the corruption, which he contracted for himself by his defection, was . . .

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1 *Institutes*, B. I., c. XV., § 1.
tion, could not be attributed to God; that the death, to which he, who had been competent to attain to life, had enslaved himself, was so induced by his own fault, that God cannot be regarded as its author. If I had ever said that it came to pass through the impulse of the Divine Spirit, that the first man alienated himself from God, and did not everywhere contend that he was impelled by the instigation of the Devil and the proper motion of his own heart, I might perhaps deserve to be insulted by Pighius."

"But what says Origen? [quoted by Pighius in his discussion of free will.] He pronounces those to be heretics who take away free will (liberum arbitrium) from man. If he speaks of the primeval condition of nature, he brings forward nothing which we ourselves cannot profess. If he makes no distinction between nature in its corruption and in its integrity, there is no pious man who will not affirm that he confounds the fundamental elements of the faith. . . . All the passages quoted by Pighius treat of man such as he was formed by the hand of God. As to the question, what he was after his fall and defection, they are altogether silent. . . . We, indeed, estimate man [in the discussion of the bondage of the will not from the point of view of his creation by God, but from that of the corruption which he contracted by his own proper fault.]"

"When he would bring forward Tertullian, it is with the preliminary statement that his opinion concerning the freedom of the will is so clear that he who cannot see it must close his ears and eyes to the truth. But what is the sum of the testimony he adduces, except that man was created by God free (liberum) and having power over himself (suae potestatis)? He is disputing against Marcion, whose opinion concerning the nature of man, as it is reproachful to God, so it is impious and profane. For he did not hold that man is evil by his own fault, but assigned the cause of his wickedness to God as the author of nature."

"Nor should Irenæus be heard, if, in opposition to the unanimous consent of the Church, he makes no distinction between nature corrupted and nature in its integrity: but if he only describes man as he was before the Fall, it makes nothing against us, who refer the bondage of the will not to God, but to the fault of man."

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1 Ibid., p. 268.  
3 Ibid., p. 134.  
4 Ibid., p. 134.
to sin. But Calvin affirms again and again that the necessity of sinning flows from nature as corrupted by man's free action, and not from nature as created by the hand of God. If so, there was, before the act which originated the corruption, no necessity of sinning; indeed, as he says, the first sin was avoidable. This is so obvious that it need not be pressed. In this respect, therefore, we have followed precisely in the steps of the Reformer. Now let us compare with this clear doctrine of Calvin, that man's first sin did not necessarily originate from his natural make and constitution, the position of President Edwards, that without a hindering intervention on God's part, Adam's nature could not but certainly and infallibly lead to sin. We will give the great metaphysician's own statement of the case:

"Yea, if it be supposed that good or evil dispositions are implanted in the hearts of men by nature itself (which, it is certain, is vulgarly supposed in innumerable cases,) yet it is not commonly supposed that men are worthy of no praise or dispraise for such dispositions, although what is natural is undoubtedly necessary."  

"If by the author of sin is meant the permitter, or not a hinderer of sin, and at the same time a disposer of the state of events in such a manner for wise, holy, and most excellent ends and purposes, that sin, if it be permitted, or not hindered, will most certainly and infallibly follow—I say, if this be all that is meant by being the author of sin, I do not deny that God is the author of sin. . . And I do not deny that God's being thus the author of sin follows from what I have laid down."  

"Thus it is certain and demonstrable, from the Holy Scriptures as well as from the nature of things, and the principles of Arminians, that God permits sin, and at the same time, so orders things, in his providence, that it certainly and infallibly will come to pass, in consequence of his permission."  

"It was meet, if sin did come into existence, and appear in the  

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1 Inquiry, etc., Pt. IV., § 4.  
2 Ibid., Pt. IV., § 9.  
3 Ibid., Pt. IV., § 9.

world, it should arise from the imperfection which properly belongs to a creature as such, and should appear so to do, that it might not appear to be from God as the efficient or fountain. But this could not have been if man had been made at first with sin in his heart, nor unless the abiding principle and habit of sin were first introduced by an evil act of the creature. If sin had not arose from the imperfection of the creature, it would not have been so visible that it did not arise from God, as the positive cause and real source of it."  

Let us look on this picture and then on that, and say whether they are the same. If so, contradictories may meet and kiss each other. Edwards says that sin resulted from the imperfect make of man's original nature; Calvin says that sin did not result from man's original nature. Edwards says that sin was rendered morally necessary by man's original nature; Calvin says that the moral necessity of sinning was not from man's original nature, but is now from his corrupt nature. So far the evidence does not sustain the proposition, that the great theologian of the Reformation was as rigorous a Determinist as Edwards himself, or that we have taught a new theology out of harmony with that of Calvin.

But it may be urged that Calvin and the Determinists agree that man at the first sinned spontaneously, and that they both hold that spontaneity is not inconsistent with necessity. To show, consequently, that Calvin maintained that Adam sinned voluntarily and spontaneously, is not to prove that he held that Adam did not sin by necessity. We proceed to adduce a class of passages which will effectually destroy this supposition, and show that the Reformer taught that Adam sinned by an election of his will which
might have been otherwise; in other words, that Adam, besides spontaneity, had also the power of contrary choice, in relation to the opposite alternatives of sin and holiness. It will also be seen that the free will which Calvin ascribed to man in innocence, denied to fallen and unregenerate men as to spiritual things, and affirmed of men now as to natural things, is precisely that sort of free will which Edwards and the Determinist school pronounce impossible, contradictory, and absurd.

"We must now examine the will, on which the question of freedom principally turns, the power of choice belonging to it, rather than to the intellect." 1

"Thus the will (free will, if you choose to call it so,) which is left to man, is, as he in another place describes it, a will which can neither be turned to God, nor continue in God, unless by grace; a will which, whatever its ability may be, derives all that ability from grace." 2

We have cited these passages to show that Calvin did not recognize the Determinist distinction between the freedom of the will and the freedom of the man, but in opposition to it, affirmed the residence of freedom in the will; and further, that as to the question under consideration, the ability of the man is exactly the ability of the will. In these respects, we have maintained the position of the Reformer in rejecting that of the Determinist. The free agency of the man is nothing different from the freedom of his will.

1"It is proper to observe how these four things differ from each other: the will (voluntas) as free (libera), or bound (serva), or spontaneous (spontanea), or forced (coacta). . . . Freedom (libertas) and bondage (servitus) are irreconcilable, so that he who would

affirm the one must deny the other. Hence, if the will of man is bound (serva), it cannot without impropriety be said to be free (libera) . . . Where there is bondage (servitus) there is necessity . . . . Now you perceive that spontaneous (spontaneum) and necessary (necessarium) can consist at one and the same time." 1

Here free will is palpably distinguished from spontaneity, and whereas spontaneity is affirmed to be consistent with necessity and necessity with bondage, and therefore spontaneity and bondage may consist; freedom (libertas) is declared to be inconsistent with bondage, and, therefore, with necessity. If, then, Calvin predicates free will of man in innocence, and of natural, fallen man as to natural things, he does not mean the liberty of spontaneity which consists with necessity, but the liberty of deliberate election between contrary alternatives which is inconsistent with necessity. He clearly affirms that unregenerate men act spontaneously, when they sin necessarily. He as clearly denies that they have freedom of the will as to spiritual things. Spontaneity and free will are, therefore, by him contradistinguished to each other. Now the only kind of freedom which the Determinists allow to man, under any circumstances, is spontaneity. If, then, Calvin concedes a sort of freedom, which is not spontaneity, to man under certain circumstances, he holds a view diametrically opposed to the fundamental tenet of Determinism. Let us interrogate him on the point.

"The holy man [Irenæus] loudly protests, that man was not evil by nature, that is, by the creative act of God, but was made in the possession of free will (liberi arbitrii), and received a soul capable of good and evil. Since it is evident that he treats of the first estate of man while he was yet in his integrity, how does that

1De Servit. et Liberal. Hum. Arbit., ut sup., p. 133.
make against us, who place the bondage of the will only in the corruption and depravation of nature? In a certain place Irenæus says among other things: Corn and chaff received their nature from their make; but man was reasonable and in this respect like God, since he was made free in his will (liber in arbitrio) and master of himself (suae potestatis); and he was a cause to himself (ipsum sibi causam esse), so that at one time he might be corn, but at another chaff. Wherefore, says he, he is the subject of just condemnation. We [Calvin] affirm that this happened to us all, through the fall of our first parent, and in this we have the consent of the whole Church."

"He [Pighius] quotes two passages from Basil, the former of which contains nothing else than a description of human nature, such as it was created by God, in order that men may be prevented from transferring the blame of their evils to God. At first, therefore, he denies that sin was innate (innatum, that is, concretum,) in the substance of man, but happened (acciisse) to him by his own fault; which we [Calvin] not only confess, but diligently maintain. Afterwards, he says that virtue is voluntary and not from necessity; but that free will (liberum arbitrium) belongs to us. Here Pighius shouts, as if the victory were won. But I [Calvin] deny that these words are to be understood of our present condition, but only show how man was made at his first origin. In express terms he explains what man was at his creation: he does not mention the corruption which ensued upon the Fall; but when he wishes to assign the cause of wickedness, he thus speaks: 'Whence is man evil? From his own proper will. Whence the Devil evil? From the same cause. For he likewise had a free life in himself, and a free will (liberum arbitrium) situated in him either of remaining with God, or of being estranged from him.'

"But that I may keep silence, it is sufficiently clear that the nature of the soul is considered in its integrity, as ought to be done when definitions are furnished."

"I deny that all those deliver a clear and established doctrine concerning free will (de libero arbitrio), who do not at the same time add what has perished of this liberty (libertate) through Adam's fall, and what believers may recover through regenerating grace."

"They [Irenæus and Tertullian] therefore teach that man was created free (liberum): we [Calvin] do not deny that; but we affirm that he fell into slavery, because he degenerated from his first estate."

"Pighius lays down the proposition, that man was made in the possession of free will (liberi arbitrii). We [Calvin] assent (unminus); nor have we waited until he should demand this assent, but have always avowed it."

"Pighius subjoins a definition of sin there laid down (in a passage cited from Augustin): 'That there is a will (voluntas) to retain or pursue what justice forbids, and thence it is a matter of choice to abstain (liberum est abstinere); although if there be no freedom (si liberum non est) neither is there will (voluntas). And according to the testimony of the author himself, who certainly had the right to interpret what he said, this definition is not adapted to any other than the first sin of Adam; because, through his fall at first from the Lord we have been plunged into a miserable bondage. Hence infer with what face Pighius, with tragic outcries, taunts me with this passage. But Augustin says that 'the thing is familiar to all, that no one is worthy of blame or punishment who fails to do that which he could not do.' At the same time he testifies that he is a perverse interpreter of his words who would apply this to all sins; that he indeed was not able to determine otherwise than that man could not be justly condemned, except he had sinned with a free will (libera voluntate); but that now a part of the condemnation is that bondage under which we are held captive in mind and will, until we are liberated by the gratuitous kindness of Christ.'"

"We see here that a profane philosopher [Aristotle] confesses, 'that it is not always in the power of man to be good; yea, that he can be nothing but evil; and yet what he is, he is through the will (voluntate) and not by violence; because in the first instance a free election (libera electio) was in his own power (penes ipsum), by which he delivered himself to the service and bondage of lust.' And indeed this is the proper philosophy of Christians, that our first parent at the same time corrupted not only himself but all his posterity, and that thence we derive the habilitus which is rooted in our nature."

"Augustin says: 'The first man had not that grace which prevented him from willing to be evil, but he had grace, which, if he

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1Ibid., p. 134. 2Ibid., p. 135. 3Ibid., p. 135.
had willed to abide in it, would have prevented him, and without which even with free will (libero arbitrio) he could not have been good; but nevertheless through free will it was in his power to abandon it. . . . Nor was the power of free will a small one, since he was so assisted, that without that aid, he would not abide in the good; but that assistance he might relinquish, if he so willed. . . . Why then is Pighius angry with me, if I avail myself of the patronage of Augustin, which he so liberally offers me? 1

"We assert that the human race, having lost the liberty (libertate) which it had received at creation, fell into miserable bondage. In this condition of bondage, we deny that man is endued with the free (libera) power of choosing as well good as evil, so that he can apply himself to whichever alternative he pleases (ad utrumlibet)." 2

"He [Augustin, whom Calvin quotes with approbation] says: 'Free will (voluntas libera) with which he was created, was given to the first man without any sin, and he reduced it into bondage to sin; but our will when it was the slave of sin, was liberated by him who said: If the Son shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed.' 3

"Finally, I not less calmly than cheerfully acquiesce in this opinion of Augustin: 'That God, who created all things good, and knew that it more pertained to his almighty goodness to bring good even out of evils, than not to permit evils to exist, so ordered the life of angels and men that he might show in it, first, what their free will (liberum arbitrium) could do, then, what the kindness of his grace and the sentence of his justice could do.' 4

"Adam, therefore, might have stood if he chose, since it was only by his own will that he fell; but it was because his will was pliable in either direction (in utramque partem flexibilis), and he had not received constancy to persevere, that he so easily fell. Still he had a free choice (libera electio) of good and evil; and not only so, but in the mind and will there was the highest rectitude, and all the organic parts were duly framed to obedience, until man corrupted his good properties and destroyed himself. Hence the great darkness of philosophers, who have looked for a complete building in a ruin, and fit arrangement in disorder. The principle they set out with was, that man could not be a rational animal un-

1Ibid., pp. 159, 160. 2Ibid., p. 161. 3Ibid., p. 176.
4Consensus Genev., Niemeyer, p. 269.

less he had a free choice (libera electio) of good and evil. They also imagined that the distinction between virtue and vice was destroyed, if man did not of his own counsel arrange his life. So far well, had there been no change in man. . . . At present it is necessary only to remember that man at his first creation was very different (longe alium) from all his posterity. . . . At first there was soundness of mind and freedom of will (voluntas libera) to choose (ad eligendum) the good." 5

"We grant that, as man was originally constituted, he could incline to either side (poterit ad alterum partem inclinare), but since he has taught us by his example how miserable a thing free will (liberum arbitrium) is, if God works not in us to will and to do, of what use to us were grace imparted in such scanty measure?" 6

These passages clearly prove that Calvin affirmed for man in innocence the power of contrary choice—the liberty of inclining to either of opposing alternatives. He plainly—in terminis—declares that, although Adam freely elected to sin, he might have done otherwise—he might have elected to stand. If this be Determinism, white is black, or we are dazed. And if we are out of harmony with Calvin in holding that Adam had the power of contrary choice, we have not been able to follow a guide in a broad road at noon-day. The truth is, we derived our doctrine from him, in great measure, and have faithfully stuck to him until this hour. But, copious as our citations have been, we have not finished. We would sooner part with most things than our good Calvinistic name, and must exhaust the means we have of protecting it. We propose to show, by further testimony, that to the only freedom of will which Determinists allow Calvin was unwilling to concede the title; that he threw contempt upon the liberty of spontaneity, and sharply distinguished it from free-

1Institutes, B. I., c. XV., § 8. 2Ibid., B. II., c. III., § 10.
Ch. III.] The Will in Innocence and in Sin.

"I would call it free (liberum), if the term could be accepted among us as synonymous with spontaneous (spontaneo)."

"Let us define necessity. Piglius will not concede to me that it is a fixed and established stability, where a thing cannot be otherwise than it is... Since he [God] continues stable, he is in some sense a necessity to himself—-is not forced from without; nor does he even force himself, but spontaneously and voluntarily inclines to that which he does by necessity."

This last passage, especially, brings out the ordinary doctrine of Calvin, that spontaneous voluntary action may consist with necessity. He never opposes spontaneity to moral necessity. He only opposes it to co-action or compulsion—a force acting against the will. He explicitly distinguishes freedom of will (libertas voluntatis) from this spontaneity (spontaneitas). He is unwilling to grant that the latter is any freedom of the will, in a proper sense. The specific difference between them, which he designates, is that spontaneity may consist with necessity, while freedom of the will cannot. Now as he constantly attributed freedom of will (libertas voluntatis), in his definite sense of it, to Adam, he affirmed for him, while in innocence, that exemption from necessity which is its differentiating property. He was free (liber) in the sense that he could choose either holiness or sin. He had the power of deliberate election between conflicting alternatives, not merely spontaneous dispositions. In a word, he had, according to Calvin, the power of contrary choice.

On the other hand, the Determinist denies to Adam the power of contrary choice (Calvin’s libertas voluntatis). The only form of action which he concedes to him is that of spontaneity—of doing as he pleased;

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1 Ibid., B. II., c. II., § 7.  2 Ibid., B. II., c. II., § 26.
5 De Servit. et Liberat. Hum. Arbit., p. 149.  6 Ibid., p. 152.
and he maintains that it was of necessity that he pleased to sin. This, we urge, rejects the difference as to freedom of will between Adam and his natural, fallen descendants, which is asserted not only by Calvin, but by the unbroken consensus of the Church. For if unregenerate men have the sort of liberty which Adam had, they are not different, but alike. No freedom of the will was lost, for there is none other, according to the Determinist, but that of spontaneity, and that is now possessed—a liberty inconsistent only with coaction, but not with necessity. What then, we ask, was lost?

If the answer to this demand be returned, that the spontaneous love of holiness was lost, and nothing remains but the spontaneous love of sin—the only answer possible, so far as we can conceive—we rejoin:

1. According to the Determinist, spontaneity and necessity always coexist. He who acts spontaneously acts necessarily. But if Adam, according to the supposed concession, had the spontaneous love of holiness, he was under the necessity of choosing holiness; otherwise his spontaneity, as motive, would not have controlled his volition. But he did not—he chose sin. He was then both necessarily and contingently related to holiness; which is a contradiction.

2. If he chose to sin—and he did—then, as his sin, according to the Determinist, was a necessity, since he could not have done otherwise, he was actuated by two necessary influences of contradictory character—the spontaneity leading to holiness and the spontaneity leading to sin. He was, therefore, necessarily determined to holiness and necessarily determined to sin; which is a contradiction.

3. If, to meet the difficulty, it be said, that Adam, like the regenerate man, had a twofold spontaneity—one leading to holiness and the other to sin, we reply: (1) That the contradiction already emphasized emerges, namely, that as according to the Determinist, spontaneity and necessity imply each other, Adam would have been necessarily determined to holiness and sin at the same time. (2) That such a dual spontaneity must either have been concreated with Adam or not. If it was concreated with him, it is admitted that God was the efficient producer of a spontaneity necessarily issuing in sin; which is monstrous. If it was not concreated with Adam, it was the product of his own agency, and then two difficulties emerge: First, that the will would have produced a spontaneity, which is contradictory to the position of the Determinist; for he makes motives efficiently control the acts of the will. Now he contends that the motives spring from the spontaneity of the soul. Consequently, the spontaneity efficiently controls the acts of the will. But according to the supposition in hand, the sinful spontaneity of Adam, as not concreated with him, must have been produced by an act of his will. What, then, efficiently controlled this act of the will? Nothing. The supposed act is, therefore, itself nothing; since it is an effect without a cause. And so the supposition is destroyed by the logic of Determinism. And yet, as we have before shown, this is the way in which President Edwards accounts for the introduction of the first sinful principle into a nature previously holy; that is, a way which absolutely contradicts his fundamental law, that the will cannot determine the principles of the
soul, but is determined by them, and derives from them all the significance of its acts! This is, to us, something truly wonderful. It shows to what expediency a great intellect was reduced in the impracticable attempt to adjust the philosophy of Determinism to the critical, regulative, far-reaching case of the first human sin—the peccatum originale originans. It could not have been produced except by a preceding principle of sin; it preceded and produced that principle! It is caused by a sinful principle; it causes the same sinful principle! It is cause and effect at the same time. Secondly, if a two-fold spontaneity—holy and sinful, was not concreated with Adam, it follows that a holy spontaneity which was concreated with him necessarily led to the production of a sinful spontaneity, which is an absurdity of absurdities, upon the Determinist scheme itself; or that the sinful spontaneity was produced by an arbitrary act of the will, which is equally absurd, upon that scheme. (3) The supposition of a dual spontaneity would suppose a schism in the moral nature of Adam, a fissure in his soul between two conflicting and irreconcilable principles, and that is an hypothesis which finds no countenance either in the teachings of Calvin or the consensus of the Church. It is the spawn of Manichaeism. (4) The hypothesis of a two-fold spontaneity would be tantamount to that of contrary choice, which is rejected by the Determinist; for a holy spontaneity would incline the will in one direction, and a sinful in the opposite. The only difficulty would be that, on the principles of the Determinist, one set of motives would effectually neutralize the other, and the will would stand stock still, like the ass between two bundles of hay. (5) If the supposition of a dual spontaneity, holy and sinful, be discarded, a return must be made to a single one; and as the pious Determinist himself does not hold that a sinful one was created by God, the history of man must have begun with a holy spontaneity. Now, however feeble it may at first have been, yet as it exclusively occupied the territory of the soul, it must, upon the principles of Determinism, have controlled the will; and it seems impossible to show how, upon those principles, it could have been lost.

These considerations appear to us to prove conclusively that the attempt to bring the doctrine of the Determinist into harmony with that of Calvin, in regard to the sort of freedom which was lost by the Fall, breaks down; namely, by the supposition that both teach the loss simply of spontaneous holiness. For, in the first place, as we have shown, this supposition is, upon his own principles, incompetent to the Determinist. In the second place, he denies the existence of such a thing as freedom of the will, as internal to man—as a part of his subjectivity; whereas Calvin affirms it, and designates that as the freedom which was lost by the Fall. In the third place, Calvin maintained, what the Determinist cannot consistently do, the loss of a holy spontaneity by the Fall; and accounts for it on the ground of the possession by a mutable will of the power of election, by which it might determine to abide in holiness, or fall away into sin: a power of contrary choice which the Determinist utterly denies, and which, in relation to the contrasts of sin and holiness, is precisely that freedom of the will (liberum arbitrium) which was
lost by the Fall, and the loss of which has reduced man to the moral necessity of choosing only one alternative—the fatal one of sin. So far from having been as rigorous a Determinist as Jonathan Edwards, in regard to man in innocence, Calvin taught that in that estate he possessed a freedom of will other than that of spontaneity, and inconsistent with necessity; that is, the liberty of contrary choice, which the Determinist wholly denies. And in affirming that power in Adam, we, therefore, have trod in his footsteps. We have not, in this respect, maintained a theory which, as has been alleged, "is perfectly irreconcilable with his views."

We pass on now to show by quotations from his works, that Calvin held the view for which we have contended, and for which we have been criticised, that the present disabled condition of man, in which his will is in complete bondage to sin, is to be accounted for on the ground of its being penal and not original.

"Thus they (philosophers) always presuppose in man a reason by which he is able to guide himself aright. From this method of teaching we are forced somewhat to dissent. For philosophers being unacquainted with the corruption of nature, which is the punishment of revolt (dejectionis peena), erroneously confound two states of man, which are very different from each other."  

"For, when it is said that the sin of Adam has made us obnoxious to the justice [rather judgment; Latin: judicio, French: jugement] of God, the meaning is not that we who are in ourselves innocent and blameless are bearing his guilt, but that since by his transgression we are all placed under the curse (maledictione), he is said to have brought us under obligation.

"For since he [Augustin] had said, 'that no ground of blameworthiness (culpæ rationem) could be discovered, where nature or

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1 De Servil. et Liberat. Hum. Arbit., p. 151
2 Comm. on Ephesians, II. 3.
terminist, and that we have faithfully stated his doctrine.

In proof of the generally admitted fact, that Calvin, like Luther and Melanchthon, held that man has free will—not merely spontaneity, but the liberty of contrary choice—in relation to things external, civil, and merely moral, we must content ourselves with producing a single but explicit utterance: "He (Pighius) says, that we had recanted half of our doctrine, because we attributed to man free will (liberum arbitrium) in things external and in civil business (in rebus externis et civilibus negotiis)."

Here the distinction is drawn between things natural and things spiritual. What he absolutely denies in regard to the latter, he allows in respect to the former, namely, the power of otherwise determining or of electing between opposite alternatives. We have adduced abundant evidence from his writings to show that Calvin by free will (liberum arbitrium or libertas voluntatis) did not mean spontaneity. He admits a spontaneous power of the will in the unregenerate, and denies to them freedom of will in the proper sense. In asserting, therefore, the existence in unregenerate men of freedom of will quoad naturalia, he must have designated a different freedom from that which he allows to them, and the same with that which he refuses to them, quoad spiritualia. What could that be but the liberty of election between contrary courses?

The point to which we here invoke attention is, that as Calvin affirmed for man the liberty of contrary choice in relation to some things, viz., things external and civil, he maintained a doctrine which is diametrically opposed to the position of the Determinist, that the liberty of contrary choice is impossible to men in relation to any things; and further, that as he asserted the existence of that power in man now, he did not consider it as a peculiar property of Adam. And so there is no support in his doctrine for the view, that Adam's case was so entirely removed from the field of our consciousness and observation that we are debarred from considering it as in relation to the question of the will. But here is a case which falls under the scope of present consciousness and observation; and we submit that the judgment of Calvin, as well as of the Reformers in general, was that this case exhibits the possession by man, under limitations, of the power of contrary choice. The truth is, that it is this power in the natural sphere which conditions, in great measure, the possibility of merely moral culture, and the penal inflictions of human government. The evidence from this particular quarter, then, fails to sustain the allegation that Calvin was a Determinist, and that we have taught doctrine inconsistent with his views.

The only consideration which seems to mar the completeness of the evidence which has been adduced as to Calvin's doctrine of the will, is that he lends an apparent countenance to the Determinist tenet, that the volitions are efficiently controlled, in the last analysis, by the dictates of the understanding—the same substantially with the lubentia rationalis view of Turretin and others. In regard to this, we would observe:

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1 Augsburg Conf., Art. XVIII., Corp. et Syntag. Confessionum.
1. That if Calvin did maintain that view, it was inconsistent with the great volume of his teaching in relation to the will. It would be a special hypothesis which could not be adjusted to the catholic genius of his views. We should, therefore, feel warranted in rejecting the special tenet, and accepting the bulk of his teaching, as representative of his true position.

2. That we have not discovered the terms, *lubentia rationalis*, nor any reference to the doctrine signified by them, in his treatise on Predestination, or in his discussion of the Bondage of the Will. If in the Institutes he alluded to the thing, although he did not use the name, it was done exceptionally and slightly. But—

3. We are decidedly of the opinion, after carefully looking into the matter, that Calvin, in the passage in the Institutes in which he mentions the regulative influence of the intellect upon the will, did not have his eye upon the question of the psychological relation between the two faculties—the only one peculiarly considered by the Determinists—but spoke of the legal relation between them. The question before his mind was not, *Is* the will, in its acts, efficiently controlled by the representations of the intelligence? But it was, *Ought* the will, in its acts, to be governed by the judgments of the intellect? The case, we are satisfied, which Calvin was enforcing was this: the intellect gives the law of truth, as the conscience furnishes the law of duty. And as the will is under obligation to conform to the standard of morality erected in the moral nature, it is also bound to adjust itself to the standard of truth in the intellectual. This was the relation between the faculties instituted at creation, and so long as man stood in innocence, the will freely obeyed the law of truth in the intelligence and the law of duty in the conscience. And so ought it to be now, although it is vastly different. But if the psychological question had been propounded to Calvin, *Is* every act of the will, in fact, necessarily controlled by a dictate of the understanding? he must to have been logically consistent with himself, have returned the answer, that the first sin of man disproved such an hypothesis; for the first volition to sin could not have been efficiently caused by a holy judgment, and all the judgments of the intellect were, in man's primitive condition, conformed to the law of truth.

We close our citations from Calvin's works, in regard to the particular point before us, with a passage which is simply extraordinary, in view of the attempt to quadrat his doctrine of the will with that of Philosophical Necessity as held by President Edwards. It exhibits a radical difference, touching the very nature of the inquiry as to the freedom of the will, between these illustrious men. Let us hear from Edwards his statement of the case:

"The plain and obvious meaning of the word freedom and liberty, in common speech, is power, opportunity, or advantage, that any one has, to do as he pleases. Or, in other words, his being free from hinderance or impediment in the way of doing or conducting, in any respect as he wills. And the contrary to liberty, whatever name we call that by, is a person's being hindered or unable to conduct as he will, or being necessitated to do otherwise... To talk of liberty, or the contrary, as belonging to the very will itself, is not to speak good sense, if we judge of sense and nonsense by the original and proper sense of words. There are two things that are contrary to this which is called liberty in common speech.
One is constraint: the same is otherwise called force, compulsion, and coercion, which is a person's being necessitated to do a thing contrary to his will. The other is restraint, which is his being hindered, and not having power to do according to his will... Let a person come by his volition or choice how he will, yet, if he is able, and there is nothing in the way to hinder his pursuing and executing his will, the man is fully and perfectly free, according to the primary and common notion of freedom."

Here with the formality of definition Edwards limits freedom to the unforced and unimpeded execution, in the external sphere, of our internal resolutions—the unhindered outward expression of our inward spontaneity. Now let Calvin state his view of the case:

"The power of the human will is not to be estimated by the event, as some unskilful persons are absurdly wont to do. They think it an elegant and ingenious proof of the bondage of the human will, that even the greatest monarchs are sometimes thwarted in their wishes. But the ability of which we speak must be considered as within the man, not measured by outward success. In discussing the subject of free will, the question is not, whether external obstacles will permit a man to execute what he has internally resolved, but whether in any matter whatever he has a free power of judging and of willing. If men possess both of these, Attillis Regulus, shut up in a barrel studded with sharp nails, will have a will no less free than Augustus Caesar ruling with imperial sway over a large portion of the globe." 1

Is it not manifest that the identification of Calvin's doctrine of the Will with the Determinism of Edwards cannot be effected? These two definitive statements of the very question at issue are as contradictory as are the members of the proposition: A is Not—A. Either freedom is outward or inward. A middle supposition is excluded. We must make our election between

...the two contradictories. We go with Calvin; and we have gone with him all along.

We have admitted, in this discussion, that the only form of liberty allowed by Determinists is spontaneity. We speak here of the current doctrine of Calvinistic writers who in the main avow Determinist principles, who accept the doctrine of Philosophical Necessity with certain modifications of their own. Among these modifications is the view that he who has spontaneity has liberty. They do not disjoin free action and spontaneous action. On the contrary, they identify them. But such was not the unmodified position of the modern eoryphaeus of that school. Edwards did not consider spontaneity, unimpeded subjective action, as freedom. He limited freedom to the external sphere, the unforced or unhindered carrying into outward action of necessary volitions. This is the only liberty he assigns to man. If that was Calvin's doctrine, outward and inward are the same. Our brother who alleges that Calvin was as rigorous a Determinist as Edwards, and that our views cannot be reconciled with those of the Reformer, says: "The definition of freedom is ever before us in the plain proposition, that the person in question may act as he pleases." That is exactly the position of Edwards, but it is also exactly the opposite of Calvin's. We are content to leave it to the judgment of the candid reader to determine whether Calvin and Edwards can be reconciled, and whether in differing from the latter we have not maintained the ground of the former.

The second branch of the allegation we are considering is, that in affirming the liberty of contrary

1 Inquiry, etc., Pt. I., Sec. V. 2 Institutes, B. II., c. IV., § 8.
choice or of otherwise determining, for man in innocence, we have made an attempt to rehabilitate the Arminian theory of the Will, and have inculcated a new theology which is in conflict with the articles of our faith as set forth in our standards. We regret that the room left us will allow only a brief answer to this allegation. We proceed to interrogate the standards which are distinctively Calvinistic with reference to the points in which it is charged that we depart from them. Those, the testimony of which we shall bring forward, are, the Gallic, the Scotch, and the Second Helvetic Confessions, the Canons of the Synod of Dort, the *Formula Consensus Helvetica*, and the Westminster Confession. They will be admitted to be Calvinistic formularies.

Gallic Confession: "We believe that man, created in purity and integrity, and conformed to the image of God, fell away from the grace which he had received by his own fault (sua ipsius culpa) ... Likewise although he be endued with a will which is moved to this or that (ad hoc vel illud), nevertheless, since it is entirely captive under sin, he has absolutely no liberty to seek good, except as he may receive it from grace and by the gift of God."\(^1\)

Here we notice: 1. That it is affirmed that man, who had no imperfection in his natural make which could lead to sin, fell by his own fault. He could not, therefore, have sinned by a necessity of nature, as the Determinist maintains, and a necessity operating through a natural imperfection, as Edwards contends. He was by his natural furniture qualified to stand, and the inference is, that he might have stood if he had so willed; an inference which the Determinist utterly denies. 2. This passage intimates that a will which may incline in different directions, which was originally possessed by man, is yet possessed by him, but only as to things which are not good, in the sense of spiritual and saving. This cannot be reconciled to the Determinist view.

Scotch Confession: "We confess and acknowledge that this our Lord God created man, that is to say, our first parent Adam, in his image and likeness; to whom he gave wisdom, dominion, righteousness, free will (*liberum arbitrium*) and a clear knowledge of himself; so that in the whole nature of man no imperfection could be marked."

"We confess that the cause of good works is not our free will (*liberum arbitrium*), but the Spirit of our Lord Jesus."\(^1\)

Here we see that the free will which man received from God at creation he lost by the Fall, in relation to good works. This is opposed to the Determinist position, which, first, denies that man can possess, under any circumstances, a free will (*liberum arbitrium*), for it pronounces freedom of the will an absurdity; and, secondly, denies that man ever lost that which he could never have possessed.

Second Helvetic Confession: "We teach upon this subject, which has always produced many conflicts in the Church, that the condition or state of man must be considered in a threefold manner: In the first place, what (*qualis*—what sort of being) man was before the Fall, without doubt upright and free (*liber*), who both had power to remain in the good, and decline to the evil (*qui et in bono manere et ad malum potuerit declinare*); but he declined to the evil, and involved in sin and death both himself and the whole race of mortals, as has before been said. In the next place, it is to be considered what man was after the Fall. His intellect was not taken away from man, his will was not torn away from him, nor was he entirely changed into a stone or stock; but they were so altered and impaired in man, that they cannot any more do what they were able to do before the Fall. The intellect indeed is ob-

\(^1\) Niemeyer, *Coll.*, p. 332.

scurred, but the will (voluntas) from having been free (ex libera) is made the servant of sin. For it serves sin not unwillingly, but willingly (non nolens, sed volens); for, indeed, it is said to be will (voluntas, willingness) not unwillingness (non voluntas, not will). Therefore in regard to evil or sin, man was not forced (coactus) either by God, or by the Devil, but did evil of his own accord (sua sponte); and in this respect it is the product of a will most free (in hac parte liberrimi est arbitrii)." 1

The third aspect of the subject relates to the regenerated condition of man, with which the present question is not directly concerned. This testimony is clear touching the possession by man in innocence of the power of contrary choice, of otherwise determining. He could have stood in the good, says this venerable standard; he could not have so stood, says the Determinist; for he did sin spontaneously, and his spontaneous action was necessary. We have adhered to the doctrine of this grand old formulary, which is not only thoroughly Calvinistic, but thoroughly Presbyterian.

We come now to the Canons of the Synod of Dort:

"Man in the beginning was created after the image of God with a true and salutary knowledge of his Creator and of spiritual things in his mind, and was adorned with righteousness in his will and heart (voluntate et corde) and with purity in all his affections, and so was holy in all his faculties (totus sanctus); but by the instigation of the Devil and his own free will (libera sua voluntate) he severed himself from God, and stripped himself of those excellent gifts."

In the Rejection of Errors, appended to the chapter from which the preceding extract is taken, the venerable Synod, among other errors, "rejects that of those"—

1 Ibid., p. 479.

CH. III. The Will in Innocence and in Sin.

"Who teach: 'That spiritual gifts, or good habits, and virtues, such as goodness, holiness, righteousness, could not have had a place in the will of man when he was first created, and hence were not separated from it at the Fall.' For this conflicts with the description of the image of God which the Apostle furnishes, Eph. iv. 24, where he represents it as consisting of righteousness and holiness, which certainly have a place in the will." 1

Here this great Synod of Calvinistic divines affirms that man, at creation, had an ample furniture of gifts to enable him to meet the requirements of his probation. He was lacking in no part: he was totus sanctus. It is true that he was defective in the sense that he was not confirmed in holiness by the determining grace of God, as we have before indicated; there was an intrinsic mutability in his will, as we shall see that the Westminster Confession specifies; but he had a sufficient supply of gifts and strength from grace to enable him to resist the tendency to evil which might arise out of this mutability of will and to overcome it. The difference between this view and that of the Determinist is, that in the one case no necessity of sinning is affirmed as springing from this defect, but, on the contrary, it is maintained that the mutable will might have chosen to stand in holiness; while in the other it is contended that, without the determining intervention of grace, the imperfection of man's constitution led of necessity, led unavoidably, "certainly, infallibly," to sin. It ought, moreover, to be noticed that the Synod makes the will itself a seat of spiritual gifts and a holy habitus, and clearly implies that, when spiritual life was lost by the Fall, sinful dispositions inhered in the will.

1 Ibid., pp. 708, 709.
This is contrary to the regulative view of Determinism, that the will is the mere servitor and instrument of the other faculties, the dispositions of which lie back of it and efficiently control its acts. And if it be said that the will, in the nomenclature of the Synod, included the emotions, the answer is obvious: 1. That if that be so, the emotions are not represented as being, exclusively of the will, the subject of regulative dispositions; 2. That the language of the Synod explicitly distinguishes the heart (cors) from the will (voluntas), and consequently it could not have employed the term "will" generically, as synonymous with "active powers."

We cite next the *Formula Consensus Helvetica*:

"As 'known unto God are all his works from the beginning of the world,' so in time, of his infinite power, wisdom, and goodness, he created man, the glory and crown of his works, after his image, and consequently upright, wise, and just; subjected him, when created, to a covenant of works, and freely promised him his fellowship, friendship, and life in it, if he should conduct himself obediently to his will. Moreover, that promise annexed to the covenant of works was not merely the continuation of earthly life and happiness, but chiefly the possession of life eternal and heavenly, that is, in heaven, if he should run a course of perfect obedience, a life to be passed, with unutterable joy, in communion with God, as well in the body as in the soul. . . . None of us assent to the opinion of those who deny that the reward of celestial blessedness was proposed to Adam in the event of his obeying God."

We have here a glowing description of those glorious qualities with which man was magnificently endowed at creation, which makes it impossible to suppose that he had not power to stand in the service of his God. And yet this view, which we have also steadily maintained, is what the Determinist denies. He affirms that the sin of Adam was unavoidable. What contradictionaries could be more pronounced? Let it be noticed, also, how plainly the *Formula Consensus* intimates that Adam might have obeyed the Covenant of Works, and secured eternal life and bliss, which of course the Determinist refuses to admit, at least must logically refuse to admit. This perspicuous formulary unquestionably sustains our view—which we have proved to have been that of Calvin—that Adam had the ability to stand, although he was liable to fall; and that, as he might have stood, he possessed the power to have determined otherwise than he did, when he decided for sin.

We tire of adducing testimony which shows redundantly, that the *Consensus* of the Reformed Church is in the teeth of the Determinist philosophy, in its application to that sin from the womb of which all other sins are born, which deluged the earth with woes, and opened the gates of hell for myriads of our race. But the allegation, that we are out of harmony with our own formularies, must be met; and we conclude the appeal to symbolic authority with the testimony of the Westminster Standards:

"After God had made all other creatures, he created man male and female, with reasonable and immortal souls, enwined with knowledge, righteousness, and true holiness, after his own image, having the law of God written in their hearts, and power to fulfill it; and yet under a possibility of transgressing, being left to the liberty of their own will, which was subject unto change. Beside this law written in their hearts, they received a command not to eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evil; which while they kept they were happy in their communion with God and had dominion over the creatures."


\[2\] *Conf. of Faith*, C. IV., § 2.
The Will in its Theological Relations. [Pt. I.

“Having the law of God written in their hearts, and power to fulfill it.”

“Man in his state of innocency had freedom and power to will and to do that which is good and well-pleasing to God; but yet mutably, so that he might fall from it.”

“Man, by his fall into a state of sin and death, hath wholly lost all ability of will to any spiritual good accompanying salvation.”

“Our first parents, being left to the freedom of their own will, fell from the estate wherein they were created, by sinning against God.”

“God gave to Adam a law, as a covenant of works, by which he bound him and all his posterity to personal, entire, exact, and perpetual obedience; promised life upon the fulfilling, and threatened death upon the breach of it; and ended him with power and ability to keep it.”

It has been not unfrequently said that the Westminster Standards are neutral in regard to the question between Supralapsarians and Sublapsarians, and in relation to the controversy about Philosophical Necessity. We are not now directly concerned about the former of these affirmations, although indirectly we are; for we are thoroughly satisfied of the correctness of Sir James Mackintosh’s opinion, that no Calvinistic Determinist can logically refuse to be a Supralapsarian; and the brother whose criticisms we are now considering is, we think, an instance of its truth. He supports his Determinism against theological objections, grounded in the Sublapsarian view, by boldly appealing to Supralapsarian principles. We admire his consistency, if we cannot his doctrine. He does not, as some others, avow a Sublapsarian theology and a Determinist philosophy, between which there is as much harmony as between Joab and Amasa.

We take issue, however, very distinctly with the assertion of the neutrality of the Calvinistic symbols in general, or of the Westminster Standards in particular, in relation to the Determinist controversy. Principal Cunningham has an elaborate discussion to prove this thesis. If we had room we would like to subject his argument to a searching examination, but we have not; and must restrict what we have to say further to a few concise comments on the passages cited from the Westminster Standards, in which, we are confident, their inconsistency with the principles of Determinism, so far as the question of the will is concerned, will be made to appear.

In the first place, these standards unmistakably declare that man at first had freedom of the will; that our first parents were left to the liberty or freedom of their own will; and that the will of man is endowed with a natural liberty. Here it is plainly asserted that freedom or liberty is a property of the will. Now the Determinist flatly denies this. He contends that freedom is a property of the man, and not of the will. The man is a free agent, but the will is not free. Edwards ridicules the notion that the will can be free. Are we dreaming when we say that these views are palpably opposed to each other? Are is and is not the same thing? Is an affirmative proposition neutral in relation to its negative?

In the second place, the standards affirm that man in innocency had freedom to will and to do, etc. They assert the freedom of the man both in willing and in doing. Now the Determinist affirms that free-

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1 Larg. Cat., Ques. 17. 2 Conf. of Faith, C. IX., §§ 2, 3.
4 Conf. of Faith, C. XIX., § 1.
dom or liberty consists only in doing as one has willed, not in willing and doing. We have already cited the definition of Edwards and the admission of our critic to prove this. Here, then, we have again two affirmations that are utterly opposed to each other.

In the third place, the standards expressly declare that man at first had power to fulfil or keep the law of God. The Determinist denies that he had such power. For if he had, he might have kept the law and been justified. But he was under a necessity of sinning resulting from the fixed operation of God's fore-ordaining purpose through the imperfection of his make. Man therefore could not have had a power to fulfil the law which might have defeated God's purpose. Now then we have the propositions before us: Man had power to keep the law; man had not power to keep the law. Can the former of these be neutral to the latter? Or can they agree? Only when est and non est can be reconciled or be neutral towards each other.

In the fourth place, the standards employ the terms liberty of the will, power of the will, ability of the will, interchangeably. They evidently make no difference between them. But Determinists insist on a difference between ability and liberty. We encounter then another contradiction.

In the fifth place, the standards assert, as to man in innocence, that there was a possibility of transgressing, thus implicitly affirming that there was a possibility of not transgressing. The Determinist asserts that there was a necessity of transgressing. Here is another contradiction. The Determinist affirms the impossibility of not transgressing, which adds still another contradiction to the growing catalogue.

In the sixth place, the standards evidently represent the will, in consequence of its mutability—its liability to change, as the seat of the cause which produced the first sin. The Determinist denies this, but lodges the mutability primarily in the nature, extraneously to the will. The will must be held to be the mere instrument used by the other faculties; hence the origin of the first sin must have lain back of the will. In this we descry another contradiction. In fact, the standards take the common sense ground that the nature of the soul must include the spontaneous disposition of the will, while the consistent Determinist represents it as excluding that disposition. The will is no sharer of the nature; it is extra-natural, and the mere hand of the nature! We can see how the nature lies back of and influences the decisions or acts of the will—the volitions; but then the nature includes the habitus of the will itself. This is the view taken by the standards and rejected by consistent Determinists.

In the seventh place, there is an irreconcilable difference between the doctrine of our standards and that of Determinism, as expounded by President Edwards, in regard to the question whether man, in innocence, possessed the power of otherwise determining than he actually did, that is, the power of contrary choice in relation to the alternatives of holiness and sin. We need not state particularly the Determinist position on this question. It is familiar to all that it wholly denies the possibility of such a power. Edwards pronounces it absurd. Adam who did
actually choose sin could not have chosen not to sin. His sin was unavoidable, as the result of a philosophical necessity operating through his spontaneity upon his will. This we have denied, and for doing so are criticised as being in opposition to our standards. Now let us collect the statements which bear upon the point: Man was made in the image of God, endued with knowledge, righteousness, and true holiness, had the law of God written on his heart and power to fulfil it. So says the Confession in one place. In another it declares that God endued man with power and ability to keep the law. He had "the law of God written on" his "heart, and power to fulfil it." So says the Larger Catechism. Again, the Confession says that man had freedom and power to will and to do that which is good and well-pleasing to God; and further, that he hath wholly lost all ability of will to any spiritual good. Man had power to fulfil the law; power and ability to keep it; freedom and power to will and to do what was right; and ability of will to spiritual good—for if he has lost that ability, he must have had it to lose. Here, then is power, ability, freedom—more, ability, and freedom of will, to choose holiness. He who can deny that the standards affirm that man had that power and freedom, can deny the plainest statements. But on the other hand, it is a fact that man did choose sin. How can the fact be accounted for? The standards say that being left to the freedom of his will, he fell; that his power to fulfil, to keep, the law was possessed under a possibility of his transgressing, because he was left to the liberty of his own will, which was subject to change; that he had freedom and power to will and to do what was right, mutably, so that he might fall from it. He might stand, yet he might fall; he might will and do right, yet he might will and do wrong; he might choose holiness, yet he might choose sin. When then he did sin, might he not have done otherwise? If so, although the terms power of contrary choice are not used—and we care for the thing, not the words—the power itself is so plainly asserted that he who runs may read. To sum up the matter: the standards say that Adam in innocence had the power of otherwise determining than he did; the Determinist says that he had not that power. The two doctrines are contradictory and mutually exclusive. We must make our election; and as, when we found Calvin and Edwards opposed to each other, we went with Calvin, so now we go with the Calvinistic standards rather than with the Deterministic philosophy. The difficulty is not that we have departed from Calvin and the Calvinistic formularies, but that we have too faithfully employed their doctrine in regard to the determining effect of man's first unnecessitated decision of the will for sin upon human guilt and corruption—a doctrine which dissipates the metaphysical speculations of Determinism as the rising sun dispels a morning mist.

We close with two brief but striking testimonies from illustrious Calvinists, whose shoes we would have been willing to bear. The first is from Dr. John Witherspoon, a successor of the great Edwards in the presidential chair at Princeton:

"It is remarkable that the advocates for necessity have adopted a distinction made use of for other purposes, and forced it into their
service: I mean moral and natural necessity—they say natural or physical necessity takes away liberty, but moral necessity does not—at the same time they explain moral necessity so as to make it truly physical or natural. That is physical necessity which is the invincible effect of the law of nature, and it is neither less natural nor less unsurmountable if it is from the laws of spirit, than it would be if it were from the laws of matter."!

The other testimony is from Dr. Thornwell, whose admiration for Calvin amounted to a passion, and who made the Institutes his text-book of theological instruction.

"The theory of Edwards breaks down. (1) It does not explain guilt; it does not rid God [of the charge] of being the author of sin. (2) It does not explain the moral value attached to character. (3) This theory explains self-expression, but not self-determination. Now a just view must show how we first determine, and then habitually express ourselves. In these determinations is found the moral significance of these expressions. Otherwise my nature would be no more than the nature of a plant. . . . The province of the will [in man's state of innocence] was to determine, that is, to root and ground these principles as a fixed nature. There was power to do so. When so determined, a holy necessity would have risen as the perfection of our being. There was also the possibility of determining otherwise—a power of perverting our nature, of determining it in another direction. . . . In the moral sphere, and especially in relation to single acts, this freedom is now seen in man."2

We are not a Libertarian, nor do we pretend to erect a philosophy of the will. No Necessitarian affirms more positively than we do the dreadful fact of the necessity which holds the will of the unregenerate man in chains of bondage to sin. But we protest against the employment of this fact as a basis for a tremendous philosophical generalization under which all the other facts of man's moral history—the fact of the first human sin and the fact of man's present agency in the merely natural sphere—are to be reduced. The scheme of Philosophical Necessity, especially in the hands of Edwards, is an instance of brilliant thinking, and owed its religious application to a laudable intention; but the Calvinistic Theology, grounding itself in the sure Word of prophecy, may well say to the advocates of that system, Non tali auxilio nec defensoribus istis!

We think we can, without arrogance, claim that we have proved: that Calvin was not "as rigorous an advocate of Determinism as Edwards himself;" that we have closely adhered to his doctrine of the will; that, in the views we have maintained, we have not contravened, but represented, the great Calvinistic symbols, and that consequently, we have not inculcated "a new theology."

1 Works, Vol. IV., Lecture on Divinity, XIII., p. 89.